2. ams-bru_hsr_janochtman

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the Dutch HSL South project

Lessons learned from a PPP pioneer

Moscow

Jan Ochtman


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HSR: a total system

Twynstra Gudde 1-4-2010 2


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Contents

1. Why did we decide to build a HSR?

2. Development in time

3. Interfaces

4. Lessons Learned



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The HSR network in North Western Europe

1989

AgreementbetweenBelgium,France,Germany,UK,LuxembourgandtheNetherlandstorealisehighspee ra networ nNorthwestEurope



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Why did we decide to build a HSR?

Dutch Government favoured the realisation of the High Speed Rail

Link Amsterdam - Brussels Paris / London. Its reasons:

rail network in Northwestern Europe

Government considered realisation of High Speed Raillink of

national strategic importance: To improve connectivity of Dutch economic centres with integrated

international businesses)

To achieve modal shift from car / plane to train for journeys (


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Financial justification ( bln, NPV)

overnment sinvestment

ommerc a BusinessCase

ene tsto oc ety acroeconom cimpact

Reduced

costs

of

traveltosociety 0.3

overnment sinvestment

ommerc a BusinessCase

ene tsto oc ety acroeconom cimpact

Reduced

costs

of

traveltosociety 0.3

ReductionofCO2

emisions andaccidents

0.1

Efficiency,time 1

ReductionofCO2

emisions andaccidents

0.1

Efficiency,time 1savingsandtransport

surplusses +

Totals

1994 1 / 1 1.4 3.2 4.5

savingsandtransport

surplusses +

Totals

1994 1 / 1 1.4 3.2 4.5

4.5 6.1 3.9/ 2.8 3,4Totals1996

6.3 8.0na/ 6.2 7,2Totals

4.5 6.1 3.9/ 2.8 3,4Totals1996

6.3 8.0na/ 6.2 7,2Totals2009

0% +30%na/ 85%ReturnonGovernmentsinvestment (2009)

2009

0% +30%na/ 85%ReturnonGovernmentsinvestment (2009)


ource:1994 an 1996 gures er ve rom out o cy ocument; 2009 acro econom c est mate ase on 2,5% n at on s nce 1996


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It takes time

HSL considered since 1975

Govt decision to go ahead 1990

Parliament approval, incl. PPP target 1995

Start tendering 1999

Contract close 2001

Construction com leted 2007

Start of commercial operation 2009



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Unforeseen events

1992: opposition against route decision

1997: MoT takes over the initiative from Dutch Railways

1999: Initial bids for D&C substructure 25% above budget

2000: Initial bids for DBFM superstructure 60% above budget

2001: Contract close DBFM 5% below budget 2001: Transportation concession won by Dutch railways, in

2003: Substructure about 1 year behind schedule

2007: ERTMS implementation problems

2009: All roblems solved start commercial o erations



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One system, but many interfaces

Project vs MoT/MoF

Vervoer

IP IP

RAS RAS RASRIB RIB NMBSnderbouwn er ouw


ro ec vs oca s


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And some organisational interfaces

Ministry of TransportPublic Works and

Water Management

Ministry of HousingSpatial Planning and

the Environment

Ministry ofFinance

eer nggroup

PrivatisationInfrastructure

Directorate-General

Passenger Transport

Project DirectorateHigh-Speed Line

Stations Transporta-

tion

Infraprovi-der

Civils &Construction

Rijkswaterstaat

NS-RIB


Engineering


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A continuous puzzle!



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Payment flows around

3 bln 0.5 bln

0 bln

StatePrivate 100 mln/yr 95 mln/yr

Trains Operator 110 mln/yr

0.4 bln

Payment during construction

Transfer (free of costs)

220 mln/yr


ass. revenues


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CLIENTINFRASPEED

EPC Consortium VOF

utc overnment o o

HSL ZUID Org. (IPCM)Concession Contract

Obligation to pay Performance Fee

Siemens, BAM Group,Fluor Infrastructure

LENDERS

fixed price

date certainlump sum turnkey

Provision of Debt

Peer Review

Mott MacDonald

Rabobank

ING Bank

KBC Bank

KfW

Dexia Credit Local

HypoVereinsbank

contract

Payment of Principal & InterestSpecial Purpose

Vehicle

INFRASPEED BV

Management ServicesFluor Infrastructure BV

BNG + 20 Syndicated Banks

Allen & Overy (Legal)

LENDERS ADVISORS

European Investment Bank

a n enance n ex n e yrsMaintenance Contract,

incl.renewals

100% Shareholding

Scott Wilson Railways (Techn)

Heath Lambert (Insurance)

PKF (financial auditor)INFRASPEED

Holdings BV

100% Shareholding

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (Legal)

INFRASPEED ADVISORS

Insurance ProvidersShareholder Funds

Siemens, BAM Group,Fluor Infrastructure


n ustr a nvestorsSiemens, BAM Group,

Fluor Infrastructure

Ernst & Young (Accounting, Fiscal)

Marsh (Insurance)Railcert (Independent Safety Advisor)

nst tut ona nvestorsInnisfree,

HSBC Infrastructure


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Lessons Learned

PPP is a powerful option to achieve public goals, but still requires a

competent project organisation r ve o mo se a now e ge an exper ence ava a e, o e

national railways knowledge base and international expertise; be

alert of knowledge transfer by matching foreign experts with national

project members Within a total system many interfaces exist, both internally in the

contractors; balance interface risks against monopolist or cartel

behaviour PPP leads to (painful) transparency, of benefits and problems

Despite proper preparation, still unforeseen events have happened,


ut n t e en we got t e tra ns runn ng


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[email protected]

www.twynstragudde.nl

All rights reserved. No part of this presentation may be

reproduced or published in any form or by any means

without the prior written permission of Twynstra Gudde.


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