1Êù IS7K�ÅIIµ

Õ1�ÅÚ���Å

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�ùSN

3. Õ1�Å

3.1 A�¯¢

3.2 �ŤÏ

3.3 1Aé

3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

4. ���Å

4.1 A�¯¢

4.2 �����.

4.3 uÐ¥I[ÅÖ¯K

4.4 �c��¥ÅÖ�Å

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3. Õ1�Å 3.1 A�¯¢

Õ1�Å�7K�¥zµ1800–2010

Source: Reinhart(2018), International Financial Crises, Lecture slides on Nobel Symposium “Money and Banking”.

Note: Reinhart and Rogoff(2008 and 2009); introspective index of capital mobility index of capital mobility based on Obstfeld

and Taylor(2004) updated and backcast to 1800-1859. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Trebesch(2017) trace a very similar capital

mobility index over 1815-2016 based on international bond issues and cross-border capital flows.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 3 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.1 A�¯¢

Õ1�Å�/n©Ùµ1970–2017

Source: Laeven and Valencia(2018).

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3. Õ1�Å 3.1 A�¯¢

I[UÂ\©|�Õ1�Å©Ù

Source: Laeven and Valencia(2018).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 5 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.1 A�¯¢

Õ1�Å�®Ç�ÅÚ���Å��S'X

Source: Laeven and Valencia(2018).

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3. Õ1�Å 3.1 A�¯¢

Õ1�Å�¤�

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 7 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.1 A�¯¢

Õ1�Å�¤�£Y¤

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3. Õ1�Å 3.2 �ŤÏ

Õ1�Å�¤Ï

Summers(2000):

Leo Tolstoy famously observed that “every happy family is the same. Every

unhappy family is miserable in its own way.” Every financial crisis is different and

involves its own distinctive elements.

Allen and Gale(2009):

The theory is at a relatively early stage,... crises are complex phenomena in

practice. One of the main themes of this book is that there is no one theory of

crises that can explain all aspects of the phenomena of interest.

Reinhart and Rogoff(2009):

Economic theory proposes plausible reasons that financial markets, particularly

ones reliant on leverage(which means that they have thin capital compared to the

amount of assets at stake), can be quite fragile and subject to crises of confidence.

Unfortunately, theory gives little guidance on the exact timing or duration of these

crises, which is why we focus so on experience.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 9 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.2 �ŤÏ

Õ1�Å�7Kgdz�'X

Reinhart and Rogoff(2009)nãÕ1�ÅÚ7Kgdz�'5�¡

�ïħXµ

Kaminsky and Reinhart(1999)ïÄ1970c±5�26åÕ1�ŧ

Ù¥k18å�Å3u)c5cS?17KÜ�gdz"

Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache(1998)©Û1980*1995c53�I

[�êâ§uy7KgdzÏ�éÕ1Ü�­½5kK¡K�"

Caprio and Klingebiel(1996)@�du7KgdzÏm�t+�§"

yk�i+ò��Õ1�Å�u)"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 10 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.2 �ŤÏ

Õ1�Å�uд»Ú­�cî

4ÏMAÚÛ�Å£2010¤µ]�d��wÍþ,!¢N²L¹Ä�~�!���

²~�8»i±9±Y�ÅÖÈ\£ØØ´h<Ü��´ú�Ü�§½öüöÓ�¤Ñ

´7K�Å�­�cî"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 11 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.3 1Aé

xzÓ�K

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3. Õ1�Å 3.3 1Aé

6Ä5�Å�����±<

XJISÕ1�7KÅ�Ï6Ä5Øv£illiquid¤¡�Õ1@ç£bank run¤�º

x§1�����±<£lender of last resort¤�±Jø&�|±!Ó�*�À1ø

Aþ§d�]�KÅL�?naquAéÀ1I¦ÀÂ"

M ↑= R + B ↑

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 13 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.3 1Aé

»��Å��ÍÏ

�ISÕ1�7KÅ�Ï]Ø-Å£insolvent¤¡�»�£bankrupt¤ºx�§

1�±Ä^;�]�?1ÍÏ£bailout¤§d�]�KÅL�?naquÀ�"

M = R ↓ +B ↑

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 14 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.3 1Aé

1�����±<Ú¢�ÍÏ�«O

1�����±<�§´��Ï5wk�ÅUå�7KÅ�Jø

áÏ6Ä5§ �vkÄ^;�]�§ÏdÚu®Ç�Å�ºx�

�¶

I�1ÍÏ�7KÅ� ´�ϲEØõ!®²���ÅU

å§ ���4òÚåXÚ5�Å�7KÅ�"duÍÏI�Ä^

;�]�½OuIŧÏd�UÚu®Ç�ÅÚÌ�ÅÖ�Å"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 15 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.3 1Aé

Ù¦�ü|Ü

Source: Laeven and Valencia(2018).

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3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

1990c�"¥I�Õ1�Å

Ì�Õ1]�|dÇ£ROA¤

êâ5 µCEICêâ¥"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 17 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

¥IªÍϵu1AOIÅÖ¿o�1]�7

²183�I<�~�¬130g¬Æ"ÆÏL§ã�Ü1998cu

12700·�AOIŧ^uÖ¿o[Õ1]�7(Ù¥ó1850·

�!à1933·�!¥1425·�!ï1492·�)§Ï�30c§c|

Ç7.2%"

2004c²�I<�~�¬1O�§dã�ÜuÙúw§2700·�A

OIÅ�c|Çl�7.2%N��2.25%"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 18 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

¥IªÍϵ¤áo�7K]�+núi?nØû]�

1999c§À�!&�!uK!�¢o�7K]�+núi3IÖ�/�I

S²��Ä:þ�U¤á§¿5½�YÏ�10c§©OKIÂ!+n!

?��éA�¥IÕ1!¥Iï�Õ1ÚI[muÕ1!¥IóûÕ1!

¥Ià�Õ1¤�l�Øû]�"

o�7K]�+núiòYIk�ä57KÅ���0º�§Å�R¬

�!$E�Ç$e§¿vkUì�k���@�È4?nØû]�!�

¹Ik]�"~X��2006c12�§uKEé4�[/±è�¤j

�4000·�<¬1ÅÖPk?��§��á�Ï!á"

l2007cm©§o�7K]�+núim©û�z$�§�/OÝ10�

��=."

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 19 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

2008c�¥7K�Å

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 20 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

'uåÏ��Ø

éu2007c{I�u�g��ÅÚ2008c,?�7K�Å��ϧ

8c�vk½Ø"Ì�)º�)µ

1 �¥²L�ï��­.¢S|ÇY²L$§r¦{ILÝÞŶ

2 2001c±5{ILu°t�À1�ü��]�d��&z¶

3 {I7Kgdz��7KM#LÝÚi+"�"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 21 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

*:1µüI�.¥I;Oþ,�K�

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 22 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

*:1µüI�.¥�IÝ]þ,�K�

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 23 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

*:1µ�¥²L�ï�­.¢S|Çeü

êâL²§3­.¢S|ÇY²Øäeü�Ó�§­.Ý]�;O

��3eü§`²­.��S£±{I��L�¤Ý]I¦�O�á�

u£±¥I��L�¤;O]7ø��O\"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 24 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

*:2µÀ1�ü�Ø

According to Taylor(2007), during the period from 2002 to 2005, the short

term interest rate path deviated significantly from what this two decade

experience would suggest is appropriate.

This deviation may have been a

cause of the boom and bust in

housing starts and inflation in the

last two years.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 25 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

*:3µ7KM#LÝ

Bernanke(2010) argues that ”monetary policy following the 2001 recession

appears to have been reasonably appropriate... (but) it is difficult to

ascribe the house price bubble either to monetary policy or to the broader

macroeconomic environment.”

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 26 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

{é;��~5À1�ü

The Discount Window

the maturity of discount window loans was extended and the interest

rate reduced.

encourage broad participation by financial firms.

Special Liquidity and Credit Facilities (lender of last resort)

provide liquidity to a variety of financial institutions and markets facing

runs or other illiquidity problems, including banks, broker-dealers,

commercial paper borrowers, money market funds, asset-backed

securities market, etc.

All loans were required to be ”secured” by adequate collateral.

Support of Critical Institutions (bailout)

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 27 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

Aé@çµ{é;�ÍÀ1½|Ä7

Ì�À1½|Ä7�]7À6Ñ�¹

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 28 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

Aé@çµ{é;�ÍÀ1½|Ä7£Y¤

In response, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee of the value

of MMF shares.

Acting as lender of last resort, the Fed created a program to provide

backstop liquidity. Under this program, the Fed lent to banks who in

turn provided cash to MMFs by purchasing some of their assets.

These actions ended the run within a few days.

The Federal Reserve established special programs to repair

functioning in the CP market and restart the flow of credit.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 29 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

2009cÔíG-20µee�ISÜ�

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 30 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

�¥5À1*ܵÄ:À1

Note: The Ratio of the Base Money to GDP(unit: %), from Takahashi(2013).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 31 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

�¥5À1*ܵÄO|Ç

Note: Central bank benchmark interest rate (unit: %), from Takahashi(2013).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 32 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

�ü�Jµ{I

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 33 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

�ü�Jµî³

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 34 / 57

3. Õ1�Å 3.4 Õ1�ÅY~

�ü�Jµ�¥

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 35 / 57

4. ���Å 4.1 A�¯¢

{¤þ�Õ1&��ú�ÅÖ

Source: Jorda et al.(2016).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 36 / 57

4. ���Å 4.1 A�¯¢

Õ1�Å��ú�ÅÖ�È\

Source: Reinhart et al.(2018).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 37 / 57

4. ���Å 4.1 A�¯¢

u�I[��?KÅÇ

Source: Reinhart(2018), “Government Debt/GDP, 1900–2017”. These debts stand at or near historic highs in a number of

advanced economies. If contingent liabilities (private debts and pensions) are added (not an issue at the end of WWII) current

levels far exceed prior peaks.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 38 / 57

4. ���Å 4.1 A�¯¢

u�I[�#,²LN¥�?�KÅÇ

Source: Reinhart et al.(2012). Figure 1. “Gross Central Government Debt as Percent of GDP (unweighted averages)”.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 39 / 57

4. ���Å 4.1 A�¯¢

���Å�¤�

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4. ���Š4.2 �����.

�?��ÀJ�/�I¦

�I�?û½´Ä���ûu�Å���¤´Ä�u�����¤§=µ

Y − (1 + rL) L︸ ︷︷ ︸Consumption after repayment (RR)

> Y − cY︸ ︷︷ ︸Consumption after nonrepayment

and default (NN)

dd���ÅK�£repayment threshold¤YT§��ÑY²Y > YT�TI

ò��ÅÖ§ÄKY < YT�ò��µ

YT =(1 + rL) L

c

d��ÑY²Y ∈[Y − V , Y

]��½Â�ÅVǵ

p =Y − YT

V= p

(rL−, c

+,V−

)

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 41 / 57

4. ���Š4.2 �����.

��ÀJ�ã«

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 42 / 57

4. ���Š4.2 �����.

|Çþ,�ÅÖKú\­µrL ↑

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 43 / 57

4. ���Š4.2 �����.

K¡ÀÂ�²LÅÄ5þ,µV ↑

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 44 / 57

4. ���Š4.2 �����.

Õ1Â|²ï�&�ø�

y¢¥�±<¬�âÙúx�

]7¤�rÚ�±VÇpû½�±

|ÇrL§¿�5�­./�½|

ò¦�±<��Jº²ïµ

p︸︷︷︸Probabilityof repayment

× (1 + rL)︸ ︷︷ ︸Lender′s revenue

if repaid︸ ︷︷ ︸Lender′s expected revenue

= 1 + r︸ ︷︷ ︸Lender′s costs

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 45 / 57

4. ���Š4.2 �����.

$ÅÄ��&�½|þï

Note: A higher level of debt means the

probability of repayment falls(and the

probability of default increases) between

points 1 and 2 in panel (a), starting at the

debt level LV . As the probability of

repayment falls, lenders increase the

lending rate as the quantity of debt

increases, so the loan supply curve LS

slopes up in panel (b). As the lending rate

falls, more debt is demanded by the

country as insurance against consumption

risk, so the loan demand curve LD slopes

down. The equilibrium is at point 3 where

demand and supply intersect.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 46 / 57

4. ���Š4.2 �����.

pÅÄ��&�½|þï

Note: More debt means a higher

probability of default between points 3 and

4 in panel (a), so repayment probabilities

now decline more rapidly starting at the

debt level L′V . In panel (b), therefore, to

the right of point 4, default is now

possible, and the loan supply curve LS

shifts up and to the left in that zone. At

the same time, at any given lending rate,

higher volatility causes demand for debt to

expand so as to give the country better

insurance, so the loan demand curve LD

shifts right. The new equilibrium is now at

point 5 where demand and supply

intersect. The lending rate rises; defaults

are more likely; debt levels may rise or fall.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 47 / 57

4. ���Å 4.3 uÐ¥I[ÅÖ¯K

uÐ¥I[�ÅÖØF¯K

'uÅÖ��¯K�-<(¾�¯K��´#,½|²LNÚuÐ

¥I[9/«�ÅÖY²�$uu�I[§%²~�\ÅÖYP§=¤

¢�ÅÖØF£Debt intolerance¤¯K"

u)��½ÅÖ­|�c"Å

ÓGDP�'­

��½ÅÖ­|�I[ê3¤k

¥�Â\I[¥Ó'£%¤

<40 19.4

41*60 32.3

61*80 16.1

81*100 16.1

>100 16.1

êâ5 µ4ÏMAÚÛ�Å£2010¤L2-2"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 48 / 57

4. ���Å 4.3 uÐ¥I[ÅÖ¯K

�mû¬d��ÅÖ�Å

Source: Abbas et al.(2011).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 49 / 57

4. ���Å 4.3 uÐ¥I[ÅÖ¯K

2008c��#,²LNISÅÖ�È\

Source: Allen et al.(2015), “International Bond Issuance by Emerging Countries”. Emerging market includes Argentina, Brazil,

Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.

Financial corporations include banks and other financial corporations. Original data from BIS.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 50 / 57

4. ���Å 4.3 uÐ¥I[ÅÖ¯K

#,²LN��GIÅ�1«�¤

Source: Allen et al.(2015), “Currency Composition of Outstanding EM Bonds”. Billions of U.S. dollars on vertical axis. Original

data from World Bank database.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 51 / 57

4. ���Å 4.4 �c��¥ÅÖ�Å

�¥KÅǵ2015

ã¡5 : Historical Public Debt Database§IMF"

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 52 / 57

4. ���Å 4.4 �c��¥ÅÖ�Å

u�I[�#,²LNÅÖ�ŵ2015

Source: IMF(2016a).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 53 / 57

4. ���Å 4.4 �c��¥ÅÖ�Å

h<ÅÖ�ú�ÅÖ�È\

Source: IMF(2016b).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 54 / 57

4. ���Å 4.4 �c��¥ÅÖ�Å

�Ih<ÅÖ�ú�ÅÖ��m\�IOY~

Source: IMF(2016b).

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 55 / 57

4. ���Å 4.4 �c��¥ÅÖ�Å

#9êm�

Source: Dobbs et al.(2015), MGI report.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 56 / 57

4. ���Å 4.4 �c��¥ÅÖ�Å

AB£2016¤µ5ÅÖÚ <6

As a result we seem condemned to continued weak growth and fiscal

austerity in the eurozone, to a mediocre recovery in the United States, and

to an unbalanced recovery in the United Kingdom. Japan meanwhile, faces

an ever-growing level of public debt that will never be repaid in the normal

sense of the word. And as 2015 progresses, it looks increasingly likely that

China’s credit boom is ending in a potentially dangerous downturn.

It seems that we are out of ammunition – the policy magazine is

empty.

�%� (E��ƲL�) IS7K 57 / 57