aristotle topics e5, 135a20—b6: the ontology of ὁμοιομερῆ

Aristotle Topics /J5, 135a20—b6: the ontology of όμοιομερή

by J. D. G. E v an s, Cambridge (England)

l n iis paper I shall considcr a neglected but important discussionof lioinoionierons thiiigs in the Topics. The passage contains diffi-cult ies of both text and Interpretation; and in support of my solutionof these diffici ties I shall examine Aristotle's comments on theontological statns of όμοιομερή in works other than the Topics.Fmally I shall note the bearing of Aristotle's theory on the moderndebate abont the semantics of mass terms.

The homoiomereity topic is concerned with properties (ίδια).Statements that 'P is a property of S' are one of the four generalf orms of predication \vhich are treated in Topics B-Η. P is a propertyof S if (among other conditions which will not concern us) it is trueof S and of nothing other than S. From this it follows that if aproposed property is not true of the subject or if it is true of some-thing other than the subject, the proposal fails.

The destructive phase of the topic (135 a20—37) exploits thedistinction between whole and part in the case of homoiomeroussubjects. A proposed property may be true of the whole amount ofthe subject but not of a part of it, or true of a part but not of thewhole: thus 'largest amount of briny water' fails s a property ofsea on the first of these counts, and 'being breathable' fails in thecase of air on the second. It should be noted that in this destructivephase the topic restricts itself to talking of whole and part amountsof S and makes no use of the notion of the attribute S-ness.

When we turn to the constructive phase of the topic (135 bl—6),there is a series of textual problems. The readings that I follow arethose of ms. A. This differs from the Teubner text of Strache andWallies only in omitting καΐ in b5, and from Ross's Oxford textin that feature and, crucially, in reading κατά την y η v in b5 insteadof κατά το yfjv είναι. But both those editorial departures from ms.A are influenced by features in mss. B and D/Boethius wherefurther — and consistent — divergences from ms. A are recorded.

The basic difficulty with all the multifarious readings other thanthose of A is that they muddy the distinctiveness of the two condi-tions for establishing a property which, s is evident from theμεν ... δε ... at bl—2 and the δε at b5, must both be satisfied.

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Ontology of όμοιομερη 285

The rule (bl—2) provides that the property must (i) be true of eachof the homoiomerous things concerned (by which he clearly meansamounts of earth where earth is the subject of the proposed proper-ty)1, and (ii) be a property of them in respect of the whole amountof the thing. This is then illustrated with a property of earth. Thismust (i) be true of all earth, i. e. every amount of earth, and (ii) bea property of the particular bit of earth in respect of Earth2. Ross'sκατά το γη ν είναι does not provide an Illustration of the requirementκατά το σΟμτταν which is specified in the rule; yet, s we saw in thedestructive phase of the topic, the argument of the entire passagedepends on the distinction between part and whole. So we wouldexpect a mention of a whole in the Illustration with earth. Moreoverit i s presumably in respect of being earth that the property is trueof every amount of earth, which has already been given s a condi-tion under (i). What is needed under (ii) is a further condition, andthis is not provided by the reading κατά το γη ν είναι. For the samereason the και read by ROSS and Strache-Wallies in b5 is a distrac-tion in that it suggests that the subject of the property, mentionedunder (ii), is something different from what the property is true of,mentioned under (i).

So this first look at the text indicates that to be a property ofearth is to be a property of a particular bit of earth in respect ofEarth. But what sort of a subject is this, and how does this featureof the constructive topic, coupled with condition (i) that theproperty be true of all earth, avoid the difficulties which are exploit-ed in the destructive phase of the topic ? These are questions whichwe shall consider in the light of more general issues in Aristotle'sontology.

Metaphysics Z shows Aristotle hostile to two views on what makesphysical substances the real things that they are. He rejects the1 This seems to be misunderstood by ms. D, followed by Bekker, which reads κατά

ττάση$ -rr\S γη$—Of the whole earth' — in the Illustration to the rule (b4). Thismay arise from a belief that 'όμοιομερέ*' designates total amounts of the stuffin question, on which see the discussion of the ambiguity-thesis pp. 287 f. below.

2 For 'Earth' s a meaning of 'ή γη' see Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, 154al7—37.It is convenient to follow usage in treating 'Earth' s the name of the object(individual planet) which is made of all the earth that there is: this has the advan-tage of marking the connection and the distinction between this object and thestuff earth. See pp. 289—291 below.I construe the κατά-phrase of b2 and b5 s qualifying the subject of the properl yrather than the notion of property itself: cf. Top. E 5, 134 MO -13. and M. J .Wodds, 'Substance and Essence in Aristotlc'. Procecdhigs of ihr .iii*totrli.tnSociety 75 (1974—5), p. 172.



286 J. υ. G. Evans

dainis of thcir matter — the stuff of wliicli thcy are composed —,and also of thc kiiid undcr which they fall, wlien this is regarded ssomothing distinct from the stibstances t)iemselves. His way out ofthe diff icul ty which is set up by the rejection of these conflictingvicws, coiisists in his notion of form s an entity which is constituteclhy the matter but yet is different in kind from that of which it iscomposed. Botli the opposing views are rejected, in large part byappeal to thc £νδοξον that a substance cannot contain a furthersubstance s a part3.

Matter fails because it cannot, in itself, provide a ground for distinguishing onesubstance from another4. Moreover when matter is given character by subsumingit under kinds (e. g. elements, parts of animals), such things lose their claim tosubstancehood by virtue of the Ινδοξον5. Kinds also fail by the ένδοξου6; and anincidental but, for our purposes, important consequence of this is that the kinds ofmaterial things are easily dismissed from substancehood7.

This leaves the Status of such material components of substances s όμοιομερηare, in a position of some doubt. For his comments on change in the natural worldAristotle uses a scheme in which entities are ordered in a series — elements, homoio-merous things, anhomoiomerous things, complete organisms. In this series eachearlier member provides the matter which is organised into the later members8.What the Metaphysics shows is that this picture, for all its usefulness s a tool ofanalysis, is liable to mislead us s to the nature of the things concerned. Insofar ssomething is of such a kind s to place it earlier in the series, it actually exists justby being a thing of a kind which is later in the series, — a thing to which it is relateds matter to form9. Thus for there actually to be earth or flesh, is just for them

to constitute respectively flesh or a face (for example). Any escape from this strange-seeming thesis is blocked by Aristotle's view that when they are not so organisedinto an entity of higher place in the series, such things are called 'earth' or 'flesh'only homonymously10.

It emerges that something like the kind flesh is, for Aristotle, amore emote abstraction than is the kind which corresponds to anon-mass thing, such s a man. Not only does it share with the latter3 In its basic form this runs 'two (things) cannot at the same time both be in one

and the same (thing)' (Met. B 2, 998 a!4; Phys. Δ 3, 210 b!9).4 Met. Z 3, 1029 a20—8.5 Met. Z 16, 1040 b —10.6 Met. Z 13, 1039 a3—14.7 Met. Z 16, 1040 b!9—24. On such a kind s flesh, see De An. Γ 4, 429 b!2—14;

Met. Z 11, 1037 b4—6.8 P. A. Bl; Mete. Δ 12.9 Met. H 6; De An. B l, 412 b6—9.

10 G. A. B l, 734 b24—6, 735 a4—9; De An. B l, 412 blO—22; Met. Z 10, 1035



Ontology of όμοιομερή 287

the feature of being unable to exist apart from the things which falluiider it; there is the further feature with mass-kinds that the thingswhich fall under them, do so in respect of what they are potentially,not what they are actually.

The Information on the nature of όμοιομερή in the physical andbiological works is not s extensive s one might have expected fromthe fact that the series in which they form part plays a crucial role inAristotle's philosophy of nature. But what he says in these contextshas generated one important misconception which bears on ourtopic. The entry 'όμοιομερής* in Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-EnglishLexicon says that the word means both 'having parts like each otherand the whole* and, of the parts themselves, 'like each other or thewhole'11.

This view, which I shall call the ambiguity-thesis, seems to niecommit a double error: it implies that there is a sense in whichόμοιομερή are primarily wholes, and that there is a sense in whichthey may not have parts like themselves. The ambiguity-thesisderives from passages12 where Aristotle says that (a) άνομοιομερήare divided into άνομοιομερή and όμοιομερή are divided into όμοιο-μερή, and (b) άνομοιομερή are composed out of όμοιομερή andόμοιομερή are composed out of elements (στοιχεία). It would bechurlish to observe that a misreading of (a), whereby the secondάνομοιομερή and όμοιομερή are taken to be ανόμοια μέρη and όμοιαμέρη, lies behind the ambiguity-thesis. A deeper factor seams to besupplied by the combination in (a) and (b) of what άνομοιομερή aredivided into and what they are composed out of. If these relatioiisare taken to be the same, then the same things (viz. those intowhich άνομοιομερή are divided and out of which they are composed)will be both άνομοιομερή and όμοιομερή; therefore the words mustbe ambiguous.

But even if we are not troubled by the Suggestion that Aristotle,usually so sensitive to ambiguity, should have failed to detect thisone in a conceptual area which is mainly of his own devising, thefollowing consideration seems fatal to the ambiguity-thesis. Aristotle11 This is the entry in the 9th edition (1925—40). Earlier editions give only the

sense 'consisting of like parts'. That the innovation is the work of J. L. Stocks(see Oth Ed., Preface pp. viii, xi) seems certain from a comparison with his notc onDe Caelo Γ 3, 302 bl. in the Oxford Translation. The Interpretation is endorsetlby R. Matthcwson. * Aristotle and Anaxagoras: an cxamination of F. IST. Corn-ford's Interpretation', Classical Quarlerly N. S. 8 (1958). pp. 77 9.

12 H. A. A l, 486 a6—8; De Caelo Γ 4, 302 b!3- -20.



288 J. 1). G. Evans

< haractcriscs homoionierous tJiings s those whcre a whole and itsparls aro συνώνυμα13. TJiat is, wJien we call parts of thc stuff we call'flosh' thomsrlves 'flrsh', wo mean the sanic by 'flesh' in both cases.Novv considrr a Statement of thc form given by (a) — 'flesh isdividedinto flcsh'. If the first niention of 'flcsh' is coiistrued s meaning'flrsh-parlod wholc' and the sccond s meaning 'flesh-part' in such away t hat these ineanings exclude each other, then thc sense of 'flesh'is not univocal. Since Aristotle says that it is univocal s betweenboth mcntioiis of 'flesh', the ambiguity-thesis which leads to adenial of this definitory requirement must be rejected.

If the relations being divided into and being composed out of were identical, thenthe elements out of which (by [b]) όμοιομερή are composed would also be όμοιομερήin the second, but not in the first, of the senses proposed by the ambiguity-thesis.In that case they would be like parts but not have like parts; they would then beάνομοιομερή. But this runs quite counter to Aristotle's idea that the more highlyorganised άνομοιομερή are composed out of the less organised όμοιομερή, not thereverse.

In fact, it is important to grasp the difference between the two relations. Bothmust be appealed to if Aristotle is to give an adequate description of his series ofnatural entities. On the one hand, the Statements about what things are divided into,serve to define the nature of each type of thing in the four-fold scheme. On the otherhand, the Statements about what things are composed of, show how things of thesefour types are ordered in the series.

From this there follow two facts about όμοιομερή, both of which are distorted bythe ambiguity-thesis. Firstly, they are not, in themselves, wholes. It is of theirnature either to be parts of the stuff which makes up a more complex entity or, ifthey are the whole of such stuff, to be in actuality such a more complex entity.Secondly, Aristotle is no atomist. He does not believe that any process of divi-sion can reduce a more complex entity to a less complex one. If you divide ananhomoiomerous thing, such s a face, you will get parts — a nose, an ear — whichare anhomoiomerous in the same sense s the face is, namely in the sense that theyare themselves divisible into parts — such s the nostril, the lobe — which arethemselves anhomoiomerous in the same sense s is that of which they are parts;and so on ad infinitum. Structure and Organisation cannot be eliminated. The sameis the case with όμοιομερή. They have a complexity of Organisation, s comparedwith the elements, which cannot be removed by the process of divisioii. At the sametime, of course, these elements are the things which, s matter, make them up; andso it is with όμοιομερή in relation to άνομοιομερη14.

13 G. C. A l, 314 a20; P.A.B 9, 655 b3—23.14 For this thesis in the case of mixtures which are homoiomerous, see G. C., A 10,

328 a5—17, with the note of H. H, Joachim, Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Oxford, 1922), p. 183.



Ontology of όμοιομερή 289

These considerations should lead us to resist the ambiguity-thesis.The word should be construed throughout s meaning 'having likeparts'. The question of how the notion of the whole is present in thesense of the word is also more complicated than the Liddell-Scott-Jones entry allows, s we shall see from the Topics passage to which1110w return.

We left this passage in doubt about the significance of the expres-sion 'the particular bit of earth in respect of Earth'. This reading ofthe text commended itself because it alone preserves, in the Illustra-tion of the constructive phase of the topic, the mention of whole andpart on which the strategy of the topic generally depends. But herea difficulty arises. Typically for Aristotle whole and part are notsynonymous15; and if that were the case with homoiomerous sub-jects, then whatever were a property of the whole could not even betrue of the part s, or vice versa. For a property is true of nothingother than its subject; and so things which are not synonymous inAristotle's sense of the word, being things of two distinct types,cannot have a common attribute s a property of either of them16.So if talk of whole and parts in the case of homoiomerous thingswere understood in this way, the destructive phase of the topicwould misfire. The fact that the attribute were not true of the wholeor not true of the part, so far from providing a reason for rejectingits claim t o be a property, would rather tend to support that claim.Likewise for the constructive purpose of establishing a property, itwould be a hindrance rather than a help to consider the whole of thesubject s well s its parts.

We have already seen how this point about synonymity makes difficulties for theambiguity-thesis. That thesis represents a misguided solution to the real problemof how to Interpret όμοιομερη in terms of the distinction between whole and part.But our review of the place of όμοιομερη in the four-fold series of natural entitiesshows that the problem cannot be evaded, and therefore justifies the general strategyadopted in Top. E 5.

The difficulty, then, remains of how to avoid the fragmentationof a homoiomerous subject. I think that the constructive phase ofthe topic, read s I have proposed, indicates a way. Here condition(ii) specifies the subject of the property— 'the particular bit of earthin respect of Earth' — in a way which incluclcs both the part and thewhole. It is this, when coupled with condition (i) that all the« Top. Z 13, 150 blO—21; Met. Λ 4. 1070 Ι>Γ>—6.16 Top. E 2, 130 a!5—28; cf. Top. Z 10, MB a23 G.



290 J. D. G. Evans

Itornoionieroiis iiug havc thc property s an attribute, which rnakesIhc (πηίφιο) Jiornoionicrous thirig the bcarcr of the property.

ParticuJar bits of earth, wjicn dcscribcd thus, ]iave thc appearanceof being parlicular things. Oncc this appearance takes us in, we getrmbroiled in the. difficulties over wholc and pari which can bedevildu» discussioii of this topic and of όμοιομερη in general. Aristotledefuses thc Suggestion by adding thc crucial qualification that suchbits are t o be considered only in relation to the whole which theyeonstitute. Thcro is such a whole — Earth. This s a whole, but nots a Whole, is the subject of the property. Condition (i) specifies that

the property must be an attribute of au earth. This is a recognitionof the massive nature of the thing earth. But it is not this — allearth — which is the subject of the property; for this would importthe difficulties about the Status of the parts s against the whole.So Aristotle makes the pari the subject of the property, but specifiesthat it is so in respect of belonging to the whole mass of the stuffearth. This is the effect of condition (ii); and we can see how thereading κατά την γη v differs crucially from κατά το yfjv είναι byincorporating a reference to the whole into the example whichillustrates the rule for being a property of a homoiomerous subject.What is import ant t o note is the way in which the notion of the part-in-respect-of-the-whole can provide a unitary subject, and thus asubject of a property, without falling foul of the objection to suchproperties which is suggested by the destructive phase of the topic.

In one way it is unf ortunate that the Topics chooses such elemen-tal substances s earth, air and sea to illustrate the properties ofόμοιομερη. It is not illegitimate to do so, since elsewhere such thingsare either said or strongly implied to be homoiomerous17. But typi-cally Aristotle contrasts such things, homoiomerous though theymay be, with what he calls 'τα όμοιομερη', that is, the uniform partsof living organisms. For while the former may seem to congregateinto simple masses which, s masses, are the same in type s theirconstituent parts18, τα όμοιομερη are what they are (in Aristotle'sview) only by being organised into a whole of different type from itshomoiomerous constituents. If, then, the Topics had considered theproperties of flesh, for example, the whole in respect of which the

" Met. A 9, 992 a7; De Caelo A 7, 274 a30—2; Γ 4, 302 b!8—20.18 This needs to be qualified in the light of the passages referred to in n. 2 on p. 285

above, where Aristotle mentions characteristics of Earth s a whole object. Mostof these passages, however, are concerned with the views of other thinkers whichAristotle opposes.



Ontology of όμοιομερη 291

inclividual bits of flesh have the property would be an anhomoio-merous thing — a band or whatever other thing they actuallyconstitute.

I want to maintain that such a view makes sense of what Aristotlesays in tbis area. A band is the flesh which makes it up (if we ignoreany other homoiomerous constituents); and yet it is, of course, morethan just this flesh. Accordingly the property of flesh will be trueof all the flesh in the band (condition [i] of Top. E 5); but at thesarne time it cannot be a property of this, since then it would be aproperty of the hand. So we must regard it s a property of theindividual bit of constituent flesh, but in respect of the whole — thehand — which such bits constitute.

Aristotle's theory of the semantics of homoiomerous names, s I have here beeilpresenting it, may usefully be viewed in the context of modern ontological debateabout mass nouns and things. Mass nouns, such s 'water' and 'flesh', differ fromcount nouns, such s 'man* and 'chair', in such features s the appropriateness ofusing plural forms and also the quantifying devices of article and pronoun which caiibe combined with them. Various views have been taken over \vhether these gram-matical differences carry any implications for the ontology of the things signifiedby the two kinds of noun. At one end of the spectrum there are those who arguethat mass nouns, like count nouns, should be construed in all their occurrences ssigiiifying the general kinds under which things fall; this may be termed the sortalistview. At the other end are those who maintain that unlike count nouns, they shouldbe construed s signifying the whole amount of some stuff; this may be termed themereological view because it uses the part/whole distinction to analyse the referenceof mass terms in predication, unlike the sortalist view which uses the particular/gen-eral distinction for this purpose19.

Without going into the Substantive issues which are canvassed inthis modern controversy, we can note the position which Aristotle10 For the initial philosophical interest in what had previously been investigated by

grammarians, see W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass., 1960),pp. 90—100, and P. F. Strawson, Individuais (London, 1959), pp. 202—9. T. G.Rosenmayer, 'Plato and Mass Words', Transactions of the American PhilologicalAssociation 88 (1957), 88—102, provides an early application of the grammaticalnotion to the Interpretation of Greek ontology. Among recent discussions I havefound the following useful: H. M. Cartwright, 'Quantities', Philosophical Revietc79 (1970), 25—42; T. Parsons, 'An Analysis of Mass Terms and Amount Torrns*.Foundations of Language 6 (1970), 362—88; V. C. Chappell, 'Stuff and Things'.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1970—1), 61—76; H. Laycock, 'SomeQuestions of Ontology'. Philosophical Review 81 (1972), 3—42; J. Morave&ik.'Mass Terms in English', in K. J. J. Hintikka, J. M. E. Moravcsik and Γ. Suppes(edd.), Approaches to Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1973), pp. 263-«8f>; F. JPelletier, On Some Proposals for the Semantics of Mass Nouns'. Journal <> /Philosophical Logic 3 (1974). 87-108.



202 J - D. G. K van s

wonlcl occupy within it. Our analysis of liis views 011 όμοιομερη inTop. E 5 and clscwhero indicatcs that lic would not accept theso rtal ist account oi inass icrms. But cqually the modern mereologicalacoount, which makes crucial use of the notioii oi the whole amountof the st u ff, would be rejected. This iiisistence on the whole has beena stumbling-block for the mereologists, since it seems an arbitraryand quite unimportaiit matter how much earth, flesh, or furnituret h re is in the universe. Aristotle's mereology avoids this difficultyby allowing that there are such wholes, but by insisting thatdiscovery of the properties of homoiomerous things depends onscrutinising their nature s parts.

I hope that this review has shown the importance of the homoio-mereity topic in Tcp. E 5 both s an integral document in Aristotle'stheory of the nature of homoiomerous things and s an interestingcontribution to debate on issues which continue to occupy ontolo-gists. It certainly requires the attention of all who are concerned\vith Aristotle's theory of matter20.20 I have been helped by comments from Prof. G. E. L. Owen, s well s from

audiences at the Universities of Liverpool, Durham and Newcastle to whom ear-lier versions of this paper were read in spring 1975.



aristotle topics e5, 135a20—b6: the ontology of ὁμοιομερῆ

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