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Arnault v. Nazareno

87 Phil 29

Petition for habeas corpusto relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid

prison. Denied.

Facts:

1. In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress

Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of

P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the

second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the

Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H.

Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and

the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the

necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were

cancelled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong

Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum

of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the

Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors

of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase

of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee

to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the

resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L.

Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent

unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000

for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited

anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for

and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on

the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of

Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating

P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000,

which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine NationalBank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.

It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that

gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate

then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to

jail and is being contested in this petition.

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2.

Issues: 1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the

name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000. 2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit

him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.

3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

HELD: 1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative

body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any

question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-

incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be

material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate,

or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness

to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The

materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry

and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the

necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself aredetermined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and

not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution

of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's

power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the

present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse

their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court

isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.

3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the

name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim

before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself,

necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a

person to him unknown. "Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to

testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable."

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a

representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon

which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal

the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of

Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its

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Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00]

to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, we find no basis upon

which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no

conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At

least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not thesole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the

court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of

the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to

determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the

testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him

to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the

same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his

privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure

immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case

whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering

merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial

judge to decide that question.