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Edinburgh University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Scottish Historical
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dinburgh University Press
The Disruption and British Politics 1834-43Author(s): G. I. T. MachinSource: The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 51, No. 151, Part 1 (Apr., 1972), pp. 20-51Published by: Edinburgh University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25528937
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G. I. T. MAGHIN
The
Disruption
and
British
politics
1834-43
The
Disruption
of
1843
was
a
peculiarly
Scottish
event
which
had
little
similarity
to
ecclesiastical
developments
in
the
rest
of
the
United
Kingdom.
Like the
tractarians
of
the
contemporary
Oxford
movement,
the
Scottish non-intrusionists?who
left
the
Kirk
in
1843
because
they
rejected
lay
interference
in
spiritual
concerns?
wished
to
reform
their
church from
within
and
to assert
its
spiritual
independence
from
civil
authority.
But
the
tractarians
developed
mainly as a doctrinal movement, whereas the non-intrusionists had
comparatively
little
theological quarrel
with their
opponents
in
the
Church
of
Scotland,
the
Moderates,
and wished
to
be rid of
civil control because
it
hindered
their
schemes
for
making
the
Church
a
more
popular
and
expanding
body.1
Non-intrusionists
also
bore
little resemblance
to
dissent.
In
the
1830s
and
1840s
dissenters
strongly
supported
the disestablishment
or
'voluntary
church'
movement to
free
churches
from
state
control and
support,
while non-intrusionists
clung
to
the
establishment
principle,
albeit
an
ideal
one
reformed
according
to
their
views.
Almost the
only
group
truly
sympathetic
to
non-intrusion
were
the
Wesleyans,
who
had left
an
establishment
but
still
believed
in its raison
d'etre.2
But
in
spite
of
the distinctiveness
of
the
Scottish
church
question
its
outcome
was
influenced
by
the
general
British situation
because
of the
political
union.
It would
be incorrect
to
say
that
govern
ments
refused
non-intrusionist
demands
because
Scotland
had
only
a
minority
voice
in
parliament,
because
she
was remote
from
Westminster, or because her clerical
quarrels
were
uninteresting,
unintelligible
or
distasteful
to
many
English
politicians.
Statesmen
were
not
rendered
immovable
by
the
indifference
of
most
MPs,
and
they
had
to
seek
to
understand
and
judge
objectively
even
where
they
did
not
sympathise.3
It
was
unlikely
that
Melbourne
would
i
Flashes
of
sympathy
did
occur
between
tractarians
and non-intrusionists?
even
that
crusty
evangelical-basher
Bishop Phillpotts
was
once
approvingly
quoted
by
Chalmers
in
the
general
assembly?but
doctrinal
disparity
caused
general
antipathy
(W.
Hanna,
Memoirs
of
the
Life
and
Writings of
Thomas Chalmers
[Edinburgh,
1850-2],
iv, 112, 320).
2
Correspondence
between
Chalmers
and
Jabez
Bunting
shows
genuine
sympathy.
Bunting
offered
non-intrusionists
the
support
of
the
Wesleyan
Methodist
Magazine
and
the
Watchman
(Edinburgh,
New
College,
Chalmers
Papers,
Bunting
to
Chalmers, 23
Jan.
1841).
3
Cf.
Journal
of
Henry
Cockburn,
ed.
T.
Cleghorn
(Edinburgh,
1874),
lh
36:
'It
is
the
duty
of
a
Government,
in the
immediate
presence
of
great
public
danger,
to
take
the
lead,
actively
and
decidedly,
and
to
endeavour
to
produce
that
wisdom
and
concord
which
it
does
not
find
existing.'
DRMAGHiNisa
lecturer
in modern
history
in the
university
of Dundee.
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THE DISRUPTION
AND
BRITISH POLITICS
21
make
a
painstaking
study
of
the
dispute:
he
confessed
that
he
was
'practically
utterly
ignorant'
of
it,1
and his
outspoken
dislike of
Chalmers
betrayed
personal
bias.
But the
essentials
of
vetos,
calls,
libera arbitria and
quoad
sacra churches were
probably grasped by
Peel,
and
if he
were
wanting,
his
lieutenant
Lord Aberdeen
was
soaked in
the
question,
as
is testified
by
the
hundreds
of
voluminous
letters he
exchanged
with
the
Moderate
lawyer,
John
Hope.
Deeper
reasons
than
mere
apathy
explain
the
failure
of both
a
whig
and
a
conservative
government
to
offer
a
settlement
which
would have
kept
the
non-intrusionists
in
the
Church.
Primarily
the
assumptions
of both
governments
about
an
established church
were
severely tried by non-intrusionist claims. The policy of whigs and
liberal
conservatives
was one
of
reviving
the establishment
and
at
the
same
time
making
concessions
to
other
denominations.2
Desire
to
uphold
the
establishment
was
unlikely,
save
under
a
threat of
great
upheaval,
to
embrace
so
sacrificial
a
measure
as
the
non-intrusionists
demanded,
namely
the virtual
elimination of
the
state
in
spiritual
government
while
at
the
same
time
retaining
the
temporal
advantages
of establishment. The
policy
of
conciliating
dissent
also worked
against
non-intrusion.
Scottish dissenters
(or
Voluntaries
as
the advocates
of
disestablishment
were
called)
opposed
non-intrusion
because
they
feared
that it
might
succeed
in
strengthening
the
establishment,
and the
whigs
were
unwilling
to
conciliate
non-intrusion
lest
their alliance
with dissent
should
become weaker than it
was
already.
The
whigs
showed
their
hand in
1839
when
they
supported
a
judgment
against
non-intrusion
and failed
to
bring
in
remedial
legislation.
The
non-intrusionists thereafter
strengthened
their
demands,
which seemed
increasingly
anti-erastian to Moderates
and
increasingly
democratic
to
aristocrats,
and
neither
whigs
nor
conservatives
would offer
enough
to
satisfy
them.
The main
compromise
was
suggested
in
1840,
and
rejected;
stalemate
followed
with
the
government
upholding
a
compromise
and
the non-in
trusionists
insisting
on more.
The
demands did
not
come
through
strongly
enough
to
change
the
government's
view.
Non-intrusionists
had
a
majority
in the
general assembly
of the
Church,
but
in
parliamentary
elections and
popular organisation
their
voice
was
muffled
and
inconclusive;
the
government
therefore
doubted
whether
a
majority
of the Church
supported
their
claims,
and
these
doubts
i
Lord
Melbourne's
Papers,
ed.
L.
G. Sanders
(London,
1890), 416,
Melbourne
to
Lord
Dunfermline,
20
Apr.
1841.
2
For
general political
attitudes
see
Olive
Brose,
Church
and
Parliament,
1828
60
(London, 1959),
ch.
3;
G. F. A.
Best,
Temporal
Pillars
(Cambridge,
1963);
O.
Chadwick,
The
Victorian
Church,
pt.
1
(London, 1966);
N.
Gash,
Reaction
and
Reconstruction
in
English
Politics,
1832-52
(Oxford,
1965);
D.
Southgate,
The
Passing
of
the
Whigs, 1832-86 (London,
1962).
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22
G.
I.
T. MACHIN
were
intensified
by
Moderate
partisans
who said that
any
secession
would
be
a
small
one.
Government resistance continued and
at
length
came
the
Disruption,
a
larger
and
more
far-reaching
cata
clysm
than was
expected.
This article will examine the sad
story
of
the relations of non-intrusionists
with
two
successive
governments,
in
an
attempt
to
show
why
schism occurred.1
I
The
non-intrusionist
movement
began?ironically
in view
of
the
fact
that it
later
appeared
to
be
threatening
the
establishment?
as an
attempt
to
defend the Church
of Scotland
against
the
menace
of
Voluntaryism,
which
in
the
later
1820s
emerged
as a
militant
force.2
Voluntaryism
directly
attacked the
establishment,
and
never
before
had
the
Kirk
met
such
vigorous
opposition.
The
needed
response
was
readily
forthcoming.
Against
the
lethargy
of Modera
tism had arisen
the zealous
evangelicalism
of
Thomas
Chalmers,
Andrew
Thomson
and their followers who
were
bent
on
rebutting
Voluntaryism
by
making
the
Church
more
vital
and
popular.
Their
activities
included
anti-voluntary
lectures
given by
later
luminaries of non-intrusion who were themselves to be accused of
undermining
the
state
connection.3
The
evangelicals4
increased
i
My
main
MS
sources are
the Aberdeen
Papers
(British
Museum,
Add.
MSS
43039-358),
Peel
Papers (BM
Add. MSS
40181-617),
Chalmers
Papers
(Edinburgh,
New
College)
and
Dalhousie
Papers (Scottish
Record
Office,
GD
45/14).
These
are
hereafter
referred
to
as
AP, PP,
CP,
and
DP.
The
Clerk
of
Penicuik
Papers
(SRO,
GD
18),
Gladstone
Papers
(BM
Add. MSS
44088-835),
Brougham
Papers (London, University
College)
and Dundee
Presbytery
Minutes
(SRO,
CH2/103/18)
have also been used.
In
contemporary
accounts
of the
crisis
the
non-intrusionist
view
is
presented
by
R.
Buchanan,
The Ten
Tears'
Conflict
(Glasgow,
1849);
Hanna, Chalmers',
and
T.
Brown,
Annals
of
the
Disruption (Edin
burgh,
1893).
A
hard
Moderate
line
is
taken
by
J. Bryce,
Ten Tears
of
the
Church
of
Scotland
(Edinburgh,
1850)
and
a
softer
one
by
A.
Turner,
The Scottish
Secession
of
1843
(Edinburgh,
1859).
Useful
later
accounts
are
in
G.
W.
T.
Omond,
The Lord
Advocates
of
Scotland,
2nd
ser.,
1834-80
(London, 1914);
W.
L.
Mathieson,
Church
and
Reform
in
Scotland,
1797-1843 (Glasgow,
1916); Hugh
Watt,
Thomas
Chalmers
and
the
Disruption
(Edinburgh,
1943);
G.
D.
Henderson,
Heritage
(Edinburgh,
1943)
and
The
Claims
of
the
Church
of
Scotland
(London, 1951); J.
H. S.
Burleigh,
A
Church
History
of
Scotland
(Edinburgh,
i960);
and W.
Ferguson,
Scotland,
1689
to
the
Present
(Edinburgh,
1968).
In
attempting
this
account of the
political
aspects
I
have
benefited from
discussion
with
special
subject
students
at
the
university
of
Dundee,
and must thank Professor D. F. Macdonald for his
helpful
comments on
the
paper.
2
For
the
development
of
Voluntaryism
see
A. B.
Montgomery,
'The
Vol
untary Controversy
in the
Church
of
Scotland,
1829-43',
Ph.D. thesis
(Edinburgh
University,
1953),
a
valuable
study
of
a
subject
on
which
little has been written.
See
also
Burleigh,
Church
History,
323-4
and
J.
B.
Mackie,
The
Life
and Work
of
Duncan
McLaren
(London,
1888),
i,
170
ff.
3 Montgomery,
'Voluntary
Controversy',
55
ff.
4
The
evangelicals
were not
exactly
co-terminous
with
non-intrusionists;
most
evangelicals
became
non-intrusionists
but
some
accepted
modified
lay
patronage
and remained
in the Church of Scotland
after
the
Disruption.
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THE
DISRUPTION
AND BRITISH
POLITICS
23
their
representation
in the
general
assembly
while that
of the
Moderates
declined;
by
1834
the former
had
a
majority
and
kept
it
until the
Disruption.
In the
same
year
Chalmers
launched
a cam
paign
for
state
endowment
of
new
churches which
was
bitterly
opposed by
Voluntaries,
and the Voluntaries
largely
had their
way
with the
government
for
satisfactory
endowments
were
not
granted. Evangelicals
also
promoted
church extension
by building,
within
existing parishes, chapels-of-ease
or
quoad
sacra
churches,
and
in order
to
give
their
ministers similar
rights
to
those
of the
parish
ministers
the
1834 assembly
passed
the
Chapels
Act.1
This
measure
was
disliked
not
only by
Voluntaries
but
also
by
Moderates,
who rightly thought it would increase evangelical strength in the
ecclesiastical
courts
such
as
presbyteries,
synods
and
general assembly
which
controlled
the
spiritual
life of
the
Church;
and the
act
was
later
repudiated
by
the
court
of
session,
the
chief civil
court.
Evangelicals
further
wanted
to remove
abuses
which,
they
were
convinced,
restricted the
popularity
of
the
Church;
and in
this
connection
they
claimed
the
Church's
right
to
make
decisions
on
spiritual
government
independently
of
the
state.
The
chief
object
of
reform
was
the
system
of
lay patronage,
abolished in
1690
but
restored
by
an
act
of
1712,
according
to
which
a
candidate
presented
by
the
patron
to
a
parish
had
to
be
accepted
as
minister
provided
the
presbytery
was
satisfied with
regard
to
his
'life,
literature
and
manners'
[i.e. morals],
and the
opinion
of
the
congregation
was
practically
immaterial.2
This
meant
that ministers
were
sometimes
'intruded'
on
unwilling parishes.
The
matter
had
long
been
a
grievance;
it
had caused
secessions in
1733
and
1752,
and
by
some
it
was
considered
a
betrayal
of
the
Union.3
The non-intrusionists wished to
modify
the law of
patronage
so
that
congregational
reaction
to
a
presentee
might
be
expressed;
if
disapproval
were
strong enough
a
presentee
should
be
rejected
and
a
more
acceptable
candidate found. In this
intention,
resistance
to
Voluntaryism
was
again
clearly
seen.
At the
1833
general
assembly
it
was
said that
'nothing
.
. .
will
disappoint
them
[i.e.
the Voluntar
ies]
more
than
the
adoption
of
a measure
to
prevent
effectually
the
intrusion
of ministers
into
parishes'.4
'John
Knox the
Younger's'
First Blast of the Trumpet against theMonstrous Usurpations of Church
Patrons in
Scotland announced
that
'the violent
tempest
which
.
. .
i
Buchanan,
Ten
Tears1
Conflict,
i,
317
ff.
2
The
crown
was
patron
of about
a
third
of the
parishes;
in
the
remainder
patronage
was
usually
held
by
a
local
landowner.
3
For
a
summary
of
the earlier
phases
of
the
dispute
see
Henderson,
Claims,
102-5.
4
Montgomery,
'Voluntary
Controversy',
132.
See also
Speeches
at
a
Glasgow
public
meeting,
31
Jan.
&
1
Feb.
1833
(Glasgow,
1833),
6
ff.;
and
Brougham
Papers,
43044,
Rev.
Henry
Duncan
to
Brougham,
5
Dec.
1832.
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24
G. I. T. MACHIN
threatens
to
ingulph
us
in
the
boiling
waves
of
infidel
rage
and
sectarian
frenzy
>
loudly
proclaims
that
the entire abolition
of
lay-patronage
has become
our
sheet-anchor'.1
Most
non-intrusionists, however,
would
at this
point
have been satisfied with less than the
complete
abolition
of
patronage.
The
Veto
Act
which
was
passed
by
the
1834
assembly
declared
that 'the
dissent
of
a
majority
of
the male
heads of
families,
being
members
of
the
congregation
and
in full
communion with the
church,
ought
to
be of
conclusive effect
in
setting
aside the
presentee',
and
no reasons
need be
given
for the dissent.2 This
was
quite
enough
to
alarm
the
Moderates who
thought
that
a
congregational
veto
without stated
reasons
could
produce
biased,
uninformed and
irresponsible decisions on the worth of a minister.3 And so there
commenced
a
conflict
within
the Church which led
to
schism
and
amidst whose
cacophony
the
dispute
with
Voluntaryism
played
second
fiddle,
though
it
was
by
no
means
rendered
in
audible.4
The
Veto Act
was
to
raise
thorny
questions
about the
right
of
the
Church
to
decide the
patronage
issue
independently
of the
civil
courts,
but
it
aroused little
controversy
until it
was
put
to
the
test.
To historians
of the Church of Scotland
the
years
1834-9
are
a
golden period
when
unity
over
many
matters
prevailed
and
im
mense
material
and
spiritual
progress
was
achieved.5
In
politics,
non-intrusionist
support
for the
state
connection
blurred the issue
until
a
direct conflict
over
patronage
occurred;
non-intrusionists
were
firm
establishment
men
despite
their wish for
reform,
and
government
could
meet
them
on
establishment
ground
despite
having
to
take
account
of the
Voluntary
position.
Such
early
attention
as
non-intrusion
did
receive,
however,
did
not
promise
a
warm political reception. Nothing was done about the report of a
select
committee
on
patronage
which
was
vaguely
in favour
of
changing
the
law6;
and
motions
in
1835
DY
Andrew
Johnston
(MP
for
the St Andrews
burghs)
for the
modification
of
patronage
received
little attention
or
support.7
In
February
1834
Peel stated
his
opposition
to
the
alteration
of
patronage.8
i
Edinburgh, 1833,
iv.
2
Buchanan,
Ten
Tears'
Conflict,
i,
289
ff.
3
Bryce,
Ten
Tears, i,
21-42.
4
Political
rivalry
between
Voluntaries
and
non-intrusionists
was
later
great
enough
for Moderates to
regard
Voluntaries as
potential
allies
against
non
intrusionists
(see
below,
p.
32).
In
1843
the Free
Church
adhered
to
the establish
ment
principle
and
was
for
a
long
period
in
conflict
with Voluntaries
on
this
point.
5
Watt,
Thomas
Chalmers, 152-3:
'At
no
period
in its
previous
history
had
it
displayed
such
energy
and sacrifice
for the
evangelization
of
the nation
and of the
world.'
6
Hansard's
Parliamentary
Debates,
xxi,
926-40
(all
references
are
to
the
third
series);
Report
from
Select Committee
on
Church
Patronage
in
Scotland,
Parliamentary
Papers,
1834
(512),
v,
pp.
iii-iv.
7
Hansard,
xxviii,
882-6; xxix,
412-17.
8
Ibid.,
xxi,
934-5.
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THE
DISRUPTION
AND BRITISH
POLITICS
25
The
eruption
of the classic
Auchterarder
case
in
1834
transformed
preliminary
skirmishing
into
a
serious
dispute.
In
this
case
rejection
by
the
presbytery
in accordance
with the Veto Act caused the
disappointed
presentee,
Robert
Young,
to
appeal
to the court of
session.
In
March
1838
the
court
declared,
by
a
majority
of
eight
judges
to
five,
in
favour
of
Young
and
against
the
Veto Act.1 The
assembly
of
1838
replied
with
a
resolution
that 'in
all
matters
touching
the
doctrine,
government
and
discipline
of
the
Church,
her
judicatories
possess
an
exclusive
jurisdiction,
founded
on
the
Word
of
God5,2
and
appealed
against
the
offending
judgment
to
a
higher
court,
the
house
of lords.
The
lords'judgment,
given
on
4
May
1839,
upheld that of the court of session. The statements of whig lawyers
on
the
case
were
not
conciliatory.
Cottenham,
the
current
lord
chancellor,
and
Brougham,
a
former
one,
said
that
the law
did
not
embrace
a
congregational
call
or
veto,
and
Brougham
said
later
that 'he had
never seen
such
a
clear
case.
It
seemed
to
be all
one
way.'3
Whig
opinion
was
echoed
by
conservative: Aberdeen told
John Hope,
dean of
the
faculty
of
advocates and
counsel
for Robert
Young,
that
'if.
.
.
the
Assembly
should
resist
the decision
of
the
House
of
Lords,
they
must
bid
adieu
to
additional
endowments,
and
in
fact
they
would
go
far
to
sever
their
connection
with
the
State'.4
The
non-intrusionists
rejected
the
decision.
Although
Chalmers
did
not
finally
adhere
to
the
veto
until
considerably
later,
he
was
driven
by
the lords'
verdict
to
re-affirm the
Veto Act
at
the
1839
general assembly.5
Views
contained in
his
influential
London
lectures of
the
previous
year
were
repeated
more
strongly
at
this
assembly:
'we
are
never,
in
any
instance,
to
depart
from
the
ob
ligations which lie upon us as a Christian Church, for the sake
either
of
obtaining
or
perpetuating
the
privileges
which
belong
to
us as an
Established
Church.'6
There
was
here
a
veiled
threat
of
secession,
which
was
put
in
plainer
language
to
Sir
James
Graham:
'rather
than be
placed
at
the
feet of
an
absolute
and
uncontrolled
patronage
. .
.
very
many
of
our
clergy
.
.
.
are
resolved
to
quit
the
Establishment and
.
.
.
leave
it
a
prey
for the
Radicals,
and
Voluntaries,
and
demi-infidels
.
.
.
who
are
bent
upon
destroying
it.'7
i
Omond,
Lord
Advocates, 54
fF. For
the
Auchterarder
case
in
detail
see
also
Watt,
Thomas
Chalmers,
157 ff.;
Buchanan,
Ten
Years'
Conflict,
i,
398-491;
ii,
1-15;
Bryce,
Ten
Tears,
i,
42-72.
2
Buchanan,
Ten Tears'
Conflict,
i,
478-9.
3 Hanna,
Chalmers,
iv,
96
ff.;
Hansard,
1,
374.
4
AP, 43202,
fo.
180,
13
June
1838.
5
Hanna,
Chalmers, iv,
115.
6
Ibid.,
iv, 109.
7
Chalmers
to
Graham,
6
June
1839,
in
C.
S.
Parker,
Life
and
Letters
of
Sir
James
Graham,
Bt
(London,
1907),
i,
373-4.
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26
G.
I. T.
MACHIN
The
conflicting
standpoints
of
non-intrusionists
and Moderates
were
soon
being expressed
through
public
channels,
and
it
could
well be
said
that 'the
Church
question
is
growing
like
a
tropical
turnip'.1
Among
further
causes
celebres
which had arisen
over
the
veto
the
Marnoch
case
was
outstanding
for
its
serpentine
course
and
aggravating
effects
on
the
controversy.
When
a
call
to
the
presentee,
Mr
John
Edwards,
was
signed
only by
the
village
inn
keeper (a
fact
which
was
enough
to
secure
notoriety
for the
case)
and the
great
majority
of the male
heads
of families
dissented,
the
presbytery
of
Strathbogie
divided
over
whether
to
apply
the
pro
cedure
of
the Veto
Act,
seven
ministers
being against
this
course
and four in favour. The assembly of 1838 ordered the presbytery
to
enforce the
act
and the
presbytery initially
obeyed.
Edwards,
however,
successfully
appealed
to
the
court
of
session,
whereupon
the
presbytery
somersaulted
and decided
to
take him
on
trials.
A
new
issue
was
thus
added
to
the
quarrel?could presbyteries
defy
their
superior
court,
the
general assembly,
and defer
instead
to
the
civil
authority
? This
question exposed
the
very
heart
of
the
dispute
over
conflicting jurisdictions.
A
commission of
assembly
decided
that
the
seven
ministers who
were
the
majority
should be
temporar
ily
suspended
from office for
their
disobedience,
and
the
1840
assembly
decided
to
continue
the
suspension.
But
the
court
of
session
held
the
suspension
to
be
invalid,
whereupon
the
seven
ministers
resumed their
functions
and
said
they
could
not
recognise
the
proceedings
of
the
commission of
assembly.
Further,
on
a
new
action
by
Mr
Edwards
the
seven
ministers
proceeded
to
ordain
and
induct him in
a scene
of
dramatic
congregational
opposition,
in
January
1841.2
The
Moderates
led
by
Dr
Cook
held
that
the
ministers had done
right
to
obey
the
'supreme
tribunals' of the
country,
but
to
non-intrusionists
an
ordination
performed
by
sus
pended
ministers
was an
almost
sacrilegious example
of the
tyranny
of civil
courts.3
i
DP,
646,
Patrick
Stewart,
MP
for
Renfrewshire,
to
Fox
Maule,
9
Jan.
1840.
The
Moderate
case
was
expounded,
and
rather
spoiled,
in
a
290-page
pamphlet
by
John
Hope,
A
Letter
to
the Lord Chancellor
on
the
Claims
of
the
Church
of
Scotland
(London,
1839).
Hope's
friends,
like
readers
of
a
later
age,
had
difficulty
in
getting
through it: Aberdeen told him 'it is too long', that Melbourne would never
read
it,
and
that
it
was
doubtful whether
even
the
lord chancellor would
do
so
(AP,
43202,
fo.
249,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
1
Oct.
1839).
A non-intrusionist
pam
phlet
in
reply,
A.
Murray
Dunlop's
An
Answer
to
the Dean
of Faculty's
Letter
(Edin
burgh,
1839), apparently
sought
to
match
Hope
in
length
as
well
as
in
argument.
2
Brown, Annals,
23-24; Hanna,
Chalmers,
iv,
214-19.
3
The Moderate view
was
expressed
by
Dr
George
Cook
to
Brougham,
6
June
1840
(Brougham
Papers,
33509).
For the
whole
case
in
detail
see
Watt,
Thomas
Chalmers,
206-21;
Buchanan,
Ten Tears'
Conflict,
ii,
passim; Bryce,
Ten
Tears,
i,
101-59,
195-217;
ii? 53-172.
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THE DISRUPTION
AND
BRITISH POLITICS
2j
II
The Marnoch
labyrinth
increased
non-intrusionist
pressure
for
a
parliamentary
settlement of the claims. 'It is
absolutely
necessary
that there should
be
legislative
interference',
wrote
Lord
Advocate
Rutherfurd after
the
suspension
of the
seven
ministers.1
Marnoch
also affected the
kind of
legislation
which non-intrusionists
would
accept.
Because the
case
showed
what
a
Moderate
presbytery
might
do,
non-intrusionists
were
reluctant
to
accept
the
compromise
which
was
shortly
offered,
that
presbyteries
should
judge
the
validity
of
popular
objections
to
a
presentee.
In
seeking
a
parliamentary
solution it became clear that while there was little to choose be
tween
the
two
political parties
as
regards
sympathy
for
non-intrusion,
rather
more
hope
could
be
placed
in
the
conservatives than
the
liberals.
Two
Scottish
whigs
who held
ministerial
office,
Rutherfurd
and
Fox
Maule,2
were
zealous
non-intrusionists but
they
had
no
support
from
their
party
leaders. Scottish conservatives
on
the other
hand
were
frequently
Moderates,
but
among
the
leaders
Aberdeen
was
more
conciliatory
than
the
whigs.
Chalmers,
moreover,
was a
strong conservative,
and the
fact
that
most
prominent
non-intrusion
ist ministers
were
whigs
weighed
little
against
his
importance
as
leader.3
On
political
and
especially
on
personal grounds
Chalmers
cut
no
ice with Melbourne. The latter's
remark,
in itself
irrational,
that
'I
particularly
dislike
Chalmers;
I
think him
a
madman
&
all
madmen
are
also
rogues',4
showed
that Chalmers
would find it
easier
to
negotiate
with Aberdeen. The liberal
press
in
both Scot
land
and
England
was more
hostile
to
non-intrusion than
the
conservative.5
For various reasons liberal
policy
was a
stalling
one. The
govern
ment
was
connected
with Voluntaries and
radicals
who
might
not
unjustly
be accused of
enjoying
the dilemma of the
Kirk6;
true-blue
whiggery,
whether
influenced
by
anglicanism
or
not,
disliked sub
mitting
to
clerical 'dictation'
and
the
'democracy'
of
the
veto;
and the
weak
position
of the
government
discouraged
a
firm
remedy
1
DP,
642/1,
Rutherfurd
to
Fox
Maule, 31
Dec.
1839.
2
Maule
was
then
under-secretary
for
home affairs. He
was
later
secretary
for
war, second earl of Panmure and eleventh earl of Dalhousie.
3
'Without
Dr.
G.
we
could
not
keep
our
majority
in
the
Assembly
& if
that
failed,
our
cause
wd. be
gone'
(DP, 658,
Murray
Dunlop
to
Maule, 3
Jan.
1840).
4
DP,
640,
Melbourne
to
Maule,
28
Oct.
1840.
5
Only
the
Caledonian
Mercury
in Scotland
was
named
as a
consistent
liberal
supporter
of
the
cause;
in
England
'the Times
formerly
&
the
Record
now
have
been
our
only
friends while
the
Examiner attacks
us
fiercely
&
the other
ministerial
papers
if
they
notice
our
affairs
at
all do
so
by
quoting
paragraphs
from
our
enemies'
(DP,
658, Dunlop
to
Maule, 3
Jan.
1840).
6
AP, 43202,
fo.
253,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
14
Dec.
1839.
For the
action
of
dissenters,
at
this
time
obstructing
a
settlement,
see
Omond,
Lord
Advocates,
73.
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28
G.
I. T.
MACHIN
which
would alienate
one
side
or
the
other.
'Upon general
principles',
said
Melbourne,
'I
never saw so
clear.
First,
I
do
not
know
how
I
could
reconcile
it
to
my
conscience
to
take the
part
of
any
Church
or
of
anything
ecclesiastical
anywhere,
in
opposition
to
the law
. . .
Secondly,
I
do
not
know how
I
could
. . .
agree
to
anything
which
was
to
place
the
election of
ministers
more
in
the
hands of
the
congregation
than
it is
at
present.
And,
thirdly,
even
if
the
Church
were
right
in
their
desires,
the
manner
in
which
they
have
been
asserted and
enforced
cannot
be
justified
or even
excused.'1
A
non-intrusionist
deputation
in London after
the lords' Auch
terarder
judgment
received
valuable
assurance
that
the
extensive
crown patronage would be exercised in accordance with the Veto
Act,
and
this
promise
was
consistently
fulfilled,2
but
Melbourne
assured
Brougham
that the
deputation
had
not
caused the
govern
ment to
question
the
Auchterarder
judgment
and that
they
were
not
pledged
to
bring
in
legislation.3
Thereafter
Melbourne's
statements
in
parliament
on
the
subject
displayed
a
monotonous
impassivity
which
caught
the flavour
of
the
whig ministry
in
its
last,
post
Bedchamber
stage.
On 6
February
1840
he answered Aberdeen
that
the
ministers
were
undecided;
on 2
March
he said
that such
an
important
matter
needed
'due and
mature
consideration';
and
on
16
March he confessed
that
the
government
had
no
measure
ready.4
By
this
time
non-intrusionists
had almost
despaired
of
the
govern
ment.5
Finally,
when
on
30
March
Aberdeen
said that Melbourne
had
been
supposed
to
be
considering
the
question
for
eight
months
?'not
to
be
prepared
to
say
whether he would do
something
or
do
nothing,
was
that
proper?
was
it
decent?
was
it
honest?
was
this
a
Government?',
the
premier replied
that
he
would
not
be hustled and that he was 'not
prepared
at
present
to
pledge
the
Government
to
introduce
any
measure on
this
subject'.6
The
next
day
Aberdeen
said he
would
introduce
a
measure
himself7
and the
ball
was
passed,
no
doubt
thankfully,
to
the
tories.
Conservatives
had
understandably
been reluctant
to
take
an
awkward
problem
from the
government's
shoulders.
If
some
political
support
might
be
won
from
a
successful
solution,
some
might
also
be
lost,
and
this consideration
was
important
because of
the
struggle
to change the government. The Perthshire by-election of February
i
Melbourne's
Papers, 416,
Melbourne
to
Dunfermline,
20
Apr. 1841.
2
Turner,
Scottish
Secession,
174-5;
Watt,
Thomas
Chalmers,
195;
Witness, 9
June
1841.
3
Hansard,
1,373-6;
Melbourne's
Papers,
401
-2.
4
Hansard,
li,
1279;
Hi,
800-1, 1193.
The
answers
of Russell
and Lansdowne
were
much
the
same
(ibid.,
1198;
Buchanan,
Ten
Tears'
Conflict,
ii,
159-63;
DP,
642/2,
Rutherfurd
to
Maule,
3
Mar.
1840).
5
DP,
658,
Dunlop
to
Maule,
28
Feb.
1840.
6
Hansard,
Iiii, 225-7.
7
Ibid.,
260.
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THE
DISRUPTION AND
BRITISH
POLITICS
29
1840
which
was won
by
a
conservative
who
was
moderately
sym
pathetic
to
non-intrusion
against
a
liberal
who
was
more
so,
in
fluenced
conservatives
to
attempt
a
settlement.1
The
proposal
which
followed was the main
attempt
during
the crisis to find a
compro
mise.
Aberdeen
was
the
right
man
to
point
out
a
via
media. He shared
the
restrained liberalism
of Peel and his
religious
views
were
sufficiently
eclectic
to
appeal
to
anglicans
as
well
as
presbyterians,
though
by
no means
to
all
those of
either
persuasion.
A
member
of the Church of
Scotland who
had
strongly
advocated
state
support
for
that
Church's
extension,
he
was
yet
able
to
tell Gladstone
(scarcely,
however,
a
sympathetic listener) that he believed 'the differences in the two
Establishments
are
to
be
found
in non-essentials' and
that 'there
is
much
in
the sister
Church
[of England]
which
I
greatly
prefer,
and
to
which
I
readily
conform5.2
If
his
good
intentions
were
fruit
less it
was
because
events
and
personalities
were
making
a
com
promise unacceptable.
His
proposal
of
a
presbyterial
veto
might
have
succeeded
earlier,
but the lords'
verdict and the
Marnoch
imbroglio
had hardened
non-intrusionist
attitudes
and little
short
of
agreement
with
the
Veto Act would
placate
them.
Aberdeen
rejected
a
congregational
veto:
letters from
Moderates
like
the
Rev.
James
Robertson
of
Ellon and
John
Hope weighed
more
with him than
the
appeals
of non-intrusionists like
Dr
Robert
Buchanan.3
Hope's
influence
was
queried
by
G. W. T.
Omond,4
but there
seems
little
reason
to
doubt
it.
Peel had his
own reserva
tions
about
Hope,5
but
the
latter
enjoyed
a
confidential
relationship
with
Aberdeen with whose ecclesiastical views his
own
were
in
close accord.
Hope's
view
of
developments
in
Scotland
undoubtedly
affected conservative
politicians
in
London;
this view was
firmly
Moderate,
though
on
occasion he
showed
surprising
conciliatory
tendencies.
Aberdeen
and others
complained
of
Hope's long
windedness but
they usually
followed
the
course
he
urged.
Aberdeen
told
him in
October
1839
that his Letter
to
the Lord
Chancellor
had
convinced
him,
which
'could
rarely
be said
of
any book';
'I
entertained
great
doubts
respecting
the
Veto,'
he
continued,
'[but]
I
am
now
satisfied that
it
must
be
very
greatly
modified
i Buchanan, Ten Tears'
Conflict,
ii, 155-9; Omond, Lord
Advocates,
70-71;
DP,
626,
Alexander
Gurrie
to
Maule,
24
Feb.
1840;
AP, 43202,
fos.
297,
330,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
11
&
25
Mar.
1840.
2
Gladstone
Papers, 44088,
fos.
25-26,
Aberdeen
to
Gladstone,
10
Dec.
1840;
see
Sir
A.
Gordon,
The
Earl
of
Aberdeen
(London,
1893),
129-30.
Aberdeen had
sought anglican sympathy
for
Scottish
church
extension
by
airing
similar
views in
parliament
{Hansard,
xxx,
1077).
3
E.g.
AP,
43237,
fos.
124-5,
Robertson
of Ellon
to
Aberdeen,
6
Mar.
1840;
ibid.,
fos.
132-5, 141-2,
Buchanan
to
Aberdeen,
25 Mar.,
7
Apr.
&
1
May
1840.
4
Lord
Advocates,
84-85.
5
See
ibid.,
and
Watt,
Thomas
Chalmers,
196
n.
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30
G. I.
T.
MACHIN
before
it
can
be made
tolerable.'1 On
this basis
Aberdeen
adopted
the
idea
on
which
his
bill
was
founded,
that
presbyteries
should
consider
objections
and
make
a
decision
when
presentations
were
opposed
by
members of the
congregation,
and that the reasons for
objection
should be stated
and
found sufficient
before
a
presentee
was
rejected.2
Non-intrusionists
much
preferred
the
suggestion
of
another
conservative,
Sir
George
Clerk,
that
presbyteries
should
take
account
of
the
numbers
objecting
to
a
presentee
even
if
the
reasons
for
objection
were
found
unacceptable.3
Correspondence
and inter
views
between Aberdeen
and
non-intrusionists
suggested
that
Aberdeen might be coming round to this solution, but he stood
by
his
more
limited
view which
was
supported
by
Hope's opinion
that
the Scottish
clergy
were
basically
submissive and
would
give
up
the
veto
rather than
leave the
Church.4
Aberdeen's
biographer
suggests
that
a
forceful intervention
by
Hope
at
the
last
minute
dissuaded
him
from
altering
his
proposal
to
satisfy
the
non-intrusion
ists,5
and
although
such
a
view
may
not
be
complimentary
to
Aberdeen's
independence
of
judgment
it
is
in
keeping
with
con
temporary opinions
about his
political
irresolution.6
Although
non-intrusionists
condemned the
draft
bill,7
Aberdeen
introduced his
measure
in the
lords
on
5
May,
denouncing
the
popular
veto
as
'the
exercise of
an
arbitrary,
capricious,
and
ground
less
will
of
a
congregation
without
any
assigned
reason',
and
pro
posing
instead the
presbyterial
veto
which
'preserved
the
jurisdiction
and
independence
of the
church
.
.
.
gave
due
weight
to
the
just
claims of
the
people,
and did
not
unjustly
restrict
the
rights
of
the
patrons'.8
The
Moderate Robertson of Ellon
thought
that
speech
and bill were both admirable, but he
realistically
added that he
i
AP,
43202,
fo.
248,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
1
Oct.
1839.
2
Bryce,
Ten
Tears,
i,
168-84.
For
Aberdeen's
disputation
with
leading
non
intrusionists
on
this
matter,
see
The
Earl
of
Aberdeen's
Correspondence
with
the Rev.
Dr
Chalmers,
etc.,
14
Jan-27 May
1840
(Edinburgh,
1840).
3
Clerk
Papers,
3397,
address
of
the
Non-Intrusion
Committee
of
the
general
assembly
to
Sir
George
Clerk,
28
Jan. 1840;
Aberdeen's
Correspondence,
47,
Chalmers
to
Aberdeen,
16
Apr.
1840;
Omond,
Lord
Advocates,
75.
Clerk's action
caused
lasting
annoyance
to
Hope
and
Aberdeen
(e.g.
AP, 43205,
Hope
to
Aberdeen,
15
June
1841).
See
also
DP,
658,
Dunlop
to
Maule,
8
Apr.
1840.
4
Buchanan,
Ten Tears'
Conflict,
ii,
164-72;
Aberdeen's
Correspondence,
22-24,
49-50;
Turner,
Scottish
Secession, 224-32;
AP,
43203,
fos.
9-24,
Hope
to
Aberdeen,
14
Apr.
1840.
5
'Possessing
that
influence
which
a
strong
narrow
mind
of
a
positive,
over
bearing
type
often
exerts
over a
mind
of much
higher
quality
in
which self
distrust
and
humility
are
the
leading
characteristics,
the
Dean
[Hope]
succeeded
in
persuading
Lord Aberdeen
to
defer
to
his
advice'
(Gordon,
Aberdeen,
134).
6 See C.
H.
Stuart,
'The
formation
of the coalition cabinet
of
1852',
Trans.
Royal
Hist.
Soc,
5th
ser.,
iv
(1954),
53-54.
7
Buchanan,
Ten Tears'
Conflict,
ii,
175-80.
8
Hansard,
Iiii,
1216-26.
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THE
DISRUPTION
AND BRITISH POLITICS
31
had
'no
hope
whatever,
that the Bill
will be
acceptable
to
a
majority
of
the
Assembly'.1
Non-intrusionist
disapproval
became, indeed,
an
overwhelming
outcry.
The bill
was
rejected
by
sixty
to
twenty
in the synod of Lothian where there was 'language the most violent,
vituperation
quite
exorbitant,
passion
inflated
beyond conception',
and
the
opinion
was
aired
that
the bill
'deposed
the
Lord
Jesus
Christ
from
his
Throne'.2
Chalmers,
who had
countenanced
a
presbyterial
veto
provided
that
objections
could
be
made
without
expressed
reasons
and that the
numbers
objecting
should
be
a
material
factor,
wrote
bitterly
to
Aberdeen of
his
disappointment:
not
only
was
a
popular
veto
condemned
but
nothing
was
done
to
prevent
the
court
of session
overriding
a
decision
by
the
presbytery.3
The
general
assembly rejected
the bill
by
221 votes to
134;
one
observer
of their
proceedings
could
only
say
that
'they
were
ready
to
go
the whole
hog'.4
Aberdeen
thought
this decision
might
extinguish
his
bill
and
wrote
that he did
not
wish
'to
cram
this
measure
down
their
throats
if
they
dislike
it'.5 But
soon,
for various
reasons,
he
decided
to
take
the
measure
at
least
to
a
second
reading,
and
when
moving
this
on
16
June
he
followed the
advice,
given
in
a
thirteen-page
letter
from
Hope,
that he should stand firm.
Rebutting
the 'monstrous
and
extravagant
pretensions'
of
the
assembly,
he vindicated his
bill
against
objections,
condemned the Veto
Act,
defended
the
suspended
Strathbogie
ministers,
and
finally
gave
a
rhetorical
call
to
Melbourne
to
declare
himself:
'the
noble
viscount could
not
continue
to
sit
chuckling
inwardly
at
the confusion
and
distraction
which
pervaded
Scotland.'6 Melbourne
answered
that
he
did
not
think
the bill
had
sufficient
support
in
Scotland
to
be
a
satisfactory
remedy, and advised the house to drop it.7 Although the second
reading
was
easily
carried
by
seventy-four
votes to
twenty-seven,
with
many
being
absent
because
it
was
Ascot
week,
the
government
had
given
a
direct
negative
and the bill faced
defeat
in the
commons
with its
liberal
majority.8
Aberdeen therefore decided
to
abandon
the
bill,
while
continuing
to
uphold
its
principle
as a
desirable
solu
tion.
He
took the bill
into
committee but
announced
on 10
July
i
AP,
43237,
fos.
173-4,
Robertson
to
Aberdeen,
22
May
1840.
2
AP, 43203, fo. 161, Rev.
Dr
William Muir
to
Hope, 13May 1840.
3
Aberdeen's
Correspondence,
54-56, 60-63,
12
&
18
May
1840;
Watt,
Thomas
Chalmers,
201-5;
Hanna, Chalmers,
iv,
162-74.
See also
W.
Hanna,
A
Selection
from
the
Correspondence
of
the late
Thomas Chalmers
(Edinburgh,
1853),
386
ff.,
Chalmers
to
Lord
Lome, 19
Feb.
1842.
4 Buchanan,
Ten
Tears'
Conflict,
ii,
195-214;
AP,
43203,
fo.
244,
Sir
A.
Pringle
to
Hope,
2
June
1840.
5 Ibid.,
fos.
214
&
233,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
21
&
31
May
1840.
6
Hansard,
liv,
1205-7; AP,
43203,
fos.
308-21, Hope
to
Aberdeen, 13
June
1840.
7
Hansard,
liv,
1233-7.
8
Ibid.,
1241-2; AP,
43204,
fo.
7,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
17
June
1840.
c
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32
G. I.
T. MACHIN
that
it
would
be
given
up
for
the
current
parliamentary
session.1
The
opposition
effort
had
failed,
and
the
onus
was
back
on
the
government.
Since
compromise
had failed to win non-intrusionist
approval,
it
was
open
to
the
whigs
to
propose
a
solution
which
was
likely
to
do
so,
namely
to
make the
Veto
Act
a
parliamentary
statute.
But
to
espouse
the
non-intrusionist
cause
would lose both
dissenting
and Moderate
support,
and
this
was
dangerous
when the
govern
ment
risked
defeat
at
the
next
election.2
Thus
the
political
sit
uation,
as
well
as
Melbourne's
unrepentant
erastianism,
favoured
a
policy
of
continuing
to
do
nothing.3
In
the months before the
next
parliamentary session the dispute worsened as the Marnoch case
neared
its climax and
municipal
elections and
a
university
rector
ship
became
battle-grounds
in the
contest.4 But
when
parliament
resumed
in
January
1841
Melbourne's tactics
were
unaltered.
On
29
January
he
said
that
the
government
was
not
prepared
to
alter
the
law;
he
discouraged
a
proposal
by
Sir
George
Sinclair for
a
select
committee,
and
on
3
May
he
said that
'neither
on
the
one
side
nor
on
the other
am
I
prepared
to
alter the constitution of
the
Church
of Scotland'.5
The
whig
attitude is
partly
attributable
to
the
growing
restlessness
of
Scottish
dissent,
which
was
nourished
by
the
conviction
of
unequal
treatment and
was
persistently
mistrustful of non-intrusion.6
In the
autumn
of
1840
Voluntaries
fought
non-intrusionist candidates
in
municipal
elections,
particularly
in
Edinburgh
where after
a
bitter
contest
the Voluntaries
were
defeated but
left
planning
revenge.7
The
prospect
of
liberal division
was
not
lost
on
the
tories.
Aberdeen
and
Hope
were
annoyed
with
the Times for
condemning
a
declara
tion of independent electoral action by Scottish dissenters; Hope
thought
there
was
potential
gain
for the conservatives
and
that
i
Ibid.,
fos.
17-48,
126-7,
Aberdeen-Hope
letters; Hansard, lv,
593-5.
A
declaration
in
favour
of
the bill
was
signed by
244
ministers
and
454
elders
(AP,
43204,
fos.
134-5).
2
Melbourne's
Papers,
418.
3
See
ibid.,
416-17,
Melbourne
to
Dunfermline,
Apr. 1841.
4
The
election
of
the
non-intrusionist
marquess
of
Breadalbane
as
rector
at
Glasgow
was
described
as
'the
greatest
triumph
which the
cause
has
yet
gained'
(AP, 43204, fo. 211, Aberdeen to Hope, 6 Dec. 1840).
5 Hansard, lvi,
137;
lvii,
1385;
GP,
Sinclair
to
Chalmers, 4
Feb.
1841.
6
'The
Dissenters
complain
that,
in
every
thing
Govt,
put
a
stigma
upon
them.
You
exclude them
from
the
Committee
for
printing
the
Bible,
from
being Chap
lains
to
any
Jail.
.
.
etc.
etc'
(DP,
628,
Sir
James
Gibson-Craig
to
Maule,
8
Oct.
1840).
7
For the
Edinburgh
elections
see
DP,
628,
642/2,
658;
AP, 43204,
fo.
199,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
14
Nov.
1840;
Memoirs
of
Adam
Black,
ed. A.
Nichols
(Edin
burgh,
1885),
106-7.
Rutherfurd
called dissenters
'the
most
intolerant &
bigotted
& conceited
and self-willed
and
interested
class,
civil
or
religious,
in
the
country'
(DP,
642/2,
Rutherfurd
to
Maule,
29
Nov.
1840).
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15/33
THE DISRUPTION
AND
BRITISH
POLITICS
33
Peel
should
be
'up
in the matter'.1
The
government
had
to
soothe
dissent,
and
this
further
dimmed
the
chance
of
their
yielding
to
non-intrusionist
demands.
As
Aberdeen
put
it,
'from
the
enormous
difficulty arising
from the difference of
opinion
amongst
[Mel
bourne's]
friends
and
supporters,
he will
probably
attempt
to
scramble
on,
without
doing
anything'.2
In
these
circumstances
the
only
attempt
at
a
legislative
settlement
in
the
1841
session
was
made
again
by
a
conservative,
the duke
of
Argyll,
who
was
prepared
to
offer the non-intrusionists
much
more
than Aberdeen.
Argyll's
bill
went
even
beyond
the Veto
Act,
giving
the
right
of
veto to
all
male
communicants
over
twenty-one,
but
also provided that the veto should be set aside when proved to have
been
instigated
by
factious
motives
or
irrational
prejudice.3
The
debate
on
the
first
reading
in the lords
on
6
May
drove
many
un
interested
peers
from the house and
only twenty-three
were
left,
'almost
all
Scotch,
or
connected
with
Scotland';
a
certain defeat
was
predicted
on
the
second
reading.4
Argyll
would
scarcely
be
supported
by
his
party
leaders,
who would
advance
no
further
than
Aberdeen's
bill,
but
he
could
expect
more
acclaim
from the forth
coming general assembly, despite
the
recent
appearance
of
a
move
ment
for
the
complete
abolition
of
patronage.
The
assembly
met
in
a
mood
of
great
militancy
and the
ardour
of the debates
was
such
that,
according
to
Hope,
'one
poor
creature
.
. .
went
raving
mad
on
the
spot,
and
the
Assembly
had
to
adjourn
till
he
could
be
put
under
restraint and
removed'.5
The
Auchterarder
charge
was
declared
vacant,
to
be
filled
by
a
congregational
call
in
defiance of
the lords'
judgment;
the
Marnoch
ordination
was
pronounced
void,
the
seven
ministers
were
deposed
and
the
con
gregational
choice of minister
upheld,
and in other cases the veto
was
endorsed.6
A
large
party
favouring
the abolition of
patronage
made
itself
felt,
but
Argyll's
bill
was
supported
by
this
group
and
was
carried
by
a
large
majority.7
Chalmers threatened
disruption
i
AP,
43204,
fo.
227,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
3
Jan. 1841;
PP,
40312,
fos.
343-5,
350-61,
Aberdeen
to
Peel,
11
Dec.
1840
&
14
Jan. 1841,
with enclosures.
Peel,
however,
felt
it
'quite
impossible
for
us
to
act
in
concert
with them'
(AP,
43204,
fo.
235,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
10
Feb.
1841).
2
Ibid.,
fo.
256,
Aberdeen
to
Hope,
3
Apr.
1841.
3
Hanna, Chalmers,
iv,
229.
4 CP,
Sir
George
Sinclair
to
Chalmers,
7
May
1841;
Hansard, lvii,
1478-88;
Buchanan,
Ten
Tears'
Conflict,
ii,
336-9.
5
AP,
43205,
fo.
40,
Hope
to
Aberdeen,
1
June
1841.
6
Buchanan,
Ten
Tears'
Conflict,
ii,
367
ff.;
Hanna,
Chalmers,
iv,
219
if.;
AP, 43205,
fos.
29
ff.,
Hope
to
Aberdeen,
30
May
1841.
7
Buchanan,
Ten
Tears'
Conflict,
ii,
340
ff.;
Hope
to
Aberdeen,
30
May
1841
(see
last
note).
This
ambiguity
may
have
meant,
as
Hope
said,
that the
extremists
would
only
take
Argyll's
bill
as a
first
instalment
and make further
demands
later
(ibid.).
It
may
on
the
other
hand have
meant
that
the
anti-patronage
group
were not
determined
on
their
claim
and
would have
settled for less.
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16/33
34
G- I- T. MACHIN
unless
parliament
gave
adequate
redress: 'if
this is
to
be the
last
knell
of the
Presbyterian
Establishment in
Scotland,
only
let
the
Legislature
say
so.'1
Moderates
were
outraged by
the
proceedings.
Hope
asked: 'in the
history
of Protestant
Europe
was there ever
such
a
series of
enormities?';
and
Aberdeen
went
further: 'the
pre
sumption
manifested
by
the General
Assembly.
.
.
was
never
equalled
by
the
Church
of
Rome.'2 The clash of
opinion
made
a
satisfactory
legislative
solution
seem
even
less
likely.
A
swift settle
ment
was
in
any
case
out
of the
question.
The
government
was
defeated
on
a
vote
of
confidence,
it
was
decided
to
dissolve
parlia
ment
on
22
June
and because
of
this
Argyll
would
not
press
his
bill,
though he intended to revive it thereafter.3 Melbourne gave a
last
warning against
the
'dangerous
and
unwise'
expedient
of
an
act
of
parliament
and
recommended
that
the
dispute
should
be
'allowed
to
work itself
out
by
the efforts of
conflicting parties'.4
Whether
the
new
government
would take
a
more
constructive
approach
was
a
question
which
might
be
influenced
by
the
strength
of
the
non-intrusionist
cause
in the
general
election.
Ill
It could be
prophesied
on
the
basis of
previous
attitudes that
neither
party
would
espouse
non-intrusion in
a
bid for
votes.
The
whigs
as
well
as
favouring
Moderatism
had
to
take
account
of
the
Vol
untaries,
and Moderate
whigs
may
have
stressed
Voluntary
dis
content
in
order
to
deter
their
party
from
conciliating
non-intrusion.5
Non-intrusionist
whigs
wrote
bitterly
of 'the
policy
of
succumbing
to
the
Voluntaries'
and
threatened
to
'support
such
as
declare
themselves for
our
cause,
whether
Whig
or
Tory'.6
But the
prospect
of liberal
non-intrusionists
voting
tory
was
inhibited
by
the
fact
that conservatives
were
just
as
reluctant
to
adopt
non-intrusion.
A
compromise
such
as
Aberdeen's bill
was
the
only
move
which
could
win the
agreement
of
many
conservatives,
and
they
did
not
think
it
necessary
to
their
electoral
prospects
to
go
beyond
this.
Hope
told
Aberdeen
of
accounts
from
all
parts
of
Scotland
which
agreed
that
'the
Clergy
will
never
succeed
in
making
any
of
their
questions
tell in the
smallest
degree
in
election
contests',
and
Aber
i
Hanna, Chalmers,
iv,
222.
2
AP,
43205,
fo.
31,
Hope
to
Aberdeen,
30
May
1841;
Hansard,
lviii,
1505.
3
CP,
Argyll
to
Chalmers, 29
May
&
4
June
1841.
4
Hansard,
lviii,
1506-7.
5
Sir
James
Gibson-Craig,
a
veteran
Edinburgh
whig
and
a
Moderate,
prophesied
that
unless dissenters
were
conciliated
'at
next
election
[they]
will
hold
back,
leaving
the
Whigs
to
be
overwhelmed
everywhere
by
the
Tories',
and
warned
that
a
non-intrusionist
like Maule should
not
stand
for
Edinburgh
'for
the
Dissenters would
to
a man
vote
against
you' (DP,
628,
Gibson-Craig
to
Maule,
8
&
16 Oct.
1840
&
17
May
1841).
6
DP,
658, Dunlop
to
Maule,
15
&
19
May 1841.
This content downloaded from 138.251.14.35 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 20:13:43 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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7/25/2019 25528937-1
17/33
THE
DISRUPTION
AND
BRITISH POLITICS
35
deen
transmitted
the
news
to
Peel.1
The
policy
of either
party
might
have
changed
if
there
had
been
a
strong
non-intrusionist
campaign
amongst
the
electorate.
But
widespread
organisation
was
lacking:
the
leading
non-intrusionist
newspaper,
the
Witness,
contains
nothing
to
show
any
co-ordinated
activity,
and
non
intrusionists
complained
that
this lack
placed
them
at
a
disad
vantage.2
Political
organisation
of
the
cause
was
likely
to
come
only
from
ministers. Non-intrusion
was
basically
a
clerical
movement
and,
except
in
parishes
where
there
was
much
congregational antipathy
to
a
presentee,
the
laity
would
usually
act
in
response
to
ministerial
influence rather than to other reasons. Non-intrusionist ministers
may
sometimes
have inclined
to
non-spiritual
considerations:
in
some
Highland parishes
where
clearances
had taken
place
the
minister
personified
social
as
well
as
ecclesiastical
antipathy
to
the
landlord.
But
only
if
the minister
gave
a
lead
were
many
laymen
likely