“on-the-fly” migration of eid to elliptic curves cryptography
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AUTHENTICATION REDEFINED
ISSE 2016 16.11.2016
Libor Neumann | ADUCID s.r.o.
“ON-THE-FLY” MIGRATION OF EID TO ELLIPTIC CURVES CRYPTOGRAPHY
Long-term sustainability of eID ecosystem
• It is impossible to:
• expect usability of current cryptography in following decades
• accept a blackout of any widely used eID ecosystem during its upgrade to new cryptography
Why?
Agenda
• Authentication protocol modification
• Deployment limits
• On-the-fly deployment support
• External authentication service
• Fully automated identifiers management
• Fully automated life-cycle of cyber-identities
• Mutual authentication using asymmetric cryptography
• Universal Cryptographic Protocol
• Independent cryptographic layer
• Built-in security management
• Integrated data channel binding with binding control
Assets
Personal Electronic Identity Guardian
Service Provider Identity Machine
ADUCID external interfaces
Target application or other ICT system
ADUCID
User
ADUCID foundation
‐ Only one framework with provable security features
‐ Repeated use of the framework for different operations
‐ Security features of the framework are independent on cryptography
One Abstract Framework
General cryptographic operations
- Encryption E (& Decryption D)- Sign S (& Signature Verification V)
General variables‐ RS – Random String ‐ X ‐ new secret‐ Y, Z – variables including specified items
Precondition‐ ATS – Authorized Information and Secret (e.g. authorised public keys of
both sites & private key of the specific site – asymmetric cryptography, authorized shared secret – symmetric cryptography)
UCP Main Principles – published 2011
t
Universal Cryptographic Protocol Note
Site(A) Site(B)
OI0 → Step 1:
← OI1OIx → Optional number
← OIy of (OIx,OIy) pairs
…. ….OI2, RS → Step 2:
← OI3, E(X), S(Y)OI4, S(Z) →
The following communication between A and B is encrypted (andoptionally authenticated)
Step 3:
← UIbUIa → Optional number
…. …. of (UIb, UIa) pairs
← OIend End
UCP sequence description
‐ Random string
‐ Entropy is defined by implementation and by configuration
‐ Authentication challengeRS
X
‐ Random string ‐ Entropy is defined by implementation and by configuration‐ Authentication challenge ‐ New authenticated shared secret
Y‐ Y = {authID, OI0, OI1, OIx and OIy pairs, OI2, RS, OI3, E(X), and optional
values }‐ Authentication & Important values integrity check
Z‐ Z = {authID, OI0, OI1, OIx and OIy pairs, OI2, RS, OI3, E(X), S(Y), OI4, and
optional values }‐ Authentication & Important values integrity check
UCP Variables t
t
‐ Only one framework with provable security features
‐ Repeated use of the framework for different operations
‐ Security features of the framework are independent on cryptography
One Abstract Framework
General cryptographic operations
‐ EC Key Agreement
‐ EC Sign S (& Signature Verification V)
General variables‐ DHSS – ECDH Shared Secret‐ X ‐ new secret‐ Y, Z – variables including specified items
Precondition‐ ATS – Authorized Information and Secret (e.g. authorised public keys of
both sites & private key of the specific site – asymmetric cryptography)
UCP2 Main Principles - EC
Universal Cryptographic Protocol 2 Note
Site(A) Site(B)
OI0 → Step 1:
← OI1OIx → Optional number
← OIy of (OIx,OIy) pairs
…. ….OI2, DHPuK1 → Step 2:
← OI3, DHPuK2, S(Y) DHSS & X
OI4, S(Z) → calculation
The following communication between A and B is encrypted (andoptionally authenticated)
Step 3:
← UIbUIa → Optional number
…. …. of (UIb, UIa) pairs
← OIend End
tUCP2 sequence description
‐ Elliptic Curve Diffie‐Hellmann (ECDH) Shared Secret
‐ Entropy is defined by EC configurationDHSS
X
‐ X = DHSS
‐ Authentication challenge
‐ New authenticated shared secret
Y‐ Y = {authID, OI0, OI1, OIx and OIy pairs, OI2, OI3, DHPuK1, DHPuK2,
DHSS and optional values }‐ Authentication & Important values integrity check
Z‐ Z = {authID, OI0, OI1, OIx and OIy pairs, OI2, OI3, DHPuK1, DHPuK2,
DHSS, S(Y), OI4, and optional values }‐ Authentication & Important values integrity check
9
tUCP2 Variables
Topology limits• Reused key issue
• Server certificate update
• User certificate update
Situation
• Many users, many service providers
• Server site & client site cryptography migration
• No service blackout
How to deploy?
Protocol update
• Known methods – version identifier
Deploy sequence
• Update of all clients
• Verify if all clients are updated - how?
• Server certificate migration
Server certificate
Smart card ID• New ID card has to be issued and delivered
to every citizen
• Usual ID validity period – 10 years
Deploying sequence
• Update of all relying parties
• Verify if all relying parties support old and new cryptography used by different clients
• Issue and delivery of new certificates to all clients
Client certificate – certification authority with many relying parties
On-the-fly deployment - architecture
Peer-to-peer topology
No reused key
User authenticator – different key set for every service provider
Server site – different key set for every user authenticator
Built-in multi-version support
Version identification
Multi-version backward compatibility
Update from cloud – Apple AppStore, Google Play,…
BYOD support
On-the-fly deployment - tools
Parameter agreement
Parameter check by authenticator
Optional parameter sets
Built-in managementProtocol/parameter enforcement controlled by security management console
On-the-fly enforcement
• Planned
• Event driven
• UCP UCP2 - Different cryptographic operation support (encryption + signature <-> key-agreement + signature)
• Protocol modification is needed -> Multi-protocol environment
• Reused keys complicate/disables on-the-fly deployment
• On-the-fly deployment solution
• Independent paired key sets topology
• Built-in multi-protocol support & parameter agreement
• BYOD + cloud upgrade
• Built-in security management
• Planned deployment
• Emergency deployment
Conclusion
top related