alma y cuerpo en platon y descartes
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
1/15
Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes
Author(s): Sarah BroadieSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 101 (2001), pp. 295-308Published by: Wileyon behalf of The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545350.
Accessed: 26/11/2013 11:40
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
The Aristotelian Societyand Wileyare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=blackhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aristotelianhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4545350?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4545350?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aristotelianhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
2/15
XIV*-SOUL
AND
BODY IN
PLATO
AND
DESCARTES
by SarahBroadie
ABSTRACT
Althoughhey
re
often
rouped ogether
n
comparison
ith
on-
dualist
heories,
lato s
oul-body ualism,
nd
Descartes
mind-body ualism,
are
fundamentally
ifferent.he doctrinesxamined re thoseof the
Phaedo
and theMeditations.he main
difference,
rom
hich thers
low,
ies n
Plato s
acceptance nd Descartes ejectionf the
ssumption
hat he
oul
=
intellect)
is identical ithwhat nimates he
body.
W
henphilosophyeachersresent
he -ism s
ertinent
o
mind-body
elations,
nd are till t thebroad-brush
tage,
quite
often ne finds hem
pairing
lato and Descartes
s
the
twomost minent ualists f ourWestern radition. s Plato to
the
hrough-and-throughaterialist
emocritus,
o Descartes
o
Gassendi, t is often uggested-reasonably, erhaps.As the
modern on-reductive aterialisto his
Cartesian
ete
noir,
o
Aristotle o Plato on
soul-bodyrelations,
we are sometimes
told-a misleading
nalogy, ome
hink. or
thepurpose
fcon-
trastwith arious
non-dualistiews t
may
eemuseful o
group
Plato sdualism nd
that fDescartes ogether,nd n
many
on-
texts heir ifferences
ay
not matter. ut
if
one
simply
om-
pares
he heories ith ach
other,
otwith
ny
third
ystem,
he
differencesrefascinatingnd seem mportant.
Of coursethere re
similaritieso sustain he nitial
airing.
Both
philosophers
rgue hatwe consist f somethingncorpor-
eal,
whetherne
calls t mind r
soul ,which or he
ime eing
is
somehow nitedwith
body
hat
s
part
fthe
physical orld.
Both
identifyhe self,
he I , with he ncorporealmember f
this
lliance.
Both
hold
thatmy mindor soul will survive he
demise fthe
bodyby
which
am now
presento this
udience-
whichnturn spresent ome throughtsmembers odies.Both
1.
A
version f this
paper was
delivered s the2000 Foerster ecture n the mmor-
tality
f
the
Soul,
at
the
University
f
California t Berkeley.
*Meeting
f
the Aristotelian
ociety,held in Senate House, University f London,
on
Monday,
4th
June, 001,
at 4.15
p.m.
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
3/15
296
SARAH
BROADIE
may be
understood
s
holding hatthe mind
or soul can
exist
altogether
ndependently
f
body, though
Plato
may
have
changedposition n thispoint.2Bothare concernedwith he
immortality
f the oul.
Here shallfocus n
separability
f
mind r soul from
ody
in
Plato s Phaedo and Descartes Meditations. ut first
word
about terms. everal imes
lready
have
said mind r soul
as
if
thewords
meant he ame,
which
f course
hey
o not.
Plato
consistently
peaks
f
the oul
psuche?),
utnot o Descartes. n
his
preface
addressed
to
the
theologians
t the
Sorbonne
Descartes laims hathe willprove he mmortalityf the oul.
He is
using
he hurch s
abel for he
doctrine,
ut t s doubtful
thatwhathe
thought
e
could
prove
s
what hechurchmeans
by
the
phrase.
Roughly, suppose,
he church s
meaning
pot-
lights he
human
ndividualminus
biological
ody.
t
is this
thatcan sin and
be
forgiven,
s
summoned o the Last
Judge-
ment,
has
prayers
aid
for ts salvation.But
what Descartes
believed e could how sthe mmortalityfthemind r ntellect,
and
although he
mind,
s he
was for ver
tressing,
s
prone
o
error
nd shouldbe
expected o conduct tself
ccording
o an
intellectual
ode of conduct, ts
errors re
not
sins or offences
against
morality.
n
more
philosophical
ontexts
Descartes
explicitlyistinguishesindfrom
oul, reservingsoul for hat
which
nimates
he
body.
n
this enseof soul he
either enies
that
any such
principle
xists r reduces t to
a
physical
on-
figuration.hebiological ifferenceetween living ody nd a
corpse
s the
purely
hysical ifference
etween
machine
n
working
rder nd one
that s broken r
worn ut.
So what
Descartes s
left
with,
n
addition o
his machine-
body-if
his or
any
other
ody
even
exists,
which
t the
begin-
ning
of the
Meditations e calls
into doubt-is
a
mindwhose
business s to
think nd
imagine,
ut not to
animate
ny cor-
poreal
ystem. nd since t s
himselfhathe
finds
hinking,nd
sincehe sunable, omatter owhardhetries,odoubthisown
existence s
this
currentlyhinking
hing,
Descartes
dentifies
himself ith
hismind.
Butat
first e snot na
position o
assert
that
he,
or
the mind
that s
he, can exist
without he
body,
2. In
the
Timaeus t
s taken or
rantedhat he
world-soul ust
ave body;
nd
purified
uman
ntellectseturn
o
spatial ocations
n
stars.
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
4/15
SOUL
AND BODY
IN
PLATO
AND
DESCARTES
297
because
prima acie
t s
possible
hat hemind s xistence r
its
essential ctivityf
thinkingepends
n
body
n
some
way.
For
even houghheminddoes notrequire ody n theway nwhich
an
animating rinciple resumably
equires body
f
t s to
do
its
thing fanimatingomething,
hemindmay
depend
n the
body
n
some other
way, way
n
which,
o to
speak,
t
is the
body
that
gives
ifeto
the
mind,
much as an
arrangement
f
particlesgives
rise to a
magnetic
ield. Later
on, however,
Descartesmaintainshat
ccording
o hisclear nd
distinct
deas
of mind ndbody,neitherfthesenatures ontains rrefersothe
other.And meanwhile e takeshimselfo
have established
that
verythinge clearly nd
distinctlyerceives
s
true.
Hence
he can conclude
hatmind, nd
perhaps
oul
in
the
theological
sense,
s
separable
rom
ody,
which s
thebasis for
proving
he
mind r
soul mmortal.
Or,
more
precisely,
escartes an concludethat
mind
and
body
are
separable
rom
ach other nce he is free f his nitial
wholesale oubt oncerninghereal xistencefbody.Forobvi-
ously
f
thephysicalworld s
only
his
finite ind s
ream
bject,
neither
t
nor
any
of its
partscan exist
ndependently
f
that
dreaming.
nd in that
ase
it
may
not
be
easy
to show
that he
finitemind hatdreams uch a
dream-a dream n which
t
is
embodied
nd ts
body
s
part
f
physical
orld-can
be
free f
dreaming
his r other
reams ike t.But fwe
take he
opposite
hypothesis,
hat he
physical
orld
xists
ndependently,
hen his
world,especially he part of it that is Descartes body, can
reasonably e held
responsibleor
he ppearances f
thephysi-
cal that
re
present
o
Descartes
mind.
n
that ase it
s reason-
able to assume
hese ppearances ill
ease when
ody nd mind
actually eparate.
The
mindwill
thenbe
phenomenallynem-
bodied
s well
s
really
o.
But as
long
s it
s uncertain hether
the
physical
s real
ndependentlyf
thefinite ind,
ne
can
sup-
pose
that ither
hismindgenerates
he ppearances
rom tself,
orthey re caused n tbyGod. But since hefinitemind annot
be
separated
rom
God
any
more han t can be
separated
rom
itself,
n either f
thesehypotheseshe ause of the
ppearances
is
necessarilylways
with hat inite
ind-so
why hould t ever
be
withouthe
ppearances?
t
s
true hat n
the
ixthMeditation
Descartes
ays he can clearly nd
distinctly
nderstand imself
to
be a
complete
eing
ven
without is
faculty fsensory nd
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
5/15
298
SARAH
BROADIE
imaginational
ppearances.
rom hishe concludes hathe or
his
mindcan
existwithout hat
faculty
nd its
objects.
t
follows
from histhat thoseobjects, heempirical ppearances, rise
neither rom is own ntellectual aturenor
directly
romGod
who s
always resent o,
or even
n,
hismind.Thus Descartes s
only
one
stepaway
from
oncluding
hat he mmediate
ource
of
these ppearances
must e
somethingltogether
ifferentrom
mind,both from he finitemind hat s
Descartes
himself,
nd
from he nfinite indthat s God.
In
sum,
the
sourceof the
appearances
must e a
corporeal
ubstance,
real
physical
hingthat xistsndependentlyf Descartesmind.
But et us
stop
our thinker efore e takes hat ast
step,
nd
question
him about
his
premiss.
f
he
or
his mind
really
s or
would be a
complete eing
minusthe
faculty
f
sensory
nd
imaginational
ppearances, hy, y
his own
admission,
o
these
appearances
esethim
so? No doubt
they
ade
away
whenhe
completely
bsorbshimselfn
puremathematicsr
in
thoughts
aboutGod and aboutpurefinite ind,ftheres such things
pure
finitemind.But
n
Descartes
wn
experience
he
mpirical
appearances lways
return.
o
perhaps
t is
the nature f his
mind o
conjure
hem
p
for tself
gain
nd
again,
r to become
receptivegainand againto
these
ffectsaused
n him
by God.
If,
on
careful
eflection,ne can
consider
his
ossible,
escartes
is
mistaken
n
claiminghat hehuman
mind an
attain clear,
distinctnd
complete
dea
of
itself
s
existing
ree
f
empirical
appearanceso tself. hatthese ometimesecedewhen hemind
is
abstractly
ngaged
oes
not
prove
hat
heyre not
mong he
objectsnatural o it or
naturallyerved
p to
it
immediately
y
God. For
where s it
writtenhat ll
themind s
natural bjects
are
present
o
it at once?
Certainly, artesian
oubt can
save
Descartes
from
egardinghese
ppearances s anything
more
than
phenomenal,
uthe knows
rom
xperience
hat oubt an-
not
put
an
end to the
phenomena s such.
He
may always
be
saddledwith hem, hen, ven fonly s appearances ecognised
as
such.
n
this
ense, sortof
phenomenalist
ense, he
self s
body
and
physical nvironment
ay be as
immortal s the
human
mind.
Thus Descartes
deas of
himselfr
his mind re not,
think,
able to show
thatthe
humanmind
s in every
ense
separable
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
6/15
SOUL
AND
BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES
299
from
ody.
To show
this,
e must allback on
the
ndependent
attractivenessf the
thought
hat real or
externallyxisting
body s what ausesthe mpiricalppearances. his s ofcourse
an
independentlyttractive
hought
o
the
xtent hat
t
s unat-
tractiveo
suppose
hatGod
(whomDescartes as
by
now
pro-
ved
to exist
nd to be his
creator) eceives r
meanly
rustrates
a
finitemind
ike
that of Descartes.For
insofar s Descartes
cannothelp
taking
heempirical
ppearances o
be
of
ndepen-
dently
xisting
odies,
f
Descartes
were
lwaysmistaken
n this
thenGod wouldbe a deceiver;nd even fDescartes an break
out of
thedeception
y
meansof
systematic
oubt,
God would
be cruel n
making
he
escapedepend
n a
method o hardfor
the
humanmind.
So
if
one
is
a
Cartesian,
he
position
hat
mind s
separable
from
body,
not only
ontologically
ut
also
phenomenally,
s
secured y
meansof
two
conclusions:f
there s
any
such
thing
as a really
xisting
ody,
mind s not
existentially
ependent
n
it;and: body really xists nd is theseparable ause ofmind s
corporeal
xperiences.
I
wantnow
to
say something
bout
the
universalityf
Car-
tesian
eparability,nd
somethingbout what
unites he
separ-
ables while
they
are
together.
hese are
points on which
Descartes nd
Plato differ
undamentally.
irst,
niversality:
n
claiming
that
mind
and body
are
ontologically
eparable,
Descartes,
f
course, laims
much
more
han hat
givenmind
canexist partfrom given atural ody. eparabilitysguaran-
teed for
him
by the
essence
f
mind
n
general nd the
essence
of
body
n
general.
romhis
deas of
these ssences
e
believes
he can
see
that
mind-any
mind-can
exist
partfrom
ody-
any
body, ndvice
versa
Meditation ).
This
s in
linewith he
Church s
eaching,
ccording
o
which
very uman oul
comes
to
the
Last
Judgementither
trippedf
body
ltogether,r
with
a
sortofsupernaturalodythrough hich tcan communicateand
suffer,
ut
which
s not
et
n
a
natural hysical
nvironment
and is
not
subject o the
aws of
physical ature.
Phenomenal
eparability,s I am
calling t, s
likewise
niver-
sal for
he
Cartesian
nsofar s the
Cartesian
olds
thatmind s
such is
subject to
corporeal
appearancesbecause
and
only
because n
associated eal
body
auses
hem. t
follows rom
his
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
7/15
300
SARAH
BROADIE
premiss hat
for ny
mind
M, once
thecausal nexusbetween
M
and real
body
s
broken,
M is
automatically
eparated
ot
only
from ealbodybut also from ll corporealppearances.3
In
sum: both
ontologically
nd
phenomenally,
he
possibility
that
humanmind
s
inked o
corporeal
hings,
nd the
possibil-
ity
f tsnot being
hus inked, low rom henature ommon o
all
humanminds; nd a mind s ctual
inkage
r
non-linkage
s
or is
based on its
standing
r
not
standing
n
causal nexuswith
something
etaphysically
xternal o itself.ts
inkage
r not
to
corporeal
hings
s thereforeot
determined
y
any
nternal en-
tal disposition f itsown,still ess by anyinternal espectn
which
ne
particular
umanmind
may
differrom
nother,
or
example
n
respect
f
strong
nvolvement
n
a
certain
ype
of
pursuit. onsider
escartes imself
n
his unusual fnot
unique
enterprise
f
seeking ertainty
hrough oubt.This
extraordinary
practice
an
surely
e
described s a
letting o
of the
corporeal
perspective,nd it
leads
him,
r
so he
thinks,
o the
proof
hat
mind ndbody reontologicallyeparable. utthis roof pplies
even to minds
unk
n
ordinary abitsof
thinking, indsfor
which
Cartesian oubt s
meaningless
nd
impossible. nd this
proof s
not
performatively
iven
n
the
practice, ut
s
derived
from
ndependent
ruths hich he
practice
ncovers s suitable
startingoints.
huswhat
Descartes
roveswhen
he
proves
ep-
aration
ossible s a truth hat
wouldhold even f
no mind
ver
engaged
n
Cartesian
r similar
etachment.t surely
uits he
doctors forthodoxheologyhatDescartes resentshemwith
the
discovery
f
a truth
hat
s
likethe
ruths f
ogic nd
math-
ematics
nd Cartesian
hysics
n
that
t
holds no
matterwhat
any
of
us
may
think
r
feel bout
anything.
his
s by
contrast
with
any facts or
possibilities e
himselfmight
bring bout
through
mental
ctivity illed y him.
Now for
he
question f
whatunites he
Cartesian
eparables
when
hey
re
together.t is
not the finite
mind sown agency
thatconnectstwith bodywhich t thenfeels o be its own.
This
could
onlybe doneby an
act ofwill
on the
part f thefinite
mind.
But
although escartes
egards
is
will
as not restricted
in
anyway
Meditation), its
unrestrictedomain urns
ut to
3. For
Descartes these
include
memories
o
far as
the latterdepend on
images
grounded
n
the
body.
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
8/15
SOUL
AND BODY
IN PLATO AND DESCARTES 301
consist ntirely
f
propositions
o whichhe
may
choose not to
assentwhen hey ailto be clear and distinct.
his unrestricted
will s nota will obring nythingboutexcepttsownassertion
and denial
f
already
onstituted
ruthsnd
falsehoods.
or this
unrestricted
ill
belongs
o
Descartes
nsofar s he is
pure
ntel-
lect. On
its
own, therefore,
t cannot ake
as its
objects hings
that are sensed
or
imagined,
or
according
o Descartes
uch
things an be present
o the
mind
nly
when
t s
already
nited
with hebody.Consequently,he xplanation
or his nion
an-
notbe that hefinitemindwants rwills o be connected ith
particularody, r with
ome
particularody
r
other.
or
with-
out sense xperience
e couldnothave
an
idea,
either efinite
r
indefinite,
f
a
particular ody.
And
presumably
ny xplanation
in
terms f themind s
wanting
o
be connected
ith
ody
would
attend o what
t
feels
ike
to
have a
body-the
mind
wouldbe
assumed
o have a
sense
f
what
hat eels
ike,
nd
to
be
drawn
towards
corresponding
xistences
if t would
be
at
home
n
a
body.But for Descartes uchfeelingsnd the maginationf
them an
only
risewhen hemind
s
already mbodied,
o
they
cannot xplain
mbodiment.
Nor can we explain t by turningo body
by tself. bviously,
body by
itself s
powerless
o connect
tself
with mind.
Only
God,
a third
eing
f nfinite
ower,
an cause
by
his
will union
between ubstances
f
such
mutually
lien
natures
s mind nd
body.
Of course
very rrangement
f finite
hings epends
n
thewillofGod,butother rrangements,ayofbodywith ody,
fall within
natural ystem nd can be explained y familiar
secondaryauses ccordingo the ystem saws.Mindand body,
however,fall within no such single system, ccording to
Descartes; heir nion hereforepeaks
directlyfa supernatural
cause. On present howing, his ause is as differentrom inite
mind
s
it s from
inite ody, ince he
atter re bothdevoid f
thethird hing s ower o unite hem. n thisrespect, hefinite
mind s as passive nd inert s matters traditionallyupposed
to
be.
Let me now turn o Plato.
Readers
of
thePhaedo sometimesake Plato to task for on-
fusing
oul as mind
r
thatwhich
hinks, ith oul as thatwhich
animates
he
body. Perhaps
his
s
a
terriblemistake. ut it is
not
a
confusion
n
the sense of a blunder
ommittedn route
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
9/15
302 SARAH
BROADIE
to
something
lse. For the
dentification
f
thinking
oul
with
animatingoul is Plato s
theory
n
the
Phaedo.
In tryingo understandhis, nemighteem odiscern close
analogy
between
hinking
nd
animating
f
one identifies
hink-
ingwith
he xercise
f
ntelligence
nd
assumes,
s is
natural
or
many
eople, hat
hepractical
phere
s
the
renafor
xercising
intelligence.
or
the
person
f
practicalntelligence
s
switched
on to the
practical emands f his
situation
n a
way
not
unlike
the
way
n
which
perceptually
ensitive
rganism
s
switched
on to
signals
n
theenvironmentnd
its
own
body,4
nd
again
not unlike heway n which he lements f a physiologicalys-
tem
re switched n
and
off
by
chemical
ignals
n the
nterest
of
purely
iological nimation.
gain, omeonewho s
irrespon-
sive to
things
hat nterest
ost
people
may
be said
not to be
properlylive,
nd even
not to
be properly
nimating is
body.
In
saying his
we need
not mean thathe
functions elow
par
physiologically;
e
may
nstead e
regarding
is
body
s a
social
presence,
n
instrument
oraction and
communication,hich
comes to lifewhen ctivated. eing liveon this evelpresup-
poses
being biologically
live, and
for
most normal
human
beings,
eing
iologically
live
utomatically
esultsn
ife n the
level of
practice,
xcept
orwhenthey
re
sleeping.
hese two
modesof
being live are linked n
sucha
way
that,
ather
han
deeming
hem
nalogous,
ne
might,
more
primitively
erhaps,
fail
o
distinguishhem,
nd thus
onflate hat
hinks
ithwhat
animates hebody.
Plato s
view,
however,s quite
different,
ecauseforhimthe
paradigm
xercise f
ntelligence
s
theoreticalrat any
ratenot
immediatelyractical: t deals in
universalsnd
abstractions,t
is
conducted t leisure
rom
racticalife, nd it has
no
palpable
effects
xcept
n
the
houghts
f
oneself
nd a few
nterlocutors.
Plato
believes hat
he oul
thinks
estwhen
issociated
rom he
body.
He
has two
reasons: ne s
theobservation
hat
we cannot
engagenthekind fthinkinghat orhim sthinkingar excel-
lencewhen
we are
physicallyctive nd
attendingo goings n
in
our
bodiesand in
our
physical
nvironment;
nd the
other s
his
theory
hat
he oul has
latentwithin
t a
supremelyure nd
beautiful
ind
of
knowledge hich t
could only
have
come by
4.
Thus
phronein
=
to
have one s wits
about one )
ranges n meaning
rom to be
sane
to
to
be conscious .
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
10/15
SOUL
AND
BODY
IN PLATO
AND DESCARTES
303
before
irth
nto
a
body.
Since
the
thinking
oul is at its
best
when
n
full
ontactwith he objectsof
this
knowledge,
lato
concludes hat he bestthing hat anhappen o this oul is to
be
separated
rom
odyupon
death.
So far ne
might
hink hatPlato s
thinking
oul
cannot
oss-
iblybe what
nimates he body;
for t seems bsurd o
suggest
that
omethingoth nimates body nd is a
pure
ntellecthat
functions
estaway from he body. But
in
fact,
he belief hat
the
soul is
an intellect hatfunctions estaway
from
ody
s
precisely ne
of two assumptionshat ie at thebase of Plato s
equationof intellect ith nimator. he secondassumptions
that
his
elf-samentellects also intimatelyonnected ith he
body.
The
argument
or his s mediated
y
the
concept
f
the
self.On the one hand it is natural or
Socrates
nd his inter-
locutorsn the
Phaedo o identify
hemselves ith heirntellects.
After
ll,
if
you
are Socrates nd
I am
Simmias
n
the
Phaedo,
then
what re you and
I
engaged n
if
not
paradigmatic
ntellec-
tion,while
minimallysing urbodies o exchange urthoughts?
Ifwe couldthink t our bestwithoutver xchanginghoughts,
or
could
exchange houghts y some non-physical eans, hen
we as
intellects
ouldnotneedbodies
t all. On theother and,
though, ach
one
of
us knowshimselfo be in or ntimately
on-
nectedwith
body.And Socrates
riends now his fSocrates,
or
whywouldthey read osing
ocrates nce
his
physical eath
has
been
decreed? o the elf hat s Socrates ntellect
s
the elf
bound
up
with
his
body.
And the
fact hat
n
this ife he soul
functionsestas intellect hen east nvolvednbodily ctivity
and
sensation,
ogether ith he
doctrine hat
he
oul s ntellec-
tual
activity asat its absolute est
when he oul was attached
to
no body,now
stronglyoints o
theconclusion hat ntellec-
tual activity
axes as bodily
nvolvement anesand viceversa.
And
since t
is natural o think f
bare biological nimation
s
the imiting
ase of a soul s bodily
nvolvement,nd as the
basic
form
whichmore complicated
orms-the ones expressed n
actions ndemotions-depend n andpresuppose,t s not dif-
ficult
o draw
he
furtheronclusion
hat he oul that an func-
tion
s pure
ntellects the ameas the oul thatkeeps he
body
alive.5
5. If
bare biological nimation
s thought
f as continuous n kind
with
ntelligent
physical ctivity
uch s playing
ennis r cooking, t will
eem
plausible hat
heoreti-
cal
contemplation
t its fullest ependson
suspension f
animation,
ince t seems o
be
a fact, nd not a
merely
ontingentne, that ttention
sed
in
theoretical
ontem-
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
11/15
304
SARAH
BROADIE
But now if
one and
the same
entity,
he
soul,
can
function
both as unembodied
ntellectnd as
animator
f a
body,what
determinest to one of thesefunctions ather han the other?
And since
hey re
alternatives,
nd
the oul
s
capable
of
both,
is neither
unctionssential
o
it,
any
more han
piece
of
wax
is
essentiallyhe hapeof ball
or
essentially
he
hape
ofa
cube?
But f
neither unction
s
essential
o the
oul,
we havebeen
told
nothing f the soul s
nature. f,
on the other
hand,
both
are
essential, hatunites hem?
According o the
theory
f the
Phaedo,
the soul
becomes
involvedwith bodybecause t desires o live n a way nwhich
it
only
an
if
t has a
body
of
suitable ind.
To
beginwith, er-
haps,the
oul s notoriented o
anyvery
pecificetof physical
activities
r pleasures, ince t
has no
experience f any. So to
begin
with
perhaps
ll
that
t
takes o involve soul with
body
is
the oul s
failure o
understand
r
fully elieve hat ts xistence
can be
complete s a
pure ntellect. ot
realizing his, t
feels
incomplete,nd thisbreeds hedesire or ome non-intellectual
activity;
nd
lo and
behold
he
oul findstself ith
body,
nd
presumably physical
nvironment,f a sort
hatwould
enable
it
to live n
theway t
thought
ouldbring t
completeness,ut
which n
fact, f
course, oesnothing f the
kind.Now
it is in
the
bodyof a human
eing, r
perhaps
humanmale, nd if t
continues o
misunderstandts own original
ature-which s
easier
now for t to do, since t
has come to
feel t home
n an
actualphysical xistence,nd to becomehabituated o various
kinds f
embodied
leasures-then t seeks o be in a
body, nd
always bodythat
wouldbest
express heway t wants
o live.
So
on
physical eath, soul n
this tate s
reincarnated,
erhaps
as
another uman
eing, ut also
perhaps so Plato held,
o the
great
mbarrassmentf someof
his admirers)
s a lower
nimal,
say
a
pig or
wolf
whose
wallowing r raveningife-style
leshes
out
the
oul s most
precious revious esires.6
lternatively,he
plation
s attention
aken
wayfrom
ntelligent
hysical
ctivity,
nd
viceversa.
lato
models
ntellection
n
dreaming,
hich
he oul s
free o
do only
whennot
governing
the
imbs nd
perceiving
hrough
he sense
organs n
waking ife cf.
the
Hippocratic
treatiseOn
Dreams
Regimen
V],
86).
However,
Plato
then urns
hings
oundwith
his
familiar
ictum
hat he
waking
world s
that f
the
ternal
ntelligibles,
he
dream
world
thatof
everydayife.
6.
Aristotle
was
unfair
f
he
meant
o
includePlato
in his
criticismf the
Pythagor-
eans for
ssigning
any
chance soul
to
any
chance body
De
Anima
3,407b
20-24).
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
12/15
SOUL
AND
BODY IN
PLATO AND DESCARTES
305
embodied oul
may
ncline
owards
isembodiment,
nd
achieve
it
or
come closer o
achieving
t
by
practising
ts
ntellectuality
andrejectinghysicalndworldlynthusiasms.his s why,n
the
Phaedo,
bout-to-dieocrates ries o
comfort
is
friends
y
telling
hem hat f
death
s the
eparation
f
soul from
ody,
he
philosopherhould e
glad
to
die,
ince he
philosopher
as
ived
his presentife
gladly
ractising
or
death
by
losing
himself
o
intellectual
ctivity.
In
Plato,then, he
question f
separability
f soul from
ody
is not a
simple ne. In the
first
lace,
every
mbodied oul is
separablefrom ts current ody,since the soul is immortal,
whereas
nygiven
ody
will
wearout.
Secondly,
very
oul
s
in
principle
eparable rom ody
altogether,
ince
very
mbodied
soul is
in
principle,
r at least
by
virtue
f
its
original
ature,
able to refine
tself o the
pointwhere t wants
nothing
hat
body
can
provide.
However, aying
his s a bit
like
saying:
human beings
by
nature an live
withoutheroinor
cocaine;
heroin nd
cocaine ddicts
re human
eings y
nature;
herefore
they an live without eroin r cocaine.Granted heyhave the
capacity,
hey
ack the
power
to exercise t as
of
now,
ust
as
humanbeings
by
contrastwith
bull-frogsave
the
capacity o
speak
severaldifferent
anguages,
ut someone
who has never
learnt
foreignanguage
acks
the
bility o exercise his
human
capacity.
n
this
ense, ome
mbodied
ouls annot ive
eparate
from
body
suitedto
their
desires,while
others,
minority
perhaps,
an.
According othis icture,hebody s simplyhe nstrumentf
the
oul,
view
hat
Aristotleoo would
ndorse
t one
stage f
his
career.
hat
s, the ouldoes
not
depend n the
body xcept
to do
through
t
somethinghat t
wants
o do. Thus t
fashions
and
animates
ts
body
for
he
ake of physical
ction,
ensation
and
experience.hat
the oul can do
this f
t
choosesgoes along
with
he
thought, hichwe find
gain
and
again
n
Plato, that
thesoul is divine r godlike.Thismeansthat n itselft has a
sort f
imited
mnipotence.
f
t
wills r really
esires
certain
kind
of ife or
tself,ts
will s
done
even f t wills
what s bad
for t:
automaticallyt comes o
be
equipped
withwhat s neces-
sary.
But once t
s
in
a body, f
course,
what t can
bring bout
is
limited
y
the
nature f ts
body nd
the
nvironment.
So to
answer
our
earlierquestions
bout
the
essence of
soul-the
soul
for
Plato s
essentially valuing
ower:
power
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
13/15
306 SARAH
BROADIE
to
create
nd maintain or tself
he ife t
truly
esires
nd
thinks
good,along
with hat
ifestyle s
ccoutrements
r freedom
rom
accoutrements.tspurelyntellectualunctionnd itsbody-ani-
mating
unction
epresentifferentents
r inclinations.f we
consider oul
n
general
nd
n
the
bstract,
t s
presumably
on-
tingent
hether
oul
s
embodied,
nd
embodied
his
way
or
that,
or
whether
t s
pure
ntellect.
hat
s essential nd
fundamental
is soul s
determinability,n fact
elf-determinability,
n
contrary
ways. f,
however,
e consider n individual
oul,
tsdeterminate
condition-its
being
embodiedor
not,
and if
embodied hen
how-is all butfundamentalor his ndividual. or on theone
hand
this condition eflectshe
individual s
urrently
earest
values,
nd
on
theotherhand it
affects
lmost verythinghe
individual oes andexperiences
n
itscurrent
ife.
We
maywonder ow the oul is
supposed o take
on
a
body.
Plato
says ittle
boutthis.At one pointhe
seems o
suggest hat
the
soul
weaves a
bodyfor tself.7
ertainly e does not want
to implyhat he oul has hands nd moves shuttleo and fro.
The
idea presumablys that
the soul informs
ertainmaterials
which n
its presence row
and organise
hemselvesnto the
requisite ody.A
previously
mbodied oul
may tartwith ome
matter
rom ts
previous
ody.8 lato showsno
sign
of
holding
that
he oul
creates ts
body
x
nihilo.
Some
philosophers
might
alk at
the
dea
that
the
soul has
power
to
re-arrange
atter.
hey
might,
f
they ccepted he
existence f the soul at all, feel more comfortable ith the
thought
hat the soul
actuallydreams ts body and
physical
environment.
ome work
would henhaveto
be done
to
explain
whether,nd
f
o,
how, ouls
dreaming ifferent
hysical reams
nonetheless
n
some
ense hare world
with ach
other. utthis
is not
Plato s
problem,
or
he does
not strike ut
in
the
dealist
direction.
It
is
sometimes
uggested
hatone needsto have
been bitten
bythebugofexternal-worldcepticismefore necan seriously
consider
dealism.
ertainlyhebug of
external-world
cepticism
did
not
get
o
Plato. But
there
s
somethinglse one
shouldbear
7.
Phaedo
87b-e. The
weaving
dea
occurs s part
of a
view
that
s
rejected,
ut
what
is
rejected s not
the
weaving, ut
the
thought
hat, s with
an actual
weaver, he
soul might
ease to
existbefore
wearing ut its
final oat.
8. Cf.
Phaedo
80c-81c.
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
14/15
SOUL AND BODY
IN PLATO AND DESCARTES
307
in mindwhen
onsidering
lato ssilence n these
reat uestions
of
modern hilosophy.
he
fact s
that
rom he
point
f
view
f
Platonic thical oncern, hichs a pointof viewthatpervades
most
of
the
dialogues,
t makes
no
difference
hether he
soul
choosesto
dream,
nd thenbecomes ddicted o
dreaming,
ts
embodiment,
r whethert chooses nd
then
becomes ddicted
to lifemediated
y
a
real, ndependently
xisting,ody
n
a real
physical
nvironment.9hereas orDescartes
hismakes
ll the
difference-one ay God is a deceiver,
he other
way
not-for
Plato eitherway the
soul
in
questiongets
what
t
wants,
nd
is just as misguidedn wantingt if thebodyturns ut to be
independently
eal as it wouldbe
if
thebody
were ts
fantasy.
I
have been
comparing
lato s
argument
n the Phaedo
with
Descartes
n
the Meditations
hat
oul is
separable
rom
ody.
Let
me
end by
comparing
ome of thewider
purposes
f
those
arguments.lato offershe
rgument
f thePhaedo
s,
inter
lia,
an instance nd
example
f
thekindof
ntellectualxercise hat
loosens the human soul s attachmento its body. Since the
attachmenteflects
he
oul s
misunderstanding
fthe
rue
ature
of
happiness,
hePhaedo
argument,
or
hosewho enter nto
t,
is
an
exercise
n
soul-saving. y contrast, hat
Descartesdis-
coverswhen he
discovers is reasonsfor
declaring
he mind
separable
rom he
body s entirely ifferent
rom he ntellec-
tualization e himself
ndergoes
n order
o reach
heproof.
And
he cannot
overtly,
ven f
he
is
inclined o
inwardly,laimthis
refinements a sortof soul-saving ithout unning oulof the
religion f his time.For although his
religion iffered ithin
itself n how
muchfaith ountsfor
alvation, nd how much
works, hese
were
the
onlyoptions
onsidered,nd Descartes
activity
oes
not
come
under ither.
nstead,
is
avowedpurpose
in
following
he
path
of the
Meditationsrom
oubt
to
himself,
and from
imselfo the
God
who s not
deceiver,s
to
establish
something
irm
nd
lasting
n
the
sciences ,10.e. mathematics
andmathematicalhysics.
This is
an
extremelyuzzling emark f it means that these
sciences
ail
s sciencesf
hey
annot e
renderedndubitable
y
9.
Plato can of course
make this
distinctionven f,
s
I
am arguing,t
does not carry
forhim
burning uestion;but the
word real
used as above
would presumably ot
be
his
tool
for
making t,
since
his
realia are
immutable orms.
10.
Meditation
,
first
aragraph.
This content downloaded from 200.26.133.140 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:40:07 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/11/2019 Alma y Cuerpo en Platon y Descartes
15/15
308
SARAH
BROADIE
an
argument
hat
first
oubts nd thenreinstatesheclear
and
distinct
deas
on
which
uch
nquiries epend.
or
the
mathema-
tician sperformances such s not ess clearor less accuratef
he lacks a
proof
o
the
effect
hat
although
he
most
rigorous
mathematics
onceivable
o man
can
be
doubted,
onethelessn
the
end
we
are
theologicallyustified
n
accepting
hem.
But
surely escartes
hope
s not to makethemathematician
more
successful
athematician,
ut
rather
o
show
the
rest f us that
mathematical
cience
n
ts
own
phere arries he ame
uthority
as divine
evelation
n
ts, ince oth omefrom he ame
ource.
Rightly nderstood,hepractice f such bstracttudies, hough
nota
religiousxercise,s
not secular ither, or t
expresses od
as
reason
or
the natural ight. lato
would surely ave
agreed
that
t s not
secular,
uthe
couldnot
have magined hehistori-
cal
context hat
made
t so
important
or
omeone n
Descartes
position
o
distinguishriest nd
mathematicalcientist,n
effect
postulating
t leasttwokinds f
higher alling , ne
devoted o
faith,heother oreason.
Princeton niversity
1879 Hall
Princeton, J
08540
U.S.A.