1 university of washington csep 590tu Πpractical aspects ......security of block ciphers 2/7 brian...

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JLM 20060209 12:16 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU Practical Aspects of Modern Cryptography Instructors: Josh Benaloh, Brian LaMacchia, John Manferdelli Tuesdays: 6:30-9:30, Allen Center 305 Webpage: http://www.cs.washington.edu/education/courses/csep590/06wi/ Recommended texts: Stinson, Cryptography, Theory and Practice. 2 nd Edition, CRC Press, 2002. Menezes, vanOrtshot, Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. Ferguson and Schneier, Practical Cryptography.

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Page 1: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

200

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:16

1

Uni

vers

ity o

f Was

hing

ton

CS

EP

590

TU �

Pra

ctic

al A

spec

ts o

f M

oder

n C

rypt

ogra

phy

Inst

ruct

ors:

Jos

h B

enal

oh, B

rian

LaM

acch

ia, J

ohn

Man

ferd

elli

Tues

days

: 6:3

0-9:

30,

Alle

n C

ente

r 305

Web

page

: http

://w

ww

.cs.

was

hing

ton.

edu/

educ

atio

n/co

urse

s/cs

ep59

0/06

wi/

Rec

omm

ende

d te

xts:

S

tinso

n, C

rypt

ogra

phy,

The

ory

and

Prac

tice.

2nd

Edi

tion,

CR

C P

ress

, 20

02.

Men

ezes

, van

Orts

hot,

Van

ston

e. H

andb

ook

of A

pplie

d C

rypt

ogra

phy.

Ferg

uson

and

Sch

neie

r, Pr

actic

al C

rypt

ogra

phy.

Page 2: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

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:16

2

New

Lec

ture

Sch

edul

e

10987654321

All

Thre

e to

pics

: Ele

ctio

ns, I

TAR

/Pol

itics

, Sid

e C

hann

els/

Tim

ing

Atta

cks,

DR

M, B

igN

umIm

plem

enta

tion

3/8

Josh

Ran

dom

Num

bers

/Elli

ptic

Cur

ve C

rypt

o3/

1

Bria

nTr

ust,

PKI,

Key

Man

agem

ent [

Last

HW

A

ssig

nmen

t)2/

21Jo

hnA

ES

and

Cry

ptog

raph

ic H

ashe

s2/

14Jo

hnS

ecur

ity o

f Blo

ck C

iphe

rs2/

7B

rian

Cry

ptog

raph

ic P

roto

cols

II

1/31

Bria

nC

rypt

ogra

phic

Pro

toco

ls I

1/24

Josh

Pub

lic K

ey C

iphe

rs1/

17Jo

hnS

ymm

etric

Key

Cip

hers

and

Has

hes

1/10

Josh

Pra

ctic

al A

spec

ts o

f Cry

ptog

raph

y1/

3Le

ctur

erTo

pic

Dat

e

Page 3: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

3

Ana

lysi

s of

Blo

ck C

iphe

rs John

Man

ferd

elli

jlm@

cs.w

ashi

ngto

n.ed

ujm

anfe

r@m

icro

soft.

com

Por

tions

© 2

004-

2005

, Joh

n M

anfe

rdel

li.

This

mat

eria

l is

prov

ided

with

out w

arra

nty

of a

ny k

ind

incl

udin

g, w

ithou

t lim

itatio

n, w

arra

nty

of n

on-in

fring

emen

t or s

uita

bilit

y fo

r any

pur

pose

. Th

is m

ater

ial i

s no

t gua

rant

eed

to b

e er

ror f

ree

and

is in

tend

ed fo

r ins

truct

iona

l use

onl

y.

Page 4: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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4

Dig

ital B

lock

Cip

hers

Com

plic

ated

key

ed in

verti

ble

func

tions

con

stru

cted

from

ite

rate

d el

emen

tary

roun

ds.

�Con

fusi

on: n

on-li

near

func

tions

(RO

M lo

okup

)�D

iffus

ion:

per

mut

e ro

und

outp

ut b

its�K

ey m

ixin

g: x

or�k

ey s

ched

ule�

at b

egin

ning

of r

ound

Characteristics:

�Fas

t�D

ata

encr

ypte

d in

fixe

d �b

lock

siz

es� (

64,1

28,2

56 b

it bl

ocks

are

co

mm

on).

�Key

and

mes

sage

bits

non

-line

arly

mix

ed in

cip

herte

xt

DE

S (1

974)

des

ign

was

wat

ersh

ed in

pub

lic s

ymm

etric

key

cr

ypto

.

Page 5: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

5

Itera

ted

Feis

tel C

iphe

r

Pla

inte

xt

Cip

herte

xtr Fei

stel

Rou

nds

k 1 k 2

k r

Key

Sch

edul

e

Key

Page 6: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

6

Page 7: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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7

Page 8: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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8

Page 9: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

9

DE

S A

ttack

s: E

xhau

stiv

e S

earc

h

�Sy

mm

etry

DE

S(k

∆1,

x ∆

1)=D

ES

(k, x

) ∆1

�Su

ppos

e w

e kn

ow p

lain

/cip

her t

ext p

air (

p,c)

for(k=0;k<256;k++) {

if(DES(k,p)==c) {

printf(“Keyis %x\n”, k);

break;

}

}

�Ex

pect

ed n

umbe

r of t

rials

(if k

was

cho

sen

at ra

ndom

) be

fore

suc

cess

: 255

Page 10: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

10

DE

S A

ttack

s: E

xhau

stiv

e S

earc

h

�Po

or ra

ndom

num

ber g

ener

ator

: 20

bits

of e

ntro

py�

How

long

doe

s it

take

?�

220

vs25

6

�Se

cond

big

gest

real

pro

blem

�Fi

rst b

igge

st: b

ad k

ey m

anag

emen

t

�Sy

mm

etric

cip

hers

are

sai

d to

be

secu

re in

pra

ctic

e if

no

know

n at

tack

wor

ks m

ore

effic

ient

ly th

an e

xhau

stiv

e se

arch

. N

ote

that

the

barr

ier i

s co

mpu

tatio

nal n

ot

info

rmat

ion

theo

retic

.

Page 11: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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11

DE

S D

escr

ibed

Alg

ebra

ical

ly

si(L

,R)=

(L∆

f(E(R

) ∆k i)

,R),

t(L,

R)=

(R,L

). k i

is 4

8 bi

t sub

-key

for r

ound

i an

df(x

)= P

(S1S

2S3…

S8(

x)).

Her

e, e

ach

S �b

ox o

pera

tes

on 6

bit

quan

titie

s an

d ou

tput

s 4

bit q

uant

ities

. P

per

mut

es th

e re

sulti

ng 3

2 ou

tput

bits

.

Eac

h ro

und

(exc

ept l

ast)

is t

si.

Not

e th

at t

t =

t 2 =

1= s

i si=

si2 .

Full

DE

S is

:D

ESK(

x)=

IP-1

s16

t ..

. s

3 t

s2

t s

1 IP

(x)

So

its in

vers

e is

DES

K-1(x

)= IP

-1s

1 t

... s

14 t

s15

t s

16 IP

(x)

Theo

rem

(Cop

pers

mith

and

Gro

ssm

an):

If s

K(L,

R)=

(L∆

f(E(R

) ∆K

,R),

< t

, sK

>= A

N, N

= 2n

.N

ote:

If a

and

b a

re c

hose

n at

rand

om fr

om S

nth

ere

is a

goo

d ch

ance

that

<a,

b>=

A nor

Sn

Page 12: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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12

DE

S K

ey S

ched

ule

C0D

0= P

C1(

K)C

i+1

= Le

ftShi

ft(S

hift i

, Ci),

Di+

1=

LeftS

hift(

Shi

ft i, D

i),K i

= P

C2(

Ci|

|Di)

Shi

ft i=

<1,2

,2,2

,2,2

,2,1

,2,2

,2,2

,2,2

,1,1

>

Not

e: Ir

regu

lar K

ey s

ched

ule

prot

ects

aga

inst

rela

ted

key

atta

cks.

[Bih

am, N

ew T

ypes

of C

rypt

anal

ytic

Atta

cks

usin

g R

elat

ed K

eys,

TR

-753

, Tec

hnio

n]

Page 13: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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Wea

k K

eys

�D

ES

has

:�

Four

wea

k ke

ys k

for w

hich

Ek(

Ek(

m))

= m

.�

Twel

ve s

emi-w

eak

keys

whi

ch c

ome

in p

airs

k1

and

k 2an

d ar

e su

ch th

at E

k1(E

k2(m

)) =

m.

�W

eak

keys

are

due

to �k

ey s

ched

ule�

alg

orith

m

Page 14: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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14

How

Wea

k K

eys

Aris

e

�A

28 b

it qu

antit

y ha

s po

tent

ial s

ymm

etrie

s of

per

iod

1,2,

4,7,

and

14

�Su

ppos

e ea

ch o

f C0

and

D0

has

a sy

mm

etry

of p

erio

d 1;

for e

xam

ple

C0

=0x0

0000

00, D

0= 0

x111

1111

. W

e ca

n ea

sily

figu

re o

ut a

mas

ter k

ey (K

) tha

t pro

duce

s su

ch a

C0

and

D0.

Then

DE

SK(D

ES

K(x

))=x

.

Page 15: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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15

Birt

hday

Atta

cks

�Pr

obab

ility

of c

ollis

ion

dete

rmin

ed b

y �B

irthd

ay P

arad

ox�

calc

ulat

ion:

(1-1

/n) (

1-2/

n) �

(1-(

k-1)

/n)=

(n!/k

!)/nk

�Pr

obab

ility

of c

ollis

ion

is >

.5 w

hen

k2>

n.�

1+x

cex

, Pi=

1i=k

(1-i/

n) c

e-k(

k-1)

/(2n)

Page 16: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

16

Mee

t in

the

Mid

dle

Doe

s do

uble

enc

rypt

ion

doub

le e

ffect

ive

key

size

? S

uppo

se:

E�(a

,b)(p

)=E b

(Ea(

p))

Atta

ck if

DE

S is

a g

roup

. [E k

(p)=

E b(E

a(p)

)].

But

it is

n�t:

Cam

pbel

l and

Wei

ner,

DE

S is

not

a G

roup

, Cry

pto

�92.

Tim

e M

emor

y tra

deof

f [K

now

n pl

aint

ext (

p 1, c

1), (

p 2,c

2)]

Sto

re E

a(p)

=x, C

alcu

late

E-1

b(c)

=y.

Page 17: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

17

The

Line

ar A

ttack

(Ful

l Mon

ty)

�Su

ppos

e L

is a

cip

her,

the

ciph

erte

xtan

d pl

aint

ext b

oth

com

e fro

m G

F(2)

n , c=

Kp, w

here

K is

an

n x

n in

verti

ble

mat

rix, K

=(k ij

) ove

r GF(

2).

How

can

we

�bre

ak�L

?

�An

swer

: G

et (a

bout

) n c

orre

spon

ding

pla

inte

xt-c

iphe

rtext

pairs

(pi,

c i).

Sol

ve re

sulti

ng li

near

equ

atio

ns to

inve

rt K

.

Page 18: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

18

The

Line

ar A

ttack

(Par

tial M

onty

)

�Su

ppos

e L

is a

cip

her,

the

ciph

erte

xtan

d pl

aint

ext b

oth

com

e fro

m G

F(2)

n , w

ith k

ey b

its k

ii= 1

,2,�

,n. H

ow c

an w

e �b

reak

�L?

�An

swer

: Obt

ain

m (l

inea

rly in

depe

nden

t) lin

ear r

elat

ions

F i(c

) + G

i(p)=

ai1

k 1+

�+

a ink

n, i=

1,2

,�,m

�G

uess

n-m

-1bi

ts o

f the

key

, sol

ve fo

r the

oth

er m

bits

�Ti

me:

2n-

m-1

+ O

(m) v

s2n

�M

uch

fast

er th

an e

xhau

stiv

e se

arch

O(2

n )

Page 19: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

19

Alm

ost T

rue

Line

ar C

onst

rain

ts

�U

sual

ly fi

ndin

g lin

ear r

elat

ions

is h

ard

or im

poss

ible

�Lo

ok fo

r lin

ear r

elat

ions

that

hol

d w

ith p

roba

bilit

y p>

1/2

�C

olle

ct a

num

ber o

f sam

ples

�Vo

te fo

r the

max

imal

ly c

onsi

sten

tsub

set o

f equ

atio

ns�

Supp

ose

you

have

n (l

inea

r) e

quat

ions

hol

d w

ith

prob

abili

ty p

, wha

t is

the

prob

abilit

y of

m o

f the

m b

eing

co

rrec

t. �

nCm

pm(1

-p)n-

m

�La

rge

cons

iste

nt s

ubse

ts v

ery

likel

y to

be

corre

ct e

ven

if p

is o

nly

slig

htly

big

ger t

han

.5

Page 20: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

20

Alm

ost L

inea

r Atta

cks

•Sp

arse

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

•D

ecom

posi

tion

•Tr

ansf

orm

atio

n•“A

lmos

t Lin

ear”

cons

train

ts•

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

•Li

near

Cry

ptan

alys

is

Page 21: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

21

Alg

ebra

ic R

epre

sent

atio

ns

�A

lgeb

raic

nor

mal

form

(AN

F):

�D

egre

e: d

eg(f)

,the

high

est d

egre

e te

rm in

AN

F.�

Exam

ple

f(X)=

x1+

x 2, d

eg(f)

=1g(

X)=

x 1x 2

, deg

(g)=

2�

Func

tions

of d

egre

e 1

are

calle

d �a

ffine

�. C

ompo

sitio

n of

A

ffine

func

tions

is a

ffine

.

�La

gran

ge In

terp

olat

ion

Theo

rem

. Eve

ry fu

nctio

n in

n

varia

bles

can

be

expr

esse

d as

a p

olyn

omia

l (he

nce

AN

F).

nn

ji

ijn

ji

ii

ni i

xx

xa

xx

a

xa

aX

f

......

)(

)(

)(

21

...12

1

10

⊕⊕

⊕=

⊕⊕

≤≠

= =

Page 22: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

22

Boo

lean

Fun

ctio

ns

�Fo

r a s

et o

f Boo

lean

func

tions

D, d

(f,g)

=#{X

|f(X

) ∫g(

X)}.

�D

ista

nce:

For

Boo

lean

func

tion

f(X) a

nd g

(X),

d(f,

D)=

m

in[g

(X)e

D]d(

f,g)

�A

ffine

func

tion:

h(x

)= a

1x1∆

a 2x 2

∆�∆

a nx n

+c�

nl(f)

den

otes

the

min

imum

dis

tanc

e be

twee

n f(X

) and

the

set o

f affi

ne fu

nctio

ns D

affin

e. nl

(f)=

d(f,

Daf

fine)

, Daf

fine=

R

M(1

,n).

�B

alan

ce: f

(X) i

s ba

lanc

ed if

f the

re is

an

equa

l num

ber o

f 0�s

an

d 1�

s in

the

outp

ut o

f f(X

).

Page 23: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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23

S B

oxes

as

Pol

ynom

ials

ove

r GF(

2)1,1:

56+4+35+2+26+25+246+245+236+2356+16+15+156+14+146+145+13+135+134+

1346+1345+13456+125+1256+1245+123+12356+1234+12346

1,2:

C+6+5+4+45+456+36+35+34+346+26+25+24+246+2456+23+236+235+234+2346

+1+15+156+134+13456+12+126+1256+124+1246+1245+12456+123+1236+1235

+12356+1234+12346

1,3:

C+6+56+46+45+3+35+356+346+3456+2+26+24+246+245+236+16+15+145+13+1

356+134+13456+12+126+125+12456+123+1236+1235+12356+1234+12346

1,4:

C+6+5+456+3+34+346+345+2+23+234+1+15+14+146+135+134+1346+1345+125

6+124+1246+1245+123+12356+1234+12346

Legend: C+6+56+46 means 1∆

x 6∆

x 5x 6∆

x 4x 6

Page 24: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

24

Dec

ompo

sabl

e S

yste

ms

E k1|

|k2(

x)=

E� k1

(x) |

| E�� k

2(x)

42m

1632t

218264

233264

m2t

2mt

Page 25: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

25

Line

ar A

ttack

s on

spa

rse

coef

ficie

nts

c 1=

f[1,0

](k1,�

,km) p

10 p20 �

p n0

+ f[

1,1]

(k1,�

,km) p

11 p20 �

p n0

+ �

+ f[

1,2m

] (k

1,�,k

m) p

1p2�

p n

�.

c n=

f[n,1

](k1,�

,km) p

1p2�

p n+

f[1,

1](k

1,�,k

m) p

11 p20 �

p n0 �

+ f[

1,2m

] (k

1,�,k

m) p

1p2�

p n

Sup

pose

mos

t of t

he f[

i,j] a

re 0

. C

an s

olve

for t

hese

with

diff

eren

t p 1

,p2,�

,pn,

even

it th

e F[

i,j] a

re c

ompl

ex a

nd n

on-li

near

in th

e k 1

,�,k

m

Page 26: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

26

Mat

hem

atic

s of

Boo

lean

Fun

ctio

ns

•C

orre

latio

n–

c(f,g

) = P

[f(x)

=g(x

)]-P[

f(x) ∫

g(x)

]. So

P[

f(x)=

g(x)

]= .5

(1+c

(f,g)

)•

Had

amar

d–

S f(w

)= 2

-nS x

(-1)f(x

)+w·x =

c(f(x

), w

x)

•Be

nt fu

nctio

nsFu

rthes

t fro

m li

near

(all

Had

amar

dco

effic

ient

s ar

e eq

ual)

Page 27: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

27

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of B

iham

and

Sham

ir(1

990)

�W

as k

now

n to

IBM

team

who

se d

esig

n ru

les

prov

ided

so

me

resi

stan

ce�

Brea

ks K

hafre

with

150

0 co

rres

pond

ing

plai

n/ci

pher

text

s in

an

hour

�Br

eaks

8 ro

und

Luci

fer i

n 22

1st

eps

with

24

text

s�

Brea

ks F

EA

L.

�Br

eaks

8 ro

und

DE

S.

�U

sefu

l in

brea

king

cry

ptog

raph

ic h

ashe

s�

DE

S R

esul

ts: 2

47C

hose

n pl

aint

ext a

ttack

.

Page 28: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

28

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

: Ove

rvie

w

Let (

P L, P

R),

(PL* ,

P R* )

and

(CL* ,

CR

* ), (C

L* , C

R* )

be p

airs

of

inpu

ts a

nd o

utpu

ts w

ith p

resc

ribed

xor

s (P

L� , P R

� ) =

(PL,

P R) ∆

(PL* ,

P R* )

(CL� ,

CR

� ) =

(CL,

CR) ∆

(CL* ,

CR

* ) Fo

llow

the

xor o

f tw

o pl

aint

exts

thro

ugh

roun

ds o

f DE

S.

Out

put x

or d

epen

ds n

on u

nifo

rmly

on

key

bits

. Ta

ke lo

ts o

f cho

sen

plai

ntex

t/cip

herte

xt p

airs

.Le

t non

uni

form

dis

tribu

tion

�vot

e� o

n se

t con

tain

ing

keys

.

Page 29: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

29

Key

Obs

erva

tion

Con

side

r a ro

und

of D

ES

: sK: (

L,R

)!(L

∆F(

E(R

)∆K

),R) w

here

if

X=X 1

||X2||

�||X

8w

ith e

ach

Xia

six

bit

quan

tity.

F(

X)=

P(S

1(X 1

)|| �

||S

8(X 8

))

Let (

L, R

) and

(L*,

R*)

be

inpu

ts to

a ro

und

of D

ES

and

(L

�, R

�)= (L

, R) ∆

(L*,

R*)

.

At e

ach

S-b

ox p

ositi

on, a

n in

put x

oris

inde

pend

ent o

f key

and

the

dist

ribut

ion

of th

e ou

tput

xor

sis

ver

y no

n-lin

ear a

nd n

ot a

ll ou

tput

xor

sar

e po

ssib

le.

Key

s ch

oose

am

ong

outp

ut x

ors.

Asi

de fr

om S

-box

, all

oper

atio

ns a

re li

near

.

Page 30: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

30

Diff

eren

tial P

rofil

e of

sin

gle

S-b

ox

�If

x� Ø

y� a

nd D

j(x�,y

�)= {u

: Sj(u

∆x�

) ∆S j

(u)=

y�},

then

k

ex ∆

Dj(x

�,y�).

�|D

j(x�,

y�)|

has

non

unifo

rm d

istri

butio

n.

�Th

e pr

opag

atio

n ra

tio, R

p(x�

, y�)

= |D

j(x�,

y�)|

/2m, w

here

m

is th

e di

men

sion

of t

he s

pace

of a

�. .�

Sham

ir an

d B

iham

den

ote

this

as

x� Ø

y� ,

p.

( p=

|Dj(x

�, y�

)| /2

m).

Page 31: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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31

S1

Diff

eren

tial D

istri

butio

nS box 1

In 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f

0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 6 0 2 4 4 0 10 12 4 10 6 2 4

2 0 0 0 8 0 4 4 4 0 6 8 6 12 6 4 2

3 14 4 2 2 10 6 4 2 6 4 4 0 2 2 2 0

4 0 0 0 6 0 10 10 6 0 4 6 4 2 8 6 2

5 4 8 6 2 2 4 4 2 0 4 4 0 12 2 4 6

6 0 4 2 4 8 2 6 2 8 4 4 2 4 2 0 12

7 2 4 10 4 0 4 8 4 2 4 8 2 2 2 4 4

8 0 0 0 12 0 8 8 4 0 6 2 8 8 2 2 4

9 10 2 4 0 2 4 6 0 2 2 8 0 10 0 2 12

a 0 8 6 2 2 8 6 0 6 4 6 0 4 0 2 10

b 2 4 0 10 2 2 4 0 2 6 2 6 6 4 2 12

c 0 0 0 8 0 6 6 0 0 6 6 4 6 6 14 2

d 6 6 4 8 4 8 2 6 0 6 4 6 0 2 0 2

e 0 4 8 8 6 6 4 0 6 6 4 0 0 4 0 8

f 2 0 2 4 4 6 4 2 4 8 2 2 2 6 8 8

10 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 14 0 6 6 12 4 6 8 6

11 6 8 2 4 6 4 8 6 4 0 6 6 0 4 0 0

12 0 8 4 2 6 6 4 6 6 4 2 6 6 0 4 0

Page 32: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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32

S1

Diff

eren

tial D

istri

butio

n

S box 1

In 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f

13 2 4 4 6 2 0 4 6 2 0 6 8 4 6 4 6

14 0 8 8 0 10 0 4 2 8 2 2 4 4 8 4 0

15 0 4 6 4 2 2 4 10 6 2 0 10 0 4 6 4

16 0 8 10 8 0 2 2 6 10 2 0 2 0 6 2 6

17 4 4 6 0 10 6 0 2 4 4 4 6 6 6 2 0

18 0 6 6 0 8 4 2 2 2 4 6 8 6 6 2 2

19 2 6 2 4 0 8 4 6 10 4 0 4 2 8 4 0

1a 0 6 4 0 4 6 6 6 6 2 2 0 4 4 6 8

1b 4 4 2 4 10 6 6 4 6 2 2 4 2 2 4 2

1c 0 10 10 6 6 0 0 12 6 4 0 0 2 4 4 0

1d 4 2 4 0 8 0 0 2 10 0 2 6 6 6 14 0

1e 0 2 6 0 14 2 0 0 6 4 10 8 2 2 6 2

1f 2 4 10 6 2 2 2 8 6 8 0 0 0 4 6 4

20 0 0 0 10 0 12 8 2 0 6 4 4 4 2 0 12

21 0 4 2 4 4 8 10 0 4 4 10 0 4 0 2 8

22 10 4 6 2 2 8 2 2 2 2 6 0 4 0 4 10

23 0 4 4 8 0 2 6 0 6 6 2 10 2 4 0 10

24 12 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 14 14 2 0 2 6 2 4

Page 33: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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33

S1

Diff

eren

tial D

istri

butio

n

S box 1

In 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f

25 6 4 4 12 4 4 4 10 2 2 2 0 4 2 2 2

26 0 0 4 10 10 10 2 4 0 4 6 4 4 4 2 0

27 10 4 2 0 2 4 2 0 4 8 0 4 8 8 4 4

28 12 2 2 8 2 6 12 0 0 2 6 0 4 0 6 2

29 4 2 2 10 0 2 4 0 0 14 10 2 4 6 0 4

2a 4 2 4 6 0 2 8 2 2 14 2 6 2 6 2 2

2b 12 2 2 2 4 6 6 2 0 2 6 2 6 0 8 4

2c 4 2 2 4 0 2 10 4 2 2 4 8 8 4 2 6

2d 6 2 6 2 8 4 4 4 2 4 6 0 8 2 0 6

2e 6 6 2 2 0 2 4 6 4 0 6 2 12 2 6 4

2f 2 2 2 2 2 6 8 8 2 4 4 6 8 2 4 2

30 0 4 6 0 12 6 2 2 8 2 4 4 6 2 2 4

31 4 8 2 10 2 2 2 2 6 0 0 2 2 4 10 8

32 4 2 6 4 4 2 2 4 6 6 4 8 2 2 8 0

33 4 4 6 2 10 8 4 2 4 0 2 2 4 6 2 4

34 0 8 16 6 2 0 0 12 6 0 0 0 0 8 0 6

35 2 2 4 0 8 0 0 0 14 4 6 8 0 2 14 0

36 2 6 2 2 8 0 2 2 4 2 6 8 6 4 10 0

Page 34: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

34

S1

Diff

eren

tial D

istri

butio

n

S box 1

In 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f

37 2 2 12 4 2 4 4 10 4 4 2 6 0 2 2 4

38 0 6 2 2 2 0 2 2 4 6 4 4 4 6 10 10

39 6 2 2 4 12 6 4 8 4 0 2 4 2 4 4 0

3a 6 4 6 4 6 8 0 6 2 2 6 2 2 6 4 0

3b 2 6 4 0 0 2 4 6 4 6 8 6 4 4 6 2

3c 0 10 4 0 12 0 4 2 6 0 4 12 4 4 2 0

3d 0 8 6 2 2 6 0 8 4 4 0 4 0 12 4 4

3e 4 8 2 2 2 4 4 14 4 2 0 2 0 8 4 4

3f 4 8 4 2 4 0 2 4 4 2 4 8 8 6 2 2

Page 35: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

35

Exa

mpl

e: D

iffer

entia

l Cry

ptan

alys

is o

f S1

thro

ugh

a si

ngle

roun

d

S1E

*=

0x01

, S1 E

= 0x

35 !

0x0d

=SO�.

S1E

*=

0x21

, S1 E

= 0x

15 !

0x03

=SO�.

0x34

!0x

0d m

eans

inpu

t diff

eren

ce 0

x34

prod

uced

out

put d

iffer

ence

0x0

d(1

) For

0x3

4!0x

d, S

1 I�=

{0x0

6, 0

x10,

0x1

6, 0

x1c,

0x2

2, 0

x24,

0x2

8, 0

x32}

.(2

) For

0x3

4!0x

3, S

1 I�=

{0x0

1, 0

x02,

0x1

5, 0

x21,

0x3

5, 0

x36}

.

Sin

ce S

1 E+

S1I=

S1K,

(1)

Red

uces

the

poss

ible

key

set

to {0

x07,

0x3

3, 0

x11,

0x2

5, 0

x17,

0x

23, 0

x1d,

0x2

9}

(2)

Red

uces

the

poss

ible

key

set

to {0

x20,

0x1

4, 0

x23,

0x1

7, 0

x34,

0x

00}.

Th

e in

ters

ectio

n (a

nd a

ctua

l pos

sibi

litie

s) a

re {

0x17

, 0x2

3}

Page 36: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

36

One

Rou

nd D

iffer

entia

l use

d to

ana

lyze

4

roun

d D

ES

Met

hod

Use

1 ro

und

char

acte

ristic

to ri

ght.

Und

o ef

fect

of p

erm

utat

ion

mat

rix

and

solv

e ea

ch S

box

sep

arat

ely.

Th

is a

llow

s us

to s

olve

for 4

8 ke

y bi

ts.

This

1 ro

und

char

acte

ristic

will

be

used

to e

stim

ate

inpu

t xor

in

subs

eque

nt ro

unds

.

20 0

0 00

00

00 0

0 00

00

20 0

0 00

00

00 0

0 00

00

FA�

= 0

a�=

0p

= 1

Page 37: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

37

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 4

roun

ds

�D

�=a�

∆ B

� ∆L 4

��

d� =

R4�

�Be

caus

e b�

=L0�,

the

outp

ut x

or

of S

2, S 3

, � ,

S 8in

roun

d 2

is

0. T

his

give

s 28

bits

of B

� and

he

nce

28 b

its o

f D� i

s kn

own.

�Si

nce

B� i

s kn

own,

we

can

calc

ulat

e D

�= B

� ∆L 4

� usi

ng 4

en

cryp

ted

pairs

for e

ach

of th

e 7

rele

vant

S b

oxes

. All

key

cand

idat

es a

re in

this

set

w

hich

giv

es 7

x6=4

2 bi

ts o

f key

w

ith h

igh

prob

abilit

y.

L 0=

20 0

0 00

00

R0=

00

00 0

0 00

L 4R

4FA

�a�

FB

�b�

FD

c�

FC

�∆

d�

Page 38: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

38

Ext

ensi

on to

Ful

l Rou

nd: O

ne R

ound

C

hara

cter

istic

A on

e ro

und

char

acte

ristic

is a

trip

le

[(Lin�,R

in�),

(Lou

t�,R

out�)

, p] s

uch

that

fo

r all

pairs

(Lin,R

in),

(Lin*,R

in*)

with

(L

in,R

in) ∆

(Lin*,R

in*)

= (L

in�,R

in�)

subj

ecte

d to

a s

ingl

e ci

pher

roun

d (d

epic

ted

on th

e rig

ht) p

rodu

cing

co

rres

pond

ing

pairs

(Lou

t,Rou

t),

(Lou

t*,R

out*)

, the

ratio

of o

utpu

t pa

irs w

ith (L

out,R

out) ∆

(Lou

t*,R

out*)

=

(Lou

t�,R

out�)

is p

.

Cha

ract

eris

tics

can

be e

xten

ded

thro

ugh

mul

tiple

roun

ds.

L in�

Rin�

L out

� Rou

t�

Fp

Page 39: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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200

6020

9 12

:16

39

Com

putin

g a

sing

le c

hara

cter

istic

�Th

e fir

st a

nd m

ost i

mpo

rtant

di

ffere

ntia

l is

(L�,0

) !(L

�,0),

p=1.

�An

othe

r is

(L�,0

x600

0000

0) !

(L� ∆

0x00

8082

00,0

x600

0000

0),

p=1/

4.�

Con

stru

ctio

n:

�E

(0x6

0000

000)

= E(

0110

000

0 �

000

0)=

0011

00 0

0000

0 �

00

0000

�S

1(00

1100

)� !

0xe

with

p=1

/4,

Sj(0

)� !

0 w

ith p

=1, j

>1 a

nd

P(0x

e000

0000

)=0x

0080

8200

.

L in�

Rin�

L out

� Rou

t�

Fp

a�A

Page 40: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

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:16

40

Mul

ti-ro

und

Cha

ract

eris

tics

�Se

quen

ce o

f Diff

eren

tials

with

id

entif

ied

inpu

t and

out

put

xors

. Eac

h ro

und

diffe

rent

ial

occu

rs w

ith p

roba

bilit

y p i

.�

Ove

rall

prob

abilit

y: p

= Pp i

�C

hara

cter

istic

to th

e rig

ht is

a

thre

e ro

und

char

acte

ristic

with

pr

obab

ility

(14/

64)2

�U

sed

to a

ppro

xim

ate

diffe

rent

ials

thro

ugh

mul

tiple

ro

unds

. �

Each

pai

r fol

low

ing

the

char

acte

ristic

at e

ach

roun

d is

ca

lled

a �r

ight

pai

r�.

Oth

er

pairs

are

�wro

ng p

airs

.��

Wro

ng p

airs

get

dis

tribu

ted

unifo

rmly

; rig

ht p

airs

follo

w

over

all c

hara

cter

istic

pr

obab

ility.

WP=

00 8

0 82

00

60 0

0 00

00

WC=

00 8

0 82

00

60 0

0 00

00

FA

�= 0

0 80

82

00a�

= 60

00

00 0

0

FB�

= 0

b�=

0∆

FC

�= 0

0 80

82

00c�

= 60

00

00 0

0∆

p =

14/6

4

p =

14/6

4

p =

1

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:16

41

Mul

ti-ro

und

Cha

ract

eris

tics

-For

mal

�An

n-r

ound

cha

ract

eris

tic is

a tr

iple

(WP,L

, WT)

, with

L=(

L1,

�, L

n)

whe

re e

ach

L1

is a

one

roun

d di

ffere

ntia

l tha

t hol

ds w

ith p

roba

bilit

y p i

, w

ith fi

rst r

ound

inpu

t xor

(to L

1) is

WP,

and

last

roun

d ou

tput

xor

(form

L

n) is

WT

and

roun

ds �m

atch

up�

.

�Pr

obab

ility

of c

ombi

ned

n-ro

und

char

acte

ristic

is p

W=P

p i

�Ea

ch p

air f

ollo

win

g th

e ch

arac

teris

tic a

t eac

h ro

und

is c

alle

d a

�righ

t pa

ir�.

Oth

er p

airs

are

�wro

ng p

airs

.��

Wro

ng p

airs

get

dis

tribu

ted

unifo

rmly

; rig

ht p

airs

follo

w o

vera

ll ch

arac

teris

tic p

roba

bilit

y.

Page 42: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

42

Con

stru

ctin

g 3

Rou

nd C

hara

cter

istic

�U

se�

(L�,0

) !(L

�,0),

p=1.

�(0

x008

0820

0, 0

x600

0000

0) !

(0x0

0808

200,

0x6

0000

000)

, p=

1/4.

WP=

00 8

0 82

00

60 0

0 00

00

WC=

00 8

0 82

00

60 0

0 00

00

FA

�= 0

0 80

82

00a�

= 60

00

00 0

0

FB�

= 0

b�=

0∆

FC

�= 0

0 80

82

00c�

= 60

00

00 0

0∆

p =

14/6

4

p =

14/6

4

p =

1

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:16

43

Two

roun

d ite

rativ

e ch

arac

teris

tic

�p=

1/2

34�

Obv

ious

ly u

sefu

l for

m

ulti-

roun

d es

timat

es∆

19 6

0 00

00

00 0

0 00

00

00 0

0 00

00

19 6

0 00

00

FA�

= 0

a�=

0

FB�

= 0

b�=

19 6

0 00

00

Page 44: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

44

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 3

Rou

nd D

ES

R3=

L 2+f

(E(R

2)+k

2)

= R

1+f(E

(R2)

+k2)

= L 0

+f(E

(R0)

+k1)

) +f(E

(R2)

+k3)

Pick

pai

r (R

0, R

0*) w

ith

R0+

R0*

=R0�=

0.

R3�+

L0�

= f(E

(R2)

+k3)

+

f(E(R

2*)+

k 3)

P-1(R

3�+ L

1�) =

f(E

(R2)

+k3)

+

f(E(R

2*)+

k 3).

Not

e R

2= L

3.

L 0R

0

F FL 1

R1

FL 2

R2

L 3R

3

k 1 k 2 k 3

Page 45: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

45

Dat

a fo

r Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 3

R

ound

DE

S

Plai

ntex

tC

iphe

rtex

t0x748502cd38451097

0x03c70306d8a09f10

0x3874756438451097

0x78560a0960e6d4cb

0x486911026acdff31

0x45fa285be5adc730

0x375bd31f6acdff31

0x134f7915ac253457

0x357418da013fec86

0xd8a31b2f28bbc5cf

0x12549847013fec86

0x0f317ac2b23cb944

Onl

y on

e co

unte

r in

each

6 b

it se

t will

be p

ossi

ble

for a

ll 3

pairs

.

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:16

46

Thre

e R

ound

Cha

ract

eris

tic

�Th

is c

hara

cter

istic

occ

urs

with

pr

obab

ility

p=1

/16

and

form

s an

est

imat

e fo

r the

diff

eren

tial

inpu

t of t

he 4

thro

und

of th

e 6

roun

ds.

�(0

0 20

00

08

00 0

0 00

04)

!(0

0 00

04

00 0

0 20

00

08)

with

p=1

/16

is a

noth

er s

uch

char

acte

ristic

.

40 0

8 00

00,

40

00 0

0 00

40 0

8 00

00,

40

00 0

0 00

F F∆

F∆

Page 47: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

47

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 6

roun

ds

�Su

ppos

e (L

i-1, R

i-1),

k iar

e th

e in

puts

to ro

und

i. P L

= L 0

, PR=

R0.

�L 6

= R

4∆

f(k 6

, R6)

= L 3

∆ f(

k 6, R

6) ∆

f(k 4

, R3)

�L 6

�= L

3� ∆

f(k 6

, R6)

∆ f(

k 6, R

6*) ∆

f(k 4

, R3)

∆ f(

k 4, R

3*)

�L 6

� = C

Lan

d R

6 =C

Rar

e kn

own.

�Es

timat

e L 3

� = 4

0000

000,

R3�

= 40

0800

00, u

sing

the

diffe

rent

ial.

�Se

t S=

P-1(C

L ∆

400

0000

0)=

f(k6,

CR) ∆

f(k 6

, CR

*) ∆

f(k 4

, R3)

∆ f(

k 3, R

3*)=

S 1

(E1)

|| S

2(E

2) ||

� ||

S8(

E8)

whe

re E

1|| E

2|| �

|| E

8 ar

e th

e bi

ts o

btai

ned

by a

pply

ing

E to

400

8000

0.

�E 1

|| E 2

|| �

|| E

8 =0

0100

0000

0000

0000

1010

00..0

=08

||00|

|01|

|10|

|00|

|00|

|00|

|00.

�Si

nce

the

inpu

t Xor

s to

S2,

S5,S

6,S

7,S

8 ar

e 0,

f(k 4

, R3)

∆ f(

k 4, R

3*) i

s 0

in

the

corr

espo

ndin

g ou

tput

bit

posi

tions

and

we

are

left

with

the

sim

ple

diffe

rent

ial:

P-1

(CL ∆

400

0000

0)=

f(k6,

CR) ∆

f(k 6

, CR

*) fo

r S2,

S5,

S6,

S7,S

8.

Page 48: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

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:16

48

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 6

roun

ds

�Fi

rst c

hara

cter

istic

yie

lds

30 b

its o

f key

. S

econ

d on

e ad

ds

anot

her 1

2 bi

ts o

f key

.�

Rec

all P

-1(C

L ∆

400

0000

0)=

f(k6,

CR) ∆

f(k 6

, CR

*)

for S

2,S

5,S

6,S

7,S

8�

This

occ

urs

with

p=

1/16

.�

Stra

ight

forw

ard

impl

emen

tatio

n yi

eldi

ng 3

0 ke

ybits

:�

Set u

p 230

coun

ters

�Bu

mp

coun

ter f

or s

ugge

sted

key

for e

ach

pair

of n

cho

sen

text

s�

Cor

rect

key

be

will

�vot

ed� a

t lea

st 1

/16

n tim

e (�r

ight

pai

rs�)

�In

corre

ct k

eys

will

be v

oted

rand

omly

eac

h w

ith p

roba

bilit

y 1/

230

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9 12

:16

49

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 6

roun

ds

�Im

prov

ing

the

�sig

nal t

o no

ise�

ratio

by

�filte

ring�

pai

rs�

For e

ach

of S

2, S

5, S

6, S

7,S

8 w

ith in

put x

or x

� and

out

put x

or y

�, lo

ok a

t x ∆

Dj(x

�,y�).

�If

this

is e

mpt

y, th

is m

ust b

e w

rong

pai

r.�

For a

ny g

iven

S b

ox th

e, th

is h

appe

ns w

ith p

roba

bilit

y .2

.�

The

prob

abilit

y th

at a

ll 5

S b

oxes

hav

e no

n-em

pty

cand

idat

e ke

y se

ts is

(.8)

5 =.3

3. C

all t

his

set o

f pai

rs R

P a

nd th

e co

mpl

emen

t W

P.

�R

P c

onta

ins

1/3

of th

e pa

irs, W

P c

onta

ins

2/3

�In

RP

, the

pro

babi

lity

of a

�cor

rect

vot

e� is

3/1

6

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:16

50

�Sig

nal t

o N

oise

�S/

N=

right

_pai

rs/a

vera

ge_c

ount

�a

= av

erag

e_co

unte

d/co

unte

d_pa

irs�

b=ra

tio o

f_co

unte

d_to

_all

�m

is th

e nu

mbe

r of p

airs

�S/

N=

mp

/ (m

a b

/2k )=

(2k

p)/(a

b)

�S/

N a

ffect

s nu

mbe

r of r

ight

pai

rs n

eede

d:�

S/N

1-2

, 20-

40 ri

ght p

airs

requ

ired

�S/

N 1

6, 7

-8 ri

ght p

airs

requ

ired

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9 12

:16

51

Diff

eren

tial C

rypt

anal

ysis

of D

ES

�Be

st 1

6 ro

unds

atta

ck u

ses

13 ro

und

appr

oxim

atio

n�

Req

uire

s 247

text

s�

Not

muc

h be

tter t

han

exha

ustiv

e se

arch

�C

onve

rting

Cho

sen

Pla

inte

xt to

Cor

resp

ondi

ng p

lain

text

at

tack

�If

m p

airs

are

requ

ired

for C

hose

n sq

rt(2m

) 232

are

requ

ired

for c

orre

spon

ding

pla

inte

xt

Page 52: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

9 12

:16

52

Com

men

ts o

n D

iffer

entia

l Cry

ptan

alys

is o

f fu

ll D

ES 15531#

Cha

r ro

unds

25816

2-55.

118

25257

16

21615

.61/

1048

630

213215

8

28216

1/16

3027

276

2416

142

2323

4

Cho

sen

Plai

nS/

NC

har

prob

Bits

Fo

und

Ana

lyze

d Pa

irsN

eede

d pa

irs# R

ound

s

Page 53: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

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:16

53

DE

S S

-Box

Des

ign

Crit

eria

�N

o S

-box

is li

near

or a

ffine

func

tion

of it

s in

put.

�C

hang

ing

one

bit i

n th

e in

put o

f an

S-B

ox c

hang

es a

t lea

st

two

outp

ut b

its.

�S-

boxe

s w

ere

chos

en to

min

imiz

e th

e di

ffere

nce

betw

een

the

num

ber o

f 1�s

and

0�s

whe

n an

y in

put b

it is

hel

d co

nsta

nt.

�S(

X) a

nd S

(X∆

0011

00) d

iffer

in a

t lea

st 2

bits

�S(

X) ∫

S(X∆

11xy

00)

Page 54: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

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:16

54

Com

men

ts o

n ef

fect

of c

ompo

nent

s on

D

iffer

entia

l Cry

ptan

alys

is�

E �W

ithou

t exp

ansi

on, t

here

is a

4 ro

und

itera

tive

char

acte

ristic

with

p=

1/2

56

�P �

Maj

or in

fluen

ce.

If P=

I, th

ere

is a

10

roun

d ch

arac

teris

tic w

ith p

= 2-1

4.5 (b

ut o

ther

atta

cks

wou

ld b

e w

orse

).

�S

orde

r�

If S

1, S

7 an

d S

4 w

ere

in o

rder

, the

re w

ould

be

a 2

roun

d ite

rativ

e ch

arac

teris

tic w

ith p

= 1/

73.

How

ever

, Mat

sui f

ound

an

orde

r (2

4673

158)

that

is b

ette

r and

als

o be

tter a

gain

st L

inea

r cry

pto.

Opt

imum

ord

er fo

r LC

resi

stan

ce: 2

7643

158.

�S

prop

ertie

s�

S bo

xes

are

near

ly o

ptim

um a

gain

st d

iffer

entia

l cry

pto

Page 55: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

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:16

55

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

�In

vent

ed b

y M

itsur

u M

atsu

i in

1993

.�

16-ro

und

DE

S c

an b

e at

tack

ed u

sing

243

know

n pl

aint

exts

-ge

t 26

bits

, bru

te fo

rce

the

rem

aini

ng 3

0 bi

ts �24

3=

9 x

1012

= 9

trillio

n kn

own

plai

ntex

t blo

cks

�Al

so e

xplo

its b

iase

s in

S-b

oxes

, whi

ch w

ere

not

desi

gned

aga

inst

the

atta

ck�

A D

ES

key

was

reco

vere

d in

50

days

usi

ng 1

2 H

P97

35 w

orks

tatio

ns in

a la

b se

tting

Page 56: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

9 12

:16

56

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

Bas

ic id

ea:

Sup

pose

ai(P

) ∆ b

i(C) =

gi(k

) hol

ds w

ith g

i,lin

ear,

for i

= 1,

2,�

,m.

Eac

h eq

uatio

n im

pose

s a

linea

r con

stra

int a

nd re

duce

s ke

y se

arch

by

a fa

ctor

of 2

. G

uess

(n-m

-1) b

its o

f key

. Th

ere

are

2(n-

m-1

) . U

se th

e co

nstra

ints

to g

et th

e re

mai

ning

key

s.

Can

we

find

linea

r con

stra

ints

in th

e �p

er ro

und�

func

tions

and

kn

it th

em to

geth

er?

No!

Per

Rou

nd fu

nctio

ns d

o no

t hav

e lin

ear c

onst

rain

ts.

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6020

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:16

57

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

Nex

t ide

a C

an w

e fin

d a

(P) ∆

b(C

) = g

(k) w

hich

hol

ds w

ith g

,lin

ear,

with

pr

obab

ility

p?

Sup

pose

a(P

) ∆b(

C) =

g(k

), w

ith p

roba

bilit

y p>

.5.

Col

lect

a lo

t of p

lain

/cip

her p

airs

. E

ach

will

�vot

e� fo

r g(k

)=0

or g

(k)=

1.P

ick

the

win

ner.

p= 1

/2+e

requ

ires

ce-2

text

s (w

e�ll

see

why

late

r). e

is c

alle

d �b

ias�

.

Bre

aks

16 ro

und

DE

S w

ith 2

47w

ork

fact

or (a

ctua

lly a

littl

e m

ore

com

plic

ated

than

sim

ple

votin

g ov

er w

hole

cip

her)

.

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6020

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:16

58

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

Not

atio

n

Mat

sui n

umbe

rs b

its fr

om ri

ght t

o le

ft,

right

mos

t bit

is b

it 0.

FIP

S (a

nd

ever

yone

els

e) g

oes

from

left

to

right

sta

rting

at 1

. I w

ill us

e th

e FI

PS

con

vent

ions

. To

map

Mat

sui

posi

tions

to E

very

one

else

:M

(i)=

64-E

E(i)

. Fo

r 32

bits

mak

e th

e ob

viou

s ch

ange

.M

atsu

i als

o re

fers

to th

e tw

o po

tions

of

the

Pla

n an

d C

iphe

rtext

as

(PH, P

L), (

CH, C

L) w

e�ll

stic

k w

ith (P

L, P R

), (C

L, C

R).

PL

PR

CL

CR

FX

1

FX

2

FX

3∆

k 1 k 2 k 3

Y 1 Y 2 Y 3

Page 59: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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200

6020

9 12

:16

59

Line

ar a

nd n

ear l

inea

r dep

ende

nce

Her

e is

a li

near

rela

tions

hip

over

GF(

2) in

S5

that

hol

ds w

ith

prob

abili

ty 5

2/64

(fro

m N

S 5(0

1000

0,11

11)=

12:

X[2]

∆ Y

[1] ∆

Y[2

] ∆ Y

[3]∆

Y[4

]=K[

2] ∆

1,S

omet

ime

writ

ten:

X[2

] ∆ Y

[1,2

,3,4

]=K

[2] ∆

1

You

can

find

rela

tions

like

this

usi

ng th

e �B

oole

an F

unct

ion�

te

chni

ques

we

desc

ribe

a lit

tle la

ter

Insi

de fu

ll ro

und

(afte

r app

lyin

g P

), th

is b

ecom

esX

[17]

∆F(

X,K

)[3,8

,14,

25]=

K[2

6] ∆

1

S5

K [1.

.6]

Y [1.

.4]

X [1.

.6]

Page 60: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

200

6020

9 12

:16

60

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 3

roun

d D

ES

X[17

] ∆Y

[3,8

,14,

25]=

K[2

6] ∆

1, p

= 52

/64

�R

ound

1X 1

[17]

∆Y

1[3,8

,14,

25]=

K1[2

6] ∆

1P

R[1

7] ∆

PL[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆R

1[3,8

,14,

25]=

K

1[26]

∆1

�R

ound

3X 3

[17]

∆Y

3[3,8

,14,

25]=

K3[2

6] ∆

1R

1[3,8

,14,

25] ∆

CL[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆C

R[1

7] =

K

3[26]

∆1

�A

ddin

g th

e tw

o ge

t:P

R[1

7] ∆

PL[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆ C

L[3,8

,14,

25] ∆

CR[1

7] =

K1[2

6] ∆

K 3[2

6]Th

us h

olds

with

p=

(52/

64)2

+ (1

2/64

)2=.

66

PL

PR

CL

CR

FX

1

FX

2∆

FX

3∆

k 1 k 2 k 3

Y 1 Y 2 Y 3

L 1 L 2L 0R

0

R1 R

2

Page 61: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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200

6020

9 12

:16

61

Mat

sui�s

Per

Rou

nd C

onst

rain

ts 42/6

4X[

17] ∆

Y[8

,14,

25]=

K[2

6]D

16/6

4X

[16,

20] ∆

Y[8

,14,

25]=

K[2

5,29

]E

30/6

4X[

3] ∆

Y[1

7]=K

[4]

C

22/6

4X

[1,2

,4,5

] ∆Y

[17]

=K[2

,3,5

,6]

B

12/6

4X[

17] ∆

Y[3

,8,1

4,25

]=K

[26]

APr

Equ

atio

nLa

bel

Mat

sui:

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

Met

hod

for D

ES

Cip

her.

Eur

ocry

pt, 9

8.

Page 62: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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200

6020

9 12

:16

62

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 5

roun

dsP

atte

rn: B

A-A

B.

PL[1

7] ∆

R1[1

7] ∆

PR[1

,2,4

,5]=

k 1[2

,3,4

,5]

L 1[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆R

2[3,8

,14,

25] ∆

R1[1

7] =

K2[2

6]R

2[3,8

,14,

25] ∆

CR[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆R

3[17]

= K 4

[26]

R3[1

7] ∆

CL[1

7] ∆

CR[1

,2,4

,5] =

K5[2

,3,5

,6]

Addi

ng y

ield

sP

L[17]

∆P

R[1

,2,4

,5,3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆C

L[17]

CR[1

,2,4

,5,3

,8,1

4,25

]=K 1

[2,3

,5,6

] ∆ K

2[26]

K4[2

6] ∆

K5[2

,3,5

,6]

P=

p A2 p

B2 +

(1-p

A)2

p B2 +

pA2 (

1-p B

)2+

(1-p

A)2

(1-p

B)2 +

4pAp B

(1-p

A) (

1-p B

)=0.

519

PL

PR F

L 1R

1F

k 1[1

,2,4

,5]

[17]

[2,3

,5,6

]

[17]

[26]

[3,8

,14,

25]

k 2

∆F F

∆[1

7]

[26]

[3,8

,14,

25]

k 4

∆F

k 5[1

,2,4

,5]

[17]

[2,3

,5,6

]

CL

CR

R2

R3

R4

L 2 L 3 L 4

Page 63: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

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:16

63

Pilin

g U

p Le

mm

a

Let X

i(1

c ic

n) b

e in

depe

nden

t ran

dom

var

iabl

es w

hose

va

lues

are

0 w

ith p

roba

bilit

y p i

. Th

en th

e pr

obab

ility

that

X1

∆ X

2∆

... ∆

Xn

= 0

is

½+2

n-1

P[1

,n](p

i-1/2

)

Pro

of:

By

indu

ctio

n on

n.

It�s

taut

olog

ical

for n

=1.

Sup

pose

Pr[X

1∆

X2∆

... ∆

Xn-

1= 0

]= q

= ½

+2n-

2P

[1,n

-1](p

i-1/2

). T

hen

Pr[X

1∆

X2∆

... ∆

Xn=

0]=

qp n

+(1-

q)(1

-pn)

=½+2

n-1

P[1

,n](p

i-1/2

) as

clai

med

.

Page 64: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

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:16

64

Mat

hem

atic

s of

bia

sed

votin

g

Cen

tral L

imit

Theo

rem

. Le

t X, X

1, �

, X n

be in

depe

nden

t, id

entic

ally

di

strib

uted

rand

om v

aria

bles

and

let S

n=

X 1+

X 2+

� +

Xn.

Let

m=

E(X)

an

d s

2 =E(

(X-m

)2 ). F

inal

ly s

et T

n= (S

n-nm

)/(s◊

n), n

(x)=

1/(◊

2p) e

xp(-

x2 /2)

and

N(a

,b)=

Û[a

,b] n

(x) d

x.

Then

P

r(ac

Tnc

b)=

N(a

,b).

n is

cal

led

the

Nor

mal

Dis

tribu

tion

and

is s

ymm

etric

aro

und

x=0.

N(-¶

,0)=

½

.N

(-.5,

.5)=

.38,

N(-.

75,.7

5)=

.55,

N(-1

,1)=

.68,

N(-2

,2)=

.954

6, N

(-3,3

)= .9

972

Page 65: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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6020

9 12

:16

65

App

licat

ion

of C

LT to

LC

p= ½

+e, 1

-p=

½-e

. Le

t L(k

,P,E

k(P))

=0 b

e an

equ

atio

n ov

er G

F(2)

that

ho

lds

with

pro

babi

lity

p. L

et X

ibe

the

outc

ome

(1 if

true

, 0 if

fals

e) o

f an

exp

erim

ent p

icki

ng P

and

test

ing

whe

ther

L h

olds

for t

he re

alk.

E

(Xi)=

p, E

((Xi-p

)2 )=

p(1-

p)2

+ (1

-p)(0

-p)2 =

p(1

-p).

Let T

nbe

as

prov

ided

in

the

CLT

. Fi

xing

n, w

hat i

s th

e pr

obab

ility

that

mor

e th

an h

alf t

he X

iare

1 (i

.e.-

Wha

t is

the

prob

abilit

y th

at n

rand

om e

quat

ions

vot

e fo

r the

righ

t key

)?Th

is is

just

Pr(T

ns �

e◊n/◊

(1/4

�e2 )

). If

n=d

2 e-2

, thi

s is

just

Pr

(Tns

�d/◊

(1/4

�e2 )

) or,

if e

is s

mal

l Pr(

T ns

-2d)

.

Som

e nu

mer

ical

val

ues:

d=

.25,

N(-.

5, ¶

) = .6

9, d

= .5

, N(-1

, ¶) =

.84,

d= 1

, N(-2

, ¶) =

.98,

d=

1.5

, N(-3

, ¶) =

.999

.

Page 66: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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200

6020

9 12

:16

66

15 R

ound

Lin

ear A

ppro

xim

atio

n

Pat

tern

: E-D

CA

-AC

D-D

CA

-A.

Not

e L i

=Ri-1

, Li ∆

Ri+

1=L i

∆L i

+2.

1P L

[8,1

4,25

] ∆

R2[8

,14,

25]

∆ P

R[1

6,20

] =

K

1[23,

25]

3L 3

[8,1

4,25

]∆

R4[8

,14,

25]

∆ R

3[17]

= K

3[26]

4L 4

[17]

∆ R

5[17]

∆ R

4[3]

= K

4[4]

5 L 5

[3,8

,14,

25]∆

R6[3

,8,1

4,25

]∆ R

5[17]

= K

5[26]

7 L 7

[3,8

,14,

25]∆

R8[3

,8,1

4,25

]∆ R

7[17]

= K

7[26]

8L 8

[17]

∆ R

9[17]

∆ R

8[3]

= K

8[4]

9L 9

[8,1

4,25

]∆

R10

[8,1

4,25

]∆

R9[1

7]=

K9[2

6]11

L 11[8

,14,

25]

∆ R

12[8

,14,

25]

∆ R

11[1

7]=

K11

[26]

12L 1

2[17]

∆ R

13[1

7]∆

R12

[3]

= K

12[4

]13

L 13[3

,8,1

4,25

]∆ R

14[3

,8,1

4,25

]∆ R

13[1

7]=

K13

[26]

15

L 15[3

,8,1

4,25

]∆ C

L[3,8

,14,

25]∆

CR[1

7]

=

K15

[26]

Page 67: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

200

6020

9 12

:16

67

15 R

ound

Lin

ear A

ppro

xim

atio

n

Add

ing

and

canc

elin

g:

PL[8

,14,

25] ∆

PR[1

6,20

] ∆ C

L[3,8

,14,

25]∆

CR[1

7] =

K

1[23,

25]∆

K3[2

6] ∆

K 4[4

] ∆K

5[26]

∆K

7[26]

∆K 8

[4]

K9[2

6] ∆

K 11[2

6] ∆

K12

[4] ∆

K13

[26]∆

K 15[2

6]

whi

ch h

olds

(by

Pili

ng-u

p Le

mm

a) w

ith th

e in

dica

ted

prob

abili

ty.

Page 68: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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200

6020

9 12

:16

68

Mat

sui�s

Use

of C

onst

rain

ts

E-D

CA

-AC

D-

DC

A-A

½+1

.19x

2-22

PL[8

,14,

25] ∆

P R[1

6,20

] ∆C

L[3,8

,14,

25]

∆C

R[1

7]=K

1[9,1

3] ∆

K3[2

6] ∆

K4[2

6] ∆

K

5[26]

∆ K

7[26]

∆ K

8[26]

∆ K

9[26]

∆ K

11[2

6]

∆ K

12[2

6] ∆

K13

[26]

∆ K

15[2

6]

15

E-D

CA

-AC

D-

DC

A-A

-1.4

9x2-

24P

L[8,1

4,25

] ∆P R

[16,

20] ∆

CL[1

7]

∆C

R[1

,2,4

,5,3

,8,1

4,25

]=K 1

[9,1

3] ∆

K3[2

6]

∆ K

4[26]

∆ K

5[26]

∆ K

7[26]

∆ K

8[26]

K9[2

6] ∆

K11

[26]

∆ K

12[2

6] ∆

K13

[26]

K15

[26]

∆ K

16[2

,3,5

,6]

16

BA

-AB

½+1

.22x

2-6

PL[1

7] ∆

PR[1

,2,4

,5,3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆C

L[17]

CR[1

,2,4

,5,3

,8,1

4,25

]=K 1

[2,3

,5,6

] ∆

K2[2

6] ∆

K4[2

6] ∆

K5[2

,3,5

,6]

5

A-A

½+1

.56x

2-3

PL[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆P

R[1

7] ∆

CL[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆

CR[1

7]=K

1[26]

∆ K

3[26]

3

Equa

tions

U

sed

Pr

Equa

tion

Rou

nds

Page 69: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

200

6020

9 12

:16

69

Fram

ewor

k fo

r diff

eren

tials

and

line

ar

appr

oxim

atio

n

�D

iffer

entia

ls�

(DX i

, DY i

)= P

r[Fi(X

i∆D

X i, K

i) ∆

F i(X

i,Ki)=

DY i

]

�[p

1, p 2

, �, p

n]= P

p i�

B i=

Max

({DX i

= D

X i-2∆

DY i

-1, 3

cic

n}) (

DX 1

, DY 1

) (D

X 2, D

Y 2) �

(DX n

, Yn)

�Li

near

App

roxi

mat

ions

�(G

X i, G

Y i)=

Pr[G

X ·X

i ∆G

Y · F

i(Xi,K

i)= 0

] -.5

�[p

1, p 2

, �, p

n]= 2

t-1P

p i�

B i=

Max

({GY i

= G

Y i-2∆

DG

X i-1

, 3c

icn}

) (G

X 1, G

Y 1) (

GX 2

, GY 2

) � (G

X n,G

Y n)

Page 70: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

200

6020

9 12

:16

70

Mat

sui�s

alg

orith

m fo

r ext

endi

ng

diffe

rent

ials

and

line

ar a

ppro

xim

atio

n

�R

ound

-1Be

gin p 1

=max

{DY}

((DX

1, D

Y) )

If [p

1,Bn-

1]> A

Bn

, cal

l Rou

nd-2

End

�R

ound

-2Be

gin p 2

=max

{DX,

DY}

((DX

2, D

Y 2) )

If

[p1,

p2,

Bn-

2]> A

Bn

, cal

l Rou

nd-3

End

�R

ound

�i (

3cic

n)Be

gin D

Xi=

DX

i-2∆

DY i

-1

p i=m

ax{D

Y}((D

Xi,

DY i

) )

If [p

1 , p

2,�

, p i

, Bn-

i]> A

Bn

, cal

l R

ound

-(i+

1)En

d�

Rou

nd-n

Begi

n DX

n= D

Xn-

2∆ D

Y n-1

p n=m

ax{D

X,D

Y}((D

Xn,

DY)

) If

[p1

, p2,

� ,

p n]>

AB

n , t

hen

AB

n= [p

1 , p

2,� ,

p n]

End

Page 71: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

200

6020

9 12

:16

71

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

of 8

roun

ds

7 R

ound

app

roxi

mat

ion,

p-½

= 1.

95 x

2-1

0

PL[8

,14,

25] ∆

P R[1

6,20

] ∆C

L[3,8

,14,

25]

∆C

R[1

7]=K

1[9,1

3] ∆

K3[2

6] ∆

K4[4

] ∆

K5[2

6] ∆

K7[2

6]

CL=

CL� ∆

F(C

R�,K

8)C

R=

CL�

PL

PR

∆F

k 8

CL

CR

CR�

CL�7

Rou

nd A

ppro

xim

atio

n

Page 72: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

200

6020

9 12

:16

72

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

of f

ull D

ES

Can

be

acco

mpl

ishe

d w

ith ~

247

know

n pl

aint

exts

�U

sing

a s

light

ly m

ore

soph

istic

ated

est

imat

ion

15

roun

d ap

prox

imat

ion

(with

247

wor

k fa

ctor

)�

For e

ach

48 b

it la

st ro

und

subk

ey, d

ecry

pt c

iphe

rtext

ba

ckw

ards

acr

oss

last

roun

d fo

r all

sam

ple

ciph

erte

xts

�In

crem

ent c

ount

for a

ll su

bkey

s w

hose

line

ar e

xpre

ssio

n ho

lds

true

to th

e pe

nulti

mat

e ro

und

�Th

is is

don

e fo

r the

firs

t and

last

roun

d yi

eldi

ng 7

key

bits

ea

ch (t

otal

: 14)

Page 73: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

JLM

200

6020

9 12

:16

73

Line

ar C

rypt

anal

ysis

of f

ull D

ES

Can

be

acco

mpl

ishe

d w

ith ~

243kn

own

plai

ntex

ts, u

sing

a m

ore

soph

istic

ated

est

imat

ion

14 ro

und

appr

oxim

atio

n�

For e

ach

48 b

it la

st ro

und

subk

ey, d

ecry

pt c

iphe

rtext

bac

kwar

ds

acro

ss la

st ro

und

for a

ll sa

mpl

e ci

pher

text

s�

Incr

emen

t cou

nt fo

r all

subk

eys

who

se li

near

exp

ress

ion

hold

s tru

e to

the

penu

ltim

ate

roun

d�

This

is d

one

for t

he fi

rst a

nd la

st ro

und

yiel

ding

13

key

bits

eac

h (to

tal:

26)

�H

ere

they

are

:P

R[8

,14,

25] ∆

CL[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆C

R[1

7]=K

1[26]

∆ K

3[4] ∆

K4[2

6] ∆

K6[2

6] ∆

K7[4

] ∆

K8[2

6] ∆

K10

[26]

∆ K

11[4

] ∆ K

12[2

6] ∆

K14

[26]

with

pro

babi

lity

½ -1

.19x

2-21

CR[8

,14,

25] ∆

PL[3

,8,1

4,25

] ∆P

R[1

7]=K

13[2

6] ∆

K12

[24]

∆ K

11[2

6] ∆

K9[2

6] ∆

K

8[24]

∆ K

7[26]

∆ K

5[26]

∆ K

4[4] ∆

K3[2

6] ∆

K1

[26]

with

pro

babi

lity

½ -

1.19

x2-2

1

Page 74: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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74

Des

X

�D

esX

fixe

s tw

o cr

itica

l pro

blem

s w

ith D

ES

:�

Key

size

is to

o sm

all

�Pr

actic

al L

inea

r and

Diff

eren

tial a

ttack

s re

ly o

n ac

cess

to

firs

t and

last

roun

ds o

f ite

rate

d ci

pher

�D

esX

repl

aces

the

56 b

it D

ES

key

, k w

ith a

184

bit

key

(ki,k

,ko)

�D

ES

X(k

i,k,k

o;x)=

ko∆

DES

k(x∆

k i)�

Xorin

g ke

y bi

ts a

t inp

ut a

nd o

utpu

t of c

iphe

r is

calle

d �w

hite

ning

�and

is u

sed

exte

nsiv

ely

by A

ES

can

dida

tes

�D

ES

X w

as p

ropo

sed

by R

ives

t and

doe

sn�t

adve

rsel

y af

fect

the

encr

yptio

n/de

cryp

tion

spee

d

Page 75: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

75

Bru

te F

orce

Kno

wn-

Pla

inte

xt A

ttack

s on

DE

S

�Th

ere

are

256

= ab

out 7

.2 x

1016

poss

ible

key

s�

abou

t 72

thou

sand

trill

ion

�D

iffie

and

Hel

lman

-19

76�

a $2

0 M

mac

hine

with

1-m

illion

pro

cess

ors,

eac

h ca

pabl

e of

test

ing

1 M

DE

S k

eys/

sec,

cou

ld s

earc

h 10

12ke

ys/s

ec a

nd a

ll ke

ys in

a

day.

Mic

hael

Wie

ner -

1993

�$1

M m

achi

ne w

ith 5

7,60

0 se

arch

chi

ps, e

ach

test

ing

50 M

key

s/s,

coul

d br

eak

in 3

.5 h

ours

on

aver

age .

�EF

F�

7/13

/98,

$10

K R

SA

priz

e aw

arde

d to

EFF

whi

ch b

roke

DE

S w

ith

$210

K m

achi

ne.

Page 76: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

76

DE

S A

ttack

s

�D

iffer

entia

l cry

ptan

alys

is: T

his

atta

ck re

quire

s th

e en

cryp

tion

of 2

47ch

osen

pla

inte

xts

�Li

near

cry

ptan

alys

is. B

y m

eans

of t

his

met

hod,

a

DE

S k

ey c

an b

e re

cove

red

by th

e an

alys

is o

f 243

know

n pl

aint

exts

. �

Firs

t Aid

: use

3-D

ES

or D

ES

-X: D

ES

X(k

1,k2,k

3,x)=

k2

∆D

ES

(k1,x

∆k 3

)�

This

�whi

tens

� inp

ut a

nd o

utpu

t.

Page 77: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

77

Oth

er a

ttack

s on

DE

S

�M

ultip

le L

inea

r App

roxi

mat

ions

, Knu

dsen

& R

obsh

aw�

Rel

ated

Key

s, B

iham

�In

trodu

ce c

ontro

lled

diffu

sion

pro

duci

ng p

redi

ctab

le e

ffect

that

depe

nds

on re

late

d ke

ys.

Als

o ap

plie

s to

has

h fu

nctio

ns.

�Ap

plie

s to

LO

KI a

nd L

ucife

r but

not

DE

S (b

ecau

se o

f irr

egul

ar k

ey

sele

ctio

n sc

hedu

le)

�N

on-L

inea

r App

roxi

mat

ions

, Knu

dsen

and

Rob

shaw

Har

d to

kni

t con

stra

ints

toge

ther

, som

e he

lp o

n fir

st a

nd la

st ro

unds

�D

avie

s A

ttack

, im

prov

ed b

y B

iham

and

Biry

ukov

Out

put o

n ad

jace

nt S

-box

es s

hare

key

s an

d pa

rity

of n

on-s

hare

d ke

ys

have

non

-uni

form

dis

tribu

tions

. M

argi

nally

bet

ter t

han

exha

ustiv

e se

arch

�Bo

omer

ang

Atta

ck, S

lide

atta

ck, W

agne

r.

Page 78: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

78

Trip

le-D

ES

Par

t of F

IPS

46-

3 st

anda

rdE

ncry

pt: C

= E

(K3,

D(K

2, E

(K1,

P)))

Dec

rypt

: P =

D(K

3, E

(K2,

D(K

1, C

))

3-ke

y: K

1, K 2

, K3

all d

iffer

ent

get 1

68-b

it ke

y2-

key:

K1

= K 3

(Tw

o ke

y ve

rsio

n is

sub

ject

to a

tim

e-m

emor

y tra

de-

off a

ttack

)ge

t 112

-bit

key

bette

r tha

n do

uble

enc

rypt

ion

Page 79: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

79

Pos

t DE

S D

esig

n C

riter

ia

�U

se in

vers

es in

GF(

2k).

(k=8

is p

opul

ar) �

Mar

s,

Rijn

dael

S-B

oxes

sho

uld

be s

urje

ctiv

e�

If S

-Box

es d

efin

e pe

rmut

atio

ns (p

),�

DP m

ax(p

)= m

ax {a

∫0,

b}P

r(p(

x∆a)

∆p(

x)=b

) <10

/256

�LP

max

(p) =

(2P

r(x·

a= p

(a) ·

b)-1

)2<1

/16

�Fe

w F

ixed

poi

nts

(3 fo

r 256

)

Page 80: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

80

DE

S S

umm

ary

�D

ES

was

a g

reat

cip

her.

�Th

ey s

houl

d ha

ve s

tuck

with

a 6

4-bi

t key

. �

Mor

e se

cure

�Be

tter a

s a

Has

h pr

imiti

ve�

To m

ake

DE

S b

ette

r.�

Incr

ease

key

siz

e!�

Pre

and

post

whi

teni

ng a

nd n

on-k

ey b

ased

mix

ing

�C

alcu

late

diff

eren

tials

and

dep

ende

ncie

s an

d m

ake

them

sm

all e

noug

h so

not

eno

ugh

plai

n/ci

pher

is a

vaila

ble

for

linea

r and

diff

eren

tial a

ttack

s.

Page 81: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

81

Hom

ewor

k 6

�P

robl

em 1

S-b

ox 4

is o

bser

ved

to h

ave

the

indi

cate

d ou

tput

xor

whe

n pr

esen

ted

with

the

indi

cate

d in

puts

In1: 0x22, In2: 0x16, Output xor: 0x0c

In1: 0x12, In2: 0x0c , Output xor: 0x05

Per

form

a d

iffer

entia

l cry

ptan

alys

is a

nd p

rodu

ce th

e po

ssib

le c

andi

date

key

(s).

You

may

find

the

tabl

es

prov

ided

in �D

C.tx

t� he

lpfu

l.

Page 82: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

82

Hom

ewor

k 6,

pro

blem

2 (o

mit)

Con

side

r the

2 ro

und

itera

tive

diffe

rent

ial c

hara

cter

istic

for D

ES

0x

1960

0000

0000

00!

0x19

6000

0000

0000

, p=1

/234

Sup

pose

for t

he fo

llow

ing

ques

tions

we

can

alw

ays

find

chos

en p

lain

text

w

ith S

/N ra

tio h

igh

enou

gh to

requ

ire o

nly

10 �r

ight

pai

rs� f

or a

su

cces

sful

diff

eren

tial c

rypt

anal

ysis

(�D

C�)

.

a.O

n av

erag

e, h

ow m

any

chos

en p

lain

cip

herte

xtpa

irs a

re re

quire

d fo

r a

succ

essf

ul D

C o

n tw

o ro

unds

?b.

On

aver

age,

how

man

y ch

osen

pla

in c

iphe

rtext

pairs

are

requ

ired

for

a su

cces

sful

DC

on

ten

roun

ds?

c.A

fter h

ow m

any

roun

ds is

DC

impo

ssib

le b

ecau

se th

ere

cann

ot

poss

ibly

be

enou

gh p

lain

cip

herte

xtpa

irs to

suc

ceed

?

Page 83: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

83

Hom

ewor

k 6

�P

robl

em 3

A c

erta

in c

iphe

r Cw

ith 6

bit

key

k 1, k

2, k 3

, k4,

k 5, k

6ha

s 4

linea

r co

nstra

ints

. G

iven

the

corre

spon

ding

pla

inte

xt, c

iphe

rtext

pairs

and

sub

stitu

ting

the

equa

tions

bec

ome:

0= k

1∆k 3∆

k 40=

k4∆

k 50=

k1∆

k 21=

k1∆

k 6

Gue

ssin

g k 1

and

k 3ca

lcul

ate

k 2, k

4, k 5

, k6.

How

man

y en

cryp

tions

are

ne

eded

to d

isco

ver t

he c

orre

ct k

ey w

ith e

xhau

stiv

e se

arch

in th

ew

orst

cas

e?H

ow m

any

are

need

ed w

ith th

ese

cons

train

ts?

Page 84: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

84

Hom

ewor

k 6,

pro

blem

4(A

) Sup

pose

the

ciph

er C

has

a lin

ear c

onst

rain

t (E

quat

ion

1) th

at h

olds

w

ith p

roba

bilit

y p=

.75

whe

re th

e in

put t

o C

is p

lain

text

bits

i 1||i

2||�

||i6;

the

outp

ut is

the

ciph

erte

xtbi

ts o

1||o 2

||�||o

6un

der k

ey b

its

k 1||k

2||�

||k6.

The

con

stan

ts a

1, a 2

, �, a

6, b 1

, b2,

�, b

6, c 1

, c2,

�, c

6, d

are

all k

now

n.E

quat

ion

1: a

1i 1∆

a 2i 2∆

a3i 3∆

a 4i 4∆

a 5i 5∆

a 6i 6∆

b 1o 1∆

b 2o 2∆

b3o

3∆b 4

o 4∆

b 5o 5∆

b 6o 6

=

�c 1

k 1∆

c 2k 2∆

c3k

3∆c 4

k 4∆

c 5k 5∆

c 6k 6∆

dFi

nally

, sup

pose

upo

n su

bstit

utin

g va

lues

from

3 p

lain

text

/cip

herte

xtpa

irs

the

left

hand

sid

e of

equ

atio

n 1

has

valu

es 1

,1,0

, res

pect

ivel

y.W

hat a

re th

e od

ds th

at c

1k1∆

c 2k 2∆

c3k

3∆c 4

k 4∆

c 5k 5∆

c 6k 6∆

d=1

rath

er th

an

0?

(B)

Supp

ose

the

sam

e se

tup

as in

A b

ut 3

out

of 4

pla

inte

xt/c

iphe

rtext

pairs

�v

ote�

that

c1k

1∆c 2

k 2∆

c3k

3∆c 4

k 4∆

c 5k 5∆

c 6k 6∆

d=1.

W

hat a

re th

e od

ds th

at c

1k1∆

c 2k 2∆

c3k

3∆c 4

k 4∆

c 5k 5∆

c 6k 6∆

d=1

rath

er th

an

0?

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:16

85

Hom

ewor

k 6,

pro

blem

4(C

) Con

stru

ctin

g a

mul

ti-ro

und

cons

train

tS

uppo

se C

is a

four

roun

d ite

rativ

e ci

pher

with

pla

inte

xt in

put,

P a

nd

ciph

erte

xtou

tput

C w

here

eac

h ro

und

has

6 bi

t inp

ut I

and

6 bi

t out

put

O a

nd p

er ro

und

keys

K(1

) , K(2

) ,�K(6

) . U

sing

Mat

sui�s

not

atio

n su

ppos

e th

e co

ntra

ints

:I[1

,2] ∆

O[3

,4]=

K(1

) [1,3

]R

1I[3

,4] ∆

O[1

,5]=

K(2

) [4,6

]R

2I[1

,5] ∆

O[1

,6]=

K(3

) [1,5

]R

3I[1

,6] ∆

O[2

,5]=

K(4

) [2]

R4

hold

with

pro

babi

litie

s p 1

= .8

, p2=

.9, p

3= .8

, p4=

.9, r

espe

ctiv

ely.

Wha

t is

the

prob

abilit

y th

at

P[1

,2] ∆

C[2

,5]=

K(1

) [1,3

] ∆K

(2) [4

,6] ∆

K(3

) [1,5

] ∆K

(4) [2

]?

Page 86: 1 University of Washington CSEP 590TU ΠPractical Aspects ......Security of Block Ciphers 2/7 Brian Cryptographic Protocols II 1/31 Brian Cryptographic Protocols I 1/24 Josh Public

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:16

86

Hom

ewor

k 6,

pro

blem

4(D

) Sup

pose

C is

a m

ulti

roun

d ite

rativ

e ci

pher

with

40

bit p

lain

text

inpu

t, P

, and

ci

pher

text

outp

ut, C

, and

40

bit k

ey.

Supp

ose,

usin

g M

atsu

i�s n

otat

ion,

that

th

e fo

llow

ing

four

line

arly

inde

pend

ent c

onst

rain

ts:

i.P

[a1(1

) , a 2

(1) ,�

, a40

(1) ] ∆

C[b

1(1) ,

b 2(1

) ,�, b

40(1

) ]= K

[c1(1

) , c 2

(1) ,�

, c40

(1) ]

ii.P

[a1(2

) , a 2

(2) ,�

, a40

(2) ] ∆

C[b

1(2) ,

b 2(2

) ,�, b

40(2

) ]= K

[c1(2

) , c 2

(2) ,�

, c40

(2) ]

iii.P

[a1(3

) , a 2

(3) ,�

, a40

(3) ] ∆

C[b

1(3) ,

b 2(3

) ,�, b

40(3

) ]= K

[c1(3

) , c 2

(3) ,�

, c40

(3) ]

iv.

P[a

1(4) ,

a 2(4

) ,�, a

40(4

) ] ∆

C[b

1(4) ,

b 2(4

) ,�, b

40(4

) ]= K

[c1(4

) , c 2

(4) ,�

, c40

(4) ]

hold

with

pro

babi

litie

s p 1

= .7

5, p

2= .7

, p3=

.8, p

4= .9

, res

pect

ivel

y.Su

ppos

e th

at o

n 10

pla

inte

xt/c

iphe

rtext

pairs

the

LHS

of i

, ii,

iii an

d iv

�vot

e�th

at th

e R

HS

of t

he e

quat

ions

are

0 w

ith ta

llies

(2,8

,2,8

)W

hat i

s th

e pr

obab

ilitie

s th

at e

ach

of th

e m

ost p

opul

ar c

hoic

es fo

r the

resu

lting

co

nstra

ints

is c

orre

ct?

Wha

t is

the

prob

abilit

y th

at a

ll 4

are

corre

ct?

If a

ll 4

are

corre

ct, a

nd a

ssum

ing

C ta

kes

1 m

icro

seco

nd/e

ncry

pt, w

hat i

s th

e tim

e to

br

eak

C b

y ex

haus

tive

sear

ch (a

ssum

ing

a se

rial p

roce

ssor

)? H

ow a

bout

by

appl

ying

the

4 co

nstra

ints

and

sea

rchi

ng fo

r the

rem

aini

ng k

ey b

its (a

ssum

ing

a se

rial p

roce

ssor

)?

PS

: Key

sea

rch

is a

�triv

ially

par

alle

lizab

le� o

pera

tion.

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87

Hom

ewor

k 6,

pro

blem

4

(E) I

n th

e le

ctur

e w

e no

ted

that

ther

e w

as a

line

ar a

ttack

that

wor

ked

on 1

6ro

und

DE

S w

ith 2

43pl

aint

ext/c

iphe

rtext

pairs

whe

re th

e ba

sic

cons

train

the

ld w

ith p

roba

bilit

y p=

½ +

ew

here

e= 1

.19

x 2-2

1 is

the

�bia

s�. U

sing

this

fact

, est

imat

e fo

r wha

t p, t

here

are

not

eno

ugh

corr

espo

ndin

gpl

ain/

ciph

er te

xts

to e

nabl

e ap

plyi

ng th

e Li

near

cry

ptan

alys

is to

redu

ce th

ese

arch

key

spac

e.

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88

End

Pap

er

�D

one