altera vs. xilinx · 8/22/2013  · aug 2013 amir moradi key1, key2 fpga f aes key enc counter...

Altera vs. Xilinx which one keeps your design hidden?

22. Aug. 2013

Amir Moradi

Embedded Security Group

Ruhr University Bochum, Germany

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Embedded Security Group

Acknowledge

Alessandro Barenghi

Markus Kasper

Timo Kasper

David Oswald

Pawel Swierczynski

Christof Paar

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

SCA on Bitstream Encryption Feature

PCB board

E2PROM

Power-up DEC

VCC-IO VCC-AUX VCC-INT

E2PROM unencrypted bitstream

IEEE CASS| Singapore | 03. Apr. 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Broken Families

Virtex-II Pro, SASEBO

Virtex-4, Xilinx DevBoard

Virtex-5, SASEBO-GII

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Broken Families

Spartan-6, SASEBO-W

Stratix-II, SASEBO-B

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

New Targets

Stratix-III, Altera DevKit

Kintex-7, SASEBO-GIII

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

EM Analysis

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

EM Analysis

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

EM Analysis

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

EM Analysis

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Decapping

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Altera’s Key Derivation

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

Key1, Key2

FPGA

AES Key

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Embedded Security Group

AES Key=ENCKey1(Key2)

Selecting an arbitrary Key1’

Key2’=DECKey1’(AES Key)

(Key1’,Key2’) works the same as (Key1,Key2)

no added security!

Altera’s Key Derivation

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

Key1, Key2

FPGA

f AES Key ENC

Counter

Bitstream Encrypted Bitstream

AES Key

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Embedded Security Group

Altera:

– AES-128 is replaced by AES-256

• Key derivation stays the same

– Counter is not increased arithmetically

• much heuristics + proprietary schemes

– revealed by reverse engineering the PC software

Old vs. New Generations

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi

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Embedded Security Group

Altera:

– AES-128 is replaced by AES-256

• Key derivation stays the same

– Counter is not increased arithmetically

• much heuristics + proprietary schemes

– revealed by reverse engineering the PC software

Xilinx:

– AES-256 in CBC mode (as before)

– HMAC is introduced (Virtex-6 and all 7 series)

• no place in FPGA to save the HMAC key!

• The first block of the encrypted bitstream is the HMAC key!

Old vs. New Generations

CHES 2013| Ramp Session | Santa Barbara | 22. Aug 2013 Amir Moradi