REMEDIOS ANTONINO,Petitioner,- versus -THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OFMAKATICITYand TAN TIAN SU,Respondents.G.R. No.185663Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES,JJ.Promulgated:June 20, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xRESOLUTIONREYES,J.:Nature of the CaseThis is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]dated May 26, 2008 and Resolution[2]dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145.Factual AntecedentsSince March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino (Antonino) had been leasing a residential property located atMakatiCityand owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su).Under the governing lease contract, Antonino was accorded with the right of first refusal in the event Su would decide to sell the subject property.[3]On July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document denominated as Undertaking Agreement[4]where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the subject property forP39,500,000.00.However, in view of a disagreement as to who between them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed as intended.[5]On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakatiCity, for the reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject property and payment of damages.The complaint was raffled to Branch 149 and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-802.[6]Later that same day, Antonino filed an amended complaint to enforce the Undertaking Agreementand compel Su to sell to her the subject property.[7]In an Order[8]dated December 8, 2004, the RTC dismissed Antoninos complaint on the grounds of improper venue and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees.According to the RTC, Antoninos complaint is one for specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are personal actions that should have been filed in the court of the place where any of the parties resides.Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa andManila, respectively, thusMakatiCityis not the proper venue.Specifically:The instant case is an action for specific performance with damages, a personal action, which may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides (Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court).Records show that plaintiff is a resident of706 Acacia Avenue,AyalaAlabangVillage,MuntinlupaCitywhile defendant is a resident of 550 Sto.Cristo St., Binondo,Manila.Hence, the instant case should have been filed in the place of residence of either the plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff.Contrary to the claim of plaintiff, the alleged written agreements presented by the plaintiff in her Amended Complaint do not contain any stipulation as to the venue of actions.x x x[9]The RTC also ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over Antoninos complaint in view of her failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees.CitingManchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[10]the RTC ruled that:Anent the non-payment of filing fees on the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that no new assessment was made when the Amended Complaint was filed since there [were] no additional damages prayed for.TheManchesterdecision has been recently relaxed as to allow additional payment of the necessary fees if the Honorable Court so orders an assessment thereof.The Court is not persuaded.The Amended Complaint, which the Court notes to have been filed at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon or few hours after the initial complaint was filed, further prays that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to sell his property located at 1623 Cypress, Dasmarias Village, Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in their agreement dated July 7, 2004 and ordering defendant to desist from selling his property toany other party other than plaintiff., which makes the instant case also an action for Specific Performance in addition to the claim for Damages.However, the value of the described property was not stated in the prayer and no docket fees were paid.Thus, following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, the instant case is hereby dismissed.[11]On December 23, 2004, Su filed an Omnibus Motion,[12]praying for the cancellation of the notice oflis pendens, which Antonino caused to be annotated on the title covering the subject property and the issuance of a summary judgment on his counterclaims.Su, among others, alleged the propriety of cancelling the notice oflis pendensin view of the dismissal of the complaint and Antoninos failure to appeal therefrom.On January 3, 2005, Antonino filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13]claiming that her complaint is a real action and the location of the subject property is determinative of its venue.Alternatively, she submitted a certification issued by the Commission on Elections, stating that she is a resident ofMakatiCity.She then prayed for the reinstatement of her complaint and issuance of an order directing the clerk of court to assess the proper docket fees.This was denied by the RTC in an Order[14]dated January 6, 2005, holding that there was non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.Antonino thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15]dated January 21, 2005, claiming that there was due observance of the rules on motions.Antonino alleged that her motion for reconsideration from the RTCs December 8, 2004 was set for hearing on January 7, 2005 and Su received a copy thereof on January 6, 2005. Antonino pleaded for a liberal interpretation of the rules as Su was notified of her motion before the hearing thereon and was not in any way prejudiced.She also reiterated her arguments for the reinstatement of her complaint.In a Joint Resolution[16]dated February 24, 2005, the RTC denied Sus Omnibus Motion and Antoninos January 21, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration.The RTC refused to cancel the notice oflis pendens, holding that:It is quite clear that the dismissal of the Amended Complaint was anchored on two grounds, e.g. (1) for improper venue and (2) for non-payment of docket fee.It is elementary that when a complaint was dismissed based on these grounds[,] the court did not resolve the case on the merits. Moreover, a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case unless the docket fees are paid x x x.Thus, the cause of action laid down in the complaint remains unresolved for proper re-filing before the proper court.Furthermore, the Supreme Court said: The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. x x x[17]The RTC maintained its earlier ruling that Antoninos Motion for Reconsideration from the December 8, 2004 Order is pro-forma and did not suspend the running of the period to file an appeal.The RTC also reiterated that Antoninos complaint is a personal action such that the proper venue therefore is either the City ofManilaorMuntinlupaCity.On April 1, 2005, Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment.[18]Antonino prayed for the nullification of the RTCs Order dated December 8, 2004 dismissing her complaint, Order dated January 6, 2005 denying her motion for reconsideration and Joint Resolution dated February 24, 2005 denying her motion for reconsideration of the January 6, 2005 Order.According to Antonino, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that her action for the enforcement of the Undertaking Agreement is personal and when it deprived her of an opportunity to pay the correct amount of docket fees.The RTCs grave abuse of discretion, Antonino posited, was likewise exhibited by its strict application of the rules on motions and summary denial of her motion for reconsideration.In its Decision[19]dated May 26, 2008, the CA dismissed Antoninos petition.While the CA recognized Antoninos faulty choice of remedy, it proceeded to resolve the issues she raised relative to the dismissal of her complaint.Thus:It should be stressed that in this case, there is neither allegation in the petition, nor sufficient proof adduced showing highly exceptional circumstance to justify the failure of petitioner to avail of the remedies of appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy through no fault attributable to [her] before filing this petition for annulment of judgment.In Manipor v. Ricafort, the Supreme Court held, thus:If the petitioner failed to avail of such remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot avail of an action for annulment because, otherwise, he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence.Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural infirmity, and in the interest of justice, we shall look into the issues raised and decide the case on the merit.x x x xA perusal of the allegations of the complaint unambiguously shows that petitioner seeks to enforce the commitment of private respondent to sell his property in accordance with the terms and conditions of their purported agreement dated July 7, 2004.By implication, petitioner does not question the ownership of private respondent over the property nor does she claim, by any color of title, right to possess the property or to its recovery.The action is simply for the enforcement of a supposed contract, and thus, unmistakably a personal action.x x x xGuided by the above rule (Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Court), petitioner should have filed the case either inMuntinlupaCity, where she resides, or inManila, where private respondent maintains his residence.Other than filing the complaint in any of these places, petitioner proceeds with the risk of a possible dismissal of her case.Unfortunately for petitioner, private respondent forthwith raised improper venue as an affirmative defense and his stand was sustained by trial court, thus, resulting to the dismissal of the case.Further, it is important to note that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.The concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion.Petitioner, by claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, actually concedes and presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case.She only assails the manner in which the trial court formulated its judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction.It follows that petitioner cannot use lack of jurisdiction as ground to annul the judgment by claiming grave abuse of discretion.In this case where the court refused to exercise jurisdiction due to improper venue, neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion is available to challenge the assailed order of dismissal of the trial court.[20](Citations omitted)Antonino filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 5, 2008.[21]IssueThe sole issue for the resolution of this Court is the propriety of Antoninos use of the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment as against the final and executory orders of the RTC.Our RulingInRamos v. Judge Combong,Jr.,[22]this Court expounded that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments:Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment,i.e.,extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment.Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.[23](Citations omitted)InBarco v. Court of Appeals,[24]this Court emphasized that only void judgments, by reason of extrinsic fraud or the courts lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible to being annulled.The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are ultimately void.Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.[25]Apart from the requirement that the existence of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction should be amply demonstrated, one who desires to avail this remedy must convince that the ordinary and other appropriate remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer available for causes not attributable to him.This is clearly provided under Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.Antoninos recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously flawed and the reasons are patent.There is therefore no reason to disturb the questioned issuances of the RTC that are already final and executory.A petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal.First,Antonino cannot pursue the annulment of the various issuances of the RTC, primary of which is the Order dated December 8, 2004, in order to avoid the adverse consequences of their becoming final and executory because of her neglect in utilizing the ordinary remedies available.Antonino did not proffer any explanation for her failure to appeal the RTCs Order dated December 8, 2004 and, thereafter, the Order dated January 6, 2005, denying her Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2005.Knowledge of rudimentary remedial rules immediately indicates that an appeal was already available from the Order dated December 8, 2004, as this is a final order as contemplated under Sections 2, 3 and 5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and there was no legal compulsion for Antonino to move for reconsideration.Nonetheless, since there is no bar for her to file a motion for reconsideration so as to give the RTC opportunity to reverse itself before elevating the matter for the appellate courts review, appeal is the prescribed remedy from the denial of such motion and not another motion for reconsideration.While Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court includes an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration in the enumeration of unappealable matters, this Court clarified inQuelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.[26]that such refers to a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and the denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal is a final order, therefore, appealable.Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration from a final judgment or order is prohibited, hence, can never interrupt the period to perfect an appeal.The RTC may have been overly strict in the observance of the three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court contrary to liberal stance taken by this Court in cases when the purpose of such rule can be achieved by giving the opposing party sufficient time to study and controvert the motion.[27]Justice and equity would thus suggest that the fifteen-day period within which Antonino can appeal should be counted from her receipt on January 7, 2005[28]of the Order dated January 6, 2005 denying her Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2005.Unfortunately, even liberality proved to be inadequate to neutralize the adverse consequences of Antoninos negligence as she allowed such period to lapse without filing an appeal, erroneously believing that a second motion for reconsideration is the proper remedy.While a second motion for reconsideration is not prohibited insofar as interlocutory orders are concerned,[29]the Orders dated December 8, 2004 and January 6, 2005 are final orders.In fact, even if the period to appeal would be counted from Antoninos receipt of the Order dated February 24, 2005 denying her second motion for reconsideration, she interposed no appeal and filed a petition for annulment of judgment on April 1, 2005 instead.This, for sure, constitutes a categorical admission that the assailed issuances of the RTC had already become final and executory in view of her omission to perfect an appeal within the mandated period.By no means can her petition for annulment of judgment prosper as that would, in effect, sanction her blatant negligence or sheer obliviousness to proper procedure.Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47,i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a conditionsine qua nonthat one must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to him.If he failed to avail of those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence.[30](Citation omitted)Grave abuse of discretion is not a ground to annul a final and executory judgment.Second,a petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction and cannot prosper on the basis of grave abuse of discretion.By anchoring her petition on the alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration, Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of lack of jurisdiction.As this Court previously clarified inRepublic of the Philippines v. G Holdings, Inc.,[31]lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.It does not contemplate grave abuse of discretion considering that jurisdiction is different from the exercise thereof. As ruled inTolentino v. Judge Leviste:[32]Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction.And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.[33](Citation omitted)In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing Antoninos complaint.The RTC was correct in classifying Antoninos cause of action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in the wrong venue.Personal action is one that is founded on privity of contracts between the parties; and in which the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or recovery of damages.Real action, on the other hand, is one anchored on the privity of real estate, where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or possession of real property or interest in it.[34]Antoninos following allegations in her amended complaint show that one of her causes of action is one for the enforcement or consummation of a contract, hence, a personal action:XIIOn July 7, 2004, plaintiff and defendant executed a document entitled Undertaking Agreement (copy of which is hereto attached as Annex H) wherein defendant agreed to sell said property to plaintiff who has leased said property since March 21, 1978 up to the presentwith the plaintiff paying a downpayment of $50,000.00 US dollars the following day, July 8, 2004.x x x xXIVDefendant also refused to accept the $50,000.00 US Dollars and was about to tear up the document they previously signed the day before when plaintiff prevented him from doing so.XVConsequently, plaintiff discovered that defendant was already negotiating to sell the said property to another Chinese national who incidentally is also one of plaintiffs buyers.x x x xPremises considered, in the interest of substantial justice, it is most respectfully prayed that after due hearing that judgment be rendered:1.Ordering defendant to sell his property located at 1623Cypress,DasmariasVillage,MakatiCitycovered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in their agreement dated July 7, 2004.x x x x[35]Antoninos cause of action is premised on her claim that there has already been a perfected contract of sale by virtue of their execution of the Undertaking Agreement and Su had refused to comply with his obligations as seller.However, by claiming the existence of a perfected contract of sale, it does not mean that Antonino acquired title to the subject property.She does not allege otherwise and tacitly acknowledges Sus title to the subject property by asking for the consummation of the sale.That there is a private document supposedly evidencing the alleged sale does not confer to Antonino title to the subject property.Ownership is transferred when there is actual or constructive delivery and the thing is considered delivered when it is placed in the control or possession of the buyer or when the sale is made through a public instrument and the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred.[36]In other words, Antoninos complaint is not in the nature of a real action as ownership of the subject property is not at issue.Moreover, that the object of the alleged sale is a real property does not make Antoninos complaint real in nature in the absence of a contrary claim of title.After a contract of sale is perfected, the right of the parties to reciprocally demand performance, thus consummation, arises the vendee may require the vendor to compel the transfer the title to the object of the sale[37]and the vendor may require the payment of the purchase price.[38]The action to cause the consummation of a sale does not involve an adverse claim of ownership as the vendors title is recognized and the vendor is simply being asked to perform an act, specifically, the transfer of such title by any of the recognized modes of delivery.Considering that the filing of the complaint in a wrong venue sufficed for the dismissal thereof, it would be superfluous to discuss if Antoninos non-payment of the correct docket fees likewise warranted it.At any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of her complaint, such had already become final and executory and will not be disturbed as it had jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less, proved that there was extrinsic fraud.Moreover, annulment of the assailed orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies, such as an appeal, were lost and were not availed of because of Antoninos fault.Litigation should end and terminate sometime and somewhere.It is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.[39]WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit and the Decision datedMay 26, 2008 and Resolution dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145 are herebyAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B. ABRENICAPetitioners,- versus -LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN and DANILO N. TUNGOL,Respondents.G.R. No. 180572Present:CARPIO, Chairperson,BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES,JJ.Promulgated:June 18, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xDECISIONSERENO, J.:The present case is a continuation of G.R. No. 169420[1]decided by this Court on 22 September 2006. For brevity, we quote the relevant facts narrated in that case:Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan (the firm).In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The first was SEC Case No. 05-98-5959, for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas. The second was SEC Case No. 10-98-6123, also forAccounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondents sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained in 1997.The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated November 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, held that:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-429481.Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render full accounting of the amounts he received as profits from the sale and resale of the Lemery property in the amount of 4,524,000.00;2.Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the said amount of 4,524,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum from the time he received the same and converted the same to his own personal use or from September 1997 until fully paid; and3.To pay the costs of suit.CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-429591.Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render a full accounting of the amounts he received under the retainer agreement between the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of 320,000.00.2.Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the amount received by him under the Retainer Agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of 320,000.00 plus interests of 12% per annum from June 1998 until fully paid;3.Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to pay the law firm his balance on his cash advance in the amount of 25,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date this decision becomes final; and4.To pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On December 21, 2004, he filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 and paid the required appeal fees.Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Executionpursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which provides that decisions in intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject to appeal unless stayed by an appellate court.On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it violated A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC[2]prescribing appeal bycertiorariunder Rule 43 as the correct mode of appeal from the trial courts decisions on intra-corporate disputes.Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to Defendant's Notice of Appeal) and an Opposition to respondents motion for execution.On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to show cause why it should take cognizance of the notice of appeal in view of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not comply with the said Order. Instead, on June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the motion.The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in its assailed Resolution dated June 29, 2005 x x x.x x xx x xx x xThe Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its August 23, 2005 Resolution.Given the foregoing facts, we dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 169420 on the ground that the appeal filed by petitioner was the wrong remedy. For that reason, we held as follows:[3]Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals, even if these were timely filed. InLanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision because the proper mode of appeal should have been a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65. x x x.x x xx x xx x xIndeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice. In the instant case, the trial court's decision became final and executory on January 3, 2005. Respondents had already acquired a vested right in the effects of the finality of the decision, which should not be disturbed any longer.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 29, 2005 and August 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 denying admission of petitioners Petition for Review areAFFIRMED.Thus, respondents sought the execution of the judgment. On 11 April 2007, G.R. No. 169420 became final and executory.[4]Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 169420, petitioners Erlando and Joena subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment assailed the merits of the RTCs Decision in Civil Case Nos. Q-01-42948 and Q-01-42959, subject of G.R. No. 169420. In that Petition for Annulment, Petitioners raised the following grounds:I.The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not present direct documentary evidence to substantiate [their] respective claims.II.The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to prove their respective position[s].III.The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law partnership transaction.IV.The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible.V.The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was 3 million and not 8 million.VI.The lower court erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transaction.VII.The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive counterclaim relative to the various personal loans secured by respondents.VIII.The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but more importantly it acted without jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction.[5]We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was with the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined Erlando as a co-petitioner.On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution[6]dismissing the Petition.First, it reasoned that the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is available only when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioners.[7]Considering that the dismissal of the appeal was directly attributable to them, the remedy under Rule 47 was no longer available.Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved on the merits of the case and the appreciation by the trial court of the evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for annulment are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated as a special commercial court did not mean that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court stated that, in any event, petitioners could have raised this matter on appeal or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but they did not do so.Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated 2 May 2007, but the CA had by then already issued the 26 April 2007 Resolution dismissing the Petition.On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 became final and executory.[8]Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA dated 25 May 2007[9]docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the ground of extrinsic fraud into what appeared to be substantially the same issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679.The following were the grounds raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:A.Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the Consolidated Decision x x x based on the following badges of fraud and/or glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:I.The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not present direct documentary evidence to substantiate their respective claims, as it relied purely on the gist ofwhat its personnel did asregards the transcript of stenographic notesthe latter [sic]in collusion with the respondents.II.The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to prove their respective positionsby relying totally on what was presented to it by its personnelwho drafted the Consolidated Decisionin collusion with the respondents.III.The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law partnership transactionfor the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.IV.The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible as against the petitioner Erlando Abrenica and his witnessesfor the same reasons as stated in Nos. I and II above.V.The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was 3 million and not 8 millionfor the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.VI.The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transactionfor the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.VII.The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive counterclaim relative to the various personal loans secured by respondentsalso for the same reasons as the above.B.As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full knowledge of its incapacity[,] rendered/promulgated the assailed Consolidated Decision x x x without jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction.[10](Underscoring in the original.)On 2 August 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution[11]dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719, which held the Petition to be insufficient in form and substance. It noted the following:x x x. Readily noticeable isthat CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically contained the prayer for the annulment of the subject consolidated Decision premised on the very same allegations, grounds or issues as the present annulment of judgment case.x x xx x xx x xAnnulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 96[2004]). Under Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court, the only grounds for an annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167[2004]). Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.x x xx x xx x xx x x. In the case at bar, not only has the courta quojurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the parties, what petitioner is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible error in the exercise of jurisdiction, not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter (as in this case), the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject ofan appeal (Republic vs. G Holdings, supra, citing Tolentino vs. Leviste, supra). (Emphasis supplied.)Subsequently, petitioners filed a Humble Motion for Reconsideration[12]on 28 August 2007.While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007, petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion[13]with Branch 226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court still had to determine the manner of distribution of the firms assets and the value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted that the RTC still had to determine the issue of whether the Rule 41 appeal was the correct remedy.On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim[14]also with Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that she[15]and her stepchildren[16]owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community of property. She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.Accordingly, the RTC scheduled[17]a hearing on the motion.On 17 October 2007, however, petitioner Erlando moved to withdraw his motion on account of ongoing negotiations with respondents.[18]Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan, witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the auction sale of the property covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an amicable settlement of the money judgment.[19]Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued the second assailed Resolution[20]denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as the last day for filing was on 27 August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds stated in the motion were merely recycled and rehashed propositions, which had already been dispensed with.Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. They insist that there is still a pending issue that has not been resolved by the RTC. That issue arose from the Order[21]given by the trial court to petitioner Erlando to explain why it should take cognizance of the Notice of Appeal when the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the dismissal of their appeal despite this Courts explanation in G.R. No. 169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus correctly dismissed by the CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order issued by the RTC, petitioners went directly to the CA and insisted that the remedy they had undertaken was correct.Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the appreciation of the merits of the case. They raise in the present Petition the grounds they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment of Judgment (including the Amended Petition) quoted above.Next, they assert that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also violated when she was not made a party-in-interest to the proceedings in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community of property was included in the execution of the judgment rendered by Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time, since 27 August 2007 was a holiday. Therefore, they had until 28 August 2007 to file their motion.Since then, it appears that a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the sum of 5 million for the property covered by TCT No. 216818.On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court, petitioners filed a Complaint[22]with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against herein respondents and Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK and was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City.[23]Petitioners sought the nullification of the sheriffs sale on execution of the Decision in the consolidated cases rendered by Branch 226, as well as the payment of damages.They alleged that the process of the execution sale was conducted irregularly, unlawfully, and in violation of their right to due process.On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondents and/or their agents, and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City from consolidating TCT No. 216818.[24]The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted respondents to file a Motion[25]before us to cite for contempt petitioner spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This Motion was on the ground that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the Complaint pending with Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City, while the present case was also still pending.Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch 226 anEx ParteMotion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.[26]That Motion was granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution[27]issued on 10 November 2011. This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition for Certiorari[28]under Rule 65 filed by petitioners before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (T.R.O.)[29]after Sheriff De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to Vacate within five days from receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this Decision, the CA has not resolved the issue raised in the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.Our RulingPetitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly denied due process when the CA rejected their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for Reconsideration.WeDENYpetitioners claims.The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to thwart them. Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this Court in G.R. No.169420by pursuing remedies that are no longer available to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment was no longer available to them, because they had already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that appeal was dismissed.It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and executory through the fault of petitioners themselves when petitioner Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2) filed a Petition for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the RTC of the issues still pending before the trial court.InEnriquez v. Court of Appeals,[30]we said:It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided.But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due process was violated, it must be recalled that after she filed her Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner Erlando filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues contained in that third-party claim, he subsequently filed two Motions withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena, meanwhile, no longer pursued her third-party claim or any other remedy available to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the impression that she was no longer interested in her case. Thus, it was through her own fault that she was not able to ventilate her claim.Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April 1990).After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got married on 28 May 1998.[31]In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table were owned by the latter. We note that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot be sustained.Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of aspouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property.Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by respondents.Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty of forum shopping when the latter filed Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City while the case was still pending before us. InExecutive Secretary v. Gordon,[32]we explained forum shopping in this wise:Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping (1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal orcertiorari) in another, or(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the Court of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open, or(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain the same from the original court.Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings undertaken by the sheriff in executing the judgment in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the present case questions the merits of the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959.These cases have different causes of action. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were clearly guilty of forum shopping when they filed the Complaint before the RTC of Marikina City.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is herebyDENIED. The Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.SPOUSES EULOGIA MANILA and RAMON MANILA,Petitioners,- versus -G.R. No. 163602Present:CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO, andVILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.

SPOUSES EDERLINDA GALLARDO-MANZOandDANIEL MANZO,Respondents.Promulgated:September 7, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xDECISIONVILLARAMA, JR.,J.:This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1]dated February 27, 2004 and Resolution[2]dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49998 which granted the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents.The controversy stemmed from an action for ejectment[3]filed by the respondents, spouses Ederlinda Gallardo-Manzo and Daniel Manzo, against the petitioners, spouses Ramon and Eulogia Manila, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 79 (Civil Case No. 3537).The facts as summarized by the said court are as follows:On June 30, 1982, Ederlinda Gallardo leased two (2) parcels of land situated along Real St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Metro Manila, to Eulogia Manila for a period of ten (10) years at a monthly rental(s) of P2,000.00 for the first two years, and thereafter an increase of ten (10) percent every after two years.They also agreed that the lessee shall have the option to buy the property within two (2) years from the date of execution of the contract of lease at a fair market value of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00)The contract of lease expired on July 1, 1992 but the lessee continued in possession of the property despite a formal demand letter dated August 8, 1992, to vacate the same and pay the rental arrearages.In a letter reply dated August 12, 1992, herein defendant claimed that no rental fee is due because she allegedly became the owner of the property at the time she communicated to the plaintiff her desire to exercise the option to buy the said property.Their disagreement was later brought to the Barangay for conciliation but the parties failed to reach a compromise, hence the present action.[4]On July 14, 1993, the MeTC rendered its decision,[5]the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, a judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:1)To vacate the subject parcels of land and surrender possession thereof upon the payment by the plaintiff of one-half of the value of the building constructed by the lessee.Should the lessor refuse to reimburse the aforesaid amount, the lessee shall have the option to exercise her right under Article 1678 of the New Civil Code;2)To pay rental arrearages up to July 1, 1992 in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand and Forty Four 80/100 Pesos (P228,044.80);3)To pay, as reasonable compensation for their continued withholding of possession of the subject lots, the sum of Three Thousand Two Hundred and Twenty One Pesos (P3,221.00) every month, commencing July 2, 1992 up to such time that they finally yield possession thereof to the plaintiffs, subject to an increase of ten percent (10%) after every two (2) years from said date; and4)To pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[6]Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 (Civil Case No. 93-3733) which reversed the MeTC.The RTC found that petitioners have in fact exercised their option to buy the leased property but the respondents refused to honor the same.It noted that respondents even informed the petitioners about foreclosure proceedings on their property, whereupon the petitioners tried to interveneby tendering rental payments but the respondents advised them to withhold such payments until the appeal of respondents in the case they filed against the Rural Bank of Bombon (Camarines Sur), Inc. (Civil Case No. 6062) is resolved.It further noted that respondents intention to sell the lot to petitioners is confirmed by the fact that the former allowed the latter to construct a building of strong materials on the premises. The RTC thus decreed:IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the decision of the lower court dated July 14, 1993 and ordering as follows:1)That plaintiffs execute a deed of absolute sale over that parcel of land subject of the Contract of Lease dated June 30, 1982 after full payment of defendants of the purchase price of P150,000.00;2)That plaintiffs pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.[7]Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on December 23, 1994.In its Order dated March 24, 1995, the RTC denied the motion for having been filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period considering that respondents received a copy of the decision on December 7, 1994.[8]Consequently, the November 18, 1994 decision of the RTC became final and executory.[9]On December 22, 1998, respondents filed a petition for annulment of the RTC decision in the CA. Respondents assailed the RTC for ordering them to sell their property to petitioners arguing that said courts appellate jurisdiction in ejectment cases is limited to the determination of who is entitled to the physical possession of real property and the only judgment it can render in favor of the defendant is to recover his costs, which judgment is conclusive only on the issue of possession and does not affect the ownership of the land.They contended that the sale of real property by one party to another may be ordered by the RTC only in a case for specific performance falling under its original exclusive jurisdiction, not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an ejectment case.Respondents also alleged that the petition for annulment is the only remedy available to them because the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault on their part.By Decision dated February 27, 2004, the CA granted the petition, annulled the November 18, 1994 RTC decision and reinstated the July 14, 1993 MeTC decision.On the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised by the respondents, the CA ruled as follows:It must be stressed that the main action before the Metropolitan Trial Court is one for ejectment grounded on the expiration of the parties contract of lease.And said court, finding that petitioners have a valid right to ask for the ejectment of private respondents, ordered the latter to vacate the premises and to pay their rentals in arrears.To Our mind, what the respondent court should have donein the exercise of itsappellate jurisdiction, was to confine itself to the issue of whether or not petitioners have a valid cause of action for ejectment against the private respondents.Unfortunately, in the decision herein sought to be annulled, the respondent court went further than what is required of it as an appellate court when it ordered the petitioners to sell their properties to the private respondents.In a very real sense,the respondent court materially changed the nature of petitioners cause of action by deciding the question of ownership even as the appealed case involves only the issue of priorphysical possession which, in every ejectment suit, is the only question to be resolved.As it were, the respondent court converted the issue to one for specific performance which falls under itsoriginal, not appellate jurisdiction.Sad to say, this cannot be done by the respondent court in an appealed ejectment case because the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and does not create that cause (Marbury v. Madison,1 Cranch (U.S.), 137, 172, 2 L. edition 60, cited in 15 Corpus Juris 727).It follows that the respondent Regional Trial Court clearly acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the petitioners to sell their properties to the private respondents.The order to sell can be made only by the respondent court in an action for specific performance under its exclusive original jurisdiction, and not in the exercise of itsappellatejurisdiction in an appealed ejectment suit, as in this case. Worse, the relief granted by the same court was not even prayed for by the private respondents in their Answer and position paper before the MTC, whereat they only asked for the dismissal of the complaint filed against them.[10](Emphasis supplied.)With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition raising the following issues:AWHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE JUDGMENT BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING THAT THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF NEW TRIAL, APPEAL, PETITION FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REMEDIES WERE LOST THROUGH THE FAULT OF THE RESPONDENTSBWHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE JUDGMENT BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE RESPONDENTS OR THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CLAIM[11]The petition is meritorious.A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.[12]It is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a partys own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.[13]The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.In this case, respondents alleged that the loss of remedies against the RTC decision was attributable to their former counsels late filing of their motion for reconsideration and failure to file any proper petition to set aside the said decision. They claimed that they had been constantly following up the status of the case with their counsel, Atty. Jose Atienza, who repeatedly assured them he was on top of the situation and would even get angry if repeatedly asked about the case. Out of their long and close relationship with Atty. Atienza and due regard for his poor health due to his numerous and chronic illnesses which required frequent prolonged confinement at the hospital, respondents likewise desisted from hiring the services of another lawyer to assist Atty. Atienza, until the latters death on September 10, 1998.Thus, it was only on November 1998 that respondents engaged the services of their new counsel who filed the petition for annulment of judgment in the CA.We are not persuaded by respondents asseveration.They could have directly followed up the status of their case with the RTC especially during the period of Atty. Atienzas hospital confinement.As party litigants, they should have constantly monitored the progress of their case. Having completely entrusted their case to their former counsel andbelieving his word that everything is alright, they have no one to blame but themselves when it turned out that their opportunity to appeal and other remedies from the adverse ruling of the RTC could no longer be availed of due to their counsels neglect.That respondents continued to rely on the services of their counsel notwithstanding his chronic ailments that had him confined for long periods at the hospital is unthinkable.Such negligence of counsel is binding on the client, especially when the latter offered no plausible explanation for his own inaction.The Court has held that when a party retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsels actions and decisions regarding the conduct of the case.This is true especially where he does not complain against the manner his counsel handles the suit.[14]The oft-repeated principle is that an action for annulment of judgmentcannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.[15]In any event, the petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent assurances or negligent acts of their counsel, but on lack of jurisdiction.Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a relief inconsistent with the nature of an ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in their answer.They contend that whatever maybe questionable in the decision is a ground for assignment of errors on appeal or in certain cases, as ground for a special civil action for certiorari underRule 65 and not as ground for its annulment.On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA, being a higher court, has the power to adopt, reverse or modify the findings of the RTC in this case.They point out that the CA in the exercise of its sound discretion found the RTCs findings unsupported by the evidence on record which also indicated that the loss of ordinary remedies of appeal, new trial and petition for review was not due to the fault of the respondents.We agree with the petitioners.Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgmentrefers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[16]In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolutelackof jurisdiction.Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.[17]There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over ejectment cases decided by the MeTC, MTC or MCTC.We note that petitioners attack on the validity of the RTC decision pertains to a relief erroneously granted on appeal, and beyond the scope of judgment provided in Section 6 (now Section 17) of Rule 70.[18]While the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of ownership or possessionde juresolely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possessionde facto,it has no jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue of ownership[19]and any pronouncement made by it on the question of ownership is provisional in nature.[20]A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.[21]We have held thatalthough it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of ownership and receive evidence on possessionde jure, it cannot adjudicate with semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either party by ordering the cancellation of the TCT.[22]In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the basis of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within a certain period (two years from date of execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00).[23]This cannot be done in an ejectment case where the only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the physical possession of the property.Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC.Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.[24]The ground for annulment of the decisionis absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.[25]Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show that the RTC did not have the authority to decide the case on appeal. As we held inYbaez v. Court of Appeals:[26]On the first issue, we feel that respondent court acted inadvertently when it set aside the RTC ruling relative to the validity of the substituted service of summons over the persons of the petitioners in the MTC level.We must not lose sight of the fact that what was filed before respondent court is an action to annul the RTC judgment and not a petition for review.Annulment of judgment may either be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.There is nothing in the records that could cogently show that the RTC lacked jurisdiction.Chiefly, Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vests upon the RTC the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then,when the RTC took cognizance of petitioners appeal from the adverse decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law.Perforce, its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as it has, beyond cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal.[27](Emphasis supplied.)The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as said court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners appeal.On the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment filed with the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.The principle of laches or stale demands ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earliernegligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[28]There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[29]Here, respondentsfailure to assail the RTC ruling in a petition for review or certiorari before the CA, rendered the same final and executory.Having lost these remedies due to their lethargy for three and a half years, they cannot now be permitted to assail anew the said ruling rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Their inaction and neglect to pursue available remedies to set aside the RTC decision for such length of time, without any acceptable explanation other than the word of a former counsel who already passed away, constitutes unreasonable delay warranting the presumption that they have declined to assert their right over the leased premises which continued to be in the possession of the petitioners. Clearly, respondents petition to annul the final RTC decision is barred under the equitable doctrine of laches.WHEREFORE,the petition for review on certiorari isGRANTED.TheDecision dated February 27, 2004 and Resolution dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49998 areSET ASIDE.The petition for annulment of judgment filed by herein respondents isDISMISSED.No costs.SO ORDERED.

Navida v Dizon

Facts:Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants motion to dismiss provided the defendants:

(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States

(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which his injury occurred.

(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;

(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and

(5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.

In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for.

Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598):

336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.)

NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to the early 1980s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the formers health and well-being.

Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce. The subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present Regional Trial Court.

Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, merely to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.

Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant companies. Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the Defendants Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that (t)he authority of each designated representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the Court. The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom. Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional.

Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum, violates the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction.

Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398)

Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.

The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility, Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP.

Eventually, the cases reached the SC!

Present case:

The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.

DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings.

Issue:Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject matter in these cases.

Held: Yes.

1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.

At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:

In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.

2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.

3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce, and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.

----Re: Jurisdiction over the person

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.

In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.

---Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction

It may also be pertinently stressed that jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

----Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to allow petitioners to return to the forum of their choice.

This Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.

It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.

* We REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints.

MAIN DECISION: see page 10 PDFRESOLUTION: Republic v MangotaraG.R. No. 170375 October 13, 2010R E S O L U T I O NLEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:On July 7, 2010, the First Division of this Court promulgated its Decision in seven consolidated Petitions, with the following dispositive portion:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the Petitions at bar:1) InG.R. No. 170375(Expropriation Case), the CourtGRANTSthe Petition for Review of the Republic of the Philippines. ItREVERSES and SETS ASIDEthe Resolutions datedJuly 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It furtherORDERSthe reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic, and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.2) InG.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894(Quieting of Title Case), the CourtDENIESthe consolidated Petitions for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo for lack of merit. ItAFFIRMSthe Decision dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 00456, affirmingin totothe Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452. Costs against Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo Cacho, and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo.3) InG.R. No. 170505(The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case execution pending appeal before the Regional Trial Court),the CourtDENIESthe Petition for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation for being moot and academic given that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte had already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case No. 6613. No costs.4) InG.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64(The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals), the CourtGRANTSthe consolidated Petitions forCertiorariand Prohibition of the National Power Corporation and National Transmission Corporation. ItSETS ASIDEthe Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It furtherORDERSthe Court of Appeals to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6613, while the same is pending appeal before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889. It finallyDIRECTSthe Court of Appeals to resolve without further delay the pending appeals before it, in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, in a manner not inconsistent with this Decision. No cos