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military authority and leverage. Moreover, it appeared
uninterested in reports that the Bosnian Serbs had committed
genocide as part of their ethnic cleansing program.
Flush from victory in the Gulf War, the Bush administration
feared that military intervention in Yugoslavia could rapidly
become another Vietnam quagmire as U.S. forces
bogged down in the same difficult terrain that the Germans
had encountered during World War II. Moreover, it did not
believe that vital national interests were at stake and so could
not count on sustained domestic support. Thus, in contrast to
his adept handling of German reunification and Iraqi aggression,
President Bush stumbled in Yugoslavia and bequeathed
the Balkan imbroglio to his successor, Bill Clinton.
Humanitarian Intervention in SomaliaAnother humanitarian crisis, in the Muslim East African
nation of Somalia, unfolded almost simultaneously, and the
Bush administration came under significant domestic pressure
to alleviate the suffering caused by a severe famine.
Television pictures of starving Somali infants and children
began to appear during the summer of 1992 with Bush inthe midst of his reelection campaign.Members of Congress
such as the Black Caucus, but also Senator Nancy
Kassebaum (R-KS), argued that the United States had a
moral responsibility to intervene. The Reagan administration
had given military aid to the anti-communist government
of Siad Barre but had lost interest in Somalia with the
termination of the Cold War. Barre had been overthrown in
1991 with several regional warlords attempting to gain
effective political control of a chaotic situation. Indeed,
these warlords had decided to manipulate the distribution
of food as a means to achieve power. On August 14,
President Bush decided to begin an emergency food airlift
and to offer to transport 500 Pakistani troops under UN
command to the capital of Mogadishu. But most of the food
fell into the hands of the warring militias who used it for
political purposes. In September, 2,500 U.S.Marines arrived
off the coast to try and protect the UN soldiers, but this
action provoked the ire of Mohamed Farrah Aidid, perhaps
the strongest of the warlords and a long-time enemy of UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
The situation continued to deteriorate throughout the
autumn, but Bush did not reassess American policy until
after his electoral defeat. Then on November 25, 1992, he
decided to mount a large-scale military intervention, dubbed
Operation Restore Hope, that would involve about 30,000
ground troops. Its announced purpose was to ensure that
starving Somalis received the food that the warlords had beenintercepting and manipulating. According to Acting
Secretary of State Eagleburger, the administration decided to
act in Somalia rather than in the Balkans because the risks
were lower, not because American interests were more substantial.
President Bush evidently believed that U.S. forces
would begin to withdraw before Clintons inauguration on
January 20, 1993, but this timetable proved to be extremely
unrealistic. First, the administration had difficulty deciding
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whether American forces should disarm the militias or simply
attempt to deliver food. Disarmament would involve
taking sides and thus placing these forces at risk, but the
mere delivery of food to areas controlled by the warlords
meant that the supplies could be manipulated, and the
famine would return as soon as the troops left. Second,
the administration never fully debated whether the famine
was primarily a natural or a man-made disaster. If the latter,
then it would be very difficult to avoid becoming entangled
in the intricacies of Somali politicsa prospect that
Bush abhorred. As it turned out, no troop withdrawals
could be made before Bush left office, and President
Clinton inherited, as in Bosnia, an exceedingly volatile and
complex situation.
Foreign Policy and the 1992 ElectionWith the disappearance of the Soviet Union and with the
United States apparently in the midst of its unipolar
moment, many Americans lost interest in international
affairs. George Bush, the quintessential foreign policy president,
faced an electorate that worried about a naggingrecession, relatively high unemployment, and fears that
countries like Mexico were stealing good jobs from hardworking
Americans. As Bush began his reelection bid in
early 1992, his considerable foreign policy accomplishments
seemed to be liabilities, and he tried to convince the public
that he genuinely cared about domestic issues.
Bush, moreover, had alienated many conservative
Republicans who accused him of abandoning Reagans
social and economic agendas. Most galling to them was
Bushs decision in November1990 to renege on his 1988
campaign promise not to raise taxes despite enormous federal
budget deficits. Patrick Buchanan, a former Nixon
speechwriter, conservative columnist, and television pundit,
posed Bushs chief challenge in the Republican primaries,blasting NAFTA and Operation Desert Storm. Essentially an
anti-immigration isolationist, Buchanan failed to win any
primary elections but also refused to drop out of the race,
forcing Bush to expend valuable resources and distracting
his attention from his main challengers, Bill Clinton and
Ross Perot.
Perot, a billionaire Texas businessman, announced his
independent candidacy on CNNsLarry King Live on
February 20, 1992. His rather quixotic campaign focused on
the federal deficitwhich Perot promised to eliminateand
his opposition to NAFTAwhich he likened to a great sucking
sound of jobs leaving the United States for Mexico. After
showing well in the early polls, he quit the race in late summerin the face of a strong Clinton run but reentered on October
1 in time to participate in the three presidential debates.
362 George Herbert Walker BushArkansas Governor Bill Clinton positioned himself as a
centrist Democrat determined to reinvigorate the economy
through a combination of federal investments, tax cuts, and
improved public education. Although he devoted little
attention to foreign policy during the campaign, Clinton
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did castigate Bush for coddling the butchers of Beijing
and pledged to oppose granting China permanent most
favored nation trading status, called on the president to lift
the arms embargo against Bosnia and to order air strikes of
Serb positions, contended that more should be done to help
starving Somalis, criticized Bush for his policy of forcibly
returning fleeing Haitian refugees to their island homeland,
and suggested that the United Nations be given additional
peacekeeping and peacemaking responsibilities. Eventually,
he lent his support to NAFTA but warned that workers
rights and environmental concerns needed to be addressed.
Notwithstanding this rhetoric, however, foreign policy
played the smallest role in the 1992 election of any since the
Great Depression. Bush failed to overcome perceptions that
he simply did not care much about domestic issues and won
only 38 percent of the vote. Perot garnered 19 percent, an
exceedingly strong showing for a third party candidate,
while Clinton received 43 percent as well as an Electoral
College landslide.
LegacyGeorge H.W. Bush, by background, training, and temperamentvery comfortable with the verities of the Cold War,
probably would have preferred to pursue a strategy of
Soviet containment. Indeed, he spent much of 1989
attempting to slow down the momentum of the Reagan-
Gorbachev express. But at the Malta meeting in December
of that year, Bush concluded that he could do business with
Gorbachev and decided to initiate a set of strategic objectives
designed to ease the transition to a postCold War
world. Among these goals was German reunification, and
the administration orchestrated that process with adroitness,
patience, imagination, and aplomb.
After continuing to pursue Ronald Reagans policy of
dtente with Iraq in an effort to balance the power of Iran,Bush appeared startled by Saddam Husseins invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990. Yet by creating and leading an
unlikely international coalition and then by carefully cultivating
domestic support for military action in the Persian
Gulf, Bush performed masterfully, and a grateful American
public made him the most popular president since the
advent of approval ratings.
But from this pinnacle of February 1991, Bush stumbled
badly. Instead of engaging in a national debate over
Americas role in his new world order, he retreated into
merely celebrating and re-celebrating the victory in
Operation Desert Storm. Furthermore, the administration
ceded leadership in the Yugoslav cauldron to the EuropeanUnion, shrank from doing much to assist the new postcommunist
governments in Eastern Europe, and appeared
reluctant to genuinely assist Boris Yeltsin.
In large part, this timidity was driven by Bushs perceptions
of the 1992 presidential campaign. Dogged by the widespread
view that he cared little for domestic issues and plagued by a
recession that lingered longer than expected, President Bush
came to regard his foreign policy accomplishments and aspirations
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as impediments to his reelection chances.
Nevertheless, this transitional president bequeathed to
his immediate successors a set of global priorities for theworlds sole superpower. That agenda featured efforts to
retard the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the
further expansion of free trade areas with the United States
serving as the fulcrum, primary reliance on American military
power to provide regional stability in East Asia and
the Middle East, perhaps a greater inclination to involve
international organizations in U.S. initiatives, and the assertion
that the new democratic peace depended on
American global leadership.
Richard Melanson
Chronology1989February 6: Polish government agrees to talks with
opposition.
March 26: Multiparty elections in the Soviet Union end
over seven decades of Communist Party monopoly.
April 15: In China student pro-democracy demonstrations
begin.
April 25: Soviet Union begins withdrawal of troops from
Eastern Europe.
May 4: Hungary opens its border with Austria, thousands
of East Germans flee to the West.
May 25: Soviet Congress of Peoples Deputies elects
Gorbachev president of the Supreme Soviet.
June 34: Chinese army attacks student demonstrators in
Tiananmen Square, hundreds are killed.
June 5: President Bush protests repression in China,
imposes sanctions.
July 1319: G-7 summit leaders offer financial aid to
Poland and Hungary.
August 17: Gorbachev proposes autonomy for Sovietrepublics.
October 6: Gorbachev advises East Germany to reform its
government.
October 18: Hungarian National Assembly ends
Communist Party monopoly.
November 9: East German border with West Germany
opens, destruction of Berlin Wall begins.
George Herbert Walker Bush 363November 28: Mass demonstrations in Prague; Communist
Party agrees to share power with oppostition Civic Forum.
December 13: Bush and Gorbachev discuss trade and
arms control in Malta.
December 19: East and West Germany agree to plan forreunification.
December 20: United States invades Panama toppling
Noriega regime.
December 20: Gorbachev opposes Lithuanian independence.
December 2225: Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu is
overthrown and summarily shot.
December 28: Elections in Czechoslovakia end Communist
rule.
1990
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January 23: Yugoslavia dissolves League of Communists.
February 2: South African government legalizes the African
National Congress (ANC).
February 12: 2+4 Plan for German reunification is
established.
February 25: Violeta Chamorro wins Nicaraguan elections,
ousting Sandinista regime.
February 2527: United States urges European Community
to cope with Yugoslav crisis.
March 18: East German elections endorse speedy reunification.
May 29: Boris Yeltsin is elected president of the Russian
Federation.
June 9: Reformers win Czechoslovakian parliamentary
elections.
July 5: In Yugoslavia the Serb Republic assumes direct control
over the province of Kosovo.
August 2: Iraq invades Kuwait; United States and Soviet
Union condemn Iraqs aggression.
August 6: Bush deploys U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia in
Operation Desert Shield.
August 25: UN Security Council authorizes naval and airblockades of Iraq.
September 12: 2+4 talks adopt a treaty, Settlement with
Respect to Germany, for German reunification.
September 20: East and West Germany are officially reunified.
November 29: UN Security Council authorizes all necessarymeans to end Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
December 2: Germany hold first elections since reunification;
Chancellor Kohls Christian Democrats win.
1991January 12: Congress authorizes military force against
Iraq.
January 16: Operation Desert Storm begins; twenty-eightnation
coalition begins the liberation of Kuwait.February 2328: One hundred-hour ground offensive
against Iraqi forces in Kuwait ends in Iraqi defeat.
March 3: Iraqi military signs UN cease-fire terms.
March 6: In a speech to Congress Bush heralds new world
order.
March 6: Uprisings by Shiites and Kurds in Iraq are
crushed.
April 18: Iraq accepts cease-fire terms of UNSC Resolution
687.
May 29: Bush vows to ban all weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) from the Middle East.
July 31: Bush and Gorbachev sign START I Treaty.
August 16: Baghdad rejects UN oil-for-food program.August 19: Attempted coup against Soviet President
Gorbachev is defeated.
August 20: Three Soviet Baltic republics declare independence.
September 7: Croatia and Slovenia declare independence
from Yugoslavia.
September 25: UN Security Council embargoes arms sales
to Yugoslavia.
November 8: NATO approves postCold War strategic
concepts.
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December 8: Three former Soviet republics form the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
December 23: Germany recognizes independence of
Croatia and Slovenia.
1992January 31: UN Security Council plans higher profile in
preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping.
February 5: UN Security Council reinstates economic
sanctions against Iraq.
March 17: UN fails to stop fighting between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.
March 26: Germany suspends all arms deliveries to Turkey.
April 6: United States and European Community recognize
Bosnia-Herzogovina.
April 24: UN sends observers to Somalia to monitor
cease-fire.
May: France and Germany agree to 35,000 member joint
military force under NATO.
May 23: United States agrees with Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to abide by START I.
June 2: UN sends peacekeeping force to Sarajevo.July 3: Croats in Bosnia proclaim an independent state.
July 16: Germanys central bank raises interest rates.
364 George Herbert Walker BushAugust 6: United States seeks humanitarian aid for
Sarajevo, rejects military action.
August 27: EC-UN conference fails to end fighting in
Bosnia.
September: Britain withdraws from EMS due to Sterlings
crash against the Deutschmark.
October 3: United States airlifts food and medicine to
Sarajevo.
November 3:William Clinton is elected president; Albert
Gore Jr. is vice president.November 25: Czechoslovakian assembly votes for separate
Czech and Slovak republics.
December 3: UN approves U.S.-led humanitarian mission
to Somalia.
December 17: United States, Canada, and Mexico sign
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
December 17: Germany provides Russia with debt-relief
and housing finance.
1993January 3: United States and Russia sign START II Treaty.
References and Further ReadingBaker, James A., III, with Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics
of Diplomacy: Revolution,War, and Peace. New York:Putnam, 1995.
Beschloss,Michael, and Strobe Talbott.At the Highest
Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War.
Boston: Little, Brown, 1993.
Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft.A World Transformed.
New York: Random House, 1998.
Gow, James. Triumph of the Lack ofWill: International
Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997.
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Greene, John Robert. The Presidency of George Bush.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
Hirsch, John L., and Robert B. Oakley. Somalia and
Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping.Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Peace, 1995.
Hurst, Steven. The Foreign Policy of the Bush
Administration: In Search of a New World Order. London
and New York: Cassell, 1999.
Quandt,William B. Peace Process.Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 2001.
Tucker, Robert W., and David C. Hendrickson. The
Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and
Americas Purpose. New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 1992.
Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1991.
Zelikow, Philip, and Condoleezza Rice. Germany Unified
and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
BOX 9.1: Case study: US intervention in Somalia, 1992-3The US intervention (Operation Restore Hope) during
the crisis in Somalia 1991-2 was a seminal event bothin terms of intervention during a humanitarian crisis andthe role of media in US foreign policy formulation. Thecrisis in Somalia had developed due to civil war, the collapseof central government, and ensuing mass starvation.
By 1992, the crisis was attracting a significant degreeof international attention and the USAstarted to become
increasingly involved. By December 1992, 28,000 UStroops were deployed in Somalia in order to support theprovision of aid. As well as apparently cementing a newnorm of humanitarian intervention, the intervention was
a major news event remembered perhaps most for thegraphic images of starvation and conflict in Somalia andthe images of US marines being greeted on the beechesof Mogadishu, not by hostile gunmen, but by the world'spress. By the end of the operation, with the worldwidebroadcast of a dead US marine being dragged throughthe streets of Mogadishu, the intervention was indeliblyetched on US memory. As a case study in media,public opinion, and US foreign policy, the interventionhighlights the various roles media and public opinionmight play. In terms of the initial intervention, manyhave argued that the decision to intervene was caused bythe CNN effect whereby graphic and emotive images ofstarving people created a cry to 'do something' from the
American public, ti iereby compelling US policy makersto ti1k~ action (e.g. Kennan: 99,3). Others have claimedthatthe attention of US media to the suffering in Somaliahelped to build a domestic constituency for the interventionwhich policy makers were then able to draw upon
to support the intervention (Robinson 2002: 59-62).As such, the media and public opinion had an enablingeffect with respect to the decision to intervene. Once theintervention was under way, US media coverage helpedto mobilize support amongst the US public for the operationby portraying US actions in a positive light, emphasizing
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the role US soldiers and aid workers were playing in
saving Somali lives (Robinson 2002: 59-62). By mid-tolate
1993, however, the operation had evolved beyondsupporting aid delivery to include military action againstspecific factions within Somalia. The now infamous'Black Hawk Down' incident, which involved the deaths
of 18 US soldiers and up to 1,000 Somalis, was a pivotal
moment vis-a-vis the perceived failure of the interventionand US withdrawal from the country. In particular,images of a dead US combatant being dragged throughthe streets of the Somali capital Mogadishu were broadcaston US media and generated, according to some (e.g.
Kennan 1993), a political imperative to withdraw fromthe country. As such, at this stage of the intervention,media may have come to have an impediment effecton policy makers whereby images of dead US soldiersturned public opinion against involvement in Somalia.Beyond the specifics of the intervention and withdrawal,and any role public opinion and '\'edia played in these,the Somalia intervention and its ignominious end havebecome embedded in US foreign policy thinking as anexample of US military failure in the context of humanitarianintervention.
the democratic process, to public opinion. The direct
route refers to the process by which policy makers
are directly affected by what they see and read in themedia. So, for example, when images of civilian deaths
during the Bosnian conflict were broadcast by CNN,
some senior policy makers would react to such images
on a personal level and be moved to 'do something' to
prevent further loss oflife.
With respect to types of effect, four distinct categories
ofeffect can be identified; a CNN effect, an accelerant
effect, an enabling effect, and an impediment effect
(Livingston 1997; Robinson 2002). The CNN effectoccurs when media coverage plays a direct role in causing
policy makers to adopt a particular policy.This does
not.r.iean that media were the only reason that policy
makers chose a particular policy option, but it does
mean that without media pressure, the policy would
not have been adopted. Generally, when academics
talk of media influence, it is the CNN effect they have
in mind. For example, George Kennan (1993) argued
that it was emotive images of starvation that caused US
policy makers to intervene in Somalia (see Box 9.1).
In the absence of those images, no intervention would
have occurred. In fact, evidence for the CNN effect hasbeen hard to find. For example, a decade of researchinto this phenomenon has failed to provide consistent
evidence of strategic foreign policy initiatives (for
example humanitarian intervention) being caused
by media pressure (Gilboa 2005). More commonly,
research has found evidence of an accelerant effect,whereby the decision-making process is speeded up by
media attention. However, whilst often cited by both
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policy makers and academics, the accelerant effect does
not entail media causing a particular policy outcome;
rather this type of effect suggests that policy makers
respond more quickly to a particular issue, but do so in
precisely the same ways they would have done without
media attention. For example, in relation to the crisis
in northern Iraq 1991, media attention to the Kurdishcrisis might have speeded up the US decision to intervene,
but that decision would have, in any case, been
made at some later point. Another effect is that media
can enable policy makers to pursue a policy by building
public support for that policy (Wheeler 2000: 165).
For example, it could be argued that the 9/11 attacks
on the USA, and the fact they were communicated to
the US public in horrific real-time reporting, were crucial
in helping to mobilize public support in favour of
the Bush administration's war on terror and military
action in Afghanistan and Iraq. The attacks, and their
mass-mediated nature, therefore helped to build aconstituency amongst US citizens for a more interventionist
foreign policy. Finally, the impediment effect is
linked to the Vietnam Syndrome. Here, it is a fear over
negative media coverage of US casualties and its impacton public opinion that constrains policy makers and
prevents them pursuing a policy. For example, during
the air war against Serbia in 1999, the Clinton administration
limited military options to air strikes in order
to avoid US casualties. A factor in this decision was the
desire to avoid negative publicity of US casualties during
an already politically controversial operation.
Procedural criticism versussubstantive criticismIn concluding our discussion of pluralist accounts,
it is important to note that whilst claims about theChapter 9 Media and US foreign policy 171
influence of public opinion and media abound, academic
research suggests actual influence wielded is
more subtle and nuanced than is commonly assumed.
As discussed, the influence of public opinion uponforeign policy, whilst receiving empirical support,
needs to be moderated by the acknowledgement of
the multitude of factors influencing policy making.At the same time, notions ofa CNN effect need to
be moderated through acknowledgement that a more
subtle range of effects (e.g. the enabling effect) are
occurring most of the time. Whilst it would be churlish
to argue that media and public carry no influence,
the question of whether that influence is sufficient
from a liberal-democratic perspective is debatable.
More significantly, much research on media influence
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suggests that media influence occurs most often
at the procedural level, rather than at a substantive
level (Althaus 2003). The termprocedurd(Ciescribes
criticism and influence that relates to debate over the
implementation of foreign policy. The term substantive
is used to describe criticism and influence that
relates to the underlying justification and rationalefor particular foreign policies. For example, the Vietnam
War was criticized by US media and public more
often at a procedural level whereby the central question
revolved arouJd whether the USA was winning
or losing the war. Criticism, however, rarely raised
the more substantive question of the justification for
US involvement in Vietnam. Again, returning to the
example of the 1999 air war against Serbia, most of
the controversy within US media related to whether
or not air power was enough to win the war. At the
same time, debate over whether intervention could
be justified at all remained marginal (Robinson 2002:93-110). As we shall see in the next section, when we
discuss elite/critical accounts of the public opinion/
media/foreign policy nexus, the primary focus of
concern is precisely this lack of substantive debateover US foreign policy.
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