102 | Mission notes

4.1

Caucasus and Moldova M i s s i o n N o t e s

I n the 1990s, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) deployed a

significant number of missions to former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. These included operations in Estonia, Georgia, Latvia and Ukraine and an assistance group in Chechnya (Russia). Today, the organization’s footprint in the region is reduced, but it still maintains missions in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova in addition to offices in Belarus and Ukraine. The EU has also deployed a number of Special Representatives (EUSRs) and civilian missions to the region in the last decade.

The outlook for the international presence in these former Soviet states is uncertain. The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia led to a significant shake-up of the political and monitoring presences in the country. Prior to the war, a UN peacekeeping operation (UNOMIG) had patrolled the seces-sionist region of Abkhazia while OSCE monitors covered South Ossetia, which also claimed indepen-dence. Both of these missions survived the war, but have since been closed due to political differences between Russia (which now recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states) and other members of the UN Security Council and OSCE Ministerial Council. The UN and OSCE continue to co-facilitate talks on the secessionist regions in Geneva with the EU, which maintains both a mon-itoring mission and a number of EUSRs covering Georgian affairs.

In the last year attention has switched to mounting tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh,

with which the OSCE has long been involved. By contrast, there have been signs that Russia and the EU may cooperate to resolve the frozen conflict in Moldova and the secessionist Transdniestrian region.

South CauCaSuS

Since the closure of its mission in Georgia in 2009, the OSCE field presence in the South Caucasus has consisted of offices in Baku and Yerevan, the capitals of Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, the OSCE’s engagement in the dis-pute over Nagorno-Karabakh is also channeled through an envoy (the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference) based in Tblisi, Georgia.

Armenian police officers undergo public order management training in Yerevan during an assessment conducted by the OSCE Office, 22 February 2010.

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for operational preparations. Since 1995, the Per-sonal Representative has been the OSCE’s primary face in the region itself – literally so, as the widely-respected Andrzej Kasprzyk of Poland has held the post since its inception.

The Personal Representative has “field assistants” in Baku, Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh itself. With a very limited number of staff, Ambassador Kasprzyk is required to monitor a frontline of nearly two hundred kilometers. Thomas de Waal, an expert on the conflict, notes that “the monitors must give advance warning of several days if they wish to visit a section of the frontline” and argues that their main function is to act as “a means of communication between the Armenian and Azerbaijani military commanders.”

The offices in Baku and Yerevan are relatively small (there are twelve and seven international staff in the respective offices) and both have wide-ranging mandates to work with both government and civil society on political, security, social and economic issues. Much of their work involves supporting government activities through commissioning independent studies of policy challenges: in 2010, for example, the office in Yerevan published reports on issues ranging from religious tolerance to military detention.

Both offices also monitor human rights, the administration of justice and press freedom, work-ing closely with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). In 2008, ODIHR published a critical report on the Azeri presidential election.

The broad mandates of both missions mean that they sometimes become involved in issues most political missions would not. In 2010, the Office in Yerevan – coordinating with the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization – laid out proposals for dealing with a hazardous chemical waste dump which the government implemented.

However, while the two offices are specifically charged with tracking political developments, both are explicitly distinct from the OSCE’s efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute through the Minsk Process. Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian-majority area within Azerbaijan, and was in a state of civil war from 1988 to 1994. The OSCE launched diplomatic efforts to resolve the war in 1992, over-seen by the “Minsk Group” of states concerned with the conflict. In 1994, OSCE members decided to deploy a peacekeeping force to Nagorno-Karabakh in the event of a peace agreement.

While large-scale hostilities ended in 1994, no such agreement has been made. The “Republic” of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has no international recognition, remains outside Azeri government control. Armenian forces control not only Nagorno-Karabakh but also Azerbaijani territory to the west and south of the secessionist region.

The OSCE has maintained an unusual set of mechanisms to deal with the frozen conflict and prepare the way for a peacekeeping mission if one is ever required. These include not only the Minsk Group but a High-Level Planning Group of six military staff officers based in Vienna responsible

EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia

Authorization 15 September 2008 (2008/736/ CFSP) StartDate February 2009 (2008/760/CFSP)HeadofMission Pierre Morel (France)Budget $.7 million (1 March 2010-31 August 2010)

CiO Representative on Minsk Conference

AuthorizationDate 10 August 1995 (DOC. 525/95)StartDate January 1997HeadofMission Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland)Budget $1.5 million (1 January 2010- 31 December 2010)Strengthasof International Staff: 61August2010 Local Staff: 11 For detailed mission information see p. 286

EUSR for the South Caucasus

Authorizationand 7 July 2003 (2003/496/CFSP)StartDateHeadofMission Peter Semneby (Sweden)Budget $2.4 million

(1 March 2010-31 August 2010)

104 | Mission notes

about the escalating conflict in parallel with the Minsk Group.

In spite of this engagement on Nagorno- Karabakh, the role of the EUSR for the South Caucasus – originally created in 2003 – was more closely associated with Georgian affairs before the 2008 war. Ambassador Semneby’s predecessor Heidi Talvitie played a mediating role in the peace-ful re-entry of the breakaway region of Ajara into Georgia in 2004. In 2005, the EU deployed a one-year justice mission to Georgia and also considered deploying a border monitoring mission to replace a previous OSCE monitoring operation.

Apparently concerned by Russian objections to the deployment of a full-scale EU mission, the EU instead created a Border Support Team (BST) answering to the EUSR. Launched in 2006, the BST consists of six international staff and three Georgian experts, that work closely with the national authorities on improving border management. Even prior to the 2008 war, the BST could not operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The frontline has become increasingly unstable in 2010, with a series of clashes resulting in fatalities for both sides. The number of incidents spiked in August and September, and the co-chairs of the Minsk Group (France, Russia and the US) appealed for calm. Russia has made sustained dip-lomatic efforts to handle the crisis this year, hosting the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers for bilateral talks in June. Nonetheless, there is a risk that the conflict may deteriorate, leaving the Minsk Process’s future in question.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also on the agenda of the European Union’s Special Represen-tative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus, currently Peter Semneby of Sweden. The EUSR’s involve-ment in the conflict is complicated by the fact that the EU is not formally represented in the Minsk Group but Ambassador Semneby (who took up his post in 2006) has attempted to ease tensions. To assist him, the EU appointed political advisers to the EUSR based in Yerevan and Baku in 2007. In 2010, the EUSR publicly underlined concerns

A Moldovan border guard and friend.

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OSCE Office in Baku

AuthorizationDate 16 November 1999 (PC DEC/318)

StartDate July 2000HeadofMission Ambassador Bilge Cankorel (Turkey)Budget $3.7 million (1 January 2010-31

December 2010)Strengthasof1 International Staff: 11August2010 Local Staff: 27 For detailed mission information see p. 265

OSCE Office in Yerevan

AuthorizationDate 22 July 1999 (PC.DEC/314)StartDate February 2000HeadofMission Ambassador Sergey Kapinos

(Russian Federation)Budget $3.9 million (1 January 2010-31

December 2010)Strengthasof1 International Staff: 21August2010 Local Staff: 74 For detailed mission information see p. 273

CauCasus and Moldova | 105

In 2009, Moldova was briefly gripped by riot-ing after presidential elections. In 2010, opposition parties instigated a referendum aimed at nullifying those elections. The OSCE was criticized in Mol-dovan media for not monitoring this – criticisms the head of mission dismissed as “baseless” – but the turnout was below the legally-required minimum.

The EU has engaged heavily in Moldovan affairs since 2005, when it appointed its first EUSR to the country. That year, the EU also launched a Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) aimed at cracking down on smuggling between Ukraine

The 2008 war resulted in an expansion and complication of the EU presence in Georgia. The EU not only deployed a stand-alone monitoring mission reporting directly to Brussels (EUMM) but also designated a new EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia. Pierre Morel (who also acts as the EUSR for Central Asia) is responsible for giving political guidance to the EUMM and co-moder-ates the talks in Geneva with the OSCE and the UN. Twelve rounds of talks had taken place by mid-2010, but this process has largely focused on technical issues rather than addressing the causes of the conflict. In June 2010, Abkhaz negotiators threatened to suspend participation, but relented shortly afterwards.

Peter Semneby has continued to be involved in Georgian affairs, following the formula of “engage-ment with recognition” with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, in July 2010 it was decided that the EUSR for the South Caucasus’s mandate would end in early 2011.

Moldova

In 1992, tensions between Moldova and the secessionist region of Transdniestria escalated to civil war. The conflict was complicated by the fact that, while Transdniestria is relatively small, significant numbers of Russian troops are based there. In February 1993, the OSCE deployed a mission to Moldova, mandated to help facilitate a politi-cal settlement. Although there has been no return to war, talks on a political settlement broke down in 2004 and stalled again in 2006 and the conflict remains unresolved.

The OSCE mission is relatively small, with just thirteen international staff, but has played a variety of technical roles aimed at mitigating the effects of the frozen conflict. These have included the verification of the withdrawal and destruction of Russian military equipment under the Conven-tional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; developing proposals to increase military transparency between Moldovan and Trandniestrian forces; and efforts to combat human trafficking. The mission has also monitored elections and rule of law issues, developing new trial-monitoring mechanisms in recent years.

OSCE Mission to Moldova

AuthorizationDate 4 February 1993 (19-CSO/ Journal No. 3, Annex 3)StartDate April 1993HeadofMission Ambassador Philip N. Remler (United States)Budget $2.7 million (1 January 2010- 31 December 2010)Strengthasof International Staff: 131August2010 Local Staff: 37 For detailed mission information see p. 254

EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM)

AuthorizationDate 7 October 2005 (The Memorandum of Understanding)StartDate 30 November 2005HeadofMission Udo Burkholder (Germany)Budget About $30.9 million (December 2009- November 2011)Strengthasof International Staff: 10027May2010 Local Staff: 100

EUSR for Moldova

AuthorizationDate 23 March 2005 (2005/265/CFSP)StartDate November 2005HeadofMission Kálmán Mizsei (Hungary)Budget $2.7 million

(1 January 2010 - 31 December 2010)

106 | Mission notes

noteS

1 Details on EUSRs in this mission note draw heavily on Giovanni Grevi, “Pioneering Foreign Policy: the EU Special Representatives,” Chaillot Paper No. 106, Institute for Security Studies, October 2007.

2 Thomas de Waal, “Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 4, August 2010, p166.

and Moldova (unusually, the EU does not run this mission directly but sub-contracts it to the UN Development Programme). This went down badly with the Transdniestrian authorities, who control part of the border area and profited from illegal cross-border trade. EUBAM is headquartered in Odessa, Ukraine, and operates in both Ukraine and Moldova.

In a complex arrangement, the EUSR does not have direct authority over EUBAM, but the border mission’s leader is double-hatted as a politi-cal advisor to the EUSR. The EUSR also has a support team of advisors based in Moldova and Ukraine – the EUSR himself is based in Brussels. In July 2010 it was decided to terminate the EUSR’s mandate in 2011.

There have been some positive signs of progress towards a political settlement in Moldova however. In mid-2010, Germany and Russia proposed setting

up a joint EU-Russia Security Committee, and suggested that Transdniestra top its initial agenda. Better cooperation between Brussels and Moscow may help end the frozen conflict. It would also reduce the role of the OSCE as a mediator in this long-running stand-off.

ConCluSion

While there may be new openings for a settlement in Moldova, the situations in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh do not seem set for imminent resolution. Although the EU is rationalizing its role in the region, and the OSCE has a much-reduced role over Georgia, it is likely that a variety of political mis-sions will be required in these former Soviet states for some time yet – especially as the potential for further conflicts remains significant.