20140708-g. h .schorel-hlavka o.w.b. to datuk seri najib razak prime minister of malaysia & mr...
DESCRIPTION
MH370, was it an insurance swindle?TRANSCRIPT
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WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak, Malaysia 8-7-2014
Email: [email protected] 5 Cc: Datuk Azharuddin Abdul Rahman (DCA) director-general
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION, MALAYSIA
No. 27 Persiaran Perdana Aras 1-4 Blok Podium, 62618 Putrajaya
Tel : +60388714000 Fax : 603 - 8890 1640 Email : [email protected] 10
Mr Tony Abbott MP (Commonwealth of Australia) [email protected]
Re: 20140708-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Datuk Seri Najib Razak Prime Minister of Malaysia &
Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re: MISSING PLANE
Sir, 15
I understood that MH380 a 737 had previous problems when on a flight from Australia to
Kuala Lumpur. At least that is what I understood from a television program about 737 rudder
problems. While missing flight HM370 is a 777 it doesn’t mean that a problem that may have
occurred in one model (737) may not eventuate in a new model (777). While I understand that
MH 380 had its flight from Kuala Lumpur to Guangzhou nevertheless as I recall the program to 20
refer to MH380 - 737 having this rudder problem when flying from Australia to Kuala Lumpur I
hold it important to remain open minded. Also, the fact that reportedly (see quotation below)
Malaysian Airlines may have financial difficulties one has to consider if then for insurance
purposes MH370 disappeared as to be ab le to obtain some cash. It may be held to be a ridiculous
consideration but not really when one may consider other factors regarding highly skilled person 25
awaiting approval of a patent, etc, word huge amount of monies and reportedly valuable cargo.
And it seems to me utterly ridiculous that the Malaysian Air Force, etc, didn’t bother to check
out a mysterious plane as after all by this it placed the lives of Malaysians unduly at risk.
In my view, as I referred to within 48 hours of the plane going missing, one must consider the
radius that the plane could have flown (and that is without even refuelling) and then eliminate 30
every possible issue that may be considered by disproving it. If it cannot be disproven then so to
say it should remain on the cards.
That were real human beings on that plane and we owe it to them and all future air
travellers to not stop investigating every possible option.
As was shown with the altitude and the auto pilot error in many planes that crashed (2009), such 35
as the Turkeys airliner just short of Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport if you ignore proper
investigation then people can and will lose their lives.
Was such or similar problem existing with the 777 but no one really realized it to be a problem?
Was MH370 by radio control or otherwise set on a pre-programmed course of destruction?
As for the air safety report Central Air Safety - Accident Investigation (see below) 40
http://cf.alpa.org/mec/aaa/docs/newmectoday/arc/airwaves/aw9904/9904ntsb.htm the real reason
was establish about 5 years later to be a jam in the cylinder (operating the rudder) that
eventuated at a certain height. It was when a third plane had the same problem but I understood
being MH380 737 leaving Australia safely landed that the problem could be established by using
hot and cold temperatures on the cylinder, even so neither Wikipedia or the Accident 45
Investigation report refers to this (see quotations below).
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http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20140703-Miracle-workers/Business/How-radical-can-a-
stateowned-Malaysia-Airlines-change QUOTE
July 3, 2014 12:00 am JST 5 Loss-laden Malaysia Airlines faces hard choices
A Malaysia Airlines jet sits on the tarmac at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. The carrier has posted big losses for three straight years. © Reuters
KUALA LUMPUR -- Malaysia Airlines, hit with the loss of one of its flights in 10 March, is also under pressure from shareholders to sort out its finances.
Malaysia Airlines CEO Ahmad Jauhari Yahya meets the press June 25 after the annual general meeting in Kuala Lumpur. © Reuters 15
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At a shareholders meeting June 25, the national carrier admitted that it needs to drastically change the way it does business but offered scant details on what it has in mind. When the floor was opened for questions, management faced quite a barrage.
According to attendees, most of the queries focused on why the company has 5
performed so badly, posting huge losses for three consecutive years. This despite a number of business plans crafted with the goal of escaping the doldrums.
Another key topic was the financial impact of flight MH370, which went missing en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing with 239 people aboard, more than half of whom were Chinese nationals. And shareholders demanded to know how 10
management intends to get the business back on track.
Executives assured the stockholders that the ill-fated flight was insured, barring the damage to the carrier's reputation. Malaysia Airlines has seen a 60% drop in business from China since the plane was lost March 8.
As for a turnaround, management would only say it is looking at all options. 15
"Malaysia Airlines should revamp everything," shareholder Chang Tek Huat, 65, told reporters. He added that the board should take responsibility for the weak results that have plagued the company for 15 years.
20
During the meeting, minority shareholders voted down one of eight resolutions, covering payment of directors' fees amounting to 396,000 ringgit ($123,000). The resolution was subsequently passed through the polls by the majority shareholders who have control over 70% stake, but the directors ultimately decided to decline the remuneration. 25
Uncertain path
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With business dwindling and cash running low, analysts have drawn up a few possibilities for recovery, including bankruptcy. Malaysia Airlines is extremely reluctant to go that route.
"We will consider bankruptcy if we are insolvent, but we are not," Chairman Mohamad Nor Yusof said after the meeting. The airline, he said, is still able to pay 5
its debts, with cash reserves of about 3 billion ringgit.
Khazanah Nasional, the majority shareholder, said last month it will unveil a rescue plan in about a year. The national investment fund owns 69% of the airline.
The carrier says fuel accounts for more than 40% of its operation costs, followed by salaries paid to its nearly 20,000 employees. A Malaysian brokerage has 10
suggested that the airline slim down by reducing flights and manpower.
RHB Research Institute, in a recent note, projected that the airline would be able to cut its losses to 349 million ringgit in fiscal 2015 "at the expense of a one-off mutual separation scheme." This downsizing, RHB said, would entail an upfront cost of 750 million ringgit. 15
In its 42 years of incorporation, Malaysia Airlines has gone through a series of ownership changes. It went from being a wholly owned state company to private hands, and then in 2000 it reverted to majority government ownership. Excessive reliance on the government is considered part of the company's problem.
Whatever happened, there was always "a grandfather to fall back on," said an 20
analyst at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, a local think tank.
(Nikkei)
END QUOTE
http://airlineroute.net/2012/08/17/mh-w12update2/ 25 QUOTE
Kuala Lumpur – Guangzhou 28OCT12 – 17FEB13 Airbus A330-300 replaces -200, 1 daily eff 18FEB13 Introduction of 2nd Daily service (MH380/381). All 2 daily flights operated by Boeing 737-800 30 MH376 KUL0930 – 1335CAN 738 D MH380 KUL2005 – 0010+1CAN 738 D
END QUOTE
http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/other-asian-australian-south-pacific-airlines/1465641-mh-a380-35
kul-lhr-f-mini-tr.html QUOTE
MH A380 KUL-LHR F Mini-TR May 9, 13, 11:46 am
END QUOTE 40
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues QUOTE
Boeing 737 rudder issues
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 45
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Jump to: navigation, search
This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this
article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged
and removed. (March 2008)
Starting in 1991, a number of accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 737 were the result of
uncommanded movement of their rudders. The rudder is controlled by the Power Control Unit
(PCU). Inside the PCU is a dual servo valve which helps direct hydraulic fluid in order to move
the rudder. The PCU is manufactured by Parker Hannifin. 5
Contents
[hide]
1 Accidents
2 Other suspected 737 rudder PCU malfunction
3 SilkAir controversy 10
4 Boeing 737 rudder upgrade directive
5 Cultural references
6 References
7 External links
Accidents[edit] 15
On March 3, 1991, United Airlines Flight 585, a 737-200, crashed in Colorado Springs, CO,
killing 25 people.
On September 8, 1994, USAir Flight 427, a 737-300, crashed near Pittsburgh, PA, killing 132
people.
During the course of the investigation of Flight 427, the National Transportation Safety Board 20
(NTSB) discovered that the PCU's dual servo valve could jam and deflect the rudder in the
opposite direction of the pilots' input, due to thermal shock caused when cold PCUs are injected
with hot hydraulic fluid. As a result of this finding, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
ordered that the servo valves be replaced and new training protocol for pilots to handle
unexpected movement of flight controls. [1] 25
Other suspected 737 rudder PCU malfunction[edit]
On June 6, 1992, Copa Airlines Flight 201, a 737-200 Advanced, flipped and crashed into the
Darien Gap jungle, killing 47 people. Initially, investigators believed that the flight experienced
loss of rudder control, but after an exhaustive investigation, they concluded that the crash was
caused by faulty instruments readings. 30
On April 11, 1994, Continental Airlines pilot Ray Miller reported his aircraft rolled violently to
the right; it landed safely.[2]
On June 9, 1996, Eastwind Airlines Flight 517, a 737-200, experienced loss of rudder control
while on approach to Richmond, VA.
On February 23, 1999, MetroJet Flight 2710, a 737-200, experienced a slow deflection of the 35
rudder to its blowdown limit while flying at 33,000 feet above Salisbury, Maryland.
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SilkAir controversy[edit]
On December 19, 1997, SilkAir Flight 185 crashed in Indonesia, killing 104 people. While the
Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee, the lead investigating agency, could not
determine the cause, the U.S. NTSB, which also participated in the investigation, concluded in a
report issued in 2000 that there was no mechanical failure (based on Parker-Hannifin's own 5
examination of the suspected PCU/dual-servo unit recovered from the crash), and that accident
was a murder-suicide by a pilot, most likely the captain, intentionally crashing the aircraft by
applying sustained nose-down control pressure.[3][4]
In 2004, following an independent investigation of the recovered PCU/dual-servo unit, a Los
Angeles jury, which was not allowed to hear or consider the NTSB's conclusions about the 10
accident, ruled that the 737's rudder was the cause of the crash, and ordered Parker Hannifin, a
rudder component manufacturer, to pay US$43 million to the plaintiff families. Parker Hannifin
subsequently appealed the verdict, which resulted in an out-of-court settlement for an
undisclosed amount.[5][6]
Boeing 737 rudder upgrade directive[edit] 15
The FAA ordered an upgrade of all Boeing 737 rudder control systems by November 12, 2002.[7]
Cultural references[edit]
The Boeing 737 rudder control issue, and the two documented crashes associated with it, were
profiled in The History Channel show Engineering Disasters 19.
The TV series Mayday also profiled these crashes in the episode "Hidden Danger". The Mayday 20
episode included details on Eastwind Airlines Flight 517, which led to NTSB investigators
issuing a finding in the earlier events.
References[edit]
1. Jump up ^ NTSB summary
2. Jump up ^ The Seattle Times: Safety at issue: the 737 "Nightmare over Honduras", 25 October 28, 1996
3. Jump up ^ SilkAir 185 - Flight Safety Australia Feb 2008
4. Jump up ^ ASN Accident description of SilkAir Flight 185
5. Jump up ^ Jury blames rudder, not pilot
6. Jump up ^ Jones Day Parker Hannifin settlement 30 7. Jump up ^ B-737 rudder design defect upgrade, , November 12, 2002.
External links[edit]
Aviation portal
1990s portal
How the 737 rudder works
Boeing 737 Rudder Design Study
Abstract of Final Report - USAir 427 35
<img src="//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1" alt="" title="" width="1" height="1"
style="border: none; position: absolute;" />
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Boeing_737_rudder_issues&oldid=613233379"
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Categories:
Airliner accidents and incidents caused by design or manufacturing errors
Airliner accidents and incidents in the United States
END QUOTE
5
http://cf.alpa.org/mec/aaa/docs/newmectoday/arc/airwaves/aw9904/9904ntsb.htm QUOTE
Central Air Safety - Accident Investigation
NATIONAL TRANSPORATION SAFETY BOARD Public Meeting of March 23-24, 1999
Abstract of Final Report (Subject to Editing)
USAir flight 427
Boeing 737-300, N513AU
Aliquippa, Pennsylvania
September 8, 1994
This is an abstract from the Safety Board’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for the conclusions,
probable cause and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from
which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent
safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached
information is subject to further review and editing.
Accident summary
On September 8, 1994, about 1903:23 eastern daylight time, USAir (now US Airways) flight 427, a Boeing 737-
3B7 (737-300), N513AU, crashed while maneuvering to land at Pittsburgh International Airport, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Flight 427 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a
scheduled domestic passenger flight from Chicago-O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, to Pittsburgh.
The flight departed about 1810, with 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 127 passengers on board. The airplane
entered an uncontrolled descent and impacted terrain near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. All 132 people on board were
killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for
the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
The safety issues addressed in this report are Boeing 737 rudder malfunctions, including rudder reversals; the
adequacy of the 737 rudder system design; unusual attitude training for air carrier pilots; and flight data recorder
(FDR) parameters.
Safety recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Also, as a result of this accident, the Safety Board issued a total of 17 safety recommendations to the FAA on
October 18, 1996, and February 20, 1997, regarding operation of the 737 rudder system and unusual attitude
recovery procedures. In addition, as a result of this accident and the United Airlines flight 585 accident (involving
a 737-291) on March 3, 1991, the Safety Board issued three recommendations (one of which was designated
"urgent") to the FAA on February 22, 1995, regarding the need to increase the number of FDR parameters.
Conclusions
[NOTE: Because the Safety Board’s analysis of this accident also included analysis of the United flight 585
accident and the Eastwind flight 517 incident, some of the findings below pertain to these two events.]
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1. The USAir flight 427 flight crew was properly certificated and qualified, and had received the training
and off-duty time prescribed by Federal regulations. No evidence indicated any preexisting medical or
behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected the flight crew’s performance during the
accident flight. 2. The USAir flight 427 accident airplane was equipped, maintained, and operated in accordance with
applicable Federal regulations. The airplane was dispatched in accordance with FAA- and industry-
approved practices. 3. All of USAir flight 427’s doors were closed and locked at impact. 4. USAir flight 427 did not experience an in-flight fire, bomb, explosion, or structural failure. 5. Neither a midair collision with other air traffic, a bird strike, clear air turbulence, nor other atmospheric
phenomena were involved in the USAir flight 427 accident. 6. Asymmetrical engine thrust reverser deployment, asymmetrical spoiler/aileron activation, transient
electronic signals causing uncommanded flight control movements, yaw damper malfunctions, and a
rudder cable pull or break were not factors in the USAir flight 427 accident. 7. Although USAir flight 427 encountered turbulence from Delta flight 1083’s wake vortices, the wake
vortex encounter alone would not have caused the continued heading change that occurred after 1903:00. 8. About 1903:00, USAir flight 427’s rudder deflected rapidly to the left and reached its left aerodynamic
blowdown limit shortly thereafter. 9. Analysis of the human performance data shows that it is likely that the first officer made the first pilot
control response to the upset event and manipulated the flight controls during the early stages of the
accident sequence; although it is likely that both pilots manipulated the flight controls later in the
accident sequence, it is unlikely that the pilots simultaneously manipulated the controls (possibly
opposing each other) during the critical period in which the airplane yawed and rolled to the left. 10. Analysis of the human performance data (including operational factors) does not support a scenario in
which the flight crew of USAir flight 427 applied and held a full left rudder input until ground impact
more than 20 seconds later. 11. Analysis of the CVR, Safety Board computer simulation, and human performance data (including
operational factors) from the USAir flight 427 accident shows that they are consistent with a rudder
reversal most likely caused by a jam of the main rudder PCU servo valve secondary slide to the servo
valve housing offset from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide. 12. The flight crew of USAir flight 427 could not be expected to have assessed the flight control problem and
then devised and executed the appropriate recovery procedure for a rudder reversal under the
circumstances of the flight. 13. The flight crew of USAir flight 427 recognized the initial upset in a timely manner and took immediate
action to attempt a recovery, but did not successfully regain control of the airplane. 14. It is very unlikely that the loss of control in the United flight 585 accident was the result of an encounter
with a mountain rotor. 15. Analysis of the CVR, computer simulation, and human performance data (including operational factors)
from the United flight 585 accident shows that they are consistent with a rudder reversal most likely
caused by a jam of the main rudder PCU servo valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset
from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide. 16. The flight crew of United flight 585 recognized the initial upset in a timely manner and took immediate
action to attempt a recovery, but did not successfully regain control of the airplane. 17. The flight crew of United flight 585 could not be expected to have assessed the flight control problem
and then devised and executed the appropriate recovery procedure for a rudder reversal under the
circumstances of the flight. 18. Training and piloting techniques developed as a result of the USAir flight 427 accident show that it is
possible to counteract an uncommanded deflection of the rudder in most regions of the flight envelope:
such training was not yet developed and available to the crews of USAir flight 427 or United flight 585. 19. During the Eastwind flight 517 incident, the rudder reversed, moving to its right blowdown limit when
the captain commanded left rudder, consistent with a jam of the main rudder PCU servo valve secondary
slide to the servo valve housing offset from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide. 20. It is possible that, in the main rudder PCUs from the USAir flight 427, United flight 585, and Eastwind
flight 517 airplanes (as a result of some combination of tight clearances within the servo valve, thermal
effects, particulate matter in the hydraulic fluid or other unknown factors) the servo valve secondary slide
could jam to the servo valve housing at a position offset from its neutral position, without leaving any
obvious physical evidence, and combined with a rudder pedal input, could have caused the rudder to
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move opposite to the direction commanded by a rudder pedal input. 21. The upsets of USAir flight 427, United flight 585, and Eastwind flight 517 were most likely caused by
the movement of the rudder surfaces to their blowdown limits in a direction opposite to that commanded
by the pilots. The rudder surfaces most likely moved as a result of jams of the secondary slides to the
servo valve housings offset from their neutral position and overtravel of the primary slides. 22. When completed, the rudder system design changes to the Boeing 737 should preclude the rudder
reversal failure mode that most likely occurred in the USAir flight 427 and United flight 585 accidents
and the Eastwind flight 517 incident. 23. Rudder design changes to Boeing 737-NG series airplanes and the proposed retrofit of the remainder of
the Boeing 737 fleet do not eliminate the possibility of other potential failure modes and malfunctions in
the Boeing 737 rudder system that could lead to a loss of control. 24. The dual-concentric servo valve used in all Boeing 737 main rudder PCUs is not reliably redundant. 25. A reliably redundant rudder actuation system is needed for the Boeing 737, despite significant
improvements made in the system’s design. 26. The results of this investigation have disclosed that the Boeing 737 rudder system design certificated by
the FAA is not reliably redundant. 27. Transport-category airplanes should be shown to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after a
jammed flight control in any position, unless the jam can be shown to be extremely improbable. 28. Pilots would be more likely to recover successfully from an uncommanded rudder reversal if they were
provided the necessary knowledge, procedures, and training to counter such an event. 29. A neutral rudder pedal position is not a valid indicator that a rudder reversal in the Boeing 737 has been
relieved. 30. The training being provided to many Boeing 737 flight crews on the procedures for recovering from a
jammed or restricted rudder (including a rudder reversal) is inadequate. 31. The continued use by air carriers of airspeeds below the existing block maneuvering speed schedule
presents an unacceptable hazard, and the existing block maneuvering speed for the flaps 1 configuration
provides an inadequate margin of controllability in the event of a rudder hardover. 32. The FDR upgrade modifications required by the FAA for existing airplanes are inadequate because they
do not require the FDR to be modified to record yaw damper command voltage, yaw damper and standby
rudder on/off discrete indications, pitch trim, thrust reverser position, leading and trailing edge flap
position, and pilot flight control input forces for control wheel, control column, and rudder pedals. 33. Based on the rudder-related anomalies discussed in this report, FDR documentation of yaw damper
command voltage, yaw damper and standby rudder on/off discrete indications, and pilot flight control
input forces for control wheel, control column, and rudder pedals is especially important in the case of
the 737, and these parameters should be sampled on 737 airplanes at frequent intervals to provide optimal
documentation. 34. The FAA’s failure to require timely and aggressive action regarding enhanced FDR recording
capabilities, especially on Boeing 737 airplanes, has significantly hampered investigators in the prompt
identification of potentially critical safety-of-flight conditions and in the development of
recommendations to prevent future catastrophic accidents.
Probable cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the USAir flight 427 accident
was a loss of control of the airplane resulting from the movement of the rudder surface to its blowdown limit. The
rudder surface most likely deflected in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots as a result of a jam of
the main rudder PCU servo valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset from its neutral position and
overtravel of the primary slide.
Safety recommendations
As a result of the investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following
recommendations: —to the Federal Aviation Administration:
1. Require that all existing and future 737s have a reliably redundant rudder actuation system.
2. Convene an engineering test and evaluation board to conduct a failure analysis to identify potential
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failure modes; a component and sub-system test to isolate particular failure modes found during the
failure analysis; and a full-scale integrated systems test of the rudder actuation and control system of the
Boeing 737 to identify potential latent failures and to validate operation of the system without regard to
minimum certification standards and requirements in FAR Part 25. Participants in the board should
include the FAA, NTSB technical advisors, the Boeing Company , other manufacturers as appropriate,
and experts from other government agencies, industry, and academia. A test plan should be prepared that
includes installation of original and redesigned Boeing 737 main rudder PCUs and related equipment and
exercises all potential factors that could initiate anomalous behavior (such as thermal effects, fluid
contamination, maintenance errors, mechanical failure, system compliance, structural flexure, etc.) The
work of the engineering board should be completed by March 31, 2000, and should be published by the
FAA.
3. Ensure that future transport category airplanes certificated by the FAA provide a reliably redundant
rudder actuation system.
4. Amend 14 CFR Section 25.671(c)(3) to require that transport-category airplanes be shown to be capable
of continued safe flight and landing after jamming of a flight control at any deflection possible, up to and
including its full deflection, unless such a jam is shown to be extremely improbable.
5. Revise AD 96-26-07 so that procedures for addressing a jammed or restricted rudder do not rely on the
pilots’ ability to center the rudder pedals as an indication that the rudder malfunction has been
successfully resolved, and require Boeing and U.S. operators of Boeing 737s to amend their Airplane
Flight Manuals and Operations Manuals accordingly.
6. Require all 14 CFR Part 121 air carrier operators of the Boeing 737 to provide their flight crews with
initial and recurrent flight simulator training in the "Uncommanded Yaw or Roll" and "Jammed or
Restricted Rudder" procedures in Boeing’s 737 Operations Manual. The training should demonstrate the
inability to control the airplane at some speeds and configurations by using the roll controls (the
crossover speed phenomenon) and include performance of both procedures in their entirety.
7. Require Boeing to update its Boeing 737 simulator package to reflect flight test data on crossover speed;
then require all operators of the Boeing 737 to incorporate these changes in their simulators used for
Boeing 737 pilot training.
8. Evaluate the Boeing 737’s block maneuvering speed schedule to ensure the adequacy of airspeed margins
above crossover speed for each flap configuration; provide the results of the evaluation to air carrier
operators of the Boeing 737 and the Safety Board, and require Boeing to revise block maneuvering
speeds to ensure a safe airspeed margin above crossover speed.
9. Require that each 737 airplane operated under 14 CFR Parts 121 or 125 that currently has a FDAU be
equipped, by December 1999, with a flight data recorder system that records, at a minimum, the
parameters required by FAA Final Rule 121.344, 125.226 dated July 17, 1997, applicable to that airplane
plus the following parameters: pitch trim, trailing edge flaps, leading edge flaps, thrust reverser position
(each engine), yaw damper command, yaw damper on/off discrete, standby rudder on/off discrete, and
control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal forces (with yaw damper command, yaw damper on/off
discrete, and control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal forces sampled at a minimum rate of twice-
per-second).
10. Require that all 737 airplanes operated under 14 CFR Parts 121 or 125 not equipped with a FDAU be
equipped, at the earliest time practicable, but no later than August 2001, with a flight data recorder
system that records, at a minimum, the parameters required by FAA Final Rule 121.344, 125.226 dated
July 17, 1997 applicable to that airplane plus the following parameters: pitch trim, trailing edge flaps,
leading edge flaps, thrust reverser position (each engine), yaw damper command, yaw damper on/off
discrete, standby rudder on/off discrete, and control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal forces (with
yaw damper command, yaw damper on/off discrete, and control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal
forces sampled at a minimum rate of twice-per-second).
Back to Article US AIRWAVES - April 1999
END QUOTE
5
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USAir_Flight_427 QUOTE
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USAir Flight 427
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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USAir Flight 427
A USAir Boeing 737-3B7 similar to the one involved.
Occurrence summary
Date September 8, 1994
Summary Rudder malfunction
Site
Hopewell Township,
Beaver County, Pennsylvania
40°36′14″N 80°18′37″W40.60393°N
80.31026°WCoordinates: 40°36′14″N
80°18′37″W40.60393°N 80.31026°W
Passengers 127
Crew 5
Fatalities 132 (all)
Survivors 0
Aircraft type Boeing 737-3B7
Operator USAir
Registration N513AU
Flight origin O'Hare International Airport
Stopover Pittsburgh International Airport
Destination West Palm Beach Int'l Airport
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USAir Flight 427 was a scheduled flight from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport to Pittsburgh, with a final
destination of West Palm Beach, Florida. The flight crashed on Thursday, September 8, 1994, killing 132 on board.
The Boeing 737-3B7 flying the route, registered N513AU, and previously registered as N382AU, was approaching
runway 28R of Pittsburgh International Airport, located in Findlay Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
which was at the time the largest hub for the airline. 5
Contents
[hide]
1 Crash
2 Investigation
3 Dramatization 10 4 See also
5 References
6 External links
7 Books
Crash[edit] 15
The sister aircraft of N513AU, a USAir (rebranded and repainted as US Airways) Boeing 737-3B7, registration
N527AU.
Captain Peter Germano, 45, was hired by USAir in February 1981. First Officer Charles B. "Chuck" Emmett III, 38, 20 was hired in February 1987 by Piedmont Airlines. Both the captain and first officer were regarded as excellent
pilots. They were both very experienced, with approximately 12,000 flight hours and 9,119 flight hours,
respectively. Flight Attendant Stanley Canty was hired in May 1989 by Piedmont Airlines. Flight Attendant April
Slater was hired by Piedmont in March 1989. Flight Attendant Sarah Slocum-Hamley was hired in October 1988.
Piedmont merged with USAir in 1989. 25
During its arrival into Pittsburgh, Flight 427 was sequenced behind Delta Airlines Flight 1083, a Boeing 727-200. At
no time was Flight 427 closer than 4.1 miles from Delta 1083, according to radar data.[1] During the approach, Flight
427 encountered wake turbulence from Delta 1083; however the FAA determined "the wake vortex encounter alone
would not have caused the continued heading change that occurred after 1903:00."[2] At 7:02:57 PM, there were
three sudden thumps, clicking sounds, a louder thump, and then the 737 began to bank and roll to the left. The 30 aircraft stalled, and rolled upside down. Germano exclaims, "Hold on" numerous times, as Emmett says "Oh sh*t"
frequently. Germano says, "What the hell is this?" As air traffic control noticed Flight 427 descending without
permission, Germano, keyed the mic and stated, "Four-twenty-seven, emergency!" The aircraft then rolled back
upright, but after a few seconds on its side, the aircraft continued to roll while pitched nose down at the ground.
Germano and Emmett began frantically shouting, "God", "No!" and screaming. At 7:03:25 PM, the 737 slammed 35 into the ground and exploded, in an 80 degree nose down position, while banked 60 degrees to the left, and traveling
at 300 mph (480 km/h) in Hopewell Township, Beaver County,[3] near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, killing all 127
passengers and 5 crew members. The plane just barely missed the Green Garden shopping plaza, and the Aliquippa
exit of the Beaver Valley Expressway (I-376, then PA-60), which was crowded with cars of people driving home
from work, crashing onto a private gravel driveway and hillside on Pettita Lane in an area protected against 40 trespassing. There is a memorial that has been put on the site where the aircraft impacted.
Flight 427 has the third highest death toll of any aviation accident involving a Boeing 737-300 after the crash of
Flash Airlines Flight 604 and China Southern Airlines Flight 3943. When it occurred, it was the second deadliest
accident involving a Boeing 737 and is currently the sixth deadliest. It was also the seventh deadliest aviation
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disaster in the history of the United States at the time it occurred; as of 2012, it now ranks ninth.[citation needed] In the
period from 1989 to 1994, it was the company's fifth crash.[4]
After the crash, USAir encountered difficulties in determining who was on board the aircraft. The company faced
confusion regarding five or six passengers. Several employees of the U.S. Department of Energy had tickets to take
later flights, but used them to fly on Flight 427. One young child was not ticketed.[4] Due to the severity of the 5 impact, the bodies of the passengers and crew were severely fragmented, leading investigators to declare the site a
biohazard.
Investigation[edit]
After one of the longest accident investigations in aviation history — lasting more than four and a half years — the
concluding statement said: 10
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the USAir flight 427 accident was a
loss of control of the airplane resulting from the movement of the rudder surface to its blowdown limit. The rudder
surface most likely deflected in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots as a result of a jam of the main
rudder power control unit servo valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset from its neutral position and
overtravel of the primary slide.[5] 15
The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that similar rudder problems caused the previously mysterious
March 3, 1991 crash of United Airlines Flight 585 and the June 9, 1996, incident involving Eastwind Airlines Flight
517, both of which were Boeing 737s. As a result of the investigation, pilots were warned of and trained how to deal
with insufficient aileron authority at an airspeed at or less than 190 knots (352 km/h), formerly the usual approach
speed for a Boeing 737. Four additional channels of information — pilot rudder pedal commands — were 20 incorporated into flight data recorders, while Boeing redesigned the rudder system on 737s and retrofitted existing
craft until the affected systems could be replaced. The United States Congress also required airlines to deal more
sensitively with the families of crash victims.[6]
US Airways 427 is no longer a valid flight number on US Airways as of January 2011.
Flight 427 was the second fatal crash in a little over two months at the company (the other being USAir Flight 1016 25 at Charlotte-Douglas Airport in July 1994). The crashes contributed to the financial crisis USAir was experiencing at
the time.[7]
Among the victims of the crash was noted neuroethologist Walter Heiligenberg.[8]
Dramatization[edit]
The accident was featured on the Discovery Channel Canada/National Geographic Channel television series Mayday 30 (also known as Air Emergency or Air Crash Investigation in various countries) series 4 episode entitled "Hidden
Danger" ("Mystery Crashes"), alongside United Airlines Flight 585 and Eastwind Airlines Flight 517.
See also[edit]
Pittsburgh portal
Aviation portal
Disasters portal
1990s portal
Boeing 737 rudder issues
United Airlines Flight 585 35 Eastwind Airlines Flight 517
American Airlines Flight 1
Northwest Airlines Flight 85
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References[edit]
1. Jump up ^ http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1999/AAR9901.pdf
2. Jump up ^ http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/USAir427/usa427%20ntsb%20findings.pdf
3. Jump up ^ "28 Seconds of Horror," Pittsburgh Tribune-Review
4. ^ Jump up to: a b "28 Seconds: The Mystery of USAir Flight 427 Part One: Zulu." 4. Retrieved on 5 December 31, 2012.
5. Jump up ^ NTSB summary
6. Jump up ^ Remarks from acting NTSB Chairman, 2002
7. Jump up ^ Halvonik, Steve. "Disaster only one in a string of setbacks for troubled company."
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. Sunday September 5, 2004. Retrieved on January 1, 2012. 10 8. Jump up ^ "List of Crash Victims." Wilmington Morning Star. September 10, 1994. 4A. Google
News (28 of 49). Retrieved on October 3, 2009.
External links[edit]
www.airliners.net - picture of N513AU painted in USAir's brown, orange, and red livery
NTSB Accident Investigation Docket (Archive) 15 AVweb article
AVweb supplement
Accident description at the Aviation Safety Network
28 Seconds Four-part article from the Saint Petersburg Times
Boeing 737 Rudder Design Defect 20 "Remembering Flight 427." Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. (Archive)
Pre-Crash accident photos from Airliners.net
Schaarsmith, Amy McConnell. "Mourners remember at 15th anniversary." Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.
September 9, 2009.
Memorial location 25
Books[edit]
Bill Adair, The Mystery of Flight 427: Inside a Crash Investigation, ISBN 1-58834-005-8
Gerry Byrne, Flight 427: Anatomy of an Air Disaster, ISBN 0-387-95256-X
[hide]
v
t
e
← 1993
Aviation accidents and incidents in 1994
1995 →
Jan 3 Baikal Airlines Flight 130
Jan 7 Atlantic Coast Airlines Flight 6291
Feb 28 Banja Luka incident
Mar 17 Iranian Air Force C-130 shootdown
Mar 20 British Army Lynx shootdown
Mar 23 Aeroflot Flight 593
Mar 23 Green Ramp disaster
Apr 04 KLM Cityhopper Flight 433
Apr 14 Black Hawk shootdown
Apr 26 China Airlines Flight 140
Jun 02 RAF Chinook crash
Jun 06 China Northwest Airlines Flight 2303
Jun 24 Fairchild Air Force Base B-52 crash
Jun 30 Airbus Industrie Flight 129
Jul 01 Air Mauritanie Flight 625
Oct 12 Iran Aseman Airlines Flight 746
Oct 31 American Eagle Flight 4184
Nov 03 SAS Flight 347
Nov 22 TWA Flight 427
Dec 11 Philippine Airlines Flight 434
Dec 13 Flagship Airlines Flight 3379
Dec 19 Nigeria Airways Flight 9805
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Apr 06 Assassination of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira
Apr 07 Federal Express Flight 705 Jul 02 USAir Flight 1016
Jul 19 Alas Chiricanas Flight 901
Aug 21 Royal Air Maroc Flight 630
Sep 08 USAir Flight 427
Dec 21 Air Algérie Flight 702P
Dec 24 to Dec 26 Air France Flight 8969
Dec 29 Turkish Airlines Flight 278
<img src="//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1" alt="" title="" width="1" height="1"
style="border: none; position: absolute;" />
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=USAir_Flight_427&oldid=613863229"
Categories:
Airliner accidents and incidents caused by design or manufacturing errors 5 Aviation accidents and incidents in 1994
1994 in Pennsylvania
Airliner accidents and incidents in Pennsylvania
Beaver County, Pennsylvania
US Airways accidents and incidents 10 Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 737
END QUOTE
Even if in this case the rudder system could not have been an issue with the 777 (MH370)
nevertheless it might be worthwhile to check other 777’s as to any kind of reported problems 15
they may have experienced, even if no fatalities eventuated, so that a possible connection might
be made to explain the strange way MH370 was going.
For example was the Auto Pilot reprogrammed and by this once engaged took over the plane and
then was beyond the control of either pilot to restore the plane back under their control if the 20
switch was deactivated to switch of the Automatic Pilot, and so the pilots were aware the plane
was doomed and they had no way to stop it? In the alternative it landed beyond their control, and
they are held or were executed after landing.
We cannot and must not give up on those missing of flight MH370 nor can we ignore the 25
problems that may eventuate if this plane was hijacked and the same could eventuate with
any other plane because authorities fails to investigate appropriately.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL® 30
(Our name is our motto!)