art.1-54 fc fulltxt_kris

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A.M. No. P-94-1054. March 11, 2003.*

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, petitioner,vs. EDDIE P. ARQUERO,

re spondent.

Courts; Court Personnel;Administrative Complaints; Onceadministrative charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not

be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth

thereof.—While complainant appears to have lost interest in the

prosecution of the present case, the same does notipso

facto warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have been

filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to

investigate and ascertain the truth thereof. For it has an interest

in the conduct of those in the service of the Judiciary and in

improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in

that direction may not be derailed by the complainant’s desistance

from prosecuting the case he initiated.

Same; Same; Baptismal Certificates; A canonical certificate is

conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity

with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the

child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and

statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the

person baptized.—On the merits of the case, the entry of

respondent’s name as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree

May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore,

cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit

relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate is

conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity

with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized

the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and

statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the

person baptized. It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its

issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of

the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the

statements therein as to the parentage of the child baptized.

Same; Same; Marriage;Marriage is “an inviolable socialinstitution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed

by law and not subject to stipulation.”—Respondent’s justification

fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have

known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on

the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife.

Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is “an

inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and

incidents are governed by law andnot subject to stipulation.” It is

an institution of public order or policy, governed by rulesestablished by law which cannot be made inoperative by the

stipulation of the parties.

Same; Same; Immorality;There is no dichotomy of morality—

court employees are also judged by their private morals; A court

employee’s act of having illicit relations with the wife of another is a

disgraceful and immoral conduct.—Although every office in the

government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater

demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an

individual than in the judiciary. That is why this Court has firmly

laid down exacting standards of morality and decency expected of

those in the service of the judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention

behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility,

characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as

to earn and keep the public’s respect and confidence in the judicial

service. It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with

respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their1

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behavior outside the court as private individuals. There is no

dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their

private morals. Respondent’s act of having illicit relations with

complainant’s wife is, within the purview of Section 46 (5) of

Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise

known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and

immoral conduct.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

Immorality.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

By letter-complaint1 dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo

charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal

Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality.

Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo,

a former stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and

respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as

husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan

as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, wasborn to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-

complaint was the girl’s Baptismal Certificate2reflecting the

names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also

attached to the letter-complainant was a copy of a marriage

contract3 showing that complainant and Dedje Irader

contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.

By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required

respondent to file an answer to the complaint.4

By his Answer5 of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently

denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is “just a

( sic) mere harassment and a product of complainant’s hatred

and extreme jealousy to ( sic) his wife.”6 Attached to the

answer were the September 27,1987 affidavit of

desistance7executed by complainant in favor of his wife with

respect to an administrative complaint he had much earlier

filed against her, and complainant’s sworn statement8 dated

September 13, 1994 acknowledging paternity of a child born

out of wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support

his contention that the complaint filed against him is but a

malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass him.

Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991,

complainant likewise instituted a criminal complaint against

him for “adultery” which was, however, dismissed after

preliminary investigation.

Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had

been cohabiting with another woman.

By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the

case to then Executive Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of the

Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for

investigation, report and recommendation.9 Judge Vergara

having retired during the pendency of the investigation, the

case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez who

2

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was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this Court

to (1) verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and

baptismal certificate submitted by complainant; (2) conduct

an investigation as to the information contained in the said

baptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it

was issued, and such other verifiable matters relevant to thecharge; and (3) submit her report and recommendation

thereon.10

In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge

Fernandez recommends that the complaint be dismissed for

failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that respondent

is guilty of the charge.11 The report focuses on the non-

appearance of complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo, thusly:

x x x

Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and

Dedjie Irader who per reliable information cannot be notified for

reason that subject persons are no longer residing in their given

address and their whereabouts is unknown as shown by the return

of the subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of

the baptismal certificate alleging therein that the father of Desiree Arquero is the respondent herein, and for the reason that the same

had not been testified to by Dedje Irader who is the informant of

the entries contained therein, this Court had not received adequate

proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion that respondent

herein could be held liable of the charge imputed against him,

hence, he should be absolved from any liability.

x x x12 (Quotedverbatim).

By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case

to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation,

report and recommendation.

By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA,

disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating

Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that

respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be

suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without

pay.13 Thus the OCA ratiocinates:

. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine

(9)months, he a single man maintained relations with Dedje

Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant, attended with

“sexual union” (TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Basedon his testimony, we observed thatrespondent justified his

having a relationship with Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the

written document purportedly a “Ka-

_______________

10 Id., at p. 69.

11 Report and Recommendation at p. 3.

12 Id.

13 Memorandum at p. 6.

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4 REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo vs. Arquero

sunduan” or agreement entered into by complainant and his

wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to

seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a court

employee respondent should have known that said agreement was

void despite it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I.

Acebedo was separated from her husband during their short lived

relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an

immoral relationship with a very much married woman and a co-

court-employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary to theCode of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and

Employees which provides that public employees of which

respondent is one, x x x “shall at times ( sic) respect the rights of

others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good

morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and

public interest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and “sling

mud” at complainant for having executed an Affidavit dated

September 13, 1994, acknowledging that he bore a woman other

than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent would wantto apply the principle ofin pari delicto in the instant case.

Respondent would have it appear that a married man with an

extra-marital relation and an illegitimate child is precluded from

complaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another

man.

Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was

executed by herein complainant. However, a cursory reading of said

document reveals that it favors only Dedje Irader Acebedo and not

herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of said affidavit is 2

September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as

evidence in his favor when the instant complaint was only filed

sometime in 1994.

Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge ifhe attended the baptism of the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo,

his former co-employee and ex-intimate friend, he answered, “I did

not. I’m not sure the child is mine”. From his answer, we could

infer that respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility

that said child might be her ( sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful

of her paternity.

x x x14 ‘(Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original).

While complainant appears to have lost interest in the

prosecution of the present case, the same does not ipso facto

warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have

been filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to

investigate and ascertain the truth thereof.15 For it has an

interest in the conduct of those in the service of the Judiciary

and in improving the delivery of justice

_______________

14 Id., at pp. 4-5.

15 Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690, 702 (1994).

15

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VOL. 399, MARCH 11,

2003

15

Acebedo vs. Arquero

to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be

derailed by the complainant’s desistance from prosecuting

the case he initiated.16

On the merits of the case, the entry of respondent’s name

as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I.

Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore,

cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintainedillicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical

certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism

administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic

Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not

prove the veracity of the declarations and statements

contained therein which concern the relationship of the

person baptized.17 It merely attests to the fact which gave rise

to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of theadministration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not

the truth of the statements therein as to the parentage of the

child baptized.18

By respondent’s own admission, however, he had anillicit

relationship with complainant’s wife:

Q

:

Durin !"# $%r&'( %$$#r %$

!"# )%**i+(# n'!ur# %$ %ur

!#*!i&%n +#$%r# !"# C%ur! + %ur -%un*#(, i !"#

C%ur! #! i! -%rr#-! !"'! !"#r#

"'* +##n ' *"%r! (i/#r#('!i%n +#!##n %u 'n

D#i# r'#r, '& -%rr#-!

in & i&)r#**i%n

A

:

Durin !"'! !i !"'! "'/#

"#'r *"# 'n "#r "u*+'n

"'/# )'r!# '* '(r#',

%in( in$%r "#r !"'!

*"# i* n% +#in *#)'r'!#,*"# i* n% *in(# 'n i* $r##!% "'/# *% -%&&i!n!.

S%, I courted her and she

accepted me, so we have a

short lived relation and after

that we parted ways.

Q: For how long was this shortlived relation you made

mention a while ago?

A

:

M' +# sic6 '+%u! #i"! 76

!% nin# 96 &%n!"*.

Q 8"#n %u *'i %u "'/#

5

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: sic6 ' *"%r! (i/#

r#('!i%n*"i) $r%& 7 !% 9

&%n!"*, you mean to tell theCourt that you have (sic) a

sexual union with this

woman?

A

:Yes ma’am.19 E&)"'*i* 'n

i!'(i-* *u))(i#6.

_______________

16 Id.

17 Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73, 84-85 (1980).

18 Fortus v. Novero, 23 SCRA 1330, 1340 (1968).

19 TSN, November 23, 2000 at pp. 14-15.

16

1

SUPREME COURTREPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo vs. Arquero

Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with

complainant’s wife with the spouses having priorly entered

into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was

embodied in a“Kasunduan”,the pertinent portions of which

are reproduced hereunder:

Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO,may sapat na taong gulang, mag-asawa, Filipino, at

kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Broke’s (sic) Point, Palawan,

ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at

magiging miserable lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming

ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama bilang mag-asawa, kami

ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang mag-

asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na

ng kaniyang makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami

maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukuman;

x x x20 (Italics supplied).

Respondent’s justification fails. Being an employee of the

judiciary, respondent ought to have known that

the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the

validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife.

Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is “an

inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and

incidents are governed by law andnot subject to stipulation.”

6

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It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules

established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the

stipulation of the parties.21

Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of

Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and

Employees, enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high

standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public

service.22

Although every office in the government service is a public

trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral

righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in

the judiciary.23 That is why

_______________

20 Rollo at p. 106.

21 Tolentino,Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the

Philippines, Vol. 1, 1990 ed., at pp. 222-223.

22 Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. OCA-01-5, August 1,

2002, 386 SCRA 1 (citation omitted).

23 Legaspi v. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679, 701 (1995).

17

VOL. 399, MARCH 11,

2003

1

Acebedo vs. Arquero

this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of

morality and decency expected of those in the service of the

judiciary.24

Their conduct, not to mention behavior, iscircumscribed with the heavy burden of

responsibility,25 characterized by, among other things,

propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the public’s

respect and confidence in the judicial service.26 It must be free

from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their

duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior

outside the court as private individuals.27 There is no

dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged bytheir private morals.28

Respondent’s act of having illicit relations with

complainant’s wife is, within the purview of Section 46 (5) of

Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292,

otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a

disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform

Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an

immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls

for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day

to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed

for the second offense.7

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8/214

Since the present charge of immorality against respondent

constitutes his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months

and one (1) day is in order.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P.

Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court of

Brooke’s Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he

is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day

without pay with a STERN WARNING that commission of

the same or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.

Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of

respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairman),Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez an

dCorona, JJ.,concur.

Respondent suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day

without pay for immorality with stern warning against

repetition of similar acts.

Notes.—Photographs of a person at baptism and in the

house do not prove that he is the father. ( Fernandez vs. Court

of Appeals, 230 SCRA 130[1994])

A baptismal certificate constitutes independent proof

corroborating the testimony of the victim and her mother.

The testimony of a person as to her age, although hearsay, is

admissible as evidence of family tradition, but cannot be

considered proof of age beyond reasonable doubt. ( People vs.

Pagdayawon, 351 SCRA 643[2001])

——o0o——

8


9/214

A.C. No. 9081.October 12, 2011.*

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO,

complainants,vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, respondent.

Family Law; Conjugal Partnership; Extrajudicial dissolution

of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.—This

case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial

dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is

void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not

facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by

encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudiciallydissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña

did in this case.

Notary Public; A notary public is personally responsible for the

entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of

this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any

member of his staff.—We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it

was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree

with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract.Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized

the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence in doing her

notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally

responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not

relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his

secretaries or any member of his staff.

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Disbarment.


Dwight M. Galarritafor complainants.

Hercules P. Guzmanfor respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by

Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo

(Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with

violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross

misconduct in office.

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10/214

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa

and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s

legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and

dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña

then prepared a document entitled “ Kasunduan Ng

Paghihiwalay” (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS

BAYAN NG GUMACA

LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga

Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa,

kasalukuyang naninirahan

3at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon,

at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod,

matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng

nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1.Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng

aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat isa sa

amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;

2.Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na

taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa,

10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming

dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang

ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama

naman sa ina na si Elena;

3.Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa

kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina,habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay

maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirahan;

4.Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa

aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5.Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama

kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay

pupunan ng ina;

6.Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas

stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloobkay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7.Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin

dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-

aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

10


11/214

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito

ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)

ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA

Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong

ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

Notary Public

PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97

Gumaca, Quezon 4

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;

Book No. XI;

Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully

convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their

marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions.However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their

children and took possession of most of the property they

acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee,

complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that

the contract executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and

Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint

against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not

personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the

contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and

requested for the notarization of the contract but she told

him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa

returned the next day while she was out of the office and

managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the

document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized

the contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s “Sinumpaang

Salaysay” (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show

that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further

presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela

Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the document

without Omaña’s knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a “ Karagdagang Salaysay”

stating that Omaña arrived at his residence together with a

girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized

the contract. He further stated that Omaña was not in her

office when the contract was notarized.5

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February

2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s desistance did not

put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that

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12/214

Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer

shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaña had failed to

exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a

notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law.

The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of

Omaña who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who

notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her

former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:

“Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still

disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her

propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of]

disciplinary sanction or disbarment.”

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for

one year from the practice of law and for two years as a

notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board

of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of

the IBP-CBD.

Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of

Governors denied Omaña’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the

Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of

Marantal and Espinosa’s “ Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.”

_______________

1 Signed by Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, Commissioner.

6

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-

CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that theextrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without

judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a

notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a

marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the

spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal

partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

InSelanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a numberof cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing

similar documents as the contract in this case, such as:

notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted

the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live

with another man, without opposition from each

other;5 ratifying a document entitled “Legal Separation”

where the couple agreed to be separated from each other

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13/214

mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and

obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and

renouncing any action that they might have against each

other;6preparing a document authorizing a married couple

who had been separated for nine years to marry again,

renouncing the right of action which each may have against

the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal

partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-

time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with

the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract.

Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who

notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence in

doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a

_______________

2 Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, A.M. No. 804-CJ, 159-A Phil. 360; 64 SCRA

69 (1975).

3 Albano v. Mun. Judge Gapusan, A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 162 Phil. 884; 71

SCRA 26 (1976).

4 Supra, note 2.

5 Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367 (1933).

6 Biton v. Momongan, 62 Phil. 7 (1935).

7 In re: Atty. Roque Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 (1940).

8 Balinon v. De Leon,94 Phil. 277 (1954).

7notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his

notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this

responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any

member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing

and notarizing a void document, Omaña violated Rule 1.01,

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which

provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Omaña knew fully

well that the “ Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay” has no legal

effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaña may be

suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics

of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of

Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña

from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty.

Omaña’s notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND

her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s

personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copyof this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the

land.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Sereno, Reyesand Perlas-Bernabe,** JJ., concur.

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14/214

Atty. Julieta A. Omaña suspended from practice of law for

one (1) year, her notarial commission revoked and is

suspended as notary public for two (2) years.

Note.—A notary public must demand that the document

for notarization be signed in his presence. (Williams vs. Icao,

575 SCRA 347 [2008])

——o0o——

_______________

9 Lingan v. Calubaquib and Baliga, 524 Phil. 60; 490 SCRA 526 (2006).

10 Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 209.

** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October

2011.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,vs.

TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005

Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.

79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a

complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage·

docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both

claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now

deceased.

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15/214

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11

November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido

(Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife

of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her

complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was

solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites

officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to

her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage

Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil

Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World

War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a

Certification3 was issued by the LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they

begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on

30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August

1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio

H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in

1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not

known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that

Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by

the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977

without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got

married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which

marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being

bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her

children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the

complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she

is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22

September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been

celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao

City. She also contended that the case was instituted to

deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right andas an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence

consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina),

Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to

substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid

marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

15

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a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of

Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office

of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon,

Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy ofCertificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil

Registrar General, National Statistics Office

(NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of

births, deaths and marriages that were actually

filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General,NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records

submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar

General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of

1945, were totally destroyed during the

liberation of Manila;8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido,

Jr.;10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio

Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of

Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to

1944 were destroyed by Second World Warissued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar

of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as

requested a true transcription from the Register

of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating

that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spousesEustaquio and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract

between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her

marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3

March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of

Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her

knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a

common law wife of Eustaquio.16Peregrina likewise set forth

documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to

prove her claim for damages, to wit:

16

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1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late

Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March

1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985

declaring himself as single when he contractedmarriage with the petitioner although he had a

common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with

whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco,

Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed

Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002,addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of

Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P.

Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of

Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred

that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of

the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of

Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s

fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying

Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The

dispositive portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF

NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLAHOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA

MACUA is hereby DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA

MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is

hereby DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the

trial court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence

of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of

Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio,

while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between

Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and

void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it

disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of

EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the

wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and

17

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[Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],

the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that

his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO,

and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence

mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due

execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both

constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction

of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very

evidence the trial court has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error,

among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity

of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June

2008, raises the following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the

"presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a

subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be

considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of

the execution or existence and the cause of the

unavailability of the best evidence, the original

document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by

the church has a probative value to prove the existence

of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the

same being presented to the witness stand.26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the

evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of

the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior

valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to

present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without

such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the

certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,

Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the

period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the

Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of

Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar

General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit

"B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally

destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4,

18

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1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from

the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila

which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of

verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy

of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla],

alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in

Talibon, Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did

not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses

as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions.

Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could

not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage.Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules

of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove

the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a

presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio

as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begotfour (4) children. Such presumption, supported by

documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications

disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial

evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created,

according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its

appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in

accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial

court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of

Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary

evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and

exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that

the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other

than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth

certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of themarriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the

marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be

accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court

of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of

the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua

non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,

were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They

have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and

loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v.

Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:

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x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that

parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred.

The court confounded the execution and the contents of the

document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven

by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not

dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document,

and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due

execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for

the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

x x x x

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last

analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally

consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when

the document is actually produced, its authencity is not

necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its

contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to

produce the document, when available, to establish its

execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but

not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to

justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v.

Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be

prove[n] by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the

parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who

saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even bythose to whom the parties have previously narrated the

execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss

may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss,

or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a

sufficient examination in the place or places where the

document or papers of similar character are usually kept by

the person in whose custody the document lost was, and hasbeen unable to find it; or who has made any other

investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the

instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the

testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the

marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to theevent. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and

the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as

relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due

execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly

shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–

20


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testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the

fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between

[Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial

evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present

during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a

living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the

certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol.

These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since

the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract wereclearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence

– testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove

the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any

competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the

parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the

marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of

marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is

also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of

marriage."

x x x x

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it

disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of

EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the

wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and

[Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],

the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that

his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO,

and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence

mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due

execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both

constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of

secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very

evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this

Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the

presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is

that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not

only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in

the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.

Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward

legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent

matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-

21



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presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact

married. The reason is that such is the common order of

society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold

themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant

violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by

our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman

deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into

a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper –

praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage

was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and

Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued bythe parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of

Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is

AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina

Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido ishereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to

costs.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 198780.October 16, 2013.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, respondent.

Civil Law; Marriages; “Limited Purpose” Marriages; Words

and Phrases; In the United States, marriages where a couple

marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific

benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. Acommon limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the

legitimization of a child. Another is for immigration

purposes.The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant―

benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the

sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,

marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular

purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as

“limited purpose” marriages. A common limited purpose marriage

is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. Another,which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration

purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention

of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter

out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.

Same; Same; Same; A “marriage is a sham if the bride and

groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they

were married.” In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration―

and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for

determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases.

It ruled that a “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not

intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.”

This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration

Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires

the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage wasnot

“entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the

22

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United States.” The focus, thus, shifted from determining the

intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention

of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this

standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,

does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a

marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for

consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the

presence of a solemnizing officer.Under Article 2 of the Family―

Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the

same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite

shall render a marriage voidab initio. Under said Article 2, for

consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the

presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires

that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter intothe marriage. Consent must bereal in the sense that it is not

vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under

Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,

intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also beconscious

or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently

understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable

consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be

affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Same; Same; Marriages in Jest; A marriage in jest is a

pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with

no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and

with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound;

Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or

unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.In―

ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA

characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A

marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered

into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual

marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties

would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct

indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended

marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create

any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuineconsent. Marriages in jest are voidab initio, not for vitiated,

defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of

consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have

absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any

purpose.586

5

7

SUPREME COURT

REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Albios

Same; Same; A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or

voidable under the grounds provided by law; There is no law that

declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than

what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship; Therefore, so long as all the essential and

formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or

voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared

valid.The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the―

Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family

life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no

real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to

nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The

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same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and

incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to

stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or

voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that

declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other

than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition

of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential andformal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void

or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared

valid.

Same; Same; Marriages entered into for other purposes,

limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,

status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal

requisites, are equally valid.Motives for entering into a marriage―

are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate onthe kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to

regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to

privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right

to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their

marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live

apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not,

and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited

or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status,

and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,

are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a

marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other

considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a

marriage.587

VOL. 0, OCTO;ER

1, 2013 7

Republic vs. Albios

Same; Same; No other misrepresentation or deceit shall

constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.

Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading

immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed

circumstances.Neither can their marriage be considered voidable―

on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.

Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code

may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous

conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of

a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually

transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,

alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit

shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a

marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading

immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed

circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of

fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In thepresent case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer

both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Same; Same; No less than our Constitution declares that

marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of

the family and shall be protected by the State; The Supreme Court

cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered

into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily

24


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nullified when no longer needed.No less than our Constitution―

declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It

must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the

contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that

marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the

parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.


Office of the Solicitor Generalfor petitioner.

Albert T. Villaseca for respondent.

588

577 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Albios

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court assailing the September 29, 2011

Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.

95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008 Decision2 of the

Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite ( RTC), declaring the

marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer ( Fringer) and respondent

Liberty Albios ( Albios) as void from the beginning.

The Facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the

Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City

(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with

Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition

for declaration of nullity4 of her marriage with Fringer. She

alleged that immediately after their marriage, theyseparated and never lived as husband and wife because they

never really had any intention of entering into a married

state or complying with any of their essential marital

obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest

and, therefore, null and voidab initio.

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his

answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to setcase for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC

ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an

investiga-

_______________

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1 Rollo, pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and

concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Associate Justice

Florito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division, Manila.

2 Id., at pp. 38-39.

3 Id., at p. 37.

4 Id., at pp. 33-35.

589

VOL. 0, OCTO;ER 1,

2013

579

Republic vs. Albios

tion and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2,

2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that

she could not make a determination for failure of both parties

to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and theprosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing

despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,

hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the

marriage voidab initio, the dispositive portion of which

reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and

Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As anecessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner

shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never

acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression

that she remains the wife of respondent.

x x x x

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each

other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony

of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a

marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that

in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of

$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their

separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States

and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed

her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when

_______________

5 Id., at pp. 38-39.

6 Id., at p. 39.

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