Mohanty, ProfRamlhirSingh, Pmf.Rajni Kolhari ProfShibam Kinkar Chaiibe,

Prof M. P.Singh, Prof.S. Kaushik, (Late)Dr. Frank ThakurDas, are some such teachers who have

left an miklihle mark on my intellectual development and thinking (this is not an exhaustive list

though).

Some libraries such as Nehru Memorial Museum <£ Library, IIPA, Centre for

Policy Research etc. were the hubs for the germination o f many ideas and provided me much

needed books, journals and other material. My own college library, the P.G.D.A. V.E College

Library also rose to the occasion and P.Maithani made possible speedier accessioning o f

many booh acquired specially for me.

I thank Dr.R.K.Seih ike then Principal, P.G.D.A. V.E College for faciUtating

the study leave , which enabled me to work full time on this work.

I also owe a debt to my spouse Nibedita and my daughter Tuheena for their

support and understanding during the writing o f this dissertation and who have tolerated the

many inconveniences that came our way in this process.

P. Sahu and Mr. Nayak have done their hit through their secretarial assistance.

The work would not have been possible without them..

However, for the shortcomings in this work no one , except me is responsible. I

am fully responsible for errors, omissions or commissions that may have inadvertently crept

in.

Basant Panchaml Subhendu Ran/an RajFeb 6,2003.

IN TR O iD iJC TlO N

POLITICS has been defined as the art o f the possible. Political systems

are contrivances to make possible what may not be achievable otherwise. Coalitions

are justifiably thought o f as via-media to make governance possible, what would

seem undoubtedly daunting and near impossible , otherwise. The age o f coalitions is

closely associated with the growing complexity in the representation process and has

come up as and when elections failed to deliver governments in democracies all over

the world. The representation systems’ failure ( or rather their incapability to muster

up majoritarian support for leading political parties , psephologically speaking ) led to

the increasing reliance on coalitions as systems o f alternative government formation

and governance mechanism. Very few democracies are left untouched by the

phenomena o f coalitions. India is not an exception.

11

India lays claim to l)eing the world’s largest democracy and it

is indeed conferred with the credit o f having a stable parliametitary system where

periodic elections are held in a largely free and fair manner. The overwhelmingly so

called poor people largely illiterate aiid tradition-bound have participated in these

elections with a great fervour and enthusiasm. The turnout in elections has remained

high with some 60 percent o f the population casting their votes periodically, in the

nineties’. Though allegations have been laid that caste and criminal factors have

marred the genuineness o f the electoral process and bogus voting and large scale

booth capturing do the rounds , these have remained a distinct part o f oiir electoral

culture and a vigilatit fourth estate has consistently been highlighting tMs incidence.

Overall then, the election process has been quite effective in its reach and impact.

The Indian political system has undergone many upheavals and political alternations

based on the power of ballot of the common man. In 1977, the first o f such changes

occuiied when the monolithic behemoth, the Congress party, the dominant political

force in the country was voted out of power by the Janata Party, a coalition of many

opposition parties, which then went on to form the first coalition government at the

Centre from March 1977 till July 1979. The coming back o f the Congress(I) to

power in 1980 marked a shift back to the Congress, but the charisma o f Rajiv Gandhi

m

couldn’t turn the tide that came in 1989 and swept in the National Front headed by

V.P.Singii. Though the Congress managed to win back power in 1991 it aiso had to

informally dabble in coalitions in the early part (as it was a minority government o f

Narasimha Rao) . There was change again in June 1996 when the United Front

headed initially by H D Deve Gowda and later by I K Gujral formed yet another

coalition with the help o f regional parties. They remained in office till November

1997. In 1998, the thi'ow of the dice worked in the favour o f the right-wing

nationalist party the Bharatiya Imata party and which again came back in saddle once

again in 1999 and continues to be heading a coalition o f 24 parties in power.

This has credited us with the sul-generis record that India has

among the non-western democracies in terms of alternation o f political pow er, which

has shifted from one broad political party to another or a formation o f parties formed

for the express purpose o f change in political formation. The shifts have largely

concentrated on centrist or right-wing parties , but there have also been occasions

when the Left also joined the cabinet apart from supporting diflerent coaltions in

power at various points o f time despite their well known antipathy to parliamentary

politics and bourgeois democracy.

II

Coalitions as we know today in India have

liistorical antecedents in the West. Most of the coalitional theory therefore,

IV

emerged in the West. A careful survey of this theory ,which is often very convoluted

with behavioural and game-theoretic underpinnings, w^ould reveal that coalitions are

resorted to politically when either the election process due to reasons which are

inherent to itself and related to the body politique is not able to throw up a nmjority for

any political party in the national legislature or due to some functional

dysfunctionality in the election procedure is unable to give a majority to any single

political party. It has largely been accepted as the modern contrivance for governance

as in democracies worldwide, a crisis of legitimacy has occurred. Legislative majority

is had to find and despite repeated elections, no single party attains the status of a

majority party. Hence almost every democracy is increasingly finds itself in a position

when it is being governed by some sort of coalition. Almost every European state has

been governed by a coalition for at least sometime in the last century.

For the purpose of parliamentary coalitions we find the Rilcer-Dodd

theory very relevant. For Indian conditions this theory suffices only when we take

this as the base and build upon it the edifice o f ‘compromise based theory’ ( based on

Luebbert’s implicit and explicit compromise model) and in addition temper it with

India’s specific brand o f opportunistic politics where ideological polarization cuts

across usual and accepted common parameters ( what Sridharan calls multiple

cross-cutting ideological axes) . This author posits that we need to go forward on

ideological premise because ideology is superseded by the convolution

o f ethnicity based ( based on caste-lingual-regional and other parameters , usually

coiiskiered as non-political criteria) salients that are pre-modem traditiotial loyalties

yet transferred to a modern setting and work within the modem space o f a

coiistitutlonai democracy with as imicli correspondence as they did in days o f yore.

These salients may define the ideological or other postures o f parties tliat participate

in the Indian setting of coalitions, and are much more o f primordial importance than

mere ideology.

Most of the European experience of coalitions m'e easily analysed

as they are ‘minimai winiiig coalitioiis’ besides having well defined party systems

on ideological grounds aiid formal itistitutional structures that operate in a body-

polUiqm where there is not great diversity on ethnic, liaguistic, religious and other

social factors. In fact there are a nmnber o f consensual democracies such as Denmark,

Norway and Sweden. But here also coalition bargaining is no easy task and the

reality of European cabinets provide an interpretative challenge to coalition theories.

Hence, even in less diverse settings such as fhat ohtainitig in the West, the conditions

o f institutional and behavioui'al ( decision making, policy fonnation etc.,) w^orking

interplay in a complex manner which differs in different countries.

Ill

Having covered the theoretical bases o f coalitions we turn

our attention to the objective reality of coalition politics in the Indian context in

Chapter 3. Coalitions at the political level is not merely a manifestation o f the federal

VI

reality in India , but also an important medium of assertion ot tiie various pluralities

that make the Indian State. They seem to be the natural growth o f the ethtiic and social

multiplicities that constitute the Indian society and are at variance in their

development and growth aspii'ations and felt needs. Another linding of this chapter

is that we have had always coexisted , as a society with the system of coalitions be

it infomial or formal. Even before coalitional systems began in the states’ o f the

Indian federal union as alternative governance models, they had become a part of the

political process informally. The existence of the ‘Congress system’ for much o f the

period of ascendancy of the Congress party was largely due to its successfixl

manipulative and effective management o f the oppositional forces and power

process. The change from informal coalition management ( largely carried out within

the confines o f the dominant political party, the Congress) to a formal, multi-layered

coalition emerged with the brealcdown and resultant structural nemesis of the

elaborate consensual system that was sensitive to the social reality o f a highly

dispersed and decentralized society,starting from the seventies’ onwards.

The Congress system was followed by political elites’ fray into

populist and plebiscitary politics which led to the gradual underaiining o f both the

institutional framework o f the federal structure and the party. Populism kills both the

role of the people and the role of the elites in the political system. The result was a

revolution of rising frustrations, initially subterranean but which burst out in course of

time . The suspension o f democracy in 1975-77 dwing the imposition o f internal

emergency and the gradual emancipation of the lower castes ( although initially this

vri

was an uneven process) in the seventies’ due to a host o f factors opened the floodgates

for the resurgence of regional forces into the mainstream. This was followed by the

emergence o f OBCs as parties went after mobilization of lower castes who had

started grouping together as the afFuinative action policies and the compensatory

discrimination policy (initially meant only for Scheduled castes/tribes) failed to touch

them. This is a peculiarity seen largely in the northern part o f India (as the case of

southern hidia is different). Whereas the Congress remained effete and reacted

halfheartedly to this social churning among the national parties the Socialists emerged

as the detenders o f the OBCs and parties such as the Bharatiya Lok Dal( an

amalgamation of SSP and BKD) took up cudgels for the peasantry. The emergence of

a new set of leaders like Madhu Limaye, Raj Narain, Charan Singh, Morarji Desai and

the first Janata government in 1977 at the Centre indicated the coming o f the lower

castes and kisaiis into prominence.

The constitution of the Mandal Commission and later implementation

of its recommendations marked an important milestone in the rise to power o f the

OBCs and lower peasantry. There was caste polarization around Mandal and it helped

the lower castes to organize themselves into interest groupings outside of the

clientelistic Congress hold. This new found identity helped the lower castes to benefit

from their mam asset - their massive numbers, during elections. The share of OBC

MPs increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s as low caste voters, now aware of

their common interests voted their candidates belonging to their own social milieu.

The OBCs constituting 52% of the Indian society were a formidable force and were

V lll

represented in almost all states. The proportion of upper caste MPs 1b the Hindi cow

belt area fell below 50% for the first time in 1977 while the share of the intermediate

castes aiid the OBCs increase from 14,2% to 20%. The Congress return in 1984

brought a volte face of some sorts for a short time, as it brought about with it with the

return of many upper caste MPs. The proportion o f OBC MPs increased again after

the Congress lost power in 1989 . it even doubled its proportion froiii 11.1% in 1984

to 20.9% in 1989, largely because the Janata Dal sourced its candidates from the

OBCs. The proportion o f upper caste MPs thus fell for the first time below 40 percent.

Significantly this trend continued and in course of time the share o f OBCs among the

MPs selected for the Lok Sabha grew , and even in 1991 in spite o f the Congress’

return and again in 1996 when the BJP frst came to power as the largest party in the

Lok Sabha. That coalitional politics is a pluralist rebellion against the established and

dominant mode of politica] formation wherein political manipulation kept the various

multi-polar centres of regional and ethnic power out from the centre or the

mainstream , opting to co-opt them or assuage their identities by subsuming it in the

monolithic ‘Congress system’. The efflorescence o f multi-party coalitions and a shift

from the dominant ideology of nation - state and political ideology o f nation -

building to the assertion o f ethno - religious identities, resurgence o f newly

empowered segmental groupings based on regional, linguistic, religious and other

loyalties and the reconfiguration of ( hitherto ‘kept away’ from power ) castes and

communities is the result o f the challenge that the subalterns and dispossessed have

taken up in earnest to come into the national mainstream.

IX

Thus there has been a change in the contours o f the social

power structure and regional level parties gained ascendancy most notably in the

course of the last: some decades. There also have been some fetters and trammels to

their growth - the process of gaining representation and social acceptability has not

been smooth for lower caste and OBC candidates and for parties in the states’ that

have projected themselves as their messiahs.

Nearly every major political party at the national level has seen

a fall in its vote percentage and this space has been captured by the emerging regional

parties. No longer does the Scheduled caste or tribe vote go to the Congress party , nor

the minorities’ vote en-bloc for them. The Muslim vote has been captured by newly

emerging forces such as the Samajwadi Party, Janata Dal etc. There is keen

competition for regional level voters at the states. Regional parties are with a few

exceptions , are largely sourcing and are securing the regional votes , for example

the Biju Janata Dal in Orissa, the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh, Shiv Sena in

Maharastra, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry,

Marumalai'chi DMK and Pattali Makal Katchi in Tamil Nadu , Trinamool Congress in

West Bengal, Rashtriya Janata Dal and Samata party in Bihar etc. Since the process

of change that is occurring has been not yet attained completion and there is still a

long way to go, this ‘silent revolution’ as someone has characterized it is creating

political upheavals.

The onset of Ibmial coalitions of power at the Centte is one manifestation of

this ciianging socio-political scenario. Coalitions have come to stay as the leading

inipriinatur o f India’s political structure and caimot be wished away. They are

highlighting the shortcomings of representation process that was in existence when

political parties held uiiassailable ma|orities( notably under the aegis of the Congress

party ) yet were imable to give space or scope for many minorities, underprivileged

sections and regional groupings. These are now emerging as never before , and with

articulation o f their demands and aspirations are seeming to take centre stage , The

established national parties are having to give them ample scope , albeit grudgingly, as

without allowing them to participate to power sharing at the Centre, they themselves

cannot muster up the numbers that are required in majoritaiian demoa'acies. Hence,

coalition power sharing are not only the need o f political pragmatism but also possibly

the only course left open to national level parties . Thus, as we have noted in our

comparative study of Coalitionis, coalition cabinet formation and power sharing is an

universal phenomenon .Though the same set o f causal factors operate here as they do

in parliamentary systems across the world namely, o f minority cabinets, minimal

winning cabinets, majority cabinets - what distinguishes our coalitions in India Is the

complexity of the social ethnicity. The existence of multitudinous diverse groups in

an open pluralist democracy in what has been cognized as one of the largest

democracies o f the world with a legacy of free elections largely Speaking, and.

frequent alternation of power from one political party to another, allows the Indian

electorate to come up with baffling verdicts because most o f the electoral

XI

calculations follow caste, regional and sub regional preferences apart from linguistic,

religious and other chauvinistic factors ( that do not obtain in the West).

These factors along with the imponderables that are connected with it may

explain at least partly, if not wholely, the causal reasons for the advent o f coalitions

in the Indian firmament. But as has been hinted at , the reality o f coalitions in the

Indian setting has something to do with our political tradition of coexistence with

some form o f informal or formal coalition as it is an accepted form of articulation,

adjustment, negotiation in an acceptedly gregarious and garrulous society, which is

still backward on many developmental fronts.

The coalitional experiment is an unique via medium for

inclusion of those sections who have remained out o f the mainstream poHtical and

power process. An important milestone in this regard has been acliieved, yet there is

a glaring lack of inclusion o f minorities and their individual and collective interests

in this edifying process. They have been overlooked by the coalition era which is

supposed to be pluralist and democratic in its effect and reach.

IV

We are concerned in this work with federal coalitions which have

taken place at the centre. The beginnings o f coalition politics actually occurred in the

states. These experiments started from the south in the fifties’ spread to a slew of

states’ later. It was only after 1967 that Indian party system transformed itself into a

xn

competitive party system and with tlie dominant Congress system in a crisis after the

onset of the seventies’. This was largely because the Congress not only was

constituting the broad centre of the political spectrutn but also performed the task of

the left and the right parties as well. The Congress could manage such a position in

the country because as a party it occupied the most space in the political system as

there was truly a high level of plurality within the party and it provided it with more

representative elan, greater flexibility and the ability to absorb groups and

movements from outside the party and in the process prevent other parties from

gaining strength. This transformed into major electoral successes in the 1952, 1957,

1961 and 1967 elections at the centre as also in the assembly polls in the states.

Post 1967 we enter into a period of multi - party politics and a

phase where the Congress’s role in maintaining and restructuring political consensus

had waned. Fragmentation of the party system ensured that despite attempts at

restoration of the Congress dominance, the time o f smaller, regional alternatives had

come. The Janata phase from March 1977 till July 1979 was the institutionalization

of the first coalition government at the centre to followed later by the National Front

coalition headed by V.PSingh (1989-1990), the United Front government led by H.D

Deve Gowda and I.K.Gujral lasting from 1996 till 1999 and the alternation to right

wing led coalition by the Bharatiya Janata Party first in 1998 for a period o f roughly

one year from March 1998 till April 1999 to be followed by another recrudescence

o f a similar BJP led rightist coalition which has 24 coalition constituent parties

and is still in existence after coming into power in October 1999. In between there

xm

was a short interlude o f the Congress party led minority govermiient ( so called at

least Initially, before the Jharkiiand Mukti Morcha and Janata Dal[Ajit] supported i t )

from June 1991 till December 1993.

Analyses Into the causal reasons for coalition reveals that apart from

the abo've-mentioiied truism regarding the upsurge in regional parties and politics,

another equally significant reason is the failure of the democratic governance in,

resolving the probleius o f the people at the ground level and the rising revolution of

irustrations among the people. The weaknesses in governance even when political

parties have had domination o f the political space and almost brute majorities’ in the

Lok Sabha ( lilce during the Rajiv Gandhi era when the Congress had 415 MPs in

the house of 542 seats ) indicates the neglect o f the needs and aspirations o f the

people. It also indicates that in our elite democracy there is concentration o f power in

the hands of a few leaders.

There is a point of view also expressed that the ‘diversity o f India’s

social structure militates against the development o f cohesive national parties.’

Thereibre it is within the nature o f the social formation to lind local and regional

variants of political parties as they are expressive o f the sui-generis nature o f their

articulation, demands and aspirations. Now this is also fraught with dangers as even

witliin the confines of a single state it is difficult to find a state-level political party

that can adequately catch the imagination of the entire state. The thrust o f the

coalitional politics which has been the focus o f our work, is on inclusion o f regional

forces , regional groupings and political parties in power-sharing enterprise at the

XIV

top echelons of state power as the w x popal iiicreaskgly wants it so. WMetlier

such a regional variant , in, place of a Mtioml level political patty and at other ttees

In coordiniilioa with at least some coiBbiDtlioii o f national parties cats bring in the

goods and satisfy the momiineata! asplratioiii ( whicli one Prime Minister - Rajiv

GsiidM said were sca,ry ) needs and requiremfiiits of the people, reinajiis to ha seen.

It would be a true test of coalltlooal politics if this ei d were seived

and tbe *janata JiiiiarclaH’ ( tfie commoii masses) were given a better gOYeriiaiace

tliasi lias beea the case so far under iiaJoritaAfi rale o f one parly doaiinaiiee . It slIB

feinaliis to be a laidge too far, iittattaiotMe and seettiingly implais!l>te to be

achieved , at feast so far, to say the least. But there is potential eaoogli m d ii

proinlse irfiefeiit in .ft wMcIi reciiilres to be translated into pragm alisia,

Chapter 1.

COALITION : A THIMETICAL PERSPECTIVE

PARLIAMENTARY tw n of governance, the most popiilai*

mode today and the accepted exefapliti' of politiciil sovereignty is nrik|Hely depeniant

osi tlie people’is conseii An ocdcleatai poMti«il conwpt, It is 'widefy foBowed all over

the world Iwcause centra! to it is tlie ratlantl coflatloii of aspirations, 4esires .and

wlslies of the people iii a ttiajoiitarfem etectoi’al tiiaiidate system. TMs is its uniqiie

toiff-de-force namely, tliat eveiytMttg depends on the strength of majority that a

poltical party coflects in a given context. Aggraodizkig raajorities' Is a seemingly

coraplicated exercfce ia a l societies' because of a lai’ge aiaiber of variables,

Iiicreasingiy, over the years it has come to mean a negotiation process whereby it las

clearly feecome a game of bargaining aad manoettvring by political entities, parties*

and vested interests,

Cofffjlexittes iii the coMsenaal framework liaw ted alMogt

universally to isituatiom where it Is iimliparty ni^oritariatMsm and coniictiag

coalitionai endgames ttet result in spawning the polities 'of tke possible'. The last

century oaa truly te crrfited with iatfodiskg ittultiptty govmEoems sud coalitiofis.

2

Almost every European state has been governed by a coalition for at least sometin'ie in

the last century. Coalitions in Third World democracies are no longer a misnomer now

as there have been quite many experiments with this form. It is also being recognised

now, tiiat the politics of coalition is more pervasive than its occurrence as actual

coalition government -and this applies as much to the West as in our pait of the world.

The study of coalition emerged from the European political

tradition as a sub field within the general study o f European politics. Genealogically,

the theory o f coalition emerged as a tradition o f empirical theory and research as

essentially empirical attempts to fit the experience of their setting. It seems to have

branch-ed out from the days o f Lawrence Lowell who in 1896 had argued that durable

cabinets require majority party systems, This thesis has been echoed by a legion of

scholars in later years. However, in spite the importance that should be accorded to

this branch o f study, coalition forming has been largely neglected by the Social

Sciences, including Economics. The literature of Coalition is overloaded with

historical lacts and a pattern o f analysis was missing. The emergence of game theory

and its introduction to Political Science can now offer a distinguished selection of

testable hypotheses on the forming of coalitions. Even economists use coalition theory

for modeling of production o f public goods as transmitted by a state sector which is

legitimised through elections. Recently, coalition theory has also been applied to the

explanation o f the market process.

P-KFINITION OF COALITION

A coalition has been defined as the "joint use of resources to

determine the outcome o f a mixed motive situation involving more than two units,"’

Gamson further defmed a mixed motive situation as one in which "there is an element

o f conflict, since 'there exists for at least two of the players (or actors) the possibility

that they can do better by coordinating theii* resources than by acting alone."

Barbara Hinckley has suggested that this definition as proposed by

Gamson has been widely accepted in coalition research needs to be broadened to

include three significant components namely

a) that coalition involve political activity that

includes individuals/groups engaged in

collective activity in interaction with more

than one other.

b) that coalition involve the exercise o f power

-the use, organization and application of

resources to gain certain ends.

c) and involves that area o f human affairs in which

no solutions of pure Conflict or pure coordination

obtain.

I

1 Gamson,William. "Experimetital Studies of Coalition Formation" in Leonard Advances inExperimental Social Psychology New York : Academic Press, (1964) p.85,

Gamson ,W. ibid. p.85.Hinckley, Barbara. Coalitions andPolitics'Ncv/Yatk: Harcourt B Jovanovich Inc ., (1981) Ch. 1 .

She believes that coalitions should pertain to political situations in order

to distinguish political activity from other Psychological and social human affaii’s and

kivolves tatioml calculation, conflicting interaction and multiple level adjustments or

compromises.I

However, this addition by Hinckley also suffers in some respects because

although it underlines the processes that combine elements of conflict and

coordination and distinctly suggests political ( but not governmental) qualifier for

allocating values /determining outcomes, it does not add the authoritative dimension to

it(as does Easton , for e.g. ). It goes to Hinckley^ .s credit that she emphasized that

coalitions are central to political and social phenomena.

William H. Riker offered a slightly different definition o f coalition

activity. According to him the ‘central activity of politics is decision making;

decisions are made either by individuals or by the quasi mechanical or conscious

processes of groups and decisions made by conscious actions of groups are made

through the process of coalition formation.’ Riker omits the requirement o f a mixed

motive situation, Instead, he prefers the w^ord decision making. ROcer's formulation

stipulates collective action and assuming consciousness and shifting the exercise of

power to decision making.

Riker, H. The Theory o f PolUicalCoalilion New Haven :Yale University Press, (1962) p.l 1.

5

T H IO E ¥ O f COALITION? A l E I l f HISTORY

M someone said quite rightly, ''iiiliereiit to social action and

social ifitegration is the foiroing of coalitions. There Is no other way to fomi a

collectlwty tliat causes outcomes wWch could not otteivise be cfeated iiidivicliialy.*

But /lespite its lmpoita,fi.ce ,coalMoB forming has been largely iiegiecteci by the social

sciences. It was not iititil Riker's seminal work tliat PoHticai science seemed pre-

occupM exclusively witli tlie oitcom es o f coaMtion formation, rather tliaii with

theoretical exfjlariations of how coalitions are foimed. This becomes evident also k

the treatment of tlie subject down the yeats, a small Mnpling of wMch we posit here.

A.Lawreiice Lowell V as |»rlm ps the frs t one to <JweM on the issue o f

cabinet foriiBtioii afid the ftiportaiit role o f coalition la it. His 1S96 work states :

“ It is ...an axiom fliat except under very peculiar CTCumstaiices, coalition

inMstries are short-lived compared with lioiaogaieous otm. A cabinet;

wMcli depends for its existence on the voters of the Chamber

can pursiie a comlstent policy with fimmess and effect oiily wfaen it

can rely for support on. a compaet aiid faitirfol majority.”

Thus, lie concWes tliat:

"... the parflameBtary system will give a country strong ani eifective

governnaent only in case the .majorily comists of a single party.”

See Holler, Manfred J. (e4) Coalitiom and Colkctm Action Verlag :Physica < 1914) p.3,

Lowell, AXgwraice. Govemmemts and parties in Cmtimntai Europe VoLi CaiobrWge: t& m rd Paiv, Press IWfi ,pj).73-<74.

After him, almost every generation of political scientists have echoed and

reaffirmed his thesis. This may be seen in a brief review o f the noted classics of

yesteiyears. James Bryce” was of the opinion th a t;

"An administration formed by a coalition of parties is

usually weak, not because the combination is unstable

but because men whose professed principles differ are

likely to be entangled in inconsistencies or driven to

unsatisfactory compromises .(In multiparty parliaments

each party) becomes a focus of intrigue. The parties

make bargains with each other and by their combination

perhaps secretly and suddenly form successive ministri­

es which may be overturned, with injury to the progress

of legislation and to the continuity of national policy.

Since there must be parties, the fewer and stronger they

are, the better.”

Laski in his 1938 work reviewed the argument that durable government requires a

majority party system. Harold J. Laski **noted :

"With some writers, indeed this position has assumed

the position of an axiom; and it is strongly argued

7Bryce, James. Modern Democracies New York; Macmillan, 1921, p .121.Laski .Harold J. Parliamentary Government in Britain N.York: The Viking Press, (1938) p.56-57.

that tWs is the best rneliiod of working represeirtative

government J believe this to be triie„.Tfie multi party

system... eitSier jnakw for eoalition governmen!:, with,

its inherent erosion of principle; or for mkority

government, which is always likely to be weak."

Maurice Diiverger also ttad similar views to offer In 1951®:

” Mmltipartisiii weakens the govemnieiit In a

parManientary regirfle... The absence o f a tiiajority

party makes it necessary to foiiii lietefogeaeoiis...

cabinets based on a coafiton, or else iniaority

cabliiets... A programme o f govenimen,t action is

tiierefore possible only for a very slioit peiod, for

iiriited objectives m d very l i te w w i measures...

Cabinet coBapses wMcii are exceptional Mid rare

under tlie two party system tecome Eonual an^ f ’eqiiert

anJ are scarcely mtigatetf by th^ feet that the same

men are oftea to 1» twmd in diffei’ent ministerial

coinbinations,”

® Dttverger,Maurice. Political Parties ioadon: Methwai&Co. 1951 f.4fl7.

Irt iTiodern times Lowell's thesis is reffectecl in Jean Blondel's writings. He opines that

the duration o f cabinet governments’ is unquestionably influenced by the type of party

system prevailing in the country.' He'° states :

" Two factors ...appear to contribute to the

relative duration of govcrnment.s in parliamen­

tary systems; the tact that the system is a

straight clash between two parties and the fact

that one party government prevails. The two factors

are quite clearly connected: one party governments are

not possible without at least one large party, except

on a temporary basis. On balance, ...it does seem that

one party government ... is the factor contributing

most decisively to the stability o f governments."

Blondel believed that coalitions, whether smdl or large, appear

directly antagonistic to stable government. He is joined by Hans Daalder” who

hypothesised that:

" Coalition cabinets are bound to be unstable"

Blondel, Jean. "Party systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies" Canadian Journal ofFolilical Science No.l JmQ p.l98.Daalder, H . " Cabinets and party Systems in Ten Smaller European Democracies" A Report to Round Table on European Comparative Politics , Turin (Sept. 1969) mimeo. p.5.

and concludes that although

" there is no gi’cat diflxTence between one party and

two party coalitions - the hypothesis seems confirmed."

The evidence presented in the foregoing works was basically o f two

different types. The earlier generation of writers from Bryce till Duverger have

supported Lowell's thesis by noting the political experience o f Weimar Republic and

France and its dysfimctioimiities to the durable governments o f England, in contrast.

They implied that the multi - party regimes fared interiorly when compared with

typical majority party system which obtained in England. Both Blondel and Daalder ,

in a later generation o f scholars have provided impressive empirical evidence by

studying a greater number o f countries. Blondel analysed behaviour o f 17 Western

parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1966, focusing inter alia, on the average

differences in cabinet durability between party systems. Daalder analysed 10 smaller

European democracies from 1918 till 1969. Alongwith them there were others like

Ferdinand A.Hermens ’ who have waxed eloquent on the dangers o f multipartism and

the benefits o f majoritypartism. They gave rise to the 'myth o f multipartism' which as

a corollary gave rise to the widespread belief that multiparty systems lead to coalitions

which are inherently non-durable, or experience a wide variation o f cabinet durability.

Multi-party politics in a democracy has been visualised as a 'parliamentary game'

See Hermens, F.A. Europe between Democracy and Ayiarchy Notre Dame ; Univ. of Notre Dame Press ,1951,

10

13

V4

U

wterein, the rationale is to form sod control the govemtneiit. The purpose then, o f a

ditt'able cabket is to litMl support from a coaltioii o f sssociateci pmtles. AlflTOgh,

alliances are always uneasy and till o f Intrigues WX Middfcton* argued some

severity yemn ago success la the game depends on the "nature o f the coaMtion'* that

forms the cabinet. This is cleperidant ipon the imtore o f pmty system and tlie quality of

leadership. Increasingly, we liave come to .associate poMtica! fsaflies with democracy

itsel£ David Rotetsoii*^', for e.g., claims that "to talc about democracy, today, is to"

'talk al>oiit a system of comptitive political parties. Unless one chooses to rqect tie

repi'eseiitatlve model that has been the staple o f the tlieoiy m d practice of democracy

siace tlie Frencli Revototio’iij osie m«st eofoe to tefios witli politicai fatties.” The

'nature o f coalition' depends m In a lafge measiTOj internally democratic poitical

jstrlies. According to Alan Ware^^;-

' Sucli parties would extend the arera wltlmi the

state k vAmk citizens coiiM be invoked la iirfdflg

choices ■felating to the state's olj|ecti¥es ;and

!n¥olviiJg siicli people fti the process o f coristroctlng

policy pro^aam es T te iS;, cleinocfttfc control o f

a party nakes for to tli more democracy and acts as a

mechanlsni to prevent distoftioms ia the process o f

etectoril eM ce.”

Middtetoii, WX. The French foiUkal System London; Ernst Benn LM., 1932 p.l54 R0be«soa,D, A Theory of Party Cottipeiition , London: JoM Wiley, 1976 {>,1.Ware, A..T. Ciiizem, Parties and the State: A Reappraisal Ffittcetoa: Priacetosi Univ. Press 19g7p.25-6.

11

In poKtical party literature there is an underlying assiiatptioii tiiat

inter party competition is sufficient for representative democracy. Classicists such as

Schumpeter have postulated democracy as the "competitive struggle for tlie people’s

vote" and the role of people is simply to "produce a government."''"He showed no

concern with the internal democracy o f the organizations that guarantee popular rule.

Sartori supported Mm by saying that "large scale democracy is not an enlargement or a

sheer adding up of many little democracies'."

William Riker, who essentially stands in the same tradition,

argues that "the function of voting is to control officials, and no more"(emphasis in

original Indeed, the representational role o f democratic political parties is both

populist ( insofar as they should faithfally represent the policy preferences o f their

members and followers) and liberal (in that they should maximise their opportunities

to gain office whether or not they correspond to policy preferences o f their

constituents) in modern times. Competitive party behaviour, in reality is much more

complex while seeking coalitions. We can identify three models o f party behaviour:

i) The Office Seeking Party

In Riker's view, parties basically seek to win power and in

parliamentary democracies, winning means controlling the executive branch, or as

much of that branch as possible.. Office-seeking behaviour aims at such goals. As

1617

18

Schumpeter, J.A. Capitalism, Soc^aHM, i r t d #.Yofk: Harper, 1943 p.269. Sartori, G. Parties and party SysM ii tU P : CamBrldge p .152.Riker, W. op.cit. p.9.

1 2

L.aver and Schofield put it, "typicaEy the yearning for office is seen, as it was seen by

Riker, as the desire to control some sort of fixed prize, a prize captured by the winmng

coalition and divided among its members".'^

WliereaS"by now, it is well established that political parties strive

for office, there is less agreement on the underlyiriig motivations for the same. Ian

Budge and Laver say that : "We can defend in two ways the assumption that those

involved in coalition bargaining are motivated by the desire to get in to government In

the first place, the rewards o f office may be valued intrinsically, in and for themselves.

In the second place, office may be valued only instrumentally for the ability it gives to

influence policy outputs. The instinsic and instramentai value o f office have not

traditionally been distinguished."

Parties want office because incumbency is a help in winning

lirture elections, though this is disputed. The lure o f power and office begins with the

spoils such as cabinet positions, prized portfolios, other offices o f profit, sinecures

etc.

ii) The Policy-Seeking Party

Another model of party behaviour posits that there are parties

which seek to maxiinise their impact on public policy. Abram DeSwaan a firm

Laver, M.J & N.Schofield Multiparty Governmenl:The Politics o f Coalition in Europe OlJl>.Oxford (1990) p.40.

“ Budge Ian & M.J.Laver “Office Seeking and policy Pursuit in Coalition Theory” LegislativeStudids Quarterly (1986) v. 11 iio.4 p.490.

13

believer of tMs tliliiicing states: "... co-flsiderations o f policy are fotemost ia tlie, a»ids

of the actors..-the parliamentafy game is, ia fact, about the cleteritiiiiation of major

govemmeot Policy." like the oSice -seeking model the policy seeldng model of

party feeliaMoiir cleirives mainly from coalition theory and was developed In respoM

to tte' 'poficy blfecf asswnptions of the first generatiott of pme tlieoretic stwJies of

goverimeiit fjcnatlon, ft specifically conteads the generic aotion that afl {laities are.

ecfmally feasible coalition paitiiers and tlierefore there is aa eleoKit of Msscritnlnste

seiection of coaftioii partners. Instead, polcy based eoaBtioii tiM y suggests that

coalitions are insde by parties ttmt ai'e congeaial la policy terms or wliat Rotert

Axeifod cails 'spatialy comected’.

It is recogiilsel ttmt poticy pmsoit can l>e pesmted as a siipplement

to, rather tliaa as a stibstitote for office seektrtg. In place of pure political paty sa k i^

pure policy payoffs, now it is supplemented as policy seeking p « y Is one tliat seeks

goverameiital portfolios as well as Meologicaly compatiMe coaltioa partners.

tii) Tlie Vtte-Swkkg Party ■

Works oa electoral competitioii Mm ^awaed a tkmty that

pities ire in feality "teams of men" who afe seeking to maxlaiis© their electoral

support to cotttrol government. In Anthony Downs's femous fonnufetion , "Parties

formulate poUcks in order to win ekctims, miher than win elections m order to

formulate p d k k s”, aad fiatlier argied that "poiitkiam ...are motimied by the desire

for power, prestige and im m e ...their primary objective i& to be elected to puMie

DeSwaaHjA. Coalition Theories m d Cabinet: Formation Afflsterda® :Eisevief 1973 p.S8.

iz AxelrwljR. Conflict of Merest , Clilcago; MarklaJfl 1970

14

office , Tills in turn Implies tk it eadi party seeks to receive more votes tia n any

other.’"‘' Downs lias stated that his model of explanation is applicable to multiparty

contexts.

His classic expostalatioii fe , tlie mote votes a party win®, the

more diamee It las to enter a coalMan, the more power i receives If it does eater one,

and the more iadiviclMals la It lioM office in the govetnirietit coalitioji. Hence vote-

ma.xltiilstrig is still the basic motive underlying the bebavioiir o f p a r t i e s . . . T o

Downs fonmilatloa paitles are seen not only as vote seekers k it also vote rim iinlsera'.

T.lioigh suteecittetttiy, works have downplayed the vote-tnaxlmlslfig assniB|Jtioti The

vote-seeking model o f pssrty belmvlow bas towever, mere te iristic value, becaese ft

ttMkes 110 sewe to assiime that paties value votes for thek m m sfcte. The am iiip tion

that parlies seek office or poicy carries greater force atid votes can ostensibly be

tta e ly JiBgtrinaeiital goals. Downs's fonnuJatloa has teen relnteipreted recently fiy

Kaare Stroni and Wotfgijsg MiiMer who suggest that if vote-geeking is eoosiderecl

instrujii^iital, "then party leaders iiecessariy look tbfwaw! to ftitiire beneits when liiey

throw tlienBdve& Into electorai coatests or when they 'take positions' o f ciaan credit'

for electoral piir|Kises. S m « elections happesi only at regular iitefvals, eiectofal

pursuits typically mean forward-tookliig tieliavioiir. The degree to wliicli party leaders

are consuniM with sucti anticlpatioi and calcalstion is ti» fest w asiire o f tbeir tia»

horizon®. Tills is particuiarly tnie wl®fl electoral pursuits conflict with it» re

Dowas, A . J ti Ecommic Jfteof^^o/i^ewwracyN.Yca'i: :Harpei‘& Row , 1957 p.2S-30,

Downs, A, iUd. p .lS f.

1 5

immediate policy or office gratification. The more party leaders value the future, the

more willingly they defer other benefits in the hope of electoral success.

Thus, we have shown in this way that as later - researchers are

emerging they are able to add by way of psychological insights, statistical inferences

etc., new dimensions to the extant knowledge on the complex subject of party

behaviour and their motivations.

The Upshot

In this section, we have traced a brief overview of the scliolars who

have done representative worics on the large body o f coalition research. Lowell's

theme set in i896 was the torch bearer. His views on cabinet formation set the format

for later scholars. Multiparty politics has no doubt complicated the question o f how

coalitions ibrm ? as also the question of preferences of party behaviour. Despite the

variety o f explanations we would have to go back to the theories regarding Office-

seeking and Policy-seeking in greater details to get perspicacity regarding why

coalitioiisare made and how they arise and how they sustain?

II

COALITION THEORY AND POLITICS OF COALITION

Coalitions may have come in our part o f the world only

now, but they have been quite widespread elsewhere and politics o f coalition

nianagement is very much a part of democratic and consensual political governance.

25Strom, Kaare & W.C.Miiller (eds.). Parly, Office or Votes ? Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press (1999) p .ll.

16

In most p a ts o f Western Europe the politics o f eoatttioa ie s at the bearl o f

representative democracy. It is a.Iso loiowa that the politics o f coalitions me more

pervasiv© thmi the frequency o f actual coalltioii goYeriiiaeirts.

Coaltiorial paittldufi is also involved ia tiie eiidfess bargaJiiIng and

negotiation tliat is fottocl after every election that fiiJIs to t l i ’ow a clear iiiandatej apart

froiti. ffltiiations o f Jiilaority govemmerits and iiiilfiparty contexts. la U,S, where bi-

parly system has no apparent fecoefse to coalitions , ‘'...th e day to day biisitiess o f

fjolMcs Is intimately concer«?d witb tl» cievelopffieiit, nminteoance and destrtictioa o f

legislative coaftlofis, many o f which sfiow scant regard for feitDal party Iiiies."“ Thus

coalitions are a general ptenoiiieoa wMi profoifid taipicatfoiis, it fe with interaction

o f the isgishtive and executive power lii the baekgfoiini o f democracies that we

would te eonceiiKd k tiiis work.

An area o f Intense poitical stiriy coalition poitics la s b m i feoth an

objec4 o f eiiiplrlcal M iyses and the foiiidatfoa for dakstale superstroctiire o f theoty.

It lias Ijeeii approacted from the 'European politics' tradition and the 'garne-fteoretic'

tradltioti ain»iigst others. Botti iiave evolved i i differettt directieiis quite iiide|»iidettt

o f eacb other. Most o f the game-flieoretic work is AiMSfica centteds expresskg itself la

ckfise natiieiiiatlcal models a a i notation iiDstly kcon^relieiislble. The European,

tradition ^w M ists have, consequently almost declared it »etevant,, aitliougli both the

traditions ‘are talkiug atoiost precise^ the same tMag liit they are simply msiiig

different Imgoages to do so'.

26 Laver; M, & Schofield ap.cit. p.#.

17

K,eepmg iti view the focus of this work, (wMcfe would be to analyse the

coalition experiments undertaken in India) we would do well to only deal with that

class o f coalition theoiy which is relevant to study coalitions in Third world context.

We would carefully sift the voluminous literature on the subject and concentxate on

basically two broad themes out of it: namely, the power maximisation theories and the

policy-based theories apart fi'om a few separate ones. By doing so, we are skipping

over a lot of mathematical constructs and hypothetical bargaining exercises to provide

propositions o f theoretical linkages to actual parliamentary party systems.

DISTINCT APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF COALITION

Two broad classes o f coalition theory are germane to our study of

politics. The Power Maximisation and the Policy Based theories o f coalition formation

and behaviour ai-e the famous representative constmcts which Imve inspired a

generation of scholars indefatigably, and today are recognizably the most basic tools

of understanding the vexacious , if not convoluted world o f coalitions.

I. The Power Maxlinisatioii Theories

Also known as size principle theories, they stress that

maximisation o f payoffs, i.e., power and other derivatives are the key factor in

coalition formation. This theory ignores ideological and policy affinities as

18

coatribisfJiig factors ( wMcti Is the forte of Policy based theories as tliey suggest that

tliese fectors me key to coalition for,rna.tloa The major tlieorfets in the tradition are

William. H.Riker, Wllltain Ganisaii aiiil iawretice HocM, The gancie theoretic iiiodel

presented by Illcef as niodiflecl t f Dodd lias teen accepted In this work aaci thsfelbre

lik e r’s model is expmcled to incliicte the 'a priori w iliigiiess to Imgairf as suggested

by Dodd to evolv? s tm m represeiitstlve theory o f cabinet ferinatioa ®rid im Jn tm w e

111 iimltiparty parfenieiits.

We will ir s t present tlie tlieorles as postuiated by tlie theorists

themselves before reacHiig for the liytiM, In tliis sectioa

Riker Ms seitlm l work laid down ttie bare esseatials o f iMs

tiieoiy. AccoKiittgiy, the power maxinisatloa constriict posits tlie concept of

'iraniniufn winning coalitions' J t priBclicts that 'fnmlmnm wimaag coafitioas’' , wMch

may be defliied as a coalition in wMcti each party is Indispensable to tbe coaMorfs

prospects of winning a simple majority of seats. la st3.ch. coafitions j,eacfi member's

share o f the payoff Is jnajtlmised. TMs is a iled the Siw Pimcipte. Tlis koWs, witli

vayatiois, whetiier one assnnies ix e i or w iable payoiFs, pfoportionafity in stefiog

the payoff or side pajwjats hy domliMiit paftiiefSj or perfect or imperfect iafijrTOtioB.

'Siae Principle theories can lave variants because tliere can tse tm t t thy i o®

tnfflitf Mm winiiiag coalitloBS sacli as raatiffliroi si® wdM ons to wMch the nm atef of

legMators of 'fee ’wlnaiog coalitioB Is minloMsed to a n tin ter Just enougli to win a

27 Rfter^W. Qp.dl

19

majority, or minimum. iMtriber of parties coaBtioii in wMcli Ae number of coatescing

parlies tiecessay to w k a inajottty Is miiiirmssd.''

Let us ej'jplaiti tliis In detail. Assiimiig that political p itie s enter

pofJiament irt their quest for governmerital power and fladlng " after elections that

there is no imjority, they setfcli for secure participation in aBcl control of the cabinet

becoffifi's a search for according to Middleton, ” a coaitlon o f natural allies" aad

fert.lier "Parties (begin)... trying to discei’n the pliysiogiiomy o f tlie assemWy, aad

paiticiilarly to forecast the majority -or the vaiioiis possible iri^orities -whKli it is

capable o f froducJag. Groups are rarely content glniply to represent shades o f electoral

opinion, they look forwarf to talcii^ aa aetive pait in go-¥en!!iieia:...HeiK« tlie

.Ititpoitance o f the calciniation o f the -visibte and latent teiideficM o f tlie newly efecfcci

assembly. Each paity lias to fe d otrt which party coalMom caii be successM in tMs

game as a!» deteiwilne wMcIi coalition or coalMons w il H fe¥oij:raMe to tlieia Iti

tOTis o f miafsteriai seat payoffs. This involves coiiidex and con&iiiidiiig calculations

and fesiiltaatly parties can te overwhelmed In such negotiations ."To avoid tMs resislt,

patties employ a basic criterloa in afl calcalatioiis aad aegotiatioiis: they seek first and

foremost to enter a minlmina winning coalition, TBat is, they seek to enter a coalition

o f parties that has a reliable inafority yet contains no party in the coaltioa that is

Buaecessary to majority status, This rmniiiiiiitt winning criterion puvides a base liie

agaiiBt wlwti afl possitte coaltioas can be coii^ared by the pai*ties. I f a eoaltion is

Sridharan ,E. “CoaMtlofl PelWcs in India: What We caa Expect from Theory, Comparison andlleceat ifistOQi'” Centre for Policy Research Delhi {milaeo)'(lW7) p.3.

® Middleton, W. op, eft p, 154,

” MiddletoB, W. ibid. pp.1074.

2 0

not of raitiitraim wkmmg status, it is either not of winning status or contatris some

unnecessary party within it that could be removed from the cabinet witli its ministerial

{myoffs being distributed among the other coalition partners, The tbrmer coalition "is

undesirable to a party because it would not guarantee victory in the cabinet formation

and inainteiiaiice process. The latter coalition is undesirable to a party because it

would waste desirable payoffs unnecessarily, denying to the party the maximum

ministerial status that it could receive if only the necessary parties were included in the

coalition."'”

Varying from case to case, extraneous criteria and considerations

may be weighed to form minimum winning coalitions, such as seeking parties that

have similar agenda or programmatic perspectives. Some over-riding ground rules are

followed by the parties involved in this coalitional game. A party in this game is

'willing to sacrifice its own potential advantage momentarily. 'The groimd rules are set

by constraints of the parliamentary system. Some o f the rules are overt such as the

necessity of a majority o f 50% plus one of legislative votes in one's favour. An

implicit rule is that the cabinet formation cannot last indefinitely. Therefore the

longer the coalition bargaining process lasts, the more is the pressure for some

cabinet to be formed. If no majority solution can be reached, then a minority cabinet

will have to be constituted 'which can attain the largest plurality o f votes.' This cabinet

may persist till a larger coalition arises that is willing to take over cabinet

responsibility or till parliament is dissolved.

Dodd, Lawi'ence.C. Coalitions in Parliamentary Government Princeton: Princeton Univ Press (1976) p.37.

2 1

Moreover, parties are constrained in their calculations and

manoeuvring by the bargaining conditions that prevail within the parliament. Parties

need reliable information regarding other parties namely, as to which of the others

ha:ve a reliable parliamentary majority. They also must be in a position whereby they

can realistically estimate which of the other parties are available to them as potential

coalition partners, i.e., icnowledge of the implicit and explicit commitments made by

parties to one another. Other writers have also pointed out, in addition to Riker, that if

parties are to enter coalitions, they must be willing to negotiate and adjust with other

parties to form coalitions and to compromise.'^ These may encrypted as 'information

certainty' and 'generalized a-priori willingness of parties to bargain’. RUcer has used

these terms in a specific way and meaning.

Riker uses 'information certainty' to mean:

a) "complete information as to weights" -In any

parliamentary setting, when all parties know

precisely the weight ( i.e., the reliable number

of legislative votes) controlled by all parties,

b) "perfect information as to prior moves" -This

happens in the bargaining process when each party

knows all of the moves ( i.e., offers, bargains,

counter-offers etc.) made among ail of the various

parties in coalition negotiations.

BracherJC.D and Max Weber have also made this point separately in their worlcs.

2 2

Further Riker's 'generalized a-priori willingness o f parties' to bargain

obtains in settings o f parliamentary systems where all parties are wiUiiig to consider

entering a cabinet coalition with any other jsarty. 'In other words, there are no a-priori

constraints which circumscribe or inhibit the negotiation and coalition formation

between any two parties .Lawrence Dodd upstages Riker and states that the type of

coalition that forms the cabinet will depend on the bargaining conditions. If

parliarnentmy conditions are highly constrained in their willingness to bargain among

themselves, there should be a tendency towards minority cabinets. Crucial to the entire

exercise is the a.vai!ability o f a set of parliamentary parties who are willing to bargain.

The willingness of parties to bargain determines the general range in which the

coaiitional status of the cabinet should fall. Within this range, the coalitional status o f

the 'cabinet that forms can vary; a critical element in tliis variation is the degree of

information certainty that exists within the parliamentary bargaining area. I f parties

can properly estimate the relative strength of all other parties and the moves being

made by all other parties, they will act to form minimum winning coalitions.

On the other hand, if parties are unsure of the reliable votes that each player

in this game possesses( i.e., other parliamentary parties) then parties will compensate

for this uncertainty by entering into oversized coalitions -described as a coalition that

is lai-ger than what is nominally necessary to the coalition's majority status. The

oversized coalitions are formed to ensure the majority status of the coalition.

‘Oversized coalitions are possible because of the generalized willingness o f the

parliamentary parties to bargain. Within the coalitional status range predetermined by

2.3

the geiietalized willingness of parties to bargain, the precise size of the coalition is

determined by the degree of iiiformafcioii certainty that exists. The more information

uncertainty there is, the more the parties will seek to compensate and thus the greater

the number and size( weight) of the extra parties that will be brought into the coalition.

By contrast, in parliaments experiencing moderate to high constraints in party

bargaining, information uncertainty creates or augments a tendency towards

undersized cabinets . (Thus) if minimuni winning cabinets are not possible because of

the constrained nature o f party bargaining, parties will seek to be in the largest

possible coalition. In this way, they maximise the security of the cabinet by maldng it

as difficult as possible for a larger coalition to arise’.

Sometimes situations can arise in highly constrained settings where a

particular party willing to enter coalition has reasons to avoid grouping itself with

particular party (say, Party y ) ,whereas it is more than willing to coalesce with another

party (Party Z); or there may arise a situation where Party X has to form a coalition

with Party Y and Z but parties Y and Z may not be willing in cabinets together. In

such set-tings also, the importance of complete and prior (and perfect) information

increases for parties to calculate their maximum advantage. Perfect information is

required of the prior moves by the parties to guard against the possibility o f being

drawn into a cabinet with an undesirable partner. Hence in such situations, if

coalitional status range can be predetermined by the willingness of parties to bargain,

only then can such undesirable coalitions can obtain. In other words if there is

See Dodd ,L ,C. supra p,44.

24

inibrmatioft that undesirable parties can bargain and mutua'Uy find manoeuvrability

and acceptance, only then such coalitions may form. In such situation, calculations and

negotiations would take more time and imder the time constramts that exist on

parliamentary bargaining, parties would be forced to settle for smaller coalitions than

the maximal one that is possible rather than enter coalitions that may not be desirable.

Thus, an increase in infomation certainty can give rise to both

oversized and undersized coalitions. Parties can calculate reliably minimum winning

coalitions only in conditions of low information uncertainty .As information

uncertainty increases, the degree of manoeuvering decreases. Dodd believes that there

are ‘continued challenges to the composition of a cabinet both from parties outside and

from parties inside the cabinet.’ The calculus o f power does not come to a stop with

the formation of the cabinet. There may be parties which want to be part of the cabinet

even after a cabinet has been formed. There could be parties within the cabinet which

may be unhappy with their respective ministerial payoffs. Such challenges will always

be there. “The nature and success of these challenges will depend on the type of

cabinet coalition that has been formed. In particular, the minimum winning status of

cabinets is vital. If a cabinet is of minimum winning status, it is in a relatively ideal

position. On the one hand, it controls a majority o f parliament's votes; unlike a

minority cabinet it is not at the mercy of a hostile parliament that it cannot control.

The cabinet should be able to meet any threat that comes solely from parties outside of

the cabinet,

” Dodd, L,C . supra, p.50.

25

On the matter of excluding a particular party fi'om the ruling coalition

Dodd says that this can be found out by comparing an ‘oversized coalition’ and

a'minimum winning cabinet’. If it is realised that at least one party is represented in

the cabinet that can ideally be removed and the reliable majority of the cabinet

still be maintained, then it is expendable.

That party had been added when it was not clear in the coalition

formation stage ( of its unnecessary status) due to information uncertainty. Therefore,

after it becomes obvious that a party is expendable, other coalition partners will want

such party to be omitted as is so doing they can gain new ministerial positions

controlied by the expendable party. Hence, “realizing this, the various parties within,

the coalition act to reduce the size of the cabinet act to reduce the size of the cabinet

by removing at least, one party. Similar action will not be taken in a minimum

winning cabinet because there is no expendable party among the coalition partners.

Consequently, in comparing minimum winning cabinets to greater than minimum

winning cabinets, minimum winning cabinets should be more durable

On the issue o f durability and longevity o f coalitions, Dodd says that

the number and relative size of the 'extra' parties in a coalition are important

determinant o f this perspective. “The more extra parties there are in a coalition and

the greater the size o f these parties, ceteris paribus, the larger the number of significant

ministerial positions these extra parties will tend to control and smaller the proportion

of significant ministerial seats controlled by each cabinet party relative to the

Dodd, L.C. supra, p.50.

26

proportion it would control deprivation that is im}3ortant. The greater the deprivation

o f mlnisteria! seats parties are suffering relative to a potential nttinimiim v^rnruiig size

tlie more quickly parties should act to remove the deprivation...the greater the

oversized status of a cabinet coalition , the shorter the durability of the cabinet

coalition should be.”' ’ A similar eventuality may occur v/hen we compare minimum

winning cabinets with less than minimum winning cabinets. A minority cabinet bereft

of tfie luxury of legislative majority and the likelihood of hesitancy of parties to

bargain inter-se faces constant thi'eats while attempting to govern. Other parties are

constantly scheming and re-negotiating their differences so that they can overthrow

their differences so as to overthrow the cabinet or at least force the dissolution o f the

parliament and new elections. In fact, it is also possible that the parties within the

cabinet may be negotiating with outside parties so as to form a larger and secure

coalition. Dodd is o f the opinion that such problems do not crop up for ‘minimum

winning coalitions’ "Consequently, minimum winning coalitions should be more

durable than undersized coalitions. In addition, the more a minority cabinet departs

from minimum winning status ( that is, the greater the number and size of the parties

that it would take to transform the cabinet to minimum winning status), the more

vulnerable the cabinet is to the rise of a larger coalition or to the forced dissolution of

parliament and new elections. Thus, among minority cabinets, cabinet durability

36 Dodd, L.C. supra, p.51.

27

should be a I'imction of the degree to which the cabinet departs from minimum

winning status.”' '

The IJpsio t

Ttie Riker-Dodd theory of coalition fbmiation holds quite categorically

that the coalitional status of the cabinet that forms after a parliamentary election is

determined by the nature o f the bargaining conditions that prevail within the

parliament. The major stimulus in the bargaining process is the generalized a-priori

willingness of parties to bargain inter-se. In conditions of low a-priori constraints,

majority coalitions should form. In situations of higher a-priori constraints, the greater

would be the possibility of minority coalitions forming. Another tangible in this

process o f bargaining process and constraints influencing cabinet coalitional status is

the information certainty. If the bargaining information within parliament is fairly

certain, then the coalition that obtains should approach minimum winning status. On

the contrary, if bargaining conditions are uncertain, the cabinet that forms increasingly

deviate from minimum winning status. Further we have noted above that in situations

of low a-priori bargaining constraints the coalition should deviate toward oversized

status; in situations of high a-priori constraints the coalition should deviate toward

undersized status.

The Riker -Dodd theory is generally applicable to multiparty

parliaments because the important constituents of this theory the bargaining

conditions and cabinet coalitional status can be more clearly perceived. It may be

added here that this theory may also be applied to parliaments which contain a

' Dodd ,L.C. supra, p.51-2.

28

doBiiiiant one -party majority M e. In such sitoatloiis a majofity rale by a single patty

formed cabinet can be coiisidei'ed as essentia.% a raMmans wiiiBing cabinet. It was

able to forni tlie cabinet because of low a-priori tafgalritog coiistraiits and high

in&rmation certainty. Such cabinets are durable because of the strategic nilriimiiii

winning status of tiie party.

W ilam G'sirtson is another supprtef o f tliis school His nisjor work

has cbaractetisticatty placed Hm In the genre of Social-psychological studies. TMs

approach is different from the Game-theoretic approacli o f Riker aad otters.

Yet it Is recognised that Ws approacli Is botlx tlieoreticai and

et'npiricai: theofetical, iti that It seeks to Identify and explain patterns In coalition

behaviow and eapMcal because It concentrates on liow coaitlon players actuaiy

tehave in real world. Ganison says, “a theory o f coalition fonnatlon sfiould tell bs who

will join with wlioiii and how they w il divide tlie rewards. Only those theories wMcti

are descriptive, or can be Interpretec! as swell, will be considered ...prescription to the

pajtidpants oa Irow they should 'behave wfll be treated only tii'ougli the additioa o f

assuinptions which tfanslate them into predictions o f how participants actually will

belia?©. ^^Gamson fiirther s a p in a pitdictive ¥eiii tliat "Coalitions w ll form along the

lines o f ieast resistance, ie ., between those p rtners for whom there exists the most

G8insoa,W. op.cU. p.86.

29

obvious and unasiibigiious solution to the problem of dividing the relative share of the

payoif.""’

Gamson suggested that in the context o f coalitions, players who are

equal in resources should form coalitions. He does not suggest what would happen

with an unequal resource distribution. Clearly this is ‘ less a theory than a single

postulate not completely specified about coalition behaviour.’ Gamson believes that

“ Many coalition situations are conducted under conditions which are not conducive

to rational calculation and analysis ...Thus, coalition formation is best understood as

an essentially random choice process. The coalition that forms will be the result of

such fortuitous events as a chance encounter or telephone call.”' ^

Although Gamson is cited by proponents of other approaches

also such as Random choice process and Utter confusion theory, what is relevant for

Power Maximisation school is his stress on likelihood o f coalition formation on

strength o f bfirgaining. As noted by analysts in Gamson, “ ...despite the reference to

theory, it is clear that there are no systematic or logical distinctions between the

categories. At times they overlap and at times they diverge in their assumptions about

the player's goals, distribution o f payoffs and the conditions for bargaining. At some

points, they predict the same results.”' *

Gamson, W. op.dt. p.90-1.

Gamson - ibid. p.92.Hinckley, Barbara .Coalitions and Politics H. B. Jovanovich Inc. .N.York (1981) pp.8-9.

30

42

43

Fiefore we shift to a analysis of the second group o f theorists termed

broadly as the Policy based theorists, it is essential to point out tto t the power

maximisation theory may not be iisefiil in identifying the relevant differences between

parliamentary systems and mderstanding these differences for cabinet durability.

Lowell has emphasized the dichotomy between majority party and multiparty

pariiameMs. Sartori has emphasized that “there is a world o f difference between the

bipolar pattern of moderate pluralism and the multipolar features o f extreme

pluralism.”'* These iodicate that multipfflly systems are not as homogeneous in their

characteristics. The existence of cleavage conflict or polarization among parties

influences the a-priori willingness to bargain. The party system fractionalization and

instability certainly influences infomiation certainty. Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor

say, “•cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a commumty or sub

community into groups with important political differences at specific times and

places,”

The wide body of existing literature shows that voters vote parties

according to the positions parties take on various salients and cleavages. Therefore,

parties o f necessity, have to attain ministerial status so as to be able to formulate,

enact, and administer legislation that is favourable to their cleavage constituencies.

This entails a willingness to bargain. Indeed, “No party can hope to gain decisive

Sartori, G. “European Political Parties: The Case of Polarised Pluralism,” in JXa Palombara &M.Weiner(eds.) Political Parties & Political Development, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,( 1966) p. 137.

Rae, D.W, & M.Taylor. The Analysis o f Political Cleavages N. Haven :Yale Univ. Press,(1970) p.l.

31

influence on the afiairs of the coiTiimmity without some willingness to cut across

existing cleavages to establish common fi'onts with potential enemies and

o pponen t s . Thus the cleavage system is both a major source o f the quest for power

and, at the same time, a major constraint on the beliavioiir o f parties.

Quite an impressive body of research exists on the issue o f spatial

representation, which means that partisan conflict on a given cleavage issue can be

depicted on a spatial continuum riimiing from left to right(i.e., the distance between

parties on a cleavage dimension indicating the political distance between them, as they

contemplate bai'gaining to form a cabinet). Sartori Downs etc.'’ have posited tliat the

greater the distance, the more parties must compromise their cleavage-related policy

stands if they are to coalesce m a cabinet .Further, greater the compromise required to

enter a coalition, the more difficult it is to justify the compromise. Hence, we reach the

conclusion that in any parliamentary context therefore, the a~priori willingness o f

parties to bargain depends on the nature o f the cleavage conflict characterizing the

parliamentary party system, at least partially.

We therefore, now turn to the body o f theories that posit cleavage

congeniality and policy commonality as the major criterions for coalitions to form

and be justified.

Lipset ,S.M A S.Rokkan ~Pa/iy Systems and Vote Alignments N.York: The Free Press, 1967 p.5. Sartori, G.-op.cit & A.Downs An Economic Theory o f Democracy N.York, Harper & Row, 1957

32

II. Tlie Policy Based The«ries

This group of theories was developed by later game theory adherents

of the second wave. They are also characterised as 'policy seeking' group who

developed this model in response to the ‘policy blind’ assumptions of the first

generation of game theoretic studies of government formation (under the rubric of

power maximisation theories). It specifically challenged the assumption that all paities

are equally feasible coalition partners, that is to say, that parties ai'e indiscriminate

with respect to their coalition partners.

The Policy based theories assume instead that coalitions can only

be made by patties that have cleavage congeniatity or axe congenial in policy terms.

They need to share elements of ideological similarity or what Robert Axelrod stated as

success&f coalition should consist of parties that are spatially “comiected”(meaTiing

thereby, adjacent) .Policy pursuit means talcing positions on any number o f issues or

more categorically, on policy dimensions related to public policies.

Policy based theories “predict minimum connected (emphasis in

original) winning coalitions, i.e., coalitions that are composed of member parties

adjacent on the ideological scale and at least not incompatible on major issues, thus

minimising the coalition's ideological range or span, and within this limiting

condition, the minimum number of parties needed for a majority. A variant of this is

the minimal policy range coalition, one that minimises the policy distance between the

coslition s e>

lings are tlie proponents' ^ of this scltool. In

, M icteel Leisefson, Sveii

works is fom d an attempt to

enhance !x)fli the realism and predictive power

They fnive posltai that coalition cahiiels

package o f proposed government policies and tteit policy is an ln.triiisic end valued iii

and for itself rather than as an instnjiiieiital means used by politicians to .gain office. A.

the nikds of actors. ,.tlie paifamealaiy game Is in factj about tlie deteroiiimtion of

ts no

mrm than an mstrumental means to affect policy.

They have MgMi;

moie

diineftsions, the theorists propose

tKtm'cea tfietnselves and their

assumed a one-dimeastonal policy

role o f cfctvage conflict In coaJ.ttioii

level policy measures In one o r several

partners. Early policy based coaltioii tlieoiy often

46 Sridharan,E. op.cit, p.3.

Axelrod ,R. CoHjlkt of Interest Markham.: PublCo 1970 ; A.De Swaaa -Coalition Theories and Cabinet Pomation, AwaersJam, Elsevier iS>73; .ieisersion M and S.Giroemlag®,E. W Kelly (ecis.) The Studv of CoatiUon Behaviour Holt Rinehart & Winston, Inc. {1970).A De Smaft ‘■op.cit p.S8.

34

applications to multi-dimensional space much less tractable. A party's success in

piu'suing its policies depends on its ability to change public policy towards its most

preferred positions or to prevent undesirable changes.

However, ‘parties may also experience policy sacrifices when, they are

asked to endorse policies that substantially deviate from the commitments they have

previously made or from their most preferred policies. The latter type o f policy

sacrifice is one that often comes up in bargaining between political paities over

cabinet or legislative coalitions.’ “At the heart of the policy-seeking model lies a belief

in the reality and significance of the contest over public policy decisions that

characterize democracy. Citizens of democracies become politically engaged because

these choices matter and they support certain political parties over others because

these parties make a difference. Politicians trade in promises of public policy and the

policy seeking literature implicitly assumes that ultimate outcomes that flow from

such polices matter to them. But, like office, policy can have intrinsic or instrumental

value. Party leaders may seek certain policy goals because they think they can benefit

in other ways or because they sincerely believe in them."

In some cases policy comes before power like in the context of

communist parties in Europe(the PCI of Italy, for e.g., ) which acknowledgably are

programmatic parties. But, even otherwise, in the context o f non communist parties

the role o f policy matters in the context o f coalition formation. This happens when

parties are genuinely motivated by the overwhelming desire to influence policy. Then,

” K.Strom & W.C Muller o p .d i , p.8.

35

such motivation has a fundamentai impact oti the entire process of coalition

bargaining.

Tlie “empirical evidence from the comparative literature on coalition

politics tends to support policy based theories, and hence, the importance of

compatibility for coalition formation and even more, for coalition longevity. About

two-thirds of majority coalitions in developed countries in the post-war period have

been ideologically connected. Tliis is so especially in polities where, like most of

Europe and Israel, there are clear ideological and social divisions, and where parties

identified with particular positions and social constituencies have fairly stable

support bases. However, within these constraints, payoff maximisation plays a

powerful behavioural role.”^

Thus, it can be said that the basic party motivation, as it were, in

government formation is to influence policy making in their arena of operation and in

this regard they try to maximise their long term and short term benefits, so that credit

comes to the party. It has been proposed that if a party finds more opportunities for

influencing legislative policy making by remaining in the Opposition, it would

renounce the power and associated dignity of Office.^’ Hence, governance holds little

charm in the face o f long terra benefits accruing to the party. This has also been

posited in terms of anticipated electoral losses which facing elections as incumbent

50 Sridharaii, E. op.cit., p.4.

See Austen-Sniith ,D.& J.Banks "Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes", American Political Science Review 82,2(1988), p.405-22. for a discussion.

36

party in power which fades in comparision to gains by waiting for more favourable

circumstances, however, it needs to be said that in democracies characterised by

consensual system, such as in the Scandinavian countries, the place for policy

bargaining is outside the legislature. Interest groups do the policy bargaining and it is

the parties which have little incentive to try hard for smplus-majority coalitions,

sacrificing policy. Minority governments are treated as 'losers wating to be defeated'

,only lialt-heaited attempts made to give coalition support., parties opting to wait for

electoral gains.

IlL Other Tlieories; The Need for

Although both the Power Maximisation and Policy based

theories are important milestones in the theorisation o f coaHtions(and as we shall see

later are significant for the analyses o f coalitions in the Indian setting) they are unable

to predict the formation o f minority coalition governments or its opposite, jirnibo

oversized coalitions which have been formed in reality with regular fi*equency. It has

been shown that in the period from 1945 till 1982 over thirty five percent o f

governments in Western pai’liamentary democracies have been minority governments,

"dependent on external supporting parties for majority support in parliament,

including over half the governments in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain and

Canada.^^ In fact, even in India, minority governments have been increasingly resorted

to in more than half a dozen instances. The Congress split and post 1967 gave rise to

Strom, Kaare. "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non­winning Cabinet Solutions", Comparative Political Studies 17(2),July 1984 gives such a view.

3 7

this phenomenon, ibllowed by the coalitions in the states' ; in 1979 after the demise of

Janata party, with Charan Singh government; in 1989 with a new alignment o f forces

the Natiotial Front minority coalition got formed; the 1990 formation of short lived

Chandra Sekhar government; from 1991 till about 1993 the Congress government of

Narasimha Rao was a minority government; the 1996 Deve Gowda government was a

minority coalition; Vajpayee's classic 12 day government which fell in 1998; followed

by Vajpayee's two stints under the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) after the 12th

and 13th General elections cumulating together the lotigest span for any minority

government to have remained in office.

Hence, the fact that minority governments or oversized coalitions have

ruled the roost and are in existence currently gives the He to the claim to Power

maximisation theories which claim that this is an aberration and will soon sort itself

out, in due course. As E .Sridharan points o u t , “Minority coalitions , one third o f all

minority governments in the Western democracies over 1945-82, are a rational

solution if ideological differences militate against external supporters participating in

the government (as in India's BJP and Left -supported National Front in 1989-

90).”^^Jorgen Elklit has pointed out an uninterrupted series of minority govemments

between 1971 and 1993 , which is o f very recent period. All this evidence should

direct our attention to the fact that “minority govemments have been shown to be

rational solutions from the standpoints of both the party or parties in the minority

(single-party or coalition) governments and those in the opposition, in specific

Sridharan, E. op.cit. p.5,

38

situations where tlie minority government is a aeaf-majority in an ideologically

divided opposition, and / or when opposition parties can get their say in policy witlioiit

assiirimng governmental responsibility saice the minority government fe vutersble to

pressure... Oversized coalitions are a fatioiial solution, when (a) the effijctiveness or

policy is enhanced tsy tAiiig oa boat’d redundant parties (not needesi for a i»a}Oiity),

!,e, , wlieft power is not a fixed payoff’but a fenctioii o f policy effectiveness and tence

greater power-sharing for coiisensiis, for example, where the govemrnent has to cai'fy

out a iiifijor economic refoim programme or foreign, policy Initiative afecting

fiational secuiity; (b) as a political ijisuraiice poficy so as to reduce tlie pivotal powe?

of smalier parties for a imijority, a§ in certain coalitions in Israel where parties to the

felt and lig'bt o f the dominant coalition pa'toer are kept on board for tils reason; mad

(c) wlien ifi a pluraity-nile electoral system, the seat majoflty o f t ie dominant

|iartoer(s) in an oversized coalition depends on tlie vote transfer o f tlie suppoitefs o f

tiie niinof pattoers thougli tlieir seats inay not be amiiericaly critical in the legislatiire

elected. For example, whie tlie CPM has an absolute majority o f seats in West Bengal

and Tripura, and heiice, jjnreiy teckiicaiy, tliere is no miaority sitiiation and no need

for a coalition, tMs seat luajority Is de^ndent on the vote transfer ©f its smaler

partners, and heiace, a coaltion Is necessaiy’ o f It is to get fe-etected.”®'

Hence there is a need to foots on such eventualities and go beyond

Power Maximsation and Policy tosed theories. In the wide rangii^ iteratui’e on

54 Sridharafe, E. op.dt. p.5-6.

39

coalitions one finds the relevance of Gregory M. Luebbert for this purpose. Luebbert

55has build his reputation on the basis of very relevant w'ork in this field.

IV. The Ccfinpromise-Bsisecl Tlieoty

We have noted broadly two types o f coalition theoiy -namely, the

power maximisation based (minimurn wuming coalitions) theory and the policy-based

(minimum connected winning coalitions) theory. Both these theories, as we have seen

earlier were examples of pure type theory.

A third type o f Coalition theory may be said to have emerged from

the work o f Gregory M. Leubbert. He has attempted to go beyond the pure type by

emphasizing that what needs focus is the kitid of compromise that a coalition or

minority government is based upon. '" For the sake of certainty, durability and stability

coalitions have, of necessity, to focus on give and take, on reconciliation and

adjustment. For this, one has to consider two sets o f issues :

i) The first is w'hat he calls a policy

profile of each party which consists

of the salient issues and principles

of that party concerning its philosophy

regarding social and economic change.and

cleavages.

56

See Luebbert, G.M "Coalition Theory and Government Formation in Multi-Party Democracies” ComparalivePoUlics Jan 1983 Pp240-261. Luebbert, G.M A Theory of Government Formation" Comparative Political Studies 17(2), July 1984 ,

For this section I have relied extensively on E.Sridharan (1997).

40

ii) The second pertains to the relationships

between policy profiles of any two pajties,

i.e., whether they are converging, diverging

or tajtigentiai.

Policy profiles are considered as converging if their differences relate to timing,

sequencing and specifics while being broadly in the same direction. One may cite the

difterences on the particulars of defence related policy, while not disagreeing on the

cardinal avowment o f nuclear non-proliferation. One would consider them tangentiaJ

if they address unrelated issues in which case there is no necessary incompatibility, for

example, between parties whose policy profile is centred on economic policy and

those centred on regional or cultural identity. They would be said to be diverging if

their policy profile on specific issues for eg., on secularism is in opposite directions.

Luebbert argues from comparative evidence that converging or tangential policy

profiles lend themselves to 'explicit compromises' in which a party has to explicitly

modify its position as part of a coalition pact, because it is easier to modify positions

when policy profiles are converging since it means less of a departure Irom existing:

positions. On the other hand, when policy profiles are diverging or sometimes even

tangentiaJ, it is diflicult to modify position, explicitly because it means that parties will

have to publicly modify positions on their core principles. Therefore, in such

coalitions 'implicit compromises' are resorted to, which essentially amount to nothing

more than minimum common platforms and leave disagreements either shelved to

avoid displeasure or to be played by the ear. Such implicit compromise -based

coalitions tend to be unstable because they seem to be sweeping too many in

41

congruities under the caipet. Moteover, they do not lend themselves to publicly

deciared coalition pacts that spell out agi'eements, disagreements and inodes o f

consultation and simple dispute settlement. Hence Luebbert is very categorical that

although some element of compromise is an inherent }3art or any coalition (such as

building federal coalitions wliich have to reconcile regional aspirations vt/ith national

cohesion) it is the intransigent positions that parties adopt in pursuai o f some avowed

aim or illusory goaf that leads to disagreements with other partners , and needs to be

eschewed for the salce of durability of any coalition. On the contrary, if a rational

headed approach Is iindertakeii and paities are sanguine about their aspirations and are

willing to forsake extreme positions, relate to reality and agree to compromise, they

stand to gain in terms of stability. It helps also if their stated ideologies have

commonality and meeting points on their policy profile. It is also immanent from

Luebbert that on the basis o f policy profiles there are three categories of converging,

ta.ngentiai(unconnected) and divergent parties which can be obtained in any given

situation. While the fii'st two can lead to explicit compromises, the tliird invariably

results in implicit compromises, averting public modijScation. They tend to be

unstable,

V. Theory of Opportunistic and Partisaa Politics

Following Alberto Alesina , Easwaran Sridharan has devised another

way of reviewing the major three theories that we have highlighted here- namely, the

42

Power Maximisation, Policy based and Compromise based theory by dividing the

motimtions o f the principal actors, the politicians or the political cultures o f societies into

"Opportunistic" and "Partisan" politics as the political business cycle literature.^

Accordingly, one can characterise a society's politics as

"opportimistic" if the pursuit o f political office is primarily for the fruits associated

with office, i.e., power and pelf for its own sake. On the contrary, "partisan" politics

occurs when the pursuit of office is tor changing public policy in conformity with the

party's stated ideology and social constituency. “And likewise, when in office

opportunistic parties and politicans manipulate policy to satisfy the lai'gest possible

number o f supporters to get reelected. Opportunistic policies tends to prevail in

societies without clear party divisions along an ideological scale, such as in India's

centrist Congress dominated paity system, where ideological parties such as the Left

parties and the Bhartiya Janata Party have traditionally played a small role. In societies

with a clear ideological spectrum such as the typical range from fai* right, mainstream

conservatives centre, centre-left (socialist / social democratic) and left (communist)

parties that prevails in most of Europe, politics tends to be about public policy

ideology and relatively stable social constituencies, and tends to be partisan, and not

just about the fruits of office and getting re-elected.

” Alesiua ,Alberto "Political Models of Macroeconomic policy and Fiscal Reforms" in Stephan Haggard & Steven Webb (eds,) Voting for Reform Ostbrd:Oxford Univ. Press (1994)may be seen

for this perspective.

E.Sridharan op.cit. p.7.

43

The latter is applicable to Third world societies, like todia, and

is clearly distinguishable by its patlioioglcal fixation for pow/er, and the parties almost

utiiversaily In this context are operating at the base opportunistic level. As studies in

other contexts show, there is a,n identifiable ideological, spectrum In non-Third world

societies which is missing iti Indian case. (See a latter Chapter for a discussion)

Briefly speaking, power maximisation theories o f coalition

formation corresponds with opportuoistic politics, while policy based theories tend to

correspond with partisan politics, 'and in turn, with societies without or with,

respectively the kind of clear socio-poEtical and ideological spectrum that each is

associated with.' The Indian case, which we will study in detail later certainly

corresponds to a particularly corrupt form of opportimistic politics. It needs to be

pitted against European examples to show its cku'acteristic, in fiiU. Only, lately an

element o f ideological polarisation has been introduced on the issue o f secularism

between the BJP and the rest o f parties. Interestitigly, despite having professed and

stated differences (as projected in the party manifestos, stated positions etc,) on

economic policy there is growing consensus in favour o f liberalisation/economic

agenda despite hic-ups.

Sridharan suggests that "India's polity to the extent that it is

becoming partisan, is not characterised by a single left-right ideological axis but

multiple cross cutting axes, e.g, secuiar-communal centralist-regional autonomist and

a variety o f castebloc based axes varying regionally. This multi-dimensionality o f

ideological space is one major criticism of the applicability of Eurocentric policy-

44

based tlieoriesof coalition formation since they ...assume a left-right ideological

polarization’' '

Further, he suggests some salients about coalitions and their

characteristics. It ought to be noted that coalitions are always considered as a second

best alternative for any political party. Every party wants to come to power on its own

without depending on others for majority support. Therefore, “each party during the

coalition's litetime will seek to position itself to improve its vote and seat share in the

next election. Thus, conflict is built into coalition and/or minority governments. Every

coalition will see jockeying for long-term electoral gains along with short-term

maximisation of po wer among its members.

A factor o f critical importance for the likelihood and also for the

behavioural characteristics of coalition governments is the cliflerent implications of

proportional representation and plurality-rule electoral systems. In proportional

representation model the pfirties involved get seats in proportion to their votes. Such

systems in operation in Europe, Israel and Scandinavia tend to throw up coalition

governments because no party gets half the votes necessary for half the seats. The

coalitions tend to be fairly stable because, at least partly, in the inevitable jockeying

for increased vote share in the next election, the member parties need not fear that a

swing will dramatically reduce their seat strength due to proportionality rule and the

improbability of huge swings in favour of this or that party.

.Sridharan ,E . op.cit. p.8.

“ Sridharan ,E. opxii. p.8.

45

On the other hand the implications of the plurality -rule electoral

system are quite different. Here we find that "due to the seat-vote disproportionality, a

plurality suffices for a legislative majority and hence, coalitions tend to be rare. This

is a commonplace observation. Wliat we need to note is the further implication for

political behaviour in the event o f a coalition. Here the dynamic is quite diiferent in

that while there will be the inevitable competition for long term electoral gains

(increased vote share) as well as short-term power maximisation, competition and

suspicion among the coalition partners is likely to be much more intense because a

small swing in popular support can hugely increase or alternatively decimate a party in

terms of seats, potentially either putting it in power on its own or destroying any

chance of it being in the government. Atid where politics is substantially about access

to state resources ( power for power's sake} the possibility o f being politically wiped

out would matter much more. In such a situation, coalitions and minority

governments, will tend to be unstable, with strong incentives for members or external

supporters who perceive themselves to be losing strength to terminate the

arrangement, to be rapacious in maximising their immediate gains from office, or

constantly blackmail the government about withdrawal of support. Thus, the

instability and short-lived character of coalitions in plurality-rule systems is due to a

struct«ral( emphasis in original} characteristic of such systems, not to human failings

or cultural factors.” ’

Sridharan's creative interpretation of theory to Third world

setting would go a long way in analysing the objective reality emerging out of

Sridharan, E. op.cH. p.9.

46

iractitious and inlernecine strife that characterises most of the politics in this part of

the world, malcing stability a chimera. His fundamental point that plurality -rule

systems are loaded with structural dysfunctionaiity will help in cognizing the Indian

experiments in coalitions that much better, as we shall see later. His valuable insights

regarding the opportunistic nature o f coalition behaviour, confounding ideological

spectrum are also well taken.

Vf. Theory of Consoclatlonallsm

This theory has deeply influenced compai'ative politics and has an

extensive literature. Among its adherents are Hans Daalder^^, G.Bingham Powell^ who

have hailed that it is a theory ‘ among the most influential contributions to comparative

politics’. A. Lijphart states that it has become a widely accepted “• paradigm for the

analysis o f democracies than can be regarded as the prototypes o f power sharing such as

the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Lebanon and Colombia. And it has been

used for the interpretation of many other political systems, from tiny Liechtenstein to the

European Union; in all parts o f the world, for instance, Canada, Venezuela, Surinam , Italy,

Nigeria Gambia, Kenya and Sri Lanka; and not only democracies but also such non

democratic states as the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Furthermore,

consociational democracy has been proposed as a normative model for many ethnically

divided countries, and it had a decisive influence in the shaping o f South Africa’s 1994

llans Daalder “The Coiisociatlotial Democracy I'lieine”, World Politics v. 26, July 1974 pp.604-21. See p,609.

(i. Bingham Powell Jr. Book Review of A. Lijphart’s ‘Democracy in plural Societies’ , American Political Science Review v.73. Mar 1979 pp.295-97, p295.

47

])Owcr-shai'iiig constitution , Given its prominent status, consociationa! theory has

received a commensurate amount of criticism, ( for e.g., Barry , Halpern, Horowitz and

Taylo/’ ') but it has successfully iield its own, partly by rebutting its critics and partly by

incorporating many of the critics’ concerns (Lehrabruch , Lijphart, Steiner and Dorff

65),, 66 j has advocated the theory of consociationalism which states that

coalitions in the West were basically an attempt to distribute power among its partner-

political groups that were in the la-politique when unclear mandate occurs after

parliamentary elections. He says that India was not considered as an applicable case

for this theory for quite a long time.

Lijphart has advocated the theory of consocmtiomlism

which states that coalitions in the West were basically an attempt to distribute

64

66

Barry, Brian , “ Political Accommodation and Consoclatioiial Democracy” Bri/ish Journal o f PoUtka! Science v,5, Oct 1975, pp477-505.; Sue M. Ilalpern The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy”, West Fjirapeanpolitics v.9, Apr l% 6 , ppl81-97.; D.L Horowitz - Ktlmic Group.s in conflict Univ. of Calif. Press, Berkeley 1985 .; Rupert Taylor “South Africa :A Cousociational Path to Peace ?” Transformation v.l7. pp.1-11.

Lchmbruch, R. “Consociationa! Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland” Puhlius v.23, Spring, pp.43-63.; J.Stciner and R H Dorff Theory of Political Decision Making in Switzerland

I Iniv. of North /Carolina Press, Chapel Hill (1980); A.Lijphart Power Sharing in South Africa Institute of International Studies , Univ. of California, Berkeley 1985.

Lijphart ,A. “The Puz/le of Indian Democracy : A Consociational Interpretation” in N.G.Jayal Democracy in India N.Dclhi , Oxford University Press (2002) p.328.

48

power considered as an applicable case for this theory tor quite a long time. It is

applicable when unclear jnandate occurs after parliamentary elections. It is opined by

some, that consociational theory has possibly remained weak on one major factor

namely, the glaring inapplicability o f its unblemished empirical validity across all

countries. He says that India was not opinion of others that in India politics is not

ill a consociational mode. We would judge this aspect in broader details in Chapter

V where it would be found that consociationalism may apply to India , contrary to

earlier thinking .However, consociationalism cannot be equated with power sharing.

IL needs to be cognized that consociational theory is different from

power sharing perspective that will be the focus of this work. This is lai'gely because

Lijphart’s and others of ids ilk are concerned with constitutional power and how it is

sought to be distributed through the canons of law and provisions already set up in

the organic law , which is what a constitution is. Our concern here in this work is not

consociationalism . Rather we are concerned with power-sharing - or rather the socio

- political process whereby policy bargaining, negotiations for power , decision

making etc ( in consensual systems that do not return one party majorities’ but

coalitions or minority governments) takes place outside the constitution but very much

within the political process, inside the legislature or outside of it. They evolve

Important schemas of adjustment, conciliation of competing interests, toleration of

diverse viewpoints, give vent to minorities and other excluded sections grouse and

effectively can present a formal of power sharing which finds acceptance o f the

different groups in the polity.

49

rhiji sort of power sharing in a representative system is very mucii a

democratic cxercisc. It has not been theorized as yet , because this can’t be

adaiuately standardized into neat parameters which tlieory building demands. Every

coalitioiial system follows a set of criteria that are wholly exclusive to itself and are

sm-genens. As wc will see in Chapter 2 , all the countries that we have surveyed with

a coalitioti have different constituents and permutations of factors, realities which are

exclusive in tliemseives. No two countries have the same set of factors , governing

realities wherein their coalitions operates in a specific way.

YIL Importance ®f the ‘local’ in analyses of coalitions

There is one aspect which has not been touched by the extant

coalition theories on the subject. This pertains to the fact that coalitions when they are

located in 'Third world societies have to talce note of some other factors as well. These

are in addition to the various criteria of coalition - making that we find discussed in

the legion of theories that we have noted earlier.

As mentioned above, no theory has analyzed nor definitively

comprehended this in a neat formulation, as of now. We can here indicate these and a

conceptual framework may follow in course of time. I am particularly noting the

importance of the iocaT or the regional criteria in coalition partaking of power in the

specific locale o f the India context. One observes that in addition to the classic Riker-

50

Dodd model assuniptions regaiding the collection of forces tbf coalition making , one

has also to note down the various specificities of the social labric in the millenEia old

civil society in a South Asian context.

In India, we find for instance the issues of caste affiliation,

regional gt:oup{ to which state, regional zone one belongs to ) , religious grouping ,

linguistic and minority / majority affiliation matter a great deal in the political arena.

It can be said with a fair amount of accuracy that within the broad rules that other

theories on the subject of coalition suggest , these specific factors tend to intervene

and govern coalition formation and later the operation o f coalitions. It has been a

tradition in India even when one - party majoritarian dominance obtained that newly

appointed Prime Ministers would design their cabinets by trying to give at least

nominal or token representation to all important minority groups, whether they

personally liked it or not and whether their policies were fostering the same culture

of accommodation or not. For example, the BJP has kept Shahnawaz Khan , a

Muslim in the cabinet ( earlier it was Sikander Bakht) as a trophy to show that

Muslims have a representation in the Union cabinet although the entire thrust of

BJP’s politics is non-secular and anti Muslim. Similarly, the BJP has in return for

support of the Bahujan Samaj Party , a party of dalits at the centre ( though not

formally , and within the modalities of the National Democractic Alliance , the

coalition front set up for the purpose) entered a marriage of convenience with the BSP

in Uttar Pradesh at the state level and catapulted it to power in the state, largely to

51

in Uttar Pradesh at the state level and cata}3ulted it to power in the state, largely to

gain strategic advantage over the Saimjwadi Party, another party with similar

credentials which is its hete-noire.

It is ao secret that iti politics, regional parties have highlighted

the tenuous linkages of caste, regional and local proximities to fight elections and

garner votes. They assume specific identities based on these affiliations. One may cite

the case of Shiv Sena, Akali D a l, Biju Janata Dal ,Telegu Desam, Dravida Munnetra

Kazhagain, Arimachal Congress, SIdiim Democratic Front, Bodolatid State

Movement Cominittee, lx3k Shakti, Himachal Vikas Congress ( aE who are

constituents of BJP coalition foraied in 1999 and contimiing with it till date) , all o f

whom have separate identities chiseled out of their proirase to give states, regions,

linguistic groupings a fair share . They project the need to articulate their specific

demands, concerns through their party and in participation with the BJP at the centre

try to wrest developmental gains for their constituencies . I have elsewhere mentioned

that these parties are selfish enough to work for claiming benefits only for their

support base and they tlirow to the winds any consideration that may be the accepted

consensus of the coalition, for reasons best suited to them. What one is indicating is

that Telegu Desam can go to any extent so as not to rock the boat of stability at the

centre ( even acquiesce and not protest over Gujarat state sponsored riots by the BJP

strongly and severe its relations with the BJP despite formal declarations to this effect

and even though it went against its acclaimed philosophy of secularism ) largely

because in its calculations there is greater harm to it fi'om the centre if it is not within

52

the coalition in the centre and the local level competition fironi the Congress party

would overwhelm it if it did not get largesse from the centre in terms of developmental

funds.

That the BJP has accommodated and promoted low caste party

men belonging to other regional parties and belonging to lower castes may seem

surprising but is true. As we will show in greater details later this was the need of the

era of coalition politics. This was done after its realization of its( the BJP’s ,that is)

inability to open its ranks and file to the lower castes and make them members. The

BJP and its predecessor , the Jana Sangh are popularly known as Bania / Brahmin

upp er caste parties and have always attracted largely upper caste voters. Now these

are considerations that are not part of coalitional bargaining in the West, but they are

essential part of coalitions here in India.

This has helped the BJP gain by winning the confidence of lower

caste voters. There has been a steady rise in the votes it has received from the lower

castes. Whereas in 1971 the caste and community of the Jana Sangh and BJP voters

was suggestive of a 6.7% uppercaste and 3.5% OBC vote , by 1999 a remarkable

tiirnaroimd showed that the national overall share of the BJP was 46% of the upper

caste voters and 40% of the OBC voters. There has also been a noticeable rise in the

percentages of the number of Scheduled caste and tribe voters who are now willing

to vote for the BJP . This has increased from 6.2% in 1971 to 31%> by 1999. (See

Table No. 1,1 ) This change has occurred due to the interest shown by the BJP by

53

\ i i . I

CASTE AND COMMUNITY OF JANA SANGH AND BJP VOTERS(1971-1999)

( ill percentages )

1971 1980 1999

Upper castes

OBCs

Scheduled Castes

Scliediiled Tribes

6.7

3.5

2.1

4.1

17,1

10

14.3

5.4

46

21(upper)

19(lower)

12

19

Source : Jaffrelot, Christophe, India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low castes in North Indian Politics N.Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003, p.466.

54

affiliating with parties that have caste and other affiliations. It is also significant on

another count because the BJP has not despite this acceptability of the dalits ,

taken much initiative in giving tickets to backwards nor seen the influx o f large

number o f backwards as members of its party. Thus , the BJP gamble of assembling

support of the backwards has helped it to gain power in a coalition and also helped it

to maintain itself in power for more than three years . The completion of three years

of unbreakable tenure for the National Democratic Alliance at the centre is being

hailed as a miijor achievement . It’s being claimed that BJP has recorded the

successful operation of a coalition government for the longest period of time in post

- independence period, till date. The NDA coalition has outlived all other coalitions

in independent India. Though apparently L K Advani, Deputy PM projected

that it was BJP’s record of governance in ofBce in, the last three yeai's which was

responsibie for this achievement and not the allies’ contribution( towards tliis) this is

doubtable! The reality is its clever management of caste and regional factors and

alliance politics.

The point being made by the author in this section is this

that in coalitions in the Third world setting ( in India, for example) apart from the

usual criteria that needs to be recognized as laid down by accepted theories on the

subject, the importance of sui-generis ‘local’ specificities need to be looked at, for

they throw up some hitherto unacknowledged factors that are in the minds o f all

coalitions that take birth in such contexts. As has been shown here illustratively,

such factors do impinge on the formation, working and longevity of coalitions in the

55

Third world countries such as India. It has already been aclaiowledged that the

particuiar set of such specificities diiiers fi'om case to case and in different locales.

Ill

IJpsiittt

In this chapter , we charted the ixiajor theories available on the subject

and made particular reference to the classical theory given by Riker and its extension

by Dodd. It is the most representative theory on the subject and it applies so well to

the focus of our study - namely, Indian coalitions. It has also been pointed out that

the salience of the local specificities in Third w^orld countries cannot be overlook in

any serious investigation into coalitions for meaningful understanding.