anhang978-3-658-14582...“, brian adamik, ana-lyst bei yankee group (the philadelphia inquirer,...
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Anhang
© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2016S. Schmal, Konsolidierungswellen und Prognoseverhalten von Finanzanalysten,DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-14582-8
254 Anhang
Tabelle A.1: Analystenaußerungen zu Konsolidierungswellen1311 Gewinnung von Erdol und Erdgas
”The Exxon-Mobil deal comes during a period of rapid oil industry consolidati-on.“, John D. Hervey, Analyst bei Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (The Washing-ton Post, 1999b).
”To see how extreme the consolidation drive has become in the energy indus-try, consider the $4.4 billion combination of Public Service Co. of New Mexicoand Western Resources Inc. It shows how crazy consolidation has become.“, TimO’Brien, Analyst bei Gabelli Utilities Fund (Daily Deal, 2001).
2711 Zeitungsverlag und -druckerei
”Newspapers, fairly recently, have started to pick up some steam. There is goingto be a rush to assemble a bunch of groups of stations, so you’ll see massive con-solidation.“, John Reidy, Analyst bei Smith Barney Shearson (The WashingtonPost, 1995).
”There’s always a risk that you can overconsolidate.“, Sig Gissler, Analyst undWirtschaftsjournalist (The New York Times, 1998).
3674 Halbleiter und verwandte Artikel
”The industry is ripe for consolidation.“, Andy Neff, Analyst bei Bear Stearns(San Jose Mercury News, 2001).
4812 Drahtlose Telekommunikation
”Critical mass is becoming more and more important in the paging industry,which is undergoing a phase of consolidation and is being dominated by fewer, lar-ger players.“, Linda Runyon, Analystin bei Merrill Lynch & Company (The NewYork Times, 1995).
4813 Telekommunikation (außer drahtlos)
”The deal also fanned speculation about another wave of consolidation in the te-lephone industry.“, Simon Flannery, Analyst bei J. P. Morgan & Company (TheNew York Times, 1996b).
4832 Radiosendestationen
”Perhaps no industry has seen greater consolidation than radio. Before the Te-lecommunications Act, broadcasters were limited to 36 radio stations, with up tofour in a market. The act lifted national ownership limits.“, Brian Adamik, Ana-lyst bei Yankee Group (The Philadelphia Inquirer, 1998).
4841 Kabel- und Pay-TV
”Exactly what’s happening in the Bay Area [consolidation of the cable industry]is going to happen in every other area. It’s totally expectable, it’s totally reasona-ble and is totally desirable for someone to consolidate all the systems in a givenmarketing region.“, Paul Kagan, Industrieanalyst (San Jose Mercury News, 1994).
4841 Kabel- und Pay-TV
Anhang 255
”Time Warner squeezed out more growth than other cablers, although it may becost-savings coming from consolidation of cable systems acquired in recent years.“,Fred Moran, Analyst bei ING Barings (Daily Variety, 1999).
”Most recently, though, cable firms have deferred further consolidation.“, Ray-mond Katz, Analyst bei Bear & Stearns (Investor’s Business Daily, 2000).
5112 Schreibwaren und Burobedarf
”The rationale for consolidations would be to drive harder bargains with manu-facturers, and further push down retailers’ costs.“, unabhangige Analysten (TheGlobe and Mail, 1997).
5812 Restaurants und Schnellimbiß
”There’s a lot of consolidation going on. Restaurant Group is being associatedwith potential corporate activity, though it would be a shame to see that growthstory taken away by a bid.“, Douglas Jack, Analyst bei Panmure Gordon (DailyMail, 2006).
5912 Drogerien, Apotheken
”Depressed pharmacy gross margins are what is driving consolidation in this in-dustry. The insurance companies are squeezing the drug retailers on reimburse-ment levels. As the retailers get larger, they regain some of the power they relin-quished to insurance providers.“, Julie Silberstein, Analystin bei Bankers Trust(The New York Times, 1997a).
7011 Hotels, Motels
”We’re going to see the continued consolidation as long as the economics of buy-ing remain better than building. It just makes sense.“, Jason N. Ader, Analyst beiBear, Sterns & Co. (The Washington Post, 1997b).
7375 Informationsbeschaffungsdienste
”At the moment, the name of the game is who moves faster than the competitionsurvives. Speed of consolidation is the key.“, Christian Kern, Analyst bei SalomonSmith Barney (The New York Times, 1999b).
”This is a tsunami wave. If you look at Web mergers and acquisitions as a seriesof hills and valleys, this is the first small hill. We’re just at the beginning.“, TimMiller, Analyst bei New Media Resources (The Philadelphia Inquirer, 2000).
8011 Arztpraxen (ohne Kliniken)
”The whole health care market is overbuilt. We are still pretty early in the ballgame in terms of consolidation.“, Larry Feinberg, Analyst bei Oracle Partners(The New York Times, 1996c).
”The industry consolidation has moved at a very rapid pace. But that rapid ex-pansion is going to slow down as people get their bearings and turn their attentiontoward the business process.“, John David Chapman, Analyst bei SunTrust Banks(The American Banker, 1998).
256 Anhang
8062 Allgemeine Krankenhauser
”Being private gave them the flexibility needed to streamline the operations. Nowthat that’s been done, they’re going back to a growth mode to take advantage ofconsolidation in the hospital industry, and they need access to capital.“, JohnRunniger, an analyst with Robinson-Humphrey Co. (The Washington Post,1992).
”This is the third announcement of a mega-merger in the last month. It is followi-ng a pattern of rapid consolidation in the hospitals industry.“, Ken Abramowitz,Analyst bei Sanford C. Bernstein & Company (The New York Times, 1996a).
8082 Heimpflegedienste
”We have a lot of consolidation going on in outpatient rehabilitation in order tomove it away from the hospitals, where it’s more expensive.“, Bernard Lirola,Analyst bei Needham & Company (The New York Times, 1997b).
Anhang 257
Tabe
lleA
.2:R
egre
ssio
nser
gebn
isse
zum
Her
denv
erha
lten
der
Fina
nzan
alys
ten
mit
max
imal
8-Ja
hres
Wel
lenp
erio
den
Abh
angi
geVa
riab
le:A
naly
stH
erdi
nga
Fixe
d-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbR
ando
m-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbO
LSm
itro
bust
enSt
anda
rdfe
hler
nc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te3,
350*
3,97
5**
4,16
8**
5,30
3***
5,39
7***
5,49
7***
4,66
6***
4,55
1***
4,61
9***
(1,8
97)
(1,8
95)
(1,8
92)
(1,4
99)
(1,4
95)
(1,4
93)
(1,0
76)
(1,0
75)
(1,0
71)
Hyp
othe
tisie
rten
Vari
able
nK
onso
lidie
rung
swel
le1,
498*
**1,
318*
**1,
187*
**0,
958*
*0,
948*
*0,
652
(0,4
45)
(0,4
51)
(0,3
83)
(0,3
93)
(0,4
15)
(0,4
31)
Peak
jahr
1,12
3**
1,13
9**
1,26
0*(0
,498
)(0
,456
)(0
,677
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
-0,0
39-0
,039
-0,0
42-0
,030
-0,0
31-0
,032
-0,0
13-0
,014
-0,0
14(0
,027
)(0
,027
)(0
,027
)(0
,023
)(0
,023
)(0
,023
)(0
,017
)(0
,017
)(0
,017
)G
ewin
nvol
atili
tat
1,26
91,
379
1,49
90,
006
0,08
60,
156
-0,1
94-0
,172
-0,1
41(1
,281
)(1
,274
)(1
,272
)(0
,940
)(0
,938
)(0
,936
)(1
,264
)(1
,266
)(1
,251
)U
nter
nehm
ensg
roße
-0,0
39-0
,103
-0,1
30-0
,326
**-0
,330
**-0
,340
***
-0,2
32**
-0,2
23**
-0,2
29**
(0,2
09)
(0,2
08)
(0,2
08)
(0,1
29)
(0,1
29)
(0,1
29)
(0,1
04)
(0,1
03)
(0,1
03)
Verl
ust
0,76
3**
0,69
4**
0,64
3*0,
982*
**0,
926*
**0,
873*
**1,
007*
**0,
967*
**0,
901*
**(0
,339
)(0
,338
)(0
,338
)(0
,294
)(0
,293
)(0
,293
)(0
,348
)(0
,346
)(0
,341
)E
PS-
And
erun
g0,
973*
*0,
847*
0,89
6**
0,92
8**
0,83
5**
0,86
5**
0,96
9**
0,91
1**
0,93
3**
(0,4
43)
(0,4
42)
(0,4
42)
(0,3
82)
(0,3
82)
(0,3
81)
(0,4
47)
(0,4
44)
(0,4
40)
Bra
nche
neffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
hres
effek
teJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Ja
N12
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
72A
nzah
lFir
men
354
354
354
354
354
354
R2
0,08
60,
097
0,10
30,
118
0,12
20,
127
0,13
50,
140
0,14
4F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t2,
990
3,31
13,
385
156,
7716
7,05
169,
516,
043
5,96
95,
851
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
258 AnhangTabelle
A.3:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
mit
maxim
al8-JahresW
ellenperiodenA
bhangigeVariable:A
nalystSurprise a
Fixed-Effects-R
egressionb
Random
-Effects-R
egressionb
OLS
mit
robustenStandardfehlern
c
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
-0,728-0,598
-0,5570,219
0,2200,238
0,426*0,399
0,414*(0,490)
(0,491)(0,491)
(0,359)(0,359)
(0,359)(0,245)
(0,243)(0,242)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,310***0,270**
0,242***0,194**
0,213**0,161*
(0,115)(0,117)
(0,094)(0,097)
(0,085)(0,093)
Peakjahr0,247*
0,225**0,221*
(0,129)(0,114)
(0,124)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl0,003
0,0030,003
-0,002-0,003
-0,003-0,006*
-0,006*-0,006*
(0,007)(0,007)
(0,007)(0,005)
(0,005)(0,005)
(0,004)(0,004)
(0,004)P
rognosestreuung0,259*
0,275**0,255*
0,0780,088
0,076-0,006
-0,001-0,015
(0,138)(0,138)
(0,138)(0,106)
(0,106)(0,106)
(0,101)(0,102)
(0,102)G
ewinnvolatilitat
0,3230,345
0,3720,002
0,0160,027
-0,036-0,031
-0,025(0,331)
(0,330)(0,330)
(0,223)(0,223)
(0,223)(0,218)
(0,217)(0,215)
Unternehm
ensgroße0,106*
0,092*0,087
-0,005-0,004
-0,006-0,012
-0,010-0,011
(0,054)(0,054)
(0,054)(0,029)
(0,029)(0,029)
(0,017)(0,017)
(0,017)Verlust
0,435***0,420***
0,410***0,450***
0,439***0,429***
0,428***0,419***
0,409***(0,088)
(0,088)(0,088)
(0,072)(0,072)
(0,072)(0,096)
(0,095)(0,095)
EP
S-Anderung
0,274**0,249**
0,259**0,350***
0,332***0,336***
0,379**0,366**
0,369**(0,115)
(0,115)(0,115)
(0,093)(0,094)
(0,093)(0,169)
(0,170)(0,169)
Brancheneffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJahreseffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaQ
uartalseffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
N1272
12721272
12721272
12721272
12721272
AnzahlFirm
en354
354354
354354
354R
20,107
0,1150,118
0,1510,155
0,1580,156
0,1600,163
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert3,686
3,8293,833
177,78184,89
188,963,717
3,8774,086
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 259
Tabe
lleA
.4:R
egre
ssio
nser
gebn
isse
zum
Her
denv
erha
lten
der
Fina
nzan
alys
ten
mit
max
imal
6-Ja
hres
Wel
lenp
erio
den
Abh
angi
geVa
riab
le:A
naly
stH
erdi
nga
Fixe
d-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbR
ando
m-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbO
LSm
itro
bust
enSt
anda
rdfe
hler
nc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te3,
350*
3,77
3**
3,94
9**
5,30
4***
5,44
1***
5,51
7***
4,66
7***
4,62
7***
4,68
2***
(1,8
97)
(1,8
99)
(1,8
96)
(1,4
99)
(1,4
98)
(1,4
95)
(1,0
76)
(1,0
84)
(1,0
73)
Hyp
othe
tisie
rten
Vari
able
nK
onso
lidie
rung
swel
le1,
026*
*0,
787*
0,80
5**
0,52
30,
674*
0,31
9(0
,418
)(0
,430
)(0
,362
)(0
,377
)(0
,399
)(0
,421
)Pe
akja
hr1,
154*
*1,
214*
**1,
352*
*(0
,507
)(0
,464
)(0
,687
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
-0,0
39-0
,041
-0,0
43-0
,030
-0,0
32-0
,033
-0,0
13-0
,015
-0,0
14(0
,027
)(0
,027
)(0
,027
)(0
,023
)(0
,023
)(0
,023
)(0
,017
)(0
,017
)(0
,017
)G
ewin
nvol
atili
tat
1,26
91,
209
1,36
00,
006
-0,0
190,
081
-0,1
94-0
,249
-0,1
80(1
,281
)(1
,278
)(1
,276
)(0
,940
)(0
,939
)(0
,938
)(1
,264
)(1
,271
)(1
,253
)U
nter
nehm
ensg
roße
-0,0
39-0
,060
-0,0
91-0
,326
**-0
,323
**-0
,336
***
-0,2
32**
-0,2
22**
-0,2
30**
(0,2
09)
(0,2
08)
(0,2
08)
(0,1
29)
(0,1
29)
(0,1
29)
(0,1
04)
(0,1
03)
(0,1
03)
Verl
ust
0,76
3**
0,75
1**
0,69
2**
0,98
2***
0,97
4***
0,90
9***
1,00
7***
0,99
8***
0,91
9***
(0,3
39)
(0,3
38)
(0,3
39)
(0,2
94)
(0,2
93)
(0,2
93)
(0,3
48)
(0,3
47)
(0,3
43)
EP
S-A
nder
ung
0,97
3**
0,89
6**
0,95
0**
0,92
7**
0,86
1**
0,89
8**
0,96
9**
0,93
0**
0,95
6**
(0,4
43)
(0,4
43)
(0,4
42)
(0,3
82)
(0,3
83)
(0,3
82)
(0,4
47)
(0,4
43)
(0,4
38)
Bra
nche
neffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
hres
effek
teJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Ja
N12
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
72A
nzah
lFir
men
354
354
354
354
354
354
R2
0,08
60,
092
0,09
70,
118
0,12
00,
125
0,13
50,
138
0,14
3F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t2,
990
3,11
13,
194
156,
7616
1,98
169,
516,
043
6,07
55,
879
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
260 AnhangTabelle
A.5:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
mit
maxim
al6-JahresW
ellenperiodenA
bhangigeVariable:A
nalystSurprise a
Fixed-Effects-R
egressionb
Random
-Effects-R
egressionb
OLS
mit
robustenStandardfehlern
c
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
-0,728-0,603
-0,5690,219
0,2400,252
0,426*0,421*
0,434*(0,490)
(0,490)(0,490)
(0,359)(0,359)
(0,359)(0,245)
(0,246)(0,245)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,303***0,256**
0,187**0,131
0,128**0,062
(0,108)(0,111)
(0,089)(0,093)
(0,062)(0,066)
Peakjahr0,226*
0,233**0,252**
(0,131)(0,116)
(0,121)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl0,003
0,0030,002
-0,002-0,003
-0,003-0,006*
-0,007*-0,006*
(0,007)(0,007)
(0,007)(0,005)
(0,005)(0,005)
(0,004)(0,004)
(0,004)P
rognosestreuung0,259*
0,254*0,238*
0,0780,070
0,062-0,006
-0,015-0,025
(0,138)(0,138)
(0,138)(0,106)
(0,106)(0,106)
(0,101)(0,102)
(0,103)G
ewinnvolatilitat
0,3230,305
0,3350,002
-0,0050,012
-0,036-0,046
-0,032(0,331)
(0,330)(0,330)
(0,223)(0,223)
(0,223)(0,218)
(0,219)(0,216)
Unternehm
ensgroße0,106*
0,100*0,095*
-0,005-0,003
-0,005-0,012
-0,010-0,012
(0,054)(0,054)
(0,054)(0,029)
(0,029)(0,029)
(0,017)(0,018)
(0,017)Verlust
0,435***0,432***
0,421***0,450***
0,449***0,437***
0,428***0,428***
0,415***(0,088)
(0,087)(0,088)
(0,072)(0,072)
(0,072)(0,096)
(0,095)(0,096)
EP
S-Anderung
0,274**0,251**
0,261**0,350***
0,334***0,339***
0,379**0,371**
0,375**(0,115)
(0,114)(0,114)
(0,093)(0,094)
(0,094)(0,169)
(0,169)(0,169)
Brancheneffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJahreseffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaQ
uartalseffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
N1272
12721272
12721272
12721272
12721272
AnzahlFirm
en354
354354
354354
354R
20,107
0,1150,118
0,1510,152
0,1560,156
0,1580,161
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert3,686
3,8553,834
177,78182,44
186,743,717
3,7864,026
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 261
Tabe
lleA
.6:R
egre
ssio
nser
gebn
isse
zum
Her
denv
erha
lten
der
Fina
nzan
alys
ten
mit
Win
soris
ieru
ngau
f5%
-Qua
ntil
Abh
angi
geVa
riab
le:A
naly
stH
erdi
nga
Fixe
d-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbR
ando
m-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbO
LSm
itro
bust
enSt
anda
rdfe
hler
nc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te3,
208*
*3,
448*
*3,
662*
**4,
225*
**4,
167*
**4,
259*
**3,
859*
**3,
729*
**3,
808*
**(1
,377
)(1
,374
)(1
,369
)(0
,992
)(0
,992
)(0
,990
)(0
,805
)(0
,810
)(0
,803
)H
ypot
hetis
iert
enVa
riab
len
Kon
solid
ieru
ngsw
elle
0,91
6***
0,74
7**
0,60
6**
0,40
90,
532*
0,31
0(0
,308
)(0
,312
)(0
,249
)(0
,257
)(0
,277
)(0
,284
)Pe
akja
hr1,
083*
**0,
959*
**0,
979*
*(0
,361
)(0
,319
)(0
,412
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
-0,0
13-0
,015
-0,0
17-0
,011
-0,0
13-0
,013
-0,0
04-0
,006
-0,0
06(0
,019
)(0
,019
)(0
,019
)(0
,015
)(0
,015
)(0
,015
)(0
,012
)(0
,012
)(0
,012
)G
ewin
nvol
atili
tat
0,43
30,
476
0,59
6-0
,156
-0,1
49-0
,097
-0,0
69-0
,082
-0,0
47(0
,930
)(0
,926
)(0
,923
)(0
,616
)(0
,616
)(0
,615
)(0
,753
)(0
,758
)(0
,748
)U
nter
nehm
ensg
roße
-0,0
82-0
,090
-0,1
23-0
,194
**-0
,185
**-0
,195
**-0
,146
**-0
,134
**-0
,141
**(0
,152
)(0
,151
)(0
,151
)(0
,081
)(0
,081
)(0
,081
)(0
,066
)(0
,066
)(0
,065
)Ve
rlus
t0,
446*
0,45
0*0,
391
0,57
9***
0,57
8***
0,52
4***
0,57
6***
0,57
4***
0,51
4**
(0,2
46)
(0,2
45)
(0,2
45)
(0,1
99)
(0,1
99)
(0,1
99)
(0,2
13)
(0,2
12)
(0,2
12)
EP
S-A
nder
ung
0,83
0**
0,77
0**
0,81
5**
0,96
3***
0,92
6***
0,94
2***
1,01
2***
0,98
6***
1,00
0***
(0,3
22)
(0,3
21)
(0,3
20)
(0,2
59)
(0,2
59)
(0,2
59)
(0,3
20)
(0,3
18)
(0,3
15)
Bra
nche
neffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
hres
effek
teJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Ja
N12
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
72A
nzah
lFir
men
354
354
354
354
354
354
R2
0,10
80,
116
0,12
50,
165
0,16
80,
175
0,17
40,
178
0,18
4F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t3,
830
4,03
54,
235
213,
3321
9,58
229,
577,
708
7,65
47,
549
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
262 AnhangTabelle
A.7:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
mit
Winsorisierung
auf5%-Q
uantilA
bhangigeVariable:A
nalystSurprise a
Fixed-Effects-R
egressionb
Random
-Effects-R
egressionb
OLS
mit
robustenStandardfehlern
c
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
-0,279-0,232
-0,2150,323**
0,305*0,318**
0,362***0,336***
0,349***(0,223)
(0,222)(0,222)
(0,157)(0,157)
(0,156)(0,126)
(0,126)(0,125)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,178***0,163***
0,116***0,090**
0,104***0,073**
(0,050)(0,051)
(0,040)(0,041)
(0,035)(0,036)
Peakjahr0,162*
0,122**0,134**
(0,096)(0,052)
(0,055)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl0,002
0,0010,001
-0,002-0,002
-0,002-0,003
-0,003*-0,003*
(0,003)(0,003)
(0,003)(0,002)
(0,002)(0,002)
(0,002)(0,002)
(0,002)P
rognosestreuung0,098
0,108*0,101
0,0360,041
0,0340,026
0,0290,020
(0,063)(0,063)
(0,063)(0,046)
(0,046)(0,046)
(0,060)(0,060)
(0,061)G
ewinnvolatilitat
0,1800,188
0,1980,021
0,0220,028
0,0140,011
0,016(0,150)
(0,149)(0,149)
(0,097)(0,097)
(0,097)(0,113)
(0,112)(0,110)
Unternehm
ensgroße0,072***
0,070***0,068***
-0,016-0,014
-0,015-0,017*
-0,015-0,016*
(0,025)(0,024)
(0,025)(0,012)
(0,012)(0,012)
(0,009)(0,009)
(0,009)Verlust
0,288***0,288***
0,283***0,317***
0,316***0,310***
0,313***0,312***
0,305***(0,040)
(0,040)(0,040)
(0,032)(0,032)
(0,032)(0,045)
(0,045)(0,046)
EP
S-Anderung
0,142***0,131**
0,134***0,169***
0,162***0,164***
0,180***0,175**
0,176***(0,052)
(0,052)(0,052)
(0,041)(0,041)
(0,041)(0,068)
(0,068)(0,067)
Brancheneffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJahreseffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaQ
uartalseffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
N1272
12721272
12721272
12721272
12721272
AnzahlFirm
en354
354354
354354
354R
20,158
0,1700,172
0,2550,259
0,2640,258
0,2630,267
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert5,735
6,0425,932
344,49353,36
360,887,687
8,4548,588
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 263
Tabe
lleA
.8:R
egre
ssio
nser
gebn
isse
zum
Her
denv
erha
lten
der
Fina
nzan
alys
ten
ohne
die
Varia
ble
Unt
erne
hmen
sgro
ßeA
bhan
gige
Vari
able
:Ana
lyst
Her
ding
aFi
xed-
Effe
cts-
Reg
ress
ionb
Ran
dom
-Effe
cts-
Reg
ress
ionb
OLS
mit
robu
sten
Stan
dard
fehl
ernc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te3,
137*
*3,
366*
*3,
406*
*3,
654*
**3,
674*
**3,
733*
**3,
455*
**3,
343*
**3,
398*
**(1
,520
)(1
,518
)(1
,514
)(1
,352
)(1
,349
)(1
,346
)(0
,881
)(0
,893
)(0
,884
)H
ypot
hetis
iert
enVa
riab
len
Kon
solid
ieru
ngsw
elle
1,05
9**
0,87
3**
0,93
7**
0,71
5*0,
854*
*0,
569
(0,4
25)
(0,4
31)
(0,3
68)
(0,3
78)
(0,3
91)
(0,4
01)
Peak
jahr
1,18
4**
1,15
8**
1,26
7*(0
,498
)(0
,457
)(0
,670
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
-0,0
404
-0,0
435*
-0,0
471*
-0,0
61**
*-0
,063
***
-0,0
64**
*-0
,043
***
-0,0
44**
*-0
,045
***
(0,0
255)
(0,0
254)
(0,0
254)
(0,0
19)
(0,0
19)
(0,0
19)
(0,0
13)
(0,0
13)
(0,0
13)
Gew
innv
olat
ilita
t1,
320
1,38
21,
560
0,32
90,
342
0,43
80,
003
-0,0
330,
019
(1,2
51)
(1,2
47)
(1,2
46)
(0,9
35)
(0,9
33)
(0,9
32)
(1,2
78)
(1,2
86)
(1,2
71)
Unt
erne
hmen
sgro
ße
Verl
ust
0,76
6**
0,77
1**
0,70
9**
1,06
3***
1,06
1***
0,99
9***
1,10
6***
1,09
7***
1,02
3***
(0,3
39)
(0,3
38)
(0,3
38)
(0,2
92)
(0,2
92)
(0,2
92)
(0,3
57)
(0,3
54)
(0,3
49)
EP
S-A
nder
ung
0,98
1**
0,91
3**
0,96
9**
1,02
8***
0,96
4**
0,99
5***
1,04
8**
1,00
0**
1,02
2**
(0,4
41)
(0,4
40)
(0,4
40)
(0,3
81)
(0,3
81)
(0,3
80)
(0,4
49)
(0,4
47)
(0,4
42)
Bra
nche
neffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
hres
effek
teJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Ja
N12
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
72A
nzah
lFir
men
354
354
354
354
354
354
R2
0,08
60,
092
0,09
80,
115
0,11
90,
124
0,13
10,
135
0,14
0F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t3,
102
3,23
13,
331
149,
3915
6,44
163,
395,
996
5,93
15,
824
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
264 AnhangTabelle
A.9:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
ohnedie
VariableU
nternehmensgroße
Abhangige
Variable:Analyst
Surprise aFixed-E
ffects-Regression
bR
andom-E
ffects-Regression
bO
LSm
itrobusten
Standardfehlernc
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
-0,156-0,0879
-0,07540,196
0,1890,202
0,364*0,338
0,352*(0,394)
(0,393)(0,393)
(0,327)(0,326)
(0,326)(0,212)
(0,210)(0,210)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,329***0,288**
0,229**0,184**
0,184**0,133*
(0,110)(0,112)
(0,089)(0,092)
(0,073)(0,078)
Peakjahr0,254**
0,225**0,228*
(0,129)(0,114)
(0,121)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl0,00747
0,006470,00574
-0,003-0,003
-0,003-0,008***
-0,008***-0,008***
(0,00661)(0,00659)
(0,00659)(0,004)
(0,004)(0,004)
(0,003)(0,003)
(0,003)P
rognosestreuung0,286**
0,304**0,282**
0,0770,087
0,075-0,008
-0,002-0,017
(0,138)(0,137)
(0,138)(0,106)
(0,106)(0,106)
(0,101)(0,102)
(0,102)G
ewinnvolatilitat
0,1840,204
0,2410,005
0,0060,021
-0,025-0,033
-0,023(0,324)
(0,323)(0,323)
(0,221)(0,221)
(0,221)(0,220)
(0,219)(0,218)
Unternehm
ensgroße
Verlust0,426***
0,427***0,414***
0,452***0,450***
0,439***0,434***
0,431***0,420***
(0,0878)(0,0874)
(0,0875)(0,072)
(0,071)(0,072)
(0,095)(0,094)
(0,095)E
PS-A
nderung0,255**
0,235**0,246**
0,352***0,336***
0,340***0,383**
0,373**0,376**
(0,114)(0,114)
(0,114)(0,093)
(0,093)(0,093)
(0,168)(0,169)
(0,168)B
rancheneffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JahreseffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Quartalseffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Ja
N1272
12721272
12721272
12721272
12721272
AnzahlFirm
en354
354354
354354
354R
20,103
0,1120,116
0,1510,154
0,1570,156
0,1600,162
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert3,669
3,8823,894
178,1185,01
189,083,712
3,8404,059
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 265
Tabe
lleA
.10:
Reg
ress
ions
erge
bniss
ezu
mH
erde
nver
halte
nde
rFi
nanz
anal
yste
noh
nedi
eVa
riabl
eA
naly
sten
anza
hlA
bhan
gige
Vari
able
:Ana
lyst
Her
ding
aFi
xed-
Effe
cts-
Reg
ress
ionb
Ran
dom
-Effe
cts-
Reg
ress
ionb
OLS
mit
robu
sten
Stan
dard
fehl
ernc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te3,
428*
3,70
5*3,
940*
*5,
510*
**5,
489*
**5,
625*
**4,
804*
**4,
650*
**4,
747*
**(1
,897
)(1
,895
)(1
,893
)(1
,491
)(1
,489
)(1
,487
)(1
,027
)(1
,022
)(1
,017
)H
ypot
hetis
iert
enVa
riab
len
Kon
solid
ieru
ngsw
elle
1,03
3**
0,85
0**
0,88
4**
0,65
1*0,
770*
*0,
474
(0,4
25)
(0,4
31)
(0,3
67)
(0,3
77)
(0,3
84)
(0,3
97)
Peak
jahr
1,16
9**
1,20
1***
1,31
2*(0
,499
)(0
,457
)(0
,675
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
Gew
innv
olat
ilita
t1,
336
1,38
91,
523
0,05
80,
084
0,16
9-0
,164
-0,1
75-0
,130
(1,2
81)
(1,2
78)
(1,2
76)
(0,9
39)
(0,9
38)
(0,9
36)
(1,2
58)
(1,2
64)
(1,2
47)
Unt
erne
hmen
sgro
ße-0
,131
-0,1
46-0
,187
-0,4
19**
*-0
,416
***
-0,4
32**
*-0
,278
***
-0,2
73**
*-0
,280
***
(0,1
99)
(0,1
99)
(0,1
99)
(0,1
09)
(0,1
09)
(0,1
09)
(0,0
77)
(0,0
77)
(0,0
77)
Verl
ust
0,78
0**
0,78
6**
0,72
3**
0,99
9***
1,00
0***
0,93
3***
1,01
8***
1,01
9***
0,93
8***
(0,3
39)
(0,3
38)
(0,3
39)
(0,2
93)
(0,2
93)
(0,2
93)
(0,3
48)
(0,3
47)
(0,3
43)
EP
S-A
nder
ung
0,95
8**
0,89
0**
0,93
7**
0,91
9**
0,86
2**
0,89
0**
0,97
2**
0,93
6**
0,95
5**
(0,4
43)
(0,4
43)
(0,4
42)
(0,3
82)
(0,3
82)
(0,3
81)
(0,4
45)
(0,4
43)
(0,4
39)
Bra
nche
neffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
hres
effek
teJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Ja
N12
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
72A
nzah
lFir
men
354
354
354
354
354
354
R2
0,08
40,
090
0,09
50,
118
0,12
20,
127
0,13
50,
138
0,14
3F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t3,
018
3,13
83,
233
154,
9216
1,13
168,
666,
165
6,06
56,
001
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
266 AnhangTabelle
A.11:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
ohnedie
VariableA
nalystenanzahlA
bhangigeVariable:A
nalystSurprise a
Fixed-Effects-R
egressionb
Random
-Effects-R
egressionb
OLS
mit
robustenStandardfehlern
c
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
-0,735-0,647
-0,5990,238
0,2180,241
0,492**0,456*
0,477**(0,490)
(0,489)(0,489)
(0,357)(0,356)
(0,356)(0,238)
(0,235)(0,235)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,326***0,288**
0,227**0,181*
0,172**0,119
(0,110)(0,112)
(0,090)(0,093)
(0,072)(0,077)
Peakjahr0,241*
0,225**0,232*
(0,129)(0,114)
(0,122)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl
Prognosestreuung
0,260*0,278**
0,258*0,078
0,0880,076
-0,0040,001
-0,014(0,138)
(0,138)(0,138)
(0,106)(0,106)
(0,106)(0,101)
(0,102)(0,103)
Gew
innvolatilitat0,317
0,3330,361
0,0060,011
0,025-0,021
-0,024-0,015
(0,331)(0,329)
(0,329)(0,222)
(0,222)(0,222)
(0,214)(0,213)
(0,211)U
nternehmensgroße
0,114**0,109**
0,101*-0,013
-0,011-0,013
-0,034**-0,033**
-0,034**(0,0517)
(0,0515)(0,0516)
(0,024)(0,024)
(0,024)(0,014)
(0,014)(0,014)
Verlust0,433***
0,435***0,422***
0,452***0,452***
0,440***0,434***
0,433***0,421***
(0,0877)(0,0873)
(0,0874)(0,072)
(0,072)(0,072)
(0,096)(0,095)
(0,096)E
PS-A
nderung0,276**
0,255**0,264**
0,349***0,335***
0,339***0,380**
0,372**0,375**
(0,115)(0,114)
(0,114)(0,093)
(0,093)(0,093)
(0,169)(0,169)
(0,168)B
rancheneffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JahreseffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Quartalseffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Ja
N1272
12721272
12721272
12721272
12721272
AnzahlFirm
en354
354354
354354
354R
20,107
0,1160,119
0,150,153
0,1560,155
0,1580,161
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert3,812
4,0184,010
177,7184,48
188,573,745
3,7763,908
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 267
Tabe
lleA
.12:
Reg
ress
ions
erge
bniss
ezu
mH
erde
nver
halte
nde
rFi
nanz
anal
yste
noh
nedi
eA
ufna
hme
von
Qua
rtal
seffe
kten
Abh
angi
geVa
riab
le:A
naly
stH
erdi
nga
Fixe
d-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbR
ando
m-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbO
LSm
itro
bust
enSt
anda
rdfe
hler
nc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te2,
696
2,98
83,
207*
4,61
0***
4,56
8***
4,69
7***
3,92
5***
3,71
8***
3,81
8***
(1,8
98)
(1,8
94)
(1,8
93)
(1,5
08)
(1,5
05)
(1,5
03)
(1,0
88)
(1,0
85)
(1,0
79)
Hyp
othe
tisie
rten
Vari
able
nK
onso
lidie
rung
swel
le1,
177*
**1,
002*
*0,
996*
**0,
779*
*0,
826*
*0,
549
(0,4
32)
(0,4
39)
(0,3
74)
(0,3
84)
(0,3
95)
(0,4
10)
Peak
jahr
1,12
8**
1,13
6**
1,22
6*(0
,509
)(0
,465
)(0
,673
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
-0,0
50*
-0,0
53*
-0,0
55**
-0,0
39*
-0,0
41*
-0,0
42*
-0,0
15-0
,018
-0,0
18(0
,027
)(0
,027
)(0
,027
)(0
,023
)(0
,023
)(0
,023
)(0
,017
)(0
,017
)(0
,017
)G
ewin
nvol
atili
tat
1,21
51,
271
1,39
50,
107
0,13
00,
211
0,03
00,
010
0,05
6(1
,305
)(1
,301
)(1
,299
)(0
,960
)(0
,959
)(0
,958
)(1
,215
)(1
,222
)(1
,207
)U
nter
nehm
ensg
roße
0,03
20,
022
-0,0
12-0
,281
**-0
,270
**-0
,283
**-0
,212
**-0
,194
*-0
,202
**(0
,212
)(0
,211
)(0
,211
)(0
,132
)(0
,132
)(0
,132
)(0
,103
)(0
,102
)(0
,102
)Ve
rlus
t0,
778*
*0,
784*
*0,
723*
*1,
015*
**1,
016*
**0,
952*
**0,
959*
*0,
918*
*0,
937*
*(0
,346
)(0
,344
)(0
,345
)(0
,299
)(0
,298
)(0
,299
)(0
,446
)(0
,444
)(0
,440
)E
PS-
And
erun
g0,
921*
*0,
843*
0,88
8**
0,89
5**
0,83
0**
0,85
7**
1,05
9***
1,05
7***
0,98
2***
(0,4
51)
(0,4
51)
(0,4
50)
(0,3
89)
(0,3
89)
(0,3
88)
(0,3
50)
(0,3
48)
(0,3
43)
Bra
nche
neffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
hres
effek
teJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
n
N12
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
72A
nzah
lFir
men
354
354
354
354
354
354
R2
0,04
70,
054
0,06
00,
087
0,09
10,
095
0,10
30,
107
0,11
2F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t1,
746
1,97
62,
093
99,2
610
6,62
112,
884,
427
4,43
04,
293
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
268 AnhangTabelle
A.13:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
ohnedie
Aufnahm
evon
Quartalseffekten
Abhangige
Variable:Analyst
Surprise aFixed-E
ffects-Regression
bR
andom-E
ffects-Regression
bO
LSm
itrobusten
Standardfehlernc
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
-0,823*-0,736
-0,6940,028
0,0040,025
0,2240,176
0,196(0,484)
(0,483)(0,483)
(0,358)(0,357)
(0,357)(0,226)
(0,225)(0,224)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,344***0,309***
0,246***0,203**
0,188**0,140*
(0,110)(0,112)
(0,091)(0,093)
(0,074)(0,079)
Peakjahr0,225*
0,211*0,211*
(0,130)(0,115)
(0,126)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl0,002
0,0010,000
-0,004-0,004
-0,004-0,007*
-0,007**-0,007**
(0,007)(0,007)
(0,007)(0,006)
(0,006)(0,005)
(0,004)(0,004)
(0,004)P
rognosestreuung0,327**
0,345**0,328**
0,1540,164
0,1530,043
0,0480,035
(0,137)(0,136)
(0,137)(0,107)
(0,107)(0,107)
(0,104)(0,106)
(0,106)G
ewinnvolatilitat
0,3180,334
0,3590,030
0,0340,047
0,0070,002
0,011(0,333)
(0,331)(0,331)
(0,226)(0,225)
(0,225)(0,230)
(0,229)(0,228)
Unternehm
ensgroße0,114**
0,110**0,105*
0,0020,006
0,004-0,008
-0,004-0,006
(0,054)(0,054)
(0,054)(0,030)
(0,030)(0,030)
(0,017)(0,017)
(0,017)Verlust
0,435***0,436***
0,425***0,454***
0,453***0,443***
0,433***0,432***
0,421***(0,088)
(0,088)(0,088)
(0,073)(0,073)
(0,073)(0,098)
(0,097)(0,098)
EP
S-Anderung
0,270**0,248**
0,257**0,345***
0,330***0,333***
0,377**0,368**
0,371**(0,115)
(0,115)(0,115)
(0,094)(0,094)
(0,094)(0,171)
(0,171)(0,171)
Brancheneffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJahreseffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaQ
uartalseffekteN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
ein
N1272
12721272
12721272
12721272
12721272
AnzahlFirm
en354
354354
354354
354R
20,095
0,1050,108
0,1320,135
0,1380,138
0,1410,143
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert3,593
3,8553,833
149,39157,14
160,664,069
3,8953,792
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 269
Tabe
lleA
.14:
Reg
ress
ions
erge
bniss
ezu
mH
erde
nver
halte
nde
rFi
nanz
anal
yste
noh
nedi
eA
ufna
hme
von
Jahr
es-u
ndQ
uart
alse
ffekt
enA
bhan
gige
Vari
able
:Ana
lyst
Her
ding
aFi
xed-
Effe
cts-
Reg
ress
ionb
Ran
dom
-Effe
cts-
Reg
ress
ionb
OLS
mit
robu
sten
Stan
dard
fehl
ernc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te2,
402*
*1,
807
2,01
6*4,
162*
**3,
593*
**3,
795*
**3,
465*
**2,
895*
**3,
063*
**(1
,188
)(1
,192
)(1
,195
)(0
,852
)(0
,860
)(0
,863
)(0
,652
)(0
,641
)(0
,642
)H
ypot
hetis
iert
enVa
riab
len
Kon
solid
ieru
ngsw
elle
1,05
8***
0,85
0***
1,04
2***
0,81
2***
0,97
6***
0,71
8***
(0,2
95)
(0,3
13)
(0,2
56)
(0,2
74)
(0,2
66)
(0,2
58)
Peak
jahr
0,95
3**
1,04
5**
1,17
1*(0
,486
)(0
,444
)(0
,694
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
-0,0
64**
-0,0
50*
-0,0
51**
-0,0
54**
-0,0
44**
-0,0
44**
-0,0
17-0
,017
-0,0
15(0
,026
)(0
,026
)(0
,026
)(0
,022
)(0
,022
)(0
,022
)(0
,017
)(0
,017
)(0
,017
)G
ewin
nvol
atili
tat
1,49
91,
387
1,45
40,
422
0,35
00,
388
0,06
50,
087
0,10
0(1
,270
)(1
,262
)(1
,260
)(0
,946
)(0
,941
)(0
,939
)(1
,151
)(1
,183
)(1
,173
)U
nter
nehm
ensg
roße
0,09
50,
110
0,08
4-0
,188
-0,1
84-0
,203
*-0
,187
*-0
,166
-0,1
80*
(0,1
72)
(0,1
71)
(0,1
72)
(0,1
24)
(0,1
23)
(0,1
23)
(0,1
03)
(0,1
01)
(0,1
01)
Verl
ust
0,78
5**
0,75
3**
0,69
0**
1,07
0***
1,03
5***
0,96
4***
1,01
4**
0,89
5**
0,92
9**
(0,3
34)
(0,3
32)
(0,3
33)
(0,2
91)
(0,2
89)
(0,2
90)
(0,4
60)
(0,4
46)
(0,4
41)
EP
S-A
nder
ung
1,01
6**
0,86
3*0,
908*
*0,
979*
*0,
821*
*0,
856*
*1,
203*
**1,
141*
**1,
051*
**(0
,444
)(0
,443
)(0
,443
)(0
,385
)(0
,384
)(0
,384
)(0
,358
)(0
,349
)(0
,341
)B
ranc
hene
ffekt
eJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Jahr
eseff
ekte
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nQ
uart
alse
ffekt
eN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
N12
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
72A
nzah
lFir
men
354
354
354
354
354
354
R2
0,02
50,
039
0,04
30,
067
0,08
00,
085
0,08
00,
092
0,09
7F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t4,
732
6,14
25,
832
68,9
286
,15
91,9
47,
479
6,23
76,
127
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
270 AnhangTabelle
A.15:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
ohnedie
Aufnahm
evon
Jahres-undQ
uartalseffektenA
bhangigeVariable:A
nalystSurprise a
Fixed-Effects-R
egressionb
Random
-Effects-R
egressionb
OLS
mit
robustenStandardfehlern
c
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
-0,316-0,451
-0,4020,325*
0,2260,266
0,385***0,311**
0,346***(0,311)
(0,312)(0,313)
(0,189)(0,192)
(0,193)(0,144)
(0,139)(0,133)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,253***0,199**
0,177***0,128*
0,124*0,074
(0,077)(0,082)
(0,063)(0,067)
(0,064)(0,063)
Peakjahr0,244*
0,220**0,223*
(0,126)(0,112)
(0,130)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl-0,005
-0,002-0,002
-0,007-0,006
-0,006-0,008**
-0,008*-0,007*
(0,007)(0,007)
(0,007)(0,005)
(0,005)(0,005)
(0,004)(0,004)
(0,004)P
rognosestreuung0,183
0,2070,191
0,0750,093
0,082-0,007
0,004-0,012
(0,134)(0,134)
(0,134)(0,105)
(0,105)(0,105)
(0,102)(0,104)
(0,104)G
ewinnvolatilitat
0,1650,137
0,155-0,046
-0,055-0,049
-0,070-0,068
-0,064(0,330)
(0,328)(0,328)
(0,223)(0,223)
(0,223)(0,237)
(0,238)(0,238)
Unternehm
ensgroße0,060
0,0620,056
-0,010-0,009
-0,012-0,021
-0,018-0,021
(0,045)(0,045)
(0,045)(0,029)
(0,029)(0,029)
(0,019)(0,019)
(0,019)Verlust
0,438***0,429***
0,414***0,445***
0,437***0,423***
0,420***0,410***
0,395***(0,087)
(0,086)(0,087)
(0,072)(0,071)
(0,072)(0,100)
(0,099)(0,100)
EP
S-Anderung
0,225*0,190*
0,201*0,334***
0,308***0,313***
0,383**0,369**
0,374**(0,115)
(0,115)(0,115)
(0,094)(0,094)
(0,094)(0,174)
(0,177)(0,176)
Brancheneffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJahreseffekte
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Quartalseffekte
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
N1272
12721272
12721272
12721272
12721272
AnzahlFirm
en354
354354
354354
354R
20,040
0,0510,055
0,1020,105
0,1080,105
0,1090,112
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert6,292
7,0066,616
93,35101,33
105,255,907
5,7275,746
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 271
Tabe
lleA
.16:
Reg
ress
ions
erge
bniss
ezu
mH
erde
nver
halte
nde
rFi
nanz
anal
yste
noh
nedi
eA
ufna
hme
von
Bra
nche
n-,
Jahr
es-u
ndQ
uart
alse
ffekt
enA
bhan
gige
Vari
able
:Ana
lyst
Her
ding
aFi
xed-
Effe
cts-
Reg
ress
ionb
Ran
dom
-Effe
cts-
Reg
ress
ionb
OLS
mit
robu
sten
Stan
dard
fehl
ernc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te2,
402*
*1,
807
2,01
6*4,
526*
**4,
112*
**4,
261*
**4,
230*
**3,
923*
**4,
071*
**(1
,188
)(1
,192
)(1
,195
)(0
,794
)(0
,797
)(0
,797
)(0
,599
)(0
,603
)(0
,599
)H
ypot
hetis
iert
enVa
riab
len
Kon
solid
ieru
ngsw
elle
1,05
8***
0,85
0***
1,00
1***
0,75
6***
0,66
5**
0,35
8(0
,295
)(0
,313
)(0
,254
)(0
,270
)(0
,272
)(0
,261
)Pe
akja
hr0,
953*
*1,
146*
**1,
527*
*(0
,486
)(0
,441
)(0
,730
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
-0,0
64**
-0,0
50*
-0,0
51**
-0,0
52**
-0,0
43*
-0,0
42*
-0,0
18-0
,018
-0,0
16(0
,026
)(0
,026
)(0
,026
)(0
,022
)(0
,022
)(0
,022
)(0
,015
)(0
,015
)(0
,015
)G
ewin
nvol
atili
tat
1,49
91,
387
1,45
40,
210
0,17
50,
216
-0,1
55-0
,120
-0,1
19(1
,270
)(1
,262
)(1
,260
)(0
,926
)(0
,921
)(0
,919
)(1
,105
)(1
,122
)(1
,108
)U
nter
nehm
ensg
roße
0,09
50,
110
0,08
4-0
,207
*-0
,206
*-0
,226
*-0
,225
**-0
,211
**-0
,232
**(0
,172
)(0
,171
)(0
,172
)(0
,122
)(0
,121
)(0
,121
)(0
,090
)(0
,091
)(0
,090
)Ve
rlus
t0,
785*
*0,
753*
*0,
690*
*1,
006*
**0,
976*
**0,
902*
**0,
857*
0,75
50,
803*
(0,3
34)
(0,3
32)
(0,3
33)
(0,2
84)
(0,2
83)
(0,2
84)
(0,4
68)
(0,4
59)
(0,4
51)
EP
S-A
nder
ung
1,01
6**
0,86
3*0,
908*
*0,
942*
*0,
782*
*0,
824*
*1,
000*
**0,
961*
**0,
844*
*(0
,444
)(0
,443
)(0
,443
)(0
,382
)(0
,382
)(0
,381
)(0
,361
)(0
,358
)(0
,349
)B
ranc
hene
ffekt
eN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Jahr
eseff
ekte
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nQ
uart
alse
ffekt
eN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
Nei
nN
ein
N12
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
7212
72A
nzah
lFir
men
354
354
354
354
354
354
R2
0,02
50,
039
0,04
30,
051
0,05
70,
064
0,05
20,
059
0,06
7F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t4,
732
6,14
25,
832
54,4
370
,55
77,6
87,
881
7,02
26,
365
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
272 AnhangTabelle
A.17:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
ohnedie
Aufnahm
evon
Branchen-,
Jahres-undQ
uartalseffektenA
bhangigeVariable:A
nalystSurprise a
Fixed-Effects-R
egressionb
Random
-Effects-R
egressionb
OLS
mit
robustenStandardfehlern
c
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
-0,316-0,451
-0,4020,276
0,2000,224
0,319**0,256**
0,279**(0,311)
(0,312)(0,313)
(0,176)(0,178)
(0,178)(0,127)
(0,122)(0,117)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,253***0,199**
0,185***0,137**
0,136**0,089
(0,077)(0,082)
(0,061)(0,066)
(0,063)(0,064)
Peakjahr0,244*
0,227**0,236*
(0,126)(0,110)
(0,134)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl-0,005
-0,002-0,002
-0,006-0,004
-0,004-0,006*
-0,006*-0,005*
(0,007)(0,007)
(0,007)(0,005)
(0,005)(0,005)
(0,003)(0,003)
(0,003)P
rognosestreuung0,183
0,2070,191
0,0890,097
0,0910,023
0,0190,015
(0,134)(0,134)
(0,134)(0,101)
(0,100)(0,100)
(0,098)(0,099)
(0,101)G
ewinnvolatilitat
0,1650,137
0,155-0,090
-0,091-0,084
-0,045-0,037
-0,037(0,330)
(0,328)(0,328)
(0,216)(0,216)
(0,216)(0,247)
(0,249)(0,247)
Unternehm
ensgroße0,060
0,0620,056
-0,016-0,015
-0,018-0,023
-0,020-0,023
(0,045)(0,045)
(0,045)(0,028)
(0,028)(0,028)
(0,019)(0,019)
(0,018)Verlust
0,438***0,429***
0,414***0,432***
0,425***0,411***
0,412***0,405***
0,387***(0,087)
(0,086)(0,087)
(0,069)(0,069)
(0,069)(0,089)
(0,088)(0,089)
EP
S-Anderung
0,225*0,190*
0,201*0,351***
0,320***0,327***
0,424**0,403**
0,410**(0,115)
(0,115)(0,115)
(0,093)(0,093)
(0,093)(0,172)
(0,175)(0,174)
Brancheneffekte
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
Nein
JahreseffekteN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einQ
uartalseffekteN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
einN
ein
N1272
12721272
12721272
12721272
12721272
AnzahlFirm
en354
354354
354354
354R
20,040
0,0510,055
0,0930,096
0,0990,094
0,0990,102
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert6,292
7,0066,616
85,4994,71
99,0212,77
11,169,948
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 273
Tabe
lleA
.18:
Reg
ress
ions
erge
bniss
ezu
mH
erde
nver
halte
nde
rFi
nanz
anal
yste
nm
it2-
jahr
igen
Prog
nose
horiz
ont
Abh
angi
geVa
riab
le:A
naly
stH
erdi
nga
Fixe
d-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbR
ando
m-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbO
LSm
itro
bust
enSt
anda
rdfe
hler
nc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te1,
966
2,10
33,
065
4,14
6**
3,86
5*4,
340*
*4,
387*
**4,
014*
*4,
467*
**(3
,051
)(3
,045
)(3
,007
)(2
,011
)(2
,011
)(2
,001
)(1
,635
)(1
,620
)(1
,612
)H
ypot
hetis
iert
enVa
riab
len
Kon
solid
ieru
ngsw
elle
1,67
6**
0,80
61,
365*
*0,
503
1,25
1*0,
357
(0,7
75)
(0,7
83)
(0,5
90)
(0,6
09)
(0,6
38)
(0,6
20)
Peak
jahr
4,49
6***
3,89
9***
3,90
4***
(0,8
86)
(0,7
63)
(1,2
67)
Kon
trol
lvar
iabl
enA
naly
sten
anza
hl-0
,045
-0,0
52-0
,066
-0,0
25-0
,032
-0,0
35-0
,001
-0,0
09-0
,008
(0,0
50)
(0,0
50)
(0,0
49)
(0,0
37)
(0,0
37)
(0,0
37)
(0,0
28)
(0,0
29)
(0,0
29)
Gew
innv
olat
ilita
t-0
,707
-0,6
80-0
,568
-0,2
52-0
,268
-0,4
43-0
,445
-0,4
75-0
,662
(2,4
22)
(2,4
17)
(2,3
82)
(0,9
75)
(0,9
75)
(0,9
73)
(0,6
16)
(0,6
22)
(0,6
30)
Unt
erne
hmen
sgro
ße0,
282
0,32
30,
145
-0,2
06-0
,165
-0,2
12-0
,259
-0,2
17-0
,254
(0,3
69)
(0,3
69)
(0,3
65)
(0,1
84)
(0,1
85)
(0,1
85)
(0,1
85)
(0,1
83)
(0,1
83)
Verl
ust
2,84
8***
2,81
5***
2,56
4***
2,51
4***
2,51
9***
2,27
5***
2,40
6***
2,41
3***
2,12
0***
(0,6
01)
(0,6
00)
(0,5
94)
(0,4
78)
(0,4
77)
(0,4
76)
(0,5
61)
(0,5
61)
(0,5
45)
EP
S-A
nder
ung
2,41
9***
2,38
1***
2,44
7***
2,50
8***
2,45
9***
2,44
2***
2,50
0***
2,45
6***
2,41
6***
(0,8
09)
(0,8
07)
(0,7
96)
(0,6
45)
(0,6
44)
(0,6
38)
(0,9
22)
(0,9
16)
(0,8
52)
Bra
nche
neffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
hres
effek
teJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Ja
N11
9411
9411
9411
9411
9411
9411
9411
9411
94A
nzah
lFir
men
332
332
332
332
332
332
R2
0,17
20,
177
0,20
10,
198
0,20
10,
219
0,20
30,
206
0,22
4F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t6,
432
6,39
67,
247
256,
726
2,9
293,
785,
802
5,60
35,
804
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em1%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
274 AnhangTabelle
A.19:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
mit
2-jahrigenPrognosehorizont
Abhangige
Variable:Analyst
Surprise aFixed-E
ffects-Regression
bR
andom-E
ffects-Regression
bO
LSm
itrobusten
Standardfehlernc
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
1,1451,301
1,6631,065
0,9131,081
1,118*0,954
1,121*(1,249)
(1,241)(1,227)
(0,821)(0,822)
(0,819)(0,669)
(0,665)(0,669)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
1,167***0,828***
0,620**0,302
0,524**0,200
(0,316)(0,320)
(0,244)(0,253)
(0,204)(0,199)
Peakjahr1,739***
1,438***1,398**
(0,359)(0,319)
(0,621)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl0,030
0,0260,020
0,0030,000
0,000-0,009
-0,013-0,013
(0,020)(0,020)
(0,020)(0,015)
(0,015)(0,015)
(0,012)(0,012)
(0,012)P
rognosestreuung1,659***
1,806***1,781***
0,739***0,816***
0,810***0,583
0,6410,612
(0,337)(0,337)
(0,332)(0,243)
(0,244)(0,243)
(0,414)(0,421)
(0,417)G
ewinnvolatilitat
-2,273**-2,289**
-2,240**-0,628
-0,641-0,714*
-0,582**-0,595**
-0,662**(0,989)
(0,981)(0,968)
(0,389)(0,390)
(0,390)(0,247)
(0,248)(0,260)
Unternehm
ensgroße-0,184
-0,169-0,236
-0,080-0,063
-0,080-0,073
-0,058-0,070
(0,154)(0,153)
(0,151)(0,074)
(0,074)(0,075)
(0,070)(0,070)
(0,070)Verlust
1,861***1,829***
1,733***1,575***
1,573***1,489***
1,455***1,449***
1,348***(0,246)
(0,244)(0,241)
(0,201)(0,200)
(0,200)(0,309)
(0,306)(0,288)
EP
S-Anderung
0,899***0,878***
0,903***1,116***
1,099***1,088***
1,148*1,135*
1,118*(0,329)
(0,327)(0,323)
(0,268)(0,267)
(0,265)(0,605)
(0,611)(0,610)
Brancheneffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJahreseffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaQ
uartalseffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
N1194
11941194
11941194
11941194
11941194
AnzahlFirm
en332
332332
332332
332R
20,242
0,2540,274
0,2210,224
0,2360,224
0,2280,240
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert9,490
9,77210,48
313,38321,2
3473,376
3,3823,321
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem1%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 275
Tabe
lleA
.20:
Reg
ress
ions
erge
bniss
ezu
mH
erde
nver
halte
nde
rFi
nanz
anal
yste
nm
it2-
jahr
igen
Prog
nose
horiz
ont
und
Win
soris
ieru
ngau
f5%
-Qua
ntil
Abh
angi
geVa
riab
le:A
naly
stH
erdi
nga
Fixe
d-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbR
ando
m-E
ffect
s-R
egre
ssio
nbO
LSm
itro
bust
enSt
anda
rdfe
hler
nc
Vari
able
nM
odel
l1a
Mod
ell2
aM
odel
l3a
Mod
ell1
bM
odel
l2b
Mod
ell3
bM
odel
l1c
Mod
ell2
cM
odel
l3c
Kon
stan
te4,
322*
*4,
427*
*4,
978*
*4,
328*
**4,
096*
**4,
344*
**4,
373*
**4,
070*
**4,
304*
**(2
,175
)(2
,170
)(2
,154
)(1
,403
)(1
,404
)(1
,402
)(1
,301
)(1
,297
)(1
,296
)H
ypot
hetis
iert
enVa
riab
len
Kon
solid
ieru
ngsw
elle
1,28
2**
0,78
31,
060*
*0,
608
1,01
8**
0,55
6(0
,552
)(0
,561
)(0
,413
)(0
,429
)(0
,463
)(0
,473
)Pe
akja
hr2,
578*
**2,
025*
**2,
019*
**(0
,635
)(0
,542
)(0
,755
)K
ontr
ollv
aria
blen
Ana
lyst
enan
zahl
-0,0
23-0
,029
-0,0
36-0
,007
-0,0
13-0
,015
0,01
10,
004
0,00
5(0
,035
)(0
,035
)(0
,035
)(0
,026
)(0
,026
)(0
,026
)(0
,022
)(0
,022
)(0
,022
)G
ewin
nvol
atili
tat
0,23
40,
254
0,31
80,
252
0,23
80,
148
0,11
10,
087
-0,0
10(1
,727
)(1
,722
)(1
,707
)(0
,672
)(0
,671
)(0
,672
)(0
,469
)(0
,480
)(0
,484
)U
nter
nehm
ensg
roße
-0,1
54-0
,122
-0,2
24-0
,225
*-0
,192
-0,2
17*
-0,2
34*
-0,2
00-0
,219
*(0
,263
)(0
,263
)(0
,261
)(0
,127
)(0
,128
)(0
,128
)(0
,130
)(0
,128
)(0
,128
)Ve
rlus
t2,
177*
**2,
151*
**2,
007*
**1,
747*
**1,
752*
**1,
625*
**1,
648*
**1,
653*
**1,
502*
**(0
,429
)(0
,428
)(0
,425
)(0
,336
)(0
,336
)(0
,336
)(0
,375
)(0
,374
)(0
,375
)E
PS-
And
erun
g2,
190*
**2,
161*
**2,
198*
**2,
340*
**2,
302*
**2,
289*
**2,
362*
**2,
326*
**2,
306*
**(0
,577
)(0
,575
)(0
,570
)(0
,454
)(0
,453
)(0
,451
)(0
,625
)(0
,620
)(0
,582
)B
ranc
hene
ffekt
eJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
Jahr
eseff
ekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaQ
uart
alse
ffekt
eJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
N11
9411
9411
9411
9411
9411
9411
9411
9411
94A
nzah
lFir
men
332
332
332
332
332
332
R2
0,19
90,
204
0,22
00,
224
0,22
90,
238
0,22
80,
232
0,24
2F-
Wer
t/χ
2 -Wer
t7,
679
7,63
68,
078
305,
1231
2,96
329,
547,
386
7,31
27,
516
Pro
b>F/
Pro
b>χ
20,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
0,00
00,
000
aW
inso
risi
ert
aufd
em5%
-Qua
ntilw
ert
anbe
iden
Vert
eilu
ngse
nden
;bSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
;cR
obus
teSt
anda
rdfe
hler
inK
lam
mer
nB
ranc
hen-
,Jah
res-
und
Qua
rtal
seffe
kte
nich
tau
fgef
uhrt
;***
p<0,
01,*
*p<
0,05
,*p<
0,1
276 AnhangTabelle
A.21:R
egressionsergebnissezum
Uberoptim
ismus
derFinanzanalysten
mit
2-jahrigenPrognosehorizont
undW
insorisierungauf5%
-Quantil
Abhangige
Variable:Analyst
Surprise aFixed-E
ffects-Regression
bR
andom-E
ffects-Regression
bO
LSm
itrobusten
Standardfehlernc
VariablenM
odell1aM
odell2aM
odell3aM
odell1bM
odell2bM
odell3bM
odell1cM
odell2cM
odell3c
Konstante
0,2080,287
0,4130,759**
0,688**0,744**
0,889***0,805**
0,859***(0,467)
(0,461)(0,457)
(0,319)(0,319)
(0,318)(0,332)
(0,331)(0,330)
Hypothetisierten
VariablenK
onsolidierungswelle
0,584***0,466***
0,322***0,216**
0,269***0,165*
(0,117)(0,119)
(0,094)(0,097)
(0,095)(0,096)
Peakjahr0,609***
0,493***0,450**
(0,134)(0,120)
(0,205)K
ontrollvariablenA
nalystenanzahl0,010
0,0070,006
0,0040,003
0,0030,000
-0,002-0,002
(0,008)(0,007)
(0,007)(0,006)
(0,006)(0,006)
(0,006)(0,006)
(0,006)P
rognosestreuung0,489***
0,563***0,555***
0,247***0,285***
0,283***0,201
0,231*0,221*
(0,126)(0,125)
(0,124)(0,094)
(0,095)(0,094)
(0,129)(0,132)
(0,129)G
ewinnvolatilitat
-0,322-0,330
-0,313-0,222
-0,226-0,248
-0,232-0,239
-0,260*(0,370)
(0,365)(0,361)
(0,156)(0,156)
(0,156)(0,145)
(0,147)(0,150)
Unternehm
ensgroße0,016
0,023-0,000
-0,037-0,029
-0,034-0,049*
-0,041-0,045
(0,057)(0,057)
(0,056)(0,030)
(0,030)(0,030)
(0,028)(0,029)
(0,028)Verlust
1,083***1,066***
1,033***0,991***
0,990***0,961***
0,900***0,897***
0,865***(0,092)
(0,091)(0,090)
(0,077)(0,076)
(0,076)(0,115)
(0,114)(0,115)
EP
S-Anderung
0,635***0,624***
0,633***0,672***
0,663***0,660***
0,706***0,699***
0,694***(0,123)
(0,122)(0,120)
(0,102)(0,102)
(0,101)(0,181)
(0,183)(0,179)
Brancheneffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJahreseffekte
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaQ
uartalseffekteJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
JaJa
N1194
11941194
11941194
11941194
11941194
AnzahlFirm
en332
332332
332332
332R
20,366
0,3840,399
0,3710,375
0,3820,377
0,3820,389
F-Wert/
χ2-W
ert17,20
17,9418,44
624,04641,11
666,669,445
9,5479,442
Prob
>F/P
rob>
χ2
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,0000,000
0,000a
Winsorisiert
aufdem5%
-Quantilw
ertan
beidenVerteilungsenden;
bStandardfehler
inK
lamm
er;c
Robuste
Standardfehlerin
Klam
mern
Branchen-,Jahres-und
Quartalseffekte
nichtaufgefuhrt;***
p<
0,01,**p
<0,05,*
p<
0,1
Anhang 277
Tabelle A.22: Regressionsergebnisse zum Herdenverhalten der Finanzanalystenmit der Tobit-Methode
Abhangige Variable: Analyst Herdinga Tobit-Regression mit Random-Effectsb
Variablen Modell 1a Modell 2a Modell 3a
Konstante 5,179*** 5,064*** 5,165***(1,410) (1,410) (1,407)
Hypothetisierten VariablenKonsolidierungswelle 0,841** 0,572
(0,356) (0,369)Peakjahr 1,242***
(0,466)Kontrollvariablen
Analystenanzahl -0,022 -0,025 -0,025(0,021) (0,021) (0,021)
Gewinnvolatilitat -0,233 -0,230 -0,173(0,873) (0,871) (0,869)
Unternehmensgroße -0,293*** -0,278** -0,287***(0,111) (0,111) (0,111)
Verlust 1,036*** 1,035*** 0,963***(0,285) (0,284) (0,285)
EPS-Anderung 0,936** 0,888** 0,907**(0,372) (0,372) (0,371)
Brancheneffekte Ja Ja JaJahreseffekte Ja Ja JaQuartalseffekte Ja Ja Ja
N 1272 1272 1272Anzahl Firmen 354 354 354F-Wert/χ2-Wert 179,67 185,90 193,93Prob>F/Prob>χ2 0,000 0,000 0,000
a Winsorisiert auf dem 1%-Quantilwert an beiden Verteilungsenden; b Standardfehler in KlammerBranchen-, Jahres- und Quartalseffekte nicht aufgefuhrt; *** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1
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