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GORAN SORBOM

Aristotle on Music as Representation

In his Politics and Poetics Aristotle claims that

music is a form of imitation (mimesis) and that

pieces of music are images of character.' It is a

view Aristotle obviously shares with Plato,2and this outlook seems to have been accepted

by many authors throughout antiquity, even if it

is not the only view held during this period of

the nature of music. In our times it is, on the

contrary, not natural to regard pieces of music

as images of something or to say that we listen

to images. In this paper I will try to reconstruct

parts of the conceptual framework within

which the idea that music is a kind of image has

been thought and formulated in antiquity, as a

background for a better understanding of the

ancient outlook on music as image. First somecrucial quotations from Aristotle's Politics in

which the nature of music in terms of images

and imitations is discussed:

Rhythmand melody supply imitations of anger and

gentleness, and also of courage andtemperance,and

of all the qualitiescontrary o these, and of the other

qualities of character,which hardly fall short of the

actual affections, as we know from our own experi-

ence, for in listening to such strains our souls

undergoa change. ... The objects of no other sense,

such as taste ortouch,have anyresemblance o moral

qualities; in visible objects there is only a little, for

there are figures which are of a moral character,but

only to a slight extent, and all do not participate n

the feeling about them. Again, figures and colours

arenot imitations,but signs, of character, ndications

which the body gives of states of feeling. ... On the

otherhand,even in mere melodies thereis an imita-

tion of character, or the musical modes differessen-

tially fromone another,andthose who hear themare

differentlyaffected by each.... The same principles

apply to rhythms; some have a character of rest,

others f motion, ndof these atter gain, omehavea morevulgar, thersa noblermovement.3

I. LISTENING TO MUSIC IS A FORMOF AESTHESIS

In an attemptto understand he ancient Greekway of thinkinganddescribingwhat music is, itis useful to start with the theory of aesthesis,i.e., the Greekconceptionof whatit is to look atandto listen to things andgenerallyto perceivethings.An initialdifficultyhere is thatthe terms"aesthesis" and "perception" are not syn-onymous. We cannotpresupposethat what weunderstandby "perception" s what the Greeks

understoodby "aesthesis."Basic here is the distinctionbetween aesthe-

sis andnoesis, which is the distinctionbetweenwhat we can see (and vision is often used as themost important orm of aesthesis and thus therepresentative f the othersenses) andwhat wethink. In Plato's strongly dualistic view, whatwe can see we cannot think and what we thinkwe cannotsee.4Noesis grasps the worldof uni-versals, whereas aesthesis consists of the im-printson the mindof the particulars f the worldin a variety of ways.

The fundamental metaphor used by bothPlato andAristotle in describing the process ofaesthesis is thatof pressure; he particulars,.e.,the things seen, heard,touched,etc., press theirindividual shapes and qualities into the mindsof the living organisms via the sense organs(and sometimes through a medium like air).They do so withoutimposing the matterof theparticularon the perceiver; only their shapesand qualities appear in the mind of the per-ceiver. There is, of course, a large variety of

opinions in antiquity regarding the nature ofThe Journalof Aesthetics andArt Criticism52:1 Winter1994



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noesis andaesthesis andtheirinterrelations;orinstance, the atomists described aesthesis interms of atoms, andthe neoplatonistsdescribedthe appearanceof particularsn the mind as an

interplaybetween impressionsfrom the outsideand universals residing in the mind. Alter-natively, some philosophersbelieved that themind sends out something like rays throughthe sense organsin orderto "feel" the shape ofthe particulars.5But either way, it is the meta-phorof pressurewhich is fundamental.

The process in which this pressureresults inan awareness in the mind of the particularsseen and heard is often described with theterms "like" and "unlike"; there is a shiftin the sense organ from unlike to like, and this

shift generatesthe mental image of the particu-lar thing heard and looked at. For example,when a signet ring is pressed into wax, itchanges the wax from a shape which is unlikethe ring to a shape which is like the ring.6

Now, there are five senses butjust one con-sciousness. This fact made Aristotle postulatethat there is an aesthesis koine (common sense)which synthesizes the "reports" rom the dif-ferent senses into one complex but unifiedimage of the world of particulars.

Further, he philosophers of antiquitydistin-guished a number of kinds of aesthesis. Thesedistinctions are drawnwith regardto the rela-tion between the mental image and the thingsarousing t, particularly he correctness,consis-tency and vividness of the mental images andthe awarenessof this relation n the receiver. Asa rule, a mental image is taken to be correctwhen the shape of it is the same as the actualshape of the particularthing seen or heard.Obviously this is not always the case. The clas-sical example is introducedby Plato: if we,

when rowing, look at the oars while they arepartly under water, the mental image showsbroken oars. But we know they are not. The"higher part of our mind" which calculates,measures,etc., tells us the truth,Plato wrote.7

This latter kind of aesthesis is often calledillusion;there is a thingoutside the mindarous-ing a mentalimage,butthis mentalimage is notadequateto the thing looked at. The perceiverbelieves it is, however. Vividness and consis-tency may be the same in both cases; the oarlooks broken even if we know it is not. An

hallucination, on the other hand, is a mental

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

image generated, for instance, by drugs andfever. When we are hallucinating there is nooutwardobject that can be correctly or incor-rectly related to the mental image occurring,

but the spectatorbelieves there is; maybe thehallucination also lacks in consistency com-paredto correctaesthesis, whereasstrengthandvividness can be both strongeror weaker thanaverageaesthesis.

Thus, correct aesthesis, illusion and hallu-cination all are formsof aesthesis. But there areyet other forms of awareness of particularsrelated to aesthesis. Aristotle claims that cor-rect aesthesis, illusion and hallucination arepassive forms of aesthesis in the sense thatmental images are created or received in the

mind without the active interference of themind. But the mind can also on its own callforth mental images of particulars withouttherebeing anythingoutsidethe mind arousingthem, as in correctaesthesis and illusion and,in a way, also in hallucination.When we re-member something a mental image is calledforth, a mental image that often lacks in con-sistency and vividness compared to correctaesthesis. It is a recalling which is partlysteeredby our will of things once experienced

in aesthesis, and we know that this is the fact;otherwise the mental image would be a delu-sion. Memories are always of particulars.Wecannot rememberthoughts;we can only thinkthem. Or in Plato's vivid metaphorof anam-nesis, thoughts are memories of the acquain-tance with Platonic ideas in an earlierexistencein an eternalworld. Dreamsbelong to anotherform of active aesthesis which certainlycan beas vivid as but seldom as consistent as correctaesthesis. At leastwhen we areawake we knowthat dreams are generatedby the mind itself.

But we don'tknow this in the state of dreaming.Plato remarks:"Is not the dreamstate,whetherthe man is asleep or awake, just this: the mis-taking of resemblance for identity?"8Finally,daydreamsandfantasiesare formsof aesthesis.When we are imagining something we knowthatthere is no outwardthing answering to thementalimage createdby our imagination.Whenwe are daydreamingwe are,perhaps,balancingon the edge betweenknowingand not knowingthatthereis no outwardobjectanswering o themental image, and this act of balance gives

strengthandvividness to the daydream.



Sorbom Aristotle on Music as Representation 39

II. IMAGES AND (REAL) THINGS

To look at images and imitations s, of course,a

kind of aesthesis. But this kind of aesthesis has

a mysterious double character which troubledPlato; it is both an illusion and a correctaesthe-sis at the same time, or something n between-neither full illusion nor correctaesthesis.

In The Sophist Plato divides the world of

things, that is the world of particulars,into(real)9 things and images. Further, these twoclasses can, each of them, be split into (real)things and images made by humanbeings andsuch made by God or Nature. The result wasthe following "map"of the worldof particularswith examples of each class:

God or HumanNature Beings

(rea) hngstrees, stones, artifacts

(real) things animals

shadows, paintingsandreflections, pieces of

images constellations poetry and

of stars music

In an attempt to define what distinguishesimages from (real) things, Plato claims that animage is something which is similar to some-thingelse butonly in some respects,and thatthefunction or natureof images is to be nothingbut similar n theserespects.10A thing,which issimilar to somethingelse in all respects, is notan image of that something but anotherexam-

ple of its kind.1 The respects in which theimage resembles something else are tied to themedium in which the image is made, as Aris-totle remarks n his classificatorydiscussion of

differentkinds of imitationin the first chapterof the Poetics.12 But things can be similar toother things in some respects without beingimages of the things they resemble. The crucialcharacteristic s that this partial similarityis theonly function or form of existence the imagehas. Suppose we look at Myron's famoussculp-ture of a cow. This piece of bronze is in somerespects (three-dimensional form materializedin bronze) similar to cows, and the basic func-tion of it is to be nothing but similarto cows,i.e., when we look at it, mental images of a cow

aremeant o occur in the minds of the spectators.

In The Cratylus Plato contrasts words and

images with each other with respect to what

they representor whatthey signify. Wordssig-nify, he maintainsin one partof the dialogue,

universals, whereas images signify things intheir particularity.Here images are regardedas

signs; it is thus natural o understandhe "beingnothing but similar in some given respects"as

an attemptto characterize he sign function of

images.13

Fundamentalo semiosis, or ouruses of signs,is that we know that the thingwe apprehend s a

sign. Whenwe reador hearthe word "beauty,"we must know that it is a word referringto

beauty and not beauty itself or just a series ofnoises. And similarly, when we look at a sculp-

ture, it is important or us to know that it is animage of a beautiful person and not a living

beautiful person in front of us. Even if Greekpaintersand sculptors riedto maketheirpaint-ings and sculpturesas full of life as possible,

they seldom intended to trick the spectatorsinto the belief that they had a (real) thing infront of them and not an image.14 This bor-derline between knowing and not knowingwhethersomething s an image or a real thing isalso Plato's concern n TheSophist.He wants to

show that the sophistsare such tricksters.Theyhave no wisdom but put up the appearanceofhaving it and trick innocent people into thebelief that they, the sophists, are wise. In The

Republic Plato claims something similar: the

painters can trick simple people with their

paintingsand that is a danger.15But even if this

can be the case sometimes, this does not mean

that all images are used in such a way or that

tricking people into false beliefs is the goal ofimage-making.On the contrary, f we look backinto historyfor all the differentkinds of usage

of images, the spectatorsknow in most casesthatit is an image andnot a (real)thing they arelooking at and that this awareness is intended.There are no real persons standing along thefuneralroadin Kerameikos n Athens, or in theAgoraor on the Acropolis.And it is not the real

Oedipus who investigates why Thebes isplague-stricken n the performancesof Sopho-cles's OedipusRex in the theaterof Dionysus.

To look at or to "listen to" an image impliesthat the spectatorsandlisteners, to some extentat least, expect different things from images

than from (real) things and that they accord-



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ingly act differently in front of an image thanthey would do in front of realthings of the kindrepresented n the image. Aristotle is aware ofthis fact: "Objects which in themselves we

view with pain,we delight to contemplatewhenreproducedwith minute fidelity: such as theforms of the most ignoble animals and of deadbodies."'16When we know that we are "listen-ing to" or looking at an image we act in a waywhich is different from the ways in which weusually act in front of the things represented nthe image. "Again, when we form an opinionthatsomethingis threateningor frightening,weare immediately affectedby it, and the same istrue of our opinion of something that inspirescourage;but in imaginationwe are like specta-

tors looking at something dreadfulor encourag-ing in a picture."''7

In a sense, images have a doublenature,andthis doublenessmightbe mystifying: t is both areal thingin its own rightand a sort of illusion.Myron's cow is a lumpof bronze which we canlook at andtouch. The sculpturehas its own setof qualities, ike yellow-browncolors, a smoothtouch and formal and structuraleatures.Thesethe sculpturehasirrespective f its beinga repre-sentation of a cow or not. But secondly, it has

its representationalunction, i.e., to create aninnerimage of a cow in the mindof the specta-tor. The spectator ees a cow butknows that t isnot a real cow, just as the person who imaginesthings knows that the things imagined are notoutside of him or her, or as the personremem-beringsomethingknows that he mental mageisrelatedto somethingthatoccurredback in time.

In The Laws Plato comments on the doublecharacterof images and imitations. The godsgave humanbeings, in pity for the beastly lifeof the humanrace,the abilityto appreciatehar-

mony andrhythm n song anddance. But sincesongs and dances also are representative,itmight happen that people take delight in therhythms and harmonies of representationsofimmoral content and are thus tricked into thebelief that the thing representedalso is good(since most people believe that the things thatgive pleasureare good).18

Aristotle seems to have a similaroutlook inthe fourthchapterof The Poetics. The reasonswhy human beings use images and imitationsare two (Aristotle writes about poetry in gen-

eral, but what he says is clearly valid also for


other kinds of images and imitations): "First,the instinct of imitation is implanted in manfrom childhood, one difference between himand other animals being that he is the most

imitativeof living creatures,andthrough mita-tion learns his earliest lessons; andno less uni-versal is the pleasure felt in things imitated....Next, there is the instinct for 'harmony'andrhythm,metersbeing manifestly sections ofrhythm."19The capacity to appreciaterhythmand harmony in things heard as well as thecapacity to appreciatesymmetryandgood pro-portions in things seen is unique for humanbeings andthese qualities, namelyrhythm,har-mony, symmetry and good proportions,belongto images and imitations as objects in them-selves irrespectiveof whatthey represent.ThusAristotle clearly saw the twofold characterofimages and imitations as the following quota-tion also shows: "For f you happennot to haveseen the original,the pleasurewill be due not tothe imitation as such, but to the execution, thecolouring,or some such other cause."20

Described within the conceptual frame ofaesthesis, looking at or "listening to" imagesandimitationsgives the spectatorand listeneradouble imprint-both the shape of the image

itself with its rhythms,harmonies,symmetries,and good proportions,and the shape of thethingrepresented.Crucialhere is that the spec-tatorandlistenerknow that the representationalimprint is without counterpartin the (real)world. Or, as Plato formulates t, an image is "asort of man-made dream produced for thosewho are awake."'21

Thus an image is, according to the ancientoutlook, a humanly made thing with a set ofqualities of its own which might be organizedinto a harmonious,rhythmical, and well-pro-

portionedwhole and with an abilityto create aninnerimage of some particularhingwhich it isnot in itself. Primarily images and imitationsare meant to call forth mental images in theminds of the spectatorsandlisteners. Then thisfunction can be put into a largevarietyof situa-tions in which this humanability is used.22 Inmost cases it is important hat the spectatororlisteneris awareof thefact that t is an imageorimitationhe or she is looking at or listening to.Sometimes,however, the image can be used totrick the receiverinto the false belief that he or

she is looking at a real thing.



Sbrbom Aristotle on Music as Representation

III. MUSIC, IMITATION, AND THE

PLEASURES OF MUSIC

If you claim thatpieces of music are images or

imitations, this means, within the conceptualframework sketched above, that a piece ofmusic is a humanlymade thing the sole func-tion of which is to create a mental image of adouble character n the mind of the listener:amental image of the piece of music as a thingwith particularqualities, foremostrhythmsandharmonies, and a mental image of somethingwhich the piece of music is not, thatis, what itrepresents.Further,t is implied that the listenerknows that the representationalmpressiondoesnot originate from a real thing of the kind

shown in the mental image.Very few personsdenythat istening to music

can give the listenerpleasure, althoughthere isa great disagreementabout the value of suchpleasure and about the role it should play inhuman life. There is also disagreementaboutthe origin of musical pleasure. Musical hedo-nism can be described as the view thatpleasurefrommusic is direct andimmediate n the sameway as the pleasure of good tastes and odors.

Anotherway of describingpleasure in con-nection with music, not necessarilydenyingthehedonistic view, is to claim that good propor-tions in the thing heard arouse pleasure. Thistype of pleasure, tied to the structuralproper-ties of the sensuous thing, is called beauty fol-lowing a very long traditionfrom the Pythag-orean school.23Since taste and smell have nostructuralfeatures in their sensuous objects,they cannot sharethis kindof beauty,andtouchcan only do it to a certain extent. Only sightand hearing provide us with full-fledged sen-suous beauty.

Since music is a form of imitation,the plea-sure experiencedin listening to music can alsobe the pleasure of learningsomething. "Again,since learning and wondering are pleasant, itfollows that such things as acts of imitationmust be pleasant-for instance,painting, sculp-ture,poetry-and every productof skillful imi-tation;this latter,even if the object imitated isnot pleasantin itself."24

The Pseudo-Aristotelian text, Problemata,makes this distinction clearby posing the ques-tion, "Why does everyone enjoy rhythm and

tune, andin general all consonances?"andthen

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answering:"We enjoy differenttypes of songsfor their moral character,but we enjoy rhythmbecause it has a recognizedandorderlynumeri-cal arrangementand carries us along in an

orderlyfashion; for orderlymovement is natu-rallymoreakinto us than one withoutorder,sothat such rhythm is more in accordancewithnature."25

Thus music can give us hedonic pleasure,structuralpleasure(beauty),and pleasurefromlearning.But what can we learnfrom listeningto music, and what can music represent?

IV. MUSIC AND ETHOS

Music also has an influenceon the characteror

disposition (ethos) of persons. Such charactersor dispositions of persons are in antiquityde-notedby means of words like "frenzy," "sober-ness," "temperance,""strength,""lascivious-ness." The idea that music can influence thecharacterand dispositions of persons seems tobe the very centerof Plato's and Aristotle's ar-gument on the natureof music. Aristotlerefersto it several times as somethingwe know fromour own experience.26When we listen to apiece of music it happensthat our minds shift,

andwhatchanges is our ethos, i.e., ourdisposi-tion or character.SextusEmpiricus ells the fol-lowing anecdote: "Thus Pythagoras, havingnoticed on one occasion that the youths whowere in a state of Bacchic frenzy fromdrunken-ness differed not at all from madmen, advisedthe flute-player who was with them in theirrevels to play them the 'spondean' tune; andwhen he had done as instructed, hey suddenlychanged and became sober just as if they hadbeen sober from the beginning."27

The fact Aristotleuses as foundation or his

argument s, then, thatmusic has the power tochangethe mindof its listeners o theircharactersordispositions hange.Sincelistening o piecesofmusic is a kind of aesthesis, it often is de-scribedas a change from "unlike o like."Now,the changeis describedas a changeof ethos, ofcharacterand disposition. The naturalconclu-sion wouldbe, then, that hepiece of music has acharacterwhich it "imprints" n the listeneror,at least, that it is similar to such a character.

The basic assumption is, of course, thatmusic has characterandmeansto communicate

this character o the listener. In Problematathe



42

following question is put: "Why is hearing the

only perception which affects the moral char-acter?For every tune, even if it has no words,has nevertheless character;but neither colour,

smell nor flavour have it."28

In this passage Pseudo-Aristotle claims thatmusic has character. But in another passageclose to it in the same text Pseudo-Aristotleasks about music's relation to character:"Whyare rhythm and tune, which are only an emis-sion of the voice, associatedwith moralcharac-ter,while flavours,colours and scents are not?"In both cases Pseudo-Aristotle's answeris that

theyhave movement."Is it because, ike actions,they are movements? Now, action is a moral

fact andimplies a moralcharacter,but flavoursand colours do not act in the same way."

What does it mean to say that rhythmsandharmonieshave characteror are similar to char-acter? Aristotle claims that it is a plain fact,something everybody knows from his or herown experience and that the explanation isfound in movement. For Plato, Aristotle, andmany other,but not all, ancient thinkers t wasnatural to use the conceptual framework ofaesthesis and mimesisin orderto describe theseprocesses. A piece of music is not, for instance,

anger itself in abstractionnor is it an exampleof anger, i.e., angry behavior,but it is an imageof anger, namely something that is similar tobut not an instance of anger,and this "nothingbut similarity in certain respects" is the basicnatureof music apart rom its rhythms,harmo-

nies, and shapes as well as it is basic for allotherkinds of image and imitation.A piece ofmusic is a humanly made thing which is ex-pressively made in order to give us innerimages of angerwhich are individual and par-ticularin shape and necessarily individual and

particular,since o listen to music is a form ofaesthesis. At the same time, the receiver knowsthat it is neitherangeritself nor an example ofangerbut an image of angerwhich she or he islooking at or "listening to"; recognizing some-thingto be an image implies that it is not under-stood as a "real" hing.This knowledgeand thepraxistied up to it is to a large extent culturallyestablished andacquiredby the membersof theculturein a process of acculturation, n whichthey learn which things are images and imita-tions andhow to react in front of them and how

to use them.


Knowing this, the listener reacts differently

than in "ordinary"situations: if we see a sad

personit is, in many situations,natural o trytocomfort him or her. But we do not comfortthe

performing musician or the composer. On thecontrary,we enjoy the shape of sadnessbecausewe learn something by listening to it, Aristotlewould say; we learn about sadness. In the sameway as we enjoy looking at paintingsof thingswhich we would dislike and detest in real situa-tions, we enjoy learning about charactersanddispositions which we, if we met with them inreal life, would abhor.And we would try to turnaway from them as quickly as possible, whichis contrary o looking at them with enjoyment.

V. THE IMITATION OF UNIVERSALS

Since Plato's challenge that images and imita-tions cannot represent anythingbut individualthings in the visual and audibleworld, i.e., that

they cannotrepresentPlatonicideas,29a centralquestionhas been: what can images and imita-tions represent?Can they in some way tran-scend the limits of the visual andaudible worldand represent something that is invisible andinaudible,that has no body?

In the Poetics Aristotleclaims thatpoetry ismore important than history because poetryrepresents something more universal, whereashistory is the representationof individual and

particular occurrences, and universality (to

katholou) s, to Aristotleand to manywith him,of greater value than particularity.Aristotlewrites in De interpretations:"I call universalthat which is by its naturepredicatedof a num-ber of things, and particular hat which is not;man, for instance, is a universal,Callias a par-ticular."30Thus, can images and imitations

show and teach us something about humanbeings in generaland not only aboutparticularhuman beings as, for instance, the individualfate of Callias?

At least poetic imitation can, according toAristotle, teach us universal truths, and thisfeature of poems is the distinctivedifferentiaofpoetic imitation. But it is likely that also otherforms of imitation in addition to poetic imita-tion can teach us aboutuniversals. Let us firsttake Aristotle's own example of poetic imita-tion: OedipusRex by Sophocles. The universal

truth about human existence, which we can



Sbrbom Aristotle on Music as Representation

learn from this tragedy,is whatthe choruspro-nounces in its last lines: human happiness isfickle. At anytime thegreatesthappinesscanbereversed into the greatest unhappiness. In

order to communicate his universaltruth o hisaudience, Sophocles chose to tell the story ofOedipusand the plague in Thebes. The fate ofOedipus demonstrates this universal withgraphic clarity. What we see in the perfor-mance of the tragedyis not, however, the uni-versal truth in abstraction,somethinga philos-opher could demonstrate and clarify witharguments.And it is neither a real thing, i.e.,Oedipus himself in his search of the cause ofthe plague,nor an image of whatOedipusactu-ally did (that is the history of Oedipus), if he

ever lived and triedto find out why Thebeswasplague-stricken.It is an image which offers aparticularexemplification of a universal truthabouthumanexistence, andthe fate of Oedipusis chosen because it is such a strikingexample.

Thus, the poetic image and imitation do notpresentchance examples or actualexamples ofsome general truthbutparadigmexamplesof it."It is, moreover," Aristotle writes, "evidentfrom whathas been said, that it is not the func-tion of the poet to relate whathashappened,butwhat

may happen-what is possible accordingto the law of probabilityor necessity." 1 Not allimages and imitations, however, are meant tobe, or in fact are, presentations of paradigmexamples of universaltruths;many images andimitations tell about particulars.32But thepoetic images and imitations are, Aristotlemaintains, not historical in that sense. Theypresent something more general to their audi-ences. Furthermore, he universal truth exem-plified should be of importance to the life ofhuman beings and the presentation of it in

images and imitationsshould,thus, be paradig-matic. According to Aristotle, the audiencedoes not learnthis universaltruth hroughargu-ments, but, throughthe emotions pity and fear,it reaches the insight that human happiness isfickle.

Aristotle mentions only poetic images andimitations in connection with the presentationandexemplificationof universals.But it is easyto see that otherformsof images and imitationscan also be "poetic" in the sense that they ex-emplify, in paradigmatic orm, some universals

importantto human life. Thus it is natural to

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ask: What sort of universals about human lifecan painting, sculpture,dance, and music pre-sent in paradigmatic orm to theiraudiences?

To know about human character(ethos) is

important o human ife. Such characters r dis-positions as temperance,sorrow,and greed areuniversals hat can be shown in paintings,sculp-tures, and dramaticperformances.But, as bothXenophon and Aristotle maintain,they cannotbe exemplifieddirectly.The only way to showsorrowor temperance,or instance, n paintings,sculptures, nddramatic erformancess throughthe outwardsigns of these characters.

Music, however, can represent characteritself, Aristotlewrites. Music shows us directly,through ts images andimitations,paradigmatic

examples of character. These examples arereceived immediately and directly through achange of mind of the receiver to the characterimitatedin the sense that the characteror dis-position is not attached to the behavior of anindividualperson as it is in what we may callphysiognomic imitation of character;it is adirect imitationof charactersand dispositions.

Aristotle maintains that hearing and musicare unique in this respect.33The other sensescannot provide us with such images. Smell,

touch, and taste cannot representanything atall. Sight, Aristotle writes, can give us imagesof character,but only to some extent, and healso points at an importantrestriction:paintingand sculpturecan only represent he indicationsof character.Painting and sculpture can, ac-cording to Aristotle, only representcharacterphysiognomically.

A similarview is found in Xenophon'sMem-orabilia. Painting can only represent "theworks of the soul," Xenophon maintainsin areport about Socrates's discussions with the

painter,Parrhasius,on the limits of painting.34Character s something immaterialand cannotbe represented.But it is possible to see andthusrepresentthe differencebetween an angryper-son and, for instance,a happy person.

Thus painting and sculpture can representpersons with a certaincharacteror in a certainmood but unable to represent he characterandmood itself. This is so because not only paint-ing and sculpturebut also poetry and theaterrepresent individuals in action. Music alonepresents examples of these dispositions and

characters themselves, which the listener



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knows are not real things but images and imita-tions. Pieces of music are images of characterbecause the listeners know that they are neitherreal and genuine signs of a character nor the

character tself; they are only similar to it. Theimpression the listeners get results in a mentalimage of, for instance, anger, i.e., an experienceand conception of anger, and he or she knowsthat it is neither anger in itself nor real genuinesigns of it. It is a thing made to give just angry"impressions"without instilling the belief thatthe piece itself or its maker is angry.

VI. MUSIC AND EXPRESSION

Modem languages find it easier to talk aboutemotions than images with regardto the func-tion of music. A piece of music calls forth anemotionof angeror expresses anger; t does notgive us an image of character.But to ancientthought it was natural to call pieces of music

images and imitations since they were not real

things, as discussed above.So far we have discussed music as imitation

of character rom the suppositionthatpieces of

music have characteror are similar to characterand that they stamp this character into theminds of their listeners resultingin a changeofcharacter.But how can we explain that piecesof music have or are similar to character?According to some authors there is a relationbetween the characterof pieces of poetry andtheir creators."Sublimity s the echo of a greatmind," Pseudo-Longinus writes.35 And muchearlier Aristophanesridiculed this idea in TheThesmophoriazusae.In the beginning of theplay Euripides and Mnesikles visit the poet,Agathon, in order to recruithim to participate

in a religious festival of women where Eurip-ides is threatened o be sentenced to death for

slandering women. Euripides is anxious tomake Agathon speak in favor of him. When

they knock at his door Agathon comes outdressed in women's clothes, and Mnesiklesexpresses his amazement.Agathonanswers:

Oldman,oldman,myearsreceive hewordsOf your tongue'sutterance, et I heed them

not.I choosemy dress o suitmy poesy.

A poet, sir,mustneedadapthis ways

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

To the high thoughts which animate his soul.

And when he sings of women, he assumes

A woman's garb, and dons a woman's habits.

MN. (aside to Euripides) When you wrote Phaedra,did you take her habits?

AG. But when he sings of men, his whole appearance

Conforms to man. What naturegives us not,

The human soul aspires to imitate.

MN. (as before) Zounds, if I'd seen you when you

wrote the Satyrs!

AG. Besides, a poet never should be rough,

Or harsh,or rugged. Witness to my words

Anacreon, Alcaeus, Ibycus,

Who when they filtered and diluted song,

Wore soft Ionianmanners and attire.

And Phrynicus, perhaps you have seen him,

sir,

How fair he was, and beautifully dressed;

Therefore his plays were beautifully fair.

For as the Worker,so the Work will be.

MN. Then that is why harsh Philocles writes

harshly,

And that is why vile Xenocles writes vilely,And cold Theognis writes such frigid plays.

AG. Yes, that is why.36

Here it is stated that the character of the

maker is carried over to his products. This

resembles the theory of poetic communication

given in Plato's Ion. The Muse seizes the poet

who in his turn communicates what he has

received from the Muse to the rhapsodist or

actor. And they continue the chain to the lis-

teners. Plato describes the process metaphor-ically: it is like the power of a magnet which

can attract rings of iron.37 Basic, here, is that it

is the same content that is communicated from

the Muse to the listeners. Thus the pieces of

poetry and music are not signs of the character

in question but the character itself or resem-

blances of it.

It is possible to describe the making of images

and imitations as a reverse process of aesthesis.

In the process of aesthesis the (real) world

imprints its shapes and qualities without its

matter into the mind of the receiver, whereas in



Sorbom Aristotle on Music as Representation 45

making an image, the shape and charactercre-

ated in the imagination of the sculptor, poet ormusician are forced upon some matter.38Bronze,for instance.Myroncreated n his imagi-

nation a mental image of a cow, and with thehelp of his skill (techne) he transformed hisshape into matter. Similarly, the character ordisposition of the mind of the musician isstamped upon the piece of music, which in itsturnacts upon the listener in such a way that heor she changes to the characterof the piece ofmusic.

So, possibly, theories of imitation and theo-ries of expression meet in Aristotle's account ofthe nature of music. Maybe we have to regardAristotle's description of musical representa-

tion as an attempt to formulate a theory ofexpression within the conceptual frameworkofaesthesis and mimesis.

GORAN SORBOM

Institutionen or estetik

Uppsala Universitet

Celsiushuset, Svartbacksgatan -11

753 20 Uppsala

Sweden

1.Politics, 1340a 18-22 andPoetics, ch. 1.2. Republic, 401 B-403 C; Laws 655 D and 668 A: "We

assert,do we not, that all music is representativeeikastiken)and imitative (mimetiken)?"The Laws, trans. R. G. Bury(London: Loeb Classical Library, 1952).

3. 1340a18-1340b 10.TheCompleteWorksof Artistotle:TheRevisedOxfordTranslation,ed. JonathanBarnes,trans.B. Jowett (PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984).

4. TheRepublic, 507B-C.5. Cf. Boethius, De institutionemusica, 179: "Whether

sight occursby imagescoming to theeye orby rayssent outto sensible objects is a point of disagreementamong thelearned, although this dispute escapes the notice of theordinary person." Quoted in Fundamentals of Music:

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, trans. Calvin M.Bower (Yale University Press, 1989).

6. Cf. Aristotle,De anima, 424a 17-28.7. TheRepublic, 602C-603A.8. TheRepublic, 476C in Plato: TheRepublic,trans.Paul

Shorey (London:Loeb Classical Library,1946).9. TheSophist,265C-266D. An image is, of course, also

a thing. But it is a thing of a particular ort, and it is thedistinguishing characteristicsof images that Plato is look-ing for; the natureof images in contradistinction o (real)things.

10. The Sophist, 239D-240B.11. Cf. Cratylus, 432B: "[T]he image must not by any

meansreproduceall thequalitiesof thatwhich it imitates, f

it is to be an image." Quoted in Plato with an English

Translation,Vol. VI., trans.H. N. Fowler (London:Loeb

Classical Library, 1953).12. Cf. also Plato's Cratylus,434A.13. Cratylus,423C-D.14. NormanBryson's idea in Vision and Painting: The

Logic of the Gaze (London:Macmillan, 1983)thatthebasicgoal of pictorial art up until recently was to produce theEssential Copy, a sort of thing that made the spectatorsbelieve thatthey looked at a (real) thing and not an image,is to my mind a very superficial interpretation f thoughtsaboutand practicesin the pictorialarts in antiquity.

15. 598 C.16. Poetics, 1448b 10-12, in Aristotle'sTheory of Poetry

and Fine Art with a Critical Text and Translationof thePoetics. First published 1894. Fourth ed., trans. S. H.Butcher (New York: Dover Publications,1951).

17. Aristotle, De anima, 427b 22-25, trans. W. S. Hett(London: Loeb Classical Library, 1964).

18. The Laws, 653C-654A, 655D-656C.

19. 1448b5-9, 20-22. Trans. cf. note 16.20. Poetics, 1448b 18-19. Trans. cf. note 16.21. TheSophist, 266C, in Plato with an English Transla-

tion: Theaetetus, Sophist, trans. H. N. Fowler (London:Loeb Classical Library, 1921).

22. In discussing the different causes why a sculptureexists and looks as it actually does, Seneca writes: "The'fourth cause' is the purposeof the work. For if this pur-pose had not existed, the statue would not have been made.Now what is this purpose? It is that which attractedthe

artist,which he followed when he made the statue. It mayhavebeenmoney, if he has madeit forsale;orrenown, f hehas workedfor reputation;or religion if he has wroughtitas a gift for a temple." Epistle 65 in Seneca: Ad LuciliumEpistolae Morales, trans. R. M. Gummere(London: LoebClassical Library, 1967).

23. Cf. Wladislaw Tatarkiewitz'spaper"TheGreatThe-ory of Beauty and Its Decline," TheJournal of Aestheticsand Art Criticism 31 (1972): 165-180.

24. Rhetoric, 1.11. 1371b4-7 in The Complete Works ofAristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation,trans. W. RhysRoberts(Princeton:Bollingen Series 71:2, 1984).

25. XIX.38. Aristotle:Problems, trans.W. S. Hett (Lon-don: Loeb Classical Library,1957).

26. In the long passage from The Politics quoted above(1340a 18-1340b 19).

27. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, VI.8, inSextusEmpiricuswith an English Translation, rans.R. G.Bury (London:Loeb Classical Library, 1961). This anec-

dote was apparently tandardknowledge in antiquity.It istold by several authors.Cf., for instance,Quintilian'sInsti-tutio oratoria 1.10.32 and Boethius De institutions musica1.185.

28. XIX.27. Trans.cf. note 27. Plato also believes thatmusic withoutwordsrepresents haracterbuthe is troubledabout how to know which character s represented n theindividual cases (Laws 669E): "[T]he poets rudely sunderrhythmand gesture from tune, puttingtuneless words intometre,or leaving tune andrhythmwithoutwords, and usingthe baresoundof harp or flute, wherein it is almost impos-sible to understandwhat is intendedby thiswordlessrhythmand harmony,or what noteworthy original it represents."Trans. cf. note 2.

29. The Republic,597E ff.



46 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

30. De interpretations, 17a 38-40, in The CompleteWorks of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed.JonathanBarnes, trans. J.L. Ackrill (Princeton:BollingenSeries 71:2, 1984).

31. Poetics, ch. IX, 1451a37-39. Trans. cf. note 16.

32. Ibid. 1451b 10-11. "The particular is-for example-what Alcibiades did or suffered."

33. Possibly dance, too, is capable of this since rhythm sa constituentpartof dance.

34. Memorabilia,111.10. -8.35. On the Sublime,IX.2.36. Aristophaneswithan English Translation, rans.Ben-

jamin Bickley Rogers (London: Loeb Classical Library,1963).

37. Ion, 533D-E.38. Cf. my paper "What is in the Mind of the Image-

Maker? Some Views on PictorialRepresentationn Antiq-

uity,"Journal of ComparativeLiteratureand Aesthetics 1-2(1987): 1-41.

An earlier version of this paper was read at the jointmeeting of the BritishSociety of Aesthetics andThe Scan-dinavianSociety of Aesthetics in Durham, England, April9-12, 1992.

7. sörbom aristotle

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