The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 6 | Number 2 | Article ID 4865 | Mar 15, 2016

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“The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster is a Serious Crime”:Interview with Koide Hiroaki 福島核災害は明らかに深刻な犯罪である—小出裕章氏に聞く

Katsuya Hirano, Hirotaka Kasai

Translation by Robert Stolz

Transcription by Akiko Anson

Introduction

Koide Hiroaki (66) has emerged as aninfluential voice and a central figure in the anti-nuclear movement since the nuclear meltdownat Fukushima Daiichi of March 11, 2011. Hespent his entire career as a nuclear engineerworking towards the abolition of nuclear powerplants. His powerful critique of the "nuclearvillage" and active involvement in anti-nuclearmovements "earned him an honorable form ofpurgatory as a permanent assistant professorat Kyoto University."1 Koide retired from KyotoUniversity in the spring of 2015, but continuesto write and act as an important voice ofconscience for many who share his vision of thefuture free from nuclear energy and weapons.He has authored 20 books on the subject.Professor Kasai Hirotaka and I visited his officeat Kyoto University's Research ReactorInstitute in Kumatori, Osaka, on December 26th,2014 for this interview. We believe that thecontents of the interview, which offer newinformation about the degree of radioactivecontamination and invaluable insight intoKoide's ethical and political stance as ascientist, remain crucial for our criticalreflection on ecological destruction, theviolation of human rights, and individualresponsibility. Professor Robert Stolz, thetranslator of this interview and the author ofBad Water (Duke University Press, 2015),provides a historical perspective on thei n t e r v i e w i n a s e p a r a t e a r t i c l e

(https://apjjf.org/2016/06/Stolz.html). KH

Koide Hiroaki

Interview

I The Fukushima Disaster and Government andCorporate Response

Hirano: How does the Fukushima accidentcompare with the bombing of Hiroshima orChernobyl in its scale? What are the possibleeffects of this yet unknown exposure?

Koide: Let's start with the scale of the accident:It was a core meltdown involving the release ofvarious kinds of radioactive material.Radioactive noble gas isotopes were alsoreleased, as were iodine, cesium, strontium,and other radioactive material. The noble gasisotopes have a short half-life and so at thisstage they are all gone. Iodine, too, is gone. Sonow four years since the accident the materialsthat are still a problem are cesium-137,strontium-90, and tritium; really, it's these

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three.2

Now, as for the scale of the accident, I think itwould be best to compare these threeradionuclides. Today the main contamination ofJapanese soil is the radionuclide cesium-137[Cs-137 or 1 3 7Cs]. The ocean is largelycontaminated with strontium-90 [Sr-90 or 90Sr]and tritium [T or 3H]. Right now the mainculprit adding to the exposure of the people inJapan is Cs-137, so I think it's best to useCs-137 as a standard for measuring the scale ofthe accident.

But we simply don't know with any precisionhow much Cs-137 was released. That's becauseall the measuring equipment was destroyed atthe time of the accident. How much Cs-137 wasreleased into the air? How much was spilled inthe sea? We just don't know.

Still, the Japanese government has reportedestimates to the IAEA [International AtomicEnergy Agency]. According to those estimatedlevels, reactors 1, 2, and 3 had been inoperation on March 11, 2011, and all threesuffered meltdowns. Those three reactorsreleased 1.5x1016 Becquerels of Cs-137, whichwould make it a release of 168 times moreradioactive material than the Hiroshimabombing. And this is only material released intothe atmosphere-at least according to Japanesegovernment estimates.

But I myself think the government's numbersare an underestimate. Various experts andinstitutes from around the world have offeredseveral of their own estimates. There are thosethat are lower than the Japanese government'snumbers and those that are higher, some twoor three times higher than the government'snumbers. According to these other estimates Ithink that the release of Cs-137 into theatmosphere could be around 500 times theHiroshima bombing.

Now for what has been washed into the sea.That number is likely not much different from

the levels released into the atmosphere. Eventoday we are unable to prevent this release.And so if we combine the amount of Cs-137released in the air and the ocean together, weget an estimate several hundred times theHiroshima levels. And some estimates suggestthe Fukushima accident could be as much asone-thousand Hiroshimas.

Now to compare this with other accidents: Theamount released into the atmosphere from theexplosion during the accident at the Chernobylnuclear plant was 800 to 1000 times theHiroshima levels. Put simply, these estimatesplace Fukushima on par with Chernobyl.

Worse than any of these, however, isatmospheric testing. From the 1950s to the1960s atmospheric testing of nuclear weaponshad already released Cs-137 into the air morethan sixty times the numbers released even bythe Japanese government for Fukushima. Ofcourse Fukushima is an incredible tragedy, butconsidered from the earth as a whole it is arather small accident.

Hirano: I want to ask in more detail about theeffect of Cs-137 on the human body and theenvironment.

Koide: Cesium is an alkaline metal. From thehuman body's perspective, cesium closelyresembles potassium. The body containsenormous amounts of potassium. It is essential

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for humans. It's everywhere in our bodies.Especially our flesh and muscles are full ofpotassium. And because of this, when cesium isreleased into the environment, the body dealswith cesium as it does with the alkaline metalpotassium, which is to say that it is taken intothe body and accumulates there.

Strontium is an earth metal. The body treats itlike calcium. As you know calcium is a humanbody building block that accumulates in ourbones. Strontium, too, is taken into and collectsin the bones. Just as cesium is taken in and istransported to the flesh and muscle.

Hirano: Comparing the releases from nucleartests by the US and the USSR during the ColdWar period, you said that the Fukushimaaccident was small. So in what way should wethink about Fukushima: is it best to consider ita Japanese problem, or to consider it from aglobal perspective?

Koide: The amount of products of nuclearfission released during atmospheric testing wasenormous, and these particles continue toexpose humans to radiation. I'm a bit olderthan you and I recall in my childhood being toldnot to let the rain fall on me at the time of thetesting. In this way everyone on earth has beenexposed (hibaku/被曝). And because of thistesting, historically speaking, cancer rates haveslowly risen; I believe this increase in cancer isdue to the exposure suffered during theatmospheric testing. Now the radioactivematerial released from Fukushima has beendispersed across the globe and so once againeveryone on earth has been exposed toadditional radiation. I think we can expectcancer rates to rise once again.

Atmospheric nuclear testing released all of theradioactive material in the explosions, whichentered the stratosphere. Between thestratosphere and the troposphere there is thetropopause, and every year come spring all thatmaterial dispersed in the stratosphere breaksthrough the tropopause and falls to earth. So

that material, though initially dispersed in thestratosphere, eventually falls to earth evenly,e v e r y w h e r e(http://scied.ucar.edu/shortcontent/troposphere-overview/). Actually, it might not be accurateto say that it falls evenly on the earth. Themajority of the testing was done in thetemperate regions of the northern hemisphere,such as Nevada and the Semipalatinsk test site[in Kazakhstan], so that the northernhemisphere-as the site of most of the testing-isheavily contaminated, and within that thetemperate region is heavily contaminated. Still,I can say the atmospheric testing overall hascaused global contamination.

My focus now is to figure out how to deal withthe acute and heavy contamination fromFukushima. I know something needs to be doneright there in that specific place. Thatcontamination will disperse and be diffusedacross the globe. Once dispersed, the amountof radioactive material from Fukushima will besmall when compared with the atmospherictesting. Which is not to say it is not harmful. Anincrease in cancer will be the result. I mentionthat for humanity as a whole; the atmospherictests were worse.

Now, strontium-90 [Sr-90] has been leakingfrom Fukushima into the ocean, so it willeventually reach the United States, especiallythe west coast. This much we are sure of. Butto answer your question, the amount ofdispersed cesium and strontium released by theatmospheric tests is tens of times greater thanthe Fukushima levels. Because the west coastof the US is already contaminated from theatmospheric testing, though the dispersedcontamination from Fukushima will reach USshores, for people living on the US west coast,the Fukushima accident―and this is perhapsawful to say―contamination from Fukushima ishardly worth considering. Historically a muchgreater event has already taken place.

Hirano: To put that another way, the current

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Fukushima accident gives us a chance torecons ider the enormity o f the pastcontamination from US and Soviet atmospherictests, which has not been openly discussed.

Koide: Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, it is themasses of people who need to realize theimpact of the contamination on them. In thecase of the Fukushima disaster, for example,they need to be aware that some radioactivematerial is reaching the North American coast,and the prevailing westerly winds will carryanything released into the atmosphere to theUS. Those earlier numbers from the Japanesegovernment indicate that the levels for Cs-137in the atmosphere are 168 times those of theHiroshima bombing. I've been told that level is1.5 x 1016 Becquerels [Bq]. These exponentscan be a pain to process, so if we think of it inpeta-units-which is 1015-we get essentially 15petabecquerels [PBq].

That said, while we are not really sure this isthe number, we do know that a portion of thismaterial will ride the prevailing winds acrossthe Pacific Ocean. On the other hand, closer tothe ground, the winds will be east, south, andnorth, and therefore this other portion will fallon Japan―and we can investigate the actuallevels here: how much fell on this town, on thisprefecture? Adding these up, it seems to beonly 2.4 PBq. Which is to say of the total fifteenPBq, 2.4, or roughly only 16%, fell on Japanesesoil. If the totals are higher, still a smallershare of the total contamination will have fallenon Japan compared with the Pacific, with thelargest portion falling on the west coast of theUnited States.

So why don't we hear complaints from the US?Why are there no calls for compensation?Whenever someone asks me this, I simply saythat there just aren't any such complaints. Whyis this so? Well the levels released by the USduring the atmospheric testing were tens oftimes greater than Fukushima. They are thecriminals, so they cannot ask for compensation

from Japan. The U.S. government does notwant to have to reflect on its own past, and Ithink they are eager to completely avoidbringing up anything like that conversation.That is why I believe it is so important thatthose who have been exposed to radioactivecontamination realize what atmospheric testinghas done to them.

Kasai: I'd like to get back to the moment of theaccident in some detail. On March 11, 2011 wehad the East Japan Disaster (meaning theearthquake and tsunami off Tohoku). You'vealready talked about the string of accidents atthe nuclear plant. At the moment the accidentwas taking place, you were following theresponse by the Japanese government and theTokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in realtime. What did you see in those initialmoments?

Japan's Nuclear Map and Epicenter of theEarthquakes of 3.11

Koide: It was truly a disastrous response. Onthe 11th I was in the laboratory in Kyoto asMarch was my month to work in the radiation-controlled area.3 It was normal workday hoursand various tasks kept me busy working withinthe controlled area. Of course there is no TV oranything like that in the work space. That night

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there was a meeting so I came out to attendand that's when I saw the images of the Sendaiairport being swept away by the tsunami. Thereport said that there had been a devastatingearthquake and tsunami. Then I wonderedabout the safety of the nuclear plants.

Right then, there real ly was no moreinformation. We had scheduled a nuclear safetyissues seminar for the 18th. I've participated inhundreds of these seminars. Participants fromthe Ukraine had just arrived on the 11th. Wepromised to go out drinking after they arrivedand so that night I went out. There was nomore TV, and while there was a vague uneaseamong us, that's how we spent the time.

The next day I learned that all power atFukushima had been lost and I knew thingswere not going to be simple. Then at noon onthe 12th the roof of reactor one was blown off;at that point any expert must have known therehad been a reactor meltdown. So I was certainof a core meltdown and because once it hasgone this far, there is no going back, it wastime to call for anyone who could evacuate todo so. I thought we were at that stage on the12th.

Yet neither the government nor TEPCO said asingle word about a core meltdown; theyannounced that the incident merited a 3 or 4 onthe International Nuclear Event Scale. Iremember thinking "You've got to be kidding!There's already been a meltdown. This is atl e a s t a l e v e l 6 o r 7 .(http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/ines.asp)" But neither the government norTEPCO gave any indication of this and therewas no word of it in the media either.

One by one there were explosions at reactors 3,4, and 2. As an expert in nuclear power, Iunderstood there was absolutely nothing thatcould be done. I thought people needed to beevacuating, but still the Japanese governmentdidn't make the call. Government officials had

set up at an off-site center near a power plantin Fukushima―at first they announcedevacuation inside two kilometers, then thatexpanded to three, five, ten, and finally twentykm. After that nothing was done. The offsitecenter was supposed to coordinate theemergency response in the event of anaccident, but it turned out that every one of theofficials fled. They left the employees behindand fled. The Japanese government's responsewas indescribably cruel.

Kasai: It seems the very words "meltdown" (メルトダウン) and "core meltdown" (roshin yōyū/炉心熔融) were strictly forbidden.

Koide: Exactly.

Kasai: I was in Japan watching on TV. Whatshocked me was all the nuclear power expertsexplaining the incident in the studio. I supposeit was a satellite relay, but when reactornumber three exploded on our screens theywere giving their analyses of the explosion inreal time. There were experts on TV saying thatthe reactor had a blast valve that was usedsuccessfully. Even hearing that, an averageviewer might think something was amiss. Buthaving physicists, experts on radiation, on TVsaying these things, well, even the averageviewer wouldn't buy that explanation. In abroad sense, nuclear experts like yourselfplayed several roles in the media andgovernment.

Koide: Yes, that's clearly true for pronuclearexperts. They all tended to tell a story thatunderestimated the accident. Immediately afterthe accident public announcements andinformation were restricted. As a resultindividual opinions or statements were strictlyforbidden and nearly all experts remainedsilent, so even basic information was notbroadcast. Though I'd made statements fromthe nuclear lab beginning on the 12th, it is likelythere were instructions from the Ministry ofScience and Education to silence me. The headof the lab convened several meetings where he

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told each of us not to make any statement, thatthe lab would toe the official line when dealingwith the mass media. I thought this was wrongand said that anyone who was asked a questionby the media should answer it, further sayingthat if I were asked a question, I had aresponsibility to answer. Since then I'vecontinued to make statements in the media.Still the large majority of nuclear researcherswere not able to do this.

As a result it was the pronuclear researcherswho monopolized the interpretations - exactly.So as they went to the TV studios I think eachwas told: "Today, it's your turn to go to thestudio." I think that's how they played theirpart and handled the media.

Kasai: With respect to controlling information,would you say your experience with the head ofthe nuclear lab shows how the professionalorganizat ions exert pressure on theuniversities?

Koide: Yes, I would. The head of the lab openeda c o n f e r e n c e w i t h a l l t h e o t h e rlaboratories―even I went. There he said thatany statements to the media should be onmessage and come only from the informationoffice.

Kasai: So pressure came from academicconferences.

Koide: Yes, there was pressure coming from theacademic conference side as well. Take forexample something like a conference onnuclear power. From the very start it was nevera real discussion; it was a meeting of powerfuland vocal spokesmen for the nuclearcommunity or village (genshiryoku kyōdōtai/原子力共同体 or genshiryoku mura/原子力村),which is to say the group of pronucleargovernment officials and private companiesmainly centered around the LDP and Toshiba,Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and other pronuclearmanufacturers of power plants―and of coursetheir supporters in the media. Thus as an

organization the conference was predisposed tounderestimate the accident and to thenpromote that underestimation.

Hirano: Immediately after the accident youtestified in the Diet presenting data indicatingthe seriousness of the disaster and demandingthat the government terminate the operation ofall the power plants.4

Koide: I did.

Hirano: After that it seems you weren't againasked to speak publicly, or given theopportunity to offer more detailed thoughts onthe situation.

Koide: By "speak publicly" you mean in the Dietor in some other official government setting?

Hirano: Yes, and also in the media.

Koide: With respect to the media, I've neverreally had any confidence in them. Since theaccident, I've been overwhelmingly busy andhaven't accepted a single invitation from TVstations.

Hirano: I see. So there were invitations.

Koide: There have been many calls saying,"come down to the studio." But I always tellthem that I am too busy for this sort of thing.I'd say, if you come to my office, we could meet.Many did come by, even back then. But aseveryone knows, in television you might talk foran hour and none of it makes it on air, or if itdoes, it's maybe thirty seconds.

Hirano: Right, and only the convenient parts.

Koide: That's it and there's really nothing thatcan be done about it. There was, however, oneoutlet for which I was extremely grateful: thedaily radio program called Tanemaki Journal(種まきジャーナル).5 There I could go on everyday and offer my thoughts live. I wish it couldhave continued, but it was completely and

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totally smashed. What a world we live.

Kasai: So, on the subject of standards used forassessing the danger posed by radiation for thehuman body and the environment: What areyour thoughts on how the government dealswith this issue?

Koide: They are absolutely not dealing with itat all. I think you already know this but inJapan the average person is not supposed to beexposed to more than one milliSievert peryear―that's set by law. Why is that the leveldecided on? Because exposure to radiation isdangerous. If exposure weren't dangerous, iflow levels of exposure were safe, there'd be noproblem even without that legal limit. Butexposure to radiation is dangerous―this is theconclusion of all research. So every nation inthe world has set legal limits for exposure.

For people like me who get paid to work withradiation, it's not really possible to observe the1 m S v / y r l i m i t [ 1 m S v / y r ](http://www2.lbl.gov/abc/wallchart/chapters/15/8.html). We're told that in exchange for oursalaries, we accept exposure to twentymilliSieverts a year. That's the standard I workunder in my job. But the current Japanesegovernment has now s ta ted tha t i fcontamination is under 20mSv/yr somewhere,that place is safe to return to―safe to return toeven for children. This is way beyond commonsense.

Hirano: What is the basis of this claim? Whywould the government announce thesenumbers and forcefully declare these areas safeto return to? What's the basis for thegovernment's numbers?

Koide: The basis for those numbers…forexamp le the government says tha torganizations like the IAEA or the ICRP[International Commission on RadiologicalProtection] suggest that in emergencies duringwhich the 1mSv/yr standard cannot bemaintained standards should be set between

twenty and 100mSv/yr. The government seizeson this and declares that since the IAEA andthe ICRP have said this, that 20mSv/yr istherefore a safe level-usually adding thatmembership in both the IAEA and the ICRP isvoluntary anyway. But because theseorganizations have said this is no reason tobreak Japanese law. If Japan is a nationgoverned by the rule of law at all, surely thismeans that the very people who make the lawsshould also follow them―that should beobvious. But these guys have declared20mSv/yr safe even for children. There isabsolutely no way I can consent to this.

Hirano: So there is no scientific basis for theselevels.

Koide: Well… the danger corresponds to theamount of exposure―you probably knowthis―so for a country that has declared itsintention to maintain the 1mSv/yr standard tothen turn around and ask people to enduretwenty times that level, there is no scientificbasis for that declaration. That's a socialdecision.

But if you want to inquire as to why, as I'vementioned to you, some 2.4 petaBecquerels ofradioactive material have fallen on Japan, thatmaterial has been dispersed, contaminatingTohoku, Kanto, and western Japan. So inaddition to the law setting the legal limit forexposure at 1mSv/yr, there is another law thatstates that absolutely nothing may be removedfrom a radioactive management area in whichthe levels exceed 40,000 Becquerels per squaremeter.

So the question becomes how many places orhow much area has been contaminated beyond40,000 Bq/m 2 ? And according to theinvestigations, that answer is 140,000 km2. Theentirety of Fukushima prefecture has beencontaminated to where all of it must bedeclared a radioactivity management area.Indeed, while centered on Fukushima, parts ofChiba and Tokyo have also been contaminated.

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The number of people living in what must becalled a radiation-controlled area is in themillions, and could exceed ten million.

For me, if Japan is in fact a nation governed bythe rule of law, I believe the government hasthe responsibility to evacuate these entirecommunities. Instead of taking a proper actionto secure people's livelihood, the governmentdecided to leave them exposed to the realdanger of radiation. In my view, Fukushimashould be declared uninhabitable and thegovernment and TEPCO should bear a legalresponsibility for the people displaced anddispossessed by the nuclear disaster. That'swhat I think, but if that were to be done, itwould likely bankrupt the country. I think thateven though it could bankrupt Japan, thegovernment should have carried out theevacuation to set an example of what thegovernment is supposed to do. But obviouslythose in and around the LDP certainly didn'tagree. They've decided to sacrifice people andget by taking on as little burden as possible. Sothey've made the social decision to force peopleto endure their exposure. In my view, this is aserious crime committed by Japan's ruling elite.

I would like people to know just how manythousands of people live in this abnormalsituation where even nuclear scientists like meare not allowed to enter, not to mention, drinkthe water. It is strange that this issue has beenleft out of all debate over the effects of theradioactive exposure. We must be aware thatcontemporary Japan continues to operateoutside the law in abandoning these people totheir fate by saying it's an extraordinarysituation. Under such circumstances, I think,there are a multitude of symptoms of illnessesin contaminated areas. But if we're talkingabout any given symptom, it's hard to say sincewe just don't have any good epidemiologicalstudies, or even any good data. But there willsurely be symptoms, namely cancer andleukemia.

However little exposure to radiation is, itcauses cancer and leukemia―this is theconclusion of all current science. Thesesymptoms are said to become visible 5 yearsafter the initial exposure. But because radiationis not the sole cause of cancer or leukemiaestablishing a direct causal relationship isextremely difficult. For this very reason weneed to continue to investigate the state ofe x p o s u r e b y c o n d u c t i n g r i g o r o u sepidemiological studies. But this governmentwishes instead to hide the damage so I'm afraidno such study is on the horizon. In addition, Ihave heard about many cases of nose bleeding,severe headaches, and extreme exhaustion.And I am truly concerned about small childrenand young people living in Fukushima as theyare most vulnerable to exposure.

Hirano: So what is your view of the actualdamages of radiation exposure on humanhealth?

Koide: On the evening of the Fukushima dai-ichi reactor accident of March 11, 2011, aRadiation Emergency Declaration wasannounced. The Declaration suspended existingJapanese law concerning exposure to radiation.Though Japanese law sets the limit forexposure for the general population at onemilliSievert a year [1mSv/yr], the newpermissible level would be 20 mSv/yr. ThatEmergency Declaration is still in effect. It iscommon knowledge that even low levels ofexposure are dangerous. Including even infantsin this newly imposed 20mSv/yr standard willobviously lead to various diseases. Further,because the monitoring equipment wasdestroyed at the time of the accident we do nothave accurate data on the exposure levels ofthe residents. Numerous cases of thyroidcancer have been found. The prevalence ofthyroid cancer is dozens of times that of normalincidence. Pro-nuclear groups say thosenumbers are the result of the screening processitself, not the effect of radiation exposure.Which is to say that this was the first major

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screening of that population and so it wasnatural that many cases of thyroid cancerwould be found. Put differently, what they aresaying is that they have never conducted athorough study of radiation exposure and itsimpact on human health. Science shouldacknowledge what it already knows and what itdoes not. I f i t is true that there is noestablished scientific data, a properly scientificapproach would be to carry out a throughinvestigation. To deny the damage to health byexposure to radiation without such aninvestigation is absolutely at odds with thescientific spirit. Prof. Tsuda at OkayamaUniversity has already conducted a detailedstudy on the outbreak of thyroid cancer,showing an epidemiological-like outbreak. Justas happened at Chernobyl, as time passes it isclear there will be more and more instances ofall kinds of illnesses.

Hirano: In your books you've often stated thatthere is no uncontaminated food. But for mostJapanese, such basic knowledge seems limitedto food from Fukushima, and nearby parts ofIbaraki, Gumma, Chiba, Miyagi. For foodproduced outside these areas, do you think it'snecessary to have strict testing of food that issold and consumed? What is to be done? Doyou think food from outside these areas shouldalso be subject to strict testing before beingsent to market and consumed?

Koide: Right, as we discussed earlier, beforethe Fukushima accident the entire globe wasalready contaminated with radiation. Thismeans that Tohoku or Kanto or Kansai food, allo f i t , h a s b e e n c o n t a m i n a t e d w i t hradiation―radiation from atmospheric tests.Beyond this, contamination from the 1986Chernobyl accident reached Japan on theprevailing westerly winds, meaning that allJapanese food was contaminated. And on top ofall this, with the Fukushima disaster, as Imentioned, it is not that a thick layer ofcontamination has dispersed to every corner ofthe globe from Fukushima, but that this thick

layer of contamination is right now centered onFukushima.

So if we were to carefully measure the levels offood contamination, we'd more or less findmoving out from the highest levels inFukushima to say western Japan or Kyushu,that the numbers would gradually decline tothe lower levels received from the atmospherictests. Right now the people of Fukushima havebeen abandoned in the areas of the highestlevels of radiation. And abandoned people haveto find a way to live. Farmers produceagricultural goods, dairy farmers produce dairyproducts, and ranchers produce meat; thesepeople must do so in order to live. They are notthe ones to be blamed at all.

As the Japanese state is absolutely unreliable inthis matter, these people have no choice but togo on producing food in that place, all the whilesuffering further exposure. So I don't think wecan throw out the food they produce thereunder those conditions. Inevitably someone hasto consume that food―I suggest it be fed to thepronuclear lobby (laughs). We should serve allof the most heavily contaminated food at saythe employee cafeteria at TEPCO or in thecafeteria for Diet members in the Diet building.But that isn't nearly enough. We must carefullyinspect the food, and once we've determinedwhat foods have what levels of contamination,once that is fully measured and delineated,then those who have the corresponding levelsof responsibility should eat it, should be givenit.

Now of course strict levels of responsibilitycannot really be allotted one by one toindividuals that way, so when it comes to thisfood, I would propose devising a "60 and over"system. The most contaminated foods couldonly be eaten by those 60 years old and older,and from there also have food for "50 andover," "40 and over," "30 and over" - giving thebest food to children. For example, schoollunches would get the most uncontaminated

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food available―there'd still be contaminationfrom the atmospheric tests―but food with onlythose levels would be given to children andonly adults would receive the contaminatedfood. That would be my proposal.

My proposal would f irst be a precisemeasurement, starting from Fukushima andthen of course including western Japan andKyushu, to sort out the levels and thendetermine the relative burdens. I am awarethat this is a controversial proposal, but eachone of us, especially those who built postwarJapan, bears responsibility for allowing oursociety to heavily dependent on nuclear energywithout carefully reflecting on the risks andconsequences of it. And more importantly, wehave the responsibility for protecting children.

Kasai: Recently, that idea has been suggestedin Nishio Masamichi's Radioactive Archipelago(Hibaku retto/『被ばく列島』). You've juststressed that though the first step must be arigorous measurement, right now that is simplyimpossible.

Koide: Right, completely impossible.

Kasai: So, that's true of water as well. First Idon't think most people know how to measurethe levels in water. You've already said how thecurrent minimum standards are worthless, thatbelow a certain threshold it would be displayedas "ND" (Not Detectable). For example, for tapwater, up to 20 Becquerels would be posted as"ND," exactly as if there was no radiationdetected at all. Yet even with all these doubtson measurement, we must start with it, thoughit's a dizzyingly long road ahead. But what doyou think can be done to change this situationfor the better?

Koide: Right now Japan has a standard of100Bq/kg for general foodstuffs. Before theFukushima disaster, Japanese foodstuffs werecontaminated―by the atmospheric tests―at alevel of 0.1Bq/kg. Of course there were somefoods with less contamination and some with

more. Still, roughly speaking it was 0.1Bq/kg.So when you're talking 100 Bq/kg that'sallowing 1,000 times the [pre-Fukushima]levels.

As I said before, any exposure is absolutelydangerous. And the dangers increasecorresponding to an increase in levels ofexposure; this is the conclusion of all research.100 Bq/kg is dangerous, 99 is dangerous, as is90, and 50, and 10―they are all dangerous. 10Bq/kg is 100 times the pre-Fukushima levels.

So I think it's necessary to precisely measurethe levels of contamination. As many people areliving in a state of anxiety, groups likeconsumers' cooperatives and other sorts oforganizations are trying to measure thecontamination on their own. But the measuringdevices that these groups are able to get, suchas the ones called NAI, these devices can onlymeasure levels above 20Bq/kg. While thismeans that they can measure levels as little asone-fifth of the national thresholds, from myperspective even this lower level is far too high.

And the worst thing that could happen isthinking that any contamination below thedetectable limits of these machines, meaningbelow 20Bq/kg, would be misunderstood asbeing free of contamination, and then havingthe Fukushima prefectural government activelyusing this data as good news: "measurementsbelow the detectable limits of the device mustbe clean; we can even serve this food in schoolcafeterias," or PR campaigns announcing"Fukushima produce is safe." Of course itwould be totally outrageous and unthinkableand yes I think every effort should be made toserve the least contaminated food in schoolcafeterias―but the reality is that any foodtested below detectable levels is distributed toschools as safe produce.

I think we need to stop this situation, andtechnical ly speaking, I think severalgermanium semiconductor detectors must bedeployed instead. But a germanium detector

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would cost from $100,000 to $200,000. And inorder to use it, the detector needs to be kept at150 degree below zero Celsius. So these arenot devices that the average citizen is going tobe able to use.

So no matter how dedicated any individualcitizen may be, there are real limitations whenit comes to measuring radiation levels. If youask me what should be done, for example whenfaced with Cs-137 or Sr-90, what should bedone about these contaminants? Well thesecontaminants were produced in a nuclearreactor at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi plantand it means that they are unmistakablyTEPCO's property. And if their private propertyis found to have contaminated other areas theyhave undeniable responsibility for it. So I thinkthis is something that is required of TEPCO. Ithink it is TEPCO's responsibility to preciselymeasure which foods have been contaminated,and to what extent, and then to report theresults to the public. I think this is somethingthe public should demand. After TEPCO thegovernment also has responsibility―they gavetheir seal of approval to TEPCO after all. So thepublic should also demand that the governmentprecisely measure the levels and publish theresults.

Because there are limits to what one can do onone's own, I think we need a movement thatforces the government and TEPCO to takeresponsibility for the precise measurement ofthe contamination.

Hirano: Some have raised doubts over preciselythis kind of rigorous measurement citingpossible damage caused by rumors ormisinformation (fūhyōhigai/風評被害), but tome this sort of criticism is tainted with a sort of"national morality" discourse (kokumindōtokuron/国民道徳論).

Koide: Yes, I think so.

Hirano: There seems to be a very strong senseof dividing people into those who are seen as

patriotic and those who are seen as un-Japanese (hikokumin/非国民).

Koide: For me, I've been making statements onthe Fukushima contamination. Thesestatements have been denounced and evenm a d e s o m e a n g r y w i t h m e . B u t t h econtamination is real. For a long time now I'vebeen the kind of person who would rather hearthe truth, no matter how awful, than to remainignorant. I am absolutely not going to hide thetruth; no matter how much criticism I have totake I am going to diligently report the truth.Yeah, a lot of people get angry with me.(Laughs).

Kasai: On this point, this year saw thepublishing of Kariya Tetsu's manga series Oishinbo: Fukushima no shinjitsu (『美味しんぼ– 福島の真実』). 6 It would seem a kind ofpolitical campaign was developed to attack it.What is your take on this?

Koide: The editors sent me a copy and I've readit. It's an awesome manga. In this day and agewe just don't have this kind of detailed mangaon this problem and I am grateful for it. Andmore, Oi shinbo talks about the nosebleeds[caused by radiation]. The nosebleeds are real.Lots of Fukushima residents are said to besuffering from nosebleeds. Itokawa, the mayorof Futaba machi, has shown us proof. One ofmy acquaintances often talks about thenosebleeds.

It was true at Chernobyl, too. But nosebleedshave not been definitively and scientificallylinked to exposure to radiation.7 Still there is nodenying that it is real and happening. So even ifcurrent science is unable to explain it, it's forscience to ask just what is going on? Sciencehas a duty to explain this, to tell the truthwithout obfuscation. No matter the reasons, weshould be allowed to tell the truth. So for me Idon't think there is anything wrong with thispart of Oi shinbo.

Kasai: I think Oi shinbo clearly exposed the

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politically constructed narratives "damage fromrumor or misinformation" and "emotionalbonds" (kizuna/絆) as fictions, and so for thisreason it appears it had to be crushed.

Koide: Exactly. But Kariya, the author of Oishinbo, is not one of the criminals responsiblefor the Fukushima disaster. Rather thegovernment off icials who caused theFukushima disaster are the criminals. Yet it isthese same government bureaucrats who nowcome out and complain that this manga is outof order. I say, "No, it's you who are out oforder. We need to send you to prison rightnow."

But isn't it always the case that a criminal whohas committed a crime remains unquestionedand so starts bashing those who are telling thetruth? When that happens I think the problemis precisely this word you just used "emotionalbonds." Since Fukushima, I have come to hatethis word. (Laughs).

Hirano: "Bonds" seems to be the newnationalism, doesn't it?

Koide: Yes, yes it does.

Hirano: You've often said that the Japaneseeconomy and the people's lifestyle would befine even without a single nuclear power plant.In fact, since the government shut all thenuclear reactors down, the people haveexperienced no real trouble at all. In addition,considered in light of world standards we stillhave material riches and a lifestyle of surplus.Given this, what are your thoughts on the callto restart the reactors? For what purpose, whatreason do you think the government has?8

Koide: First of all, the power companies don'twant to go bankrupt. In other words, the headsof the power companies do not want to takepersonal responsibility. For example, if thereactors are restarted and there's an accident,are the heads of the power companies going tobe punished? We already know that they will

not be. Even after the Fukushima disasterneither the chairman, nor the CEO, nor anyonebelow―not a single person―was punished.9 Itcertainly looks as if the reactors are restartedand there's an accident, the heads of the powercompanies would not be required to take anyresponsibility. The heads of the powercompanies, from Kyushu Electric to KansaiElectric, have received this message loud andclear.

What's more, if the nuclear power plants areidled and not allowed to restart, then all thecapital they represent becomes a non-performing asset. And of course this isanathema to anyone in management.

Hirano: If we could return to a technicaldiscussion specifically how to decommission areactor. As have others in your field you'vealready stated that a full end game cannot beenvisioned yet. Still could you talk about whatmakes this issue so difficult?

Koide: By decommissioning you mean theendpoint of the Fukushima reactors?

Hirano: Yes, what does it mean for Fukushimadai-ichi?

Koide: When we say decommission we basicallymean: How do we fully contain the radiation?At least I think that's the main point. Now thisis impossible if we don't know the status of themelted core. Though it's been four years sincethe disaster we simply do not know where thecore is or in what state it is.

This is a situation that only happens in nuclearaccidents. However large a chemical plantexplosion may be there'd probably be an initialfire, but usually after several days, perhapsweeks you'd still be able to go on site andinvestigate. You'd be able to see just howthings broke down. And in some situationsmight even be able to fix them. But with anaccident at a nuclear plant you cannot even goon site four years later―probably not even ten

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years later.

Hirano: Because the contamination is so severethat no one can come close to it.

Koide: Yes. For humans going there meansinstant death, so the only way at all is to userobots. But robots are extremely vulnerable toradiation. Consider, robots receive theirinstructions through series of 1s and 0s, soshould the radiation switch a 0 to a 1 you'd endup with completely different instructions.Essentially robots are useless. Even if you areable to send them in they can never return.Because this has been the case up to now, theonly way left in the end might be to use robotsthat try to avoid exposure or that are built asmuch as possible to withstand exposure, butthat is no simple thing.

So it means until we figure out what to do itwould stil l take many years. Once youunderstand this fact you can start thinkingabout what can be done. And at the very leastthe "road map" devised by the government andTEPCO is the most absolutely optimistic roadmap that there could be. They are convincedthat the melted core fell through the bottom ofthe pressure vessel and now lie at the bottomof the containment vessel―basically piling uplike nuggets of the melted core. There's no wayt h i s w o u l d b e t h e c a s e(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201108085674). (Laughs).

As the severity of the disaster became clear,water was repeatedly thrown on the reactors.This water would evaporate and dissipatecontinuously. That was the actual situation.There is no way that the melted core wouldhave stayed as slimy liquid and then piled uplike so many little nuggets. It should have beenscattered all over the place. This is how thegovernment and TEPCO's roadmap goes: Thebuns would stay at the bottom of thecontainment vessel, above which is the reactorpressure vessel―a steel pressure furnace. Withthe furnace floor broken open, there is a hollow

at the bottom through which the melted coremust have leaked.

So at some point both the containment vesseland the pressure vessel would be filled withwater and they'll be able to see the nuggets ofmelted core by looking from above down intothe water. They say the nuggets (the fallenmaterial), yes, that they sit some thirty to fortymeters below the water's surface, that they'lleventually be able to grab and remove them.This is all it takes, according to the governmentand TEPCO's roadmap. Not a chance. Thissimply cannot be done.

Hirano: Obviously we can't confirm or reallysay anything definitive about the situation inthe reactors, but what do you think hashappened?

Koide: I simply don't know. But as I havementioned, this whole "nugget" scenario is justnot the case, and so I think the materials arescattered all over the place. Though thecontainment vessel is made of steel, if themelted core has come in contact with thatsteel, just as it ate through the floor of thepressure vessel, it could possibly have meltedthrough the containment vessel. Depending onhow things developed this, too, is a possibility.Unfortunately, I simply do not know.

Hirano: If that is in fact the situation, whatsteps are necessary?

Koide: First, as we talked about earlier,radiation must be prevented from beingreleased into the environment. As I considerthis task as "decommissioning" or the finalcontainment of the accident, I think in order toprevent the release into the environment youmust do whatever you can starting from theworst-case scenario.

There are situations in which the containmentvessel can suffer a melt-through. I think thislikely has already happened. And if it hashappened what should be done? Outside the

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reactor there flows ground water. If the meltedcore were to come in contact with the groundwater , the whole s i tuat ion would beunmanageable. While this may have alreadyhave happened, in order to get any kind ofcontrol over the situation, some sort of barriermust be built to prevent the melted core fromreaching the ground water. I've been sayingthis since May 2011―and they have not done athing.

Kasai: This barrier would be an ice dam, a wallof super-chilled soil.

Koide: That's the most recent idea. But itsimply cannot be done successfully. It wouldcost billions of dollars. And it would fail. Andwhen it did fail they'd say there's nothing to bedone but build a concrete wall. No matter howfoolish an idea may be, they'll just keep movingfrom failure to failure.

But really, for the construction companiesthat's a good thing. I think Kashima would bethe ones to build the super-chilled earth wall,for some billions of dollars. And if it doesn'tw o r k ― t h e y w o u l d n ' t h a v e t o t a k eresponsibi l i ty . Next they 'd bui ld animpermeable concrete wall. Several hugeconstruction firms (zenekon/ゼネコン) wouldbe contracted and would all make billions.

But considered from the perspective of actuallyending the disaster, it would be a series offailures. Personally, I think an underground,impermeable wal l needs to be bu i l timmediately. They are not going to be able toremove the material. All that can be done is tocontain it. Underground the wall needs to bestrengthened; above ground the only choice issome sort of sarcophagus like the one they builto v e r C h e r n o b y l(http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25086097). But even this would take dozens of years―I'llprobably be dead by then.

Kasai: There are temporary tanks sitting onland for this water, but they are starting to

leak. What should be done about thiscontaminated water? There's not enough spacefor all of it on land; it cannot be controlled; andevery year the volume grows larger.

Koide: The radioactive water has penetratedthe coastline around the Fukushima Daiichi.Underground water in the large area ofFukushima has been seriously contaminated.And at some point those contaminated watertanks will fail. I thought we must do everythingthat we possibly could. Already in March of2011 there was some 100,000 tons ofcontaminated water. Even then I proposedmoving it but didn't get anywhere with it. Nowt h e r e ' s u p - t o 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s . I n t h enear―meaning not too distant―future therewill be nothing left but to release it into thesea.10 The water contains plutonium 239 and itsrelease into the Ocean has both local andglobal impacts. A microgram of plutonium cancause death if inhaled.

Contaminated Water Tanks

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Kasai: It appears that they are already movingtoward that direction a little at a time aren'tthey.

Koide: The Nuclear Regulatory Committee hasbeen hinting at the possibility of releasing itinto the ocean.

Kasai: They have been trying to persuade thefishing cooperatives and others to allow therelease.

Koide: Yes, they have.

Kasai: Something that has not been much of atopic of discussion today is decontamination. Ithas become a rather large industry, in otherwords, "the exposure industry" (hibaku sangyō/被曝産業). Do you think decontamination isreally meaningful and effective?

Koide: Yes, I do. And we must do it. But, to saythat because we've decontaminated some areathat the whole issue is resolved, or that peoplemay safely live in a decontaminated place―Ithink that is a real problem.

First, fundamentally, people must not be forcedto live in contaminated areas that must bedecontaminated. First must come completeevacuation. The state must take on theresponsibility to allow whole communities toevacuate. Of course, they did not do this.

Briefly, I use the word "decontamination"(josen/除染), which is a compound wordwritten with the characters for "remove" and"stain." But this is something that cannot becompleted when it comes to radiation, so theoriginal sense of the word "removal ofcontaminants" is impossible. But as long aspeople are abandoned in the contaminatedareas, I believe all possible actions should betaken to lessen their exposure. It is essentialthat the contamination be removed as far awayas possible, to be transported far from wherepeople live. For this reason I prefer to call it"[toxic] relocation" (isen/移染).

But even if this is done, that does not mean thatthe radiation has been erased. This stuffcontaminates everything from mountains towhat have you, it gets into the space of people'slives. When that happens it must be removed.But removal merely means moving it around―itdoes not mean eliminating it. It means anotherjob is waiting to handle the contaminatedmaterials that get moved around.

Right now the authorities say they want variousprefectures and other local governments tobuild a temporary storage and bury theaccumulated contamination there.

We talked about this before, but thecontaminants themselves were clearly formerlyin the reactor at TEPCO's Fukshima Daiichiplant and are therefore also clearly TEPCO'sproperty. So while it is residents who are doingthe hard work of col lect ing al l thesecontaminants, I think it would be right and justfor these contaminants to be returned toTEPCO. Earlier prof. Kasai told us thecontaminants were being called "no-one'sproperty" (mushubutsu/無主物), but I say in allseriousness, the conclusion of my logic here isto say to TEPCO: "Hey, this is your crap" andreturn it to them. That way the residents arenot forced to accept the stuff, TEPCO is. Thebest solution is to return all of the materialback to the Fukushima Daiichi plant, but that isnot possible. Right now that place is abattlefield between poorly paid workers andthe radiation, so I don't see this as a possibility.

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What I would most like to do is have TEPCO'sheadquarters buried under all the radiation,but whenever I say this people just laugh.(laughs)

I do have a second proposal. Fifteen kilometerssouth of Fukushima Daiichi [Fukushima 1] isthe Fukushima dai-ni [Fukushima 2] nuclearplant. There is a lot of wide open space there.So first off we would return the Fukushima 1contamination to TEPCO there. I think therewould be enough space, but if there were not,the res t cou ld be taken to TEPCO'sKashiwazaki Kariya nuclear plant. It's theworld's largest nuclear plant and so there is alot of space. I think turning that place into anuclear waste site is a good idea.

Lately I've been invited to Kashiwazaki11 andtalked about it. I think I've become a hated manthere. (Laughs). But I think taking fullresponsibility for various actions is the mostimportant thing. And when it comes to thisparticular disaster no one has greaterresponsibility than TEPCO. As I think itimportant for one to take full responsibility, ifFukushima 2 doesn ' t work out , thenKashiwazaki Kariya is the only other option.

Hirano: State expenditures for decontaminationhave supposedly reached one trillion yen.

Koide: It's more than that.

Hirano: This summer I spent some time in Iitatevillage. Of course at the time the place wascrawling with decontamination workers. It wasa truly bizarre scene. I had the feeling ofrunning around on a moonscape. Of coursethere were no res idents there - jus tdecontamination workers in strange gear,trucks running all over the place. Looking atthat scene, being shown the actual work ofdecontaminat ion, i t seemed to be anexcruciatingly slow―even endless―endeavor. Imean they were scrubbing everything withsmall brushes. I was able to ask the workers afew questions―off the record. Many werepeople from Hokkaido, Okinawa, andFukushima who had lost their homes. It was acollection of modern day migrant workers andvictims of disaster. They said that they work forjust 15,000 yen a day.

I asked them if they thought their work wasdoing any good. They said they needed themoney and honestly had no way of knowing ifthis sort of minute and delicate work wouldremove the contamination.

Was this a mistake? Is scrubbing everything byhand and then dumping it all in the groundreally the only way to decontaminate an area?

Decontamination Workers

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Koide: Well I think both that it is and it isn'teffective. For example, when they first startedthe decontamination work, what they did wasblasting everything with high-pressure waterhoses. That's bad. All that does is get all thecontamination moving around. It's really justdispersing it.

Some of my colleagues have said that is a badmethod. Be it a roof or a wall, you shouldn'tjust douse it with water. To really remove thecontamination, you would first cover it withsomething that could prevent the escape ofradioactivity then knock down the radiatedstructure, tear it all off, and then fold it up andcollect it all. I think that's probably true. But ittakes a long time.

I think there are effective ways of doing it and Ithink there are ineffective ways. Still it isfundamentally impossible to erase thecontamination and so it must be moved. Theonly thing we should be doing is thinking aboutthe easiest way to relocate it all.

Hirano: That's the meaning of "effective" in thissituation isn't it.

Koide: Right. So the current method may berather small in scale. But for me even small-scale methods are necessary. As long as peopleare living there everything is necessary.

Of course, there's legitimate criticism over thefact that this is a decontamination business andthat the large construction companies aregetting rich, but again, for me, as long as thereare abandoned people still living there it allmust be done.

Hirano: It was really a shock going there andseeing it. To see those workers and, honestly,their lack of conviction for the work. It was areally weird scene. No real enthusiasm, butrather one day after the other, contingentlabor. The media has reported that the workerscome from a few particular prefectures, butactually being there and talking to them, I

could really get a true sense of the structure ofeconomic inequality in Japan, that this sort ofwork found this kind of person, a personcoming from economically precarious andsocially marginalized backgrounds. In fact, youcome to understand that decontamination workdepends on these people.

For example, decontamination, or yourpreferred "relocation," couldn't those jobs bemade more equitable―say by requiring TEPCOoffice workers, especially executives, to do it?

Koide: I've said that.

Hirano: You have? (Laughs).

Kasai: So…about the airborne radiation dosageand the soil contamination, there is a publicentity that measures and publishes theairborne levels. But the soil contamination isnot measured. I remember reading aboutChernobyl that the soil contamination levels arethe standard by which one gets the right toevacuation and refuge. But Japan onlymeasures the air. And there are those whodoubt the accuracy of the levels recorded. Ithought the soil contamination had not beenmeasured yet, but from what you mentionedearl ier, we do know the extent of thecontamination, don't we?

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Koide: Yes, we do.

Kasai: The actual levels?

Koide: With respect to soil contamination wemore or less know the extent of it. We largelyknow which prefectures, which towns, andwhich villages―as well as how badly―havebeen contaminated. Four years after thedisaster it has moved around. Radiation movesthrough the environment; it has a materialexistence and also does die out. I'm sure muchhas changed since immediately following theaccident.

We have the data necessary to draw a map ofthe situation immediately following theaccident, but we don't have the data necessaryto draw a map of the contamination today. Thatsaid, we basically know the extent of the soilcontamination.

Kasai : Who is i t that is making thesemeasurements?

Koide: It is basically the Ministry of Education,Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Somelocal governments took part as well. Someindependent groups, as well as some localg o v e r n m e n t s , t o o k p a r t i n t a k i n gmeasurements back then. But for us thenumber one data source is the US military.

Hirano: I see; how is that?

Koide: They worked at truly amazing speed-andaccuracy.

Hirano: Sorry if this next thought seems a bit ofa tangent, but right after the accident both theUS and Japan were looking at the same data.But their interpretations of it were extremelyfar apart. The US ordered all of its personnel toevacuate an area 80 km from Fukushima. WhileJapan's largest evacuation zone was 20 km.Where does this disparity in evacuation zonescome from? They are both looking at the samedata. How do they arrive at such definitive anddivergent judgments?

Koide: Well…and this was true for me, too, anynuclear specialist would have known on March11th-March 12th at the latest-that there hadbeen a meltdown. And this means, quite simply,that control had been lost. And once control islost you simply don't know what is going tohappen next-or that's what you must think atthe time. Disaster preparedness must alwaysimagine the worst-case scenario. If you don'tplan for the worst-case scenario it will be toolate. What the US did was believe there hadbeen a worst-case scenario-a meltdown-and somoved to take care of its people. That's whythey ordered an 80 km evacuation. I think thiswas the correct strategy. Japan didn't do this.Japan was always thinking of the ideal, the bestcase scenario. They had to be thinking theycould still get control and based their policy onthat optimistic assumption. So they onlydeclared a 20 km evacuation zone. I would saythat from this conclusion two things mayunfold: one is their desire to see this as a best-case scenario and the other is their inability to

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deal with it.

Hirano: What do you mean by their inability?

Bags containing contaminated soil. Thisapocalyptic scene extends infinitely in the villagesnear the Fukushima dai-ichi

Koide: In a word, the Japanese state isincapable of functioning adequately whendealing with a disaster. That's why theyevacuated those within 20 km by bus but whenit came to the 30 km zone they told those whocould easily evacuate to do so and for all othersto merely close their doors and windows.

Hirano: So there was no emergencymanagement.

Koide: None. There simply is not a singleperson in the Japanese government who hadthought an accident like this was possible. Theyall immediately fled the off-site center and sothere was abso lute ly no emergencymanagement―there couldn't be. And becausemanagement was now impossible, there wereno announcements. Even if they had declaredan 80 km evacuation zone there were noemergency shelters. They had made nopreparations, so there was nothing to be done.

Hirano: Last summer I interviewed MurakamiT e t s u y a(https://apjjf.org/2015/13/20/Katsuya-Hirano/43

20.html) 12 Just as the accident was happeninghe reached out to the government. But he gotno response. He went to the prefecture. Noresponse from them either. In the end he justused his own judgment. So really there wasessentially zero emergency management inplace. His thoughts at the time were to get thewhole village to emigrate; that really there wasnothing to do but to buy land and move toHokkaido. He said these were his actual plansat the time. In fact, it would seem that the mythof safety has so totally permeated thebureaucracy that there really is no one whothinks about these things―wouldn't you say?

Koide: That's right. Not a single nuclear expertor policy maker ever seriously considered thepossibility of an accident like this. I knewaccidents were possible, and that when theyhappened the damage would be enormous; Ihad been commenting on the possibility,referring to some results of simulations. Butstill I would have thought the kind of disasterthat happened at Fukushima was some kind ofimpossible nightmare―yet it actuallyhappened. It was like the worst nightmarebecoming a reality. And if even I thought thisthen all those pronuclear people surely nevergave it a moment's thought. And so when itactually happened, no one had thought about,let alone built a system to deal with it.

II The Responsibility of the Scientist and theCitizen

Kasai: In your books and lectures you oftenexpress strong respect for Tanaka Shōzō.13 Canyou connect what you've just said to this aswell?

Koide: Sure. I first became aware of Shōzōwhen I was in the student movement during the1970s This was a time when there was closeattention paid to Japan's many pollutionincidents, such as at Minamata. Personally Iwas working on nuclear power, but it was atime when, like it or not, we learned of all theharm that came along with building Japan into

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a modern nation. What I got from Shōzō wasthis epiphany that just like the Minamatadisease right there before our eyes these sortsof pollution incidents went way back inJapanese history. With Japan's decision to castoff Asia and follow the West after the MeijiIshin of 1868 came these sorts of incidents, andthe question within that was just how shouldone live? I learned the way Shōzō lived his life.I thought: Wow, it is possible to live that way; Imust do it. Unfortunately I am completelyunable to do so, but I never stop thinking thatShōzō's was a wonderful way to live a life.

Hirano: Going back to an earlier discussion.You 've repeated ly ta lked about thegovernment's responsibility, scientists'responsibility, and individual responsibility. Itwould seem that this word "responsibility" is anextremely important keyword for you. You oftenemphasize it in your writing, too. What I wantto ask concerns the issue of scientists' specialresponsibility, a particular social responsibility.Scientists are often thought of as technicians,but this is not really the case. As a result, I feelyou've pursued an intense interrogation ofyourself as a scientist. As you've said you arenot going to enter politics, could you connectthis discussion of scientific responsibility toyour earlier discussion of doing all that hasfallen to you personally to do? How should wethink about these two things?

Koide: I am in science and as such I have totake on the responsibility of a scientist-Just as apolitician must take political responsibility. Ithink I mentioned this to you the last time, but Iam an absolute individualist (tetteiteki nakojinshugisha/徹底的な個人主義者). I don'twant to be constrained by anyone. I want to beable to decide my own life for myself. Butbecause I've made this choice by myself I mustalso take full responsibility for that choice.

It's two sides of the same coin. I don't takeorders from anyone. And this means that Ialone bear the responsibility. It's really as

simple as saying: I'm a scientist and so I havethe responsibility of a scientist.

Hirano: On this way of thinking aboutrespons ib i l i t y : "Who i s the sub jec tresponsible?"―this way of thinking about itseems to be quite absent in contemporaryJapan.

Koide: Right. People living in Japan today havenot made decisions as individuals. They just "gowith the flow;" as long as they follow the"authorities" whom they believe will guaranteethe happiness of their individual selves. Thisseems true of education, too. Go to a slightlybetter school; get into a slightly bettercompany; grow a bit more rich, a bit moregrand. I think everyone is swept up in thiscurrent, and it's really senseless.

I think it is extremely important that each andevery individual live out their individuality. Theabsolute worst thing is for everyone to becomeblindly obedient to the "authorities," yet this isthe Japan we find ourselves in today. And so noone takes any responsibility. Living in such asociety it is too easy to say, "It can't be helped."Everyone is thus able to blame the society as awhole; "It can't be helped." And so no one takesany individual responsibility.

The most extreme and obvious example was thewar. Everyone would say: "It's not my fault; Iwas deceived. The military were the culprits."Saying this allows people to remain at adistance, indifferent. It is bad news for a nationwhen its citizens have only this view ofresponsibility.

Hirano: You've declared, "I am an absoluteindividualist." Personally I am very interestedin that statement. So could you speak a bitmore concretely about the meaning of yourindividualism for how one lives a life? In otherwords, could you explain just what you mean bythis "individualism?"

That is, in Japan being individualistic is more

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often a way to say egotistical; a sort ofdisregard of others. One should pursue one'sown interests―in English the word is "selfish"― egocentric ― pursue your own egotisticadvantage. Now this seems completelydifferent from the way you use the term. Couldyou speak directly to this difference?

Koide: I think you've just done so.

Hirano: Did I? (Laughs). So that's it then, justas I said? Still it's clearly not selfishness.

Koide: No, I don't think it's about interests.

Hirano: It's about values isn't it?

Koide: Yes, it's about personal values. You and Iare different people. I am different again fromMr. Kasai. Why? Well our genetic information isdifferent. I received a bundle of informationfrom my parents. You and Mr. Kasai, too, areinfluenced by your genetic information. Everyone of the over one hundred million Japanese isa unique human being; and every one of theover 7.3 billion people on earth are uniqueindividuals.

History may keep moving on, and there is a big,wide world here on this planet earth. That said,right now, at this moment, and right now, inthis place, I exist as an irreplaceable being. It isnothing but an absolute truth. You normally livein Los Angeles, but right now at this momentyou are a person who is here. Mr. Kasai hascome down from Tokyo. While acknowledgingall the implications of being within the flow ofhistory, we are all right here, right now.

In other words, every single individual humanbeing has a different way of living a life; theyare each unique. They have each lived a lifethat absolutely no one else could have lived. Itis a real loss if they don't live up to their fullpotential. Those are my thoughts.

So for my own unique self, and so for your ownunique self, and Mr. Kasai's own unique self,

none of us should be compelled by someoneelse to do something (meirei o sarete/命令されて). If we don't live our lives according to thewill coming from deep within ourselves, that's areal loss; we must all live with our valuescoming from within ourselves.

I am going to retire next March, but though Iam the lowest ranked employee here― aboveme are assistant professors and professors ―because of the peculiar arrangements ofworking where I do, I am not compelled to takeorders from anyone. I am the lowest ranked soof course there is also no one below me toorder around. So I am in a position where Inever take nor give orders. For me this is theideal position to be in.

And so I can live out my own life according tomy own values; I'm allowed to live a life thatsuits me. Now I found myself in this positionlargely by accident, and then chose to continueto live my life this way. Related to this, I am ahuman being and so will make mistakes, butthese mistakes will be things that I havechosen, things that I have personally done sothere is nothing to do but to take responsibilityfor them. This is what I mean when I say thatresponsibility is an extremely important word.

Hirano: Well, you've exhaustively criticized thiscompetitive society. You've said that thiscompetitive society has ruined Japan anddestroyed l i fe based on what you callresponsibil ity.

Koide: Yes. Everyone is running towards theexact same goal. It's ludicrous. You want to gothat way; I want to go this way. I think thiswould be the ideal society. Full mutualrecognition is a good thing.

Hirano: Does your view come from yourpersonal experience? In your books you statethat you were a really conscientious studentwhen you were younger (laughs).

Koide: (laughs) Well, yes.

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Hirano: You studied extremely hard. Dideverything extremely hard. You continued thisin your nuclear research in college believingthat a new energy source was cheap and goodfor everyone. You must have thought this was agreat thing.

Koide: That's right.

Hirano: But you eventually noticed that it wasall wrong. So on this, from deep in your ownexperience, it's an individual history, anindividual experience, in one sense it'sconnected to your current individualism, tohow you live your life focused on the importantthings to you.

Koide: I think that's right. So, well, when I wasyoung, in my late teens, I was consumed by thedream of nuclear power. I devoted my life to it.That was all a mistake―it did not take me toolong to realize that.

Hirano: When did it happen? In graduateschool?

Koide: My third year in university.

Hirano: Third year―so as an undergraduate.

Koide: Yes, I came to this realization in thelatter half of my undergraduate studies. It wasfoolish and I curse myself for it, but I didn'tquit. To this day I've lived my life as someonewho made that wrong choice, and there isnothing to do but make amends for that choice.

At a minimum I wanted to get rid of nuclearpower before there was a bad accident. I guessI've lived with this wish for over fortyyears―but that wish stayed out of reach. Andhere we have had the accident so my life hasbeen for nothing. You could say that thing Iwanted most to do has been denied. Really,what have I lived for? I think about that fromtime to time.

As this was my choice I have to accept it. So

while the meaning of my life may have beenlost, still I was able to live my own life as Ipleased, without submitting to the orders ofothers and without ordering others around―forthis I am grateful. My hopes were neverrealized. History is full of that kind of thing.Likely very few people see their hopes fulfilled.And while in my case they were rejected, I wasable to live the life I wanted and that is a life tobe grateful for.

Hirano: In a way, it's just how Tanaka Shōzōlived his life isn't it?

Koide: Yes it is. That is what I like about Shōzō.

Hirano: On that point. His life, too, was adefeat.

Koide: Complete and total defeat.

Hirano: Still, he used all sorts of means, andfollowed all the way through on his beliefs.(https://apjjf.org/-Robert-Stolz/2331/article.html)

Hirano: So getting back to Fukushima, it seemswhen it comes to the life choices of the so-called Japanese elites, they seem caught in asystem in which they will succeed and becomefamous by crushing their individuality andsubsuming it under some organization in orderto get ahead in a society and achieve fame andstatus. And the education system seems to bepromoting this lifestyle where these sorts ofpeople are created through intensecompetition. I think the very end result of thissocial and educational system was revealed,and it exploded in an explicit and ugly mannerthrough various problems the Fukushimadisaster has posed.

Koide: Yes, I think so. You said it.

Hirano: I see. In one sense it would have beenpossible even for these Japanese elites to maketheir personal responsibility clear and takeappropriate actions only if they had lived a life

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based on individualism as you suggested.

Koide: Yes I think such a possibility exists, butunfortunately in Japan today that possibility hasbeen completely crushed. It was abundantlyclear from the Fukushima disaster that no onein this country is going to take responsibility.

Hirano: You've already talked about howTEPCO and the government made hugemistakes in dealing with the problemimmediately after the accident. What do yousee as the definitive mistake that led to thisdisaster?

Koide: There's a ton of them. Any specialistwould have known right away there had been ameltdown, and that everyone needed to beevacuated immediately. And evacuating to 20km away is totally inadequate. Iitate villagesome 40-50 km away received an enormousamount of contamination and was neglected forover a month.

Soma residents evacuated to Iitate, this kind ofstupidity cannot stand, the government'scriminal mistakes.

The Hosokawa family of Iitate Village continues tolive in the heavily radiated area to look after theirhorses (2014). More than a dozen horses diedsince 2011.

Kasai: I'm deeply taken by your previous

discussion on responsibility. It's really a storyof something with no owner. A golf course thathas had to close because it is consideredcontaminated with radiation from TEPCO'splant has recently sued. TEPCO's top attorneysargued in defense that the radiation is not theirproperty, which would make it no one'sproperty and therefore TEPCO is notresponsible. It seems the opposite of whatyou've just said about responsibility, to be sure,yet this declaration of complete lack ofresponsibility, once passed through the logicand system of the courts, these lawyers havearrived at precisely this conclusion. It is not aquestion of individual responsibility; it is aproblem of the social system. Lack of anyresponsibility is the basis of the entire socialsystem. What are your thoughts on this?

Koide: It's exactly as you say. This is what ithas come to. I couldn't care less about acountry like that. But in order to overcome thissituation, it's something I mentioned earlier,but there is no way but for rather foolishcitizens to get smarter. Only each individualstanding up for his or her own way is going todo it.

Hirano: You've also talked about "responsibilityfor being fooled." You've said that even thedeceived are guilty and stressed that they toomust take responsibility. How do you thinkabout this at the individual level? For example,you've often stated that there should be a newfood labeling system put in place by whichespecially the generation that agreed to buildthe reactors would be obliged to eat thecontaminated food―would this be an exampleof taking individual responsibility for you?

Koide: Yes, that's exactly what I mean. So,because I think that every Japanese adult hasresponsibility for both allowing the rampantdevelopment of nuclear power and theFukushima disaster, I said that they should bethe ones to eat the contaminated food. And sothat this disaster may never happen again,

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nuclear power must be eliminated―of coursethere should be no question of restarting thereactors. Yet, what I've just said is not really awidespread idea. Slowly all the reactors arebeing restarted.

Hirano: So in that sense Japanese citizens'responsibility is increasing in that they areallowing the restart of the reactors.

Koide: I think the nuclear power issue isprecisely analogous to the war.

Hirano: Indeed, as with the damage ofmisinformation and national morality discoursewe talked about and the pressure that comesfrom those hints of someone being somehow"un-Japanese," it seems to really resemble thewar.

Koide: I think so, yes.

Hirano: I 'd l ike to ask more about theresponsibility for being misled. Up to now thereason most would say that nuclear power hasbeen allowed is the myth of safety―a mythinvented by the coord inat ion o f thegovernment, TEPCO, and the media. SoJapanese citizens have been robbed of beingtold the truth, of having the chance to know thetruth.

Koide: That's true.

Hirano: So the likely response to your positionwould be that it's unjust to blame those whowere robbed of the chance to know the truth.How would you answer this challenge?

Koide: I also said that the current situation isjust like during the war. Then, too, the mediaonly reported the information coming fromimperial headquarters: The Japanese militaryenjoyed nothing but a string of victories. Wewere all told that because of the emperor Japanwas a divine country and therefore could notlose. You would go to school and there wouldbe the emperor's portrait hanging on the wall.

There was a place where the emperor wasenshrined right there on school grounds. Everychild was taught that the emperor was presentthere.

In such a country it wasn't strange to think thatJapan would win the war. But those who knewmore about the world, including of course thosein the military, knew that Japan could not win.Still they said nothing. And so everyone wasswept along with the current.

But history is harsh, and in the end Japan wasbattered. And people at that time said, "Ah,we've been misled. The military are theculprits." But even within all of this there werethose who resisted the war. The number ofpeople tortured and killed by the SpecialHigher Police was huge. And those people, too,were labeled as "un-Japanese" and ostracizedfrom society by the majority of the population.Whole families, whole groups of people wereobliterated.

So those who lived then were duped, they weregiven false information. But should they saythat's where their responsibility ends? I wouldrespond that even if they were duped, theduped still bear the responsibility of the duped.How did each and every one of them live theirlives during the war? How did they deal withthe information they were being given? I thinkwe need to include these kinds of questionswhen we interrogate ourselves over takingresponsibility. Now if you say this people getangry but I think without question the emperorhas absolute responsibility for the war. Weended up moving on without trying to pursuethe emperor's war responsibility.

Even today you'll see people happily shouting"Tennō heika banzai," Long Live the Emperor.At midnight NHK will broadcast the Japaneseflag flapping in the wind. I can't stand that andso don't watch TV. Most Japanese get happywhen they hear 'honorable' addresses by HisMajesty the Emperor or news about theimperial family. From the bottom of my heart I

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think we should have pursued his war crimesand punished him with whatever it takes,including execution. I have been saying thisand people get very angry.

I am told not to criticize the emperor. They sayif I do I'll harm the anti-nuclear movement.

Hirano: Even people in the anti-nuclearmovement warn you about things like that? Acritical reference to the emperor's wartimeresponsibility could be fatally divisive for themovement?

Koide: Those roots are that strong when youtalk about war responsibility. But as I havementioned to you, I feel at the bottom of myheart that each and every individual must takepersonal responsibility for how he or she livedhis or her life. That's the reason why I wanted

the emperor to take his responsibility as aperson.

We must build such a country. Even the dupedand the lied to have responsibility as individualhuman beings. It's true for those who livedthrough the war, and it's true for those whopromote nuclear power in Japan today―indeedit's true for everyone on earth. Each one,should they be deceived, is responsible forbeing deceived.

Hirano/Kasai: Well we've gone on long todayand heard some really important things. Thankyou very much.

Recommended citation: Katsuya Hirano andHirotaka Kasai interview Koide Hiroaki, "TheFukushima Nuclear Disaster is a SeriousCrime", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 14, Issue6, No. 1, March 15, 2016.

Katsuya Hirano is Associate Professor of History at UCLA. He is the author of The Politics ofDialogic Imagination: Power and Popular Culture in Early Modern Japan (Chicago). Thisinterview is the second installment of his oral history project on Fukushima in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. The first interview(https://apjjf.org/2015/13/20/Katsuya-Hirano/4320.html) was with Murakami Tatsuya:"Fukushima and the Crisis of Democracy: Interview with Murakami Tatsuya", The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol. 13, Issue 20, No. 1, May 25, 2015.

Hirotaka Kasai is Professor of Political Thought at Tsuda College in Tokyo, Japan. He haspublished articles and book chapters on Maruyama Masao and radical democracy in GendaiShiso and others.

Robert Stolz is Associate Professor of History at University of Virginia. He is the author ofBad Water: Nature, Pollution, and Politics in Japan, 1870-1950 (Duke). He has published anarticle on Tanaka Shozo in The Asia-Pacific Journal: "Remake Politics, Not Nature: TanakaShozo's Philosophies of 'Poison' and 'Flow' and Japan's Environment", Vol. 5, Issue 1, January2, 2007.

Akiko Anson is a freelance translator who lives in Iowa City, Iowa. Anson obtained a BAdegree in English Literature from Gakushūin University in Tokyo, Japan and an MA degree inAsian Studies from the University of Iowa.

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Notes1 Koide Hiroaki, "The Truth About Nuclear Power: Japanese Nuclear Engineer Calls forAbolition," The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 31 No 5, August 1, 2011.2 Translator's note: There is also a significant amount Cs-134 (although now perhaps 20% ofCs-137 totals). Large amounts of Cs have flowed into the ocean as well. Cs-134 is the maintracer for following Fukushima effluents in the ocean. I am indebted to Timothy Mousseau forthis insight.3 放射線管理区域 "Controlled area means an area, outside of a restricted area but inside thesite boundary, access to which can be limited by the licensee for any reason."(http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part020/full-text.html)4 See the English translation of his testimony at the Diet: Koide Hiroaki, "The Truth AboutNuclear Power: Japanese Nuclear Engineer Calls for Abolition"(http://apjjf.org/2011/9/31/Satoko-Norimatsu/3582/article.html) The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9,Issue 31 No 5, August 1, 2011.5 "Tanemaki Journal," an Osaka based radio show by Mainichi Broadcasting Station, began toair critical evaluations of the Fukushima incident immediately after March 11th. TanemakiJournal invited Koide as a commentator on a daily basis and he offered astute and up-to-datecomments on the disaster. Despite, or perhaps because of, its popularity, according to somereports, the radio program was shut down in July 2012 under pressure from Kansai ElectricPower Company which was a major sponsor of the TV station MBS. When Mainichi announcedthe termination of Tanemaki, listeners protested outside the company's office. The programwon a Sakata Memorial Journalism Award in March 2012.6 Kariya Tetsu, Oi Shinbo 111 Fukushima no shinjitsu (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 2014). The episodewas published in April 28th , 2014 in a popular comic book. After returning from their visit toFukushima, Protagonist and his father began to feel very dull and experienced nosebleeds.The episode developed into a social and political issue as it came under attack by conservativepoliticians and media for stirring up "damage by rumor."7 Oi Shinbo discusses the theory that nosebleeds may be the result of ionizing radiation thatconverts H2O in the nasal passages to the hydroxyl radical HO which can then form hydrogenperoxide (H2O2), see Kariya, Oi Shinbo, 111: 240-48.8 Kyushu Electric Power Co. (KEPCO) reactivated the No. 1 reactor in August 2015 and No. 2in October in the same year. Abe Shinzō's government expressed confidence in the safety therestart by calling the new safety measure "the world toughest." According to the Japan Times,the government plans to have nuclear power account for 20 to 22 percent of the country'stotal electricity supply by 2030, compared with roughly 30 percent before the disaster at theFukushima complex. The government continues with the policy despite the overwhelmingpublic opposition against the reactivation of the reactors and the clear evidence that Japaneseeconomy is sustainable without nuclear energy.9 Mutō Ruiko and Fukushima residents filed a lawsuit against TEPCO and the Japanesegovernment officials, seeking criminal responsibility for the Fukushima nuclear accident.Muto's interview will be published in the Asia-Pacific Journal this year.10 In September 2015, TEPCO released its first 850 tons of filtered radioactive groundwaterinto the sea. This is a part of TEPCO's "subdrain plan" that was approved in late July, 2015,

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after a year-long battle with local fishermen who opposed the release fearing that it wouldpollute the ocean and contaminate the marine life. 300 tons of contaminated water is beinggenerated at the plant daily. TEPCO has yet to deal with remaining 680.000 tons of highlycontaminated water that was used to cool the reactors during the 2011 meltdown.11 Kashiwazaki is a city in Niigata prefecture.12 The Tokaimura nuclear accident occurred on September 30th 1999, resulting in two deaths.It was the worst civilian nuclear radiation accident in Japan prior to the Fukushima Daiichinuclear disaster of 2011. The criticality accident happened in a uranium processing facilityoperated by JCO, a subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. in the village of Tokai, IbarakiPrefecture. Both the national and the prefectural governments failed to deal promptly withthe accident due to the lack of evacuation plan and Tatsuya Murakai, then the major of theTokaimura, decided to evacuate villagers from the affected area. 27 workers, who containedthe crisis, were exposed to radioactivity.13 Tanaka Shōzō (1841-1913) is considered to be Japan's first environmentalist. Tanaka is wellknown for his activism in connection with pollution caused by waste from the Ashio CopperMine in Tochigi prefecture. From the mid-1880s, the Watarase river near the mine becamewas heavily contaminated by mine waste and in 1890 a large flood carried poisonous wastefrom the mine into surrounding fields and villages. Tanaka took the cause to the National Dietas a member of the House of Representatives, but it ended with little success. In 1900,Tanaka and villagers in the valley of the Watarase river planned a mass protest in Tokyo, butwere stopped and dispersed by government troops. He resigned from the Diet in 1901 andmade a direct appeal to Emperor Meiji. He became the supporter of local autonomy anddeveloped his own anti-war, anti-imperialist, and environmental philosophy. He died of cancerin Yanaka village in 1913.