a. k. mishra

Upload: makmohit6037

Post on 03-Jun-2018

217 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    1/19

    LD&C_SCADA

    Security

    Smart Grid and Security

    ,

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    2/19

    LD&C_SCADA

    Why Secure

    Interoperability among six aspects of the electric

    power industry

    Power generation, transmission and distribution(all things that are physical)

    Command, control and communications

    sensing, collection,

    analysis and

    interpretation of all source operational data intoinformation, and

    Transfer of such information to facilitate

    commerce and safe and reliable operation of power systems;

    Include such things as scheduling and dispatching thepower and control of the whole power system

    If Man in middle, impact is slow/local/partial;

    Everything auto, impact swift/widespread/total

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    3/19

    LD&C_SCADAIEEE POWER & ENERGY Magzine 2009

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    4/19

    LD&C_SCADA

    STRUCTURE

    o What need to be secured,

    o How it can be secured

    o Who will secure what and how

    o Operational systems which can be facing

    cyber vulnerability

    o Security System requirement

    o Security practices

    o Security audit

    o Continual Improvement perspective i.e. we

    need to plan, build processes to do, check

    effectiveness of the two and act for

    improvement.

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    5/19

    LD&C_SCADA

    SECURITY

    Firewalls and security zoning Separation among application

    SCADA/EMS

    ISR

    STOA

    Scheduling

    Metering and settlement

    Web access

    Corporate access

    Competing Objective Maintaining Model/values exchange

    Single sign on for users v/s individual

    application v/s zonal boundaries

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    6/19

    LD&C_SCADA

    To Secure

    Malware

    Careless Employees (Password robustness

    etc)

    Exploited vulnerabilities

    Zero-day exploits

    Application robustness against known

    exploits such as buffers overflow/RPC

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    7/19

    LD&C_SCADA

    SECURITY

    Utility companiesCritical-infrastructure custodiansLikely targets of cyber terrorism

    Government regulations

    Historically

    DCS/ SCADA/ EMS/ DMSProtected by proprietary technology

    Isolated from enterprise IT

    Cost and Skill Issues led to:

    Standard operating systemsexposure of internet connectivity

    Remote access

    Has Exposed these networks to 21st-century cyber threats

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    8/19

    LD&C_SCADA

    Approach

    A holistic approach based on standards of goodpractices (e.g., ISO 27002)

    to achieve and maintain compliance with the

    regulations and applicable standards

    Plan-Do-Check-Act

    security gap analysis

    risk based prioritization of remediation requirements

    implementation of controls

    periodic assessment of implemented controls

    Implementing an information security management

    system based upon standard to demonstrate high

    standard of security

    business partners,

    customers, and

    regulators

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    9/19LD&C_SCADA

    REGULATION

    Discuss regulatory landscape CERC,

    IT Act

    List security implications for utilities

    Recommended approach for compliance To achieve

    To maintain

    Evaluate The Rules

    implications requirements

    approach for compliance

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    10/19LD&C_SCADA

    Possible incident scenario

    An employee has a company laptop on the internetat his home office, connected to the control

    network through a VPN (Virtual Private Network)

    A hacker from overseas infects the laptop with a

    virus over the Internet

    The virus then propagates over the VPN connectioninto the control network and infects another

    Windows PC located right in the heart of the

    control system

    Is this just a hypothetical situation? It couldn't

    happen to you? The bad news is that this is a realincident that actually happened to the water

    supply system in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 2006

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    11/19LD&C_SCADA

    Communication

    General IssuesComplacency

    Not a concern since not attacked

    Institute a security process/team building

    exercise that includes consequence analysis/

    ramifications of a successful security attack

    Utility do not assess any value to the information

    being communicated, except in the case of control

    actions Unbundling may change this attitude???

    Dial-Up Modem Usage

    use of auto-answer modems is of concern

    TCP/IP

    increasing dependence on TCP/IP as a transport for

    critical information ICCP; Exchange; schedule

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    12/19LD&C_SCADA

    Communicationcontd

    Some information exchanged (e.g. schedule)is using the Internet instead ofIntranets. The trend may continue, sinceconnectivity options using the Internetrepresent a low cost option.

    security threats

    eavesdropping,

    spoofing,

    denial of service,

    Replay

    number of people/entities attached

    Appropriate security measures should bedeployed based upon an appropriateconsequence analysis

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    13/19LD&C_SCADA

    Internet Connectivity

    infrastructure connectivity point to theInternet needs to be isolated through a

    screening router/firewall combination from

    the rest of the corporate LAN/Intranet

    personnel need to be assigned to audit/monitor this connectivity for any security

    attacks that occur

    Given sufficient audit trail, prosecution

    of every attacker should be stronglyconsidered

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    14/19LD&C_SCADA

    FIREWALL

    Firewall represent a valid security countermeasure typically validate a remote connection/ user to

    use a given transport -TCP/IP or OSI

    make application service requests - FTP, HTTP, RFC-1006, DNP

    Limited to a set of well defined nodes/applications

    However, once authenticated and connected,firewall is not sufficient to enforceaccess/service privileges to information on thedestination application

    Internet applications e.g. FTP, Telnet - have theability to be configured for user authentication(usually passwords) upon which access privileges

    (e.g. read, write, etc.) will be granted. However, protocols (e.g. DNP/870-5) are inadequate in

    this regard

    Active work is ongoing to address the issue ofauthentication and security within several protocolsby TC 57

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    15/19LD&C_SCADA

    Risks

    consequence analysis is unique to each businessentity however Bypassing of controls/ controlsecurity can be rated as highest. Others include

    Exposed Trading Functions - analysis of the typeof information conveyed anticipated financialdamages of a successful attack

    ICCP - Analysis of the dependency on informationconveyed (Telemetry and calculated data from RLDCto SLDC etc.) by/to other control centers

    Control Center to Substation Communication: The

    disruption of a substation communication can cause

    problem only if remotely controlledMetering: All revenue is based upon data acquired

    through metering - this may not be an area ofconcern given alternate available and mode of datacommunication

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    16/19

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    17/19LD&C_SCADA

    Control System

    Control systems Distributed Control Systems (DCS),

    Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC),

    Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

    (SCADA),

    Remote Terminal Units (RTUs),

    Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)

    Designed to be highly reliable and

    interoperable

    proprietary operating systems in the

    control systems often preclude the use of

    existing Information Technology (IT)

    security

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    18/19LD&C_SCADA

    Vulnerability

    Vendors and utilities employ Remote access

    dial-up modem

    pc

    facilitate maintenance and remote operations

    cyber vulnerabilities can result in business-

    related or safety/regulatory issues

    IT security technology will help with known

    Internet threats, but is not designed to secure

    control systems

    IT is responsible for cyber security but often

    does not understand control systems

    Control system suppliers understand control

    systems, but they are not security experts

  • 8/12/2019 A. K. MISHRA

    19/19

    Differences

    IT security policies such as ISO-17799 do notaddress the unique needs of control systems

    Remote access is important for the efficient

    operation of control systems

    vulnerability assessments and penetration testing

    of T&D and generation control systems lead tosuccessful breach in obtaining unauthorized access

    to SCADA and DCS

    In the near term, control system security can be

    enhanced by a combination of implementing cyber

    security procedures and utilizing IT technologiesto protect from traditional IT threats