annotated bibliography

42
Barkan, En, Hernandez, Kaplan, Yannix 1 Annotated Bibiliography Primary Sources (52) "The Battle For Iran." N.d. TS, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435. George Washington University. The National Security Archive. George Washington University, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2014. This recently declassified internal CIA report summarizes Operation AJAX’s process, and confirms in an appendix that most of the documentation covering the coup was destroyed. Interestingly, it states that much of the public’s knowledge of the event around the time period was wildly inaccurate. Additionally, it shows that the CIA was extremely naive in “the aftermath of victory,” neglecting to follow the Shah’s government closely or the oppressive regime that he began with the creation of SAVAK. Baraheni, Reza. " .ﺩﺍﻧﻠﻮﺩ ﻓﻴﻠﻢ." ﺩﺍﻧﻠﻮﺩ ﻓﻴﻠﻢAmnesty Intl. N.p., 28 Oct. 1976. Web. 04 Jan. 2015. This source, which is written in Arabic, was useful in determining how Iran was during the brutal rule under the shah. This source was a direct writing from Reza Baraheni, an Iranian historian during 1976, when the turmoil was rising and actions were coming to a head. This source talks about how low the public opinion was of the Iranian secret police, the SAVAK. Specifically, it details how SAVAK would randomly take citizens from their house and would torture them even if they simply lived next to a possible Shah protester, in a grotesque description of the brutality allowed under the Shah’s regime. British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ed. "BritishAmerican Planning Talks, Washington, October 1011, 1978." (n.d.): n. pag. The National Security Archive (George Washington University). George Washington University. Web. 13 Oct. 2014. This document is a set of notes from a meeting of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1978, as they discuss the state of foreign affairs with American officials. In the section pertaining to Iran, the note taker outlines a point that Henry Precht, British Country Director for Iran, makes, where he calls the mess in Iran "the worst foreign policy disaster to hit the West for many years." Precht goes on to correctly predict the fall of the Shah's government within a year, and the uprising of Khomeini. All in attendance agreed that however bad relations with Iran got, they could not be terminated because of Iranian dependence on the West buying oil. This shows that while both Americans and British officials understood the situation was rather dire as a result of the Coup, and they realized they had made a mistake, they did not fully appreciate the legacy that they could be leaving, and the full extent of their mistakes, as they did not account for the antiwestern sentiment felt in Iran at the time of Khomeini's rise to power.

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  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix1

    AnnotatedBibiliography

    PrimarySources(52)"TheBattleForIran."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.

    435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,19Aug.2013.Web.20Dec.2014.ThisrecentlydeclassifiedinternalCIAreportsummarizesOperationAJAXsprocess,andconfirmsinanappendixthatmostofthedocumentationcoveringthecoupwasdestroyed.Interestingly,itstatesthatmuchofthepublicsknowledgeoftheeventaroundthetimeperiodwaswildlyinaccurate.Additionally,itshowsthattheCIAwasextremelynaiveintheaftermathofvictory,neglectingtofollowtheShahsgovernmentcloselyortheoppressiveregimethathebeganwiththecreationofSAVAK.

    Baraheni,Reza.""..AmnestyIntl.N.p.,28Oct.1976.Web.04Jan.2015.Thissource,whichiswritteninArabic,wasusefulindetermininghowIranwasduringthebrutalruleundertheshah.ThissourcewasadirectwritingfromRezaBaraheni,anIranianhistorianduring1976,whentheturmoilwasrisingandactionswerecomingtoahead.ThissourcetalksabouthowlowthepublicopinionwasoftheIraniansecretpolice,theSAVAK.Specifically,itdetailshowSAVAKwouldrandomlytakecitizensfromtheirhouseandwouldtorturethemeveniftheysimplylivednexttoapossibleShahprotester,inagrotesquedescriptionofthebrutalityallowedundertheShahsregime.

    BritishForeignandCommonwealthOffice,ed."BritishAmericanPlanningTalks,Washington,

    October1011,1978."(n.d.):n.pag.TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity).GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Web.13Oct.2014.ThisdocumentisasetofnotesfromameetingoftheBritishForeignandCommonwealthOfficefrom1978,astheydiscussthestateofforeignaffairswithAmericanofficials.InthesectionpertainingtoIran,thenotetakeroutlinesapointthatHenryPrecht,BritishCountryDirectorforIran,makes,wherehecallsthemessinIran"theworstforeignpolicydisastertohittheWestformanyyears."PrechtgoesontocorrectlypredictthefalloftheShah'sgovernmentwithinayear,andtheuprisingofKhomeini.AllinattendanceagreedthathoweverbadrelationswithIrangot,theycouldnotbeterminatedbecauseofIraniandependenceontheWestbuyingoil.ThisshowsthatwhilebothAmericansandBritishofficialsunderstoodthesituationwasratherdireasaresultoftheCoup,andtheyrealizedtheyhadmadeamistake,theydidnotfullyappreciatethelegacythattheycouldbeleaving,andthefullextentoftheirmistakes,astheydidnotaccountfortheantiwesternsentimentfeltinIranatthetimeofKhomeini'srisetopower.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix2

    Bruce,DavidK.,andRobertA.Lovett.BruceLovettReport.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.ThisreportcommissionedbytheBoardofConsultantsonFederalIntelligenceActivitieshighlightstheshortfallsoftheCIAorganizationalsystem,whichitdescribesasfreewheelinganduncheckedbyqualifiedauthorities,bothinternallyandexternally.AuthorsDavidK.E.BruceandRobertA.Lovett(theSecretaryofDefense)werehighlycriticalofthefreenatureoftheCIA,statingthatitcontainednoneofthelongrangeguidanceandvisionsnecessarytoensureeffectivepolicyprocedure(PP)operations.Theyprovidefewspecificdetailstosupporttheirclaims,usingmostlybroadgeneralizationsaboutCIAworkersorleaders,althoughtheauthoritativenatureofthereportanditswritersleadsustobelievethattheyhavesomeweightbehindtheirclaims.

    CampaigntoInstallaProWesternGovernmentinIran.N.d.CIA,Summary.Thisreport

    releasedin2011withtheCIAFreedomofInformationAct,likelypreparedbyDonaldWilbur,anarchitectofthecoup,detailstheUnitedStates'spointofviewandthoughtprocessregardingtheeventsandtheiractionsinIran.Althoughlikelybiased,itprovidesanelucidatingperspectiveofthecoup,firstpresentingknowledgeoftheTudehparty'sandSovietUnion'sinfluenceandrecognizingtheexistenceofFedayenIslam.ItclaimsthattheUSsawitselfasan"honestbroker,"andthatitwas"admittedlyreluctant"totakecovertactioninIran,butthatthecoupwasa"moredesirablerisk"thanlettingtheSovietsgainanadvantageintheregion.Itmaybeimportanttonotethatthedocumentwasheavilyexcised,presentingthepossibilitythattheCIAiswithholdingyetmoreimportantinformation.

    Coyne,J.Patrick.CoyneReporttotheCIA.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.ThisreportonthestatusofCIAoperationssystemsprovidedacomprehensivesummaryoftheissueswithintheCIAorganizationalsystem.Primarily,alackofproperchecksandbalancesonCIAoperationsallowedittopursuemultiplepotentiallydisastrousundertakings,withoutanyofthelongrangeguidanceandplanningthatshouldbeprovidedbytheStateandDefenseDepartments.Overall,thissourceunderscoredthedownfallsoftheCIAatthetime,andgavesomesuggestionsonhowtoimprovetheaccountabilityoftheorganization.

    Daniel,Clifton."U.S.andBritainConfrontedByDilemmaonHelptoIran."TheNewYork

    Times11Aug.1952:n.pag.Print.Thisprimarysourcenewsarticle,publishedintheNewYorkTimesaboutayearbeforethecoup,discussesthedilemmaoftheAmericanandBritishgovernmentsindecidingwhetherornottoactinIran.TheprimaryBritishmotivationinIranwastocombatMossadeq'snationalizationoftheAIOC.TheBritishinsisteduponmeetingwiththeUnitedStatesfirstinordertogetthemtoagreetoassist.OfparticularinterestinthisarticleisthefacttheUnitedStates'StateDepartmentwas

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix3

    mentionedasthedrivingforcebehindtheAmericandecisiontoinstigatethecoupduetothebeliefofacommunistthreatbytheTudehParty.TheheadoftheStateDepartment,ofcourse,wasnoneotherthanJohnFosterDulles.ThisarticleprovidesaninterestinglookathowtheBritishwereabletodragtheUnitedStatesalongwiththemtohelptheminthecoup,andhowmisinformedtheUnitedStateswere.ItalsoreflectsthemisguidedandmisinformedleadershipofJohnFosterDullesandtheresultinglegacyofthat.

    Dulles,Allen."AllenDullesInterview."Interview.YouTube.Google,20Feb.2010.Web.13Oct.2014.This1966interviewofAllenDullesprovidesagoodlookatDulles'spersonalcoveringupofthecoup.WhentheinterviewerdescribestheamountofdocumentsstillclassifiedbytheCIAabouttheCoup,Dullesclaims"Ithinkeverythingthatisvitalasfarasformingajudgementastowhatreallyhappenedhasbeenmadeavailable."Thisisablatantlie,andtheinterviewercontinuestovoicehisskepticism,onlytobemetbyDullesunyieldingandcharismaticdefense.ThissourcewasafairdemonstrationofboththelackofleadershipofthecoupbecauseitshowedtheCIA'sadamantdenialthattheymessedup,andpartiallythelegacytoobecausetheywereunwillingtocomeoutwiththetruthandtrytofixtheirmistakes.

    Dulles,Allen."Correspondence."LettertoDonaldWilbur.30Jan.1954.MossadeghProject.N.p.,22June2014.Web.22Nov.2014.InaninternalCIAletter/memorandum,AllenDullescongratulatesDonaldWilburforhisworkonthe1953Iraniancoup.ThisletterhelpedusunderstandtherelationshipbetweentheBritishandAmericansidesofthecoupthatWilburmediated,whichwasgenerallytactfulandprofessionalwithoutcopiouscommunication.Also,heonceagainexpresseshissomewhatignorantopinionofthecoup'ssuccess,withoutanythoughtforthelongtermconsequencesofanoppressiveandauthoritarianregimeinIran,evenifitsupportedtheWest.

    Dulles,Allen."AllenW.DullesOralHistoryInterview."InterviewbyThomasBraden.JohnF.KennedyPresidentialLibrary.N.p.,n.d.Web.30Dec.2014.ThisinterviewofAllenDullesin1964coverstheplanningfor,execution,andaftermathoftheBayofPigsinvasionledbytheCIAduringDulles'stenureasDirector.DullesexplainsthathemadeamistakeinallowingPresidentKennedytobecomesoinvolvedinthecrisis.Hebelieves,despitethedisasterthatoccurred,thattheoperationhadhadsomehopeforsuccess,andthatitwasmainlypoorluckandexecutionthatledtothepartialfailureoftheoperation.ThissourcehelpedusunderstandDulles'sopinionsonhowCIAoperationsshouldberunandled,withoutinterferencefromoutsidegovernmentagencies.

    Dulles,Allen.Germany'sUnderground.NewYork:Macmillan,1947.Print.Thisbook,which

    waswrittenbyAllenDulles,goesindepthintohowtheOSSwascreated,andhowthat

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix4

    affectedtheeventsinWorldWarII.Withinthisbook,Dulles'judgmentalattitudeisapparenttoalltheleadershedisagreedwith.HetalkedabouthowtheUnitedStatesshould'vegottenintothewarasearlyaspossible.Fromthisbook,wecanseehowhisthoughtsaboutradicalactionaffectedhisleadershipinthecoup.Itisaveryhelpfulprimarysource,inthatitprovidesdeepinsightintoDullessperspectiveonhisownleadership.Combiningitwithothersources,onecandrawconclusionsabouthisoverconfidence,andhowJohnFosterDulleswasoverconfidentaswell.Itwasverybeneficialtotheleadershipargument.

    Dulles,Allen.TheInvisibleWar.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,2007.HarveyMuddLibrary.Web.14Dec.2014.ThisundatedOSSreportissuedbyAllenDullesexplainsthestandoffbetweentheUnitedStatesandtherecentlyinpowerCommunistsinRussia.HespendsasignificantamountoftimedetailingtheAmericanpublicopinionoftheCommunistadvance,thoughhebelievesthatpeopleshouldbemorewaryofthethreat.HeadmitsthatnobodyhasanyaccurateinformationontheSoviets,showingthatmostofthehyperbolicclaimshecontinuestomakeareunfounded.Overall,itshowstheinaccuratepreconceptionsthatDullesformedevenbeforehewasfullyinformedoftheCommunistsituationaroundtheglobe,andthereforeisveryhelpfulfortheleadershipargumentofimpulsiveforeignpolicy.

    Dulles,AllenW."THEPRESENTSITUATIONINGERMANY."CouncilonForeignRelations.3Dec.1945.ForeignAffairs.Web.4Jan.2015.ThisisanofftherecordspeechwhichAllenDullesmadethatwasrecentlyreleasedtothepublic.AlthoughitisaboutGermanyin1945,itprovidesinsightintoDulles'sleadershipabilities.Heoftendescribesthesituationasimpossibleandmakesbroadgeneralizationsaboutthepopulationsinvolved,supportingtheideathatDulleswasgenerallypessimisticintheshortterm,andthathewaspronetoromanticizethesituationinhismindtomatchwithhisselfimageasaChristianAmericancrusaderouttohelpthepeopleoftheworldagainstallevils.

    Dulles,Allen.SovietEconomicInfluences.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1958.05Dec.2007.Web.6Jan.2015.ThisreportwrittenbyAllenDullesfortheCIAoutlinesSovieteconomicactivitiesaroundtheglobe,focusingmainlyon"thirdworld"countries,includingIran(althoughbythispointIranwasalreadyunderUScontrol).DullesexpressesconcernsofthepowerofSovietpropagandathroughouttheglobe,specificallyinEgyptandIran,demonstratinghisfearoftheSovietsintheMiddleEast.Mostimportantly,though,hehighlightstheextentofSoviettradeintheMiddleEast,whichhebelievedtobeanindicatorofSovietexpansionarytendencies.ThishelpedrevealthatwhileDulleswasanidealisticleader,set

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix5

    inhisways,hewasstillbrilliant,andhadsufficientknowledgeofthesentimentsinIranafterthecoup.

    Dulles,JohnF."InterviewwithJohnFosterDulles."InterviewbyHull.AmericanHistory.AshlandUniversity,2006.Web.15Dec.2014.InaninterviewwiththeForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoard,JohnFosterDullesexplainshisviewonthepolicyofcontainment.Hesaysthatamoredynamicandproactive"positive"policyisnecessarytocountertheSoviets,andinordertofreethecaptivepeoplesunderSovietcontrol.Hestatesthatadefensivepolicywillinevitablyfailandbepushedbackbyanaggressivepolicy,sotheAmericansshouldassumeamoreaggressivestandpoint.Overall,hebelievesthatthemoralsuperiorityoftheUnitedStatescanovercometheSoviet"evil"aslongastheydonottakeonanegativedefeatistattitudeastheyhadbeen,whichwouldrequireamoreactiveforeignpolicyconcerningtheColdWar.

    Dulles,JohnF."JohnFosterDullesInterview:U.S.SecretaryofStateunderPresidentDwightD.Eisenhower."InterviewbyWilliamB.HuieandHenryS.Hazlitt.LonginesChronoscope.1952.Television.ThistelevisedinterviewofJohnFosterDulleshimselfprovidedanuncensoredperspectiveofFosterDulles'sviewsontheColdWar.Asheexplainedhimself,hebelievedthattheUnitedStatesneededtobecomemorevigorousandregainAmerican"dynamism"inordertofightSovietRussiaindefenseofAmericanandhumanrightsaroundtheworld.HealsostatesthatmoreopentradeandeconomicpoliciesintheFirstandThirdworldswerekeytoholdingbacktheRussiansoffensivesaroundtheglobe.Dullesalsostatesthathedoesnotacceptthe"communizationoftheChinesemainland."InadditiontoshowingthefearDulleshadofCommunismintheworld,theinterviewisalsoindicativeofhowDullesaffectedUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.Theviewpointshesharesintheinterviewarethatofananticommunistideologyasopposedtoaprodemocracypolicy.ThisisextremelyrelevanttoourargumentthatDulles'leadershipleftthelegacyofafundamentalchangeinthegoalsofUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.

    Dulles,JohnF."JohnFosterDullesonMassiveRetaliation."JohnBurroughsHistory.Web.15Dec.2014.ThisstatementmadebyJohnFosterDullessummarizeshisperspectiveonAmericanforeignpolicyconcerningtheSovietthreatonaglobalscale.Asheputsit,theAmericanscouldnotaffordtoallowtheSovietstocometothem,orelsetheywouldbeforcedtouse"massiveretaliation"measuresalloutornuclearwarinordertosimplyholdbacktheSoviets.TheSoviets,knowingthis,wouldthenbesecureintheirabilitytodominatetheUnitedStates.Instead,hesays,theAmericancommunityhadtobeproactiveandbecometheaggressoritself,sothattheSovietswouldnothavethechance

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix6

    toattackonitsownterms.Averyhelpfulleadershipsource,itprovidedtheinsightonFosterDullessideas,whichwenthandinhandwithhisbrothers.

    "EisenhowerDoctrine(1957)."WorldHistory:TheModernEra.ABCCLIO,2015.Web.29

    Dec.2014.Thisprimarysource,commonlyknownastheEisenhowerDoctrine,isafamousspeechthatdefinestheAmericanforeignpolicyofthatera.Inthespeech,EisenhowerdeclaredthatMiddleEasternstatescouldrequestAmericanaidiftheyfeltthreatenedbyanotherforeignpower.EisenhowerspecificallypointsoutthethreatoftheSovietUnionandthespreadofcommunism.ThissourceisextremelyrelevantbecausewhatEisenhowerissayingperfectlyreflectsthefundamentalinfluencethattheDullesbrothers'leadershiphadonAmericanforeignpolicy.EisenhowerevengoessofarastomentionJohnFosterandhisviewsonforeignpolicy.Assuch,thissourceisclearlyindicativeofthelegacyinforeignpolicyoftheDullesbrothers'leadership.

    Eisenhower,DwightD.MandateforChange,19531956:TheWhiteHouseYears.GardenCity,

    NY:Doubleday,1963.Print.Thisprimarysourcespansexactlythetimeperiodweareinterestedin.ItgivescopiesofEisenhower'scorrespondencewithIranianleadersandalsogiveshisthoughtsontheirnationsrelationships.Specifically,hebelievedthatIranandtheUnitedStateswerehighlydependentoneachother,mainlyduetothetraderelationshiptheyheldwithIranianoilbeingusedinaAmericanandAmericanmilitarysupportinIran.However,hedoesnotmentionspecificallythecovertactionstheCIAhadplannedforIranandMossadeq,whichwereonlylaterunveiledin2012.IthelpswiththelegacyinIranargument,showinghowthesituationwashandledinthecountryafterMossadeqwasoverthrown.

    Eisenhower,DwightD."PresidentEisenhower'sFinalReplytoPremierMossadegh."Letterto

    MohammedMossadeq.29June1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,n.d.Web.4Jan.2015.NearlyamonthafterreceivingMossadeq'spleafordomestichelpinIran,Eisenhower'sreplyisfranklycurt.HeputstheblameonIran'sinabilitytoworkwiththeBritishinsteadofproposingwaysinwhichtheUnitedStatescouldhelp.ThisisbecausehehadalreadygiventheDullesbrothersthegoaheadtocarryouttheIraniancoup.ThiscorrespondenceshowshowlittleEisenhowerknewaboutIranoutsideofwhattheDullesbrothershadtoldhim.Ithelpsshowthemisguidedleadership,andinformationandcommunication,becauseEisenhowerwaswillingtoalienateMossadeqattheorderoftheDullesbrothers,withoutbotheringtolearnanythingofthesituationhimself.

    Eisenhower,DwightD."CorrespondencetoPremierMossadegh."Letterto

    MohammedMossadeq.26Feb.1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,n.d.Web.4Jan.2015.InEisenhower'scordialresponsehesayshewilltakeMossadeq's

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix7

    viewsintoconsideration.Thisisinterestingbecauseatthistime,hewasawarethattheDullesbrotherswantedtooverthrowMossadeq.Thisbehaviorwas,frankly,blatantlydishonestandareflectionoftheDullesbrotherspowerfulinfluencesoverEisenhower.Inaddition,itshowstheAmericangovernmentswillingnesstosayonethinganddoanother,inthiscasemisleadingMossadeqwhileplanningtodeposehim.Thissource

    Excised."AntiTudehActivitiesofZahediGovernment."CIAMemo.10Sept.1953.Web.2Jan.

    2015.Thisprimarysourcedocument,obtainedbytheNationalSecurityArchivethroughtheFreedomofInformationAct,isaCIAmemoregardingtheantiCommunistactionsoftheZahedigovernmentinstalledbytheCIA.WrittenbytheActingChiefoftheCIA'sdivisionofNearEastandAfrica,thememodiscussestheZahedigovernment'splantohaveanationalcrackdownontheTudehpartyinIran.ThismemoisextremelyrelevanttoourargumentbecauseitshowstheintentionsoftheCIAthroughZahedi.TheCIA'sultimategoalandconcerninthecoupwasthepresenceofthecommunistTudehpartyandtheirallegedgainingofpowerandinfluence.Assuch,theirfirstgoaluponinstallingtheirhandselectednewleaderofIranwastoremovethecommunistthreat.ThisisindicativeoftheDullesbrothers'leadershipgoalsofdestroyingcommunism,andofthelegacyofanticommunismthattheirleadershipcreated.

    Gaddis,JohnLewis.TheUnitedStatesandtheOriginsoftheColdWar,19411947.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1972.Print.ThissourcedirectlyfromtheColdWarerawaskeyinhelpingdevelopaconnectionbetweenthecoldwarandtheIraniancoup.Thisbooktookaworldlyviewwhenexplainingeverythingthathadhappened,andhowtheworldsurroundingaffectedthecoldwar.Thisbookwentindepthintoexplainingeverycountriespartandcontributiontotheeventsthatleduptothecoldwar.Thisbookalsogoesbeyondandbrieflyexplainshowthearmsracehasledtoaviolentsocietytodayobsessedwithstaying"safe"fromtheenemy.

    Golestan,Erahim."ErahimGolestanDescribes28MoradCoup."Interview.TheMossadegh

    Project.BBCPersian.England,n.d.Radio.Thisisaveryinterestingfirsthandaccountofwhatitwaslikeonthegroundduringthecoup.ItwillhelpuswithfiguringoutwhatthedayofthecoupwaslikeandhowtheDulles'actionshadanaffectonaveragepeopleinIran.Inparticular,thissourcedescribestheviolencebehindthecoup,andtheseeminglyobviousoutsideinfluencesthatwereaffectingtherevolution.GolestanbelievesinthegoodintentionsofMossadeqasarepresentativeofthepeopleofIranandasastaunchsupporterofdemocracy,demonstratingthepositivepublicopinionthatthepublicheldofMossadeqandthehypocrisywithwhichthepeopleofIranlaterviewedtheUnitedStates.

    Haines,GeraldK.CIAandGuatemalaAssassinationProposals,19521954.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix8

    NationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Web.6Jan.2015.InareporttotheCIA,analystG.K.Hainesgivesafairlyobjectiveandfactbaseddescriptionofthe1954Guatemalancoup,whichwasthesecondCIAsponsoreddepositionofaforeigngovernment.Itprovidedaveryclearanalysisofthisevent,whichwasusefulinimprovingourunderstandingofthelegacyoftheIraniancoupinCIAforeignaffairs.

    "InterviewwithRezaShahPahlavi."InterviewbyGerardDeVilliers.TheImperialShah.N.p.,

    1975.15Nov.2014.Thisbrief,measuredinterviewofRezaShahPahlavishowssomeoftheShah'spublicopinionsofhisregime,andhisignoranceofthegeneralstateofhisnation.Essentially,hehadneglectedhisdutiesasleaderduringhistenureasShahandasaresultlosttouchwiththeneedsofhispeople,whoatthetimewerebeginningtobecomerestlesswithSAVAK'stightcontroloverthepopulationandtheShah'sinabilitytoimprovethesituation.TheShahseemedtobelievethattheoverallpopulationwasrelativelysubmissivetohispsychologicalpressures.

    Jefferson,Thomas."Correspondence."LettertoMarquisDeLafayette.2Apr.1790.MS.NewYork,NewYork.InapersonallettertotheMarquisdeLafayette,FoundingFatherThomasJeffersonexplainshisgoalsforthenewAmericangovernment.Inparticular,hestatesthattheultimategoalofagovernmentistofaithfullysupportthevaluesuponwhichitwasfounded.InthecaseoftheUnitedStates,hemeansthatdemocracyshouldbetheendgoalofallofthenewgovernment'sengagements,andthattheyshouldbehonorableintheirpursuitsregardlessofcircumstances.

    Killian,JamesR.,WilliamO.Baker,ClarkClifford,JamesH.Doolittle,GordonGray,EdwinH.Land,WilliamL.Langer,RobertD.Murphy,andMaxwellTaylor.ForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoardReporttothePresident.Rep.Comp.J.PatrickCoyne.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.ThisreportbytheForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoardisacompletedescriptionoftheCIA'slacklusterprocessesforapprovingpolicyprocedure(PP)actions,includingtheIraniancoup.Inthemostbasicterms,therewasnoapparentevidenceofanysortofchecksonthepoweroftheCIA,whichwasabletoundertakeimpulsiveoperationswithpoorplanningandevaluationofpotentialconsequences.Theauthorsexpress"concern"fortheweakornonexistentsystemsinplaceforqualitycontrolintheCIA,whichwereforthemostpartinformalandproforma.

    Kirkpatrick,LymanB.KirkpatrickReport.Rep.NationalSecurityArchive,14Apr.2011.Web.10Nov.2014.TheKirkpatrickreportisacomprehensiveinternalCIAstudydetailingtheAgency'sroleinBayofPigsInvasion.Itconcludesthat,essentially,theCIAwasextremelydisorganizedandillpreparedtohandleanoperationofthescaleoftheinvasion.InamirroroftheBruceLovettandCoynereportsfollowingtheIraniancoup,

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix9

    thisreportisextremelycriticaloftheoverallCIAexecution,andstatesthatitisimperativetofixthesefundamentalshortfallswithintheAgency.Inparticular,itstatesthattherewerenomeasuresinplacetochecktheviabilityofsuchoperations,whichseemedtorunoutofcontrolontheideasoftheleadership,leadingtotheblameonandeventualresignationofAllenDullesasDirector.

    Koch,ScottA."Zendebad,Shah!":TheCentralIntelligenceAgencyandtheFallofIranianPrimeMinisterMohammedMossadeq,August1953"N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,19Aug.2013.Web.18Dec.2014.ThisdeclassifiedCIAdocumentisthemostrecentlyreleasedinternalhistoryofthe1953IraniancoupbyaCIAhistorian.Althoughheavilyexcised,itprovidesavaluableperspectiveofthecoupfromsomeonewhowitnessedtheeventbuthadnodirectstakeinit.Basically,Kochgivesaplainsummaryofthecoupanditsaftermath.IncomparisontootherCIAdocuments,itismuchlessextremeinitsopinions,suggestingthatthepeoplebehindthecoupwereslightlybiasedanddidnotnecessarilyhaveaccurateinformationoropinions.

    "MarshallPlan(1947)."WorldHistory:TheModernEra.ABCCLIO,2015.Web.6Jan.2015.

    Thisprimarysourcedocument,aspeechbySecretaryofStateGeorgeMarshall,isthespeechthatannouncedtheMarshallPlan,whichwasacrucialpieceoftheUnitedStates'postWorldWarIIforeignpolicy.MarshallspeaksofthedireneedfortheUnitedStatestohelprebuildthedemocraciesofEurope.Thisshowshowatthetime,AmericanforeignpolicywasmorecenteredaroundprotectingandpromotingdemocracythanactivelyfightingCommunism.WhilethisisduetothefactthattheColdWarwasnotinfullswing,thisisalsoindicativeofhowtheDullesbrothers'influencemanagedtochangetheverybasisofAmericanforeignpolicy.ThelegacyoftheirleadershipliesinhowAmericashiftedfrompoliciesliketheMarshallPlantomoreactiveantiCommunistones.

    Mossadeq,Mohammed."Mossadegh'sMessagetoPresidentEisenhower."LettertoDwightD.

    Eisenhower.7Jan.1953.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.N.pag.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh.Web.4Jan.2015.InthisdirectcorrespondencetoPresidentEisenhower,MossadeqrequestshelptheEisenhoweradministrationdemocraticgrowthinIran.ThisshowsthatMossadeqgenuinelybelievedindemocracy,askingforhelpfromtheUnitedStatesgovernment,despitewishingtostayneutralintheColdWarcapitalismvs.communismconflict.ItsupportsourargumentforthelegacyregardingtheUnitedState'sColdWarideology,inthatitshowsthattheUnitedStateswaswillingtobendorbreaksomeofitsvaluesregardingdemocracyandfreedominordertostompoutwhatitperceivedascommunismaroundtheworld.

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    Mossadeq,Mohammed."Mossadegh'sSecondMessagetoPresidentEisenhower."Letterto

    DwightD.Eisenhower.28May1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,n.d.Web.4Jan.2015.Inthisletter,MossadeqisspecificallyoutliningthetroublesheishavinginIrantoEisenhower.HetellsEisenhoweraboutthelowstandardoflivingoftheIranianpeopleandasksforassistancewiththeBritishgovernmentbecauseMossadeqiswishingtonationalizeoil.WhatMossadeqdoesn'trealizeisthattheplanningforthecoupisalreadyunderway.

    "Mossadeq'sSpyService."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,19Aug.2013.Web.20Dec.2014.ThisinternalCIApropagandapieceillustratesclearlytheCIAperspectiveonMossadeq'sleadershipintheIraniangovernment.Accordingtotheauthor,Mossadeqisacorruptdictatorandrunsawidespreadspysysteminordertocrushallinternalopposition.TheauthorcontinuestoclaimthatMossadeqheldstrongtieswiththeTudehandMoscow,andexpressesadesiretobreakthosetiesandchangetheleadershipsituationinIran.

    Naftali,Timothy,GeorgeEliades,FrancisGavin,ErinMahan,JonathanRosenberg,DavidShreve,PatriciaDunn,PhilipZelikow,andErnestMay,eds.TheGreatCrises,VolumeOne.Rep.NationalSecurityArchive,2Apr.2014.Web.6Jan.2015.ThiscompilationofPresidentJohnF.Kennedy'scorrespondencesincludesasectionregardingtheBraziliancoupof1964,anotherCIAbackedoperation.Basically,ithelpedusunderstandthebackgroundoftheBraziliancoup,whichwasadirect"descendant"oftheoperationTPAJAXin1953.Especiallyusefulwasapassagedescribingingeneraltheeffectsofthecoup,supportingourargumentforthelegacyofthe1953operation.

    NationalSecurityArchive.Rep.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,11Dec.2011.Web.04Jan.

    2015.InareportmadeduringtheVietnamcoup,theStateDepartmentdescribestheatrocitiescommittedbythevariouspartiesinvolvedduringtheevent.ThissourcewasmainlyusefulforoutliningtheSouthVietnamcoup,improvingourunderstandingoftheinsidiouslegacythattheprecedentoftheIraniancoupleftin1953.Additionally,itprovidedveryspecificstatementsthatwouldbehelpfulinexplainingtheimpactoftheeventinthelongrun.

    Nixon,Richard."RichardNixononthe1953CoupinIran."Interview.CSPAN.CSPAN,2014.Web.29Dec.2014.Interestingly,thisvideointerviewisfrom1991andRichardNixon,theVicePresidentunderEisenhower,admitsEisenhower'sroleintheoverthrowofMossadeqinararebreachofconfidentiality.HealsodefendsEisenhower'scontroversial

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix11

    decisiontocontinuewiththecoup,despitetheobviousroleitplayedintheRevolutionjustadecadeearlierandtheturmoiliscreatedwithinIranandforUSIranianrelations.

    Obama,Barack."REMARKSBYTHEPRESIDENTONANEWBEGINNING."CairoUniversity,Cairo,Egypt.4June2009.TheWhiteHouse.Web.4Jan.2015.ThisaddressbyPresidentBarackObamainEgyptspeaksofathawingofrelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandMiddlesEasternnations,followingtheirturbulenthistory.PresidentObamastatesthattheAmericangovernmentwishestonormalizetherelationshipsbetweentheirnations,afteradecadeslonghiatus.ThisshowsusthatonlynowaretiesbetweentheUSandtheMiddleEast,specificallyIran,beinghealed,followingthecoupandthesubsequentrevolution,duetothebrashdecisionsoftheDullesbrothers.

    Pahlavi,Shah."INTERVIEWWITHTHESHAHOFIRAN1977."InterviewbyBarbara

    Walters.YouTube.ABC,1977.Web.29Dec.2014.InterestingtoseetheShah"inperson."ThemostelucidatingpartwaswhentheShahisaskedifIranisgettingmoneyfromtheCIAand,andhebrazenlylies,statingthatIranisnotbeingfundedbytheUnitedStates.ThishelpedusunderstandtherelationshipbetweenIranandtheUnitedStatesundertheShah,whichwasstillclandestineatthetime.Basically,welearnedthattheShahwasstillastaunchsupporteroftheWestevenrightbeforehisdeposition,inreturnforbeingplacedintopower,withhisunwillingnesstosellouthisallies.

    Roosevelt,FranklinD."ArsenalofDemocracy"RadioAddressDeliveredbyPresident

    Roosevelt,1940.RadioAddress,WashingtonDC.Address.ThissourceisaradioaddressgivenbyPresidentFranklinD.Rooseveltin1940abouthowtheUnitedStatesmustbean"arsenalofdemocracy."RooseveltstatesthattheUnitedStatesmustaiddemocracyinWorldWarIIby"bysendingeveryounceandeverytonofmunitionsandsuppliesthatwecanpossiblysparetohelpthedefenderswhoareinthefrontlines."ThissourceisextremelyusefulandrelevantbecauseitisindicativeofthepredominantideaofprodemocracyinUnitedStatesforeignpolicypriortotheDullesbrothers,asopposedtothelaterzeitgeistofanticommunism.BypresentingtheblatantdifferencesinforeignpolicygoalsbeforetheadventoftheDullesbrothers'decisions,thisspeechshowsthelegacyoftheDullesbrothers'leadershipchoices.

    Roosevelt,Kermit."CIA,MemofromKermitRooseveltto[Excised],July16,1953."(1953):n.

    pag.TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity).CIA.Web.28Sept.2014.ThisisaletterwrittenbyKermitRoosevelttoananonymousgovernmentofficial.Itwasdeclassifiedin2011,alongwithacollectionofotherlettersfromRoosevelt.Itisaprimarysource,andthereforegivesexactinsightintotheplanningprocessbehindthecoup.Althoughthetypedletterisshort,itshowssomeleadershiponbehalfofKermitRoosevelt,

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix12

    intheformofsimplyplanning,yetitalsoshowsalackofleadershipinthattheBritishandAmericanintelligenceagenciesarehavingtroublepersuadingZaheditobethenextrulerofIran.

    Roosevelt,Kermit.Countercoup:TheStrugglefortheControlofIran.NewYork:

    McGrawHill,1979.Mohsen.1.banan.byname.net.Web.13Oct.2014.Roosevelt'sbook,althoughpartiallycensored,providesanindepthlookathisperspectiveoftheevent,theplanningoftheevent,andhowtheycarrieditout.Partsofitaresimplyapersonalnarrativeandunhelpful,butthereareextremelyhelpfulsectionsthatdetailtheplanningprocess.Throughwhatwehavealreadydeducedpertainingtothelackofleadership,thereisaslightundertoneofconfusion,somesmallthingsthatdidn'tgoaccordingtoplan,eveninthebookthathasbeenwrittensuchthatthesethingsaren'tonthesurface.Thissourcehelpeddeterminewherethingswentwronginthecoup,asadirectresultoflackofleadership.

    StateDepartment.USIranianFriendship.MossadeghProject.N.p.,9May2014.Web.15Nov.

    2014.ThisstatementissuedbyJohnFosterDullesimmediatelyfollowingthecoupoutlineshishopesfortheUSIranianrelationship.Asheputsit,hehopesthattheywillbeabletodobusinesswithIranasamembersofthe"familyoffreenations."ThishelpsshowthateventhoughDulleswasbeingdishonestaboutUSinvolvementinthecoup,hemaystillhavebeentrulyinterestedinsupportingIranagainstSovietinfluences,offeringsubstantialamountsofemergencyaidinresponseto"recentCommunistabetteddisorders"inIran,andhailingtheIranianambassadortotheUnitedStateswithgenuinerespect.

    "SupremeCourtJusticeWilliamO.DouglasonMossadeghinIran."SupremeCourtJustice

    WilliamO.DouglasonMossadeghinIran.TheMossadeghProject,n.d.Web.04Jan.2015.ThisisacompilationofmanyprimarysourcesfromWilliamO.DouglaswhowasagreatadmirerofMossadeq.Inaprevioussecondarysource,StephenKinzer'sbook,wefounditmentionedthatDouglaswasabigcriticoftheDullesbrothers.Becauseofthis,hisisainterestingperspectivebecausehewasoneoftheDulles'onlycontemporarieswhowouldprobablyagreewithourargumentthattheDulles'didmoreharmthangood.

    "TheSourcesofSovietConduct."ForeignAffairs.4Jan.2015.Web.4Jan.2015.

    .TheXArticlewaswrittenbyGeorgeF.Kennan,oneofthemostpowerfulvoicesinAmericanforeignpolicyduringtheColdWar.Inthisarticle,Kennanoutlinesthetheoryofcontainment,astrategytopatientlybutfirmlycontainSovietexpansionaroundtheworld.ThisisincontrasttoJohnFosterDullessstrategyofrollback,thestrategytopushbackSovietinfluences.Kennanessentiallyadvocatesforaslowbutsureprodemocracypolicy

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix13

    thatwilleventuallybeabletoweardownthecommunistswithhelpfromtheinternalissuestheUSSRfacesonitsown.

    Townley,Michael.NationalSecurityArchive.Rep.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,11Sept.1973.Web.6Jan.2015.ThisDINAreporttotheStateDepartmentcoverstheCIAruncoupinChilein1973,whichwasrunbythesameleadershipastheoriginalcoupin1953AllenDulles.ThereportwasmostusefulinexplainingtheChileanoperation,andprovideduswithelucidatingquotesaboutthelegacyoftheChileancoupandhowitwasaffectedbytheCIAspoliciesformedduringthe1953operationinIran.

    Truman,HarryS."RecommendationofAssistancetoGreeceandTurkey."Addressofthe

    PresidentoftheUnitedStates.80thCongress1stSession,WashingtonDC.12Mar.1947.TrumanLibrary.Web.2Jan.2015.ThisaddressbyPresidentTrumanistheaddressinwhichheannouncedthepolicyoftheTrumanDoctrine.WiththeTrumanDoctrine,TrumanestablishedthattheUnitedStateswould"supportfreepeoplewhoareresistingattemptedsubjugationbyarmedminoritiesorbyoutsidepressures."ItisindicativeofAmerica'sforeignpolicyatthetime,onethatostensiblypledgedtohelpdemocracybutinactualitywasintendedtocombatcommunism.ThisprimarysourceisrelevantbecauseitprovidesinformationaboutthegoalsofAmerica'sforeignpolicypriortotheDullesbrothers.Basedonthatinformation,itappearsthattheDullesbrotherswerenotthesoleforceintransitioningAmerica'sforeignpolicyfromoneofprodemocracytooneofanticommunism.Instead,thelegacyoftheiractionsinAmericanforeignpolicywerelikelyanextensionofaprevailingAmericanzeitgeist.

    UnitedStatesofAmerica.CentralIntelligenceAgency.ClandestineServicesHistory.Overthrow

    ofPremierMossadeqofIran:November1952August1953.ByDonaldN.Wilber.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.Thisservicehistoryofthe1953Iraniancoup,knownastheWilberreports,provideacompletehistoryoftheCIAsactionsinIran,andthusitisoneofthemostusefulandrelevantsourcesonthetopic.WhilesomenamesanddetailswerealteredandexcisedbytheCIA,allofthevitalinformationisaccurateandintact.Thesourcedelvesintodetailsabouttheimpetusforthecoup,thereasoningbehinddecisionsthatweremade,thesituationinIran,andotherimportantaspectsofthecoup.Mostimportantly,itrevealstheimpulsiveandmisguidedactionsoftheCIAduringthecoup.ThereasoningbehindmanyoftheactionsdepictedinWilbersreportareflawed,andtheleadershipquestionable.Thisisadirecteffectofaglaringlackofleadershipatthetopofthechainofcommand:theDullesbrothers.Asawhole,theWilbertreportshowsthe

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix14

    legacyofthemisguidedleadershipoftheDullesbrothers,whichwasextremelyvitalinsupportingourargumentandaidingourresearch.

    Wilson,Woodrow.JointAddresstoCongressLeadingtoaDeclarationofWarAgainstGermany

    (1917).UnitedStatesCongress,WashingtonDC.ThissourceisanaddressfromWoodrowWilsontoCongressdiscussingtheUnitedStates'declarationofwaragainstGermanyduringWorldWarI.WoodrowWilsonemphasizestheimportanceofprotectingdemocracyintheglobalscale.HisjustificationfordeclaringwaragainstGermanyisthatitsactionsinthewararethreateningtheveryexistenceofdemocracy,soitisthedutyoftheUnitedStatestonotonlyprotectdemocracyfortheirownbenefit,butfortheentireworld's.ThissourcespecificallyshowstheprimaryideainUnitedStatesforeignpolicyatthetime:protectingandspreadingdemocracy.ThisstandsinstrongcontrastwithitsgoalsaftertheriseoftheDullesbrothers,wheretheyshiftedfrombeingprodemocracytoanticommunism.Assuch,thissourceemphasizesthelegacyoftheDullesbrothers'leadershipdecisionsthatchangedthegoalsofUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.

    Wisner,Frank."Memorandum."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.NationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,19Aug.2013.Web.15Dec.2014.ThismemofromFrankWisner,oneoftheplannersofOperationAJAX,isrecommendingacommendationforoneoftheotherparticipantsintheoperation,evenafterevidenceappearsthattheShahhasbeguntoimplementhisbrutalregimeofoppression.ThisprimarysourceshowsthattheCIAlackedanyforesightorevenadesiretomonitorthesituationinIranafterthecoup,despitetheShah'sactionsinthecountry.

    SecondarySources(107)

    Abrahamian,Ervand,MichaelBarkan,ChristopherEn,JakeHernandez,AveryKaplan,and

    JustinYannix."ErvandAbrahamianInterview."Telephoneinterview.7Jan.2015.WewerefortunateenoughtoarrangeaninterviewwithnotedIranexpertandMiddleEastprofessorErvandAbrahamian.HewasextremelyhelpfulingivingusinfoaboutAmericanmotivesbehindthecoupandtheleadershipbehindtheAmericansideofthecoup,amongothertopics.Inparticular,heexplainedhowtheDulleses'preconceivedideasledthemignoreother'sideas,evenfiringsomewhoexpressedcontradictoryopinions.TheinformationhegaveuspaintedaclearerpictureoftheDullesbrothers'leadershipandgaveusabetterideaofthelegacyoftheiractions.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix15

    Abrahamian,Ervand."The1953CoupinIran."ScienceandSociety65.2(2001):182215.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.ThisbookbyErvandAbrahamian,anIranianhistorian,helpeddescribetheIraniancoupdetailbydetail.Withinhisbookhegoesdeepintodetailabouthowthecoupwasfabricated,andhowthemindsetsoftheleadersgreatlychangedthesuccessofthecoup.Thisbooktalkedaboutthebrothersinvolvedinthecoup,andhowtheiraggressivedominationofthepeacetalksledtoanunsuccessfulcoupandadestructiveandlonglastinglegacy.

    Abrahamian,Ervand.TheCoup:1953,theCIA,andtheRootsofModernU.S.Iranian

    Relations.NewYork:TheNewPress,2013.Print.ErvandAbrahamianisahistorianoftheMiddleEastspecializinginmodernIran,andaprofessoratBaruchCollegeoftheCityUniversityofNewYorksystem.Thisbookprovidesextensiveandspecificdetailsabouteverythinginvolvingthecoup,includingCIAinvolvementandthelegacy.AbrahamiandiscussesextensivelytheroleoftheCIA.AbrahamianarguesthattheUnitedStateswasmotivatedtosendtheCIAintoIrannotduetothethreatofcommunism,butduetotheiroilinterests.Thisdiffersfromtheargumentofthemajorityofotherhistorianswhoarguethatcommunismwastheprimarymotive.ThisdrawsintoquestionwhatexactlytheCIAhopedtoachieveinIran.Whilethatremainsrelativelyunclear,thelegacyofitsactionsdonot.SimilartowhathasbeenstatedbyotherpreeminentexpertsonIran,likeStephenKinzer,AbrahamianstatesthatthecoupledtoeventsliketheIslamicRevolutionandtheriseofextremistIslam.WhilethelegacyoftheCIA'sactionsareclear,theactionsthemselvesareextremelyquestionableandmysterious,whichislikelyindicativeofalackofleadership.

    Abrahamian,Ervand.FeathermanDistinguishedLectureonHumanities:The1953IranianCoup

    Revisitedin2012.UniversityofNewEngland.24Oct.2012.Lecture.InalectureatUNE,ErvandAbrahamiandetailsthecoupandarguesthatitwasmotivatedbyUSandBritishoilinterests.Abrahamian,ahistorianatCUNY,claimsthattheAmericanswantedcontinuedeasyaccesstoIranianoil,insteadoftheoriginalbeliefthattheywereafraidofaCommunistcoupinthenation.HecontinuestoshowthattheTudehwerenotcapableofacoup,despiteearlieropinions.Also,AbrahamianstatesthatbyfirstattemptingtoinstallQavamintheplaceofMossadeq,andfailing,theygaveMossadeqmorelegitimacyandpopularsupportasatruenationalist.Heconcludeswiththelegacyofthecoupinthemoderndaynuclearissue,sayingthattheWesternimperialisttendenciesoriginatingfromthecoupcontinuetoaffectUSIranianrelations,withtheUStryingtoconstrainIran.

    Ali,Tariq."OperationIranianFreedom:Iran'sBriefExperimentwithDemocracyCametoa

    TragicEnd,CourtesyofWashington."Nation18Aug.2003:37.StudentEdition.Web.21Sept.2014.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix16

    r&p=STOM&sw=w&asid=acc6ad41cdecb0c8625fc2faecd8cde0>.AcommonmisconceptionabouttheMiddleEastisthatithashasoneoppressiverulerafteranotherforthousandsofyears.Thisisnotthecase,thisarticlediscussesthetimeswhenIrantriedfordemocracy,mostnotablyunderMohammedMossadeq.Thisarticle,writtenbyanestablishedjournalists,isaboutStephenKinzer'sproMossadeqbook.ItprovidesmorecontexttosupporttheclaimthatAmericaandBritainroyallymessedupIranforthenext50yearsbyoverthrowingMossadeq.

    Amini,Fariba."FaribaAmini."Telephoneinterview.14Dec.2014.FaribaAminiisanIranian

    journalistandalsothedaughterofMossadeq'spersonallawyerwhowasveryclosewithMossadeqinthefinalyearsofhislife.AminiprovidedanIranianperspectivetowardsthecoupandexplainedheropiniontousthat,ratherthantheleadershipoftheDullesbrothersbeingardentlyanticommunist,itwasantinationalist.Shesaidthatmanyoftheleadersweredrivenbymonetarygain.Also,shehadaveryidealogicalviewofMossadeqasamanwhotrulyloveddemocracy.Thisistrue,Mossadeqwasanidealistwhichmakesthelegacyofthecoupthatmuchmorecrushing.

    Bahrampour,Tara."PatriotofPersia:AReview."WashingtonPost21July2012:n.pag.Print.

    TaraBahrampour'sreviewofChristopherdeBellaigue'sbookprovidesbothaninsightfulsummaryofhisviews,aswellasanexcellentoverviewofthelegacyofthe1953coup.BahrampourgivesanexcellentsummaryofMossadeqslifepreceedingthecoup,includinghisbackground,andthereforethisservesasanexcellentbroadcontextsource,aswellasahelpfulreview.BothBahrampourandBellaigueoffersympatheticviewstowardsMossadeq,andseemhimasavisionarywhohadsomuchtoofferhiscountrybeforehewastragicallyremovedfrompower,andreplacedbyAmericaspuppet.Thissourcehelpswiththelegacyargument,bydescribinganIranthathadmaintainedMossadeqinpower,asanillustrious,modernizedcountry.

    Bamberg,JamesH."Mossadeq'sOverthrow,August1953."TheHistoryofTheBritish

    PetroleumCompany.Vol.II.Cambridge:CambridgeUP,1994.48890.Print.InthisbookaboutwhatisnowBP,BambergexplainshowBPwasn'ttherootofalltheproblemsinthemiddleeasttoday,itwasmerelyacatalystfortheBritishandU.S.governmentstooustcommunisminthemiddleeast.ThischapterfocusedonexplaininghowMussadiq'sdecisiontobeuncompromisingwastherootofexistingproblemstoday,thattheU.S.andbritswereunwillingtomakeanotheroilcompromise.BambergalsostatesbecauseMussadiqwasn'twillingtoshareontheoilfront,thepoliticalreasoningbehindthecoupwasnaughtbutasimpleexcuseforwantingtheoil.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix17

    Behrooz,Mazaria."TudehFactionalismandthe1953CoupinIran."InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies33.3(2001):36382.JSTOR.Web.28Sept.2014.ThroughoutourresearchwehavebeentryingtodeterminehowmuchofathreatcommunismreallywasinIran.ThisarticlewashelpfulinexplainingtheTudehrelationshipwithMossadeqandhowcomplexitwas.Accordingtotheauthor,therealquestionwasnothowmuchofathreatcommunismposed,butratherwhytheTudehpartydidnotactivelytrytointerferewiththecoupandchangethelegacy.Theanswer,accordingtotheauthor,isthattheTudehleadershipwastofragmentedandindecisive.

    Behrooz,Maziar."TudehFactionalismandthe1953CoupinIran."InternationalJournalof

    MiddleEastStudies33.3(2001):36382.JSTOR.Web.05Oct.2014.Inthisjournal,MaziarBehroozprovidesanoverviewofthelongtermlegacyofthe1953coup,mainlyconcerningtheCommunistTudehparty.Behrooz,aprofessorofhistoryatSFSU,connectsthecouptothedownfalloftheTudehparty,andexplainsthattheywereneverabletorecoverduetothetimingofthecoupinalongsideaperiodofintrapartyfactionalism.Additionally,hestatesthatthecoupisatleastpartiallyresponsibleforthe1979revolutioninIran,thetensionsincurrentUSIranrelations,andthearresteddevelopmentofIran'snationalindependence,withtheinstitutionoftheShahhaltingconstitutionalprocessesandthemovetowardnationalistleadership.

    Bezhan,Frud."AftershocksofIran's1953CoupStillFeltaroundtheWorld,60YearsLater."

    RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.BroadcastingBoardofGovernors,15Aug.2013.Web.3Oct.2014.Bezhan,anestablishedinvestigativejournalistwhospecializesinIran,detailsthelegacyofthecoupinthepresentday.Citingvarioussources,hesaysthatthecoupwasdetrimentaltoWashington'sstandinginIran,andinthelongrunpavedthewayforapowerfulantiAmericanregimetocometopower.Itallowedtwooppositiongroups,radicalIslamistsandradicalleftists,torisetoprominenceinthewakeoftheShah.Also,the"success"ofthecoupencouragedtheCIAtousesimilartacticsinothernationssuchasGuatemala,leadingtostronglegaciesaroundtheglobe.

    Bezhan,Frud."AftershocksOfIran's1953CoupStillFeltAroundTheWorld,60YearsLater."

    RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.N.p.,n.d.Web.28Sept.2014.AlthoughthisarticlewaspublishedbyRadioFreeEurope,amediaoutletinitiallystartedbytheCIAasasourceofpropaganda,itgaveinsightintothelegacyofthecoup.Forexample,inIranundertheShahallpoliticalpartieswereoppressedwhich"pavedthewayfortwopoliticaltrendsradicalIslamistsledbyAyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniandradicalleftistsintheformofthemilitantMujahedineKhalq."TherepercussionsofthecouparestillfeltinIraniananimosityanddistrustoftheUnitedStates.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix18

    Bill,JamesA.TheEagleandtheLion:TheTragedyofAmericanIranianRelations.NewHaven:YaleUP,1988.Print.Thissourcewasfoundafteritwasmentionedas"requiredreading"onUSIranianrelationsbyanotherjournalist.ItisanindepthhistoryofIranfromtheendofWWIItothe1980'sanditexploreshowtheUSandIranwentfrombeingbestfriendstobitterenemies.ItalsoisverycriticalofAmericaninvolvementinthe1953coup.JamesA.BillisacelebratedauthorityofIranianhistoryandapossibleinterviewcandidateforlateroninourproject.

    Blake,Kristen.TheUSSovietConfrontationinIran,19451962.Lanham:UofAmerica,2009.

    Print.AuthorKristenBlakeisaprofessoratMolloyCollegeandanexpertontheColdWarintheNearEast.Inhervolume,BlakecoversthepoliticalandeconomicdevelopmentsinIraninthecontextoftheColdWarinahighlycomprehensivemanner,includingtheoilnationalizationcrisisof1952.Takingapostrevisioniststance,shearguesthatthecoupwascausedprimarilybyUSSovietrivalries,althoughherfocusremainsontheoriginsandimpactsoftheUSUKSovietrivalriesintheregion.Ultimately,thissourcedhelpedputthecoupinthecontextoftheColdWar,andgaveinsightintothelongtermeffectsoftheconflicts.

    Blum,William.KillingHope:USMilitaryandCIAInterventionssinceWorldWarII.London:

    Zed,2003.Print.Inthisbook,authorWilliamBlum,whoisahistorian,notedforeignpolicycritic,andformeremployeeoftheStateDepartment,discussestheCIA'shistoryofforeigninterventions,withonesectiondevotedtothe1953IranianCoup.OfparticularinterestishowmuchofamesstheentireUnitedStatesoperationinIranwas.InresponsetoaStateDepartmentreportthatessentiallystatedthattheTudehPartywasnotathreat,KermitRoosevelt,theleaderofMiddleEastoperationsoftheCIA,said"Idon'tknowwhattomakeofthat...[aUSambassadortoIranin1953]thoughtthattherewasaseriousdangerthatMossadeghwasgoingto,ineffect,placeIranunderSovietdomination."ThisshowsthelackofcommunicationandleadershipontheAmericansidetheleaderofoperationsdidn'tevenknowthepurposeofwhathewasdoing.Ofcourse,lackofleadershipleadstoanegativelegacy,whichisexactlywhathappenedinIran.TheIranianpeoplewereforcedtoendureanoppressivereignundertheShahandhisbrutalSAVAKpoliceforce.ThiscreatedtheantiU.S.sentimentthatlikelycontributedtotheriseofradicalIslaminIran.

    Blum,William."Iran1953:MakingItSafefortheKingofKings."KillingHope:U.S.Military

    andCIAInterventionssinceWorldWarII.Monroe,Me.:CommonCourage,1995.6472.Print.ThisbookisverycriticaloftheCIAandgaveafactualaccountofwhathappenedduringandafterthecoup,juxtaposedagainstwhatKermitRooseveltandotherCIAinsiderssaidhappened.ItshowshowunpreparedanduninformedtheCIAleadershipwasinexamplessuchasquotesabouttheTudehthreatthatneveractuallygivespecific

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix19

    examples.ItalsoshowshowunpreparedKermitRoosevelt,thedefactoleaderintheMiddleEast,was.Forexample,hehiredthetwokeyIranianagentsthedaybeforethecoup.

    Byrne,Malcolm."MalcolmByrneInterview."Telephoneinterview.7Jan.2015.Malcolm

    Byrne,deputydirectoroftheNationalSecurityArchive,wasfortunatelywillingtotalktousoverthephoneandanswerafewofourquestions.AlargenumberofourprimarysourcescamefromhiswebsiteatGeorgeWashingtonUniversitythatheandtheNationalSecurityArchiveobtainedfromtheCIAthroughtheFreedomofInformationAct.HewashelpfulingivingusmoreinformationabouttheCIA,specificallythebureaucracythatpreventedlowerlevelspecialistsfromvoicingtheirconcernsregardingtheoperation.Unfortunately,weweren'tabletospeakwithhimaslongaswehadhopedto,andwedidnotgetmuchinformationabouttheDullesbrothersfromhim,butoverallhisinterviewwasstillveryhelpfulinassistingourresearch.

    Byrne,Malcom."IraniansDebatethe1953Coup."JSTOR.MERP,2000.Web.28Sept.2014.In

    therecordingofatelevisionprogrambetweenIranianmen,thecoupisdiscussedinadifferentlight,explaininghowitaffectedtheirlivesindividually,givinganinsightintoaregularman'slife.ThemenmainlyfocusonhowthefailureoftheUStoputabetterleaderinplace,thenewgovernmentbegantofail,andtheUS'sincessantneedtoeradicatecommunismmayhaveinfluencedIranfortheworse.

    Byrne,Malcolm."Iran1953:TheRoleofMI6,BritishPetroleumandKermitRoosevelt's

    Countercoup."TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity).GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,13May2014.Web.05Oct.2014.Byrne,DirectorofresearchattheNationalSecurityArchivesponsoredbyGeorgetownUniversity,andauthorofseveralbookschroniclingtheMiddleEast,providesalookatthecensorshipoftheIraniancoup.HediscussesitbylookingatseveralkeychangesmadetoKermitRoosevelt'sbook"Countercoup,"withaspecificfocusontheirkeepingtheAngloIranianOilCompanyfrombeingmentioned.ThesourceprovidesalookintotheBritishleadershipofthecoup,becauseallmentionsoftheAIOCwerechangedto"britishintelligence."ThereforethisshowsthattheBritishintelligenceagencywasessentiallyoverpoweredbyanoilcompany.Thesourcewaspublishedfairlyrecently,withthehelpofseveralrecentlydeclassifieddocuments.

    Caistor,Nick.Forward.NuncaMs.ComisinNacinalsobrelaDesaparicindePersonas.

    London,ButlerandTannerLtd.Frome,1986.Thissecondarysourcewasaforwardtoabook,writtenbyNickCaistor,apublishedhistoricalauthorveryknowledgeableabouttheDirtyWarthattookplaceinArgentina.Intheforwardhegoesintodepthaboutthe

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix20

    repercussionsoftheDirtyWarandlosdesaparecidosandwhatitmeansforthemodernworld.ThisishelpfulforthelegacyargumentbecauseithelpsputtheIranianCoupintocontextwithotherCIAcovertlybackedcoups.Additionally,theauthorprovideseasilyquotablestatements,compatiblewithatimelineinthelegacyargument.

    Cohen,Roger."TheNewYorkTimesUpfront|TheNewsMagazineforHighSchool."TheNew

    YorkTimesUpfront.Scholastic&TheNewYorkTimes,n.d.Web.27Sept.2014.RogerCohen'swellwrittenandauthoritativearticlemorethanadequatelydescribesthelegacyofthe1953Iraniancoup,indescribingtheleadup,theeventsof,andwhathappenedimmediatelyaftertheIranianRevolutionandHostageCrisisattheendofthe1970's.Cohenisawellestablishedjournalistwhohasworkedasaforeigncorrespondentinfifteencountriesincludingplacesinthemiddleeast,whichensureshehasthenecessarybackgroundtomakethisarticlecredible.Ittiesinwelltoourtopic,becauseweneedevidenceonhowthelackofstrongleadershipinthe1953coupleadtoabadlegacy.

    Connor,JohnT.,RonaldReagan,andNelsonA.Rockefeller.ReporttothePresidentbythe

    CommissiononCIAActivitieswithintheUnitedStates.WashintonDC:USGovernmentPrintingOffice,1975.Print.ThisprimarydocumentisareporttoGeraldFordontheactionsoftheCIA,andtimeswhenitdidthingsoutsideofit'sauthority.ItshowsthatCIAandFBIleadershipattimesworkedagainsteachotherattheexpenseofnationalsecurity,howevertheCIAhashadgoodtieswithstateandlocalpolicedespitethattheCIAisonlysupposedtodealwithforeignaffairs.ThisdocumentalsoshowshowthelegacyoftheCIAwasshapedbythelawssayingwhatitcouldandcouldnotdo.

    Cottam,RichardW."AmericanPolicyandtheIranianCrisis."IranianStudies13.14(1980):

    279305.Web.4Oct.2014.ThisjournalbyRichardCottamplacesaheavyhandonhowtheinternalconflictsinIranmadeitweakandthereforesusceptibletoothercountriessuchastheUStryingtoextortitsresources.Theseinternalconflictshestatedwerehowtheseparationbetweenthereligiousgovernmentandtheseculargovernmentwasn'tclear.ThisuncertaintyinthegovernmentmadeitcleartotheUSthatsomethinghadtobedoneaboutthelackofleadership,thereforetheUSdecidedtoreplacethecurrentleaderwithaprechosenone.ThishelpedIran'sgovernmentforawhile,anditalsoplayedtowardstheUS'sinterests.

    Cottam,RichardW."TheUnitedStates,IranandtheColdWar."IranianStudies3.1(1970):

    222.JSTOR.Web.20Sept.2014.ProfessorandIranistRichardCottamoftheUniversityofPittsburghoverviewsAmericanforeignpolicyinIranduringtheColdWar.Inparticular,hestatesthatwhilesomehistoriansbelieveoilinterestsprovidedtheprimarymotiveforUSactions,thereislittleevidenceofsuchinstead,Americanperceptionsofacommunist

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix21

    threatcoloredAmericanforeignpolicy.Essentially,CottamcreatesanoverviewoftheeventsandmotivesofAmericanactionsinIranduringtheColdWar,andcontextualizesthecoupinabroaderperiodofIranianhistory.

    deBellaigue,Christopher."Coupdunnit:whatreallyhappenedinIran?"ForeignAffairs

    Sept.Oct.2014.GlobalIssuesinContext.Web.11Sept.2014.ThissourcewasveryusefulindetermininghowModerndayIranhasbeenaffectedbypastevents.Thissourcedoesagreatjobofexplainingthepasteventsthathelpedgeneratetheturmoilthatexiststoday.Thisarticlegoesontoexplainhowthecoupwasacrucialpartofthecurrentevents,andhowtheremovalofthefirstdemocraticallyelectedprimeministerleaderwassoonoustedandreplacedbyalongstringofleaderswhoweren'tnecessarilybad,butleaderswhodidnotimproveuponthepegsofIran,butsimplystayedwithinthetraditionalideasofthinking,anddidnotbringnew.Thisarticlealsoexplainedhowthecoupandthehostagecrisisledtoantiussentimentsthatcarrythroughtoday.

    DeLuce,Dan."TheSpectreofOperationAjax."TheGuardian.N.p.,20Aug.2003.Web.3Oct.

    2014.Inthiscontextsource,authorDanDeLuceprovidesasummaryoftheeventsofthe1953IranianCoup.WhilethearticledidhelpbyprovidingageneralunderstandingofwhatitwaslikeinIranin1953,andtheAmericanandBritishinvolvement,itisprimarilyinterestingbecauseitsuggeststhatAmericanactionsinIranledtoIslamichostilitytowardtheUnitedStates.DeLucesaysthatAmericaninvolvementinMossadegh'soverthrowhelped"unleashawaveofIslamicextremismandassistedtopowertheantiAmericanclericalleadershipthatstillrulesIran."ThisprovidesadefinitivelegacyofAmerica'sinvolvementinthecoupaftertwodecadesunderthedictatorialShah,theIranianpeople'sresentmentturnedtowardAmerica.BasedonwhatotherarticleswehavereadhavesaidabouttheorganizationandleadershipoftheCIA,itisclearthatpoorleadershipontheAmericansideledtothislegacyinIran.TheGuardianisareputablepublication,sothissourceismostlikelytrustworthy.

    Divine,RobertA."EisenhowerandtheMiddleEast."EisenhowerandtheColdWar.NewYork:

    OxfordUP,1981.N.pag.Print.ThischaptergavesomehistoricalcontextforwhatwasgoingonwiththerestoftheColdWarconflictaroundthetimeoftheCoup.Foronething,WashingtondidnotknowwhattomakeofthenewsthatStalinhaddied,theyhadlittletonoinsideinformationandtheydidnotknowhowhisdeathwouldeffecttheSovietUnion.AfewmonthsbeforetheCoupEisenhowergavehis"AtomsforPeace"speechwhichshowedthathewantedtoleadtheUnitedStatesintoaneweraofpeacewiththeRussians.Hiswordsarecontradictorytotherealityofwhatwouldhappeninafewmonthstime.Thisbookshowedthatdespitegoodwilledleaders,resolvingtheColdWarconflictwouldtakealotmore.

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    Doenecke,JustusD."Revisionists,OilandColdWarDiplomacy."IranianStudies3.1(1970):

    2333.JSTOR.Web.21Sept.2014.JustusD.Doenecke,ProfessorofHistoryatNewCollegeofFlorida,explainstherevisionistviewpointofAmericanpolicyinIranduringtheColdWar.Adesirefornaturalresources,namelyoil,drovetheAmericanforcesintheregion,eventuallyleadingtothecoupin1953.Ingeneral,thejournalplacesthecoupinalargercontextofAmericanpolicyinIranduringthetime,helpingtoillustratetherolethecoupplayedduringtheColdWarinIran.

    Dujmovic,Nicholas."IntelligenceinPublicLiterature."CentralIntelligenceAgency.Central

    IntelligenceAgency,05Feb.2013.Web.05Oct.2014.InreviewingSarahJaneCorke'sbook,NicholasDujmovic(amemberofCIAsHistoryStaffattheCenterfortheStudyofIntelligence),highlightedpartsofCorke'sargumentsuchasthelackofCIAleadershiporefficiencyinthebeginningwaspartlyduetotheTrumanadministrationnothavingacomprehensiveplanforfightingcommunism.Whenlefttoitsowndevices,theCIAtendedtofollowtheDonovanmodelofcowboydiplomacy,however,DujmovicmakesthepointthefactisthattherewassignificantpolicyinputfrombothStateandthePentagonforCIAoperationsintheFarEastintheearly1950s,mostofwhich...wereunsuccessful.AllthissuggeststhatCIAsharestheblameforthesefailureswithotherpartsofthegovernmentandthatbettercoordinationdoesntnecessarilyleadtobetterormoresuccessfulcovertaction.

    Frazer,Simin."SiminFrazer."Telephoneinterview.6Jan.2015.SiminFrazergrewupina

    wealthyfamilyinIraninthe1960s,butsheisnowanAmericancitizen.Sheansweredourquestionsregardingwhatitwaslikeforanaveragecitizenfollowingthecoup.HerfamilydidwellundertheShah,butshehassincecometorealizationsabouthisregime.Oneinterestingthingshesaidwasthatsheneverlearnedaboutthe1953coupinschool,theShahasaleaderwasafactoflife.Overall,shewasabletoenlightenusinregardtothechaoticbutdiscordantcivilianexperiencefollowingthecoup.

    Engdahl,William.ACenturyofWar:AngloAmericanOilPoliticsandtheNewWorldOrder.

    London:Pluto,2004.Print.Thissourceisabookthatgoesindepthexplainingabouthowpoliticsandoilhavebeeninterconnectedforthepastcentury.Thissourcealsoexplainedhowsomepoliticalleaderstookthisopportunityofthecouptotakeadvantageofthepubliceye,sopeoplesuchasZbigniewBrzezinskitookcreditforhelpingoutthesituationinIran.Althoughhetookcredit,itwasmostlytheUSandbritishgovernments,notonesinglepersonthathelpedliftoutthecorruptshah.

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    Gasiorowski,Mark."MarkGasiorowskiInterview."Telephoneinterview.6Jan.2015.MarkGasiorowskiisoneoftheleadingexpertsregardingthe1953coup.Inthe1980sheinterviewedmanypeople,whohavesincedied,whoweredirectlyinvolvedinthecoup.HealsotaughtinTehran.HecomplicatedourthinkinginmanyaspectsofourprojectandaddednuancessuchasthedifferencesbetweenEisenhowerasarepublicanleaderandTrumanasademocratleader.HealsoaddedtopreviousknowledgewhichwehadgainedfromStephenKinzeraboutthetruelegacyofthe1953coup.Inhiswords,itwassimplyafactorthatwasseperatedby25years,notadirectcauseandeffectrelationship.Thiswasaveryhelpfulinterview.

    Gasiorowski,MarkJ."The1953CoupD'EtatinIran."InternationalJournalofMiddleEast

    Studies19.03(1987):26186.JSTOR.Web.1Oct.2014.Gasiorowski,politicalscientistatTulaneUniversity,givesanoverviewofthepoliticalandoperationaldecisionsbehindthecoup.Asheexplainsit,conflictingpointsofviewbetweentheTrumanandEisenhoweradministrations,aswellaswithineachentity,ledtoseriousbureaucraticfailureintheAmericandecisionmakingprocess.Theleaders,includingEisenhower,A.Dulles,andothers,supportedthecoup,butlowerlevelspecialistsrecognizedthepotentialconsequencesofsuchanundertaking.Notonlyweretheleadersunabletowinthesupportoftheirsubordinates,theythemselveswerenoncommittalforalongtime,andwhentheydidmakethefinaldecisionstheyeitherlackedaccurateinformationonIran'spoliticalsituationorchosetoignorethefacts.

    Gasiorowski,MarkJ.,andMalcolmByrne.MohammadMosaddeqandthe1953CoupinIran.

    Syracuse:SyracuseUP,2004.Print.Thisbookisoneofthedefinitiveresourcesonthecoup.Itcoversalmosteverydetail.Thetwoauthors,GasiorowskiandByrne,aretwoofthepreeminentexpertsonthecoupinIran.OneoftheaspectsofthisbookthatmadeitsospecialwasthatithadmuchmoredetailabouttheDullesbrothersthanotheraccountsofthecoup.Whileinotherbooksandarticles,onlyvaguementionsoftheCIAandtheStateDepartmentareincluded,inthisbooktheDullesbrothersareexplicitlytiedtotheiractionsandthelegacyofthoseactions.Thisbookwasinstrumentalforusinformulatingourviewsontheleadershipofthebrothers.

    Gasiorowski,MarkJ."TheCIALooksBackonthe1953CoupinIran."MiddleEastReport216

    (2000):45.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.Thisarticlewaswrittenwithnearly50yearsofhindsightontheeventsoftheIranianCoup,butitwasalsowrittenayearbefore9/11.Fromthisperspective,itexploreshowtheCIAhaschanged,orfailedtochangesinceitsfirstcovertoverthrowofaforeignregime.ThelegacyoftheCIAsinitialactionin1953canstillbefeltinCIAsoperationstodayanditscontinuedinvolvementintheMiddle

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    East.However,afterthe1970s,theCIAbecamemarkedlysmallersothelegacyofthecoupwassomewhatdiminishedatthattime.

    Gates,RobertM."Intelligence,Democracy,andFreedom."PresidentialStudiesQuarterly22.2

    (1992):23137.JSTOR.Web.21Sept.2014..ThisessayisbasedonRobertM.Gates'addressinMarch1992atthe23rdAnnualStudentSymposium,CenterfortheStudyofPresidency.Gates,formerdirectoroftheCIAandSecretaryofDefense,referstoWilliamDonovanas"thefounderofmodernAmericanintelligence."HedescribesDonovan'sleadershipandsignificanceincreatingtheCIA,andthelegacyoftheorganization.Giventhattheessayispublishedinareputablejournal,andthatthespeakeroftheaddressofwhichtheessayisderivedisextremelyauthoritative,thisisaverytrustworthysource.

    Gavin,FrancisJ."Politics,Power,andU.S.PolicyinIran,19501953."(n.d.):n.pag.Harvard.

    Web.21Sept.2014.FrancisJ.GavinmanagestomakeIranianpoliticsofthe1950'ssoundinteresting,evenwhiletalkingaboutyawninducingtopicssuchasreligioustiestowardseconomicpolicy.ThisacademicwritingwasbeneficialtoresearchingthecoupbecauseitwasimportanttohaveastrongbackgroundknowledgeofIranianpolitics.Additionally,GavinisanextremelywellestablishedexpertonAmericanforeignpolicy.

    Ghosh,Palash."Iran:TheLongLastingLegacyofthe1953U.S./CIACoup."International

    BusinessTimes.InternationalBusinessTimes,20Mar.2012.Web.21Sept.2014..Inandinterviewwithacollegeprofessor,thissourcestressestofindthelegacyofthecoup,andallthesentimentstowardstheevent.ThisarticlealsodoesagoodjobofgoingintodetailaboutcountryrelationsandhowpreviousleadersanddifferentcountriesimpactedIran'shistory.FromthissourceIlearnedmuchmoreaboutrelations,suchastheU.Ssufferedmuchblowbackfromthecoup,becausethenewleaderdidhelpconsolidatepower,butpublicopinionofhimwasn'thigh,makingitseemasifhewasapuppet.ThissparkedthebeginningofIraniandistaintowardstheU.S.

    Grim,Ryan."BP'sLongHistoryOfDestroyingTheWorld."TheHuffingtonPost.

    TheHuffingtonPost.com,08June2010.Web.21Sept.2014..Inthisshortarticle,theauthorobviouslyhasabiastowardstheOilCompanyforcausingmanyoftheproblemsintheMiddleEast.Thissourcewasn'tonehundredpercentreliable,butitdidprovideanothersideofthearguementstatingthatbadleadershipwasn'tthereasonforthecoup,butratheritwasforthecontrolofoil.Thisarticlesaysthemainand

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    onlyreasonforthecoupwasforoil,focusingontheeconomicviewofthecoupratherthanpolitical.Althoughthisarticleisratheronesided,theauthordoesprovideveryindepthreasoningintowhyhefeelsthewayhedoes.Overallthisarticleiswellwrittenanddoesprovidedecentinformation.

    Hader,Leon."OurManinIran:HowtheCIAandMI6InstalledtheShah."OurManinIran:

    HowtheCIAandMI6InstalledtheShah.N.p.,16Feb.2013.Web.05Oct.2014.Hader,globalaffairsjournalistintheMiddleEastandcriticofAmericanpolicyintheMiddleEast,paintsaverynegativepictureoftheAmericanIntelligenceinchargeoftheIranianCoup.HeputsMuhammadMossadeqinanewlight,describinghowhisgoalwasnottoalignwiththeSoviets,butrathertoavoidtheColdWarconflictalltogether,andthatthenationalizationoftheAIOCwastoprotecteconomicinterests,nottospitetheBritish.Thissourcerevealsleadershipinanewway,showinghowthefirstworldcountriesactedoutoffear,ratherthanlogicallyseeingthesituation.ItwaswrittenbeforethedeclassificationofallIranianCoupdocuments,butthatchangeslittleasthetruthwasalreadypublished.

    Hardy,ThomasS."IntelligenceReformintheMid1970s."CentralIntelligenceAgency.Central

    IntelligenceAgency,04Aug.2011.Web.21Oct.2014.ThisarticletoldusalotabouttheleadershipwithintheCIAbycomparingthetheleadershipofAllenDullesinafledglingbranchofgovernment,tothesomewhathumiliatedleadersoftheCIAinthe1970swhowerelookingtoopenanewchapteronUnitedStatesintelligencegathering.Onethingtheychangedinthesereformmeetingsofthe1970swastheypassedlawsmakingtheCIAmoreaccountabletotheSenate.ThisshowedbycomparisonhowunaccoutabletheCIAhadpreviouslybeen.

    Heaps,JenniferD.TrackingIntelligenceInformation:TheOfficeofStrategicServices61.2

    (1998):287308.JSTOR.Web.21Sept.2014..ThissourceprovidesinformationabouttheOSS,theprecursortotheCIA.ItdelvesintodetailabouthowtheOSSgatheredinformationandhowitfunctioned.AstheCIAeventuallywouldtakeoverthefunctionsoftheOSS,thearticleshedsvaluablelightontheoriginsoftheCIAanditsinformationgatheringtactics.Thissourceisfromareputablejournalandistrustworthy.

    Heiss,MaryAnn."TheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,andtheCreationoftheIranianOil

    Consortium,19531954."Taylor&Francis.TheInternationalHistoryReview,1994.Web.28Sept.2014..ThissourcewaswrittenbyahistoricaljournalthatmadeamemoofameetinginIranin1954.Thisdocumentfocusedonhowtheeventssurroundingthecoupchangedthe

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    worldmorethanthecoupitself,explaininghowoilisoneofthebiggestfactorsthatdecidedtheUS'sdecisiontointervine,butalsointheprocessofobtainingoil,alsostoppedthespreadofcommunism.Thisdocumentalsopaystributetotheoilnegotiationsin1954thatHerbertHooverJr.hadcalled'perhapsthelargestcommercialdealeverputtogether.'

    Hilsman,Roger."DoestheCIAStillHaveaRole?"ForeignAffairs74.5(1995):10416.

    JSTOR.Web.21Sept.2014..ThissourcediscussesthechangingroleoftheCIA,andisthereforeparticularlyrelevanttotheorganization'slegacy.ThearticlediscussestherelevanceoftheCIA'sprimaryfunctions,likecovertpoliticalactions,codebreaking,espionage,oresotericfunctions.Theauthorarguesthat,whileonceusefulduringperiodssuchastheColdWar,theCIAsprimaryfunctionsarenolongercosteffectiveornecessary.TheauthorquestionsthepurposeoftheCIAsexistenceasawhole,andthereforeitslegacyasanorganization.Thearticlewasfoundinareputablejournal,andwhiletheauthorspersonalviewsmustbetakenintoaccount,theinformationisauthoritativeandtrustworthy.

    Historian,ClaytonLaurieCia."ANewPresident,aBetterCIA,andanOldWar:Eisenhower

    andIntelligenceReportingonKorea,1953."TheEvolutionofCIAunderEisenhower54.4(2010):n.pag.Web.ThisarticlewasveryhelpfulinexplainingEisenhowersroleinthegrowthoftheCIAintoatruecowboyorganization.AnimportantdistinctionwasmadebetweentheRepublicanleadersunderEisenhowerandthemoreliberalleadersunderTruman.Thissourceilluminatedourknowledgeoftheleadershipbehindthegovernmentatthetimeofthecoup.

    "HistoryofIran:AShortAccountof1953Coup."HistoryofIran:AShortAccountof1953

    Coup.N.p.,n.d.Web.11Sept.2014.Thisbroadcontextsourceprovidedussomebasistoourargument.Itprovidednamesofleadersandablowbyblowoftheeventitself.TheactualonthegroundoperationwasledbyKermitRoosevelt,anditwastoputitlightly,afiasco.Initialattemptsatthecoupfailedanditseemedlikeallwaslost,untilariotincitedbytheCIAanditspropagandaanditsthugsbroughtdownMossadeq.Ifthispoorleadershipandconfusionisanyindicationofthelargerorganization,theCIAshouldprovetobequiteamess.

    "HistoryoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency."Fas.org.FederationofAmericanScientists,n.d.

    Web.04Oct.2014.ThisarticlefromtheFederationofAmericanScientiststalksabouttheoriginsoftheCIA.WhilethevalueofcentralizedintelligencewasmadeclearafterWorldWarII,theinceptionoftheCIAwasatroubledandcontroversialprocess.WilliamDonovan,whoiscreditedasthecreatoroftheCIA,wantedanorganizationthatwould

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    "correlatetheintelligencematerialcollectedbyallgovernmentagencies."Hisplanwasopposedbymanydifferentgovernmentdepartments.Itisclearthatatthattime,manyAmericansdidnotsupportthecreationoftheCIA,butinthewakeofWorldWarII,itwasdeemedanecessaryevil.Aninterestingthingmentionedinthearticleishow,astimepassed,theCIAgrewlargerinsizeandinfluence,yetitsactionsbecameincreasinglysecretive.ThisisrelevanttothecoupinIran,aboutwhichtheCIAwasextremelysecretive.Basedonthearticle'sdescriptionoftheorganization'sstructureanditssecrecy,thenegativelegacyleftinIranbytheCIAcouldverywellbeaproductofpoorleadership.Thesecrecyoftheorganizationlikelyprovidedasortofveilthatgaveitsleadersasafetynettomakepoordecisionsintheeventthattheyfailed,nobodywouldknowwhotoblame.

    "HistoryoftheCIA."CentralIntelligenceAgency.CentralIntelligenceAgency,18Feb.2014.

    Web.11Sept.2014.ThissourcewasveryhelpfulindetermininghowtheCIAwasbroughtup,andwhythataffectedtheeventssurroundingit.ThissourcewentintothehistoryofhoworiginallytheCIAwastheOSS,whichwasbornoutoftheaftermathofWorldWarII.ThissourcealsotalkedabouttheleadersoftheCIA,andhoweachleaderandtheirdifferentideologyaffectedtheoverallleadershipoftheCIA.ThehistoryofeverythingtheCIAwasinvolvedwithwasnotdiscussedhowever,manyofthecovertoperationsandfailuresthatwelearnedaboutwerenotdiscussedastomaketheCIAlookgood.

    Holsti,Ole."The"OperationalCode"ApproachtotheStudyofPoliticalLeaders:JohnFoster

    Dulles'PhilosophicalandInstrumentalBeliefs."CanadianJournalofPoliticalScience/RevueCanadienneDeSciencePolitique3.1(1970):12357.JSTOR.Web.04Oct.2014.OleHolsti,professorofpoliticalscienceatDukeUniversity,providesanintensive,extensive,andhighlysystematicanalysisofJ.Dulles'sbeliefsasapoliticalleader.Inshort,hehadverystrongbeliefsinthepowerofmorality,waspessimisticintheshorttermbutoptimisticlongrun,andbelievedthatinflexibilityinpoliticalgoalswasextremelyimportanttodefendcredibilityandpreserveperceivedstrength.Additionally,HolstistatesJ.Dulles'sbeliefthataleader'sspiritualqualitiesdirectlyaffectforeignpolicy,implyingthatJ.Dullessoughttohaveastronginfluenceoninternationalaffairs,includingthecoup.

    Holsti,OleR."WilltheRealDullesPleaseStandUp."InternationalJournal30.1,Diplomatic

    Method(1974):3444.JSTOR.Web.28Sept.2014.OleHolsti,ProfessorEmeritusofPoliticalScienceatDukeUniversity,createsanimageofJ.Dullesasanidealisticandrigidleaderwhoseambitionblindedhimtotheconsequencesofmanyofhisactions.Bychoosingtoignoreorsuppressmanyoftheopinionsofhissubordinates,J.Dullesranaverydictatorialsystem,wherehemademanydecisionswithoutoutsideinput.Thisperhaps

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    causedJ.Dullestomakemanyimprudentchoices,resultinginmanynegativelongtermconsequencessuchasthelegacyofthecoup.

    Immerman,RichardH."EisenhowerandDulles:WhoMadetheDecisions?"Political

    Psychology1.2(1979):2138.JSTOR.Web.28Sept.2014.IndescribingtherelationshipbetweenJ.DullesandEisenhower,Immerman,aprofessoratTempleUniversity,bringsuptwodifferentviewsoftheirleadershipdynamic,especiallyregardingtheColdWar.ThefirstandmorecommonlyacceptedisthatJ.Dulles'sforcefulstyledominatedEisenhower'smorepassiveleadership,butthesecondclaimsthatEisenhowerhadmorecontrolthanpreviouslythought.BothperspectiveshelpunderstandthehowthebureaucraticmachinethatistheAmericangovernmentfunctionedduringtheIraniancoup.

    Immerman,RichardH.JohnFosterDullesandtheDiplomacyoftheColdWar.Princeton,NJ:

    PrincetonUP,1990.Print.ProfessorImmermanofTempleUniversitydescribesJ.Dullesasamuchmorecalculatingleaderthanotheranalystshavedescribed,althoughheconcedesthathewasnotnecessarilyanymorefarsightedthanpreviouslythought.ImmermancreatesanargumentfortheabilityofJ.Dullesasadiplomatwhowasabletousehisleadershipskillstoeffectivelyguideandforcewhathewantedoutofothers.

    Johnson,LochK."CovertActionandAccountability:DecisionMakingforAmerica'sSecret

    ForeignPolicy."InternationalStudiesQuarterly33.1(1989):81109.JSTOR.Web.12Oct.2014.Johnson,aprofessorofpoliticalscienceattheUniversityofGeorgia,providesahistoryofthedecisionmakingprocessforcovertactionintheUSgovernment.Byhisdescription,thevastmajorityofthemoderndayprocess,includingalmostalloftheofficialcontrolsandexaminations,wereonlyimplementedaftertheNixonadministration.Before,theleadersoftheCIAhadfreereign,andwentlargelyuncheckedintheactionsabroad,creatingthepotentialfordangerousorevendisastrouscovertoperationstotranspire,suchasthe1953Iraniancoup.

    Kangas,Steve."TimelineofCIAAtrocities."Serendipity(2002):n.pag.MicrosoftAcademic

    Search.Web.28Sept.2014.Inthisarticle,writtenbyaformermilitaryintelligenceworker,thehistoryoftheCIAischronicledtosupporttheauthorsargumentthattheCIAshouldbedismantledbecauseofitspatternoforchestratingmilitarycoupswithlegaciesofhumanrightsabusesandthencensoringmediaabouttheCIA'sinvolvementinfailedcoups.Itmakesthepointthatfromitsinception,theCIAlackedmoralleadershipbecausetheCIAleadershiponlyansweredtothePresidentaccordingtotheNationalSecurityActof1947.

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    Karasipahi,Sena."ComparingIslamicResurgenceMovementsinTurkeyandIran."TheMiddleEastJournal63.1(2009):87107.JSTOR.Web.5Oct.2014.WheninitiallychoosingourtopicweknewthattheoppressiveregimeoftheShahhadledtoreligiousinstitutionsbeingtheonlyplacewherecitizenscouldexpressdissentandthisiswhytheAyatollahKhomeiniwasabletooverthrowtheShah.Thisarticle,however,explainshowmuchmorecomplexthereasonsfortheIslamicRevivalinIranwere.Theauthor,aprofessoratTexasA&MUniversity,sites"denunciationofsubserviencetotheUS,"asonlyonereason.Othersincludetheinfluenceofreformistintellectualsduringthe1970s,thetraditionsofShi'aIslam,andIslamasanideologytotakerefugeintoconfrontWesternizationanditschallenges.

    Kinzer,Stephen.AlltheShah'sMen:AnAmericanCoupandtheRootsofMiddleEastTerror.

    Hoboken,NJ:J.Wiley&Sons,2003.Print.AlltheShah'sMenisafantasticbookandsource.Itheldsomuchinformationdirectlyrelatedtoourtopic.ItclearlyoutlinestheleadershipofAllenDullesandotherssuchasresistancefighterswhomadethiscouppossible.Possiblythebestpartofthisbookisthattheauthorisnotonlyanauthorbutalsosomewhatofaninvestigativejournalist.Amajorityofhisinformationarethingssuchasinterviews,publicsources,anddeclassifiedinformation.Thisbookcoverssomuchinformationrangingtothelivesofthoseinvolvedinthecoup,tothingssuchasthefactMohammadMossadeqoftenworepajamasduringaffairsofstatewithofficials.Kinzeralsoprovidesspeculationfortherelevancetoday,withanargumentbackingitup.

    Kinzer,Stephen."BPandIran:TheForgottenHistory."CBSNews.CBSInteractive,2010.Web.

    05Oct.2014.InthisnewsarticlewrittenbytheStephenKinzer,theblameforissueswithinIran'sgovernmentarerestedontheshouldersofBP(BritishPetroleum).KinzerstatedBPwasoverzealousandwishedtoprofitheavilyfromIran,andtakeit'sresources.ThisleadMossadeqtotakeonanationalisticvalue,andtakebackIran'soiltomaximizetheircountriesprofit.Britaindidnotwanttheoiltofallintothehandsofthecommunists,soOperationAjaxwasputintoplace.Kinzerexplainshowthelackofauthorityandcooperationinoperationajaxledtotheendofdemocracyiniran,eventuallyleadingtonewleaderswithanantiwesternattitude.

    Kinzer,Stephen.TheBrothers:JohnFosterDulles,AllenDulles,andTheirSecretWorldWar.

    N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.Thisbookiswhereweinitiallycameupwithourideaforhistoryfair.Asthetitlewouldsuggest,itdealsmainlywiththeleadershipoftheDullesbrothers.Itbeginswithathorough,albatedramatized,depictionoftheiryouthandschoolingandthusdescribeshowtheygrewuptobethementheybecame.TherestofthebookissplitupintothesixmaincountrieswheretheycarriedouttheirsecretwartogetridofleadersthatwentagainsttheirAmericanvalues.Themostvaluableknowledgeabouttheirleadership

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    whichItookawayfromthisbookisthat,asthemosthighconcentrationofpowerbetweenrelativesintheUSinhistory,theiropinionsandpolicieswereessentiallyanechochamberofeachother.Theirleadershipwascloseminded,andthisledtodisastrousresults.

    Kinzer,Stephen."TheBrothers."PoliticsandProse,Washington,D.C.03Oct.2013.Lecture.In

    alectureforPoliticsandProse,acclaimedjournalistandacademicStephenKinzerexplainssomeoftheDullesbrothers'reasonsforinitiatingthecoupinIran.First,beingraisedextremelyreligiously,theybelievedinthestarkcontrastbetween"good"and"evil,"andthatasChristianstheyhadtoactivelycombatimmoralityaroundtheglobe.Additionally,aslawyersatSullivan&Cromwell,theDulles'soriginaljobsweretoprotectAmericanbusinessinterestsfromgovernmentsaroundtheworld,andtheirfirstshockingdefeatcamewhenIrannationalizeditsoilindustry,causingtheDulles'stohaveahugegrudgeoncetheyarrivedinofficein1953.Asbrotherswithalmostidenticalworldviews,theydidnotconsultorseekapprovalfromothers,andinsteadwereconvincedfromthestartoftheirdecisions.Finally,Eisenhower'sopinionsregardingdefensethatcovertoperationsweresuperblyeffectiveonlyencouragedthemtocontinuewiththeirplanstooverthrowMossadeq,despitetheiradmittedlackofinformation.

    Kinzer,Stephen."FTMWeeklyInterview:StephenKinzeronOperationAjaxandtheBlowback

    fromIranSince1953."InterviewbyJerryRobinson.FTMDaily.FTMDaily,11Feb.2012.Web.12Oct.2014..WehaveusedmanysourcesfromStephenKinzer,asheappearstobethepreeminentexpertonthe1953CoupinIranandOperationAJAX.ThisisanextremelyusefulinterviewbecauseKinzer'sargumentisthattheCIAandtheUnitedStates'involvementinthecoupdirectlyledtoitscurrentconditions.KinzerstatesthatinIran,thecommonsentimentpeoplegivehimis,"Weusedtohaveademocracyhere.ButyouAmericanscameoverhereanddestroyedit.Andeversincethen,wevebeenspiralingdown."KinzeralsostatesthatCIAinterventioninIranledtoa"cliqueoffanaticallyantiAmericanmullahswhoareinpowernow."KinzerformsadirectconnectionbetweenCIAactionsinIranandthelegacyoftheriseofextremistIslam.NotonlydoesKinzerdiscussthelegacy,howeverhetiesitbacktoCIAactionsanditsleadership,orlackthereof.KinzersaysthatsendingtheCIAtoIransentIraninto"totalchaos,"andthatwhenyoulookbackattheevent,itisclearthat"theAmericanroleincrushingIraniandemocracyin1953...setIranandtheMiddleEastintoturmoilfromwhichithasneverrecovered."Duetoitsactionsduringthecoupthatresultedfromlackofleadership,AmericaanditsorganizationsliketheCIAareresponsibleforthenegativelegacy.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix31

    Kinzer,Stephen."HowTwoBrothersWagedA'SecretWorldWar'InThe1950s."InterviewbyArunRath.NPR.NPR,2013.Web.13Oct.2014.StephenKinzersuccinctlyandeloquentlydescribestheargumentinhisbookduringthisinterview.HetalksabouthowtheDullesbrotherswereinfluencedbytheirprotestantupbringingtonotsitbackandletbadthingshappen,buttointervene,andalsothattheworldisveryblackandwhiteandsplitupintogoodandevil.TheDullesbrothersleadershipinwagingasecretwarbeginningin1953showedtheinfluenceoftheirleadershipandalsorepresentedthecovertandovertpartsofAmericanForeignPolicy.Finally,KinzerdiscussedthelegacyofAmericansecretinterventionaroundtheworldandhowAmerican'sthesedaysaremoreawareofit.(Avery)

    Kinzer,Stephen."InsideIran'sFury."Smithsonian.SmithsonianMagazine,Oct.2008.Web.05

    Oct.2014.StephenKinzerhaswrittenmanybooksandarticlesabouttheUnitedStates'involvementinthecoupinIran,andgivenhishistoryasacorrespondentfortheNewYorkTimesandasanacademic,heisclearlyanexpertinthisfield.Inthisarticle,KinzertellsIran'ssideofthestory.Iranhashadalonghistoryofbeingdominatedbyforeignpowers,andtheCIA'sroleinthecoupaswellastheAmericanfundingoftheShahonlyexacerbatedtheintenseresentmenttheIranianpeoplebuiltup.ThecoupitselfwasapoorleadershipdecisionbytheCIA,onlyinitiatedduetoa"wilddistortion"aboutaCommunistthreatthattheBritishfedtotheCIA.Additionally,thedecision"wasallveryemotionalandveryquick.TherewasnorealattempttofindoutwhoMossadeghwasorwhatmotivatedhim."AsaresultofpoorAmericanleadership,antiUnitedStatessentimentcontinuedtobuildupinIran,resultinginthe1979hostagecrisisandthelegacyofanantiAmericansentimentthatpermeatestothisday.

    Kinzer,Steven."KinzerInterview."Telephoneinterview.6Dec.2014.Ourfirstinterviewwas

    illuminatingintheareaofleadershipbecauseKinzerwrotethebookwhichinitiallygaveustheideatostudytheDullesbrothersinthisproject.Healsofurtherexplainedthecoup'slegacyinIran.Specifically,hesaidthatadirectcauseandeffectlinecouldbedrawnbetweentheeventsof1953andtheeventualrevolutionin1979.Finally,hedirectedustowardsomeverygoodprimarysourcestospeakwith,includingMalcolmByrneandMarkGasiorowski'sworksonthecoup.

    Little,Douglas."Chapter2."AmericanOrientalism:TheUnitedStatesandtheMiddleEast

    since1945.ChapelHill:UofNorthCarolina,2002.4346.Print.InthisbookaboutIranianAmericanrelations,theauthoroutlinesthelegacyofthebureaucraticfailuresleadinguptothecoupin1953.TheauthorstatesthatthelackofsupportersofMossadeq'sregimewaspartialininfluencinghisdecisions.Overalltheauthorsaidthatthefailuretocometoasolidcompromiseovertheoilcausedmanyofthelonglastingproblemstoday.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix32

    TheauthoralsonotedhowthesituationscouldhavebeenavoidediftheUnitedStatesgreedhadnotcloudeditspoliticalagenda.

    Little,Douglas."19491958,Syria:EarlyExperimentsinCovertAction."PressforConversion!

    51(2003):1213.Web.WrittenbyDouglasBrown,aprofessoratBrownUniversity,thissecondarysourceprovidesinsightontotheSyriancoupwhichwasaidedbytheCIAfrom1949to1958.ItelaboratesontheDullesroleinthecoup,primarilyJohnFosterDulles's,butthesourcewasprimarilyusedforthelegacyargument,specificallyforreferencetothelegacyinAmericanforeignpolicy.IthelpsshowtherelationoftheIranianCouptoothercovertoperationscarriedoutbytheCIAduringtheColdWar,andprovidesquotablestatementswhichareextremelyusefulforthewebsite.

    Marsh,Steve."TheUnitedStates,IranandOperation'Ajax':InvertingInterpretative

    Orthodoxy."MiddleEasternStudies39.3(2003):138.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.ThisarticlediscussestheUnitedStatesinvolvementinthe1953IranianCoup.ItgoesintodetailabouttheobjectivesandmotivesoftheTrumanandEisenhoweradministrations.Thearticlearguesthatultimately,theUnitedStates'motivationtogetinvolvedinthecoupwastostopthespreadofcommunism.TheEisenhoweradministrationhadreachedapointwhereitsonlytwooptionsinIranwere"writingIranofftocommunismasanexpendableasset,"orOperationAJAX.ThearticleisrelevantbecauseitdiscussestheleadershipofthepeoplebehindtheAmericansideofthecoup.Thearticlewaspublishedinarespectedjournal,andislikelyreliable.

    MatinDaftari,Hedayat."HedayatMatinDaftari:Mossadeq'sLegacyToday."MERIPReports

    No.113.IranSincetheRevolution(1983):2425.JSTOR.Web.05Oct.2014..InaninterviewwiththegrandsonofMohammadMossadeq,thereasonforthecoupof1953inIranwereputintocontextexplainingtheworldhadbeenunderimmensepressureatthetime,andthattheweaknessoftheleadershipinRussiaafterthedeathofStalinhadcontributedtotheWestthenbeingallowedtotinkerinthebusinessofthemiddleeast.HeydeyatMatinDaftariarguesthatMossadeqonlyhandledthesituationspoorlyduetothelackofhisresources.

    McCurdy,Dave."GlasnostfortheCIA."ForeignAffairs73.1(1994):12540.JSTOR.Web.5

    Oct.2014.OnetheoryforwhytheCIAdidsomanymorallyquestionablethingsduringtheColdWaristhatitwasasecretiveagencythatonlyhadtoanswertoonebranchofgovernment.Inthe1970's,theUSgovernmenttriedtoaddressthisissuebycreatingtheHouseIntelligenceCommitteesotheCIAwouldhavetoanswertoCongressalso.Rep.DaveMcCurdyservedonthiscommitteefortenyearsandinhiswritingaboutwaysthe

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    CIAmustchangeaftertheColdWar,itpaintsapictureofhowtheCIAwasduringtheColdWar.ItwasaninstitutionwiththesinglegoalofbeatingtheSovietsanditwasaveryclosedinstitution.McCurdysaysthattheCIAneedstobringinmoreoutsideexpertsbecauseduringtheColdWar,theleaderswereveryclosedandinneedofacademicandbusinessexpertsasleaders.

    McMahon,RobertJ."EisenhowerandThirdWorldNationalists:ACritiqueoftheRevisionists."

    PoliticalScienceQuarterly,1989.Web.28Sept.2014.Inthisjournalarticle,theleadershipofEisenhowerwasgreatlycriticized,sayinghewasa"lazyloof".Thisarticleobviouslyhasabiasbysayinghedidn'tcontributetohelprelations,butitalsogoesasfartosayEisenhower,eventhoughhighlyregarded,wasactuallyworseningrelationsbetweentheUSandtheMiddleEast.Thisarticlewasadifferentpointofviewontheleadershiporlackofitthatwentintothecoupbeingsuccessful,butinthelongrun,worseningrelations.

    MERIP."ACelebrationofPower."MiddleEastResearchandInformationProject(n.d.):

    36+14.Web.28Sept.2014.ThissourceisamemoirwrittenbyaPeaceCorpsvolunteerinIranin1971,18yearsafterthecoupthatdroveMossadeqoutofpower.TheauthordescribesthedilapidatedandoppressivestateofthecountryinthemidstoftheShah'srule.ThearticledescribestheviolentoppressionoffreespeechbySAVAKagents,theconsolidationofpowertotheShah,andthepoorlivingconditions.ThisisparticularlyrelevantbecausethelandreformthatconsolidatedpowerintothehandsoftheShahwasduetopressurefromtheUnitedStates,andtheUnitedStatescontinuedtogivetheShahweaponsandaidafterthecoup.AstheCIAwastheprimaryUnitedStatesorganizationinvolvedwiththecoupinIran,thisarticleisparticularlyrelevanttotheCIAbecauseitshowsthelegacyofitsactions.ThelegacyinIranofwhatwasmostlikelyweakleadershipintheCIAisanoppressive,dilapidatedcountry.Whilenoindividualauthoriscredited,thearticlewaspublishedbytheMiddleEasternResearchandInformationProject,arespectedindependentresearchgroup,soitisareliablesource.

    Mintz,HelenC."IranMOSSADEQANDOILNATIONALIZATION."IranMOSSADEQ

    ANDOILNATIONALIZATION.LibraryofCongress,1987.Web.11Sept.2014.TheNationalizationofIranianoilwasahugepartofwhytheUSandBritishintervened,andwithinthisarticle,theimportanceoftheoilwasheavilydisplayed,andthecoupandmanyothereventswereblamedonthenationalizationofIransoil.Theoilwasnationalized,andsoonafter,thebritishandtheamericansbecameveryangry.TheyviewedmossadeqasacommunistandwantedtogettheirhandsonIransoil,theybelievedtheonlywaytheycouldachievethiswasbykickingoutMossadeqandbyputtinginsomeonewithideassimilartotheirs.

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    Moaddel,Mansoor."TheoriesofRevolution."Introduction.Class,Politics,andIdeologyintheIranianRevolution.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1993.123.GoogleBooks.Web.13Oct.2014.Moaddel,MiddleEasternstudiesprofessorattheUniversityofMichigan,providesanexcellentsourcethatlooksatthecausesofthe1979IranianRevolution,whichwastheultimateresultofthe1953Coup.Publishedin1993,itwasbeforetheCIAreleasedmostofitsresourcessurroundingtheCoup,butsufficientlylateenoughsothatenoughinformationwasavailabletoformanopinionontheCoup,andenoughtimehadelapsedaftertheRevolutiontoseemostofitseffects.Ithelpsassemblemorepiecestothelegacyofthelackofleadershipinthe1953Coup,byexploringitseffects.

    Mokhtari,Fariborz."Iran's1953CoupRevisited:InternalDynamicsversusExternalIntrigue."

    MiddleEastJournal62.3(2008):45788.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.ThisarticlediscussesthesituationinIranbefore,during,andafterthecoupin1953,aswellastheBritishandAmericanrole.AfterMossadeqcametopower,theUnitedStatesbegantofearthatIranwasfallingbehindthecommunistIronCurtain.SecretaryofStatesJohnFosterDullesaskedtheCIA,ledbyhisbrotherAllenDulles,toformulateacoupforMossadeq'sremovalfrompower.ThisarticleisparticularlyrelevantbecauseitdiscussestheAmericanandCIAleadershipbehindthecoup,aswellastheimmediateeffectsoftheleadership'sdecisionsinIran.Thiswaspublishedinarespectedandauthoritativejournal,andisthereforeatrustworthysource.

    Nalapat,M.D."WahhabismKhomeinismIsTheEnemyOfIslam."

    RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.RadioFreeEurope,13Mar.2009.Web.23Oct.2014.Nalapat,directorofaninternationalrelationsdepartmentatanIndianUniversityprovidesanindepthlookattheidealsofWahhabismandKhomeinism,thenamegiventotheIslamicideologythatemergedfromKhomeini'sriseto,andtimespentinpower.AlthoughthetwogroupsdonotlikeeachotherasoneisaformofSunniIslamwhiletheotherisShi'a,inrealitytheybothpracticeverysimilarthings.ThissecondarysourcewashelpfulinthatithelpedconnectsomeofthedistantlegacyeventsfromtheIranianCoup.Thisisbecauseitdiscussesidealsthatemergedfromoneofthecoupsbiggesteffects.

    Norourzi,Arash."Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953."

    Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953.TheMossadeghProject,n.d.Web.13Oct.2014.ThisisanarticlefromthepresidentoftheMossadeghProject,whichbyitsselfwasnotaveryhelpfularticle,butitincludedaonepageexcerptfromEisenhower'sdiarythreeweeksaftertheIranianCoup.InitheexpresseshisprideinandadmirationofKermitRoosevelt'sleadership.HementionsthatRooseveltdidanincrediblejobdespitebetrayalsatthebeginningofthecoup,whichcontradictsotherinformationwehavefoundthatshowsthattheissuesatthebeginningofthecoupweremostlyduetoCIA

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix35

    oversight.ThisshowsthatEisenhowerfullysupportedtheleadershipbehindthecoupandbelievedittobeasuccessthatwouldhaveapositivelegacywhichtheUnitedStateswouldbenefitfrom.

    Norouzi,Arash."Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953."

    Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953.TheMossadeghProject,8Oct.2013.Web.13Oct.2014.InthiswebsitededicatedtoexplainingthetruthaboutwhoMossadeghreallywas,theauthorputsaheavyblameonEisenhower,whoinadiaryentryboastsaboutthegreatoperationandanimpliedagent,(KermitRoosevelt)whowassuccessfulandquickwitted.TheauthorstatesEisenhowerandmanyotherU.S.officialsweregenerallycocky,andfeltasiftheyhaddonewithbestjobwithease.Wheninrealitytheoperationwasverylackluster,andleftIranwithalotofproblemsforthefuture.Theauthorarguesthelackoftrueleadershipleadtoalegacyofconfusionandconflictinternalandexternal.

    OperationAjax.Perf.KermitRoosevelt.IRTV,1973.Youtube.Web.13Oct.2014.Inthisshort

    clipfromadocumentaryabouttheeventsofthecoup,KermitRooseveltisinterviewedabouthisrole.HeexplicitlystatesthenumberoneruleforOperationAjaxwastoensurethattheU.S.wasnotshowninabadlight,thattheU.S.didnotwanttobereflectedbadlyuponiftheoperationfailed.Rooseveltsaysthisoperationwasverycheapanddidn'trequirepersonnel,andwasquiteproudofthatfact.Onthecontrarythough,thenarratorexplainsthesmallnumberofpersonnelwasactuallydetrimental,thattherewasnostrongleadership,thatthecoupledtomoreconflictinthefuture.

    Risen,James."SecretsofHistorytheCIAinIran."NewYorkTimes(2000):n.pag.NewYork

    TimesontheWeb.Web.Thisthorougharticlewascompiledfrommanyprimarysourcesanddigestedwithoutmuchopinionadded,simplythefacts.Itwasinterestingbecause,althoughitwasnotwrittenatthetimeofthecoup,ithasthestyleofanewspaperarticle.ItdescribedthelegacyofthecoupinitsrelationtotheoverallriseofradicalIslaminIran.IthelpedmeunderstandtheimportantdistinctionbetweenSunniandShiamuslims,andalsothepulloftheAyatollahin1979.ItmadeclearalsothatthecoupwasjustanothereventinalonghistoryinIranandtheinstabilityanduncertaintyoftheColdWarwhichculminatdinthe1979revolution.

    Risen,James."TryingtoPersuadeaReluctantShah."NewYorkTimesonthe.TheSecretsof

    History,theCIAinIran,2000.Web.13Oct.2014.ThisarticlereinforcesothersourceswehavefoundwhichshowKermitRoosevelttobeanimpulsiveleader,andtheCIAtohaveoverlookedmajorissueswhenplanningthecoup.ThecoupwasalreadyinmotionbeforeEisenhowersignedoffonit,andtwoweeksintotheexpensivepropagandacampaignand

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix36

    protestswhichmayhaveincludedCIAagentsposingascommunistsandblowingupabuilding,theshahstillhadcoldfeet.HerefusedtosigntheproperpaperswhichwouldinditeMossadeghandittooktwoweeksforRooseveltandtheCIAtoconvincehim.ThisshowstheShah'sweakleadership,andtheCIAslackofplanningintheirleadership.

    Roberts,G."Moscow'sColdWaronthePeriphery:SovietPolicyinGreece,Iran,andTurkey,

    19438."JournalofContemporaryHistory46.1(2011):5881.Web.21Sept.2014.ThissourceprovidedanewviewpointofIran'sroleintheColdWar,bysummarizingtheSovietthoughtprocessonIran,amongotherstates.ProfessorRobertsemphasizesthatIranwasasecondaryobjectivefortheUSSR,incontrasttomoreimportantgoalsinEasternEurope.Overall,RobertscreatesanimportantperspectiveofIran'srolerelativetothelargerColdWar.

    Ruehsen,MoyaraD."Operation'Ajax'Revisited:Iran,1953."MiddleEasternStudies29.3

    (1993):46786.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.ThisarticlepublishedinthejournalMiddleEasternStudieswasveryhelpfulinprovidingcontextaboutthecoupandsheddingsomelightaboutwhoexactlywasinvolved,andtheextenttowhichtheywere.WhileEisenhower,JohnFosterDulles,andAllenDulleswereallinterestedintheregionduetothethreatofcommunism,thearticledescribeshowtheUnitedStateshadtobeswayedbytheBritishtobeinvolvedinthecoup.ThearticledescribesthepoorleadershipoftheCIAindecidingtoinitiateOperationAJAX.KermitRoosevelt,whowashighlyinvolvedinthecoup,saidthat,atthemeetingwhereJohnFosterDullesdetailedhisplansforthecoup,many"iftheyhadfeltfreeorhadthecouragetospeak,wouldhaveopposedtheundertaking."MuchoftheCIA'sactionsduringthecouparedetailed.AlmostallCIAactionswerecovertandindirect.ThissuggeststhattheCIA'sprimaryinterestwasmakingthebestdecisionforIran,itwassimplytoeliminatetheexistingproblemasefficientlyandquietlyaspossible.Manypeopleintheorganizationdidnotliketheideaofthecoup,butwentalongwithitbecausetheysawnobetteroption.ThisisanexampleofweakleadershipbytheCIA,andbyinstallingtheShahintopower,anegativeandoppressivelegacyinIranwouldblossomfromthelackofleadership.

    Sanchez,Raf."BritishDiplomatsTriedtoSuppressDetailsofMI6RoleinIranCoup."The

    Te