(lprr) 2010 floods case study, sindh, pakistan depp linking preparedness resilience & reponses...
Post on 19-Mar-2018
220 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
START DEPP Linking Preparedness Resilience & Reponses
(LPRR) 2010 Floods Case Study, Sindh, Pakistan
Authors: Rebecca Murphy, Mark Pelling, Emma Visman & Simone Di Vicenz
1
Contents Executive Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3
Context…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3
Disaster & Intervention…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6
Methodology…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………8
Findings………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...9
Challenges & Recommendations………………………………………………………………………………………………….10
Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………27
Next Steps…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..27
References…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..29
Executive Summary
This case study aims to outline the strengths, challenges and recommendations shared by the
humanitarian staff, local partners, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders involved in the Pakistan
2010 Sindh Province flood response.
This paper is one of a collection of eight START DEP Linking Preparedness Response and Resilience
(LPRR) case studies exploring a range of humanitarian interventions in the Philippines, Kenya,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia, Myanmar, DRC and Bangladesh. LPRR is a START Disaster and
Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP) Department for International Development (DfID)
funded 3 year, consortium led project which is aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming
for more resilient communities. Specifically this case study has been developed as part of the
humanitarian strand of the LPRR project which focuses on developing a practical method for
improved, resilience informed humanitarian response.
This particular World Vision program included an immediate response, recover and then
rehabilitation phase and mapped out how each of the five resilience principles and Bene et al’s
(2012) AAT framework plays out differently in different phases of the project.
This papers findings illustrate that the disaster and humanitarian intervention is thought to have
increased social togetherness and cohesion, challenge cultural norms to offer more equal
opportunities and increased the level of participation, learning and preparedness throughout the
community as the program developed in time. It also served to bridge relationship with the
community and local government and support the community to bounce back.
2
However the majority of participants did not feel that the community had effectively bounced back
better and outlined a number of challenges that were felt to contribute to this. The fist was the
feudal system and unequal power that the landlords and land owners have over community
members. The second was the lack of trust felt towards both the government and community
members. Furthermore political, ethnic and religious differences along with poor communication
around beneficiary selection was thought to cause tension throughout the community.
Recommendations from both field staff and community members included:
1. Enabling and empowering community members to be decision makers and lead emergency
response initiatives
2. Train and build the capacity of the local government,
3. Educate girls and tackle power inequalities, ask the community what they want and how they
would like it to be done and build social cohesion and togetherness across caste and religion.
Provide community training to tackle root causes of vulnerability and inequality.
4. In addition it is felt imperative by participants to hand programs over to the local government or
department of social welfare at the end and run a thorough hand over period.
5. Lastly, participants requested the need for psychological support for both the community/
survivors and field staff. This would also include community motivation and future vision
development.
Ultimately it is clear that the World Vision 2010 Pakistan Flood Response Program illustrates success
and challenges. Whilst the resilience principles mapped out appear to have been challenging to
implement in the immediate response they have all appeared to have developed throughout the
timeframe of the project.
3
The 2010 Flood Response, Sindh, Pakistan
1. Introduction
This case study aims to outline the strengths, challenges and recommendations shared by the
humanitarian staff, local partners, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders involved in the 2010
World Vison flood response in the Sindh province of Pakistan. This paper does not provide a
comprehensive analysis of the case study’s level of resilience building but aims to act as a
communication piece outlining participants’ reflections and recommendations. A second paper will
be developed critically analysing the impact this example can have on resilience building.
This paper is one of a collection of Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response in Emergency
Contexts (LPRR) case studies and analysis papers. LPRR is a START Disaster and Emergency
Preparedness Programme (DEPP) Department for International Development (DfID) funded 3 year,
consortium led project which is aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming for more
resilient communities. It is important to note that this project recognises the term ‘community’ as a
collective group of at risk, exposed residents.
The LPRR consortium is led by Christian Aid and includes Action Aid, Concern Worldwide, Help Age,
Kings College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld and World Vision. The countries of focus
include Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic Congo, Colombia, Indonesia and the
Philippines and cover a multi-risk profile. The project has three strands focusing on; resilient
informed humanitarian response, resilience informed conflict prevention and learning and capacity
building.
Specifically this case study has been developed as part of the humanitarian strand of the LPRR
project which focuses on developing a practical method for improved, resilience informed
humanitarian response. In order to do this, eight case studies of past humanitarian response
interventions will be explored. This particular paper focuses on World Vision’s 2010 response to the
Sindh floods.
4
2. The Context
First, in order to provide a clear picture of the context and environment that this specific
humanitarian program was working in, this section will map out Pakistan and specifically Sindh’s
economic, environmental, political and social background, the disaster and the subsequent
intervention.
2.2 Pakistan
Pakistan has an estimated population of more than 184 million people with a diverse socioeconomic
makeup; including diverse ethnic groups, 2 national languages and tens of regional dialects. The
main religion is Muslim and whilst Pakistan is ruled under national law it has heavy Islamic influence.
Pakistan faces a number of economic and social challenges which have been intensified and
(re)produced by recurring crises and protracted ongoing conflict. Pakistan ranks 147 out of 188
countries in the 2015 Human Development Index (HDI) with most indicators lower than most
countries in South Asia. Pakistan has one of the world’s largest numbers of refugees with a
registered 1.5 million Afghan refugees. A sharp decline in economic growth in 2006 put the country
under significant strain. Combined with multiple disasters (5 major floods and multiple earthquakes
since 2005) and protracted ongoing conflict and tension both within Pakistan and with neighbouring
countries is thought to have contributed to 49.4 per cent of the population living in multi-
dimensional poverty. Furthermore access to education remains low in Pakistan with one of lowest
rates of primary school education competition in the world. Health rates have improved at a slow
rate however nutrition has not improved for two decades; 45% of children are stunted in growth and
16% of children under five suffer from malnutrition. Nevertheless, Pakistan has made substantial
progress in reducing poverty. However the number of people living near to the poverty line makes
rates of vulnerability to poverty very high (World Bank, 2016).
A number of conflict drivers are thought to exacerbate and fuel an ongoing level of insecurity.
Drivers of conflict include; inequality and poverty, social issues such as religious divides, cultural
communal divides, youth alienation, failure of justice (both formal and informal systems face
criticism), militancy from armed rebel and terrorist groups, political participation, feudalism,
governance and military rule (UNICEF 2016). Further to this, Pakistan’s geography is also thought to
contribute to governance challenges. The mountains of Baluchistan, FATA, NWFP, and the desert
areas in southern Punjab, eastern Sindh and parts of Baluchistan, pose significant challenges to
transport, communication, the delivery of goods and services, and the provision of administration
and security (Initiative for peace building, 2007).
5
2.3 Sindh
This case study focused on Sukkur in the Sindh province. The Initiative for Peace Building describes
Sindh province as socially, culturally and economically diverse. Sindh is thought to be negatively
associated with urban – rural inequalities, unequal wealth and intense struggles for political power.
Sindh has the largest population of non-Muslims in Pakistan many of whom face marginalisation.
Ethnic tensions are exacerbated through political party’s affiliations. Rural Sindh has a traditionally
tribal and feudal system which can cause severe challenges for service provision such as education
for girls (UNICEF, 2016). Sindh was the worst affected area in the 2010 floods; which caused mass
displacement and loss of life, housing, livelihoods and infrastructure; further exacerbating
inequalities and poverty.
Map: Sindh Flood Impact 2010 Source: UNOCHA
6
3. The Disaster
On the 29th July 2010 Pakistan was hit with unusually heavy monsoon rains which caused severe
flash floods and landslides. The flooding continued into August and was ranked as the worst flooding
Pakistan has experienced in 80 years (IFRC).
The over-all damage was estimated at 885 billion rupee (8.44 billion US dollars) (Christian Aid, 2010)
with over 44% of damages reported in the Sindh province. 880, 000 houses were completely or
partially damaged, killed 200, 000 people, 1.2 million livestock and displaced 1. 8 million people
(Thomas Reuters Foundation, 2011).
4. The Intervention
The initial needs assessment conducted by World Vision Pakistan informed the design of the DEC
(Disasters and Emergencies Committee) funded program and included three core areas:
1. Destruction of community infrastructure
2. Lack of livelihood opportunities
3. Clean water/adequate sanitation and hygiene practices
Target community selection criteria
All targeted villages were severely affected by the floods and are now hosting a large number of IDP
“returnees” as well as the flood affected population that opted to stay in the aftermath of the
floods. Villages were selected for a comprehensive and integrated early response programme across
multiple sectors. The criteria used to select these villages were as follows:
Heavily damaged by the floods and with a population facing significant needs in multiple
sectors: WASH, Health, Education, Livelihoods
Other NGOs/INGOs not responding in these areas
WV Pakistan’s operational presence – WV implemented relief interventions (NFI, Food,
Health, WASH, Protection) in these areas, thus building grounds to implement a
comprehensive recovery programme.
7
Target beneficiary selection
The bulk of this DEC project consisted of rehabilitation of community infrastructure (community
centres, livelihoods infrastructure and other social services infrastructure e.g. health / education).
Whole communities benefited from access to these rehabilitated assets, including children, women,
the elderly, differently-abled, etc. Overall, 4000 most vulnerable families in Sukkur, Shikarpur &
Khairpur were assisted with the implementation of this project.
IDP returnees
Although the targeted villages are predominantly comprised of flood IDP returnees, this World
Vision project will benefit both returnees as well as “stayees” who remained throughout the floods.
The floods affected both displaced and non-displaced households: thus beneficiaries will be selected
according to their level of need and vulnerability, not displacement status.
Women
Given frequent incidences of low participation of women in relief/recovery projects in Pakistan, WV
aimed to create space to increase participation. Women’s Village Development Committees were
formed to encourage and maximize Women’s participation and decision-making within the
community. Village rehabilitation grants were also prioritized to increase the access of women and
girls to resources and development. Special attention was given to female-headed households in
beneficiary selection. Additionally, specific CFW activities will be designed to favour women’s
involvement including for example: nurseries raising/plants production; orchards rehabilitation, etc.
5. The Project strategy
A summary of the project’s different phases is outlined in the diagram below. The core focus of the
project included cash for work, cash transfers, water filters, and community involvement, local
market strengthening, Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience Building.
8
Immediate Response
•Tents, shelter and food
Recovery
•Food and other basic goods distibuted
•Houses began to be re-developed
Cash for work
•World Vision dentified target beneficiaries amongst the most vulnerable groups. It will target villagers who have limited opportunities for livelihoods restoration
•The targeting criteria as well as the wage (15 days at a rate of $5) prioritised the most vulnerable.
Cash Vouchers
•The extremely vulnerable in the communities were targeted for cash vouchers
Water Filters
•WV tested water quality in all villages and identify those households with the highest levels of arsenic in household water usage.
•These recieved appropriate arsenic filtration systems and weretrained on their use.
Community Grants
•The Village Rehabilitation Grants were allocated according to the size of the villages as well as the level of damage affecting community centres.
•Local community involvement was central to the implementation of the Village Rehabilitation Grants. Communities were be directly involved in the decision-making process as well as the implementation of the rehabilitation grants
DRR & Resilience
•The rehabilitation of community infrastructure (schools, health facilities of irrigation channels, etc) will allow communities to recreate a sense of normality and restart their social, economic and spiritual life in dignity
•The project will reduce the vulnerabilities of the target communities through the enhancement of safe drinking water sources and the provision of sanitation facilities and hygiene awareness.
•Skills enhancement training sessions will be conducted to support CFW reconstruction and rehabilitation activities as well as household shelter reconstruction activities
•Community capacity to prioritize their needs, plan actions, make decisions and solve problems will be reinforced through the creation and mobilization of village development committees (VDCs).
9
6. Research Methodology
The following research methodology was then employed to explore the different phases, challenges
and opportunities that the program faced throughout its life span/
6.1 Research Aims
1. To explore the World Vision (and partners) response to the 2010 floods
2. To explore both the response & rehabilitation, to capture lessons learnt; recommendations and
challenges of smoothly aligning resilience informed response and rehabilitation phases to
strengthen community resilience
3. With the over-all project aim of developing recommendations for global resilience informed
humanitarian response
6.2 Methods, Study Site & Sampling
The LPRR research team spent two weeks in the Sindh province researching World Vision’s response
to the 2010 floods in Sindh. This research is underpinned by Bene et al’s (2012) conceptual
framework which outlines a resilient system as one which is stable, flexible and able to cope with
change. A comprehensive and detailed outline of the methodology can be found in the LPRR learning
google drive and project box account. Links to both can be found in the bibliography. Ultimately five
core resilience principles have underpinned the research methodologies. These include:
1. There is community involvement, incorporating social values and appropriation of local
knowledge in resilience building projects
2. There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion and recognising that resilient
systems take a cross-scalar perspective
3. The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with preparedness activities
enabling flexibility to a range of future unexpected hazards
4. There are spaces and places for continuous learning
5. A high degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a
system are acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward and better’. Any approach to building
resilience should not work with an idea of restoring equilibrium because systems do not have a
stable state to which they should return after a disturbance.
10
6.2 Methods, Study Site & Sampling
Taking a triangulated approach this research adopts a mixture of methods including; semi structured
interviews with key informants and household interviews and focus group discussions with
community members which included risk and resilience mapping as the primary data collection
methods. The case study sites have been selected by World Vision as good examples of lessons
learnt. Purposive sampling was adopted for participants in order to gain a diverse range of
participants.
6.3 Data Analysis
Data was analysed through thematic analysis, drawing out core aligning and opposing themes and
perceptions around the identified resilience variables and additional core factors. A further, more in-
depth phase of analysis will be conducted after all case studies have been captured.
6.4 Limitations
Due to the security situation in Pakistan it was felt more appropriate for the KCL team to conduct the
data collection remotely. A local researcher was hired and trained in Islamabad by the KCL team on
the LPRR methodology alongside a number of World Vision and partner staff. This research team
then conducted the two week data collection.
On the one hand this was felt to strengthen the quality of data due to the cultural acceptance of
community members being interviewed by familiar World Vision staff. However, on the other hand
it meant that the KCL research team was not able to directly access the community.
Furthermore the research team reported the heat to be a major challenge in data collection; with
temperatures reaching 40 degrees Celsius this limited the amount of time you could spend in the
field. Furthermore it was difficult to track down project officers who had implemented the project as
they had moved on to work in different places.
11
7. Findings
Resilience Principles
Community Reflections
“I came out of the mouth of death” (Community member)
“The 2010 flood was the worst in the history of our village. We were
helpless” (Community Member).
“Nothing was left behind but mud and water” (Community member)
Next the five core principles underpinned by Bene et al’s (2012) theoretical conceptualization of
resilience have been explored. Community members, field staff, local government officials and other
key stakeholders have been asked to reflect on the five core principles; map out the challenges that
existed and opportunities and recommendations for where resilience could be introduced into
preparedness, response and recovery and rehabilitation.
Principle 1: There is community involvement, incorporating social values
and appropriation of local knowledge in resilience building projects
Community Reflections
The community appear to have mixed thoughts around the level of participation that the
humanitarian response program achieved. On the one hand a number of community members
explained that World Vision were very inclusive and conducted household visits for need
assessments and helped to set up a village committee who they met with regularly and learnt about
what the village needs were, what local knowledge could be shared and how the community wanted
to project to be implemented. For example during the Women’s FGD participants explained how
women from the NGO’s came into their homes to talk to the women and ensure they were not being
left out.
However a number of community members also explained that they were not involved in the design
or implementation of the program but that it was the village Syed’s (the land owners and leaders of
the village) who were selected to participate; leaving the poor and vulnerable out of decision making
and information sharing.
In reflection of this the community members recommended that NGO’s focused on building the
capacity of the CBO’s and community themselves (not the Syed/ landowners) to be able to
effectively prepare for and respond to an emergency. The community members felt that they should
be the ones who run the emergency response with the support of the government.
12
“The Syed decided what our needs were, there was a community
meeting with the male members of the community and Syed”
(Community member)
“No my household was not asked what we need. I think it would be
better if they came straight to the people to ask us” (Community
member)
“We were not involved, neither were any of the other women we know.
Now I suggest it is better to select a person who lives in the village not
the Syed as we will have the local knowledge” (Community member)
Field Staff Reflections
Next, when exploring the field staff’s reflections on community participation there appears to be a
difference between the levels of participation throughout the different phases of the program. Field
staff explained that they feel that in the immediate response community members were not
engaged with but that in the recovery and rehabilitation it became more feasible to empower the
community to be involved, to learn from the community’s local knowledge and allow them to make
decisions on their future. In particular participants explained that there was a sudden increase in
female participation in the recovery and rehabilitation phase of the program. Here, it was felt that
World Vision made a specific effort to ensure female community members were being engaged
with.
Furthermore, field staff explained that they feel that the relationship between the community and
NGO’s was challenging and that it was difficult to engage with the community members at the start
of the program. It was felt to be hard work motivating people to come together and work together.
In particularly field staff feel that in the beginning there was reluctance to come together with
members of the village who were from different areas, religions and castes in the village.
In addition one field staff explained that He felt that there was a lack of trust in the beneficiaries and
explained that a lot of community members could not be trusted as ‘those who have always want
more and more. This thing was there; greed’ (Field staff). This was felt to be particularly true with
community leaders (The Syed). Further to this, the same field staff explained that community
members do not have the same level of understanding as a CBO and so cannot fully partake in
decision making.
However other field staff explained that it was the nature of immediate response which made them
unable to include participation in the initial response. Here field staff felt that they were just focused
13
on distribution but as the project timeframe went on the field staff had the capacity to engage with
the community members more and include them in decision making. Despite this it was felt that the
project did include some participation and when it did it was felt to be effective in including all
sectors of society; male, female, young, old and different caste etc.
In reflection of community leadership a number of field staff explained that they do not like working
with the community leaders. It was explained that in Sindh the ‘Syed’s’ or land lords/ land owners
are the community leaders, they have a great hold and power and hold over the community
therefore World Vision prefers to go straight to the community members. However it was explained
that this is challenging to do without angering the Syed’s.
“Leaders in Sindh are not true leaders, they are not advocating for the
people, they always have their own personal interest” (Field staff).
Other field staff disagreed with this and explained that these leaders played a very good and
important role in mobilising the people and making decisions on their behalf and for their interests.
Some field staff even stated that they feel that the program supported a change of thinking
throughout the leaders who began to think more carefully and for the benefit of the whole village.
“This program changed the mind-set of the leaders” (Field staff).
With regards to social values; a number of field staff explained that whilst the earlier phases of the
program did not have the capacity or time to think about social values; the rehabilitation phase did
aim to incorporate social values. For example the program created women’s groups and developed a
team of female field staff who would visit the women who do not leave their home compounds to
ensure the female members of the community were included. Here, the program aimed to ensure
that the livelihood capacity building projects were in keeping with the local social values and norms
and could include the female community members as well as the male. The community here are felt
to have engaged 100%.
“The rehabilitation was all about what the community needed and
wanted” (Field staff).
Recommendation
One recommendation made here was that a practical, time efficient way of engaging with
community members needs to be developed from the very beginning. It is felt that the community
should be asked what they need and would like first. NGO’s and government should be guided by
the community members. Field staff explained that local knowledge could have prevented a number
14
of mistakes such as distributing Pulse (daal) as the food response which the community members
didn’t eat because they were not use to it.
“Ask the community what they want and what they need” (Field staff).
“If we don’t ask the community what they want then how can we expect
the design to be fruitful in the long term?” (Field staff).
Principle 2: There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion
and recognising that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective Community Reflections
In general the community feel that the 2010 flood and World Vision’s program bridged links
between the community and the government and enabled a relationship and trust to be developed.
The community feel that they are now more aware about their rights and more confident in
speaking the government officials because of the program. However a number of village members
stated that they would need more confidence and training to feel able to advocate to the
government for something. Community members also explained that both the flood and programme
brought the community closer together, ended the internal conflict and tensions between
households and strengthened community cohesion.
“The community have more togetherness but the government thinking is
still the same” (Community Member)
However the community have split perceptions on how the government were involved in the
project. On the one hand the majority of participants explained that the government were first to
give out meals twice a day and then supported households by giving them a ‘wattan’ cash card
which they could use for everyday needs. However a small number of community members
explained that they did not receive any help from the government at all.
Interestingly, here the ‘Syed’s’, the landlords and landowners and leaders of the village offered
support through donating money and through providing small loans to community members
throughout the recovery. On the one hand the community explained that this brought the landlords
and villages closer together; however on the other some community members felt that it reinforce
the inequalities and power dynamics and the community highlighted the World Vision savings
programme as much better for them than receiving loans from the Syed.
“Syed went to the government for help and got them to give us food and
aid at the beginning” (Community member)
15
“The government and the NGO’s helped us, they cared for us after the
flood, I don’t know who they were but they were angels from the sky to
us” (Community member)
“Before the flood there was no togetherness and people fought each
other all the time. We were a village of strangers. Now we love each
other and are a strong community working together with our community
committee” (Community member)
“During the flood we helped each other, we are united, we respect and
love one another” (Community member)
“The government took no interest in us after the flood” (Community
member)
“We don’t know how to meet with serious government officials”
(Community member).
“The landlords got help from the government after the flood but the
poor did not” (Community member).
Field Staff Reflections
“People came forward to develop their own community” (Field staff)
In addition to this the field staff reflected on their perceptions of leadership, cohesion and
governance. Firstly, the lack of trust between the people and the government is felt to have been a
huge challenge. Interestingly, field staff feel that this lack of trust was the reason that community
members did not act upon the government’s flood warning.
However there also appears to be a difference in opinion between field staff about the
governments’ involvement. On the one hand field staff also explained that the government was not
involved in World Visions’ work with the communities before the flood, however the 2010 mega
flood brought the INGO’s, NGOs and government together.
Furthermore a number of field staff explained that they feel the program supported relationship
building between the community and government and NO’s and government. Here, field staff
explained that they feel that the government were attempting to reach out to the community and
support them and work with the INGO’s to do so.
However on the other hand a number of field staff disagreed and said the government was not
involved in anyway other than providing police for the aid distribution. A number of field staff also
16
explained that after the initial disaster response the government went back to being disconnected
from the communities and a challenge for the INGOs and NGOs.
Nevertheless, the majority of field staff explained that they feel the disaster and program increased
community social cohesion and togetherness. The disaster and program is felt to have put a stop to
tension, conflict and intolerance of each other and create an environment of support, love and
respect. This was seen less so in the immediate response but significantly throughout the
development of the program.
One core success reflected on by the field staff was the way in which World Vision developed a
community committee which brought the community together to decide how the recovery and
rehabilitation should be run. Field staff also reiterated the fact that working with the village leaders
(the Syed’s) was often challenging. There was often a complete lack of communication between the
local leaders and whilst sometimes the leaders would help but other times they would completely
block the NGO’s work.
Recommendations
A core recommendation was made here to support government capacity development, work
through and hand over to the local government, encourage relationship building between the
government and the community (and CBO’s) and build the confidence of people to meet with
government officials and explain their concerns and needs. It was agreed amongst field staff that
this had begun “Now they (the community) can raise their voice for their right” (Field staff).
However more work is needed to ensure everyone was heard. A second recommendation made by
field staff includes supporting and encouraging the community to develop a vision for the future and
a goal to work towards.
Principle 3: The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is
accepted with preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of
future unexpected hazards Community Reflections
The community explained that they felt that they were not prepared before the flood. In particular
the community explained that they did not trust the government when they issued the Early
Warning before the 2010 flood hit. The community thought that it would be the same level of
severity as flooding they experienced each year.
17
However the community explained that the trainings that World Vision ran had created increased
awareness, preparedness, and access to information and trust for warning information in the future.
The community feel that that they know risks are likely to change in the future and that they now
take information about risk much more seriously.
“No one can face the disaster. The community was not
prepared…everyone ignored the warning and information because we
thought it would be the same as all the small floods we have every year”
(Community member)
“There was rumour of a flood but we ignored the warning as we thought
it would be the same as every year and not so bad” (Community
member)
“I do feel the World Vision Project helped us, not only to prepare better
but also to think for the future” (Community member).
“We didn’t know how the water suddenly came” (Community member)
“We have plans and we are prepared now” (Community member)
“Before they (the community) don’t listen to the government but now
they take them more seriously” (Field staff)
Field Staff Reflections
Field staff went on to reflect on community preparedness before and after the flood and whether
they feel future risk is understood and effectively communicated throughout the community. All
field staff interviewed feel that the community was not prepared before the 2010 flood. Field staff
explained that they feel the community did not have the awareness that a mega flood could happen
and did not trust their sources of information.
However after the flood; field staff feel that the community’s preparedness has significantly
increased due to a combination of the experience of the mega flood, the training and awareness
raising from WV and strengthened relationships with the government. It was also explained that
due to the stronger relationship with the government the community now have access to
information through the radio, television, mobile phones and newspapers and take information on
risk more seriously. Furthermore the government also send text messages with warnings, use
mosque loud speakers to give warnings and distribute information pamphlets.
18
“They (the community) are aware now. They will not follow their
mistakes of the past, they have experience and training now” (Field
Staff).
Interestingly, field staff also highlighted mental strength of the community members as a core issue.
Whilst field staff explain that the community is more prepared and physically strong, they feel that
the community is mentally weak and fragile and do not believe in themselves to have the power,
agency and an influence over their future or potential risks. One example of this was given by a field
staff who explained that the community members preferred keeping their temporary shelters as
they are worried that if they invested time and money into building a permanent house it could
wash away and be lost in a future flood;. This therefore limits resilience building or longer term
development. Here, recommendations were made for programs to include training on confidence
building, motivation and empowerment.
Field staff also feel that religion, combined with the scale and shock of the 2010 floods has left some
of the community feeling hopeless and that it is God’s will. “They (the community) say what will
happen, will happen as it is God’s will and we cannot do anything” (Field staff). “Their (community)
thinking must change” (Field staff).
Principle 4: There are spaces and places for continuous learning Community Reflections
Community members explain that there were a number of trainings and capacity building sessions
around preparedness, health and hygiene, livelihoods and savings throughout the 2010 flood
response program. This was one of the most helpful aspects of the project and feel much more
aware and knowledgeable now because if them. However one recommendation made by
community members was to also include the local government in training and capacity building.
Furthermore, the community felt that the World Vision training also challenged cultural beliefs and
traditional way of life in a positive way. It was explained that WV taught participants how important
girls’ education is and would like to see a girls’ schools in their community and challenged the
concept of child marriage. Community members felt that these negative aspects of their way of life
needed to be challenged for a positive, resilient future.
“Before the flood we do early childhood marriages and we fight each
other but now we don’t. We learnt.” (Community member).
19
“World Visions’ training booted us to build capacity, think wider and
more holistically” (Community member).
“World vision gave us lots of training on health, hygiene, savings and
preparedness. This was the most helpful thing we got. We received know
how knowledge and in result of that we feel encouraged” (Community
member).
“They (World Vision) taught us how to save ourselves in a flood. We are
now more confident that we can respond to save ourselves if it happens
again” (Community member).
Field staff
Further to this field staff reflected on their experiences of opportunities to learn throughout the
program. Whilst it was clear that the field staff feel that the community was given a lot of training
and that this training was put into practice effectively, it appears that the NGOS did not prioritise
their own learning, reflections or capacity building.
A number of field staff also recommended that the government should be given capacity building
and that the DRR training should last for at least two hours as appose to the short session that the
community received. It is also felt by field staff that this should also be done regularly to update the
community on changing risks and it should not just be a one off session. Furthermore field staff
explained that they did not feel like they had the power or position to reflect or change the program
once it had begun. “We did not have the power to change the design” (Field staff).
Field staff recommendations included training the community to run emergency response
programme themselves, conduct disaster drills and ensure basic needs are met before conducting
training. One example was given of community members who hadn’t eaten for days sitting through
trainings hungry.
20
Principe 5: A high degree of social and economic equity exists in
systems. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a system are
acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward and better’. Any
approach to building resilience should not work with an idea of
restoring equilibrium because systems do not have a stable state to
which they should return after a disturbance.
Community Reflections
A number of community members explain that they do not see much difference in their community
when the compare their lives before the 2010 flood and after. The community agrees that they were
able to bounce back and that there are a few improvements around preparedness; such as increased
awareness, access to information and raised houses. However there were also a number of
negatives such as the contamination of farm land from the salt water. The community feel that crop
yielding is poor in comparison to before the flood.
However a small number of community members do feel that the village has bounced back better
and has improved through this training, increased preparedness, community cohesion and
togetherness, changed perceptions and through enhancing the community to take control and make
decisions through a CBO not the landowners.
“The community is better now; we feel change inside the community.
World Vision enhanced the community with the committee and the
training” (Community member)
“I feel a big change in the community because we are aware and we
have our savings” (Community member)
“The community is better now; we feel change inside the community.
World Vision enhanced the community with the committee and the
training” (Community member)
In addition to this, the community explained that they feel everyone was equally exposed to the
floods; however those with land and savings were able to cope better in the aftermath. Throughout
the community mapping exercise it was clear that before the flood there were risks but the
community were not prepared. Furthermore there was no community committee and there was
conflict between community members, a lack of togetherness and a lack of trust between
21
community members. The Syed (land owners) did not help the villagers and were removed from the
community.
Straight after the flood, everything was completely destroyed however the community came
together, the Syed (land owners) hosted them in their houses and gave them money as is was Eid.
The government and NGO’s then brought aid and supported them. The NGO’s helped them to
rebuild their lives.
Today, the community explain that sometimes they still feel unsafe and afraid of the river. However
they feel more prepared, they keep their houses higher, the put important belongings up high in
houses and know what to do if a flood warning is given. The community explain that they have more
facilities now than they did before the 2010 flood and more access to information through SMS
messages and the TV and radio. It is felt that the education is better, the community togetherness is
better, the community has more information and awareness, the relationship with the Syed and
government is better, services and local leadership is better and they feel stronger and more
independent due to the savings initiative. The community explained that their awareness around
rights and hygiene had also increased. For example the community now had latrines and no longer
practiced open defecation.
However, the community explained that in order to have truly bounced back better and be resilient
they would like to have seen their community action group turned into an emergency response
committee and have the training and resources to run the initial emergency response themselves.
To do this the community felt that they would also need life jackets, a life boat, swimming lessons,
an evacuation center, an ambulance and health center. The community feel that they would also
need flood walls and stronger, higher houses with emergency exits to feel resilient against future
floods. In addition to this the community also wanted independence. To these community members
independence means reliable livelihoods, a village market and the opportunity for local people to be
elected as government officials.
Lastly, the community discussed the need for education and schools for girls. Field staff commented
on this and through that it could be argued that challenging the cultural norm of not education
females could be an example of transformational change.
“There will be no issues if we can plan our community with our own
hands and minds” (Community member)
“After the committee was made it changed our thinking to work better
together” (Community member)
24
Field Staff Reflections
Field staff agreed and explained that whilst the communities’ risk perception, awareness and
preparedness had increased, the people still need confidence building to speak to government
officials and advocate for their needs. Further to this it is felt by field staff that both community
members and government officials need capacity building and relationship strengthening.
Field staff went on to reflect on the social inequalities throughout the community. It is felt by the
field staff that whilst economic issues were tackled and addressed by the World Vision program; the
social inequalities were ignored. Issues of power and perceptions of difference; from caste to
religion and whether or not participants are land owners are thought to create divisions and
(re)produce social inequalities. For transformative resilience building a number of field staff felt that
the social perceptions that have been deeply imbedded in Pakistani culture needed a radical change.
Here, even field staff felt religions and cultures should be separated when recommending the British
funding should help the Christians and Hindus and Pakistani’s should stick together with government
aid. A second requirement for building back better would include advocating for the eradication of
poverty and the promotion of human rights throughout the legal system. This would include in
particularly ensuring that the relationship between the governments’ police and the people is more
positive. Ultimately in reflection of the fact that it was the land owners made the initial decisions
and were consulted from the offset and it was land owners who had the power to offer support, aid
and loans; the program could be thought to (re)inforce the communities’ unequal power dynamics.
Challenges and Recommendations
Lastly, the community members and field staff were asked to map out any challenges and
recommendations that they feel the project f aced or should have included.
Challenges Recommendations
Field staff explained that just looking after the community and survivors was a big challenge. NGO’s helped us with rehabilitation and psychologists came and helped with trauma.
There was a lot of sickness after the floods
Health, livelihoods, community emergency response committee and savings.
Disease, rats and water animals were a problem
Lack of interest from villagers
Lack of trust of Early Warnings
People should be given psychological education and support
Ask the people themselves what they need, who is at risk, what they want. They know.
Check and double check with the people what is needed
Include everyone regardless of religion or caste
Bridge gaps between community and government and community and NGOs and NGOs and government
The government needs to take responsibility. Field staff would suggest that they take four government officials from each province and work together to develop a comprehensive emergency and disaster preparedness and response plan.
Don’t just leave at the end but help build the capacity of a social welfare department and hand over
25
7. Bene et al (2012) Absorb (cope), Adapt, Transform Analysis
In reflection of Bene’s (2012) Resilience Absorb, Adapt, Transform (AAT) observations, it was felt
important to gauge the community’s perception of what resilience means to them and explore how
the field officers and other stakeholders felt that the intervention impacted on the community’s
resilience. The graphs below illustrate the participants’ reflections on the intervention’s phases in
relation to the resilience principles. The x axis maps out the efficiency vs. equity through inclusivity
and participation whereas the y axis maps out Bene’s (2012) AAT stages of resilience and the way in
which the community and intervention supported the stabilisation of the community and
strengthening of resilience. The numbers illustrate the five resilience principles and are mapped out
in the graph’s key. It is important to note that whilst this is an overview an in-depth analysis of the
data collected in this case study will be presented in a second paper.
Gap in communication between the (I)NGO’s and people
Access to the community – both physically and reluctance from the community and government to have us there
Religious segregation even amongst team: “I would recommend that the British should help the Hindu and Christian and the Muslims should help each other” Field staff
Tension in the refugee camp due to different tribes and castes having to come together to live in the same place
Government should provide opportunities for regular learning and updates for the community members
Lack of communication with the beneficiaries “If we don’t receive assistance and others do and we don’t know why we become very disheartened, sad and angry” (Community member)
Build social cohesion across caste and religion
Ensure psychological support for both the community/ survivors and field staff
Develop trainings with the community to tackle root causes of vulnerability, exclusion and inequality
26
What does this table show?
Indicator Response Recovery Rehabilitation
Community involvement (participation) 2 5 1 0
3 5 3 1
5 5 4 3
1 Mean 2 3 4
Community Cohesion 0 5 0 0
2 5 1 1
4 5 4 3
2 Mean 1 2 4
Strengthen Links to Government 0 0 0 0
2 5 1 1
4 5 4 3
3 Mean 0 2 4
Understanding of risk strengthened 0 5 0 0
4 5 0 1
4 5 4 5
4 Mean 1 2.5 4.5
Access to information increased 0 4 0 0
2 4 1 2
4 4 3 5
5 Mean 1 2 4
Preparedness 0 1 1 0
0 1 3 1
5 4 4 5
6 Mean 0.5 1 4
Learning throughout 0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
4 4 4 5
7 Mean 0 1 4
Building Back Better as a focus 1 4 1 3
3 4 2 3
3 4 5 3
8 Mean 2 3 4
27
It is clear that this table of scores demonstrate how the eight resilience indicators changed and
developed throughout the three phases of the project. For the response phase all indicators are at 0
(non-existent) apart from a small amount of participation and community cohesion building.
The table illustrates how these indicators begin to be applied more throughout the recovery phase
of the program. In particular participation and a focus on bouncing back better strengthening are
increased however the focus on preparedness and learning is still low.
Furthermore the table outlines the final rehabilitation phase where participant’s scores indicate that
all of these resilience indicators have developed into a level 4. Here it is clear all of these core
resilience factors have been taken into consideration and acted upon during the rehabilitation
period. A second paper will be developed analysing what blockages and limitations prevent these
resilience indicators from being implemented from the offset and if they should and how they could
be included earlier on in programming in the future to community support resilience building.
7. Conclusions
In conclusion this case study paper has explored the World Vision 2010 Flood Response program in
Sindh, Pakistan. As part of the LPRR START DEPP project this case study aims to make up part of a
collection of up to 10 past humanitarian interventions and map out how the sector can better link
humanitarian response, longer term development and resilience building.
This particular World Vision program included an immediate response, recover and then
rehabilitation phase and mapped out how each of the five resilience principles and Bene et al’s
(2012) AAT framework plays out differently in different phases of the project.
This paper’s findings illustrate that the disaster and humanitarian intervention is thought to have
increased social togetherness and cohesion, challenge cultural norms to offer more equal
opportunities and increased the level of participation, learning and preparedness throughout the
community as the program developed in time. It also served to bridge relationship with the
community and local government and support the community to bounce back.
However the majority of participants did not feel that the community had effectively bounced back
better and outlined a number of challenges that were felt to contribute to this. The fist was the
feudal system and unequal power that the landlords and land owners have over community
members. The second was the lack of trust felt towards both the government and community
28
members. Furthermore political, ethnic and religious differences along with poor communication
around beneficiary selection was thought to cause tension throughout the community.
Recommendations from both field staff and community members included:
1. Enabling and empowering community members to be decision makers and lead emergency
response initiatives
2. Train and build the capacity of the local government,
3. Educate girls and tackle power inequalities, ask the community what they want and how they
would like it to be done and build social cohesion and togetherness across caste and religion.
Provide community training to tackle root causes of vulnerability and inequality.
4. In addition it is felt imperative by participants to hand programs over to the local government or
department of social welfare at the end and run a thorough hand over period.
5. Lastly, participants requested the need for psychological support for both the community/
survivors and field staff. This would also include community motivation and future vision
development.
Ultimately it is clear that the World Vision 2010 Pakistan Flood Response Program illustrates success
and challenges. Whilst the resilience principles mapped out appear to have been challenging to
implement in the immediate response they have all appeared to have developed throughout the
timeframe of the project.
Next steps
Next a further 3 case studies will be captured from DRC, Colombia and Bangladesh. Finally all 8-10
case studies will be critically analysed and a global approach for resilient informed humanitarian
response will be developed, piloted and rolled out. For any questions please contact Becky Murphy
the LPRR Resilience Learning and Capacity Building officer at rmurphy@christian-aid.org.
29
References
LSE (2012) Linking Preparedness Resilience and Resilience in Emergency Contexts: A Comparative
Analysis of Humanitarian Interventions, LSE, London
Bene, C., Wood, R., Newsham, A., Davies, M., (2012) Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny?
Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability
Reduction Programmes, IDS, 40
UNICEF (2016) http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Social-Cohesion-
Analysis-Summary-20160321.pdf
http://news.trust.org//spotlight/Pakistan-floods-2010
UNOCHA (2010) https://pakistanifloodrelief.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/sindh-flood-impact-
profile-as-of-14-sept-2010.jpg
World Bank (2016) Pakistan Country Profile
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview
top related