econ 522 economics of law dan quint spring 2012 lecture 13
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HW3 is online, due next Thursday (Mar 15)
First midterm will be returned at end of lecture
Second midterm March 26 Cumulative, through end of contract law More weight on more recent material
Logistics
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Contracts which won’t be enforced Derogation of public policy
Formation defenses and performance excuses Incompetence (but not drunkenness) Duress and necessity Impossibility, and determining the efficient bearer of a risk
Today: more ways to get out of a contract, and remedies for breach
Monday…
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Old urban legend:A man bought a box of extremely rare and expensive cigars, and insured them against loss or damage.
After smoking them, he filed an insurance claim, saying they had been destroyed in 20 separate small fires.
The insurance company refused to pay, the man sued and won.
But as he was leaving the courtroom, he was arrested on 20 counts of arson.
Serious question:If the intent of a contract is clear, but different from the literal meaning, which should be enforced?
Discussion question
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Four doctrines for invalidating a contract
Fraud
Failure to disclose
Frustration of purpose
Mutual mistake
Contracts based on faulty information
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Fraud: one party was deliberately tricked
Fraud
source: http://www.wyff4.com/r/29030818/detail.html
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Under the civil law, there is a duty to disclose If you fail to supply information you should have, contract will be
voided – failure to disclose
Less so under the common law Seller has to share information about hidden dangers… …but generally not information that makes a product less valuable
without making it dangerous Exception: new products come with “implied warranty of fitness” Another exception: Obde v Schlemeyer
What if you trick someone by withholding information?
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Under common law, seller required to inform buyer about hidden safety risks, generally not other information
But… Obde v Schlemeyer (1960, Sup Ct of WA) Seller knew building was infested with termites, did not tell buyer Termites should have been exterminated immediately to prevent
further damage Court in Obde imposed duty to disclose (awarded damages)
Duty to disclose under common law
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Under common law, seller required to inform buyer about hidden safety risks, generally not other information
But… Obde v Schlemeyer (1960, Sup Ct of WA) Seller knew building was infested with termites, did not tell buyer Termites should have been exterminated immediately to prevent
further damage Court in Obde imposed duty to disclose (awarded damages) Some states require used car dealers to reveal major repairs done,
sellers of homes to reveal certain types of defects…
Duty to disclose under common law
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Frustration of Purpose
Change in circumstance made the original promise pointless
Coronation Cases
“When a contingency makes performance pointless, assign liability to party who can bear risk at least cost”
What if both parties were misinformed?
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Frustration of Purpose
Change in circumstance made the original promise pointless
Coronation Cases
“When a contingency makes performance pointless, assign liability to party who can bear risk at least cost”
What if both parties were misinformed?
Mutual Mistake
Mutual mistake about facts Circumstances had already
changed, but we didn’t know Logger buys land with timber
on it, but forest fire had wiped out the timber the week before
Mutual mistake about identity Disagreement over what was
being sold
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Hadley v Baxendale (miller and shipper) Hadley knew shipment was time-critical But Baxendale was deciding how to ship crankshaft (boat or train) Party that had information was not the party making decisions
Efficiency generally requires uniting knowledge and control Contracts that unite knowledge and control are generally efficient,
should be upheld Contracts that separate knowledge and control may be inefficient,
should more often be set aside
Another principle for allocating risks efficiently: uniting knowledge and control
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Mutual mistake: neither party had correct information Contract neither united nor separated knowledge and control
Unilateral mistake: one party has mistaken information I know your car is a valuable antique, you think it’s worthless You sell it to me at a low price
Contracts based on unilateral mistake are generally upheld
Mutual vs. Unilateral Mistake
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Mutual mistake: neither party had correct information Contract neither united nor separated knowledge and control
Unilateral mistake: one party has mistaken information I know your car is a valuable antique, you think it’s worthless You sell it to me at a low price
Contracts based on unilateral mistake are generally upheld Contracts based on unilateral mistake generally unite knowledge and
control And, enforcing them creates an incentive to gather information
Unilateral mistake
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War of 1812: British blockaded port of New Orleans Price of tobacco fell, since it couldn’t be exported
Organ (tobacco buyer) learned the war was over Immediately negotiated with Laidlaw firm to buy a bunch of tobacco
at the depressed wartime price
Next day, news broke the war had ended, price of tobacco went up, Laidlaw sued Supreme Court ruled that Organ was not required to communicate
his information
Unilateral mistake: Laidlaw v Organ (U.S. Supreme Court, 1815)
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Laidlaw v. Organ established: contracts based on unilateral mistake are generally valid Agrees with efficiency: these contracts typically unite knowledge
and control
What about Obde v. Schlemeyer? The termites case was based on unilateral mistake Court still upheld contract, but punished seller for hiding information In that case, contract separated knowledge from control
Uniting knowledge and control
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Productive information: information that can be used to produce more wealth
Redistributive information: information that can be used to redistribute wealth in favor of informed party
Cooter and Ulen Contracts based on one party’s knowledge of productive information
should be enforced… …especially if that knowledge was the result of active investment Contracts based on one party’s knowledge of purely redistributive
information, or fortuitously acquired information, should not be enforced
Unilateral mistake: productive versus redistributive information
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Courts will generally not enforce contract terms that are overly vague
Can be thought of as a penalty default “Punish” the parties by refusing to enforce contract… …so people will be more clear when they write contracts
But some exceptions Parties may commit to renegotiating the contract “in good faith”
under certain contingencies
Vague contract terms
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Back when software came on disks or CDs… Box was wrapped in cellophane Inside, “By unwrapping this box, you agree to the following terms…”
Contract is not binding if one party had no opportunity to review it before agreeing
Adhesion (I): “Shrink-wrap” licenses
“Due to the unscheduled trip to the autowrecking yard the school bus will be out of commission for two weeks. Note by reading this letter out loud you have waived any responsibility on our part in perpetuity throughout the known universe.”
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Adhesion (II): What if a party chose not to review the contract?
Source: http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls/
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British computer game retailer GameStation, on April Fool’s Day, added this to Terms & Conditions customers agreed to before buying online:
“By placing an order via this website… you agree to grant us anon-transferable option to claim, for now and for ever more, your immortal soul.
Should we wish to exercise this option, you agree to surrender your immortal soul, and any claim you may have on it, within 5 (five) working days of receiving written notification from gamestation.co.uk or one of its duly authorised minions.
…If you a) do not believe you have an immortal soul, b) have already given it to another party, or c) do not wish to grant us such a license, please click the link below to nullify this sub-clause and proceed with your transaction.”
Adhesion (II): What if a party chose not to review the contract?
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Contract of Adhesion: standardized “take-it-or-leave-it” contract where terms are not negotiable “Bogus duress”
Not illegal per se, but might attract “closer scrutiny” A few state courts have adopted a rule: if I have “reason to believe
that the other party would not agree if he knew the contract contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement”
Adhesion (general)
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Under bargain theory, courts should ask only whether a bargain occurred, not whether it was fair Hamer v Sidway (drinking and smoking)
But both common and civil law have doctrines for not enforcing overly one-sided contracts Unconscionability/Lesion “Absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-
sided contract provisions, together with terms which are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them”
When “the sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist”
Terms which would “shock the conscience of the court”
What if you signed a contract that was dramatically unfair?
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“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
…In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.”
Unconscionability: Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture (CA Dist Ct, 1965)
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“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
…In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.”
Unconscionability: Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture (CA Dist Ct, 1965)
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“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
…In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.”
Not normal monopoly cases but “situational monopolies” Think of Ploof v Putnam (sailboat in a storm), not Microsoft
Unconscionability: Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture (CA Dist Ct, 1965)
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Party-designed remedies Remedies specified in the contract
Court-imposed damages Court may decide promisee entitled to some level of damages
Specific performance Forces breaching party to live up to contract
Three broad types of remedy for breach of contract
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Compensate promisee for the amount he expected to benefit from performance You agreed to buy an airplane for $350,000 You expected $500,000 of benefit from it Expectation damages: if I breach, I owe you that benefit ($500,000 if you already paid, $150,000 if you didn’t)
“Positive damages”
Make promisee indifferent between performance and breach
Expectation damages
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Reimburse promisee for cost of any reliance investments made, but not for additional surplus he expected to gain
Restore promisee to level of well-being before he signed the contract You contracted to buy the plane and built a hangar If I breach, I owe you what you spent on the hangar, nothing else
“Negative damages” – undo the negative (harm) that occurred
Reliance damages
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Give promisee benefit he would have gotten from his next-best option Make promisee indifferent between breach of the contract that
was signed, and performance of best alternative contract You value plane at $500,000 You contract to buy plane from me for $350,000 Someone else was selling similar plane for $400,000 By the time I breach, that plane is no longer available I owe you $100,000 – the benefit you would have gotten from
buying the other seller’s plane
Opportunity cost damages
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You agree to sell me ticket to Wisconsin-Purdue football game for $50 Expectation damages: you owe me value of game minus $50 If I pay scalper $150, then expectation damages = $100 Reliance damages: maybe 0, or cost of
whatever pre-game investments I made
Example: expectation, reliance, and opportunity cost damages
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You agree to sell me ticket to Wisconsin-Purdue football game for $50 Expectation damages: you owe me value of game minus $50 If I pay scalper $150, then expectation damages = $100 Reliance damages: maybe 0, or cost of
whatever pre-game investments I made When you agreed to sell me ticket, other
tickets available for $70 Opportunity cost damages: $80 (I paid a scalper $150 to get in; I would
have been $80 better off if I’d ignored your offer and paid someone else $70)
Example: expectation, reliance, and opportunity cost damages
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Ranking damages
ExpectationDamages
Opportunity CostDamages
RelianceDamages
ContractI Sign
BestAlternative
Do Nothing
Breach +ExpectationDamages
Breach +Opportunity Cost
Damages
Breach +RelianceDamages
$100 $80 $15
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Hawkins had a scar on his hand
McGee promised surgery to “make the hand a hundred percent perfect”
Surgery was a disaster, left scar bigger and covered with hair
Hawkins v McGee (“hairy hand case”)
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Hawkins v McGee (“hairy hand case”)
Hairy Scarred Nextbest
doctor
100%Perfect
$
Hand
Initial Wealth
+ Reliance Damages
+ Opp Cost Damages
+ Expectation Damages
Rel
ianc
e D
amag
es
Opp
Cos
t Dam
ages
Exp
ecta
tion
Dam
ages
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Restitution Return money that was already received
Disgorgement Give up wrongfully-gained profits
Other court-ordered remedies
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Restitution Return money that was already received
Disgorgement Give up wrongfully-gained profits
Specific Performance Promisor is forced to honor promise Civil law: often ordered instead of money damages Common law: money damages more common; S.P. sometimes used
when seller breaches contract to sell a unique good Like injunctive relief
Other court-ordered remedies
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Peevyhouse v Garland Coal and Mining Co(OK Supreme Court, 1962) Garland contracted to strip-mine
coal on Peevyhouse’s farm Contract specified Garland
would restore property to originalcondition; Garland did not
Restoration would cost $29,000 But “diminution in value” of farm
was only $300 Original jury awarded $5,000 in
damages, both parties appealed OK Supreme Court reduced
damages to $300
Expectation damages vs. specific performance
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At first, sounds like a perfect example of efficient breach Performing last part of contract would cost $29,000 Benefit to Peevyhouses would be $300 Efficient to breach and pay expectation damages, which is what
happened
But… Most coal mining contracts: standard per-acre diminution payment Peevyhouses refused to sign contract unless it specifically promised the
restorative work Dissent: Peevyhouses entitled to specific performance (Peevyhouses seemed to value condition of property much more highly
than change in market value)
Expectation damages vs. specific performance
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Contract promised restoration work, didn’t specify remedy if it wasn’t performed
Which default rule works better: Default rule allowing Garland to breach and pay diminution fee? Default rule forcing Garland to perform restoration work?
Ayres and Gertner: default rule should penalize the better-informed party Garland routinely signed contracts like these Peevyhouses were doing this for the first time Default rule allows Garland to pay diminution fee: they have no reason to
bring it up, Peevyhouses don’t know Default rule forces Garland to do cleanup: if that’s inefficient, they could
bring it up during negotiations In this case, specific performance would serve as a penalty default
Think about Peevyhouse in terms of penalty defaults
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Remedy for breach could be written directly into contract
But common law courts don’t always enforce remedy terms Liquidated damages – party-specified damages that reasonably
approximate actual harm done by breach Penalty damages – damages greater than actual harm done Civil law courts are generally willing to enforce penalty damages But common law courts often do not
Party-designed remedies
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Peevyhouse v Garland Coal Peevyhouses only wanted farm strip-mined if it would be restored
to original condition after Suppose coal extracted worth $70,000 Garland paid $25,000 for rights to mine it Restoration work would cost $30,000 Diminution of value was $300 So liquidated damages would be $300 Suppose Peevyhouses got $40,000 of disutility from land being left
in poor condition
Penalty DamagesCoal worth $70,000Garland to pay $25,000Restoration would cost $30,000Liquidated damages are $300Peevyhouses value restoration at $40,000
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Liquidated damages
Peevyhouses
Sign Don’t
Garland Coal
Restore property Don’t, pay damages
(25,000, 15,000) (-14,700, 44,700)
(0, 0)
If damages limited to liquidated damages… Peevyhouses shouldn’t believe restorative work will get done So Peevyhouses better off refusing to sign Even though mining and restoring Pareto-dominates
Coal worth $70,000Garland to pay $25,000Restoration would cost $30,000Liquidated damages are $300Peevyhouses value restoration at $40,000
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Penalty damages
Peevyhouses
Sign Don’t
Garland Coal
Restore property Don’t, pay penalty
(25,000, 15,000) (25,000, 5,000)
(0, 0)
Coal worth $70,000Garland to pay $25,000Restoration would cost $30,000Liquidated damages are $300Peevyhouses value restoration at $40,000
If penalty clauses in contracts enforceable… Write contract with $40,000 penalty for leaving land unrestored Now restoration work would get done, so Peevyhouses willing to sign But if courts won’t enforce penalty damages, this won’t work
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Whatever you can accomplish with penalty clause, you could also accomplish with performance bonus I agree to pay $200,000 to get house built, but I want you to pay a
$50,000 penalty if it’s late Alternatively: I agree to pay $150,000 for house, plus a $50,000
performance bonus if it’s completed on time Either way, you get $150,000 if house is late, $200,000 if on time Courts generally enforce bonus clauses, so no problem!
Penalty clauses
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Whatever you can accomplish with penalty clause, you could also accomplish with performance bonus I agree to pay $200,000 to get house built, but I want you to pay a
$50,000 penalty if it’s late Alternatively: I agree to pay $150,000 for house, plus a $50,000
performance bonus if it’s completed on time Either way, you get $150,000 if house is late, $200,000 if on time Courts generally enforce bonus clauses, so no problem! Similarly, Peevyhouse example
Peevyhouses get $25,000 for mining rights, $40,000 penalty if land is not restored
Equivalently, get $65,000 for mining rights, pay $40,000 bonus if restoration is completed
But, if intent of contract is too transparent, still might not be enforced
Penalty clauses
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