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Singapore–Hong Kong Symposium on Chinese Philosophy

13(FRI)-14(SAT), March 2015 Convenors: Dr. Franklin Perkins and Dr. Chenyang Li

Philosophy Programme, School of Humanities and Social Sciences Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

中國哲學

Singapore-Hong Kong Symposium on Chinese Philosophy 13-14 March 2015

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13 March 2015 (Friday)

08:30 – 09:00 REGISTRATION, HSS Conference Room (HSS-05-57) 09:00 – 09:10 WELCOME / OPENING REMARKS Alan K. L. CHAN

Professor; Dean of the College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Nanyang Technological University

09:10 – 10:30 KEYNOTE ADDRESS Chairperson: 09:10 – 10:30

Chenyang LI, Nanyang Technological University The Self-Cancellation of Monism: Transformation, Forgetting, and Zhuangzi's Rhetorical Two-Step Brook ZIPORYN University of Chicago

10:30 – 10:55 TEA BREAK 10:55 – 12:25 SESSION 1 Chairperson: 10:55 – 11:40 11:40 – 12:25

Franklin PERKINS, Nanyang Technological University Zhuangzi on "The Transformation of Things" CHONG Kim-chong Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Zhuangzi's Philosophy of Thing KWOK Sai Hang Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

12:25 - 13:35 LUNCH 13:35 – 15:50 SESSION 2 Chairperson: 13:35 – 14:20 14:20 – 15:05 15:05 – 15:50

Mary RILEY, National University of Singapore The Death of Hundun: Satire and Sanity in the Zhuangzi Hans-George MOELLER University of Macau

Ruan Ji's "Da Zhuang Lun"─A Neo-Daoist Metaphysics of Oneness David CHAI Chinese University of Hong Kong Zhuangzi’s Idea of Spirit and Nourishment of Life Wai Wai CHIU Lingnan University

15:50 – 16:15 TEA BREAK 16:15 – 18:30 SESSION 3 Chairperson: 16:15 – 17:00 17:00 – 17:45 17:45 – 18:30

HUANG Yong, Chinese University of Hong Kong Cultivating Feeling: Education and the Emotions in Classical and Intercultural Confucianism Eric S. NELSON Hong Kong University of Science and Technology/Univ. of Massachusetts Lowell Zhu Xi’s Criticism on the Methodology of Moral Cultivation of the Hu-Xiang School NG NG Kai-chiu The Chinese University of Hong Kong The Way without Crossroads Revisited Dan ROBINS University of Hong Kong

18:30 END OF DAY ONE 18:30 – 19:00 TRANSFER TO DINNER VENUE 19:00 – 21:00 CONFERENCE DINNER (For Speakers, Chairpersons & Invited Guests)


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For inquiries about the conference, please contact Franklin Perkins, the conference convenor,

at [email protected] and also Kyuhoon Cho, the coordinator, at [email protected]

Program Committee: Franklin Perkins (committee chair) (Nanyang Technological University/DePaul University), Yong Huang (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Loy Hui Chieh (National University

Singapore), Chenyang Li (Nanyang Technological University), Dan Robins (University of Hong Kong)

This conference is sponsored by the Center for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, the Philosophy Programme, and the HSS Global Asia Cluster of Nanyang Technological University

14 March 2015 (Saturday) 08:30 – 09:00 REGISTRATION, HSS Conference Room (HSS-05-57) 09:00 – 10:30 SESSION 4 Chairperson: 09:00 - 09:45 09:45 – 10:30

CHONG Kim-Chong, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology A Third Type of Knowledge in Addition to Knowing-that and Knowing-how? HUANG Yong The Chinese University of Hong Kong The Contemporary Construction of Chinese Philosophy GUO Yi Seoul National University


Els VAN DONGEN, Nanyang Technological University Two Views of Confucius in the Shanghai Museum Manuscripts Scott COOK Yale-NUS

Reconstructing Mozi’s Jian’ai 兼愛

Youngsun BACK City University of Hong Kong

12:25 – 13:35 LUNCH 13:35 – 15:05 SESSION 6 Chairperson: 13:35 – 14:20 14:20 – 15:05

Dan ROBINS, University of Hong Kong Logos and Dao Revisited: A Non-metaphysical Interpretation Steven BURIK Singapore Management University Philosophy of Music in Early China: Debates and Consummation So Jeong PARK Nanyang Technological University


LOY Hui chieh, National University of Singapore Being Contented versus Satisfying Our Desires: Zhuangzi and Xunzi and Their Attitudes towards Life TING On Ki Angel Hong Kong Baptist University Xunzi vs. the Primitivists on Nature and Culture Frank SAUNDERS Jr. University of Hong Kong

17:00 – 17:15 CONCLUDING REMARKS 17:15 END OF CONFERENCE

mailto:[email protected]



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KEYNOTE ADDRESS The Self-Cancellation of Monism: Transformation, Forgetting, and Zhuangzi's Rhetorical Two-Step Brook ZIPORYN University of Chicago [email protected] The Zhuangzi as a whole seems to express such a wealth of contradictory ideas that many modern scholars have found it advisable to divide it into the works of many separate authors expressing very different, and perhaps incompatible, points of view. I share the view that the 33 chapters of the extant Zhuangzi clearly show the work of several hands, working at different times and with identifiably different styles and agendas. But I think the Inner Chapters show an intricate inner coherence both philosophically and stylistically, which is crucial grasp before the more interesting of its ideas can be understood. In particular, I want to point today to a specific technique we find repeatedly in the Inner Chapters, but nowhere else in the anthology in any comparable density, easily missed because of the lack of punctuation and other inflectional markers in ancient Chinese writing. I will call this the rhetorical technique of “making and going beyond a provisional statement without rejecting it.” The high density of prevalance of this trope in precisely these chapters and not elsewhere is one good marker which I hope will suggest a deep inner connection in these texts, and perhaps help to argue against the view that they are a haphazardly assembled collection of unrelated statements. Further sealing the deal, in my view, is the fact that the examples of the same rhetorical trope repeat again and again weaving variations of a progression through the same handful of ideas. In various forms, they rehearse the relation between an expansion of perspective toward an awareness of a perspective that encompasses many smaller perspectives toward a sense of a causal whole, which then proceeds to an eschewal of this view of a known totality into a form of non-knowing, rooted in the very same premises. Again and again we will see a stairstepping from a refutation of a view of the world as consisting of a set of real distinctions of value, constituted by genuinely distinct entities with fixed identities, linked to limited perspectives and positioning in their proper places, resulting in the positing of a monistic view of a single total entity of the world that serves as the source of all production and the undifferentiated encompassing whole of all existence, to a further view that rejects the possibility of assigning any identity to that causal whole, or of even definitely knowing it to be a causal whole, yielding instead a self-forgetting transformation of perspectives and agnosis—non-knowing as a form of gnosis which does the same work that the previous monistic causal whole view did. The Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi show us a multi-dimensional variation on the these themes, not a philosophical argument but a fugue of sturucturally parallel conceptual rhymes: from separate identities, to global vision of oneness of whole and source, to abandonment of knowledge and oneness in forgtetting and transformation. The transforming agnosis view, however, is not a refutation and rejection of the monistic causal whole view, but a further self-negating entailment of it, with an appeal to both of these views as ultimately mutually entailing and perhaps, in the final analysis, synonymous. We might call it successive mutually eliciting momentary monisms, or omnicentrism.


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Brook A. ZIPORYN is a scholar of ancient and medieval Chinese religion and philosophy, expositor and translator of some of the most complex philosophical texts and concepts of the Chinese religious traditions. Professor Ziporyn received his BA in East Asian Languages and Civilizations from the University of Chicago, and his PhD from the University of Michigan. Prior to joining the Divinity School faculty, he has taught Chinese philosophy and religion at the University of Michigan (Department of East Asian Literature and Cultures), Northwestern University (Department of Religion and Department of Philosophy), Harvard University (Department of East Asian Literature and Civilization) and the National University of Singapore (Department of Philosophy). Ziporyn is the author of six published books: Evil And/Or/As the Good: Omnicentric Holism, Intersubjectivity and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought (Harvard, 2000), The Penumbra Unbound: The Neo-Taoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang (SUNY Press, 2003), Being and Ambiguity: Philosophical Experiments With Tiantai Buddhism (Open Court, 2004); Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Hackett, 2009); Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought; Prolegomena to the Study of Li (SUNY Press, 2012); and Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and its Antecedents (SUNY Press, 2013). He is currently working on a cross-cultural inquiry into the themes of death, time and perception, tentatively entitled Against Being Here Now, as well as a book-length exposition of atheism as a form of religious and mystical experience in the intellectual histories of Europe, India and China.


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Zhuangzi on "The Transformation of Things" CHONG Kim-chong Hong Kong University of Science and Technology [email protected] In the very first passage of the Zhuangzi, the immeasurably large fish Kun ”transforms” (hua 化) into a bird named Peng. Peng’s wings are like clouds that spread across the sky and it flies toward the southern darkness which is the “lake of heaven.” Two related concepts in the text are thus introduced, namely, transformation and sky/heaven ( tian 天). Together, they signal the concept of wu hua (物化) or the ”transformation of things.” I shall discuss this concept and its implications for Zhuangzi’s philosophy as a whole. As we shall see, the butterfly dream which appears at the end of chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi is only one of several fables, stories and dialogues which depict this concept of the transformation of things, and it will be better understood if we read it under this concept. A comparison will be made with the Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s analysis of “transformation” to deepen our understanding of Zhuangzi’s concept. CHONG Kim-chong earned his BA from the University of Singapore, and his PhD from the University of London. He taught at the National University of Singapore before joining the faculty of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.


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Zhuangzi's Philosophy of Thing KWOK Sai Hang Hong Kong University of Science and Technology [email protected] “Qiwulun” 齊物論 is one of the most philosophical texts in the Zhuangzi where the concept of thing is discussed in detail. Previous studies of this chapter have focused on Zhuangzi’s strategy of“equalizing things”齊物 while the concept of thing itself is seldom investigated independently. When “equalizing things” has become the main topic, scholars have focused only on how the myriad things can be equalized in a spiritual state. In this regard, their discussion already assumes that things are beings existing independently in the external world and thus can later be equalized or unified subjectively. Therefore, in their view, Zhuangzi only proposed a specific perspective of how things can be perceived, namely, that of oneness. However, is it true that Zhuangzi views oneness as a mere perspective? In this paper, we will argue that Zhuangzi has in fact proposed a general theory of thing, or a philosophy of thing, which reflects on how the concept of thing is commonly used. According to Zhuangzi’s philosophy of thing, the concept of thing is just a linguistic construction which pragmatic meaning is not only naming or referring; rather it is a linguistic action that transforms our basic relationship with beings in the world. We find that Zhuangzi distinguishes two attitudes of meeting beings in the world, namely weishi 為是 and yinshi 因是. In the yinshi attitude, beings in the world are encountered in our using without intention (the use of uselessness). In this state, they are functioning in a whole in our living background. However, by calling them “things,” they are objectified by people from the living background and treated as beings that embody facts and exist in the external world. This objective relation with beings in the world is called weishi. Base on this interpretation, I am going to argue that oneness is not a mere perspective or any mystical spiritual states as some scholars claim; rather, oneness as the state of being of the living background is just our primordial relationship with beings in the world. It is also the condition for things being objectified. In this regard, what the “Qiwulun” conveys is not an aesthetic perception of things against our natural attitude. Instead, it is a philosophical reflection on how things are separated from oneness so that they are treated as things. In this sense, I propose that there is a philosophy of thing in Zhuangzi’s thought. KWOK Sai Hang is a research student of ph.D. in humanities in the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He has earned his B.Sc. in mathematics and M.phil. in humanities in the same institute in 2011 and 2013 respectively. His research interest includes Daoism, Confucianism, phenomenology and comparative philosophy. Under the supervision of Professor CHONG Kim Chong and Professor Eric Sean NELSON, he is conducting a research on the phenomenology of life experience and the implication of the phenomenological movement to ethics and philosophy of life.


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The Death of Hundun: Satire and Sanity in the Zhuangzi Hans-George MOELLER University of Macau [email protected] This paper discusses several interpretations of the parable of Hundun’s Death which concludes the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi. The first part recapitulates readings of the tory from mythological and “medicinal” as well as from metaphysical and moral perspectives. It is argued that all these interpretations are equally justifiable because of the multi-dimensionality of the text. The second part presents a reading of the story as a satirical parody about three failed sages. It is argued that from this perspective, too, the story addresses “medicinal” issues of sanity and insanity. Hans-George MOELLER is full professor in the Philosophy and Religious Studies Program at the University of Macau, Macau. He previously held positions at University College Cork, Brock University, and Universität Bonn. His publication includes The Radical Luhmann (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), The Moral Fool. A Case for Amorality (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), Daodejing (Laozi). A Complete Translation and Commentary (Chicago: Open Court, 2007), Luhmann Explained. From Souls to Systems (Chicago: Open Court, 2006), The Philosophy of the Daodejing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), Italian translation: La filosofia del Daodejing (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), Chinese Translation: Daodejing de Zhexue (Beijing: Renmin, 2010), Daoism Explained. From the Dream of the Butterfly to the Fishnet Allegory (Chicago, La Salle: Open Court, 2004), Laozi. Freiburg (Herder Verlag, 2003), 8. In der Mitte des Kreises. Daoistisches Denken (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp/Insel, 2001; New Edition: Frankfurt/Main: Insel, 2010), Die philosophischste Philosophie. Feng Youlans Neue Metaphysik. Mit einer Übersetzung der „Neuen Methodologie” (The Most Philosophical Philosophy. Feng Youlan’s New Metaphysics) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000), Laotse. Tao-Te-King (Die Seidenmanuskripte von Mawangdui (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1995), and Die Bedeutung der Sprache in der frühen chinesischen Philosophie (The Meaning of Language in Early Chinese Philosophy) (Aachen: Shaker, 1994). Areas of his research interest are Chinese and comparative philosophy, social systems theory, and ethics.


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Ruan Ji's "Da Zhuang Lun"─A Neo-Daoist Metaphysics of Oneness David CHAI Chinese University of Hong Kong [email protected] Ruan Ji’s “On Comprehending Zhuangzi” is an interesting work on two accounts: first, it was written by a poet, not a philosopher; second, it attests to the worldview of Neo-Daoism in which the sage, or in Ruan Ji’s case, the exemplary person, embodies the ideals of harmony and spontaneity. Ruan Ji’s treatise is built around one principal task: to respond to his interlocutor’s criticism of Zhuangzi for perverting the truth of the world by claiming that good and bad fortune are without difference, life and death are equal, Heaven and earth are a single body, and the myriad things of the world belong to one class. Ruan Ji is able to defend Zhuangzi by employing the themes of harmony and spontaneity and by pointing out the flaws of an over-reliance on rational thought and historical practices. Where he differs from Zhuangzi is in his use of spontaneity as a supplement for Dao. He writes that “Heaven and earth came into being spontaneously and the myriad things were born in heaven and earth, thus there is nothing lying beyond spontaneity and so Heaven and earth derive their names from it.” The task of this paper is thus to explore Ruan Ji’s understanding of unity through spontaneity and to offer some possible explanations as to why he felt the need to modify the Zhuangzi’s formulation so as to better convey the vision of Neo-Daoism. David CHAI holds Masters (2005-2006) and Doctorate (2006-2012) degrees from the University of Toronto where from 2010-2013 he served as a Sessional Lecturer for the Department of Philosophy and the Department of East Asian Studies. Professor Chai’s principal area of research is Chinese philosophy with a focus on Daoism, specifically Zhuangzi. Secondary areas of research include Modern European philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and comparative philosophy. Professor Chai endeavors to bring together the philosophical traditions of East and West wherever possible and is currently doing so by way of the doctrine of meontology—the study of nothingness. In addition to general courses such as the History of Chinese Philosophy, Introduction to Western Philosophy, and Introduction to Chinese Culture, Professor Chai has also taught courses on Classical Daoism, Early Medieval Daoism, Medieval Chinese Philosophy, Personhood in Ancient China, and reader courses on Laozi and Zhuangzi. In addition to offering these at CUHK, future courses will be devoted to the subjects of cosmology, temporality, technology, music, and nihilism.


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Zhuangzi’s Idea of Spirit and Nourishment of Life Wai Wai CHIU Lingnan University [email protected] It is well known that, in the Zhuangzi, problems of understanding and practice arise from taking one’s completed heart-mind (cheng xin 成心) as the guidance. Questions remain about what can be the guidance in one’s person if the completed heart-mind is not in charge. One possible candidate is spirit (shen 神), as discussed in several skill passages such as the story of Cook Ding and the cicada catcher. In this article, I articulate the relationship between heart-mind and spirit to show three points: first, spirit is a kind of qi 氣 that relates to clarity in thinking or action, or rather the state in which that qi runs smoothly. This reading brings the skill passages together with the fasting of heart-mind (xin zhai 心齋) passage. Secondly, the proceeding of spirit admits no fixed ways and is not confined to any particular organ or faculty, so it avoids the problem of self-assertion mentioned in Qiwulun. Thirdly, the proceeding of spirit implies that one’s practice takes as many particularities of the context as possible into account, so the person has a higher chance to reduce conflict in interacting with things and other people and bring out their potential. This is a reason why skillful activates are related to Zhuangzi’s ideal of nourishing life, both physiologically and psychologically. Wai Wai CHIU is Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department at Lingnan University. He received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of New South Wales. Areas of specialization are pre-Qin Daoism and Mohism. His recent publications include “Assessment of li in the Mencius and the Mozi.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13(2): 199-214 (2014), “Ming in the Zhuangzi Neipian: Enlightened Engagement.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40 (3-4): 527-543 (2013), “Jian ai and the Mohist attack of early Confucianism.” Philosophy Compass 8 (5): 425-437 (2013), and “Challenges and Arguments.” Journal of Chinese philosophy and Culture 8: 325-351 (2010).


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The Debate over Confucius in European Philosophy Eric S. NELSON Hong Kong University of Science and Technology/University of Massachusetts Lowell [email protected] Modern Western philosophy has been largely indifferent if not hostile to non-Western forms of thought, including Confucian philosophy. However, an exceptional group of Western thinkers have argued that Eastern forms of thought such as Confucianism offer suggestive models for Western philosophical reflection and practice. Since Malebranche’s critique of “Spinozist Confucianism,” the exotic figure of Confucius has been entangled in European debates about the intrinsic religiosity of morality or the possibility of a more secular and more rationalistic ethics. On the one hand, Confucius has been condemned by a series of philosophers from Malebranche through Hegel to Rosenzweig for inadequately formulating the religious character of morality. Confucian ethics has also been depicted as inadequate to the rational character of ethics by Kant and as being yet another variety of priestly morality by Nietzsche, However, on the other hand, Confucius is defended as an Enlightening religious philosopher in the writings of Leibniz and Wolff, who prioritized the ethical in interpreting religion, and understood as prefiguring or indicating the possibility of a secular non-religious ethics in works from Voltaire through Misch to Fingarette. I will consider the philosophical issue of whether ethics must be religious or whether there can be a valid secular ethics by exploring select historical examples of the role and interpretation of Confucianism in German philosophy. I examine in particular how a diverse range of religious and secular German thinkers intellectually engaged Chinese culture and thought by debating the religious and ethical significance of Confucian philosophy in a modern European context. Eric S. NELSON is Associate Professor of Department of Philosophy at University of Massachusetts Lowell. He received his PhD in Philosophy from Emory University in 2002. His areas of research and teaching are “History of Philosophy: 18th- to 20th-Century German Philosophy”, “Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of Nature and Environment, Philosophy of Religion”, and “Chinese, Buddhist, and Comparative/Intercultural Philosophy and Religion”. His publications include Between Levinas and Heidegger (Albany: SUNY Press, 2014), Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), Anthropologie und Geschichte. Studien zu Wilhelm Dilthey aus Anlass seines 100. Todestages (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2013), Rethinking Facticity (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), Addressing Levinas (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), Special Topic Issue: “Mind and Emotion (xin)” in Frontiers of Philosophy in China (2014), and supplemental Issue on European and Chinese Philosophy in Journal of Chinese Philosophy (2012).


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Zhu Xi’s Criticism on the Methodology of Moral Cultivation of the Hu-Xiang School NG Kai-chiu The Chinese University of Hong Kong [email protected] In the 12th century of China, there was an interesting philosophical debate on the methodology of moral cultivation, an essential topic of Neo-Confucianism, between Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200) and the Hu-Xiang School (湖湘學派). This paper aims at clarifying, assessing and developing Zhu Xi’s criticism on his opposites. Based on Mengzi (孟子, 372-289 BC), the Hu-Xiang School states that human mind is originally moral. This mind manifests itself in many occasions in our daily life, such as the famous example in Mengzi, “when seeing a child on the verge of falling into a well, one would certainly be moved to compassion.” According to this theory, moral cultivation is equal to cultivating or extending this mind, and to bring about successful moral cultivation, the very first and essential step is to “識” – know and grasp – this mind. We can call this Hu-Xiang’s view of moral cultivation as “the theory of knowing and grasping the mind”. Zhu Xi objects to it. In his view, just as an eye cannot see itself, “the mind is a knowing subject, how can we treat it as an object to be known and grasped?” The Hu-Xiang’s “theory of knowing and grasping the mind” is simply mistaken. However, doesn’t Zhu Xi’s criticism violate our common belief that our mind can reflect on itself? It is so obvious that we can know that we know. That means the mind’s function of knowing can be reflexive – “knowing” can be applied to “knowing” itself. An eye cannot see itself, but the mind can know itself. The analogical argument seems not to be working as well as Zhu Xi originally intended. I will argue that Zhu Xi’s criticism is much more sophisticated than the literal sense. What he really wants to point out is that “knowing one’s mind” in Hu-Xiang’s sense involves in fact two different functions of the mind but not only one. For example, in the case of “seeing a child on the verge of falling into a well”, the reaction that “being moved to compassion” is something emotional, whereas “knowing and grasping” this “heart of compassion” have something to do with judgment – to see the emotion as something valuable to keep and extend. As emotion and judgment involve different functions of the mind, the work of “knowing and grasping the mind” is not similar to “knowing one knows”. Finding the theory of Hu-Xiang unsatisfactory in explaining our moral experiences, Zhu Xi would like to provide us a far more accurate one.

NG Kai-chiu graduated from the Department of Philosophy of CUHK (with honor, first class) in 2001, then continued his graduate study in that department, and finally got his Ph.D. in 2009. He taught as an instructor at the Chinese Civilisation Centre (CCIV) of City University of Hong Kong (2008), and at the Department of Philosophy of CUHK (2009-2011). He is currently Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy of CUHK (since 2011).


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The Way without Crossroads Revisited Dan ROBINS University of Hong Kong [email protected] Herbert Fingarette argued that for Confucius the Way is \a way without crossroads," that is, that a moral agent never genuinely faces a choice between competing ways. This paper mostly defends that claim, though with reference to the Mencius rather than the Analects. Some reformulation is required. Fingarette's conception of what it would be for a way to feature crossroads is (intentionally) bound up with thick concepts of choice and responsibility that derive from western traditions. This makes it unlikely that any early Chinese philosopher conceived of the way as having crossroads in his intended sense. Accordingly, I reformulate the idea in what I hope are less tradition-bound terms. This leads me to focus on three questions. How did the authors of the Mencius conceive of the ostensible ways of their rivals? What did they have to say about hard cases in which norms they endorsed conflict? And what role if any did they give to normative judgment in the moral cultivation of an individual? (This need not be the normative judgment of the individual concerned, it might be the judgment of a teacher or an ancient sage, for example.) I argue that the answers to these questions imply that the authors of the Mencius conceived of their way as a way without crossroads. Most of my time will be spent on the third question, since that turns out to be trickiest. I argue that the authors of the Mencius thought of moral cultivation in such a way that it made sense to ask whether and to what extent an individual was cultivated, but not whether the individual had been cultivated in the right way. This is so even on interpretations (such as my own) that take the Mencius to be advancing relatively modest claims about human nature: even if the spontaneous dispositions of our nature do not do all the work in explaining how we can develop morally, the texts consistently ignore, disavow, or rule out the possibility that our cultivation will be guided by normative judgment. Dan ROBINS was born in Toronto and schooled in Montreal and Hong Kong. Before returning to HKU in 2012, I taught at the Richard Stockton College of New Jersey for several years and at the University of Michigan for one. My work focuses on Chinese philosophy of the pre-imperial Warring States period. I also enjoy poking around in various corners of ethics, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and so on. For less philosophical fun, I cook and fiddle with software. I have a reasonably complete list of publications on academia.edu.

http://hku-hk.academia.edu/DanRobins


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A Third Type of Knowledge in Addition to Knowing-that and Knowing-how? HUANG Yong The Chinese University of Hong Kong [email protected] Gilbert Ryle made the famous distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how (Ryle 1946, 1968 and 1990). While the former is theoretical, the latter is practical. The point that Ryle attempts to make in drawing this distinction is to highlight the latter, as it has not been paid enough attention to. Having initiated a debate between intellectualism and practicalism in the Western scholarship (see Fantl 2008 and Hetherington 2011), this distinction has also attracted a significant amount of attention from scholars doing Chinese philosophy. As the type of knowledge emphasized in Confucianism is clearly practical, it is now claimed to be knowing-how in contrast to knowing-that (see, for example, Raphals 1992: 9; Wong 1989; Kupperman 2005, and Tu 2002). In this paper, by focusing on Wang’s liangzhi, I argue that what is unique to Confucian knowledge cannot be explained by either knowing-that or knowing-how. Liangzhi is not merely the knowledge of what is good and what is evil but also the knowledge that loves the good and hates the evil; this love for the good and hate for the evil is not included in Ryle’s knowing-that or knowing-how. For example if I know that I ought to love my parents and I know how to love them, both in Ryle’s senses, it is still possible that I don’t love them. However, if I have the liangzhi about love for my parents in Wang’s sense, I will not only (1) know that I ought to love my parents but (2) will also be inclined to love them, which will inevitably lead me to seek (3) the most appropriate and efficient ways to love them. While the first is clearly knowing-that and the third the knowing-how, I dub the second the knowing-to, not in the exactly same sense as Steve Hetherington and his colleague Karyn Lai use it (see Hetherington forthcoming, Hetherington and Lai 2012, and Lai 2012). In this understanding, Wang’s liangzhi includes both knowing-that and knowing-to, while knowing-how is what liangzhi will naturally lead to. (Here I revise my previous view that liangzhi also includes knowing how, as liangzhi, both knowing-that and knowing-to, is what everyone is born with, while knowing-how is clearly not.) HUANG Yong, Ph.D in Philosophy (Fudan University) and Th.D in Religious Studies (Harvard University), had taught at Kutztown University of Pennsylvania since 1996 before he moved to the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2013. With interest in both philosophy and religious studies and familiar with both Western and Chinese traditions, his research focus has been on moral (both ethical and political) issues from an interdisciplinary and comparative perspective. Dr. Huang is currently a co-chair of the Confucian Tradition Group of American Academy of Religion. He was a Co-chair of the University Seminar on Neo-Confucian Studies at Columbia University until he moved to CUHK. In the past, he also served as the President of Association of Chinese Philosophers in American (1999-2001). During this tenure, among other things, he inaugurated a book series, ACPA Series in Chinese and Comparative Philosophy, and a journal, Dao: A Journal of Comparative philosophy. He has been the chief editor of the latter since the very beginning.


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The Contemporary Construction of Chinese Philosophy GUO Yi Seoul National University [email protected] The Chinese philosophy was integrated by six parts, namely the theory of benyuan本原论, the theory of human nature, the theory of human mind, theory of human life, ethics and politics. Among them, the theory of benyuan and the theory of human nature belong to the learning beyond physical form形而上学, the theory of human life, ethics and politics belong to the learning under physical form形而下学, and the theory of human mind belongs to the learning between the beyond and the under physical forms. The learning under physical learning reflects the value of the philosophers, while the learning beyond physical form is the supporting theoretical structure for their value, and as the learning between the beyond and under physical forms, the theory of human mind is the connection of the above two. In the history, the development of Chinese philosophy was manifested on the level of value, as well as on the level of the supporting theoretical structure. If we can use “Dao” to express the value, so that the former is “broadening the Dao”弘道, the latter is “proving the Dao”证道. The development of contemporary Chinese philosophy will continue to manifest on the two levels. As the level of “broadening the Dao”, it will absorb the universal values from the West and other civilizations based on the universal values from the Chinese civilization. The so-called Chinese universal values include taihe太和 of Zhouyi, ziran自然 of Daoism, renyi仁义 of Confucianism and cibei 慈悲 of Buddhism. As the level of “proving the Dao”, the philosophers will provide the supporting theoretical structures for the world universal values which was fused by the universal values from all the civilizations on the world. GUO Yi is a professor at Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (since 2003); vice Chair of Academic Committee, International Confucian Association (since 2002); guest Professor at China University of Political Science and Law (since 2007); vice president and chair of Academic Committee, Nishan Confucius Birthplace Academy (since 2008). He was a researcher at Institute of Confucius, Qufu Normal University (1984-1993). After receiving his Ph.D. from Fudan University in Chinese philosophy (1993), he was appointed as assistant professor (1993-1996), then as associate professor (1996-2003) at Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Afterward, he was appointed as visiting scholar at Harvard, USA (1999-2001); as guest professor at Seoul National University, Korea (2002-2004); and as Fulbright Research Scholar at University of Wisconsin at Madison, USA (2008-2009).


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Two Views of Confucius in the Shanghai Museum Manuscripts Scott COOK Yale-NUS [email protected] Recently excavated Warring States bamboo manuscripts, especially the grave-looted manuscripts of Chu purchased by the Shanghai Museum, include a number of texts in which we find Kong Zi 孔子, Confucius, portrayed in dialogue with important ministers and disciples, each offering relatively sustained discourse on some aspect of ethical governance. This paper examines two of those manuscripts, “Kong Zi Had Audience with Ji Huanzi” 孔子見季桓子 and “Ji Kangzi wen yu Kong Zi” 季康子問於孔子, and analyzes what they might have to tell us about the philosophical debates of the 4th Century BC. Scott COOK 顧史考 received his Ph.D. in Chinese from the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Michigan in 1995, and spent the next eighteen years teaching at Grinnell College, where he served as Cowles-Kruidenier Chair of Chinese Studies. Beginning last year, he has moved on to serve as Tan Chin Tuan Professor of Chinese Studies at Yale-NUS College in Singapore. He specializes in pre-Qin textual studies and early Chinese intellectual history. He is author of the books The Bamboo Texts of Guodian: a Study and Complete Translation (Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series, 2012), Guodian Chujian xian-Qin rushu hongweiguan 郭店楚簡先秦儒書宏微觀 (The Pre-Imperial Confucian Texts of Guodian: Broad and Focused Perspectives) (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 2006), editor of Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), and the author of over fifty articles in English and Chinese.


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Reconstructing Mozi’s Jian’ai 兼愛 Youngsun BACK City University of Hong Kong [email protected] This paper examines Mozi’s 墨子 doctrine of Jian’ai (兼愛). The secondary literature on Mozi’s jian’ai has been written primarily based on the Mengzian contrast between Mozi’s jian’ai as “love without distinctions” and Ruist ren (仁 benevolence) as “love with distinctions.” According to Mengzi’s simply appraisal of “love without distinctions,” Mozi’s jian’ai has been interpreted as prescribing universal obligations, meaning that all beings have the same ethical duties toward all other beings. However, in this paper, I argue that Mozi’s jian’ai is a complex and multilayered system that promotes universal obligations and, at the same time, incorporates particularistic obligations as well. In the first section, by analyzing the three chapters of “Jian’ai,” I argue that there are three different layers in Mozi’s doctrine of jian’ai: Impartial Care1, Impartial Care2, and Impartial Care3. At the basic level, Impartial Care1 applies to each distinct relationship we encounter in our lives. By practicing Impartial Care1, we give equal weight to the well-being of another person and our own, and thereby we fulfill our various obligations toward others. At the second level, Mozi required a more demanding form of Impartial Care2: in our dealings with non-particular others (i.e., strangers), we should take care of them as we take care of particular others (e.g., family). At the third level, Mozi demanded the most difficult and extreme form of Impartial Care3 from rulers: rulers should take care of all people equally. In the second section, based on this analysis of Mozi’s jian’ai, I investigate to what extend Mengzi’s criticism of Mozi was accurate and to what extent his criticism misrepresented Mozi’s doctrine of jian’ai. I argue that Impartial Care1 does not in any way in conflict with the Ruist emphasis on particularistic obligations. It is Impartial Care2 that is something similar to what Mengzi criticized. Nevertheless, I argue that Mozi’s Impartial Care2 is a more complex and nuanced one. Furthermore, concerning Impartial Care3, I think Mengzi would not have opposed it either because he would not deny the portrayals of various sage kings that Mozi provided in order to defend the practicability of his doctrine. However, I argue that there is a crucial difference between Mozi and Mengzi in their ways of perceiving the ideal rulership. My conclusion is that neither Mozi nor Mengzi ignored the significance of universal obligations as well as particularistic obligations. Rather, a major difference between them lies in the way that they related these seemingly conflicting notions of universal and particularistic obligations into their own systems: Mozi’s “from the whole (universal obligations) to the parts (particularistic obligations)” vs. Mengzi’s “from the parts to the whole.” Youngsun BACK received her BA in journalism from Ewha Womans University, an MA in Korean studies from Ewha Womans University, and an MA and PhD in East Asian Languages and Literature from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Her research interests include Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, especially comparative study of Zhu Xi and Dasan.


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Logos and Dao Revisited: A Non-metaphysical Interpretation Steven BURIK Singapore Management University [email protected] The notion of logos has been a long-time favourite amongst comparative scholars looking for a term to translate dao. It seems that enough scholars have looked into possible connections between the term logos and the notion of dao. After all, there are, at least on the surface, similarities between the two: both can mean ‘speaking’, ‘discourse’, ‘language’, and both refer to patterns in the world. I will argue that in many instances, the approach of some of the scholars who have compared logos and dao has been one-sided and has mostly consisted in comparisons of these two key notions that have sought to portray both as denoting some kind of metaphysical principle underlying the processes that make up our world. However, when another perspective is employed, logos and dao might fruitfully be compared on a different level than most of these comparisons do. I will first provide an alternative to this metaphysical approach to logos, and consequently to dao, using Heidegger’s interpretations of logos through his rereading of Heraclitus. Instead of the usual metaphysical approaches there is a different way to compare the two notions that is non-metaphysical, in other words, an interpretation where logos and dao are not seen as principles that stand above and govern in some way the world as we know it. Second, I will engage with the language component that accompanies both notions of logos and dao. In the traditional view, language is seen as an incomplete vehicle to be discarded when ‘real’ understanding of higher principles takes place. But both Heidegger and the Daoists are of the view that such a shortsighted idea of language is mistaken, and they are extremely aware of the necessity of language, and in their own way argue for an opening up of language to its own possibilities, rather than remaining in its limited metaphysical field. Language is not denied, but a certain idea and use of language, the metaphysical or propositional and representational use, is denied dominance and superiority over other avenues. As such thinking about language also opens up new ways to understand both logos and dao. I will show that such an interpretation as I will venture is much closer to both Heidegger and Daoism, and that consequently, comparative philosophy needs to be aware of imposing metaphysical claims on culturally different ways of thought.

Steven BURIK is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in School of Social Sciences at Singapore Management University. He obtained his PhD in Comparative Philosophy from National University of Singapore in 2006 and his MA in Philosophy from Erasmus University Rotterdam in 1999. His research interests are continental philosophy and Chinese philosophy.


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Philosophy of Music in Early China: Debates and Consummation So Jeong PARK Nanyang Technological University [email protected] Music has been a hugely missed theme in the field of Chinese philosophy despite its significance in early China. This paper shows musical discourses in early China as a colorful landscape, in which different thinkers weave their own patterns and different voices ring. I will explore the process of development in musical theory and practice throughout the debates between the various schools over different stages of the Warring States period. A uniformed description of Confucian ‘ritual and music’ is misled. I will examine the aesthetic positions of the different camps which had once attacked Confucian idea and explain the different responses from the Confucian camps as well. We will see that as a result of internal and external contention, musical discourse of the early China came to take on its unique character. So Jeong PARK is currently lecturer of Philosophy/Chinese at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She received her Ph.D in Chinese philosophy from Yonsei University (Seoul, Korea) in 2002, with a dissertation on Zhuangzi’s philosophy of art. Her publications include “Musical Thought in the Zhuangzi: A Criticism of the Confucian Discourse on Ritual and Music” (Dao, Fall 2013), “Sound, Tone, and Music in Early China: Philosophical Foundation for Chinese Sound Culture” (Inter-culturality and Philosophic Discourse, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). She is currently writing a book entitled Landscape of Sound: Aesthetic Philosophy in the Music Theory in Early China.


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Being Contented versus Satisfying Our Desires: Zhuangzi and Xunzi and Their Attitudes towards Life TING On Ki Angel Hong Kong Baptist University [email protected] Tian in the book of Zhuangzi and the book of Xunzi is portrayed as nature, or the natural world, rather than an anthropomorphic heaven that directs the behaviours of humans. Although both Zhuangzi and Xunzi acknowledges the importance of knowing this tian, the implication of this knowledge on their attitudes towards life is vastly different - while Zhuangzi emphasizes being the companion of tian (與天為徒), Xunzi emphasizes the division between natue and mankind (天人之分), and the establishment of a good government to organize the society and manipulate the nature. Zhuangzi sees tian as nature with constant transformation, where myriad things in the world come into existence through the transformation of qi (氣). Humans, being one of the myriad things in the natural world, cannot escape this transformation of qi and hence they must confront this natural world. Zhuangzi recognizes that humans often encounter circumstances that are "inevitable" (不得已), which he referred to as fate (命). Nevertheless, rather than seeking to change the world to satisfy human needs, Zhuangzi stresses that we must be content with this fate (知其不可奈何而安之若命), by changing our beliefs so it conforms to the transformation of myriad things; his ideal is to become companion with tian. Unlike the traditional view of anthropomorphic tian described in the Analacts and Mencius, Xunzi affirms that tian refers to an impersonal nature. Neither will it reward the good nor punish the bad. All the celestial movements are natural phenomena that occur without specific reasons. Nevertheless, a constancy (常) can be found in this course of nature, and the duty of humans is to understand this constancy and establish a good government (治) by making good use of the resources provided by the earth (天有其時，地有其財，人有其治). For Xunzi, it is essential to establish an order because he recognizes the fact that humans have various desires that needs to be satisfied, and desires can only be satisfied by making good use of the resources available. With the emphasis on desire, humans are seen to be motivated by their desire to change to world. Through analyzing their conception of tian and the importance of knowing tian (知天), this paper aims to show the difference in the motivational structures of Zhuangzi and Xunzi. Zhuangzi, emphasizing on being content with fate, does not attempt to change the world in order to fit the human nature. Instead, he urges humans to change their heart-mind in order to participate in the transformation and become part of the natural cycle. In this sense, he emphasizes changing the belief to fit the world, which is a "mind to world" direction of fit, and hence this explains why he condemns people who actively participate in changing the world, such as Confucianism. Xunzi, on the contrary, emphasizes satisfying human desires, aims to organize the world through establishing a good government, which is a "world to mind" direction of fit. This also explains why Xunzi highlighted the concept of desires.


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Xunzi vs. the Primitivists on Nature and Culture Frank SAUNDERS Jr. University of Hong Kong [email protected] I focus here on a dispute between the philosopher Xunzi and the primitivist authors of Zhuangzi Books 8-10 about the relationship between nature and culture. Unlike Mencius, the primitivists and Xunzi are in agreement that traditional cultural norms like ren-yi as understood by the Ru and the Mo are not a part of our natural constitution, our xing (nature) and qing (constitution). Their disagreement is over whether we should adopt traditional moral and cultural norms anyway. The primitivists claim that a society with simple norms and institutions—far less elaborate and invasive than ren-yi—that enables people to live in accordance with their xing and qing is best. They call this ideal the “age of de” (de zhi shi 德之世) where de refers to simple activities that arise out of natural desires, such as farming for food and weaving clothing to keep warm. Xunzi denies the possibility of such a society in both XZ 23.3 and 23.4, claiming that all cultural norms inevitably cause us to go beyond or oppose our xing. Xunzi’s catch-all term for culturally or socially motivated (as opposed to spontaneous xing-motivated) behaviors is wei, and he spends much of Book 23 elaborating the distinction between xing and wei. I argue that the primitivists’ example of the state of de either undermines this distinction, or severely weakens its ability to justify Xunzi’s ideal state and its demanding values like ren-yi. If a minimal state in harmony with xing is possible, then Xunzi’s distinction falls apart. If we retain Xunzi’s distinction, however, and grant that the “state of de” involves the curbing or suppression of some of our xing by wei, then Xunzi needs an explanation of why his ideal maximally invasive state is better than the primitivists’ minimally invasive one. Essentially, Xunzi must explain why xing must always and to the utmost be opposed by wei. I conclude that his most promising strategy is to appeal to the “badness” (e 惡) of xing, which he does, but that this approach has serious problems of its own.


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List of Participants

Name Affiliation Position Email Address

1 Youngsun BACK City University of Hong Kong Postdoc Fellow [email protected]

2 Steven BURIK Singapore Management University Asst. Professor [email protected]

3 David CHAI Chinese University of Hong Kong Asst. Professor [email protected]

4 Alan K. L.CHAN Nanyang Technological University Dean [email protected]

5 Wai Wai CHIU Lingnan University Asst. Professor [email protected]

6 Kyuhoon CHO Nanyang Technological University Postdoc Fellow [email protected]

7 CHONG Kim-chong

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Professor [email protected]

8 Scott COOK Yale-NUS Professor [email protected]

9 Chenyang LI Nanyang Technological University Assoc. Professor [email protected]

10 GUO Yi Seoul National University Professor [email protected]

11 HUANG Yong The Chinese University of Hong Kong Professor [email protected]

12 KWOK Sai Hang Hong Kong University of Science and Technology PhD Candidate [email protected]

13 Franklin Thomas PERKINS

DePaul University/Nanyang Technological University

Professor/ Visiting Professor [email protected]

14 Hans-George MOELLER University of Macau Professor [email protected]

15 Eric S. NELSON University of Massachusetts Lowell Assoc. Professor [email protected]

16 NG Kai-chiu The Chinese University of Hong Kong Asst. Professor [email protected]

17 So Jeong PARK Nanyang Technological University Asst. Professor [email protected]

18 Mary RILEY National University of Singapore PhD Candidate [email protected]

19 Dan ROBINS University of Hong Kong Asst. Professor [email protected]

20 Frank SAUNDERS University of Hong Kong Mphil Student [email protected]

21 TING On Ki Angel

Hong Kong Baptist University Lecturer [email protected]

22 Els VAN DONGEN

Nanyang Technological University Asst. Professor [email protected]

23 Brook ZIPORYN University of Chicago Professor [email protected]













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