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DO CUM ENT INFORMALLY M ADE AVAILABLETO M EMBERS OF THE COURTBY THE U NITED STATES INFORMATIONOFFICE IN TH E HAGU EDOClJMENT M IS OFFICIEUSEMENT LA DISPO SITION DES MEMBRES DE LA COURPAR LE BUREAU D'INFORMATION

DES TATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE A LA HAYE

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"REVOLUTION BEYO ND OUR BORDERS"SANDINISTA INTERVENTION IN CENTRALAMERICA* **

"This revolution goes beyond ou r borders." (T om as Borge, July 19, 1981.)

1. WHATTHE CONTROVERSYS ABOUT"1 am aware of the alleaations mad e bv the eovernment of the UnitedSi;iic, that ni) gi>i.crnmcni 1 cnding ; i rms. ; imniuni t ion. cc>mmunici i iniequipnicnt and medici l supplie i i < iB r i n . .orcign M in i~ t c r o r N ~ s ~ r n g u a ,\tliJa\ it filcd bcforc the

Inicrnat i ,~nalCour t

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460 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESdispelled by the events of the post-war period. If the prohib ition o n the useof force in Article 2 (4 ) [of the United Nations Charter] was to have anymeaning, it would have to cover this new and dangerous mode of militaryactivity . . . '."T he critical element o f the debate, therefore, is not the identification of theapplicable legal standard, but the determination of the facts to be measuredagainst that undisputed legal standard. In determining the facts, it is importantto assess both the evidence of what has been done and the credibility of whathas been said.Nicaragua charges that, since at least 1982, the United States bas used forceagainst Nicaragua in the form of assistancc to Nicaraguans fighting against theSandinista reeime. Anv such actions. N icaraeua areues. are i lleeal and imorooer- - - . .iince Kiiilragua ha, neter taken

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RI~VOI.UTION BREYONDOUR BORDERS 461That support is such as to greatly aid the insurgents in their struggle withgovernment forces in El Salvador '."

T h e full Congress has o n repeated occasions mad e form al f indings concerningSandinista aggression :"by providing military support (including arms, training, and logistical,com ma nd and control , an d comm unicat ions facil it ies) to gr oup s seeking tuoverthrow the Government of El Salvador and other Central Americangovernments , the Gov ernme nt . . . of Nicaragua kas violated Article 18 ofthe C harte r of the [O AS ] which declares that no State has the r ight . tointemene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the interna1o r ex ternal af fa i rs of any o ther S ta te . . . ."

T ha t the Sandinistas have engaged a nd c ontinu e tu engage in aggression is no tin do ub t to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America. There is n o need tu provetu these countries what they are experiencing on a daily basis. Nor are theCo ntad ora countries in do ub t ab ou t the nature of Nicaragua's behavior. Indeed,as El Salvador informed the lnternat ional Co urt of Justice las t yea r:

"Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto, when pressed at a meeting of theForeign Ministers of the Contadora erouD in Julv 1983 . . . on the issues of- .~i ca&uan mat e r i a l suppor t fo r t he subver s i on l n E l ~a l vador , shamel es s l ~and openly admit ted such support in front of his col leagues of the Con-The purpose of this paper is tu address the real i ty and consequences ofNicaragua's longstanding an d cont inuing intervention against i ls immediate

neighbors, and to d o su by focussing on the factors that a re relevant tu thelegality an d m orality o f the use of f orc e: aggression an d self-defense.T he record is documented in this s tudy. It demo nstrates that :- lmost precisely a year af ter the fall of Som oz a in July 1979, the San din istasbegdn a m ajor e R on to help guerri lla forces overthrow the G ove rnm ent of ElSalva dor by rcpeating th e strategy followed by the Sa ndinista s in their own finaloliensive against Somoza. As a direct result of support hy Nicaragua, and byother S ta tes using Nicara eua as a conduit . the Salv ado ran euerrillas were~~t ransformed from-terroris t fact io ns that had been l imited to ruh ieries , kidnap-pings and occasional Street violence into an organized arm ed force able tu mo un ta coor dinate d nationwide offensive. inflicting sirnificant loss of l ife an d econ omicdam ag e on El Sa lva do r. A ltho ug h this fir; in?ervention failed with the failureof the guernl las in January 1981, the Sandinis tas have cont inued tu ship and

' Prcss relcasc dted March 4, 1982, by Congressman Edward P. Boland, Dcmocrat, ofMassachusetts, p. I . On August 8, 1985. a similar view becamc United Staics law. Section722 ( c ) (2 ) (C) o f the lnternational Secunty and Devclopment Cooperation Act of 1985expresses the finding of Congress that' i he . Go\emnieiii of Y!i;ii;igua ha, f l agr~nl l )io l~l d ihc r K u r i i y i > i h ~ .nsi iai , i n the rigiun. ii i ih.ii it . . h ~ soitiriliticd and r s r~ rc J o ccase .iggr I ' ~ n i . Juhvcrrion xyainbt 115 nclehbvrr . ." ( P 1, 99-83-See also Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Rcpon on H.R.276 (Amendmcntto the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1983), H.R. Rep. 98-122, p. 5.

'Intelligence Authonration Act for 1984 (P .L . 98-215) s. 109 (a) .'Sce App. 1, Clossary4DDecration of Intervention of the Rcpublic of El Salvador, case concerning Militoryand Poromilifory Activiries in and opinsr Nicoro.quo (hnicaroguo v. Uniied Siares OJAmerico), submitted to the lnternational Court of Justice, August 15, 1984, pp. 10-11.

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462 MILITARY AhW PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlESstore arms. and to orovide trainine. headouarters and coordination on Nica-v ,raguan territory for a new "prolonged war" strategy. As of early September1985, Sandinista support continues to be an essential element in the training,comm unications andlog istics systems of the Salvadoran guerrillas.

-- andinista security services have, both directly and indirectly, throughtraining, supply and support of subversive groups in Honduras and Costa Rica,engaged in bombings, assassinations and other unlawful attacks against thepeople an d institutions of those nations. In Ho nd ura s, they supported "vanguard"groups first to supply the attack on El Salvador, then t o engage in kidnapping,hijacking, and mo re recently in eff orts t o establish guerrilla fron ts in the H on -dura n Departments of Olancho (in 1983) and El Paraiso (in 1984 and 1985).In Costa Rica, the Sandinistas redirected alliances established during the anti-Somoza struggle to support the expanded insurgency in El Salvador, providedcovert support and training for the paramilitdry wings of far left groups, andsupported several terrorist actions.- inally, the Sandinistas' military buildup threatens Nicaragua's neighhors.It has emboldened the Sandinistas to engage in military incursions into theterritories of H on du ras a nd C ost a Rica, incursions in which citizens of these andother countries have died as a direct result of Nicaraguan military actions.

From the outset the United States has been aware of Nicaraguan aggressionand has sought to help end it peacefully, using diplomatic appeals and economicand political measures. Notwithstanding the Sandinistas' claims that the UnitedStates has consistentlv soueht for its own nurooses to ovcrthrow their reimeand kas only r ecent l; "ma~ufac tu red" a c ~ l l e ~ i v eelf-defense rationale f& itsactions , the diplom atic and public record clearly shows that after July 1979 theUnited S tatesassisted the new eovernment in ~ i c a r a e u a nd tried io develonfricndly hi latcral relat ion5 T h ~ r c ; o r d shi> us a i u c I that the Unitcd S I ~ I &respondcd in a nie surtcl and gradu atcd fashion when ihc S andinis tas rcfurcd I Oceise their intervention aa ainsi othe r States in Cen tral Am erica. And the recordshow s that the ~ ~ n d i n i s t &hcmsclvcs. through persistent aggrcssion and rcfus:ilto par ticip -tc scriously in en orts I O iiddrer, thc regional conliiit through pc~ceiulrneans, bear the primary responsibility for the distrust and resentment of theSandinistas that is found th roug hou t Central Am erica, and for the current strifewithin Nicaragua itself.

II. THE RAXIS F INTERVENTION"The foreien oolicv of the Sand inista Peoole's R evolu tion is based o n thefull exercise of iational sovereignty and independence and on the principleof revolutionary internationalism." (F S L N "72-hour" Doc um ent, Septemher"This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was alwaysinternationalist fro m the mom ent San dino fought [his first battle]." (T om asBorge, July 19, 1981 '.)

' Anolu Jc lu C , ! u n ! u r d v Turcii~ z la Rzivlucii,n fiipulor .Sun

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REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 463"We cannot cease being internationalists unless we ccase being revolution-aries." (Bayardo Arce, May 6. 1984 '.)

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in Tegu-cigalpa, Honduras, in July 1961 at a meeting among Tomas Borge Maninez,Carlos Fonseca Amador, and Silvio Mayorga. All had heen student activists inNicaragua; al1 had participated in preliminary meetings in Cuba; al1 identifiedwith the Cuban revolution and with armed conflict. The first armed FSLNguerrilla units entered Nicaragua from Honduras in 1962 carrying Cuban-supplied weapons '.By the time the FSLN was founded, internationalism and guerrilla warfarehad already been united in Sandinista praxis in the form of the "RigobertoLopez Perez" Column. This guerrilla group had been organized in mid-1959with advice from Ernesto "Che" Guevara and supplied by Cuba. The 55Nicaraguans, Cubans and other internationalists who belonged Io it weredispersed by the Honduran army before they could enter Nicaragua3.The FSLN suffered repeated defeats in its amed opposition to the Somozadynasty, which after 1967 was headed by Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Fif-teen years after their opening attacks, Fonseca and Mayorga were dead andFSLN forces had no more than 300 guerrillas belonging to three feuding fac-tions4.A new strategy to gain alliances beyond the borders of Nicaragua, especiallywith non-Marxist States and organizations, gradually developed in the wake ofa failed October 1977 campaign against Somoza. Events soon gave the FSLNthe opportunity to develop alliances with moderate and democratic groups andindividuals who oreviouslv would have shunned the FSLN hecause of its Cubdntics and ior i,ioirnce In January 1978. Pcdro Jo~quinChaniorro, ther.diti>r > f l ~>r~)i.

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464 MILITARY A N D PARI\MILITARY ACTIVITIESFSLN. In March 1979, the three Sandin i s ta fac t ions en tered in to a fomal izeda ll iance wit h Fi de l C as tro 's s u p ~ o r t. Once uni tv was achieved. Cuba increased.covert support operat ions, providing weapons, t raining and advisory personnelto the FS LN . Es t rada an d Jul ian Lopez Diaz , la ter Cuba ' s f ir st amba ssado r toSandinis ta Nicaragua, co ncen trated on bui lding a supply network fo r channel inga m s an d s u ~ ~ l i e so Sand inis ta guerri lla force s? Bv Ma v 1979. these suoolv..a n d ~ u p p o r t ' 6 ~ e r a t i o n seached ]evels that helped ku tr af iz e th convent ionalmi li tary super ior i ty of Somoza ' s Na t ional G ua rd a nd permi tted the l a unc hinr ofa "final offensive" -Within weeks of Somoza's fal l in July 1979, the FSLN was reaffiming i ts"internation alism" an d solidarity with guerril las elsewhere in Ce ntra l Am erica.Using their l ies with Cuba, the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nat ions,t he F S L N beean t o deve loo a monono l v ho l d on domest ic oower and t o con -. , ~ ~~ ~ver t N i ca ragua i n t o an ope ;a tiona l cen te r o f " revo lu t ionary ~ n t e r na t i on a~ i s m "~ .F S L N l eaders in Man agua qu ick ly co n f i m ed re l a ti onshi ps o f mu t ua l suppor tw ith t he le ad er s of v a n o u s a m e d m o v em e nt s t h ro u e h o ut Ce n tr al ~ m e i i c a .Contact s were a l so es tab li shed wi th o rganizat ions an d ~ o l i t i a lmovements thatwere no1 d irect ly engaged in a m e d s tmggle , bu t th at could become, or wereal ready , par t o f a reg ional sup por t ne twork for a m e d revolu t ionary act iv it ies inCent ra l Am erica .In 1979, the FSL N's p rogra m, which declared tha t the "principle of revolut ion-ary internat ional ism" was one of the keys to Sandinis ta foreign pol icy, hadbeen discussed and approved without publ ici ty4. By 1981, the Sandinis tas fel tconfident enough to reissue their 1969 program, which was more specif ic. TheFS LN cal led for "authentic uni ty" of Central America to "lead the way t ocoor dinat ing the efforts t o achieve nat ional l iberation"

'Cuban radio announced as early as D y m b e r 1978 that the three factions had agreedto mergc. Also sec Richard L. Millett, Historical Setting". in N i c o r a p o ; A CounlrySludy (Washington, 1982), p. 51. Black, op. cil., pp. 142-148, discusses unification withoutmentioning Cuba.'Cuba today has an extensive intelligcncc and training apparatus. modem military forcesand a large and sophisticated propaganda netwark. Making "Che" Guevara's attemptslook amateurish, the Castro government is now able to utilize agents and contacts nurturedover 20 to 25 ycars. Most of the coven operations in Nicaragua werc planned andcoordinated by the America Depanment of the Cuban Communist Party. Headcd byManuel P ineiro Losada , thc America Depariment cmerged in 1974 Io centrlizc opera tionalcontrol of Cuba's covert ac tivities in thc Westcrn Hemisphere. The department bringstogether the expertise of the Cuban military and the General Dimtoratc of IntelligenceinIo a far-Aung operation that includes secret training camps in Cub a, networks for cavenmovement of personnel and matriel between Cuba and abroad, and sophisticated propa-ganda suppan. See Cuba's Renewed Supporl for Violence in h i i n Americo, Departmentof Statc Special Repon No. 90, Deccmber 14, 1981.' I n this, of course, the Sandinistas are squarely in linc with Cuban doctrine and practice.Article 12 of the Cuban Cons titution "espouses the principlcs of prolctarian internationalisman d of the combative solidarity of the peoples". Section (c) statcs that "hclp to . . .peoplesthat stniggle for their liberation constitutes . . . [an] intemationalist right and duty".Betwecn mid-1979 and mid-1981, thc period in which the FSLN effectivelydrove out theother memkrs of the national coalition that defeated Somoza, Cuban involvement in thedaily allairr of the Nicaragua" govemm ent became comprehensivc and d irect. Cubanmi litar i, secur ity and intelligence advisors served in many kcy rolcs in such key ministriesas Defensc and Interior.'See footnote 1 , p. 462, abovc.' rom "The Histaric Program of the F S L N in Resset and Vandemeer. The NicaroguaReader. New York, Grove Press, 1983, p. 145. 1981 was also the year in which Minister ofDerense Humteno Ortega declaral in a private meeting with army and militia officcrs that:

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REVOI.UTION AEYOND O U R BORI>IIRS 465'1'0 coordinie "nation31 libcration" elToris. the Sandinistas Jeveloped by niid-1980 the ap par atu s to \urtr;iic . i i In tel li~ cn ce ~shc>ciatcd li h the g~i vcr nn tr.nt '> ;encr:ilD i re ct or at e o f S ta te S ec uri ty ( ~ G S E ).The Sandinistas' prdni of revolutionary intcmationalism is implemented largclythrough thesc two organizations. Th e DR!, which is d o x l y modeled ;ifter the AmencaDepanment of the Cuban Communist Party, provides administrative support forpolitical trainees from Central America. Headed by Julio Lope Campos, it reponsdiratly to the FSLN National Directorate and is responsible for establishing andmaintaining suppo rt nctworks for the D G SE and the Fifth Directorate of Intelligence.n i e Fiftb Directorate has b e n headed since its creation hv Renan M ontero Corales(former n:unc. AnJrcs 1hrahon.i Ixipcl). s Cuban-bom n at u ra lv ~d i: ;ir~gu;tn \ ,ho\ i d , (lilh C he G u cr s ra in B$)Iii.i:i. Il pr.i\idc> the irwior:iie ( I > K l J ) of lil &;:idor.lluuc\r .r . a dcclriun u:i< ni.idi. I i i rlen ihc' duiun~cni ii \lanacu.i Io r r i f i m i "ihr . is-~. ~~~~~ordination and unity of C C ~ ; & I ~ G i i c a ' s evol"tionary va&uGd forcer" and 10 be ;hcfirst revolutioniiry organizations 10 unify on Central American soil. (Drawn from o tapc-recordrd account entiiled "lnforrne de Manolo" (Manolo's Reporl) and obtained byGuatcrnalan secunty Sorccs in March 1981.)

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466 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESUniied Revolutionary Directorate, the DRU. The featured speaker was BayardoArce, who spoke on ixhalf of the FSLN and promised "unconditional assistance tothe revolutionary process in Guatemala and El Salvador"'.To ensure that they would be inwlne rable to retaliation from th& neighb on fortheir expanding intemationalist role, the Sandinistas undertook a substantial in m as ein Nicaragua 's conventional military pow er2. By the end of 1980, Nicaragu a's arm edfor s were twi as large as the Somoza National G uard at its height. The S an di ist aPeople's A m y doubled in size again by the end of I98z 3.The country studies that follow illustrate the practical content the Sandinistasgive ta "revolutionary intemationalism".

A. EL SALVADOR"They say that we ar e sending weapons to El Salvador but they have notoKered any real proof. But let us suppose that weapons have reached ElSalvador from here. This is oossible. M ore than that. it is ~ o s s ib le hatNicaraguan combatants have gone ta El Salvador, but this c a n k t he hlamedon an y decision of ours." (T om as Borge, April 1981 4.)"One thing is evident, the members of the [Sandinista] Directorate andal1 its working teams, some inside the country and others outside thecountry, are steadfastly at work fully aware of the need to unite the internulsrruggle ivirh international solidority and with the struggle of al1 peoples forthe liberation of Central America an d El Salvador . . . the Central Americanpeoples' struggle is one single struggle." [Emphasis added.] (Salvadoran

Guerrilla Leader, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, Managua, April 9, 1983 .)'"lnorme dc Manolo", pp. 18-22.'Concem about "counter-revolutionary" sctivitics by former National Cuardsmen and

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REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 467"The Salvadoran revolutionaries do not have military bases here. If theyhave bases outside of El Salvador, they ar e in Guatemala and Honduras."(Daniel Ortega, June 1983 '.)

Before the Sandinis ta Directorate look power in Managua, there werc guerrillasin El Salvador but no euerrilla war. Extremis1 forces of El Salvador's left werevii>lcni but liagmcnt eJ into competing itciiuns Thry had neiihcr a unitirciorgani/.iii

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468 MILITARY A N D PAUMILITARY ACTIVITIESthe People's Revolutionary A m y ( E R P ) and the Central American Revolu-t ionary Workers' Par ty (P R T C ) to f o m the F arahun do Mart i National LiberationFront (F M L N ), which, with i ts poli tical a m , the Democratic RevolutionaryFron t ( F D R ) has semed as the umhrella organization for the Salvadoran guer-rilla movement.R ed ire ci in ~ he C osia Rican netwurks. Th e first step was to revitalize thenetworks originally established in Costa Rica during the struggle against Somozato su pp ort armed struggle in El Salvador . Aided by a few Costa Rican oilicials,the Cuhans arranged for the collection of excess Sandinista arms still in CostaRica. Modest a mo un ts of arms were inf i lt ratcd inIo El Salvador hy Co sta Ricanand Panamanian pi lots . On June 15, 1980, a twin engine Aero Commandercrashed in El Salvador . T h e weap ons and a mm unit ion o n b oard w ere recoveredby the Salva doran m il itary. Ar ms from Cos ta R ican caches were also smuggledoverland assisted bv the FSLN and the Communist Par tv in Honduras ' .~~ ~

.\'i~.urvic ts uggcs tcd tha t Sha iik I land al i r a ~ c lO Vir.inam io jcck arms. In Vieinant,Shdl ik I la nJa l i i ,ss rcieii,erl h > 1.r. I > w n . he S c~ rc ta rr ;ci icr.i l oi ' the Vir. tn.imewCom munis t Par tv . and othr hieh- rankine oar tv a n d mi l itarv oi licial s. The- . , ,~ ~ ~~Vietnsmzrc agrecd a i a "first co ntr ibuiion" I O provide 611 tons of a rm\ -~ i . c r \ ielmingl! of Unitcd St.~tcsnt;iii.ii,t~iurc. inclu Jing I.ti2O M - h iuiont; i t ic' A Special Commission established in June 1980 by the Costa Rican lcgislature conf im edthat the clandestine ams-supply link between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, established inthe fight against Somoza, continued Io function bctween Co sta Rica and El Salvador afterJuly 1979. According Io the Comrnission'r repart, "ams traficking, originating in Costa

Rica or through Co sta Rican icrritory , [beg an] toward El Salvador, directly or usingHonduras as a bridgc". The quotalion is frarn the Commission's Repori , which wasexccrptcd May 15 , 1981, in La Nocion, San Jos, and reprinted by FBIS on June 12, 1984.'"lnfomc de Eduardo/Viaje de 5 de Mayo al 8 de Jun io/80 (Rcpart of trip of Eduardofrom May 5 Io June 8, 1980). Bocum~n i s ,D, pp. 2-3.' l h i d . , p. 3.

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RI!VOLUTION BEYONU o m BORDERS 469rif les with 1,500,000 rou nds of am mun it ion, enough to equ ip an ent ire com batinfantry battalion '.Managing rhe iveaponsjluw f f l Nicaragua. FSLN Directorate member BayardoArce met with members of the DRU General Staff in July 1980 to review thelogistical infrastructure for the guerrilla war in El Salvador. Arce questioned theD RU 'S militaw an d oolit ical o reoarations. but aereed to furnish am mun ition..arrdn gc mcctings ui th ihc FS1.S miliiary commissioii tu d ic u s s niiliia? m atter i.and su ~ gc slc d h;il Ille) niight provicie u ~ cs ic m -m an uf ai tu rd Cdp.tcrn a m > n thcir i n ic ntor ie s IO the S.il\,adomn insurgeni\.By mid-Scptctiibcr 1980. thc arnis prumi,cd t i ~h xlik I I d n J al d ~ r i n g is wrl ic ri r ; i \c ls uc re en rou te Io Cuh a and N iisr sg ua . In Septeniber and Octoher, a ircra i tflight Ircquencics and intclltgenrc rcporting boih indicated ii iharp increare inthe lIi i \i~ol 'militar! cquipiiient inIo h' i~ ir d g u 3 iim C uh a. S.indintlici: t lr. might hciii\,i>l\,ccl n ar m r shi pm en t>. the go\criiiiieni itselC wa > no1 rerpim rihlc'.In m id-Octobcr. H a w n a u.31 the .ite o i a meeting al irhich rcDrcsenfaii\es oft he Communi s t P a rt ie s o f Ce n t ra l Ame ri ca . ~ e x i c ;and panama ae reed to se t~ ~- ~-~~ ~~~up a commission to oversee the provision of material aid to the Salvadoranguerrillas. O riginally scheduled for M anag ua, the meeting w as shifted t o Ha va nai t the reque s tof the Sandin istas so as too bs cu re the ir i ivolvement .A t the en d o f October 1980, immediately aller the second tranche of a speciallyenacted $75 million program of United States aid to Nicaragua was authorizedfor disbursement, the N icaraguans vrovided the Salvadoran guerrillas with a new-dcl~very checlulc and rcwm ed ucap ons del i \ .cr~csy rca n d i r o n an e t e n Ihrgcrs ~ a l clidii bc i j rc the suspens iim A lw in Idte O c t < ~ k r . h ~ dl\sJorun guerril lasilecidcd 10 i iw raic a cl:indcstinc r sdio station u ith the tcihnisal hclp o f the Cubon sand Nicaraeuans4. On December 15. Radio Liberacion beean to broadcast from~Nicaragua. -A second clandestine staiion, Rlidio ~encerem

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470 MlLlTARY A N D PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESO n Novem ber 1 , 1980, the D R U logistics coo rdina tor in M ana gua informedthe guerrilla Genera l Staff tha t approximately 120 ton s of military equipm entwere still in Nicaragua awaiting shipment to El Salvador. He added thatapproximately 300-400 tons of weapons and matriel would be in Cuba by mid-November, ready for t ransfer Io Nicaragua and then to El Salvador . The D R Ucoordinator urged the armed groups in El Salvador 10 work harder to absorbmore ar ms shipments, noting that some communist countries had doubled theirpromised aid, and adding that "This is the first revolution in Latin America towhich they have committed themselves unconditionally with assistance beforethe seizure of power" '.Air roules from Nicaragua. Existing land infiltration routes could not movethis growing volume of arms in time for the planned FMLN offensive of early1981. Accordingly, N icaragua - i th Cuban suppor t - ssumed a m ore directrole and began airlifting arms from aifields in Nicaragua. This airlift was

directed bv the Com ma nde r of the Nicaraeuan Air Force. Rau l Venerio Gra nera .~ ~ ~~ ~-~ ~.and a c u b a n advi so r.The pr incipal staging area came to be an airf ield at Papalonal . The patterna n d s ~ e e d f construction at Paoalonal. which is in an isolated area 23 nauticalmiles 'northwest of M anag ua, lacking adjacent comm ercial or econ omic activi ty ,ma de clear its military fu nction. In late July 1980, this airfield w as an a griculturaldirt airstrip approximately 800 meters long. By Decem ber, ph ot og ra ph j revealeda lengthened and graded runway with hard dispersal areas , an d storag e buildingsunder construction. By January 1981, the strip had been lengthened to 1,200meters. A turnaround had been added at each end. A dispersal parking areawith three hard sta nd s had been constructed a t the west end of the runway. Threcparking aprons had been cleared, and three hangar or storage buildings, eachab ou t 15-meters wide, had been constructed o n the ap ron s2.O n Ja nu ary 2, 1981, a C-47 was observed a t Papa lonal fo r the first time. Tw oC-47s were observed in February. These C-47s and DC-3s (the civilian version)were used to ferry larger cargos of arms from Papalonal to areas of guerr i l la

'"Informe #4" ( R e p ~ t4) addressed Io "Joaquin, Jacobo, Marcial, D R U dcl FMLN",Dornmenis, K , p. 2. This hand-wntten lettcr-report from the PCES files adds tha t: " I l isimpressive how al1 countries in thc Socialist Bloc fully com mitted thcmselves to mect ourc i i r y ri.qu:\i 2nd \me 3vc L . \ L < ~ o~hl:d Ihslr prnil,r.J l d'h>llouing ~r an crirdrt bcforc ihr . "l-inal Otfinsivc" *JI Isunrhd Thr an~l!ri*appcarr uii pdpcr 2 :$!id3 o i s ~ lx s i l i i d icmorndum cn iiilcJ ' ' S l c ~ r~ g~ a- C uh i lnrrea,ingSupport Id r Crnirdl r\mrriwn In s~ rg c nl ~ "l u.3, niirmrd ) i~ b s c q ~ c n i\enii andi n f o m ~ t i u nn \ ~ n u ~ l l yvrg. rnprvi alihuugh ihc vl~mcf ump.>nr. eriimaied h l o u aiiboui 60 ion, hy I>

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REVOLUTlON BEYOND OUR BORDERS 4 7 1inf i lt r a tion in sou the as t e rn E l Sa lvador . S eve ra l p i lo t s were iden t i f ied in Nic a ra guawh o r e g u l a r l y f l e w t h e r o u t e i n t o E l Sa l v a d o r . R a d a r t r a c k i n g a l so i n d i c a t e df li gh ts f r o m P a p a l o n a l t o so u t h e a s t e rn E l Sa l v a d o r .

O n J an u a ry 24, 1981, a C - 4 7 d r o p p e d a r m s b y p a r a c h u t e i n t h e v ic in it y o f as m a ll s i p i n s o u t he a st er n E l S a lv a d or . O n J a n u a r y 24, 1981 , a C essna f r omNi c a r a g u a c r a sh e d u p o n t ak eo iT a f t e r u n l o a d i n g p a s se n g e rs a t a n a i f i e l d i n E lS a lv a d o r c l o x t o w h er e t h e C-47 a i r d r o p o c c u r r e d . A se c o n d p l a n e, a Pi p e rA z te c, s e n t t o r e c o ve r t h e d o w n e d c re w . w a s s tr af ed o n t h e r r o u n d h v t h eS a l v a d o r a n A i r F o r c e . T h e o il o t a n d n u m e r o u s w e a n o n s w er e -c m tu r cd : T h e~ .~~ ~~.~~~ ~-pi lo t s t a i cd hc ua s . in cmplo ;ce o f t he Ni a i ra gua n Na t ion a l Ai r l incs ( I .AN ICA )a n J t h d i t h e f li gh t o r i g i n a l c d f r o m S a n d i n o I n rc rn .i ti on al A i r p o r t in h l a n a c u a 'Land und sen sh ipm~nts / ro rnNicaraguu. W h i l c a i r r e su p p l y w a s p l a y i ng a k e yro le , i n f i lt r a t ion was a l so t ak ing p lace by l a nd a n d sea. Ov e r l a n d arms s h i p m e n t sr e ac h ed E l S a l v a d o r t h r o u g h H o n d u r a s f r o m N i c a r a g u a a n d C o s t a R i c a. S m a lll a u n c h e s o p e r a t i n g o u t o f s ev e ra l N i c a r a g u a n Pa ci fi c p o r t s c r o s se d t h e Gu l f o fFo n se ca a t n i g h t c a r r y i n g ams, a m m u n i t i o n a n d p er s o n n el 2 .

coordinated with Salvadoran leftists who secured and lit the airfields and unloadedthe aircraft in minutes. A Nicaraguan govemment aficial and a Cuban advisorreportedly oversee the operations . By December, some 60 tons of wcapons had beenstockpiled in Nicaragua for transfer to El Salvador.Follawing the crash of onc o f the planes a l San ta Teresa on 25 N ovember, FS LNautharities o rdered a halt to further flights until mid-D ecem bcr; a1 the pilots' rcquest,the stan d-dow n was exlended until after the holiday reason. Plans cal1 for at least fourflights per weck from bo th Papalo nal and Ros ario airstrips, with daily flights once theSalviidoran insurgents begin a gcneral olTcnsive . . .In addition. a Nicaraguan govcrnmcnt C 4 7- iloted by a Sandinista Air Force(F A S) officer and with a joint Nicaraguan-Cuban crew- as to begin ferrying arms10 El Salvador in mid-Decembcr, au'ording Io detailed information provided by twoseparate sources. Thc flights, under the supervision of Colonel Carlos Rodriguez.Cuban adviser ta thc FAS, were to originale from an unnamed airstnp in the ramearea as Papalonal.Recent imagery [aerial photograph y] substantiatcs this rcporting. Pa palonal airstripwas lcngthencd and new ha ngars and parking a prons were constructcd late Iast ycar.Moreover, imagery also canfirms the presence or a new C 4 7 a1 Managua's SandinoAirport o n dates when our sources reported the plane's acquisition and the Decembertraining Rights; imagcry also subsequently showcd a C 4 7 at Papalonal in earlyJanuary a1 the same lime there was a rcturn to the normal inventory of C-47 planesi n M a n a g u a . . .There are indications of more widnprcad Nicaraguan support operations in theofing. A camouflaged communications intercept site has bcen reported in cxtrcmcnorthcrn Nicaragua across thc bay from El Salvad or, and its presence app ear sconfirmed by imagery. Il will reportedly be augmcnted with additional equipment inth e near luturc. This area was earlier reportcd t o be the pldnncd staging groun d for afutu rc Nicaraguan-supportcd assaull by Salvadoran insurgents against a coastalSalvdaran target."

Nore: A March 12. 1981, photograph of Papalonal airstrip, showing ils development, inincludcd in this reoon.' T h e FBIS for janu ary 27 and 28, 1981, carries accounts of thir incident from A CA N,ACA N-EFE , Latin, and LA Prensa Grrifico, San Salvador. January 26, 1981.'Arquimedes Cana das, alias Alcjand ro Montenegro. described these routes in detailafte r his arrcst in Hon duras in August 1982. Sec Appendix 3 and Hcndnck Smith, "AFormer Salvadoran Rebel Chief Tells of A m s from Nicaragua". New, York Times, July 12,1984, p. A10. An individual accou nt o f this same period was provided by Salv ado ranguerrilla Santa Salome Morales, who defectcd in Honduras in Scptembcr 1981, repanedchat he and 12 othcrs went from El Salva dor 10 Nicaragua via a point near the Gulf01Fonseca in May 1980. From Managua, thcy proceeded to Cuba wherc thcy receivedextcnsivc military training. together with over 900 othcr Salvadorans. Morales said he wastrained in und envater dernolition.

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R E V O L W I O N BEYOND OUR BORDERS 473a t 40 to 50 locations throughout El Salvador, downed two helicopters andoverran a National Guard post. Hit and run street actions were everywhere. Inthe cities buses were burned; in the countryside, guerrillas hoarded buses andexhorted surprised passengers t o take up arm s. The cities of San Salvador, Sa ntaAna, Chalchuapa, Chalatenango and Zacdtecoluca came under especially heavyfire. Th e governor of Sa nta An a descnbed the city as "under siege". B oth airportswere closed, their access roads cut '.T he guerrillas had ho ped fo r a popu lar insurrection, which with their armedattacks, would result in a total breakdown in the government and lead to animmediate victory. This did n ot h appe n because a large majority of El Salvador'spopu lation ignored th e guerrillas' appe als. Altho ugh four a rm y officers joinedthe guerrillas. the armv remained basicallv united and foueht back.~ i eo s t s o f t h i s ~ i c a r a ~ u a n - b a s e dss au lt on El %&ador's society wereheavy. The y were al1 the m ore tragic in tha t by 1981, the S alvad oran G over nm entwas heginning to address the serious political, social and economic problemsthat most concerned the people of El Salvador. In its commitment to reform,the Chr istian Dem ocratic- arm ed forces junta of El Salvad or had the full politicalsupport of the United States. On January 16, 1981, President Carter reacted toSandinista arms supply activities by authorizing a modest resupply of ammu-nition'. But for transportation an d commun ication equipment and other non-lethal items, the United States had provided n o m ilitary aid, and n o weapons orammunition, to El Salvador since 1977.2. Prolu~rgedwar

The fai lure of the "f inal offensive" ~ r o d u c e d decis ion to carrv on a ~ r o l o n ~ e d-war of at tr it ion and economic sabo tage while d rawing on ~ i c a t a ~ u ao increasethe military strength of the guerrillas! Altho ugh the F M L N was generallyrejected hy the population at large, guerrilla numbers continued to incease f&some time af ter the "final offensive". Th e sophistication of their military equip-ment and strategy also improved.Seeking t o compe nsate for the failure of the "final offensive", the F M L Nlaunched a series of terrorist attacks starting in late Fe bniary 1981. T he Am enca nEmbassy in San Salvador was rocketed twice and strafcd five limes in Marchand early April. Guerrilla attacks against the economic infrastructure reachedhigher levels, as they increasingly targeted powcr towers, water pum ping station s,electrical generators, the highways and productive facilities such as farms andbusinesses.- ~ -In October 1981, in a sophisticated attack displaying hetter training than theyhad previously shown, a large guernlla contingent succeeded in destroying the- 'Sec t .WLS ' >uun ummAr) o i ~ i ~d ci io ns . i io lou.iry I ? . I.>SI. cpnnlcJ inAppcn diii6k l u w Also r c " I l Sahador'r CibiI War". .Vi,it.~,ie nOAIpublishcd Januag. 30. IOS I. uutguing Se;rei~ry ul Siaie 1:rlmunJ MusLle ,iiid ih:ii armr3n.1 5111)n11i\ hc~n~ .5e.i in I l i ~ I\ d J d r 'i loirJ, ;,vil , i . ir srcr i l au in2 ihrouch Ni:.ir;iuu.i-~~~~ ~- - - -"certaiiniy with the knowledge and to sorne ~ ~ & n the help of Ni ia ra iuan ~~tho"iics".'The decision was probably joint. The Salvadorans needed Nicarasuan help. TheS:indinirin, i h ~ . a r in III S;il,aJor 3s ;i mr m, o lJ i \c r i lng x i iznt iun irom S i r i r i i g ~ ~ .In ih.ti pcrind . 1)sniil 0ric.g; 1iiI.I ,\ ~> ir ta ii iScir:tdr) diSi.iic I hrn~> Incicri thdi the1'\11.S wili " n ~ c i i r ~rcudo" \t;arauu.i'< "4 i1 rld" "Hu i ld in ~ h: Pe.icr. tn CrnirlAmencas, Unit ed States Department o f ~ ta e , urrenr Policy No . 41;. ~ u g u i t0, 19821p3.

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474 MILITARV AN U PARAMILITARV ACTIVITIESmaior Puente de Oro hridee over the Rio Lemoa. Bv that time. the strateev ofattacks aimed at targets leading to a rapid pop;lar uprising, as hoped for in t h e"final offensive", had given way t o the attrition a nd eco nom ic starvatio n inherentin the "prolonged war" concept.The prolonged war concept was continued in 1982, with two noteworthyexceptions - he highly sophisticated and successful attack on Salvadoranmilitary aircraft at the llopango Airhase early in the year and the nation-wide,coo rdinate d, guerrilla offensive against the Ma rch 1982 elections, which failed inils goal of preventing the vdst majority of voters from going to the polls. In thecountryside, the guerrillas were massing, operating in larger numbers, utilizingmore sophisticated communications equipment and weaponry and, in isolatedareas, conducting operations mo re typical of a conventional war than a guerrillaconflict. These tactics con tinued thro ugh 1983, a year mark ed by an a ttack onthe military headquarters of the Fourth Brigade in El Paraiso, ChalatenangoDepartment, and destruction of the Cuscatlan Bridge on the Pan AmericanHighway in December and January 1984.Damage caused hy the guerrillas. As of early 1983, some of the most fertileland could not he cultivated hecause of euerrilla attacks. Guerrilla actions haddcsiroyed 5 5 of the couniry's 26U h r~ d g c in d dam ged m ny niore. The natiorialu.dier ;iuthority had I O rcb~ild I? uitter Fiicilitier d;imgcd hy gurrill acticin;239 ai iacks on the ie le~hone;\item iiiurcd millions ol'diillar$ in damace. In the2 2 - m o n t h p e r i o d e n d k g ~ G e r n b e r1982, the guerrillas caused oGr 5,000interruptions of electrical power - n average of almost eight a day. T he entireeastern region of the country was blacked out for over a third of the year inboth 1981 an d 1982. T he gue rrillas destroyed over 200 buses in 1982 alone. Lessthan half the rolling stock of the railways remained operational by early 1983.In short, unahle to win the free loyalty of El Salvador's people, the guerrillasset out deliberately a nd systemiitically t o deprive them of food, w ater, transp or-talion. lieht. sanitation and work.~.~~~ ~ ~~~ -Continuing patterns of Nicaraguan support. Continued Sandinista backing forthe FM LN's military strateev consisted of three maior com Donen ts: arm s andother logistical suppiies, t r a k n g and comm and andcontrol..Levels of materialsupport have Ructuated occasionally. The most notable declines took placedurin g 1981 in the disorganization tha t hriefly followed th e defeat of the Janu aryoffensive an d again in late 1983 after the United S tates-C aribb ean action inresponse to the collapse of the New Jewel government in Grenada. Thiscontinuing Nicaraguan aid was what allowed the Salvadoran guerrillas tocontinue their operations on a large scale.Arms supplies. With Cuba as a main source ', Nidraguan supplies of arms toFM L N units were stepped u p to m ake possible an offensive to disrupt a peacefulvote in the M arch 28, 1982, Co nstituen t Assembly elections.In the first three m onth s o f 1982, shipments of a rm s into El Sa lvad or reachedthe highest overall volum e since the "final offensive" in 1981. Th e Nica ragua n-based arms flow into El Salvador utilized both sea and overland routes throughHonduras. In February 1982, a large shipment of arms arrived hy sea fromNicaragua to the Usulutan Coast. Early in March 1982, a guerrilla unit in ElSalvador received several thousan d sticks of T N T and deto nato rs (five sticks ofT N T are sufficient to blow up a n electrical pylon).

' In a Bonn press conference on Junc 19, 1981, German Social Democrat leadcr Hans-Jurgen Wischncwski reported that whcn he had personally confronted Castro with StateDepartm ent contentions that Cuba had shipped weapons to Salvadoran guerrillas, Castrohad admitted it was tnie.

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REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 475In addition to small arms and vitallv-needed ammunition. euerrilla suoolv. u . . ,oper tionr in 1982 providcd greatcr qun titiei o l heavicr u,eapuns. insluding57mm rccoillrr, rifles and M-72 ntitank wepons, thus significrntly incresing

g~crrilla irepouer. InJi\ idual unitr a1.o regularls re;ci\ed tcnh of ihous;iiids ofdollars for routine commercial ourchases oTsun

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476 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlESTraining: The Sandinistas also provided training to the Salvadoran insurgents,and s e ~ e d s a transit point to other external training locations. Nicaraguanand Cuhan political and military training created the basic framework for the

use of the arms by the guerrillas within El Salvador. The two countries co-ordinated the trainine eiorts. with Cuha nrovidine most snecialized trainine forsabotage and demolzion operat ions '. ~ k ean dk is t as , Or their part, trzne dSalvadoran guerrillas in military tactics, weapons use, communications, andexplosives a i emporary training schools scattred around the country and onSandinista military hases.Training in Cuha and Nicaragua included rehearsing for attacks on specifictargets in El Salvador - ncluding the Puente de Or o Bridge in October 1981,the llopango Air Base in January 1982, and the 4th Brigade Headquarters inDecemher 1983. Adin lngles Alvarado. formerly a commander of the specialforces unit of the FPL and a guerrilla from 1977 to his defcction this year,recently puhlicly acknowledged that he and 27 others rehearsed in Cuba theDecember 30, 1983, attack on the 4th Brigade making simulated assaults usinga mock-up of the 4th Brigade garrison constructed from sketches. Ingles alsostated that the material used in the actual attack - xplosives, machine gunsan d ammunition -ca me in via Nicaragua.Command and conrrol: As noted ahove, Salvadoran guerrilla actions werecoordinated first by the Unified Revolutionary Directorate ( D R U ) then by theFM LN , using a general s t a r consisting of three memhers from each of theguerrill groups active in El Salvadorz.

The basic system which continues in10 1985 is as follows: boats or large canoes deliverthe materials along the caastline whcrc they ar e picked up and transporled by animais, per-sons or small vehicles into the Jucuaran rcgion of southern Usulutan to thc sevcral dozcnguerrilla logistics basecamps. From Jucuaran, the suppliesare transponed dong four major"corridors", within which there are dozens of routcs depending on the mcthod oftransporlation, the presence of Salvadoran security farces and thc weather. Thcse routcslead west out of Jiquilisco-Trcs Calles, nonhwest via Tapesquillo Alto, nonh to El Braroand northcast to Ticrra Blanca-Bolivar. All major guerrilla fronts receive supplies throughthe Urulutan logistics netwark.Wiihin the Jucuaran arca and along the four "corridors" and the dozcns of roads, trailsand rivers are locatcd a serics of storagc lacilities, usually natural caves or undergroundbunkers that have been fortified and concealed. Once malerials are olf-loaded along thecoastline, thcy seldom remain in one location for more than 72 hours - eflecting boihsecunty precautions and the pressing need to sustain FMLN operations.Napolcon Romero, the former FPL commander, estimaicd that this supply infrastructurewas able Io provide some 20,000-30,000 rounds of ammunition pcr month for the FPLalone. Some 3,000 guerrillas could be provided 100 rounds each (the usual load carricd bya combatant). or 1,500 gucrrillas could be provided with 200 rounds for a major battle.Such a delivcry would wcigh about 1,300 pounds and packaged in about 34 mctal boxeswhich could be easily transportcd by 15-20 men. six pack animals or one small pickuptmck. Given El Salvador's small si x and the short distances involved, matcrial enteringalong the Usulutan coastlinc could arrive at any of the guerrilla fronts in about one wcckunder optimal conditions.

' Vice-Presidcnt Carlos Rafael Rodnguezconfimed that Salvadoran guerrillas arc traincdin Cuba in al lcast two interviews (Der Spiegel, Septcmber 28, 1981, and El Diariode Caracos, October 29, 1981). The "Nidia Diaz" PRTC documents captured in April1985 show that the Salvadoran guemllas continue to receivc training in Sovict Bloccountncs in general. Sce "Captured Salvadaran Rebcl Papcrs List Training ClasscsOverscas", Ne w York Times. May 21, 1985.'Public indications of centralized control come from the guenillas themselve. OnMarch 14, 1982, thc FMLN clandestine Rodio Yenceremos locatcd in El Salvador broadcasta message to guerrillas in El Salvador urging thcm "10 maintain their Oghting spirit 24houn a day Io camy out the mlrsions ordered by the FMLN generol c o m m d (emphasisadded)".

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R B VOL UIION BEYONO OUR BORDERS 477Planning and operat ions were (and to a large extent cont inue to be) guidedfrom Managua where Cuban and Nicaraguan officers provide advice . Theguidance is radioed to guerri l la uni ts throughout El Salvador. DRUIFMLN

officiais coo rdina te logistical supp or t for the insurgents, including food, medicines,c lo th ing, money and, most important ly , weapons and ammuni t ion . Al thoughsom e "free-lancing" takes place in the field as targets of oppo rtunity app ear,decisions on locations to be attacked and supply deliveries have generally beencoordina ted with M anagu a ' .The FMLN Genera l Command was in Managua f rom 1981 unt i l l a te 1983,when the FMLN, in conjunct ion with Cuhan advisors and the Sandinistas ,decided that the F M L N m ili tary leadership should re locate to El Salvador, inparticular to M oraz an an d Chala tenango departrnents . Th e changes were app ar-ent ly due to Sandinisia desires to mainta in a lower profi le in iheir support forthe Salvadorans in the wak e of the United Sta tes-Caribbean act ion in Gr enad a.Komc ro points .lut thdi dc\p itc thcsc ~h cing ch. a ",c:ond.iry dire ctor ate"remainr in Msndgua pr

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478 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARV ACTlVlTlESAlthough the FMLN probahly achieved its greatest military strength in late1983, and thereafter increasingly lost the little popular support it had been ableto maintain until then, the guerrillas have continued to operate in 1984 and 1985

as an effective fighting force. Guerrilla numhers may be down to about two-thirds of their highest levels. The strategic focus increasingly shifted to acts ofterrorism and economic sabotage, as acknowledged hy senior guerrilla lcaders inrecent interviews with the western press.Little has changed in the Nicaraguan support system. Although Romero notedthat the level of aid dropped after Grenada in October 1983, supplies havecontinued to come in from the warehouses in Managua. Romero said that hisfaction still receives about three-quarters of ils ammunition supplies fromManagua and virtually al1 its supply of explosives. The Sandinistas continue tocontrol the distribution of the supplies, approving or disapproving the requestsfrom individual guerrilla groups on the basis of the tactical soundness of theirplanned operations. Weapons continue to be infiltrated by land and sea '.The Sandinistas also continue to provide training for the Salvadoran guemllas.From March to Iune 1984, for example, 100 ERP members received a self-defense course at Cerro Chiribisquira in Leon department al Kilometer 28 onthe Old Leon Highway'. Alfredo Fernandez Flores, an ERP member capturedin early August 1985, indicated during his debriefing that Nicaragua continuesto provide ERP with combat training. Fernandez said that he spent 15 days inMay 1985 in Nicaragua's Matagalpa department fighting with the SandinistaPeople's Army (EPS) to gain combat experience. Eight other Salvadorans alsoparticipated in this fighting'.

B. HONDURAS"At no time has there k n ny at m k on Hondurdn temtory from Nim.ragua . . ." (Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry Communique, Iune 22, 1983".)

lmmediately after July 1979, the Sandinistas and the Cubans paid littleattention 10 "solidaritv" activities in Honduras. Radical leftists in Honduras hadnever k e n particularG effective, and in 1979 were not yet in a position 10 carryout senous subversive activities5. Honduran territory, however, was from thestart of primary importance as a transit routc for the flow of arms fromNicaragua 10 the Salvadoran insurgency, and, to a lesser extent, to guerrillasactive in Guatemala. In 1980, the Sandinistas also began to provide logistical

'On A u g u r l 27 . 1985. S~lvndordnauih~nlic r pprrhcndcd a p i i k u p iruck enlrnng lilSalr;iJdr frortcd nlsiril ~ n difle ammuniiwn of Cnlied Stalir m.lnui'acturc in J roncz.ilsJCornparlrncnt.'Santos Enrique Garcia, who was a rnernber of ERP in Nicaragua frorn 1981 unlilMarch 1985 and traincd in Cuba, wds capturcd by the National Police in July 1985 afterhe had rcturned to El Salvador. During Garcia's stay in Nicaragua, the ERP hadapproxirnately 150 rnembers in Nicaragua. According to Garcia, as ol March 1985.approxirnately 75 of those mernbers had left the ERP, cornpldining of poor treatrncnt anda lack of rnonctary compensation for their work.' ebriefing of Alfredo Fernandez Flores, August 1985.'As reponcd Mananua dorncstic service. FBIS. June 23. 1981.' I n th; \oi;mh:r 7991 I I . I L ~ C > ~ J ~lxl~onshc tr.i.i~iimalpdri!c< rc;c1\cJ Y6 pet-ccni of thc popullr %oie rom a hiph Iurnwi 01'80F r ceni of cligiblc rotrri Sri. "LihrralI'.inv in Ilondur:ir h k i , Bie I.cad in \'ulrM. \'+,iv ) i d T i n i ~ ~ .obr.nih.r 30. 1981dur dur an Victor in ~v er lu r to ocs", New York Times, ~ccernber , 1981:

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RBVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 479suouort. t raininn and advicc for the ~ro l ife ra t in eHo ndu ran factions seekine thei, i&nt ot,erihr.;u of the Hi>nJur.in ~ o i ~ e r n m c n t . -Tru!tcjfthc oalitic nsiuork for the transfcr oiarms I O S ~ l v a J o r a ninsurgents. ~ h eperat ions~ere one in ways to minirnize act ions that mightprovoke the Honduran Government into abandoning the passivity it hadpreviously displayed toward Sandinista operations against Somoza. Indeed, itwas some lime before the Honduran Government was able to move cffectivelyagainst the supply routes operating through Honduras.In January 1981, Honduran authorities made their first major interdiction ofsupplies headed for the rehels in El Salvador when they discovered the armstraffickin g network in the town of Com ayag ua, near the El Salvado r bo rde r'.In April 1981, the H on du ran s intercepted a second shipmcnt in a tractor -trailer.This truck had entered Honduras al the Guasaule crossing from Nicaragua andwas apparently heading for Guatemala. Ammunition and propaganda materialswere hidden in the side walls of the trailer. The same arms traffickers operateda storehouse in Tegucigalpa, Ho ndu ras, w ith a false floor an d a special basementfor storing weapons2.Hon duran terri tory was also the l ikely conduit for the a m s caches capturedby Guatem alan security f o r e s at safehouses in Guate ma la City in April andJuly 1981. As with arm s captured in Janu ary in H ond uras , traces made on theserial numbers of individual United States-manufactured weaoons seized in- -~~~~~~ ~Guatemala revea led tha t 17 M - I ~ /A R - I S Sad originaly been shipped toAmerican units in Vietnam. Several of the vehicles captured at the GuatemalaCity safehouses bore recent customs markings from ~ k a r a ~ u a ' .

Th e discoveries p in te d to the greater eiiectivness of Ho ndur an security operationsalong the border with Nicaragua. In respnse, the level and size of arms shipmentspassing through Honduran territory began to fall off. They did not cedse, however.A former guemlla commander of the Salvadoran People's Revolutionary &y(ERP), Alejandro Montenegro, stated that guemlla units under his comrnand in1981-1982 received monthly shipments of arms frorn Nicaragua, mostly via theoverland route from Ho ndur as4. More r ee ntlv . an other senior Salvddoran euerrillaleader. Sap oleo n Rom ero, coniirm cJ an er his deicciion in A pnl 198s ih ii 11;ndurasioniinuci 1,) bc nn im pi ~ na nt ransit routc for am. roni i\'icar.igua. tlis group. ihc1'opul.u Likr 'i t i i~n Ii ~ rc er(FPL). bnngs \upplics o\crland froni N1ursgu3 IOTegucigalpa uhcnce the). arc transferrcd IO Chalatcnango deparimrnt in norihcrnEl Salvador. He ha, ,taled ihai m oi1 shtpriicnts nou,, in ciinrrast 10 czrlier ye3n.are small so as to minimize the danger ofdiscovery:Sec i c x i and louinuti 1 . Swiion I I A. p 172. iitpru- Iniclllgn;r. ~n i h i fir,! major inicrJiciionr uf :im r ,h~li!iisniib ) ihr. IlooJ ~r.in eiurir)lorcc, w;,i J " c I ~ ~ ~ i 6 e dn.i pri\rnied b> ihc Hunduran [.tic Ikparinieoi ~n ;ld\\tiI~ I ~tb lc i,yu

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480 MILITARY A N D PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESArmedsi rugg/e 1981-1983. Prospects for vanguard activism in Honduras itselfbegan t o change in late 1981 when th e country's small Marxist parties fragmented.The solits were often renerational in nature, and took the form of differences

over the road to poweF Almost invariably the new younger factions - nspiredby Sandinista success - avored armed struggle over the gradua1 methodsavored by the older generation.Bv 1981 the Sandinistas were work ine closelv with th e new e rouo s. In a n- - .0ciob:r 1981 inicrview in rhc pr o- g~ ~i ,cr nr iic riiicargu.in ncuyxipcr II I .Vui,i.i~Drurio, ihc !4ora/ani51 Front l i ~ rhe I .ibration o f Ilondurlis ( F M L H ) foundedin 1979 was dcicrib cd bv "O~~i ; i \~ io" .nc o f 11s ledcrs 4s a ~ o li ti ca lmiliiarsorganization formed as part of the "increasing regionalizatioh of the ce nt ra lAm erican conflict". O n Novemb er 17, 1981, the H on du ran police raided asafehouse in Tegucigalpa belonging to the Honduran Front for Popular Liber-ation ( F H L P )' . Police ultimatelv caotu red several mem bers of this erouD..including a ond dur an, a Uruguayan and several Nicaraguans. The caiturdterrorists told Honduran authorities that the Nicaraman government hadprovided them with funds for travel expenses and explosives. -Documents captured in the raid and statements by the detained guerrillasfurther indicated tha t :- he group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level San-dinista leaders:- he group's chief of operations resided in M an ag ua ; and- members of the group received military training in Nicaragua and CubaThe documents included classroom notes from a one-year training course held inCu ba in 1980. Othe r documents revealed tha t guemI1.d~ a t one saehouse wereresponsible for transporting arms and munitions into Honduras from Esteli, Nica-ragua.Du ring 1981 other "post-Nicaragua" gro up s m ad e their presence felt. Th emost formidable was the People's Revolutionary Union/Popular LiberationMovement (URPJMLP) . lt was more popularly known as the "Cinchoneros".In March 1981 Cinchonero members hijacked a Honduran Airlines flight anddiverted i t to M ana gua . Tellingly, they dem anded the release of 10 Salvadoranguerrillas who had been captured in H ond uras while smuggling arm s to the F PLin El Salvador. Sandinista officiais refused to cooperate with Honduran authori-ties- o the point of refusing them access to the con trol tower t o comm unicatedirectly with the hijackers. The Hondurans were forced to accede to the terroristdemands, freeing the Salvadorans and flying them to Cuba2.In September 1982, the Cinchoneros seized control of the Chamber of Com-merce in San Pedro Sula, Honduras' second largest city, holding 107 prominentbusinessmen and three cabinet ministers hostage. The demand once again cen-tered on the release of captured Salvadorans and other imprisoned guerrillas.The Cinchonero attackers finally ended the hostage incident without achievingany of their demands except safe passage to Cuba on September 28, 1982'.

'Officiel Inf i rme sobre la Coplura y Desmrinrelomienlo del Grupo SubversiveAulodenorninodo "Frenle Ilondureno de Lib~rocionPopular", Tegucigalpa, December 2,19x1

'Sec. "Honduran Plane is Hijackcd and Lands Ln Managua", March 28,1981 ; HostagesReleased From Honduran Jet", March 29, 1981 ; and "Panama Plane Will Fly CaptivesFrom Honduras", New York Times, March 30, 1981.'Sce Agence France Presse (AFP), El Tiernpo (Tegucigalpa), La Prensa (San PcdroSula), El I fer~ ldoTegucigalpa), ACAN-EFE, as rcported in FBIS , Scptember 22-24, 1982.

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REVOLUTION BEYOND O U R BO RD E RS 48 1Another armed Honduran group, the Popular Revolut ionary Forces (FPR),carried o ut an airp lane hijacking on April 28, 1982. They dem anded the releaseof over 50 prisoners but again settled for sale passage 10 Cuba on May 1, 1982 '.

The FPR were also responsible for a number of bombings and at tacks on theoffices in H on du ras of United States companies in 198Z2. O n July 4, 1982, theysabotaged the main power station in Tegucigalpa3. In roughly the same timeperiod as the at tacks, the FP R was also t raining cadres in Nicaragua a nd C ub afor a future "invasion" of Ho nd ura s.Olunclio 1983. El Porain 1984-1985.The extent to which the Sandinistas back~~ ~~iu hv cr sl i ,~ o\ ,cmentr inside H on du rai bamr apparent when Hu ndu ran gucr-rlll;i\ - r;iineJ an d rupp licd by N.:JrJgua anil Cub ii - ttcniptcrl 10 e\iahlisheuerrilla h4scs in thc Olancho denariiiicnt iiiIlrinilurar i n l9h3 ancl in CI Paraicoin 1984 '.T he two Ho nd ura n gr ou ps involved in the attempted "invasions" were the

Ho ndu ran branch of the Central American Revolutionary W orkers Party (P R T C )and the aforementioned FPR . The P R TC was then led bv Jose Maria Reves~ ~ ~~- ~ ~~~~~~ ,Mata, a radical activist since the 1960s who had accompanied "Che" ~ u e v a r xo n his i ll-fated adven ture in B olivias. In A pril 1980, in the m on th when Ho nd ura swas holdine democratic elections for a constituent coneress. Reves Mata was-arrrstcd in ionncciion with a wave 01 ' prc.clection violcncc an d the kidn kpp ing,, ia Tc.\.

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482 MlLlTARY AhD PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESIn July 1983 Reyes M ata a nd his 96-man force, arm ed by the Sandinistas,entered the isolated and underpopulated department of Olancho in easternHonduras. T he operation w as structured as a vanguard action for other groups.

T he oth er forces were never infiltrated, however. Th e "invasion" was easily foiledby Ho ndura n security forces a nd Reyes M at a was killed. Many of the participantscaptured by the Honduran Army gave detailed descriptions of their training inboth Nicaragua and Cuba.In July 1984 a similar effort was mad e t o establish the base for a ru ralinsurgency with the attempted infiltration of 19 FPR guerrillas into the Paraisodepartment along the border between the two countries. As was the case withthe Olancho group, the FPR cadre received training at Pinar del Rio in Cubaand aftenvards trained in Nicaragua fighting the armed opposition to theSandinistas.Again, the operation was contained by the Honduran army. ACterwards,members of the group led Honduran authorities to several arms caches andsubversive grou ps in th e Coma yagua area.In April 1985, the Sandin istas were again caugh t trying to provide su pport forthe Honduran guerrilla groups, but this time the operatives arrested wereNicaraguans. Between April II and 14, seven Nicaraguans were arrested inParaiso derartment trvine to infiltrate arms to Cinchoneros based in Olanchodepartmeni. One of th m w as a member of the Nicaraguan Directorate for StateSecurity (DGSE) who stated tha t he had c oordinated similar arms infiltrationssince November 1984'.The leadership of Honduran guerrilla groups continues to reside in Nicaraguaan d U nited State s intelligence rep orts current training of Ho ndur an guernllas inManagua.I n i i m i d a t ~ o n .The Sand in is ta eovernmen t, in add it ion to s u ~ ~ o r t i n rubversivemovements inside Honduras, bis engaged i n a campaign apparentl; devised t ointimidate the Honduran Government and keep it from effectively controlling ilsborders.Border incursions by the Sandinistas have soured relations between the twocoun tries almost fr om the m om ent Som oza fell in July 1979. T he first of nearly300 border incidents through mid-1985 occurred on July 22, 1979- hree daysafte r the Sand inistas entered M anag ua'. Before the year was ou t there were atleast a dozen more incidents. While the early missions were usually characterizedby small units ope rating with light weaponry, by 1985 the Sa ndinistas wereemploying 120mm mortar rounds. Heavy shelling from Nicaraguan territory byrockets and heavv artillerv has also occurred.~~ h e ~ a n d i n i s t i sn addh ion have p~aced~an t i~er sonne land mines along bothsides o f the Hon dura niNifa ragu an border. Although the mines are justified bythe Sandinistas as se lf -defense igains t incursions by ~ i c a r a ~ u a nesistance forces,the net efiect is to endanger the resident rural population in the border areas. Inlu ne 1983, two A merican journalists were killed when their car hit a Czecho-slovakian-manufactured mine on an Honduran road 3.

'State Department unclassificd cable TeaucimI~a 152. May 8, 1985' I n ~ i d < t t l e . i'ri.!iiy

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REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 483C. COSTA RICA

" ln 40 years of Somocismo, we never had the threat th at W C have in fouryears of Sandinismo." (L uis Albe rto Mong e, President of Cos ta Rica,Decemher 1983 '.)

Costa Rican support was essent ial ta the success of the s t ruggle againstSomoza. In November 1978 the Cos ta Rican Government severed d ip lomat icre lat ions wi th the Som oza rg ime, an d over the next e ight mo nths a l lowed C os taRican ter r i to ry to he used a s a c ondui t for arm s an d supplies to the an t i -Som ozawar c i or t on i ts nor thern border .In the orocess of aidine the insurrect ion. however. Costa Rica 's ooen andbtahlc de ~ i ) i r ; i c y nwit tinF ly i )pr.ncd the do or 111futur; tr

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484 MlLlTARY A N D PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESTh e PV P maintained i t s force in Nicaragua af ter the Sandinis tas came t opower. Major elements of i t remain there today and provide permanent trainingfor paramil i tary cadres who return to Costa Rica. The uni t d id not act in

isolation. From the start i t maintained close contact with the Sandinista armyand over the years hecame an integral part of Sandinista defenses along theborder with Costa Rica. The Nicaraguan government supplies the unit withtraining. uniforms, arms and food, and in return the unit carries out mili taryactions against Nicaraguan resistance forces operating along the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border .Armingjor the revoluiion. While Panama and Venezuela were providing aid tothe ant i -Somoza opposi t ion through Costa Rica in 1979,Cuba with the aid ofcorrupt Costa R ican officiais estahlished i ls own clandestine arm s supply networkfor the Sandinistas. This network was later used to supvly the Salv adora n.insurgency a nd interna1 Co sta Rican left ist groups.The circumstances surrounding the shipments were estahlished by a SpecialCommission created in June 1980 by the Costa Rican legislature to investigatecharges then circulatina that after the Nicaraguan civil war a black market haddevzoped in connect icn wi th war matriel lef t hehind in Costa Rica ' . Duringthe course of i ts investigation, the commission discovered the shipments fromC u b a .Then-President Rodrieo Carazo of Costa Rica first denied that the fl iehts hadoccurred when quest ioGd by the commission on November 4 , 1980, but lateradmitted them. On March 25, 1981, five Costa Rican pilots publicly admittedtheir varticivat ion in the t ra ns sh i~ m en t f arm s from Cuba. an d eave details oft h e o p er at io n s a n d th e n a m es o f 't h e C u b a n an d C o st a ~ i c i n $cias involvedin supervising the clandestine fl ights2. The commission established that a total

of at least 21 such fl ights were made, most of the shipments arriving at asecondary airport , in Liberia, removed from public scrutiny.Many of the weapons flown in by the Cuban airl ift were diverted to theinsurgency in El Salvador. The pilots in their 25 March statement recalled thatin one of the t r ips to Cuba, Manuel Pineiro of the Cuban Communis t Party ' sAmerica Dep artm ent asked whether they would be will ing to Ry a m is to El

cadre in the "internationalirt" brigade in 1983. In March 1985, La Republico in San Joseran a stary on 100 Costa Ricans trainine in Cuba and Nicaragua, and quoted SecurityMinisicr Ucnjsmin Pird a, ,a!ing "wc h i c Ilux), hrlrd u i ~ h ~ p o , ~ i b i l i t ~hxt ihsrcprups arbonng ruch a llne of dprdilon WC ki l l do cicr)thlng pdllihls 10 ncutralirihcm". SR. 1 .1R c ~ l i h l , ~ ~ .a81J u ~ c . hlilrch 14. IYR5. as r~.nt>rIedv F B I S \l:*rch 25. 1985.In May 1985, La ' ~ n c i o " n San os q u o t e d ' ~ ~ ~eader ~ e r g i i E r i k r d o nhat "therearc presently Costa Ricans fighting at the ride o f the Sandinista forces, just as the rc are inthe countcrrevolutionary groups".'Rep ort on a m s trafficking issued by a special Costa Rican legislative commission onMay 14, 1981. The report is the basis for the lallowing comments. La Noelon, May 15,1981, as rcported by FBIS, June 12, 1981. Also sec "Amis Scandal is Chargcd in CostaRica': Ne w York Thes, May 21, 1981.'ACAN -EFE, March 24, 1981, as reparted in FBIS, March 26, 1981. During the monthslcading up to the ovcrthrow of Somoza in July 1979, a group of officers o l the A moncaDepartment ol the Cuban Communist Party playcd a major role in the Nicaraauanrc f Anirnii I>cp.iriincni .,f li; irr k i r c :XW~!>CJ11 C.,N~ R~:i.:!nduer: rc\p.,nilblc i i i r nioiing arm, ;and rnsn inio Fii:amgu.i lrum C.,,i:i Ki;d Th, w . a \cnl.>r ~nt:llicence ulliccr. irha bv.imr Cuba',a i i ib .o \ ~Jo r ~ .~ i ; a r a~u : iiir han i u d uwk* l ~ . r < > % o , a ' ,dII I.ope/ :and h l i .irro;i;iizrmor,cJ frel) thro~ghoutC o i t ~Knca dunng this pmod ihanki 10 xi(: cnJurtp.is,r,ir,urJ theni b) l ~ n i r t r r i I'ublic Swuni) Juan Ju ri Ilchc v~.rr i~ rcalcy.

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RliVOLUTlON BIiYONO OUR BORDERS 485Salvador'. The legislative commission traced three shipments to El Salvadorthrough Costa Rican territory hetween 1980 and 1981.Importantly for the Costa Ricans, the commission confirmed that a substantialnumher of these weapons remained in Costa Rica after the fall of Somoza. Theminister of public security in 1979 was Juan Jos Echeverria Brealey - manwith close lies to Cuba, and now the leader of the Radical Democratic Party.The commission in ils Mav 1981 reoort held Echeverria resnonsible for the fact. ~ ~that "there were no con trds over th war mat& that entered the country" andfor the "disappearance" of war material from State arsenals, including 2,018~ -firearms.The commission concluded that the imported weapons had heen widelydistrihuted inside Costa Rica. It reported that "weapons of war" had heenconfiscated from various private homes, including properties owned byEcheverria. Nine months later, on March 25, 1982, another cache of arms wasfound in the house of Mora Valverde, the leader of the PVP. At the time of theseizures he claimed that the weapons were for "self-defense"'.The supply network, once in place, continued to operate for some time afterthe air shipments from Cuba had ceased. In March 1982 Costa Rican securityforces raided a safehouse in San Jose, arresting nine persons including twoNicaraeuans in connection with an arms traffickine ooeration to El Salvador.About'i75 weapons were seized including 70 ~ - 1 6 < 5 6 f which were traceahleas rifles originally shipped to Vietnam3.Terrorism: 1981-1985. The new orientation of Costa Rican radical ErouDshelped set off a wave of violence inside the country over the next fewyea;s.Many of the terrorist acts, however, were attributable to external forces. Whilehiding behind a screen of legitimate international relations, Nicaragua tookactions which were clearly meant to intimidate the Costa Rican Government.The initial terrorist act look olace in March 1981 : an attack on a vehicle~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~ ~~carrying a Costa Rican driver and three ~ n i t e dtat tes emb&sy security guards.It was followed in June 1981 hy the killinas of three policemen and a taxi driver.Both attacks were traced to a-radical sointer erouv [rom the Marxist Peoole's. .Kcv\ m~cn i1'the Revolutionary ~ l t I R ) bccamc lhe icadinifigure in a s6ohirticatcdai~-suiiii&l.,pir;ii.on Io p r ~c i i l e im \ and :~rnm..nitiun a ~n ,ucg irz , i n I:I S~l;;idsr H y tirtus o? hi ,po\ilion .i , ~ h r .c:rd o f \ r icr~l( g r r.\prc,,< iornp mic ,. ~riiludin;on: b.1wi1 n

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486 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESstas - ere arrested in July 1981 crossing the Nicaraguan border into CostaRica on a mission to seize the Guatemalan embassy in San Jos and demandthe release by Guatemala of convicted terrorists '.- On lanuary 19, 1982, Iwo Salvadoran PRTC rnembers, Jos Marroquinand Jonathan Rodriguez, were arrested in Costa Rica in connection with anattempted kidnapping of a Salvadoran businessman. They later told Costa Ricanpolice that they passed first through Nicaragua, where they and others wereprovided with false identity documents to enter Costa Rica. Marroquin told aCosta Rican court on Febmary 4, 1982, that he "received military and politicaltraining" during the several montbs he spent in Nicaragua2.- n November of the same year, the Costa Rican branch of the CentralAmencan Revolutionary Workers' Party (PR TC) seriously wounded a lapanesebusinessman - who later died - n a botched kidnapping attempt. TwoSalvadorans, a Honduran and two Costa Ricans were arrested in connectionwith the attempted kidnapping3.Three Nicaraguan embassy officials were expelled from Costa Rica on July 28,1982, for their involvement in the July 4 hombing of the San los ofices ofSAHSA, the Honduran national airline. Costa Rica's investigation of the caseimplicated a Colombian terrorist recruited hy Nicaraguan embassy officials inCosta Rica. One of the three Nicaraguan diplomats was arrested al a clandestinemeeting with the Colombian4.Terrorist actions on Costa Rican soi1 peaked in 1982 but did no t end. Membersof the New Republic Movement were responsible for a major bank robbery inGuanacaste province in February 1985. When they were arrested, they werefound to have collected information on the movements of United States embassypersonnel in Costa Rica as well as those of Costa Rican officials and other

foreien diolomats '.~ i u c k . i o nVrciJru~r~

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REVOLUTION B E Y O N U OUR BORUERS 487In Novem her 1984, an a ttem pt was mad e on the life of anot her oppositionleader, Alfonso R obelo, with a fragmen tation grenade'.Alrempied intimida~ion. Not surprisingly, Costa Rica's relations with Nica-ragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union deteriorated after 1979. Consular relationswith Cuba were severed in May 1981. In November 1982 the Monge adminis-tration asked Moscow to withdraw 17 of the 25 officiais at its emhassy in SanJos. The Soviets had heen active promoting lahor strife inside Costa Ricasince 1979'.In the case of Nicaragua, approximately 90 incidents involving diplornaticprotests were recordcd before Costa Rica ordered Nicaragua on Fehruary 19,1985, Io reduce ils Embassy personnel from 47 Io IO3 . The Sandinista attemptsto intimidate the Costa Rican Government hegan as early as 1980, Iwo yearsbefore former-Sandinista Eden Pastora beean his anned resistance to the reime

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488 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESthe cffort to remove Somoza- as one o f deep satisfaction at the replacementof the Somoza dictatorship with a popularly supported coalition publiclycommitted to a program of democratic reform.

Concerns about the role to be played by the Sandinistas in the new governmentwere largely set aside in the interesl of providing the support and assistanceneeded to reconstruct Nicaragua from the civil war '. Both Latin Americancountries and the United States were determined to cooperate in the rebuildingof Nicaragua and the reintegration of that country - n accordance with 11spromises to the OAS - nto the inter-American system that had played anessential role in the removal of the Somoza rgime2.Nicaragua's neighbors. Of Nicaragua's immediate neighbors only Costa Ricareacted in a fully positive manner to the removal of Somoza. Costa Ricanterritory had been available for the supply of weapons from Cuba, Panama,Venezuela and other foreign sources Io the anti-Somoza rebels. Costa Ricanshoned that the advent of a oonular. democratic eovernment in Nicaraeua had= ,finally freed Costa Rica from a long-standing miitary threat to ils democratic,unarmed status, and aiven it a new partner in the protection and advancementof democracy in central America. 'The reactions of the Governments in Honduras and El Salvador were cautious.Neither had opposed the OAS resolution which stripped the Somoza rCgime ofils legitimacy. But the strong position of the FSLN, which they saw as an agentof "International Communisrn". was a source of real fear. The Government of~~~~~~~El Salvador, in particular, feared the influence and impact of the Sandinistas onEl Salvador's troubled interna1 situation.The Unired Srares. Contrary to many popular misconceptions, the UnitedStates had since mid-1978 directed ils efforts toward facilitating a peacefulresolution to the conflict. Hoping to ensure that Somoza would not be followedhy an equally repressive rgime, the United States participated actively in anOAS-endorsed mission that sought to avoid violence.Consistent with this policy goal, the United States viewed with concern therole of the Sandinista Front in the military events culminating in Somoza'souster. Nonetheless, the presence on the five-memher Junta of Violeta deChamorro (widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of LA Prensa) and

'The United Nations estimatcd ihat 45,OW people had bccn killed. 160,000 wounded;tnJ 4U.ililil orphanmi in ihc lighiing i n iir.ar~~u.i,.thercal m.ipni) ln thc 1L.n monthlpriuiding S

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REVOLUTION B EYOND O U R BORDERS 489prominent businessman Alfonso Robelo, both of whom were unquestionablycommitted to democracy, gave the United States and other countries of thehemisphere reason to believe that the Junta's announced program and itspromises to the OAS would be honored.1979-1980

The fall of Somoza increased the aonreciation in neiehborine countries of theneed for substantial reform. At the 'same lime, howeGer, actial and potenrialguerrillas throughout Central America were encouraged by the Sandinistae x a m ~ l eo believe that thev t o o could. with sulficient ex te m ai suno ort. succeedin shoot ing their way in to power . ~ h i s as particularly the case in' El Salvadorand Guatem ala. T he United States, despite major misgivings abo ut developmentsin Nicaragua, embarked on a major program of economic assistance toNicaraeu a' . Th e inter-American a nd international communitv as a whole looka similCr ap pro ac h of large-scale assistance to ena ble the new r&me to overcom ethe civil war's destruction.NicuruguuS neighbors. On October 15, 1979, a coup led hy reformist officersoverthrew the reime of General Carlos Humberto Romero in El Salvador.~ -~~Three months laer a new Junta was formed, with the participation of theChristian Dem ocratic Party . By M arch 1980 a civil-militdry Junt a h eaded byJos Naooleon Du arte had be m n a series o l maior social and nolitical relormsde si gn ci tu add rcr s 111s whi& had providcd m ic h o l the appc:il uldbc achicved wirhoui civil war I'how rciorm s enco mn asscd Land rcdisiribution .basic changes in the banking and commercial sectois, and opening the politi:cal system. The Junta committed itself to the holding of free elections for acons tituent assem bly2 . Disturbances by gro up s encouraged by the Sandinistasuccess peaked in the sp ring of 1980, but by sum mer, a s the newly united guerrillaforces began to p repare for their Ja nua ry offensive, the reforms began to takehold an d several strike calls received only limited sup po rt.Honduran social and political tensions, while significant, were less polarizedthan those in El Salvador or Nicaragua, and the militas. govemment did notabuse civil rights. There had not yet developed a pattern of violent politicalextremism or armed anti-government activity. The first step in the return todemocratic civilian rule announced by the Honduran militas. government wasthe popular election of a constituent assemhly in April 1980.

Tlie Unired Srures Between July 1979 and January 1981, the United Statesorovided more than $100 million in economic assistance to Nicaraeua. Itncouraged other Western countries to provide major assistance as wzl, andurged private bank s to reach a rescheduling ag reement with Nicaragua. It offered

iro;ided a total $4648 million in assistancc t o ~ i c a r a a u a v thee nd of 19791 As notcd

'On Ociobrr 15. I Y ~ . i"

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490 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESto reinstate a Peace Corps program to assist in Nicaraguan reconstruction andto helv meet that countrv's need for teachers and medical care ' as well as amilitary training program tar\i\t in the profersi.inali/ation oi its armcd li~rssfollowing thc diisi>lution i i the National CiudrJ. Both t11Ti.r. wcrc rcl'uscd, a\was a C>ta iiiln i>iler of telichcrs 'l he Sandinistas g>\c rior rit) to obtaininc. -both teachers and militarv assistance frorn Cuba2.In late 1979, the ~dministrationproposed a special appropriation of $80million in assistance for Central Amenca; $75 million - ver 90 w r cent- fthis assistance was to be nrovided to Nicaraeua. Concerns in ~ o n e r e s s boutSandinista activities led to a requirement th;, before disbursing assistance toNicaragua, the President certify that Nicaragua was not "aiding, abetting, orsupporting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries"'.In the middle of 1980, the United States began to receive reports of Sandinistainvolvement in logistical support- ncluding provision o f arms- or guerrillasin El Salvador. While these reports were at first fragmentary and difficult toconfirm, they gave rise to increasing concern about the role the Sandinistasintended to play in Central America. The United States Ambassador to Nicaraguawas instructed to raise this issue with the government of Nicaragua and to urgethat any matenal support for the FM LN cease4. Nicaraguan officials denied any"governmental" involvement, but asserted that the govcrnment of Nicaraguacould not he held responsihle for the activities of individual Nicaraguanss.Despite the reports of involvement hy high-ranking and individual FSLNmemhers in furnishine arms and trainine to Salvadoran euerrilla erouns. onSeptember 12, 1980, tKe President made the certification required hyihe Spcialassistance legislation. This decision was taken on the basis that the informationthen available was not "conclusive" as to Nicaraguan government involvementin terrorist activities6. While some officials believed that the accumulation of~~~ ~ ~~ ~evidence was such as to preclude certification, the decision was made that theoverriding United States interest in attempting to retain a ~ositiveelationshipwith thenew government in Nicaragua Gourd be best seived hy viewing thevidence as inconclusive. The resulting certification made possible dishursementof $75 million in economic assistance to Nicaragua.The decision to certifv was acc om ~a ni ed v a decision to send the DenutvArsi*t

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REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 491relations. He cmphasized the United States' desire to preserve good relationswith N icaragua, bu t made c lear to his interlocutors tha t provision of supp ort t oSalvadoran guerril las could force the United States to terminate the assistanceprogra m. The officiais with whom he met , including Daniel Ortega and othermem hers of the Junta , Foreign Minister d 'Escoto, and C om and antes BayardoArce, Humberto Ortega and Jaime Wheelock, promised that al1 steps would betaken to ensure that such activities did not occurt.

T hc "finl r>ilr.iisi\r."olJ.iiiiiiir) 1981 in El Sa li J or mas prrm l\rJ on ii\,rruhr.lm-ing rhr,Salii iJor an armcd l

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REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 493Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez. He noted that evidence available to theU n it ed S t a t es c on fir m ed t h at s u ~ o l v o t h e F M L N w as c o n t in u i n r d e s ~ i t eprevious c lear promises by the ~andii is tas .H e made c lear - in v iey a he iac ttha t Nicaragua's previous assurances that i t would not su pport the F M L N hadproven false - he United States' intention to monitor the situation to ensurethat these actions were taken. He stated that the United States would exoect theNicaraguans to provide evidence that they had carried out their undeGakings.He specifically identified a number of actions which the United States wouldconsider evidence of Nicaraeuan eood faith 'hc Si-arag udn h uc rc inickned-thdi ihc L'nitcd Staics h;iJ dc ~ ii lc do uiihhiildnew disbiin ern eni of C niir,J S ia ir r acrtolincc. uniil t t >vassatirficd th;ii Shndtni..urupply t< i the F M L S h;id h;tlted 'l 'his decision io n\ titu ted . in clre it. ;i ~ r o v i s i o n a ldeienkination that the certification requirement of the assistance legiilation wasno longer met . The United Sta tes decision as to whether Nicaraguan act ionswould permit the cont inuat ion o f a id would be based o n th e situation in on emonth's t ime; if the Nicararuan resoonse were not satisfactorv. a oublicdrterniination Irading 10 a formal cut-ni1 of ar%thtancsu,< ,ulJ bc furihcorn'ing.In rcply. Ju nt a mc mh crsO rtcg a and Kamire, replicd tha t the FSLN Dirc i iora ieh.id ;i.ithori,cil Ihm I O siaie thlit ihey unders tri\ s uell a s accumul;iting~in Nicaragua arms for-the FMLN.Faced with this add itional evidence, the United States concluded th at i t couldno longer certify that Nicaragua was not engaged in support for terrorismahroad. On April 1, 1981, the President made a determination to that effect,therebv form allv sus oen din e disbursem ent of the final $15 million in assistance.ma Jc a \a i lahlc the pre \ i

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494 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESW hi le Sand in i s ta ac t ions ha d fo rced th e U n i ted S ta tes t o cu t o ff ass i s tance toNi ca rag u a , t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s co n t in u ed e f for t s t o r each an acco m m o d a t i o n w i t hthe Sand in i s ta rgime which wou ld ha l l N icaragua' s supp ly o f a rm s and o th ers u p p o r t t o t h e S a l v ad o ran g u e rr i ll a s.In A uau s t 1981. the Un i ted S ta tes Ass i s tan t Secre ta rv o f S ta te fo r In te r -~ n i e r i c a i t l ir s p r e\ en tc d N i c dr g u a w ith ii i ive-point proposal for impro!eJr r l a t ion r . Th is p roposa l u a s des igncd to meet Nic ragu a ' s concerns wi th Un i tedSta tes polic,. includin): 11s cx prr rre d fear o f a L inited Sta tcs invi li t in 2n d rlesircth a t ~ k a r a g u a n x ile g roups in the U n i ted S ta tes and e l sewhere shou ld be t igh tlycon t ro ll ed , wh i le a l so address ing the Nicaragu an ac t ions mos t t ro ub l ing to th eUn i t ed S t a t es . Th e U n i t ed S t a t e s p ro p o s a l , b a sed u p o n a n en d t o S an d i n i st as u o o o r t fo r au e r ri ll a a ro u o s . c a ll ed fo r h o t h s id e s t o m ak e o u b l i c d ec l a r a ti o n s o f.n i i n - i n i c r \ c ~ i o n n C e nt ra l , \ m c r ia i : 3 Unit:d Sid tes s t i i t~ m cn t in the cnio rce-nient of Un i ted S t a i c s Iau , p c ru i n i n g I O t h e as ti v ii ic s < ~ I 'K i r a r ag u an xi le groupsin the Cn i ted S t a t es ' : a n end to the Nicarae uan mi l i ta rv hui ldu ri . rccs ti ib l ishmenio f U n i t ed S t a t e s e co n o m i c a s si s t an ce ; an d ex p an s i o n o f cu l t u r l' t ie s b e tween t h etwo coun t r i es2 . In Oc tohe r , the S and in i s tas rejected th i s p roposa l a s "ster il e" ,a t t h e s am e ti rn e r enewi n g t h ei r a s s e r t io n s t h a t t h e N i ca rag u an g o v e rn m en t w asn o t s u o o o rt i na th e F M L N 3 .A t {h u rg & o f t h e P res i den t o f Mex i co , t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s m a d e a s eco n da t tem pt in Apr i l 1982. T h e p rev ious f ive po in t s were expanded to cal1 fo r (1 ) a nmodcratc forces within Nicaragua, the officia1 Departmeni of State statcmcnt hcld out thefurthcr passibility of resumine P.L. 480 food assistance. develooment assistance andt:cunomiz Suppoii I'unJ, \ ~ O I J ihr siluailon in \icar.n Ui;~r~gu.i. hou e\e r.' h i Jrscripiion Iaier giwn o l ,\srirt,i~iiS c c r c i a ~Tndcri. Jm.irihc b) Arturu Cn i r ,thrn Slr ard g* ~'. i mb:irrxior I O ihc Unlied Siai:,. i i niiruriisr

"ln Augurt of lYb l IE nd cn ] mci nilh my wpr.rior5 in Managua. ;i l the highrriIc\cl Ilis mesr;igc wwb cli.ar. in i\rhange lor non

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REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 495end to Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in other countries; (2 ) a UnitedStates pledge to enforce laws pertaining to exile activities in the United States;( 3 ) a joint pledge of non-interference in each other's affairs or in the affairs ofothcrs in the region; (4) a regional, reciprocal ban on imports of heavy offensiveweapons; (5 ) a reciprocal reduction of foreign advisors in the region; (6) in-ternational verification of the foregoing points; (7) exchange of cultural groups;and (8 ) the reaffirmation of previous commitments by the Sandinistas to plura-lism. free elections. non-alienment and a mixed economv. The United Statesmade clear that a halt to ~gnd inis ta upport for subversion beyond its horderswas the sine quo non for achieving results on the other elements of the proposal '.Nicaragua responded hy taking refuge in procedure, demanding that the talkstake place at a higher level and that the Mexican Government be drawn into thedialogue, but avoiding any comment on the substance of the proposals. Buildingon continued denials by Nicaragua of involvement in El Salvador and assertionsthat Nicaraeua wished to "fulfill its international oblirations". the United States-dso requested thxi Sicl irag~ enion\irxc iis dlir to cnpgc in *riou, etforisIO rssolve rcgional prohlcmr h) ~Iosing oun the cornmand and control ccnrcrof the FMLN operating out of Nicaragua.The United States response duriog this period was not confined to its con-tinuation of diplomatic approaches to Nicaragua. Expanded economic assist-ance and support for strengthened defense efforts were provided to hoth El Sal-vador and Honduras. At the same time. the Sandinistas' reoeated reiection of~ ~United States diplomdtic efforts led to concern hy the United ta& that a policyconfined to diplomatic representations could not he effective in modifyine Nica-raguan behavfor, and forced consideration of alternative means of achievhg thatobjective.Resistance forces' began to take on importance for the broader effort tocounter Sandinista "internationalism". For those concerned with Nicaraeua's-intervention in neighboring countries, the significance of the resistance groupslay in the pressure that their operations could bnng on the Sandinistas to turntheir attention away from subversion heyond Nicaragua's horders and reducethe availabilitv of material to he sent to the FMLN. The erowth of armedresiiian~.rhy i>rhrr Yicaraguans ui,ulJ m;ikr ilcar Io the San

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496 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIESmilitary advisors and trainers should he removed; (2) to frcc Central Americancountries from fear of each other's aggression, the import of heavy weaponsshould he banned, support for insurgency on neighhors' territory should beprohibited, and frontiers should be suhject to international surveillance;(3) democratic institutions open to opposition elements should he established.President Reagan personally endorsed these proposals in San Jos in 1982 andbefore a Joint Session of Congress on April 27, 1983.Th e seven countries asked C osta Rica's foreign minister to present theseprinciples to Nicaragua as a hasis for dialogue, but the Sandinista governmentinsisted that it would receive the foreign minister only if the discussions wereconfined "exclusively" t o bilateral issue