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Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2001) 31

Russia’s Military Involvement in the Middle EastBy Oksana Antonenko*

Russia's emergence after the collapse of the USSR brought an evolution in Moscow's policy

regarding Middle East arms supplies. The country's financial needs became a more important

factor in decisions to sell military equipment. At the same time, the arms industry emerged as a

semi-independent lobby in promoting such sales. This article evaluates Russia's arms development

and supply relationships with different countries in the region, including the strategic and political

implications of such linkages.

From the mid-1950s until itsdissolution four decades later, the SovietUnion played a key role in helping ArabStates improve their military capabilities.Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Unionsupplied advanced military equipment,trained officers in its military schools and

provided in-country military advisors toregional allies such as Egypt (before 1972),Syria, Libya, Yemen, Algeria and Iraq. This

assistance was provided in the context ofU.S.-Soviet competition for influence in theMiddle East and therefore under veryfavorable conditions, often practically free ofcharge or under long-term loan arrangementsthat were never expected to be repaid.

For many Arab states, Soviet militaryassistance was important both in its geo-

political and military aspects. However,although Soviet military assistance providedsome tactical advantage for its allies during

the Arab-Israeli conflict, it failed to give themsuperiority.

There were a number of reasons forsuch low effectiveness. The main reason isthat the Soviet Union provided onlyinadequate and selective training to its clientsand therefore they had only a poor ability toabsorb and use more advanced Sovietweapons. Although the Soviet Union suppliedSyria and Egypt with MiG-21 and Su-7fighters, T-55 tanks and other advanced

equipment, they still suffered a humiliatingdefeat in the 1967 war.

Later, the Soviet Union providedSyria over $20 billion of weapons, but theSyrian armed forces failed to absorb them dueto their ongoing operations in Lebanon,

preoccupation with internal securityobjectives, and political problems. This wasdemonstrated during the 1982 Israeli invasionof Lebanon, when Syrian troops showed verylimited capability despite large shipments ofweapons from the Soviet Union. Most

improvements in Syrian capabilities areattributed to their improved skill in using oldweapons rather then new high-tech suppliesfrom the Soviet Union. In fact no Sovietmilitary assistance could compensate for thefact that Israel possessed better-trained and

better-equipped forces with much higherreadiness levels and overall efficiency.

The second reason for the low impactof Soviet military assistance was Moscow'srestraint in offering particular advanced

weapons (including Weapons of MassDestruction, WMD) to its clients, fearingescalation of the conflict would drag theSoviet Union and the United States into directconfrontation. While new equipment wassupplied, the newest and most advancedweaponry, such as SS-1 "Scud" SSMs,though promised, was held back. Sovietmilitary cooperation with Arab states was

provided as long as the main Cold War bargain--cheap weapons supplies for political

influence--benefited both sides. However,even during the Cold War, the Soviet Union


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could not completely restrain its clients'actions, limiting its political influence.Moreover, once the bargain was no longeracceptable, both sides used the termination ofmilitary assistance as a geopolitical signal. In

1972, Egypt cut off all military ties with theSoviet Union, while the Soviet Union did not

provide any military assistance to Iraq duringthe Iran-Iraq or Gulf wars.

After the end of Cold War and thedissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia'smilitary cooperation with regional statesunderwent a significant transition away fromthe two previous main principles of Sovietmilitary cooperation.

On one hand, Russia was no longer in

the position to offer large-scale financialdonations, in the form of weapons' supplies,in exchange for illusory political influenceover traditional Soviet allies. Moreover, untilrecently it was unclear whether reasserting its

political role in the Middle East was indeedamong the priorities of Russia's foreign andsecurity policy (political statements wererarely backed by real actions).

On the other hand, Russia was nolonger prepared to exercise self-restraint in itsarms sales to the region as long as financialarrangements were beneficial for the Russiandefense industry, which over the past decadehad grown to depend on arms exports for itssurvival. All arms sales were seen as purelycommercial projects, often driven byindividual Russian arms-producing or arms-exporting companies. This was clearlydemonstrated in Russia's military cooperation

program with Iran, which was continued

despite active U.S. pressure includingsanctions. A similar lack of restraint isdemonstrated in Russia's proposals to Syriaand Libya, as well as declared plans to restoreactive military cooperation with Iraq oncesanctions are lifted.

As a result of these two changes,Russia's military cooperation with MiddleEast states, while reduced in scale, may

potentially have a much greater impact onregional security if including such weapons as

missiles. Moreover, Russia's desperateattempts to penetrate the world's largest arms

market in the Middle East now facescompetition from other suppliers--such asUkraine, Belorus, Eastern European states,China and North Korea--all offering used andolder models of equipment and modernization

of ex-Soviet equipment for lower prices. This places the sale of advanced weapons systemsat the top of Russia's arms marketing strategyfor the Middle East.

Finally, the most significant feature ofRussia's new post-Cold War foreign militaryassistance is that it is more and more often

provided by private Russian actors actingwithout state sanction, or in some cases inviolation of Russia's declared policy. Themost striking case of such assistance is the

training of Iranian scientists, including thosedealing with ballistic missile technology, inRussian universities and scientificinstitutions. There is also the possibility ofRussian scientists moving to Iran and Iraq inexchange for highly paid positions.

Another category of Russia's privateactors are the military advisers who worked inthe Middle East during the Soviet period,many of whom continue to do so in a privatecapacity after they have left the Russianarmed forces by signing individual contractswith the former host country. From the 1950sonward, the Soviet Union sent over 80,000military advisers to the Middle East andtrained over 55,000 officers from Middle Eastcountries in its military schools andacademies. According to Russian sources, at

present only around 360 Russian militaryspecialists officially work in the Middle Eastand 270 officers from the region are being

educated in Russian military schools.(1)

STRATEGIES FOR MILITARY

COOPERATIONThe main strategies for Russia's

military cooperation with Middle East statesnow include: (2)--Arms sales on platforms and components aswell as used equipment.--Technical cooperation on upgrades, repairsand modernization of ex-Soviet equipment

and production of ammunition.


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Russia’s Military Involvement in the Middle East


--Providing Russian military in-countryadvisers and educating officers from MiddleEast armies in Russian military schools andacademies, as well as training specialists tooperate Russian-made equipment.

--Joint projects for modernization of Russia'sequipment for sale to third countries.--High-level political and military exchangesand promotion of Russian weapons systemsthrough participation in arms exhibitions inthe Middle East.--With the exception of modernization ofRussian equipment for export to thirdcountries, all the above strategies are similarto those pursued by the Soviet Union.

However, the scale of Russia's

cooperation with Middle East armies in allthe traditional spheres has declined drasticallyover the past decade. In addition to financialconstraints and growing competition from ex-Soviet and private arms suppliers, there are anumber of more fundamental reasons whyRussia's offers of military cooperation are nolonger readily accepted in the region unlessthey include services and assistance whichcannot be acquired from other sources.

The main factor is the decline ofRussia's influence in the world as a whole and

particularly in the Middle East. Russia'svoluntary and abrupt withdrawal from theregion left ex-Soviet allies in strategic limbo,with a great sense of vulnerability anduncertainty. While the Russian governmentwas busy developing relations with theUnited States and Europe, Arab states soughtto diversify their military and strategicrelations. By the time the Russian

government under Foreign Minister YevgenyPrimakov decided to refocus more attentionupon the Middle East, it quickly discoveredthat it has lost credibility and is no longer

perceived as major regional power. Moreover,many states understand that Russia isdesperately trying to obtain great power statussymbols while being unwilling to providefunds to support its influence.

Thus Russia's initial attempts torevitalize ex-Soviet alliances in the Middle

East were met with a great deal of skepticism practically everywhere in the region. Many

states like Syria, Yemen and Libya (after thesanctions were lifted) are now seeking to usearms sales as a vehicle to gain more leverageover European and U.S. policies. Moreover,many states are acutely aware about Russia's

desperate dependence on arms exports and tryto lengthen negotiations in order to secure

better financial conditions. Unlike the UnitedStates, which continues to provide financialassistance to Egypt, Israel and Jordan foracquiring its equipment and offers training,Russia is no longer in the position to do so.

Thus the only two states where Russiadid manage to link military cooperation to

political relations were Iran and Iraq. Iraqneeded Russia's support to lift sanctions and

hopes to use its assistance to eventuallyrebuild its military capability. Iran needsRussia to provide military equipment notavailable from Western sources. However,Russia's alliance with Iran and Iraq did littleto improve its role in the Middle East, as it

became a constant source of concernthroughout the region, as well as in bothTeheran and Baghdad.

Another factor for the loss of Russia'scredibility as a reliable military partner forArab states can be found in Russia's domestic

policies. During the 1990s, continuoustensions and rivalry between the ForeignMinistry, Defense Ministry and various armsexporting agencies (which were reorganizednine times between 1995 and 2000),significantly undermined both the trust inRussia's supplies and their effectiveness. Eachof the agencies pursues its own agenda in theregion. Therefore, despite many high-level

visits to the region by various Russianofficials, practically no significant contractswere signed. Moreover, different agencieswithin Russia often leak information aboutnegotiated arms export deals in the press inorder to expose their domestic rivals,complicating negotiations and preventingfinalization of major arms export deals.

Finally, the most important factor thathas undermined the effectiveness of Russia'smilitary cooperation is the decline in the

quality of services and equipment. Thedecline of Russia's armed forces in the 1990s


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is well known to its potential clients in theMiddle East. Although the Russian armedforces are still better equipped and trained tooperate equipment than most Arab armedforces, their expertise has significantly

declined. Many of the best specialists whowork as military advisers and have languageskills left the armed forces to findemployment in the commercial sector. Thosewho remain in the army lost their technicalskills due to shortage of funds for regulartraining and military exercises. The quality ofmilitary education is inadequate to addressthe challenges of modern warfare. Moreover,many in-country advisers working onmodernization of their clients' equipment

experience delays and poor quality in supplyof spare parts.

Despite uncertain and inferior service,Russia continues to seek U.S. levels of

compensation for its specialists' work whileother ex-Soviet states like Ukraine andBelarus are happy to provide similar servicefor a fraction of the price. And finally, inmany traditional Soviet client states in the

Middle East, such as Syria, Libya, Algeriaand Yemen there is a gradual change in the

political and military elites. While the oldgeneration was primarily educated in theSoviet Union and speaks Russian, the newgeneration is often pro-Western and prefers toreceive education in Europe.

Despite these problems, Russiamanaged to preserve and in some casesexpand its military-technical cooperation withMiddle East countries. The following chart

summarizes Russia's arms sales to the regionsince 1993.


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RUSSIAN ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 1990s

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999-2000

Iran One Kilo-

class SSK,10 Su-24,8 MiG-29

80

ACV*,1 Kilo-classSSK

200+

T-72deliveredupto 1994,*94 AAM

2 T-72

MBT2BMP-1ACV

One Kilo

classSSK,Aircraftenginelicense,(2 An-74TUkraine)

100

T-72kits,200BMP-2Kits (3)

UAE 80 BMP-3ACV

95 BMP-3 ACV*

118BMP-3ACV

122BMP-3ACV

25BMP-3ACV

69BMP-3ACV

4 Il-76ac, 82BMP-3

Kuwait

30 SA-18SAM

9 9A52MRL,100BMP-3(4)

18 9A52MRL (5)

Egypt SA2/3/6up-grade

20 Mi-17 SA-3 up-grade

Syria 200T-55MV

fromUkraine

1000AT-14

ATGM

Yemen

4 Su-22fromUkraine

31T-72

Jordan

126BMP-3

50BTR94Ukraine

Oman 6 MBT (6)

SOURCE: IISS Military Balance, UN Conventional Arms Register, others.Abbreviations: AAM = Air to Air Missile, ACV = Armored Combat Vehicle, ATGM = Anti-TankGuided Missile, SSK = attack submarine, MRL= Multiple Rocket Launchers; *= withoutammunition

These sales show three main trends:Low volume with a focus on modernization;diversification from traditional to newmarkets; and Russia's failure to prevail incompetition with ex-Soviet as well asWestern suppliers in different markets. Thesetrends have a major effect on Russia's

military cooperation with each MiddleEastern state.

IRANOver the past decade, Russia's military

cooperation arrangements with Iran have beenthe most extensive of these efforts. Iran has

been the third largest Russian arms exports


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client after China and India. Since the twocountries signed a bilateral military-technicalcooperation agreement in 1989 (signed withthe Soviet Union and inherited by Russia),Russia has supplied Iran with equipment and

services worth over $4 billion. According tosome reports, Iran paid two-thirds in cash andone-third in goods for Russian militarysupplies, thus making it among one ofMoscow's most profitable customers.(7)

Amongst all Russia's Middle Eastclients, Russian-Iranian cooperation is themost advanced in the range of weaponssystems sold to Iran by Russia and in thescale of technical cooperation. Between 1992and 2000, Russia sold Iran 3 Kilo-class

submarines, over 200 T-72 tanks, 10 Su-24and 8 MiG-29 aircraft. Moreover, Iran hasacquired licenses for the production of T-72Cand BMP-2 armored fighting vehicles. Russiahas also provided Iran with a large number ofmilitary advisers who have trained itsmilitary--including submarine crews--tooperate these advanced weapons systems andhelped set up licensed productionarrangements. A number of Iranian militaryofficers are attending Russian militaryschools. There are also many private Russiancitizens (some estimate more than 500) areworking in Iran and suspected of providingmilitary-technology related expertise.

Russian-Iranian military cooperationis supported by close bilateral relations thatamount to a strategic alliance based oncommon strategic interests in containing U.S.and Turkish influence in the Caspianregion.(8) Moreover, Russian-Iranian bilateral

military cooperation is complimented bycooperation in other areas such as civiliannuclear energy, oil and gas exploration andcommercial trade which has exceeded $500million a year.

However, Russia's military andcivilian nuclear cooperation with Iran has

become a source of constant concern andtension in Russia's relations with Israel andthe United States. The U.S. government hasapplied consistent pressure on Russia to

reduce or even cancel some of its projects. In1995, Russia and the United States reached an

agreement in the framework of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission under whichRussia agreed not to complete new arms dealswith Iran after fulfilling all its currentcontractual obligations in exchange for lifting

some U.S. restrictions on high- technologyexports to Russia. This agreement wascontroversial in both countries. Russianofficials argued that the agreement coveredonly Russia's obligation in the field of nuclearand missile technologies. Republicans in theU.S. Congress questioned the Clintonadministration's judgment in agreeing thatMoscow could complete the sale of arms toIran (including tanks, armored personnelcarriers and Kilo-class submarines). The

Clinton administration responded by pointingout that arms transfers allowed under theagreement did not provide Iran with newweapons capabilities or alter the military

balance of power in the Persian Gulf.(9)However, a number of states, including Israel,expressed concerns over the content and thescale of Russian arms transfers to Iran.

The Putin government, however,decided to abrogate the Gore-Chernomydinunderstanding and failed to halt arms sales toIran. It appears that in early November 2000Russia informed Washington that it was towithdraw from its commitments not to supplyIran with conventional weapons, probably

because of the profits to be made from furthersales to Iran.(10) The legal status of thisagreement had always been in dispute. Itseems likely that Russia will not supply new

platforms, while continuing to supply spare parts and compete for modernization of

Iranian Soviet-made equipment. Russia fearslosing the Iranian arms market, which isincreasingly targeted by other states includingChina, North Korea and even France.

Russian experts called on Russianarms export agencies to intensify Russia'scooperation with Iran in order to become themain supplier for the Iranian 25-year programto modernize its armed forces.(11) Iranreportedly expressed interest in acquiringRussia's used Su-25s, MI-17-1B, and T-72s;

the new air defense system S-300 PMU1 andthe RLS "Defense-14" as well as a licensing


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agreement for the production of the Tu-334civil airliner. Some Russian experts alsosuggested that parts might be exported toSyria and thence from Syria to Iran even ifRussia abides by its moratorium on future

military supplies to Iran. Russiancommentators have speculated the contractswith Iran could be worth as much as $7-8

billion.A particular concern is over any

Russian assistance that might help Iran obtainnuclear and missile technology.(12) Russianexperts deny Russian governmentalassistance, though the United States claimsthat Russian institutions, companies andindividual scientists, frequently without direct

sanction from the government, often provideassistance. The Israeli government declared in1999 that Russia's arms export control systemhas begun to erode further. AlthoughPresident Putin has tried to reinforce theeffectiveness of federal government controls,

particularly in the sensitive military and othertechnology transfer fields, more measureswill be required to dispel U.S. and Israeliconcerns.

U.S.-Russian tensions overcooperation with Iran were heightened mostwhen Russia began to provide assistance toconstruct the nuclear power plant at Bushehr,which the United States claims can assist theIranian nuclear weapons program. Russia is

providing four reactors and turbines. TheUnited States claims that this project couldassist Iran to advance its military nuclear

program and was successful in haltingUkrainian participation in this project. The

Russian government views U.S. pressure ascommercially rather then security motivated.Further, Russia refuses to acknowledge theseaccusations, claiming that it has supplied toIran similar technology that the United Statesagreed to supply to North Korea as part ofagreements to stop that country'sdevelopment of nuclear weapons. Russia alsostates that Iran is ready to open the Bushehr

plant for intrusive inspections by theInternational Atomic Energey Agency

(IAEA). So far, these disagreements have not been resolved and Russian personnel continue

to work at Bushehr. There are also suspicionsthat Russia provides direct support to theIranian nuclear program (which is not linkedwith Bushehr), but there is no clear evidencethat Russian nuclear scientists working in Iran

are authorized by the Russian government.Another aspect of U.S. and Israeli

concern is suspected Russian assistance toIran in the development of ballistic missiletechnology. Some U.S. intelligence reportsclaim that Russia has transferred unspecifiedSS-4 SSM technology to Iran as well asassisting Iran with the development of anational communications satellite with dual-use technology.(13) The Missile TechnologyControl Regime (MTCR), to which the

Russian Federation belongs, while only avoluntary arrangement and not a treaty,

presumes that the sale of complete rocketsand certain complete subsystems will not be

permitted by its members. However, CategoryII material--covering a wide range of parts,components and subsystems such as

propellants, structural materials, testequipment and facilities, and flightinstruments--may be exported at thediscretion of the MTCR Partner governmenton a case-by-case basis for acceptable end-uses. In the absence of further information, itis difficult to assess whether MTCRguidelines were breached by any Russiantechnology transfer.

In February 1998 the RussianMinistry of Defense released an officialstatement stating that it has neitheragreements nor contacts with Iran or otherMiddle East countries covering missile

technology. Moreover, it has recognized that proliferation of missiles and missiletechnology constitutes a serious threat toRussia. However, in 1998, on the basis ofintelligence reports, the United Statesimposed sanctions on several Russianinstitutes which train Iranian scientists.Despite Russia's outrage with these sanctions,it had to acknowledge that some programscould potentially compromise its non-

proliferation commitments. Since that time

Russia has announced new measures toreinforce its export control policies and


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stopped some of the more controversialtraining programs.

The United States continues toexpress concern over the potential leakage ofRussian technical expertise to Iran. In March

1999, then-Israeli Minister of Trade andIndustry Natan Sharansky charged that Russiawas not doing enough to stop the leakage ofmissile technologies to Iran.(14) Israeliconcerns have resulted in the cancellation ofits agreement with Russia for the sale ofnatural gas. Russian officials claim that theUnited States and Israel have provided no

proof for their allegations that Russianmilitary specialists and defense institutes arecontinuing to leak sensitive technologies to

Iran.A sign of intensified Russian-Iranian

military cooperation came in July 2000 whenthe first Russian military delegation, led bythe head of Russian Ministry of DefenseDepartment of International CooperationGeneral Leonid Ivashov, visited Teheran. Theresult of this visit was an agreement toorganize regular consultations between thetwo ministries of Defense on military and

political issues of common concern.According to some reports, the three areas ofcommon concern (or perceived commonthreats) included: expanded U.S. and NATOinvolvement in the South Caucasus, theexisting balance of power in the Middle East,and uncertain developments inAfghanistan.(15) Putin considers its relationswith Iran as an important factor in his strategyto increase Russia's influence in the MiddleEast.

SYRIAUnlike in Iran's case, where the Soviet

Union began military cooperation only in1989, Soviet-Syrian military cooperationdates back to the mid-1950s. This cooperationcovered all spheres including massive arms'supply, training of Syrian officers, and

provision of a large network of Soviet in-country military advisers. From 1980 to 1991,the Soviet Union supplied Syria with military

equipment worth over $26 billion, including65 launchers for tactical and sub-strategic

missile systems, about 5,000 tanks, 1,200aircraft, 4,200 artillery pieces and mortars and70 warships.(16) The Soviet Union alsoassisted Syria with the construction of over100 military facilities. During the same

period more then 9600 Syrian officers weretrained in Soviet military schools.(17) Over90% of Syrian military equipment is Soviet-made though much of it--more then 500aircraft and 4000 tanks--requiresmodernization.

Between 1990 and 1991, Soviet armstransfers to Syria dropped from $1.47 billionto $1.05 billion(18) as Russia started todemand hard currency payment for itssupplies. Since 1991, military supplies were

practically frozen with the exception of acontract for T-72A tanks in 1992-1993 at atotal cost of $270 million. In 1997, Russiaonly supplied Syria with spare parts worth $1million.

According to a number of Russiananalysts and officials, Syria is viewed as a

priority customer for Russian militarycooperation and arms sales in the Middle Eastand is thought to have the potential to becomethe third largest Russian arms customer (afterChina and India).(19) However, Syria's weakeconomic position, unresolved debt issues,and fears of competition from Ukrainian andBelorussian companies have prevented Russiaand Syria from substantially expanding theirmilitary-technical cooperation.

In the past, Syrian officials haverepeatedly expressed interest in consideringRussia as a potential candidate formodernizing its armed forces. In 1996, a

special bilateral Russian-Syrian commissionon military-technical cooperation developed adraft agreement under which Russia wassupposed to supply Syria with a largeconsignment of AKS-74U and AK-74M riflesand ammunition, 9M117M guided missiles,9M113 missiles for Konkurs anti-tank missilesystems, PG-7VL rockets for RPG-7 rocketlaunchers and PRG-29 grenade launcherswith night-vision equipment. In addition,Russia was to modernize Syria's T-72 and T-

55 tanks. The contract was expected to beworth $2 billion.


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However, disagreements over theSyrian debt to Russia, and Syria's insistenceon lower prices and extended paymentschemes for future purchases, led to a failureto sign any comprehensive contract. Syria

refused to recognize its $11 billion debt toRussia and proposed to postpone repaymentindefinitely. Russia had high expectations fora breakthrough in Russian-Syrian military-technical cooperation during the visit ofPresident Hafiz al-Asad to Moscow insummer 1999. In order to reach this

breakthrough, Moscow announced before thevisit that it was ready to remove the linkage

between debt negotiations and new armssupplies agreements. However, no agreement

was reached during the visit. Asad insisted onlong-term payment schedule for a $2 billioncontract, while Moscow was opposed to anynew loans to Syria.

In the meantime, other ex-Sovietstates offered more attractive conditions toDamascus. A Ukrainian tank-repair plant atKiev won a contract for the modernization ofSyria's T-55 tanks. The plant also hoped towin the next contract for the modernization of300 T-72 tanks.

So far, Russia and Syria have signedone major arms export contract for the supplyof 1000 "Metis-M" (NATO designation AT-13) and "Kornet-E" (AT-14) anti-tankmissiles worth $138 million ($73 million and$65 million, respectively). This deal caused alot of concern in the US and in Israel. In1999, the United States introduced sanctionsagainst three Russian institutes and arms

producers (the Instrument-Making Design

Bureau in Tula, the Volsk mechanical plantand the Central Institute of Machine-Building), who were planning to supply moreadvanced anti-tank weapons to Syria.Moreover, the Clinton administration linkedany Russian supplies of advanced weaponsfor Syria with continued U.S. aid to Russia.The Russian government expressed outrageover these sanctions and the missiles werereportedly delivered to Syria in 1999.

Israel expressed concern over the sale

of the AT-14 "Kornet" third generation anti-tank guided missiles to Syria. According to

Jane's Defense Weekly, the AT-14 Kornet isdesigned mainly for the export market, andhas an outstanding 5,000-meter range. Theuse of laser beam-riding technology forguidance enables simpler operation by

operators with only limited training. Whilethe "Kornet" does not pose a new challenge toIsraeli main battle tanks, it poses a moreserious threat in a static battlefield, such assouthern Lebanon or the Golan Heightsdemilitarized zone, where its accuracy allowslethal attacks against fortified positions ormedium-protected vehicles.(20) Thesecharacteristics make "Kornet" a source of

potential threat to Israel.Moreover, the sale of such equipment

to Syria violates the pledge that Russia wouldonly sell "defensive weapons and spare partsfor arms sold to Syria under previouscontracts. Russia does not sell offensiveweapons to anyone."(21) In contrast, inOctober 1999 the Russian ambAsador toSyria stated that "Russia will sell to Syria anymodern weapons which it may require

because Syria is not threatening any state'ssecurity and is not subject of internationalsanctions."(22) This statement demonstratesthat the Russian government was determinedto capture the Syrian arms market despitestrong opposition from the US and Israel.

Syria continues to experiencedifficulties in providing cash payments for thenew arms contracts with Russia. There werereports that Saudi Arabia and even Iran might

provide financial assistance to Syria to helpmodernize its weapons systems but there isno sign such help will actually be given.

However, Russian arms exporters haveformulated proposals for Syria. DuringRussian Minister of Defense Marshall IgorSergeev's visit to Damascus he offered tosupply Su-27 aircraft, T-80 tanks and S-300air defense system as well as modernize MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft and T-72 tanks.(23)Experts suggested that projects might include20 Su-27 or MIG-29SMT aircraft, largeshipment of T-90 tanks and the upgrade ofover 100 MiG-23s and MiG-21s as well as T-

90 tanks.(24) There are reports Russia hasnegotiated with Syria on the sale of S-300


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surface to air missiles, as well as TOR-M1and BUK-M-1.2 air defense missile systems.

Syria also reportedly expressedinterest in expanding military-to-militarycontacts with Russia, which do not involve

large payments. Syria is planning to increasethe number of its military officers educated inRussian military schools (including at the AirForce Academy). Russia is also seeking toexpand such cooperative arrangements as

joint exercises. Syria has already participatedin exercises at the Transbaikal MilitaryDistrict using S-200B air defense systems.Such joint exercises are expected to continueand be expanded. There were alsounconfirmed reports that Syria and Russia are

discussing establishing a Russian naval baseon the Syrian Mediterranean coast.(25) Thenumber of Russian military advisers in Syriais also set to increase.

However, these expectations ofRussian arms export companies may never

become reality. Although Russia's armsexport officials continue to speak withoptimism of a Syrian arms deal, there has

been little to suggest that the two sides haveresolved their differences. While arms salesare no longer linked with the resolution of thedebt dispute, Russian officials in Putin'sadministration continue to insist that anydeliveries to Syria be made under strictcommercial conditions. Equally, the Syrianside understands that Russia is asking for ahigher price than Ukraine, Belarus, China, or

North Korea. Syria also believes thatMoscow's wish for greater influence in theregion may provide leverage if it waits to

obtain better payment terms for any futureRussian arms supplies. Finally, there isuncertainty about whether President BasharAl-Asad, educated in the West, will be ascommitted to close relations with Russia aswas his father.

Under certain circumstances, Russia-Syria military cooperation and arms salescould vastly increase, though this is by nomeans certain. Ultimately, the regionalsituation might force Syria to accept at least

some Russian offers, since there is no otherstate likely to supply Syria with large

amounts of arms. This deal could be made possible if wealthy Arab states finally provideSyria with financial assistance. But anysupply of modern weapons to Syria by Russiaunder the current conditions is bound to

intensify tensions between Moscow andWashington, as well as between Russia andIsrael.

LIBYARussian officials repeatedly declared

that they view both Libya and Iraq after thelifting of international sanctions as majormarkets for Russian arms exports. However,in the Libyan case, an end to sanctions failedto bring Russia many dividends. As with

Syria, Russia's arms exports are hampered byunresolved disputes inherited from Sovietcontracts and by intense competition fromother ex-Soviet states such as Ukraine,Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as well as Chinaand North Korea.

Between 1970 and 1991 Russiasupplied $19 billion of military equipment tothe Libyan armed forces. More then 90% ofLibyan military equipment is Soviet andRussian made. Since the introduction ofsanctions in 1991, Russia has lost potentialsales worth approximately $7.5bn. In

particular, sanctions destroyed a large-scaleLibyan Air Force modernization program,which would have included the delivery ofMiG-29 fighters, worth billions of dollars.After sanctions were lifted in 1999, Russiasought to renew its arms sales including

platforms, spare parts and modernizationcontracts for Libyan equipment. However

Russia's hopes on major contacts for theLibyan armed forces so far remain unfulfilleddue to unsettled debts--the largest part being$3 billion for contracts unfulfilled due tosanctions. Libya also insists that Russiashould compensate its losses incurred whenRussia joined the international sanctionsregime and terminated the implementation of

previously signed contracts.Although Libya hired Russian experts

to undertake the assessment of modernization

requirements for its Soviet-made weaponssystems (mainly Su-17 and Su-24 aircraft), it


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is reluctant to give Russia preference for theimplementation of actual modernizationcontracts. This can be explained byaggressive competition from Ukraine, Belarusand a number of other Eastern European

states for such contracts. Ukraine offers moreattractive financial conditions formodernization than Russia (monthly salaryfor Ukrainian military specialists working inLibya is approximately $350-400, whileRussian specialists charge over $1000 for thesame work). Moreover, the spare part marketfor ex-Soviet equipment is very big andincludes a number of Warsaw Pact countrieswhich seek to sell excess equipment and spare

parts still held by their armed forces under

very good conditions.As a result, out of 40 projected

modernization contracts, Russia has so farwon only one, for the supply of ammunitionand spare parts for $100 million to thePromeksport company. It is likely thatUkraine and Belarus will receive a much

bigger share of modernization contracts. InAugust 2000, the Russian vice-premier incharge of the military-industrial structure,Ilya Klebanov, announced that Russia'sexpectations towards military-technicalcooperation with Libya so far have not beenrealized because "Tripoli has not taken the

political decision to develop large-scalemilitary cooperation with Russia".(26)

As far as sales of new equipment areconcerned, Russia has offered Libya anumber of systems, but may be facingcompetition from Western arms suppliers.According to the president of Russian

financial-industrial group Oboronitel'nyeSistemy, which markets Russian air defensesystems such as S-300, Yuri Rodin-Sova,Russia offered to develop the Libyan airdefense system on the basis of the S-300PMU1 and S-300PMU2. This would usesome older air defense systems Libyaacquired from the Soviet Union. However,these negotiations were far from complete. Itappears likely that in case of completeremoval of political sanctions toward Libya

from European states, the Libyiangovernment, which possesses significant

financial resources for modernization of itsarmed forces, is likely to look to the West formajor new arms import contracts.

The example of military-cooperationwith Libya demonstrates that, in the future,

Russia will have problems increasing its positions even in the so-called "traditionalSoviet markets." Russia's marketing strategiesface many obstacles: first, unsettled disputesover past contracts undermined Libya's trustin Russia as a reliable ally. Second, Russia'sinability to compete with financial termsoffered by other ex-Soviet states and byChina and North Korea, damages Moscow'schances. Finally, realization of Russia'sdeclining role has removed the strategic

rationale for regional states to pursuecontracts with Russia regardless of financial

problems.Similar problems are likely to torpedo

Russia's high expectations aboutmodernization of Iraqi armed forces after theremoval of sanctions. If, however, Europeanstates continue to enforce self-imposedrestriction against arms sales to Iraq (as theydo toward Iran and China), Russia may haveless difficulty capturing the Iraqi armsmarket. There are some reports that Russianofficials are already discussing prospects forthe upgrade of the Iraqi air defense system,which were denied by the Russiangovernment.

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Although the UAE does not belong toRussia's traditional markets in the MiddleEast, Russian-UAE military cooperation

developed quite rapidly in the 1990s. In 1998,the UAE was the fourth-biggest Russian armscustomer after China, India and Iran. The factthat Russia and UAE do not have anydisputes left from Soviet times and that theUAE is interested in purchasing newequipment for cash, makes it one of the keytargets for Russian arms export agencies.From 1992 to 2000, the UAE purchased 591Russian BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles for$800,000 each. In May 2000, Russia

delivered several sets of dynamic protectionequipment and splinter-proof screens to


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Oksana Antonenko


modernize the BMP-3 previously sold to theUAE (this was the first time Russia undertookmodernization of BMP-3).(27) Russia alsoleased 4 IL-76 transport aircraft to the UAEin 1998.

Russia is expecting further expansionof such sales. On May 24, 2000, Russiaannounced a $500 million deal (other sourcesreported it is worth $734 million) for thesupply of Panzir-S1 anti-aircraft system. Thissystem is among the most advanced air-defense systems produced by Russia to

protect strategic facilities from tacticalaircraft, attack helicopters, ballistic andguided missiles, guided bombs, high

precision weapons as well as to destroy

medium-protected facilities and manpower.The range of its missiles is from 1000 metersto 20 kilometers and its artillery fire from 200to 4000 meters.(28) The deal was reportedlynegotiated by the Tula Design Bureau, which

builds the system, and is said to be among thelargest contracts ever concluded by a Russiadefense enterprise.(29) This is only thesecond time in the history of Russia's armsexports that a county-recipient has signed acontract under which the Russian companymust first complete the R&D of the mostadvanced technology equipment. The UAE

paid 30% of the contract in advance to coverthe R&D phase. Russia will be offering theUAE other advanced systems such as theMiG-31M interceptor aircraft, Ka-50 attackhelicopter and T-90 MBT.(30)

OTHER MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB

STATES MARKETS

Russia has established extensivemilitary cooperation with Kuwait which in1995-1996 bought 27 9A52 Smerch multiplerocket launchers. The contract was estimatedto be worth over $48 million.(31) Russia isalso supplying Kuwait with 100 BMP-3Armored Combat Vehicles and has started to

build a plant for repairing and servicing ofthese vehicles.

Russia is also developing militarycooperation with Yemen. Yemen was a long-

standing Soviet client, but financial problemscombined with Russia's instance on

immediate cash payments practicallyterminated bilateral military cooperation. InJuly 2000, Russia made the first delivery ofmilitary equipment to Yemen since 1990,consisting of 30 T-72 tanks. Following this

delivery, Russian Defense Minister IgorSergeev visited Yemen to promote furthermilitary cooperation. However, it is unlikelythat bilateral military cooperation willdevelop more dynamically in the near future.Yemen is seeking cheaper supplies from otherex-Soviet states. In 1995, for example, itacquired four Su-22 attack aircraft from theUkraine for a very low price.

Similar tactics are being practiced byJordan, which is conducting negotiations with

practically all potential suppliers of usedequipment from ex-Soviet states and EasternEurope. Jordan established military-technicalcooperation with the Soviet Union in 1982,and sales exceeded $1 billion by the time ofthe USSR's collapse. Although Jordan

purchased 126 BMP-3 Armored CombatVehicles from Russia in 1995, bilateralmilitary cooperation between the twocountries has been practically frozen sincethat time. Jordan has made a few acquisitionsfrom Russia's competitors, including 50 BTR-94 from Ukraine in 1999. In August 2000, theRussian Independent Military Reviewreported that Jordan and a Georgian aviation

plant are developing plan for joint upgrade ofSu-25s that might be sold to thirdcountries.(32) Russian arms export officialsand experts view Jordan as potentially veryattractive market emphasizing, on one hand,Jordan's political motives to use Russian and

other East European supplies to balance itsdependence on U.S. military aid and, on theother hand, Jordan's requirements formodernization of ex-Soviet equipment.However, no major contracts between Russiaand Jordan are expected in the near future.

Russia's military cooperation withEgypt started in 1955 and was practicallyterminated by 1973. Over that period theSoviet Union supplied Egypt with militaryequipment worth over $8.5 billion. Since the

collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia hasactively targeted Egypt for contracts to


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modernize its ex-Soviet equipment.According to Russian estimates, over 70% ofair defense systems, 40% of aircraft, 85% ofartillery systems, and 45% of tanks andBTRs, which Egypt received from the Soviet

Union, require modernization.(33) However,Russia's expectation for large contracts werenot fulfilled because of the reorientation ofEgyptian armed forces to U.S. equipment,which is supplied under favorable financialconditions. Finally, in 1998 Egypt and Russiasigned a contract for the supply of spare partsand electronic components which was worthan estimated $2.7 million. Russia alsosupplied 20 Mi-17 helicopters and undertookupgrades of surface-to-air missile complexes

for additional $125 million. Given that Egyptwas generally satisfied with the quality ofservices and equipment provided by Russia, itis likely to continue using Russian companiesfor modernization of ex-Soviet equipment.

One of the more extensive examplesof Russia's military-technical cooperationwith Arab states can be found in Algeria.Since 1962, the Soviet Union has suppliedover $11 billion worth of military equipmentto Algeria. In 1996, the Algerian governmentmade a political decision to develop strategiccooperation with Russia to modernize itsarmed forces. Since that time Russia andAlgeria have developed a number ofagreements for the development of a systemfor radio-electronic warfare and electronicintelligence-gathering. Moreover, Algeria hasexpressed interest in the modernization of itsair defense system on the basis of the RussianS-300PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system

and the upgrade of the old Soviet air defensesystems, as well as purchasing Su-24Maircraft and modernizing MiG-21 aircraft.(34)Moscow is also conducting negotiation onupgrading Algerian surface ships anddevelopment of a coast guard system. Russianexperts assess the value of potential contactsas up to $4 billion. While Russian-Algerianmilitary cooperation has a good chance ofexpanding further, there are several problems,including Algeria's $4 billion debt to Russia

as well as increasing competition fromUkrainian and Belorussian firms for the

upgrade of Soviet equipment. The Algerianleadership is exploiting this competition toreduce prices to a level that is no longerattractive for Russian suppliers.

ISRAELSince December 1995, when Israeli

Prime Minister Shimon Peres and RussianDefense Minister Pavel Grachev signed afive-year bilateral agreement for military-technical cooperation (which was extended in2000), Russia and Israel have pursuedmilitary cooperation. Unlike other MiddleEast and Arab states, Russia and Israel worktogether to upgrade Russian equipmentmainly for exports to third countries.

Moreover, Israel has developed the know-how and has managed to capture unilaterallya large share of market for the upgrade of ex-Soviet equipment. Russia and Israel cooperateon upgrades of aircraft, sold by Russia toIndia and China, as well as for CentralEuropean and African markets. Many ex-Soviet scientists who were working in themilitary-industrial complex beforeimmigrating to Israel provided the basis forthis know-how. This cooperation isstrategically important to Russia, which isseeking ways to compete for arms sales in thedeveloped markets in Europe and in EastAsia, practically impossible without foreignelectronics. While Russian companiescontinue to lobby the Russian government tomaintain the principle of full self-sufficiencyfor all arms exports, many Russian clientsspecifically request foreign electronic sub-systems as a prerequisite for purchasing

Russian weapons systems, particularlyRussian aircraft.Although Russia's cooperation with

Israel is very important for Russia's globalarms export ambitions, a number of concernsare repeatedly voiced in Russia about thiscooperation. Many Russian experts claim thatIsrael received a disproportionately largeshare of profit from the sale of upgradedequipment.(35) Others claim that Russia'smilitary cooperation with Israel could

undermine Russia's plans to expand militarycooperation with other Middle East and Arab


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Oksana Antonenko


states. And finally, there are claims thatRussia cannot consider Israel as a reliablestrategic partner for future upgrades becauseU.S. influence over Israel which couldsabotage future contracts.

Concerns over the reliability of Israelicooperation were tested in April 2000 whenthe United States pressured Israel to cancel itscontract to install the Elta Phalcon phased-array radar (Airborne Early Warning system)on the Russian A-50 airframe for export toChina. U.S. Secretary of Defense WilliamCohen announced that this system couldchange the balance of forces in the TaiwanStraits and endanger U.S. troops.(36) Cohenalso warned that China could sell the Israel

technology to Iran and Iraq. Under continuedstrong U.S. pressure, Israeli Prime MinisterEhud Barak cancelled the sale on July 10,2000.(37) It now appears that Russia willexploit the failure of that contract to sellChina A-50s with Russian avionics.(38)

Unless the situation in the Middle Eastescalates further into a prolonged newconflict, and despite the failed AEW deal,Russian-Israeli military-technical cooperationis likely to develop further. This cooperationis clearly mutually beneficial and strategicallyimportant for the Russian defense industry,which is unlikely to significantly improve thereputation of its electronic sub-systems, whilecontinuing to depend on exports for survival.

For Israel, this cooperation is likely to bring significant profits as Russia expands itsexports to both traditional and new markets.However, Israel remains concerned over

potential transfer of its technology to

adversaries in the Arab states, which maintainclose military cooperation with Russia.

CONCLUSIONSAlthough Russia's military

cooperation with Middle East states declinedsignificantly after the end of Cold War andthe collapse of the Soviet Union, it continuedto maintain presence in the old traditionalSoviet markets. Moscow has developedcooperation with new clients such as Israel,

the UAE and Kuwait. Although Russia'smilitary supplies were mainly oriented

towards the upgrade and modernization ofSoviet equipment, there have been a numberof contracts that have shifted the military

balance among different armed forces in theregion. These include, for example, the sale

of three Kilo-class submarines to Iran as wellas the contract for supply of anti-tank missilesto Syria and advanced air defense systems tothe United Arab Emirates. Additional deals ofthe same significance have so far beendelayed by financial difficulties by Russia'sclients in the region. But a number ofcontracts under negotiation between Russiaand Syria, Libya, Algeria and Iran may becompleted and thus significantly alter theregional balance of forces.

Despite continuous pressure on Russiafrom the United States and Israel, Moscow isdetermined to expand its military sales to theregion. Aside from economic needs,Moscow's determination is further reinforced

by its perception that the United States istrying to marginalize Russia's role in theregion. In an environment of mistrust anddeteriorating U.S.-Russian relations,Washington will have little leverage to

pressure Moscow to abandon these efforts, ascases of Russian technology transfer to Iranand Syria--despite U.S. threats of sanctions--demonstrated. Russian-Israeli militarycooperation represents a more effectivealternative to sanctions-driven policies. Aslong as Russia sees economic benefits fromalternative military cooperation programs, itis more likely to exercise restraint in itsmilitary transfers.

* Oksana Antonenko is Research Fellow and Programme Director (Russia and Eurasia) at

the International Institute for Strategic

Studies. Research support for this paper was

provided by Colin Robinson.

This article is based on a presentation made

at the conference "Armed Forces in the

Middle East: Politics and Strategy," held on

November 15-16, 2000. The conference was

sponsored by the Johns Hopkins University

School of Advanced International Studies(SAIS) Foreign Policy Institute, the Begin-


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Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and the

Bar-Ilan University Department of Political

Studies. This article will also appear as a

chapter in an upcoming book Barry Rubin

and Tom Keaney (eds.), Armed Forces in the

Middle East (Frank Cass, upcoming).

NOTES1. Yuri Morozov, "Strategiya Rossii v oblastivoenno-technicheskogo sotrudnichestva sostranami blizhnego vostoka (Russia'sStrategies for military-technical cooperationwith the Middle East", Arms Export Journal(Russia's AST Centre, No. 3, 2000).2. Ibid.3. 4 T-72, 3 BMP-2, two 140mm artillery

pieces, and two unspecified missiles andmissile launchers were also listed as imported

by Iran in 1998, but not confirmed by theMilitary Balance.4. UN CAR gives 91 BMP-3. IISS also showsdelivery of unspecified number of BMP-2;Currently, Kuwait holds 46 BMP-2 and 55BMP-3. (Military Balance, 2000-2001).5. UN CAR shows a transfer of 27 ACV notconfirmed by the Military Balance.6. Not reported in the Military Balance.7. Andrei Volpin, Russian Arms Sales Policytowards the Middle East. The WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy Report (October1993), p.14.8. Deputy Chairman of the State DumaDefense Committee said that "apart fromcommercial interests, Iran is a regional

partner and our cooperation with Iran is long-term." Janes Defense Weekly (Volume 33,Issue 016, April 19, 2000).

9. Statement by John Baker, Deputy AssistantSecretary of State, Washington Post, 26October, 2000.10. RFE/RL Newsline, Part I, 27 November2000, quoting Vremya Novostei and

Nezavisimaya Gazeta.11. Yuri Morozov, "Strategiya Rossii voblasti voenno-technicheskogosotrudnichestva so stranami blizhnegovostoka (Russia's Strategies for military-technical cooperation with the Middle East",

Arms Export Journal (Russia's AST Centre, No. 3, 2000).

12. Steve Rodan, 'Secret Israeli data revealsIran can make missile in year', Defense News,October 6-12, 1997, cited in Stephen Blank"The Spirit of Eternal Negation: Russia'sHour in the Middle East." The Conflict

Studies Research Centre (November 1998), p.22.13. Sources cited in Stephen Blank "TheSpirit of Eternal Negation: Russia's Hour inthe Middle East." The Conflict StudiesResearch Centre (November 1998), p. 22.14. The James Town Monitor(http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/005/052_002.htm).15. Paul Goble "A Russian-IranianRapprochement", RFE/RL

(http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/07/f.r u.000703124557.html).16. Vadim Kozyulin, "Russia and Syria:Military-Technical Bargaining", YadernyiKontrol Digest (Volume 5, No 3(15),Summer 2000).17. Yuri Morozov, "Strategiya Rossii voblasti voenno-technicheskogosotrudnichestva so stranami blizhnegovostoka (Russia's Strategies for military-technical cooperation with the Middle East",Arms Export Journal (Russia's AST Centre,

No 3, 2000).18. Andrei Volin, "Russian Arms Sales Policytoward the Middle East", The WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy (October 1993),

p. 13.19. Yuri Morozov, "Strategiya Rossii voblasti voenno-technicheskogosotrudnichestva so stranami blizhnegovostoka (Russia's Strategies for military-

technical cooperation with the Middle East",Arms Export Journal (Russia's AST Center, No 3, 2000).20. Janes Defense Weekly, (Volume 030,Issue 005, August 5, 1998).21. David Hurst, "Russia Agrees to sell armsto Syria", The Guardian, April 29, 1994.22. Independent Military Review. 29 October1999. (http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/1999-10-29/1_korotko.html).23. Vadim Kozyulin, "Russia and Syria:

Military-Technical Bargaining", Yadernyi


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Oksana Antonenko


Kontrol Digest (Volume 5, No. 3(15),Summer 2000).24. Yuri Morozov, "Strategiya Rossii voblasti voenno-technicheskogosotrudnichestva so stranami blizhnego

vostoka (Russia's Strategies for military-technical cooperation with the Middle East",Arms Export Journal (Russia's AST Center,

No 3, 2000).25. "Damascus reportedly offers use of naval

base to Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean",Al-Quds, April 2, 1999. (cited in the BBCsummary of world broadcasts, April 6, 1999).26. Independent Military Review (No. 028,August 8, 2000).27 "Russia modernises United Arab Emirates'

infantry combat vehicles". SWB SU/3833S1/1 May 6, 2000.28. Independent military Review. (No. 021,16 June, 2000).29. The Jamestown Foundation Monitor(Volume 6, Issue 105),(http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/006/105_001.htm).30. Yuri Morozov, "Strategiya Rossii voblasti voenno-technicheskogosotrudnichestva so stranami blizhnegovostoka (Russia's Strategies for military-technical cooperation with the Middle East",Arms Export Journal (Russia's AST Center,

No. 3, 2000).31. Janes World Armies.32. Independent Military Review. 18 August,2000.33. Yuri Morozov, "Strategiya Rossii voblasti voenno-technicheskogosotrudnichestva so stranami blizhnego

vostoka (Russia's Strategies for military-technical cooperation with the Middle East",Arms Export Journal (Russia's AST Center,

No. 3, 2000).34. Ibid.35. Ibid.36. Janes Defense Weekly, (Volume 033,Issue 016, 19 April, 2000).37. China's Foreign Conventional ArmsAcquisitions: Background and Analysis, CRSReport for Congress, October 10, 2000,

Congressional Research Service, pp. CRS-20.

38. "Russia to sell radar planes to China",ITAR-TASS, 31 October 2000, SWB/3987.

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