almeida, paulo roberto - lula's grand diplomacy

8/4/2019 Almeida, Paulo Roberto - Lula's Grand Diplomacy

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Never Before Seen in Brazil: Luis Incio Lula da Silvas

grand diplomacyNnc ns vs n Brsl: grn plc Ll

PauLo RoBeRto de aLmeida*

South America was not enough: Luis Incio Lula da Silvagoes out into the world

Has Brazil already attained the status o a global power, as sought by LuisIncio Lula da Silvas diplomacy? Or, despite all his eorts, does it remain a mereregional power? Those two questions were, almost obsessively, at the center oLulas entrepreneurial diplomacy, or the whole duration o his administration(2003-2010). The questions are still open.

Global power status, as is well known, is not a matter o national choice,

or an issue subjected only to the political will o the actors involved in what isa complex and interrelated equation. It depends on a complete set o objectiveactors connected with economic strength, technological endowments andmilitary capabilities as well as on a clear recognition o that status by otheractors, rst o all by the general consensus o the international community, butespecially by the great powers.1 This recognition is usually linked to primarysources o power Russia and China clearly t the pattern but it can also beassociated with other attributions and types o participation in world aairs cooperation, deense o human rights and democracy, etc.

According to those criteria, Brazil cannot be recognized, yet, as a globalpower, as it lacks some o the capabilities linked to those pre-conditions, with anemphasis on nancial and military capabilities. Neither is it acknowledged as suchby the world community. Much o the talk about Brazils new role is due to itsactive diplomacy under Luis Incio Lula da Silva, together with the deployment

* PhD in Social Sciences and Brazilian career diplomat ([email protected]).

1 Some o the questions debated in this essay have been already dealt with in other articles by the author,namely: Brazil in the world context, at the rst decade o the 21 st century: regional leadership and strategiesor its integration into the world economy, In: Joam Evans (org.), Brazilian Deense Policies: Current Trends

and Regional Implications (London: Dunkling Books, 2009), p. 11-26; Lulas Foreign Policy: Regional andGlobal Strategies, In: Werner Baer and Joseph Love (eds.), Brazil under Lula (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan,2009), p. 167-183; Poltica exterior: potencia regional o actor global, In: Brasil Emerge, Vanguardia Dossier(Barcelona: La Vanguardia, n. 36, Jul-Sept., 2010), p. 68-72.

Rv. Brs. Pl. in. 53 (2): 160-177 [2010]


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neveR BefoRe seenin BRazil: luis incio lulada silvasgRanddiPlomacy

o external cooperation towards poor countries in Arica and Latin America(eorts labeled, by the President himsel, as the diplomacy o generosity). But,Brazils association with some less commendable actors such as Iran or Cuba as well as its poor record on human rights questions, an issue which clearly

diminished in importance in Lulas time, has weakened its credentials in terms othe expectations o public opinion.

But even on a more limited regional basis, it is also probably an exaggerationto count Brazil as a South American natural leader, or reasons other than adesire or grandeur. Notwithstanding the act that it lls almost completelythe objective criteria to be recognized as such territorial, economic anddemographic dimensions; size o internal markets; presence in external markets;concentration and diversication o investments; level o industrial development;the most advanced technological basis on the continent; its already large direct

investment fows in neighboring countries; and, o course, military capabilities Brazil does not yet enjoy some o the subjective criteria linked to that status,the most important o those being the willing acceptance by the neighboringcountries o such a role. Not only Argentina and Colombia, the two othermiddle-level powers in South America, but also the smaller countries, are not yetready to accept Brazil as their regional representative or want it to act as a kindo an unelected speaker on their behal. Unortunately, big countries are seldomappreciated in their regions.

This lack o natural leadership derives not only rom historical reasons the act that Brazil is the sole Portuguese-speaking country within a Spanishenvironment, and that it emerged as a monarchy in the 19th century, in arepublican continent but also rom negative contemporary actors, such asthe traditional links it has maintained with developed countries in Europe andNorth America at the expense o its interactions with South American neighbors.Huge Brazilian direct investments and many diplomatic initiatives have beenundertaken in recent years in practically all South American countries, but thishas not been enough to change the lack o enthusiasm or Brazils role as a leader.

Notwithstanding its importance in the regional context and its growingrole and presence in some questions on the international agenda especiallyin multilateral trade policies and WTO negotiations, and environmental aairs,among others it would be a little premature to count Brazil among the majorpowers in the world. An objective evaluation o Brazils current limited capabilitiesalso has to recognize brilliant prospects or the medium term: Brazil is already anemerged country, but still an emerging economy and a power broker. The acto the general discussion about its greater role on the world diplomatic agendashould be acknowledged as a real accomplishment or President Luis Incio Lula

da Silva.Any assessment o his diplomacy has to start rom the act and this is

its distinctive character that it does not ollow the traditional patterns o


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proessional diplomatic practices, but rather its own Workers Party, the PTs,ideological choices and political inputs. Those party preerences have let theirmarks heavily in the oreign policy o Brazil in a manner never seen beore 2003.Accordingly, we shall rst review the said innovation in Brazilian oreign policy,

both in terms o doctrine and o political orientation, and then move to the mainissues o the diplomatic agenda. Lulas diplomacy was not only conceived andapplied more in line with party politics than with State considerations, but ithas also served much more his own motivations or personal aggrandizement inworld scenarios than Brazils national interests.

Shoes and sovereignty: the rhetoric of a sectarian Party diplomacy

For the rst time in decades, or ever, Brazilian oreign policy was conceived

and conducted under the overriding infuence o non-proessional diplomats. ThePTs oreign policy was the dominant element in Brazilian oreign policy since thebeginning o the da Silva government, but not in a structured manner, as the PTnever produced a structured or a complete set o conceptions and solutions orBrazils international relations. The party always had a poor theoretical structure,simply relying on Gramscian gures rom academia or the preparation o moresophisticated papers and proposals relating to economics and political lie. Butthe core o its thinking i one can indulge it with such a description isa conused mixture o typical (and stereotypical) Latin-American letism withold-style nationalism and anti-imperialism, with brushes o Castroism, Stalinism,Trotskyism, and Liberation Theology belies.

From the standpoint o its organizational structures, the PT is a quasi-Bolshevik party, albeit without the old apparatchik apparatus o a Soviet-styleCommunist party. In the beginning, its core sta was ormed mainly by: (a)alternative trade-unionists, who started by rejecting the traditional trade-unionslinked to the Ministry o Labor, but who have quickly adapted to the fow o easymoney provided by the compulsory labor tax (the act o creating new trade unions

is a prosperous industry, and the practice has enormously prospered underLula); (b) old guerrilla-ghters, or semi-proessional revolutionaries, recycledinto party politics (albeit keeping some old habits rom their previous clandestinelie, and liaisons with Cuba in particular); and, (c) religious movements, such asthe letist Liberation Theology and ecclesial communities.

The PTs ideology is a mixture o old style socialist credo, prior to theall o Berlin wall, and o social-democratic economic belies (mostly o a purelyredistributive character). In act, many o the sects that make up PT are still truebelievers in socialism, and are die-hard statists who still trust in the merits o a

planned economy. For all purposes, they are anti-capitalists, anti-imperialists, andnaturally, anti-Americans, as almost all o the letist Latin-American parties are.Some o the PT apparatchiks were trained and instructed by Cuban intelligence


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ocers, which can explain their loyalty to Cubas goals in Latin America, suchas the organization o the So Paulo Forum (the FSP), a Cuban-sponsoredcoordinating mechanism or all letist parties in the region which until 2005included members o the Colombian FARC.2

The PTs main guidelines in oreign policy were established by thoseinvolved in its international relations, starting with the who had apparatchiksthat lived in exile during the military regime (1964-1985). Some o themhappened to enjoy the condence o their Cuban mentors, a act that exertedsome infuence in the denition and implementation o their oreign policy,when the time arrived. The uture President himsel who, as a trade unionistand leader o metalworkers, developed links with counterparts in Cuba, in theUSA, and in Europe came to understand better the intricacies o internationalpolitics; his qualitative leap, the one that was decisive or his own personal lie

and or the political itinerary o Brazil, was to create in 1980, with the help oormer guerrilla ghters, a political party that was to represent a departure romtraditional politics and trade-unionism in Brazil.

Nevertheless, the PT always was, and continues to be, a consortium oletists, engaged actively in the partys cause, which is not exactly a national causeaccording to the normal lines o a parliamentary or even a presidential democracy.The PT has always relied on mass politics or popular organizations, like studentsassociations, labor unions or peasant movements, which it controlled. Its concepto democracy is merely instrumental: everything that serves the major objectiveo holding power or the party ts its philosophy and practices. Adhering to aCuban agenda, it is not surprising i human rights or democracy do not occupyhigher levels in this kind o diplomacy. This eature has to be considered as themajor political component o Brazilian oreign policy during Luis Incio Lula daSilvas government.

Bizarre friendships and new trade geography: Luis IncioLula da Silvas international policy

Two main objectives have marked, in a somewhat contradictory manner,Brazilian oreign policy under Luis Incio Lula da Silva: the preservation onational sovereignty and the strengthening o regional integration in South America, the latter being a continuation o policies already implemented byprevious governments. The ormer, that is, the sovereign presence o Brazil in theworld, would have to be decreased i the latter is to be reinorced, as exclusivelynational policies in sectors such as industry, agriculture, or even trade policy have to accommodate the choices being made in avor o regional integration. Its

2 Minutes o the regular meetings o the FSP, since its oundation, in 1990, up to 2007, with evidence othe participation o the Colombian narco-terrorist group FARC, can be ound at this website: http://www.midiasemmascara.org/arquivo/atas-do-oro-de-sao-paulo/7.html, accessed on 20th October 2010.


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priorities were established in three main areas: the reorm o the United NationsCharter and Brazils accession to a permanent seat on its Security Council; thenalization o multilateral trade negotiations, with a preerential option or therelationship with the European Union, instead o the conclusion o the American

project o a hemispheric ree trade area (FTAA), strongly opposed by the PTand other letist movements; the reinorcement o Mercosur and its extensionto other countries in South America, starting with Chile and other SouthernCone countries, such as Bolivia. Other priorities comprised the establishmento a strong relationship with selected strategic allies, designated as being non-hegemonic countries, namely China, Russia, India, and South Arica, the lasttwo orming part o the IBSA orum, the rst three organized along the linesproposed in the Goldman Sachs study on the BRIC countries.

All these moves ollowed the so-called South-South diplomacy and the desire

to create a new geography o world trade and strengthen the democratizationo international relations, without imperial arrogance and hegemonicunilateralism. In terms o tools to accomplish those objectives, it is not dicult torecognize the high quality o Brazilian proessional diplomacy. Brazils diplomaticGDP is greater than its economic GDP, and the latter is certainly greater than itsmilitary GDP, in other words, its capacity or projecting power abroad. Indeed,Brazils infuence in diplomatic negotiations is more important than its actualpresence in the world, as compared, or instance, to its participation in trade andnancial fows (as a recipient o oreign capital and know-how, and a modestinvestor abroad). Brazils proessional diplomatic skills make it a relevant actorand sometimes a broker in important multilateral trade negotiations (despite itsminor role in nancial or trade areas).

Nevertheless, Brazils infuence in the new global interdependence is beinghandicapped by its mixed eelings toward globalization, and this is reinorcedby the PTs leading role in its diplomacy, as the party combines an old-stylenationalism with deensive policies in the industrial and investment sectors,including trade protectionism and the promotion o substitutive industrialization.

For many o its political leaders and obviously or all the letists in the da Silvagovernment globalization is just another name or Americanization, which theyreject and even despise because o their supercial nationalism and instinctiveprotectionism. It is true that Brazil, in promoting Mercosur, has abandoned theworst aspects o its hard-core protectionism rom the 1950s up to the 1980s,but entrepreneurs and the political elite maintain the same old eelings o thedependency school, a mixture o developmental Keynesianism and a vagueThird World ideology demanding a new international economic order.

Policy reorms, in line with the Washington Consensus o the 1990s,

and the Cardoso administrations more receptive attitude toward globalization,brought Brazil more in line with mainstream economics, promoting economicopening and trade liberalization. But, starting with Luis Incio Lula da Silvas


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government, those policies were somewhat reversed, i not taken back to the olddays o Latin American Structuralism, identied with Raul Prebisch and CelsoFurtado, ormer guardians o this heterodox school. This reversal in diplomaticguidelines was presented as a renewal with the Independent Foreign Policy o

the early 1960s, when it was in act only the result o nostalgia or old times.Many o the new maniestations o this sovereign diplomacy have been

ocused in consolidating alliances with a ew selected partners in the Third World,mainly large emerging countries, notably India, South Arica and China, with theaddition o Russia to the process, as it is considered to be an anti-hegemoniccounter-power. Great eorts have been made to achieve the goal o insertingBrazil into the inner sanctum o the UN Security Council, an initiative that servedto arouse the opposition o Argentina and other competitors. Another goal, thato strengthening and expanding Mercosur, with the inclusion o new partners in

South America has, in act, resulted in the dilution o its trade rules and in anoverextension o social pacts, which have little meaning or real integration.

In parallel with the so-called diplomacy o generosity in Latin America toconsolidate a sel-ascribed Brazilian leadership in the region, a role always rejectedby proessional diplomacy, mindul o its negative tones the PT governmenttook initiatives to isolate United States in the region and enlarge the sphere o sel-coordination among Latin American or South American countries. It started byreusing in act sabotaging the FTAA initiative, proposed by President Clintonin 1994, an act undertaken by a joint action by Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela.This policy was also pursued through a series o proposals or the establishment onew bodies uniting exclusively South or Latin American countries. One o themwas aimed at submitting the Colombian-US agreement or cooperation against thenarco-guerrillas to a detailed scrutiny by a new consultation mechanism proposedby Brazil: the South American Deense Council, itsel part o a larger structure, theUnion o South American Nations (Unasur).

In February 2010, or instance, with total support rom Brazil, a LatinAmerican unity Summit decided the double establishment o the new Community

o Latin American and Caribbean States, which replaced the ormer Rio Group(1986), and o a Latin American Summit on Integration and Development,also created by a Brazilian initiative in December 2008. For the rst time in200 years, it was said, Latin American countries were meeting without anykind o guardianship, that is, exempt rom any infuence rom the empire andully integrating Cuba into the coordinating and consultation mechanisms. Theexclusion o the empire was presented as a success, a rst in Latin Americanhistory, as Brazilian diplomacy acquired the capacity to say no.

The anti-American orientation o those actions was very clear, not only or

ideological reasons, a eature which might be normally expected rom a typicalletist Latin American party, such as PT, still proud o its Cuban links and itssolidarity with liberation movements. It was also welcomed as a misguided


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eeling that integration under the aegis o imperialism o ree-trade (as the American initiatives were labeled) would rather correspond to a project oannexation, instead o a symmetrical integration. It was on behal o that creedthat many other initiatives were taken, including the deliberate sinking o the

regional negotiations or a hemispheric ree trade area and the rustrated proposalor a South American ree trade area (which did not prevent some countries romsigning bilateral trade agreements with the US).

Paradoxically, Brazil was accused o being imperialist, and has been asked,in consequence, to pay the costs o the asymmetrical situation created by itsvery huge presence. Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, other countries even Argentina orced Brazil to accept new and very generous terms or the reinorcemento their relationship: Bolivia nationalized oil and gas resources exploited by theBrazilian state company Petrobras; Paraguay required additional payments or

its share o electricity generated by the bi-national hydro-electric plant at Itaipu;Argentina unilaterally imposed saeguards and other deensive trade restrictionson a number o Brazilian manuactured goods that would be normally exportedthrough the ree-trade area o Mercosur; Uruguay and other countries, includingVenezuela wanted investments or nancing rom Brazil.

During previous administrations, proessional diplomacy conductedbilateral relations with the United States under normal assumptions o cooperationand consultation without any ideological misconceptions about what is usuallycalled American hegemonic pretensions. The PTs diplomacy reverted to thenormal anti-imperialism (together with some anti-Americanism) o the oldLatin American let. Dealing cautiously with American interests in the worldand in the region during its rst mandate, the da Silva government exhibited amore assertive anti-hegemonic stance in its second mandate, developing (at leastrhetorically) some conrontational positions in relation to American interests inthe global scenario; political conficts over specic issues were always avoided anddirect opposition never allowed to arise, but a more assertive behavior, connectingBrazil with other non-hegemonic emerging powers, was allowed to develop (in

act, was explicitly promoted).

Too much transpiration, less inspiration: Luis Incio Lula da Silvasdiplomacy in action

Intentions and proclamations aside, diplomacy under Luis Incio Lula daSilva has to be evaluated according to its concrete results or lack thereo in the many subjects that mobilized the attention o the proessional sta othe Foreign Service, under the triple guidance o the Presidential Assistant, the

Minister and his Secretary-General, with the clear approval and the appreciationo the President himsel. Among those issues, the ollowing protracted the mostattention rom all these actors during the period under consideration: the UN


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Security Council; alliances with strategic partners; Mercosur and related issueso regional integration; the relationship with Argentina; Brazils leadership inSouth America and regional blocs; the WTO and multilateral trade negotiations;relations with other emerging powers and the international role o Brazil. For

some o these issues, the PT already had its own policies; or others, it ollowedthe ocial diplomatic line, distorting it or its own purposes.

The United Nations Security Council: a long-standing obsession

Despite a vague mention related to the reorm o international organizations,the issue was never a priority in the PTs guidelines on Foreign Policy but it was apet subject or the Foreign Minister, who had a long career in multilateral orumsand a personal attraction or international security matters; he transmitted this

interest to the President, who promptly excepted the idea that Brazil was ready toenter the inner sanctum o the United Nations. This issue is notoriously dicult,and Brazil engaged vast resources human, diplomatic, nancial in lobbyingother countries or the purpose o reorming the UN Charter and enlarging itsSecurity Council. The remarkable degree o acceptance o Luis Incio Lula daSilva by the international media and other world leaders all o whom, with theexception o George Bush, invited him to the annual G8 meetings convincedthe President that the idea was not only easible but attainable, despite someopposition rom regional partners (most vocierously, Argentina and Mexico).

Brazilian initiatives took various orms. With other developing countries,bilateral debt write-os were oered to the poorest countries, but sometimes evento oil exporters like Gabon. With the other candidates (Japan, Germany, andIndia), a G4 was created to support one o the proposals put orward by ormerUN Secretary General Ko Annan. Brazil never reached an agreement withtwo key actors in this process, USA and China, who continuously opposed anysubstantial reorm o the international body. For the sake o its great objective,Brazil assumed a commanding role in the pacication process o Haiti, engagingconsiderable resources in the task o nation-building that went clearly beyond

the countrys traditional participation in peacekeeping missions. Also, to enhanceBrazils international presence, the President ordered the opening o permanentembassies in almost all Arican countries and in all the Latin American states,even in the smallest islands o the Caribbean, all with very limited results inpractice. Despite rhetorical support or his pretention, expressed in many bilateralcommuniqus along his mandate, the President was continuously rustrated.

Alliances with strategic partners (Argentina, China, India, South Africa)

Luis Incio Lula da Silvas diplomacy believed that countries such as Brazil,Argentina, China, South Arica and India not only share common values and thesame objectives in the world system, but also have relatively similar social and


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economic characteristics, making them ready to sustain joint projects and eortsat cooperation. IBSA, or the G-3, or instance, was presented as one exampleo creativity and shared vision between three great multiracial democracies,Brazil, India and South Arica. Having decided to orm the group, the three

countries struggled hard to nd common problems and to establish a list oshared solutions, installing as many working groups as possible without regardor the actual dierences among. Ocial rhetoric reers to IBSA as a successstory, although concrete results, objectively assessed, remain below expectations,providing more promises than real accomplishments.

Argentina is another kind o strategic partnership: it was the co-oundero the Southern Cone integration process, with Mercosur at its core, theconsolidation o which would require that the co-ordination o macroeconomicpolicies between the two big associates, as well as a set o joint measures to

strengthen the regional bloc, be placed at the center o that endeavor. Instead,Argentinas behavior in Mercosur became a hindrance or Brazilian industrialists,as their exports were subjected to many protectionist restrictions adopted by theBuenos Aires Government, which was still committed to old national practicesin trade and industrial policies. The da Silva Government not only tolerated suchabuses contrary to the spirit and to the letter o Mercosur agreements, as wellas to WTO-GATT dispositions on saeguards but also managed to contain thedissatisaction o Brazilian exporters.

China, or its part, was previously (and uncritically) selected by the Presidentand the PT as a strategic ally, and began to benet rom this position by thedeclaration, by Brazil, that it lled the requirements o a market economy, asdened by WTO rules (and thus able to enjoy the bonuses o this recognition inits bilateral trade with Brazil). Brazilian diplomacy misread completely the real willo China in terms o accepting the reorm o the UN Charter and the elevationo Brazil to its long sought ambition to become a permanent member o theSecurity Council. Neither were the Chinese ready to make the huge investmentsin Brazilian inra-structure that were expected by Luis Incio Lula da Silva, as they

actually regarded Brazil as one more commodity provider among many others.

The dismantling of Mercosur as an unintended consequence

The restructuring, institutional consolidation and enlargement o Mercosur were on Lulas diplomatic menu, as had been explicitly announced since thebeginning. According to this priority, total dedication was devoted to theattraction o new partners Bolivia, Chile, Venezuela, and Ecuador andacilitating their integration into the bloc (including a waiver on the application

o the Common External Tari, a clear circumvention o the normal disciplineinside a customs union, which is what Mercosur pretends to be). Besides thecreation o a Mercosur Parliament without real unctions, to be precise there


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was no real progresses in the elds o trade liberalization and economic openingamong member countries. From the designated group o candidates, only HugoChvezs Venezuela decided to join the bloc, to the consternation o the realdemocrats and the concerns o the business world. Despite a strong lobby exerted

by the da Silva Government in avor o Chvez, the documentation has not yetbeen concluded, as Paraguay has still to endorse it.

Irrespective o the real setbacks in the commercial areas o Mercosur, it isa act that Brazil has invested heavily in the project o a stronger Mercosur andits expansion throughout the region. For instance, Brazil proposed, created andnanced, at 70% o its cost, a und to correct the imbalances in the region,a nancial scheme equivalent to only a small part, 1%, approximately, o thecombined Mercosur member countries GDPs and that, in act, duplicates thework o the multilateral banks already operating in the region the World Bank,

the Inter-American Bank and other bodies. Instead o reducing imbalances in theregion by market-riendly mechanisms, in line with each countrys comparativeadvantages, governments allocate money to a vast array o projects poorly managedby bureaucrats and incapable o correcting any imbalance between them.

As well as an emphasis on its social and political agenda, Luis Incio Lulada Silvas big push towards Mercosurs enlargement was to oer it to whichevercountries in South America would be willing to join, even at the price ooverlooking some o its requirements, simply to accommodate specic countrieswith strong political motivations. Bolivia, or instance, was oered the chance toenter Mercosur without being liable to the Common External Tari (which wasconsidered an exaggerated concession by Argentina). Ecuador, along with Bolivia,a member o the Andean Community o Nations (CAN), was also approached, butpreerred not to be entangled in any new commercial compromise. Chile, boundto a single tari, as consolidated in the GATT system, declined rom the start tobecome a ull member o Mercosur, taking into account that it benets rom ree-trade agreements concluded with each o its hemispheric partners. Colombia andPeru, too, setting aside their CAN membership, opted or ree-trade agreements

with the United States, a move that pushed Venezuelas Hugo Chvez to denouncethe countrys membership o CAN and to make a pledge to join Mercosur.There are two problems with Chvezs political decision to become a ull

member o Mercosur: on the one hand, since 2006, when that option was chosen,he signed, at the same time, a trilateral pact, with Cuba and Bolivia, creating ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance o the Americas, a bizarre integration schemebuilt around state trading, managed cooperation and no ree trade at all. On theother hand, Venezuela has never complied with the requirements o Mercosurscustoms union that is, the Common External Tari and all other regulations

to that eect declaring instead that its intention was to transorm Mercosurrom its neoliberal rules to a new political bloc, animated by its own proposalsconcerning 21st-century socialism. Even accounting or the political empathy


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demonstrated by the two biggest associates towards Venezuela in the case oArgentina compounded by the act that Hugo Chvez was its sole nancier aterthe 2002 moratorium that was a little too ar rom the modest capitalist, albeitdirigiste, integration scheme devised by Brazil and Argentina.

Sleeping with a restive neighbor: relations with Argentina

The most sensible, and relevant, o all bilateral Brazilian relationships, thediplomatic interaction with Argentina, remains in a delicate situation, despite thebenign propensity o the da Silva Government to accept almost all restrictionsand limitations unilaterally imposed by Buenos Aires on the trade exchanges andreciprocal economic fows. At the beginning the da Silva and Kirchner mandates,in 2003, the excuse or many deensive measures was the proound crisis created by

the end o the convertibility exchange regime and the external debt moratorium,ollowed by a complete standstill in oreign nancing or Argentina. In a secondstage, bruised by the excessive number o initiatives the Brazilian President wastaking to assert Brazils leadership in the region, Nestor Kirchner hardenedArgentinean positions in many negotiating situations, either in Mercosur or inregional matters, and even in multilateral situations, such as Brazilian candidaciesin some international organizations (IADB, WTO, and others).

Ego disputes aside, the most important problem was a special saeguards regimethat Argentina sought to impose on bilateral trade with Brazil, invoking structural

imbalances arising rom the Brazilian exchange fotation or hidden subsidies onBrazilian exports; involuntary export restrictions and other market arrangementswere put in place, even against Mercosur rules and WTO dispositions, which theBrazilian President accepted as part o his diplomacy o generosity (to the greatdispleasure o Brazilian industrialists). In other contexts, Brazil was unable (or wasnot accepted) to mediate the confict between Argentina and Uruguay over thecellulose plants next to the border. Favorable diplomatic rhetoric apart, Argentina was never very enthusiastic about Brazilian initiatives in the region: the SouthAmerican Community o Nations, the two inter-regional summits with Arab

and Arican Countries the South American Deense Council within Unasur,the Latin American and Caribbean meetings, and some other initiatives. Aboveall, though, the most contentious issue was Brazils candidacy to the UNSC seat,ollowed by its implicit posture as regional leader two endeavors that aectedArgentina sel-esteem and moved her to an openly active opposition.

Tropical Mans Burden: Brazils regional leadership

One o the most important o Luis Incio Lula da Silvas diplomatic

initiatives, along with the Brazilian candidacy to a permanent seat in the UNSC,is the union o South America as a political entity, ree rom any intererencerom the American empire, and this has always corresponded to a permanent


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project or his party, obviously supported by its Cuban and other Latin Americanletist allies. The core o Brazilian regional diplomacy, under the direct inspirationo Itamaratys Secretary-General, was strongly directed towards this ambitiousobjective, with partial successes in various aspects.

The economic aspect o the project the political implosion o theAmerican proposal o a FTAA, ollowed by the creation o a South American FreeTrade Area was only hal-achieved: the abandonment o a hemispheric tradeliberalization scheme. Brazilian initiatives towards creating its own economicspace in the region were downsized to a mosaic o bilateral agreements within theramework o a Latin American Integration Association that ailed to promoteexpanded exchanges or to eectively integrate the economies o the countries.The modest opening o the Brazilian economy in avor o its neighbors curtailedthe Brazilians grand vision or the continent.

The political components o the project remained too vague to really unite tenSouth American States that harbor dierent conceptions, sometimes opposed toeach other, about political and economic integration. Unhappily or the Brazilianproject, the act is that South America became less, not more, integrated duringLuis Incio Lula da Silvas tenure, and the reason has little to do with externalcrises or military dictatorship. Indeed, democracy has progressed in the region, butpolitical instability remains a crucial actor that explains the diering concepts ointegration, and some o the regional crises. By most accounts, Bolivarianism andindigenism, arising in Andean countries, have rendered those polities more instable,socially and politically, and prone to old conceptions o integration, marked byState-led economic policies, nationalization and a less relevant role or trade andnance, compared to social and political issues, all o which was completely atodds with a market-led integration, such as that practiced in Mercosur.

In addition, the exercise in regional leadership, as tentatively tried by LuisIncio Lula da Silvas diplomacy, was not well received; in act, it had never beenwelcomed in the past, one more reason or proessional diplomacy making a tabooo this dicult concept. Tempted by his warm reception in the world press and

among many political leaders, Lula believed that the time was ripe or Brazil toassume a more assertive posture based on political dialogue, Brazilian nancing odevelopment projects and a tentative measure to coordinate positions in regionalor multilateral negotiations.

Being the largest economy in the region, Brazil exerts a natural attraction onneighboring countries, but that has not been enough to overcome old suspicionsabout its quasi-imperialistic behavior in South America, or its supposed desireto impose its own domination over other countries, replicating, albeit in a lessarrogant manner, American imperial tutelage. In act, Brazil has never exerted

any guardianship over the region, but the multiplication o initiatives could beseen as devoid o vested interests. That could be one o the reasons or Andeancountries not accepting the oer by Brazilian diplomacy to set up a secretariat or


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the newly-created South American Community o Nations, an entity that wasreplaced, one year later by the Hugo Chvez-sponsored Union o the Nations oSouth America (Unasur), with its headquarters in Quito.

The da Silva Government also ailed to provide an adequate substitute to

a scheme devised by Cardosos administration or the inrastructure projects inSouth America. The Initiative or the Integration o South America (IIRSA),created in 2000, never advanced rom its stage o portolio projects preparedby the INTAL-IADB to transorm them into concrete undertakings capable omobilizing private and ocial nancial resources to deal with the multiple needsin the region in terms o energy, communications, and major engineering projects(notably in transport). As regards investments and other market opportunities,the successul implosion o the FTAA by Brazilian diplomacy (with a little helprom Argentina and Venezuela) may have thrown some countries into the arms

o the USA, as Brazil is not really a powerul replacement solution or economieslooking or big fows o direct investment and access to larger markets, at least notthose o the size o the United States; in the same move, Brazil ended up with lessmarket access and reduced preerences in its neighbors markets.

A bridge too far: multilateral and regional trade negotiations

Access to new markets through multilateral trade negotiations, with smallconcessions in new areas like investments, intellectual property and services

but also in industrial taris, have always been a chasse garde or Itamaraty,preserved rom intrusions by other government agencies. This domestichegemony was somewhat contested during Lulas government especially byBrazilian agricultural producers competing in world markets, but also othersectors because o the extreme politicization o those economic issues practicedsince the beginning. Under the slogan o creating a new geography or worldtrade, Itamaraty aligned Brazil with other developing countries always with theaim o presenting a united ront against rich countries disregarding the act thatsome o those countries (including China and India, two o its strongest allies)

possessed in reality interests directly opposed to Brazils aim in dismantlingagriculture protectionism and high subsidies in the area.

The Commercial G20, created at the Cancun ministerial meeting o theWTO (2003), was presented as a strong expression o Brazilian leadership in tradenegotiations, and as an alternative to old negotiating schemes, but its internalcontradictions quickly became apparent in subsequent phases and the group wasnot capable o overcoming dierent interests among its members to present aunited ront in some crucial issues related to it. For all practical purposes, theoensive stance o Brazil in those matters was rendered as deensive as the Chinese

or Indian positions, including in non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and inservices, in a time when Brazilian armers, and even many industrialists, weredisposed to advance urther.


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In the same areas, and in other negotiating instances such as in theramework o trade talks between Mercosur and the EU less ambitious positionsor a limited disposition to make concessions in industrial taris rom partners likeArgentina (but the same applies to India and some other developing countries)

curtailed the possibility or Brazil to reach an acceptable agreement with otherdeveloping countries, thus opening new markets or Brazilian products. Thepreerential alliances devised by Itamaraty with other developing countries which included social concerns and interests o less competitive agriculture, oramily arms added to the hindrances that had been sel-inficted or politicalreasons, in addition to the act that the great expansion or Brazilian exports inthe arming sector is essentially concentrated in the emerging markets, not inrich countries. In this sense, the South-South policy and the new geographyo trade, with all their political bias, were in contradiction to Brazilian national

interests and the countrys natural competitive advantages. Asian countries, orinstance, have or a long time been practicing the new geography in expandingtheir exports to rich countries in the West.

Dragons, elephants and other fauna: Brazils presence in the world

China was designated an ally, or strategic partner even beore Luis IncioLula da Silvas coming to power, as he made a political visit to that country in 2001,and was received with the honors due to an important political leader. At that time,

many o the PT leaders still held the erroneous belie that China was a socialisteconomy and a country interested in constituting a common ront against thearrogant rich countries and Western imperialism. When he came to power, LuisIncio Lula da Silva started to put in practice his unilaterally conceived Chinesepolicy, which consisted o great expectations concerning major investments inBrazil and, especially, a strong political relationship by which both countries wereto infuence a big change in world power, reducing the spaces or hegemony ininternational politics a concept used by the Chinese, by the way.

The Brazilians diplomacy imagined that, by conceding to China the

status o a market economy, as requested by the Chinese leadership, it wouldbe possible to capture large-scale investments and technological cooperation, aswell as the most prized reward sought by the president: Chinas support or theBrazilian aspiration to a seat in the UNSC. In other occasions during reciprocalstate visits the President even considered the idea o a ree-trade agreementbetween China and Mercosur, and oered the possibility o replace the paymentsystem in bilateral trade, starting to use local currencies instead o dollars. Bothmeasures were clearly in avor o Chinese interests and, thanks to the oppositionrom entrepreneurs alarmed by the destructive potential o low-cost Chinese

competition and rom some more vigilant bureaucrats in the Central Bank,they were not implemented at all, despite being proposed by the President himsel(probably out onavetor simple ignorance o economic matters).


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China never committed itsel to supporting Brazil in its quest or the UNSCseat and has always acted in its own sel-interest, even on strictly bilateral matters;it did not hesitate, or instance, to impose a trade embargo on the arrival oa Brazilian cargo o soy beans invoking sanitary measures, when it was simply

pushing down the prices, and this on the eve o one o Luis Incio Lula da Silvasocial visits to China. In other contexts China makes very clear that it wantsto keep or itsel the decision on the desirable pattern or bilateral relations,including matters pertaining to private investment and a common multilateralagenda (either in BRIC meetings, or elsewhere).

The creation o the inormal group called BRIC, comprising Brazil, China,India and Russia, has the latter country as the main partner with Brazil in theendeavor that looks more at political aims than economic objectives, despitethe act that the proposal by an investment economist takes its legitimacy rom

their economic importance or the uture world economy. The new acronym hasattracted a lot o publicity but it remains to be seen i the group has, eectively,coherent, sound and easible proposals or global governance, justiying its claimto be an alternative to the traditional G7-G8 group. In the same way, the decisionto strengthen links with new and old partners, in other continents, ts Luis IncioLula da Silvas intention to diversiy the options available or Brazilian exports,other sources or sophisticated technology with France, or instance and toachieve a balance o commercial objectives and attain a leading political role orthe country in the world (as in the summits organized with Arab and Aricancountries together with South American neighbors o Brazil).

A resident diplomatic representation was established in Ramallah and LuisIncio Lula da Silva tried to insert himsel in the complicated chessboard o MiddleEast conficts, oering to mediate a peace between Israelis and Palestinians onthe basis o sincere dialogue, which, o course, arrived at nothing. New attemptsat bona fdediplomacy were made in connection with the troubled negotiationsbetween the great powers and Iran, over that countrys covert activities regardingits nuclear program, only to characterize Brazils President as a riend o the

controversial gure o Ahmadinejad. Brazils too lenient posture regardinghuman rights violations around the world, together with Luis Incio Lula daSilvas indulgence towards dictators like Fidel Castro, have tarnished the goodrecord previously held by Brazil.

There is no doubt that Brazil has become an important broker in manyinstances on the international agenda, even i some ambiguities remain overspecic points o the political aspect o the PTs external policy (human rights anddemocracy being the most visible, but also non-prolieration and environment).Luis Incio Lula da Silva had the opportunity to engage in dialogue at the same

time with capitalists in Davos and the dreamers o the World Social Forum, butmany in his immediate surroundings exhibited a clear anti-American stance, aswas revealed, or instance, in the cases o Honduras and Venezuela. The Presidents


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negative appraisals o neoliberalism and Wall Street speculators have moreto do with old-ashioned letist postures than with the diplomatic seriousnessrequired rom an aspiring emerging power. At the beginning o his mandate,Luis Incio Lula da Silva attempted to sell to other Latin American countries

a replacement o the Washington Consensus, by means o a so-called BuenosAires Consensus, a ragile set o ragile rules about welare policies. At the endo his mandate, had become a strong critic o the current international system,probably rustrated by the unwillingness o great powers to reorm the UNOCharter and accept Brazil as one o the more equals.

Luis Incio Lula da Silvas heritage: Brazilian diplomacys new clothes

The October 2010 presidential elections in Brazil provide the opportunity

to change many things in oreign policy, i there is a social-democratic victory probably more in the region, and specically in connection with Mercosur, thanin Brazils world role or, otherwise, a new government can maintain, roughlyspeaking, the same lines in diplomacy as ollowed during the last eight years o theda Silva administration. Indeed, the PTs oreign policy, though not consensual,is widely accepted by many sectors o public opinion, mainly in academia andlet-wing parties and movements. It would be more o the same, except or thelack o a colorul president, who has represented Brazil abroad in a lively mannerin times o great changes in world scenarios.

Some positions will probably not change, o course: the sel-characterizationo Brazil as a developing country, its pretension to be a speaker on behal o otherpoor countries seeking a new economic order, with more justice and airness beingshown towards those countries, the reduction o the inequalities and imbalancesthat still divide the world, the democratization o international politics withBrazil standing yet again as a candidate or a permanent seat on the UNSC and many other requests o this nature. Strong action against hunger, povertyand injustices will continue to be high in the agenda, as well as the deense osovereignty and states policies directed to social development.

South America and with the PT, Latin America will be maintained asthe most relevant priority o Brazilian oreign policy, but in the case o a social-democratic win, exclusive South-South policies will probably be scaled downwithin the ranks o Itamaraty, in avor o a more balanced view o cooperationand a more pragmatic position regarding commercial policies and human rightsissues. Multilateralism in economic and political careers will keep the sameimportance as always and Itamaraty will regain some o the spaces it lost to avery activist presidential palace in the last eight years. There will probably beless presidential diplomacy, and more normal, proessional diplomacy, with less

travel and visits both abroad and to Brazil.Changes in or o style and dierent emphases apart, Brazil will undoubtedly

retain the growing economic and political importance it attained during Luis


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Incio Lula da Silvas administration. The new view o Brazil held by oreigncountries has objective grounds: the preservation o economic stability andthe steady, albeit modest, growth rates exhibited by Brazilian economy thatits diplomacy has been able to capitalize upon. China, the current engine o

the world economy became the main Brazils trading partner in the last year oLuis Incio Lula da Silvas mandate, but it was China that that has contributedmost to Brazilian growth, a growth much more based on the value given to itscommodities than on the diversication and expansion o exported manuactures.In act, economic growth in Brazil is perhaps becoming too dependent on China,as was the case in the past with the Brazilian-American relationship. However, inthe context o the BRIC countries, Brazil has shown the worst growth rate o theour nations, and has not lost its relative share o the world GDP or the intensityo its participation in international trade.

Thus, despite Luis Incio Lula da Silvas satisaction with the greaterpresence o Brazil in the world, which allows him to enhance his own leading rolein building that position, it would not be wrong to say that this new role derivesmuch more rom a hyperactive diplomacy, based on the strong promotion othe President himsel, than rom a real transormation in the objective positiono Brazil in the economic and political scenarios. Growth in nominal GDPas compared to other countries is, at least in some measure, the result o thecurrencys appreciation against the dollar; in the same way, growth in exportsrefects the growing demand rom dynamic countries or Brazilian commodities;there is also the expansion o domestic credit or consumption, even at the risk oa bubble arising rom excessive debt contracted by individuals and amilies. On asimilar topic, the economic stability granted since Cardosos administration, andrightully preserved by da Silva, together with the size o the domestic marketand Brazilian connections within the ramework o Mercosur, are responsible orthe huge amounts o oreign direct investments that have been attracted sincethen. This relatively benign scenario will probably be maintained or the nextew years, depending on the main markets or Brazilian products (today tending

towards China) and on external credits rom nancial markets.An overall evaluation o Luis Incio Lula da Silvas diplomacy should beable to recognize its ability to project a dynamic image o Brazil worldwide,helping to make the country a ully-fedged actor in the oreront o internationaldiplomacy. Brazil is certainly present in many o the most important discussionbodies dealing with economic and political issues in the world agenda. Notsurprisingly, the personal gure o da Silva is even more present than the country,which conrms the real success o his diplomacy in projecting his own image asthe personication o Brazil.

In terms o its own development though, Brazil is still an emerging country,with many social deciencies, economic imbalances, uneven regional progress,and an extremely problematic public education system; its state institutions and


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almeida, paulo roberto - lula's grand diplomacy

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