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1

A. Interpretation

Substantially means without material qualificationBlacks Law Dictionary 1991[p. 1024]

Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.

B. Violation the affirmative qualifies their increase they only increase transportation

infrastructure in rural areas.C. Voting issue1. Ground/fairness the neg can only be ensured strong generic links to spending, politics,

and oil DAs if the aff has to defend a wholesale, unqualified increase of transportationinfrastructure

2. Education breadth is greater than depth learning about more types of transportationinfrastructure is better than learning about small areas of the topic teaches us moreabout the topic in general

2

The Department of Transportation should submit investment in theconstruction andmaintenance of rural transportation infrastructure in the United States for a NationalEnvironmental Policy Act Environmental Impact Statement. The United States federalgovernment should implement the least environmentally damaging alternative identified in theEnvironmental Impact Statement.

The counterplan is not topical and plan-minus

It severs shouldSummers 94 (JusticeOklahoma Supreme Court, Kelsey v. DollarsaverFood Warehouse of Durant, 1994 OK 123, 11-8,http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity ormay be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be

governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if theomission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e.,an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of adisputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16[CONTINUES TO FOOTNOTE]13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" withvarious shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall 9, Judgments 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN,GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P.

1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contextsmandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference ordesirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages inproportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligationand to be more thanadvisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules ofAppellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" wasinterpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211,

215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or"must" when used in an instruction to the jury whichtells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law ispresently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effectivein the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

It severs substantialWords and Phrases 1925Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 7, p. 6738

The wordsoutward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive, in connection with a change of possession,mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment,dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed

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to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute;real at present time,as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to anyothers; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

The counterplan solves the process of evaluating environmentally friendly alternatives pr ior to action leads to a compromise that solves the aff and the environment

Dreher 5 - Deputy Executive Director of the Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute. He served as Deputy GeneralCounsel of the U.S. Environmental Protection AgencyRobert, The Political Assault on the National Environmental Policy Act,http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/research_archive/nepa/NEPAUnderSiegeFinal.pdf

Yet anothercriticism ofthe NEPA review process is that it impedes the development ofconsensus support forsolutionsto environmental problems. In fact, there is no necessary conflict between the decision-making process

established by NEPA and the formation ofconsensus around particular projects or programs. Properlyconducted, the NEPA process can be instrumental in achieving lasting solutions with broad publicsupport. Those who insist on seeing conflict between NEPA and consensus building argue, in effect, for rolling back the most val uable aspects of the NEPAprocess for no good reason. According to some critics, conflict between NEPA and so-called collaborative decision-making processes is inevitable. Collaborativedecision-making is typically understood as an i terative process of consultation among government officials and stakeholder representatives designed to develop aconsensus solution for a particular natural resource problem. Expressing a representative viewpoint, Douglas MacDonald, Secretary of Transportation for the State ofWashington, recently opined that the NEPA process creates a context for discussion and problem-solving that maximizes the polarization of opinion, the staking outof positions, and the exclusion of iteration and compromise in problem solving. 49 To like effect, the Deput y Chief of the Forest Service has commented: Therequirement that alternatives to proposed actions and their effects be documented in an environmental impact statement and environmental assessment prior to adecision does not facilitate a collaborative process between agencies or with other interests. ... Documenting and circulating ... alternatives in a draft and finaldocument for public comment fosters an assumption that the decision maker has a range of options to choose from and various i nterests can weigh in and commenton the alternatives they support. There is no incentive built into the NEPA process to work toward a single solution that accommodates multiple interests. 50 TheForest Services new forest planning regulations reflect this viewpoint, calling the traditional approach of developing and evaluating alternatives in the planningprocess divisive. 51 Under the new regulations, forest plans will be developed through a collaborative process that encourage[s] people to work together tounderstand each other and find common solutions. 52 Significantly, environmental analysis will apparently play little if any role in that endeavor; the planningregulations state that Forest Service will not provide indepth social, economic, or ecological analysis for options that are discussed in the collaborative process, 53and the Service separately proposed to exempt forest planning from NEPA analysis altogether. 54 There is unquestionably a serious tension between the NEPA

process and the type of collaborative approach advanced by the Forest Service. As discussed, NEPA is based on the principles thatinformation on environmental impacts is important in making rational choices among options

and that the public should have broad access to the decision-making process. The Forest Services approachignores both principles, threatening to recreate the kind of narrow, environmentally-insensitive decision-making that prevailed prior to NEPAs enactment. Byessentially eliminating environmental analysis, the Forest Services approach leaves agency personnel and other participants in the planning process effectively blind

to the potential effects of a proposed management approach. Theagencys refusal to identify and evaluate alternatives , in particular,will preclude meaningful evaluation ofthe potential environmental benefits and tradeoffs offered bydifferent management approaches. Furthermore, theForest Services substitution of a vague collaborativeprocess forthe clearly-defined rights ofpublic involvement under NEPA threatens to limit, and possiblybias, public engagement in the planning process. The Forest Service will itself choose the participants in i ts collaborative process;it may either deliberately or instinctively select citizens and groups that it views as likely to agree with its views, and exclude those that it anticipates will makereaching consensus difficult. Thus, the representativeness and fairness of the agencys collaborative process will frequently be open to question. Citizens outsidethe collaborative process, meanwhile, will be denied all the procedural rights afforded by NEPA, including the opportunity to participate in scoping sessions, toreceive information on the environmental impacts of the agencys proposed action, to propose alternative approaches, and to offer comments on the accuracy of theagencys environmental analysis. Ultimately, the Forest Services approach appears to be based on the notion that by embracing a philosophy of collaboration, andcontrolling the range of viewpoints involved in planning, the agency can magically make disputes over management of forest lands disappear. In reality, managementof federal lands, like most government actions affecting the environment, inevitably raises conflicts among different values and interests. NEPA is based on the sound

premise that these types ofconflicts are best resolved through an inclusive, analytically rigorous process , notan artificially-constrained search for consensus. There are other approaches to collaborative decision-making that do allow federal agencies to engage the public

broadly in their planning processes without undercutting environmental reviews. There is no necessary conflict between a well-managed NEPA process and an effort to arrive at a conclusion supported by broad publicconsensus. The scoping process that agencies undertake before beginning preparation of an EIS is explicitly intended to be a collaborative process, albeit anopen one, drawing together agency planners, concerned citizens, tribes and other affected governments to define the key environmental issues and alternativeapproaches that should be studied by the agency. Agencies can continue that cooperative approach throughout the EIS process, consulting with the public and withother affected interests to build consensus on a preferred alternative, on mitigation measures, and on issues arising during scientific studies in the course of

preparing the EIS. Concurrent with or subsequent to the NEPA process, agencies can employ alternative dispute resolution,negotiated rule-making, or othertechniques in an attempt to arrive at a conclusion with broadpublic support. 55 Such dispute resolution efforts are actually more likely to succeed oncedisputed issues have been thoroughly aired and narrowed through the NEPA review process.The recent success in the Gifford Pinchot National Forest in Washington State, described earlier, illustrates thepotential for NEPA to help generate solutions with broad public support. In that case,environmentalists, timber companies, local citizens and the Forest Service used the NEPA processas the springboard for negotiating a new management approach for the national forest that reconciled timber harvestingwith ecological goals. A local resident involved in the process concluded: We were able to get timber out in an environmentallyresponsible way, and we succeeded in avoiding appeals that plague controversial timber sales .56

3

Transportation infrastructure is a just a way for the state to securitize the transactions of themarket through normalizing the social body.

Nadesan, 08Professor Social & Behavioral Sciences, ASU, in 8 [Majia Holmer, Governmentality, Biopower, andEveryday Life, pg. 51]

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From Foucault's perspective, liberalism birthed the idea of the autonomous market as a critique of statesovereignty. Foucault (1997c) remarked in "The Birth of Biopolitics" that the "market as a reality and politicaleconomy as a theory played an important role in the liberal critique ," although " liberalism isneither the consequence nor the development of these" (p. 76). For Foucault, the market played "therole of a ' test'" for excessive governmentality (p. 76). He observed that the market's relevance as test stemmed fromthe " basic incompatibility between the optimal development of its economic process and a maximization of governmental procedures" (p.

76). Thus, the liberal critique of excessive government settled on the market freeing " reflection oneconomic practices from the hegemony of the ' reason of the state'" (p. 76). By focusing on the market, theliberal philosophers hoped to dislocate the mercantile formulation of the sovereign as the seatof power and economic administration, freeing the circulation of goods and control from thesovereign reins of power. Accordingly, seventeenth-century merchants and financers heeded the call of individuals such as SirDudley North, who advocated " Peace, Industry and Freedom that bring Trade and Wealth and nothing else" (cited in Davies, 1952, p. 284).These aspirations would be fully articulated in eighteenth-century political economy, which articulated rights within a semantic context of

individual ownership. The emerging philosophy of liberalism critiqued sovereign authority over markettransactions but, simultaneously, called upon the state to securitize those transactions throughlegal and transportation infrastructures. The state was also called upon to police the poor, togovern those who were viewed as ungovernable or as requiring government (Dean, 1990; Driver, 1993).

B. The problem-solution framework of the 1ac expedites biopolitical domination of populationsand guarantees perpetual policy failure.

DILLION AND REID 2KMichael Dillon, Professor of Politics, University of Lancaster and Julian Reid, GlobalGovernance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency, ALTERNATIVES: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION &HUMANE GOVERNANCE v. 25 n. 1, January/March 2000, npg.

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms ofthe originof the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the

management of population.The management of population is

further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced . Thesetypically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the f ollowing topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and

so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledgethere is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production ofdiscourse isat once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedureswhose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events , to evade itsponderous, formidable materiality.[34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and wherethere is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailedand elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reifythe problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politicallycontestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policyscience and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and competeon the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their clientpopulations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit t he market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated,bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways inwhich the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable.Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby createsa market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsorswhile policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations.Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investmentssurrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapableontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation . There is nothing so fiercelycontested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so f iercely ridiculed as the suggestion that t he real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the l evel of suchassumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both

more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yetserial policy failure--the fate and the fuel ofall policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract themfrom the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed .[35] Serial policy failure isno simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policyfailure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in

which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence throughfitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously tonegotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintendedoutcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure . Thus, globalliberal governanceis not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problemssimply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy ofpower/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributionsof wealth, opportunity, and mortal dangerboth locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is v ariously (policy) problematized by it. Inconsequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries thatinfuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern theintroduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic ofgovernance begins to make its appearance. For it i s increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy

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increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well asFoucauldian "biopower" ways.

C. Biopower sets the stage for our own extinction

Mitchell Dean 01, Professor, Sociology, Macquarie University, STATES OF IMAGINATION: ETHNOGRAPHICEXPLORATIONS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE, ed. T.B. Hansen & F. Stepputat, 2001, p. 53-54.

Consider again the contrastive terms in which it is possible to view biopolitics and sovereignty. The final chapter in the firstvolume of the History of Sexuality that contrasts sovereignty and biopolitics is titled Right of Death and Power Over Life.

The initial terms of the contrast between the two registers of government is thus between onethat could employ power to put subjects to death, even if this right to kill was conditioned by thedefense of the sovereign, and one that was concerned with the fostering of life . Nevertheless, each

part of the contrast can be further broken down. The right of death can also be understood asthe right to take life or let live; the power over life as the powerto foster life or disallow it.Sovereign power is a power that distinguishes between political life (bios) and mere existence orbare life (zoe). Bare life is included in the constitution of sovereign power by its very exclusionfrom political life. In contrast, biopolitics might be thought to include zoe in bios: stripped downmere existence becomes a matter of political reality. Thus, the contract between biopolitics andsovereignty is not one of a power of life versus a power of death but concerns the way thedifferent forms of power treat matters of life and death and entail different conceptions of life.Thus, biopolitics reinscribes the earlier right of death and power over life and places it within anew and different form that attempts to include what had earlier been sacred and taboo, bare life,in political existence. It is no longer so much the right of the sovereign to put to death hisenemies by to disqualify lifethe mere existenceof those who are a threat to the life of thepopulation, to disallow those deemed unworthy of life, those whose bare life is not worthliving. This allows us, first to consider what might be thought of as the dark side of biopolitics (Foucault 1979a: 136-137).

In Foucaults account, biopolitics does not put an end to the practice of war: it provides it with newand more sophisticated killing machines. These machines allow killing itself to be reposed at thelevel of entire populations. Wars become genocidal in the twentieth century. The same state thattakes on the duty to enhance the life of the population also exercises the power of death overwhole populations. Atomic weapons are the key weapons of this process of the power to putwhole populations to death. We might also consider here the aptly named biological andchemical weapons that seek an extermination of populations by visiting plagues upon them orpolluting the biosphere in which they live to the point at which bare life is no longer sustainable.Nor does the birth of biopolitics put an end to the killing of one's own populations . Rather, itintensifies that killing--whether by an "ethnic cleansing" that visits holocausts upon wholegroups or by the mass slaughters of classes and groups conducted in the name of the utopia tobe achieved. There is a certain restraint in sovereign power. The right of death is onlyoccasionally exercised as the right to kill and then often in a ritual fashion that suggests arelation to the sacred. More often, sovereign power is manifest in the refraining from the right to

kill. The biopolitical imperative knows no such restraint. Power is exercised at the level ofpopulations and hence wars will be waged at that level, on behalf of everyone and their lives . Thispoint brings us to the heart of Foucault's provocative thesis about biopolitics: that there is an intimate connectionbetween the exercise of a life-administering power and the commission of genocide: Ifgenocideis indeed the dream of modern powers. This is not because of recent return of the ancient rightto kill: it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life , the species, the race, andthe large-scale phenomena of population" (1979a: 137). Foucault completes this same passage with anexpression that deserves more notice: massacres become vital.

Thus the alt: vote negative to endorse imminent criticism of the logics founding the 1ac.

Criticism is the ultimate responsibility of intellectuals, necessary to ensure that reforms andrevolutions dont replicate the problems they seek to address

Michel Foucault 71, Professor, College de France, Human Nature: Justice Versus Power, Noam ChomskyDebates with Michel Foucault, International Philosophers Project, 1971. Available from the World Wide Webat: http://www.chomsky.info/debates/1971xxxx.htm, accessed 4/30/05.

"It seems to me thatthe real political taskin a society such as oursis to criticise the workings of institutions, whichappear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise and attackthem in such a manner that thepolitical violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked,sothat one can fight against them. Thiscritique and this fight seem essentialto me for different reasons: firstly,because political power goes much deeper than one suspects; there are centres and invisible,little-known points of support; its true resistance, its true solidity is perhaps where one doesn'texpect it. Probablyit's insufficient to say that behind the governments, behind the apparatus of the

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State, there is the dominant class; one must locate the point of activity, the places and forms inwhich its domination is exercised. And because thisdomination is not simply the expression in politicalterms of economic exploitation, it is its instrument and , to a large extent, the condition which makes itpossible; the suppression of the one is achieved through the exhaustive discernment of theother. Well,if one fails to recognise these points of support of class power, one risks allowing themto continue to exist; and to see this class power reconstitute itself even after an apparentrevolutionary process."

4

There will be compromise on fiscal cliff now-- prefer insiders-- but it will be a fight

Politico 11/29 ("Inside the talks: Fiscal framework emerges,"http://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/84364.html)

Listen to top Democrats and Republicans talk on camera, and it sounds like they could not be further apart on a year-end

tax-and-spending deal a down payment on a $4 trillion grand bargain. But behind the scenes, top officials whohave been involved in the talks for many months say the contours of a deal including the sizeof tax hikes and spending cuts it will most likely contain are starting to take shape. Cut through the fog,and heres what to expect: Taxes will go up just shy of $1.2 trillion the middle ground of what President Barack Obamawants and what Republicans say they could stomach. Entitlement programs, mainly Medicare, will be cut by no less than$400 billion and perhaps a lot more, to get Republicans to swallow those tax hikes. There will be at least $1.2 trillion in

spending cuts and war savings. And any final deal will come not by a group effort but in a private dealbetween two men: Obama and House Speaker John Boehner(R-Ohio). The two men had a 30-minute phoneconversation Wednesday night but the private lines of communications remain very much open. No doubt, there willbe lots of huffing and puffing before any deal can be had. And, no doubt, Obama and Congresscould easily botch any or all three of the white-knuckle moments soon to hit this town: the automaticspending cuts and expiration of the Bush tax cuts, both of which kick in at the end of this year, and the federal debt limit that

hits early next. But its clearto veterans of this budget fight a deal is there to be done . Here is the stateof play that is sketched out by top officials in both parties: The coming tax hike There is no chance taxes are not going up

for people making north of $250,000 and virtually no chance that doesnt include their tax rates, too. Republicanspublicly say they are opposed to rate hikes but privately they know they are going up, if not allthe way to the Clinton-era 39.6 percent, then darn close. The reason is simple math. Take a look at this list, and you will seethat any tax loopholes worth closing wont get Obama or Republicans close to their targets. To those involved in the talks,its not really a mystery how big the overall hike will be. Boehner was for $800 billion before the election, and Obamaslapped down an opening bid of $1.6 trillion after. So it doesnt take Ernst and Young to add those numbers, divide by twoand know the president wants to end up close to $1.2 trillion. House Republicans, already worried about possible primarychallenges in 2014, are pleading to keep that number below $1 trillion, even if it is by a hair. Still, they know its likely tocome in a shade higher. The safe bet is just over $1 trillion for the final number. A bit less, and thats a notable win forBoehner.

Capitals key to deal success --- compromise is possibleMcTague 11/10, Jim, Obama and the Cliff: What He Can Do Now, 11-10-12,http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748703728004578105080119247220.html?mod=BOL_twm_fs#articleTabs_article%3D1

Winning re-election may have been the easy part. President Barack Obama now faces the monumental task ofworking with GOP leaders and agridlocked Congress to avoid the looming fiscal cliff. Can he pull itoff? While a short-term fix looks entirely doable, a real solution will require the president to change some of his ways. For

starters, Obama must stand up for his positions and not leave as much to Congress as he did withother major legislation, including the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation and his own economic-stimulus package. The latter plan was the most glaring example of his tendency to punt, withCongress turning it into little more than a pork package. It's time to be a true leader. " Almostevery big decision ever made in Washington has started with executive leadership," says formerMichigan GovernorJohn Engler, president of the powerful Business Roundtable.To succeed, Engler andothers say, the president will need both a detailed deficit-cutting plan and the determination tosway both parties in Congress. There were signs last week that both the president and HouseSpeaker John Boehner were ready to put aside some partisan differences and steer clear of thecliff, the year-end combination of tax hikes and spending cuts that threaten the economy. Bothtalked about compromise. Boehner acknowledged that the federal government needs morerevenue to reduce its mountain of debt. Obama said that he was open to new ideas and would meet withleaders of both parties to get some.

Transportation spending unpopular new spending means backlash fiscal cliff magnifieslink

Cassata 12,Associated Press Political Editor, 7/9/12(Donna, Associated Press, Conservatives make it rough for business, http://www.wtvm.com/story/18976891/gop-conservatives-make-it-rough-for-business, accessed 7/9/12)

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"The world has changed," Chocola said in an interview. "People understand that the size and scope ofgovernment isnot just entitlements. It's also transportation bills. It's also programs like Ex-Im bank. It'scorporate welfare as well. And things that have automatically been reauthorized are being questioned as towhether that's really good policy and whether we can afford it." Blair Latoff, a spokeswoman forthe Chamber, said the organization understands that lawmakers are not going to agree with it100 percent of the time. Democratic Sen. Maria Cantwell of Washington state, home to major Boeing facilities,recalled at least five or six t imes when reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank occurred with no problems. "All of suddento throw it up in that kind of disarray when we need to win in the international marketplace - we need to be competitive ingetting U.S. manufacturers products into international markets," she said in an interview. "It was definitely disappointing."

Brian Hansen, vice president of Dustrol Inc., an asphalt recycling and resurfacing company in Towanda, Kan.,came face to face with the new political reality on the transportation bill. Hansen was part of a group ofKansas construction industry executives who met with the state's congressional delegation and staff in May to press for the

transportation bill. "They are all in favor of it but nobody wants to fund it. That's the big problem," Hansen

said. "It all boils down to money and how are we going to pay for it. With the economy and all theother issues going on, everybody is very reluctant to talk about funding anything with any typeof increase, which is ridiculous when infrastructure is one of the few things the federal government should be involvedin." Freshman Republican Rep. Tim Huelskamp of Kansas was one of those who voted against both the Ex-Im Bank andthe transportation package. "Conservative folks like myself believe in the marketplace making decisions," he said.

Fiscal cliff collapses the economyMaximillian Walsh (writer for the Australian Financial Review) 10/25,2012Good ship QE3 must reversesometime Lexis

Even though fiscal gridlock has meant Ben Bernanke has, in effect, been operating with one arm tied behind his back, his

monetary strategy has been courageous and reasonably effective. The US still has a way to go but its recoveryto date has been in line with the experience of previous systemic financial crises as outlined byCarmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in their timely study, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Fullrecovery from such episodes averages out at about 10 years. Output in the US rose above its pre-crisis peak in the second

half of 2011 - a result that put it ahead of most developed economies. Since then, however, the US, along with rest of thedeveloped world, has lost some momentum. The IMF's World Economic Outlook, published this month, reports there is now

a one in six chance of global growth falling below 2 per cent. For the US the biggest immediate risk is the so-called fiscal cliff - drastic and automatic tax increases and spending cutbacks - scheduled tocome into effect on January 1. The conventional wisdom is that these measures will bepostponed by Congress in the lame-duck session after the coming presidential election. WinstonChurchill's observation that the US always does the right thing after all other options have been tried, is widely quoted tosupport the conventional wisdom. That wasn't the case in 1930, when Congress gave open slather to vested interests andbrought down what was the most protectionist bill in US history - the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. This became the excuse forother countries to introduce "beggar-thy-neighbour" policies that exacerbated the contraction in global trade and deepenedthe Great Depression. This was the outcome predicted by economists who petitioned Congress against Smoot-Hawley.

Not surprisingly, the approaching threat of the fiscal cliffand the absence of any engagement in the politicalarea on its consequences is already having a significant impact on the capital investment and employment plans ofAmerican industry. It needs to be said that, considering the magnitude of the ongoing financial crisis, the two presidentialcandidates remain insouciance personified. It's not just the candidates. As John Hussman, an American economic analyst,wrote in his weekly commentary: "We've become desensitised to extraordinary large numbers - if hundreds of billions don't

solve the problem, then a few trillion will - ignoring the magnitude of those figures relative to our actual capacity to produceeconomic output." If the fiscal cliff is not dealt with - and this would involve postponing most of themeasures - then the US is headed for recession in 2013 and it will drag the rest of the developedworld and quite a swag of the emerging economies down with it.

Economic decline leads to warstrong statistical support.Royal 10 Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense,M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales (Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and theProblem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives ,Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p.213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict .Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the securityand defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and

national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski andThompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associatedwith the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminentleader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistributionof relative power(see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing therisk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power couldlead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a decliningpower(Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallelleadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that thecauses and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic

level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is asignificant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states . He

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argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have anoptimistic view of future trade relations. However,if the expectations of future trade decline,particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases,as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources . Crises could potentially be thetrigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependentstates.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods

of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperityare strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international

and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also beenlinked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which hasthe capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions . Furthermore, crises generally reduce

the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularityarising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricateexternal military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). andBlomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least

indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendencytowards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states , due to the factthat democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack ofdomestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economicperformance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to anincrease in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integrationwith an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline withexternal conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armedconflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is notcontradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict,such as those mentioned in the fi rst paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic

interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditionscreated by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Case

Do not evaluate their ethics without first assessing the consequences of its actualimplementation. Viewing ethics in isolation is irresponsible & complicit with the evil theycriticize.

Issac2002.,( Jeffery C. Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington & Director of the Center for the Study ofDemocracy and Public Life. PhD Yale University. From Ends, Means, and Politics. Dissent Magazine. Volume 49. Issue # 2.Available online @ subscribing institutions using Proquest. Herm

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military

intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to whichintervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, butrather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requiresus to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence ofa Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Tal iban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to

justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilizedethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of howdiplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account.To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is notpurity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It isthe core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the

distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to themeans that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power.To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as

Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with

moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind ofpersonal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention doesnot ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause withmorally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to v iew them

as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of realviolence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form ofcomplicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always apotentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certainviolent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintendedconsequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives ofaction, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of

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"good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one'sgoals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuingthese goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moralabsolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotesarrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Policymakers must be utilitarianincomplete information

Goodin 95 (Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University (Robert E., Camb ridge University Press, Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy pg 63)

My larger argument turns on the proposition thatthere is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible forthem (or, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding with that larger

argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and their situations that makes it both more necessaryand more desirable

for them to adopt a more credible form ofutilitarianism. Consider, first the argument from necessity.Public officials are obligedto make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at t hat. All choices-public and private alike- are madeunder some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things,private individuals will usually have more completeinformation on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them .Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will haveon individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most oftento most people as a result of theirvarious possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy makers to use the utilitariancalculus if they want to use it at all to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs fromadopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledgeof generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that. Furthermore, the argument from necessity would continue, the instrumentsavailable to public policy-makers are relatively blunt. They can influence general tendencies, making rather more people behave in certain sorts of ways rather more

often. But perfect compliance is unrealistic. And (building on the previous point) not knowing particularcircumstances of particularindividuals, rules and regulations must necessarily be relatively general in form. They must treat more people more nearly alike thanideally they should, had we perfect information. The combined effect of these two factors is to preclude public policy-makers from fine-tuning policies very well at all. Theymust, of necessity, deal with people in aggregate , imposing upon them rules that are general in form. Nothing in any of this necessarily forces themto be utilitarian in their public policy-making, of course. What it does do, however, is force them- if they are inclined to be utilitarian at all-away from direct (act) utilitarianism. The circumstances

surrounding the selection and implementation of public policies simply do not permit the more precise calculations required by any decision rule more tailored to peculiarities of individuals or situations.

We have to solve large-scale violent conflicts before we can focus on everyday forms ofviolencetheyre a key barrier to peace

Joshua Goldstein, Intl Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Manypeace scholars and activists support the approach, if you want peace, work for justice. Then, ifone believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhapsamong others) in order to pursue peace. This approachbrings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor,minorities), butrests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggeststhat causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism,imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars outbreaks andoutcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So ,if you wantpeace, work for peace. Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run justupward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes inattitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to reverse womensoppression. The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, inlight of this booksevidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

Events of war preclude solutions to structural violence

Rabie 94(Mohamed, professor of International political economy, Georgetown University, Praeger, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, 1994,http://www.questiaschool.com/read/14788166?title=Conflict%20Resolution%20and%20Ethnicity, AD; 7/11/9)

In countries where democracy does not exist and where the control of authoritarian states over peoples' lives and fortunes is real,the nonviolent resolution and prosecution of political conflict is an impossibility becauseviolence is the major tool of the oppressor rather than the oppressed. Democratization as the first orderof concern, which the proponents of a limited definition of peace further advocate, cannot be effected without freedom and liberty,two conditions for access to cherished values. Therefore, a realistic definition of peace ought to take both argumentsinto consideration. This is particularly important since the proponents of positive peace tend to view it more as a process and less as a stationary stateof political affairs, while the others see it generally in opposite terms. In fact , human experience seems to indicate that theabsence of war and violence cannot be maintained without social justice, and social justicecannot be achieved under conditions of war and violence. Consequently, an operational definition of realistic peace wouldprobably describe it as the absence of violence under conditions and relationships that provide for the nonviolent resolution of political conflict and the freedom topursue legitimate individual and group goals without threat or coercion. Peace, to be real and human, must be understood and employed as a continuous process tolessen social tension, resolve political conflict, and create conditions to pursue freedom and justice through a gradual evolution of human perceptions and socio-

political institutions. Thus, a strategy for universal peace must deal not only with war but also with the veryforces and conditions that cause the eruption of war and induce the spread of violence in the

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first place. It must also strive to change a people's perceptions of the otherin order to humanize the adversary,acknowledge his grievances, and legitimize his basic concerns. Above all, it must lay the foundation for transforming existinggroup relationships and state and civil society institutions, with a view to creating new more dynamic ones committed topromoting compatible visions and values with developing shared interests.

Poverty is decliningEconomist 9Four decades of declining world povertyhttp://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/10/four_decades_of_declining_worl

HERE is a fascinating new paperby Maxim Pinkovskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, which attempts to track globalpoverty trends between 1970 and 2006. The abstract reads: We use a parametric method toestimate the income distribution for 191 countries between 1970 and 2006. We estimate theWorld Distribution of Income and estimate poverty rates, poverty counts and various measures

of income inequality and welfare. Using the official $1/day line, we estimate that world povertyrates have fallen by 80% from 0.268 in 1970 to 0.054 in 2006 . The corresponding total number ofpoor has fallen from 403 million in 1970 to 152 million in 2006 . Our estimates of the global poverty count in2006 are much smaller than found by other researchers. We also find similar reductions in poverty if we use other povertylines. We find that various measures of global inequality have declined substantially and measures of global welfare

increased by somewhere between 128% and 145%. We analyze poverty in various regions. Finally, we show that ourresults are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests involving functional forms, data sources for thelargest countries, methods of interpolating and extrapolating missing data, and dealing withsurvey misreporting.

Poverty rates are declining everywhere your evidence is just paranoia and ignores thestatistics

Chandy & Gertz 11 Laurence Chandy [fellow in the Global Economy and Development program and theDevelopment Assistance and Governance Initiative at Brookings] Geoffrey Gertz [research analyst with the program.

This column first appeared in The Washington Post.] Global growth lifts millions out of povertyhttp://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/The-untold-tale-of-declining-world-poverty-984448.php#ixzz1it4QAfiV

Yet on one issue our understanding remains impervious to this new reality: the state ofglobalpoverty. Our sense of this topic remains firmly rooted in the year 2005 -- the last year for whichthe World Bank has produced data on the number of people living on less than $1.25 a day. Thuswe are routinely told that "today," 1.37 billion people around the world are poor, including 456million in India and 208 million in China. Such figures, though, are six years out of date. A lot haschanged in the past six years. The economies of the developing world have expanded 50 percentin real terms, despite the Great Recession. Moreover, growth has been particularly high incountries with large numbers of poor people. India and China, of course, but also Bangladesh,Tanzania, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Uganda, Mozambique and Uzbekistan -- nine countries that were collectivelyhome to nearly two-thirds of the world's poor in 2005 -- are experiencing phenomenal economic advances. In the new

Brookings Institution report "Poverty in Numbers: The Changing State of Global Poverty from 2005 to 2015," we updatedthe World Bank's official $1.25-a-day figures to reveal how the global poverty landscape has

changed with the emergence of developing countries. We estimate that between 2005 and 2010, nearly half a billionpeople escaped extreme hardship, as the total number of the world's poor fell to 878 mi llion people. Never before inhistory have so many people been lifted out of poverty in such a short period . The U.N.Millennium Development Goals established the target of halving the rate of global povertybetween 1990 and 2015; this was probably achieved by 2008, some seven years ahead ofschedule.

Moreover, using forecasts of per capita consumption growth, we predict that by 2015, fewer than 600 million people willremain poor. At that point, the 1990 poverty rate will have been halved and then halved again.Thedecline in poverty is happening in all the world's regions and most of its countries , though at varyingspeeds. The emerging markets of Asia are recording the greatest successes; the two regional giants, China and India, are

likely to account for three-quarters of the global reduction between 2005 and 2015. Africa, too, is making advances.We we estimate that in 2008 its poverty rate dropped below the 50 percent mark for the first time.By 2015, African poverty is projected to fall below 40 percent, a feat China did not achieve until

the mid-1990s. These findings are likely to surprise many, but they shouldn't. We know thatgrowth lies at the heart of poverty reduction. As the growth of developing countries took off inthe new millennium, epitomized by the rise of emerging markets, a massive drop in poverty wasonly to be expected. With few exceptions, however, those who care about global development have been slow tocatch on to this story. We hear far more about the 64 million people held back in poverty because of the Great Recessionthan we do about the hundreds of millions who escaped impoverishment over the past six years. When talk at Davosinevitably turns from the haves to the have-nots, participants should avoid falling back on their long-held views. It is time toexalt the remarkable growth of developing countries while simultaneously bemoaning the intractability of global poverty.

The state is responsible for structural violence- it should not be the actor against it

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Nancy Nyquist Potter, Part 2: The State and its Apparatus: World Views in Practice: Introduction, Putting Peace intoPractice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004.p.53. (Wayzata- LAP)

In Preventing Violence, James Gilligan, a psychiatrist who works with lethally violent prison inmates, argues that we cannotcurb violence until we understand its causes and its workings. When we study violent criminals, we find that the backdrop

for their violence is, in fact, another form of violence: structural violence. Structural violence, according toGilligan, is the existence of "increased rates of death and disability suffered by those whooccupy the bottom rungs of society.' The solution, he argues, is to create policies that addressissues of poverty and suffering. But this direction may not be as fruitful as we might wish. PierreMertens writes that violence permeates governance even in the most democratic societies. OnMertens's view, law, economics, and culture are founded on inequalities that perpetuate injustices.Thus, we cannot count on the state to protect us from violence, because the state is implicated

in violence at every turn.

Poverty is not tied to structural violenceEdwards 10 Michael Edwards [Distinguished Senior Fellow at Demos in New York, the author of Civil Society, andthe editor of the Oxford Handbook of Civil Society; which is published in September] Is world poverty declining and ifso why? http://www.opendemocracy.net/michael-edwards/is-world-poverty-declining-and-if-so-why

Measurements of global poverty are fairly meaningless since they disguise enormousvariations between different countries, and no-one seems able to agree on what poverty means or how it should be measured notexactly the ideal basis for a conversation about lessons learned. Poverty can go down while inequality and insecurity go up,and incomes can rise even though peoples wider sense of wellbeing is falling. Stiglitz opened theproceedings with a few statistics and then rambled on for far too long. China, for example, had 673 million people living on incomes below US$1.25 a day in 1990

and only 208 million in 2005, a dramatic fall in poverty, especially in percentage terms. By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa saw anincrease from 298 million to 388 million over the same period, though because of populationgrowth the percentage of people living in extreme poverty fell from 57 per cent to 51 per cent not

exactly the African economic r enaissance weve been hearing about from some pundits lately but evidence that progress is being made.

Util is key to value of life it maximizes happiness for the most people making it the bestframework for the policymaker and those whom are affected

Smith 97[Smith 1997. Book Review: Jonathan Schells Fate of the Earth and The Abolition,

www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdf]

Utilitarianism begins by generalizing the hedonistic pleasure principle in terms of happiness. Then what is moral or good is that which brings an agent happiness. This thesis is further generalized tosay that happiness should be secured for as many agents in the community as possible. Everyaction, therefore, should be motivated in terms of trying to maximize as much happiness for asmany agents as possible within the given community. The use ofhappiness in this thesis is in relation to

the overall consequences of all the agents in the given community. The basic argument is thatindividual good is maximizing individual happiness. Morality though, involves the common goodof all the agents in the community. The common good, therefore, is maximizing every oneshappiness. I think the most promising variation of utilitarianism is rule utilitarianism where emphasis is placed on theconsequences of every agent in the community adopting a particular action as a rule. Implicit within rule utilitarianism is astrong consistency thesis which places necessary constraints on the basic utilitarian argument.

Human value and dignity is impossible to determine externally, utilitarianism is onlyalternative.

Kateb 92William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics Emeritus at Princeton University (George, Cornell UniversityPress; The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture pg 13-14)

We can say in regard to the relevant examples that no one has the right to enslave or mutilate orritually kill another, even with the others permission. There is no right to accept anothers renunciation of aright. One cannot cooperate with or take advantage ofanother persons abdication of humanity.We can also say, for other activities, that one has no right to use ones freedom to abandon it altogether (as with drugaddiction) or alienate it (as with voluntary slavery), for freedom is meaningless when it becomes the instrument of bondage.All these arguments are true but do not reach the deepest level of objection, for all these activitiesarouse deep and wide spread disgust and revulsion. To be guided by these feelings, however, isrisky because many activities once thought disgusting and horrible are now allowed andsometimes welcomed and celebrated,

at least in some democratic societies. Also, we cannot say that the feelings hostile to theseactivities are instinctual; though common, such feelings are culturally deposited . I can understand

http://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdfhttp://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdfhttp://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdfhttp://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdfhttp://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdfhttp://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdfhttp://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdf

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the wish to say that these activities injure the human dignity of people who do them. It can be argued that the injury resultsnot merely because (in some cases) they are renouncing a right and (in other cases) using their rights in ways never

contemplated by advocates of rights. Rather, these free or consensual activities degrade people who dothem below the level of decent humanity. The practitioners forfeit respect: that is the reason theymust be controlled. I do not think, however, that I can follow this line because I do not associatehuman dignity with any teleology or reason for being, or even with a more boundedperfectionism. As I understand the theory of rights-based individualism, it disallows universal andenforceable answers to the questions, Why do we live? What is the point of living? I am thereforereluctant to rest a case for control on the notion of human dignity itself.

Alt causes to rural declineplan cant solve timeframe issues

A. DroughtUSDA 11-9

(US Department of Agriculture, U.S. Drought 2012: Farm and Food Impacts, 11 -9-12,http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/in-the-news/us-drought-2012-farm-and-food-impacts.aspx)

About 80 percent of agricultural land is experiencing drought, which makes the 2012 drought moreextensive than any drought since the 1950s. USDA's October 11 World Agricultural Supply and DemandEstimates (WASDE) report reflects current estimates of the 2012 drought's economic impacts. ERS's August 28 farmincome forecast is based on the August WASDE report and will be updated in November. Highlights The drought rapidly

increased in severity from June to July and persisted into August. As of September 12, over 2,000 U.S. countieshad been designated as disaster areas by USDA in 2012, mainly due to drought. As of August 14, 60 percent of farms are located in areas experiencing drought. Based on the 2011 value of production, atleast 70 percent of both crop production and livestock production is in areas that are experiencing at least moderate drought

as of August 14. Severe or greater drought is impacting 67 percent of cattle production, and about 70-75 percent of cornand soybean production. More than 80 percent of the acres of major field crops planted in the United States are covered byFederal crop insurance, which can help to mitigate yield or revenue losses for covered farms. Details As of mid-August

2012, 60 percent of farms in the United States were experiencing drought. About 17 percent of farmswere in counties where most of the land is under moderate drought; 15 percent of farms were experiencing severe drought;

and 28 percent were experiencing extreme or exceptional drought. A striking aspect of the 2012 drought is how thedrought rapidly increased in severity in early July, during a critical time of crop development forcorn and other commodities. The table shows the progression from mid-June to mid-August of severe or greaterdrought within the agricultural sector. While there has been some easing of drought conditions during early September, formost crop production exposure to drought during the June to August period will determine drought impacts. From mid-Juneto mid-August, the share of farms under severe or greater drought increased from 16 percent of all farms to 43 percent.Total cropland under severe or greater drought increased from 20 percent to 57 percent, while total value of crops exposedincreased from 16 to 50 percent.