FUNGSI DAN PERANAN BANK SENTRALBANK SENTRAL DI US (THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK)BANK SENTRAL DI BERBAGAI NEGARABANK SENTRAL DI INDONESIA (BANK INDONESIA)THE CENTRAL BANK

Bank Sentral: Fiscal AgentTempat menyimpan sementara dana pemerintah dari penerimaan pajak, sehingga dana tersebut tidak menganggur sebelum digunakan untuk membayar pengeluaran pemerintah.Pemerintah butuh lembaga terpusat untuk menerbitkan instrumen utang, seperti T-bills atau T-bonds di pasar uang.

Externalitas dan Keterlibatan Pemerintah. Transaksi di perbankan dapat menimbulkan eksternalitas negatif (rush, bank panic, dll) & positip butuh keterlibatan pemerintah dalam menyelesaikannya. Eksternalitas dan Kebutuhan Adanya Bank Sentral.Perlu ada aturan(regulasi)yang jelas untuk melindungi semua pihak (masyarakat)yang melakukan transaksi perbankanBank Sentral: The Bankers Bank

Contoh: Neraca Keuangan Bank Sentral

Neraca Keuangan Bank Sentral AS(juta $, Pada Bulan januari 1992)AssetsLiabilitiesAccountJumlah%AccountJumlah%Treasury Securities266,14879.9Fed reserves Notes280,11784.1Loans to Depository Instituion1120.1Reserve deposits of Depository Institutions29,1958.8Fed Agency Obligations6,0951.8U.S. Treasury deposits10,8283.3Gold Certificate Account11,0583,3Foreign Official deposits3210.1SDR10,0183,0Deferred Credit items4,7881.4Asset denominated in Foreign Currencies26,9288,1Other Liabilities2,8080.8items in process of Collection5,0341,5Capital5,0721.5Other Assets7,7362,3Total Assets333,129100Total Liablities333,129100Sumber : Miller & Van Hoose, 1993, hal.385

Komponen Asset Dalam Neraca Bank Sentral Treasury Securities (T-Bills, T-Bonds)Loans to Depository Institution (Pinjaman ke Bank Umum, KLBI/BLBI)Fed Agency Obligations (Pinjaman ke Pemerintah Daerah/ Negara Bagian)Gold Certificate Account (Cadangan emas)SDR (cadangan uang di IMF)Asset denominated in Foreign Currencies (Cadangan Devisa dalam mata uang Lain)items in process of Collection (dana yang disimpan di Bank Umum sebagai pemberian kredit cepat)

Komponen Liabilitas Dalam Neraca Bank Sentral:Fed reserves Notes (Jumlah Uang beredar)Reserve deposits of Depository Institutions (Reserve Requirement /GWM dari Bank)U.S. Treasury deposits (Dana Pemerintah di BS)Foreign Official deposits (Cadangan dana pemerintah luar negeri)Deferred Credit items (Pembayaran Pemerintah kpd partai tapi sdh dijanjikan)Other Liabilities Capital (Modal yang dimiliki Bank Sentral, seperti Tanah, Bangunan, Inventaris, dll)

Sumber Resiko Dalam Sistem Pembayaran Resiko Likuiditas (resiko yang muncul dari Bank karena kekurangan dana yang harus dibayarkan kpd nasabahnya)Resiko Kredit (Resiko yang dihadapi Bank karena adanya moral hazard dari pihak debitur)Systemic Risk (Resiko yang dihadapi oleh semua bank karena kondisi perekonomian makro yang lesu)

PERANAN BANK SENTRAL DALAM SISTEM PEMBAYARAN1. As a Lender of The Last Resort CB serve as lender of the last resort to solvent but illiquid depository institution2. As a Custodian Of Financial System:CB monitors and supervises many of the activities of the nations payment system3. As a Financial Safety NetProtection against widespread financial failures and panics

Organisasi Bank Sentral Pada UmumnyaBank sentral dibentuk dan didirikan berdasarkan undang-undangSusunan unit dan bentuk koordinasi dari organisasi bank sentral dipengaruhi oleh tujuan,tugas, wewenang, hubungan bank sentral dengan pemerintah dan parlemen.Faktor-faktor tersebut selanjutnya akan mempengaruhi tingkat independensi, transparansi dan akuntabilitas bank sentral

Tujuan bank sentral serta implikasinya pada organisasi(1) Kompleksitas organisasi bank sentral dipengaruhi oleh banyak-sedikitnya tujuan yang diembannya.Tujuan-tujuan bank sentral(ditetapkan berdasarkan UU),meliputi (Chandavarkar, 1996):kestabilan harga, pertumbuhan ekonomi dan pembangunan, tingkat pengangguran rendah, nilai tukar wajar dan kesejahteraan umum

Tujuan bank sentral serta implikasinya pada organisasi(2) Dalam prakteknya, ada bank sentral yang hanya memiliki satu tujuan, dan adapula yang memiliki lebih dari satu tujuan.Pada bank sentral yang memiliki lebih dari satu tujuan, dimungkinkan terjadi conflict of interest, sehingga diperlukan sinkronisasi strategi pencapaian tujuan kompleksitas organisasi lebih tinggi

Tugas Bank Sentral:Secara umum, tugas bank sentral meliputi:Bidang moneter(monetery)Bidang pengawasan(supervisory)Bidang sistem pembayaran(payment)Bidang operasi internal(internal operations)Contoh:Reserve Bank of Australia mpy tugas 1 & 4Bank Negara Malaysia mpy tugas 1,2 & 3Bank Indonesia (?)

Bank Sentral dan Tugasnya

NegaraOtoritas MoneterPengatur BankSistem PembayaranBruneiYaTidakTidakHongkongYaTidakTidakInggrisYaTidakTidakAustraliaYaTidakYaJepangYaTidakYaAmerikaYaSebagianSebagianPerancisYaSebagianSebagianBelandaYaSebagianYaItaliaYaSebagianYaJermanYaSebagianYaAfrika SelatanYaYaTidakBrasilYaYaSebagianIndiaYaYaSebagianSingapuraYaYaSebagianIndonesiaYaYaYaMalaysiaYaYaYaSelandia BaruYaYaYa

Wewenang Bank SentralBerdasarkan wewenangnya organisasi bank sentral terdiri dari dua level (Chen Yuan,1990):Level yang memiliki kewenangan tertinggi dalam membuat kebijakan(decision making body):Policy making body (Badan Pembuat Kebijakan)Executive body(Badan Pelaksana)Supervisory body(badan Pengawas)Unit-unit operasional yang bertugas melaksanakan kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh badan tertinggi

Klasifikasi Bank sentral berdasarkan Jumlah badan yang memiliki kewenangan tertinggiBank sentral dengan hanya satu badan yang memiliki kewenangan tertinggi (e.g.Federal Reserve System of United State & Bank of England)Bank sentral dengan 2 badan terpisah yang berwenang membuat dan melaksanakan kebijakan (e.g.Bank of Japan, Deutsche Bundesbank & Bank of Italy)Bank sentral dimana wewenang membuat dan melaksanakan kebijakan dan wewenang mengawasi kebijakan berada pada tiga badan terpisah(e.g.Bank of France, The National Bank of Belgium & The National Bank of Switzerland

Badan Pembuat Kebijakan di berbagai negara (The Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory, 2003)

NegaraNama BadanJumlahAmerika SerikatBoard of Governors7 orangJermanExecutive Board8 orangPerancisGeneral Council13 orangJepangPolicy Board9 orang

Badan Pelaksana KebijakanMenggunakan dua sistem:1. Council System:Tanggungjawab keputusan merupakan tanggungjawab bersama 2. Unilateral System Tanggungjawab keputusan berada pada pengambil keputusan tertinggi (gubernur Bank Sentral)Dilengkapi dengan sub-ordinate organizations(Departemen, direktorat,kantor cabang,dan kantor perwakilan

Badan Pengawas

NegaraPenunjukan AuditorRuang LingkupJermanCentral Bank CouncilAudit rekeningTaiwanPresiden berdasarkan rekomendasi kabinetPengawasan aset & kewajiban serta rekening-2 bank sentralKanadaKabinet Berdasarkan rekomendasi MenkeuAudit kegiatan operasional Bank sentralJepangMenkeuauditSelandia BaruMenkeuAudit kegiatan operasional Bank sentral

Struktur Organisasi Bank SentralDipengaruhi oleh luas cakupan tujuan, dan tugas, upaya peng koordinasian tugas dalam mencapai tujuannya serta wewenang yang diberikan oleh UU.Dapat dilihat dari bagan organisasi bank sentral,yang mencerminkan: (i) Hierarchy of authority, (ii) Departmentalization, (iii) Span of control dan (iv) Line and staff positions

BANK SENTRAL DI US :THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK

Formal Structure of the Federal Reserve SystemFigure 7.1 Formal Structure and Allocation of Policy Tools in the Federal Reserve

Figure 7.2 Federal Reserve SystemFederal Reserve Banks

Federal Reserve Bank Functions: GeneralClear checksIssue new currency and remove damaged currencyEvaluate bank mergers and expansionsLender to member banksLiaison between local community and the Federal Reserve SystemPerform bank examinations

Federal Reserve Bank Functions: Monetary PolicyEstablish the discount rate at which member banks may borrow from the Federal Reserve Bank (subject to BOG review)Determine which bank receive loansElect one member to the Federal Advisory CouncilFive of the 12 bank presidents vote in the Federal Open Market Committee

How Independent is the Fed?A broad question of policy for the Federal Reserve Systems is how free the Fed is from presidential and congressional pressure in pursuing its goals.Instrument Independence: the ability of the central bank to set monetary policy instruments.Goal Independence: the ability of the central bank to set the goals of monetary policy.Evidence suggests that the Fed is free along both dimensions. Further, the 14-year terms (non-renewable) limit incentives to curry favor with either the President or Congress.

How Independent is the Fed? Other EvidenceThe Fed is usually generates revenue in excess of its expenses, so it is not typically under appropriations pressure.However, Congress can enact legislation to gain control of the Fed, a threat wielded as needed. For example, the House Concurrent Resolution 133 requires the Fed to announce its objective growth rate for the money supply.Presidential appointment clearly sets the direction of the Fed.

Structure and Independence of Foreign Central BanksUnlike the United States, central banks of other industrial countries consist of one central bank that is owned by the government. Here, we examine the structure and independence of four important foreign central banks:Bank of CanadaBank of EnglandBank of JapanEuropean Central Bank

Bank of CanadaFounded in 1934Directors are appointed by the government for three-year terms, and they appoint a governor for a seven-year term.A governing council is the policy-making group comparable to the FOMC.In 1967, ultimate monetary authority was given to the government. However, this authority has never been exercised to date.

Bank of EnglandFounded in 1694The Court (like our BOG) consists of the governor, two deputy governors (five-year terms), and 16 nonexecutive directors (three-year terms).The Monetary Policy committee compares with the U.S. FOMC, consisting of the governor, deputy governors, two other central bank officials, plus four outside economic experts.The Bank was the least independent of the central banks, until 1997, when it was granted authority to set interest rates.The government can step in under extreme circumstances, but has never done so yet.

Bank of Japan (Nippon Ginko)Founded in 1882The Policy Board sets monetary policy, and consists of the governor, two vice governors, and six outside members. All serve five-year terms.The Bank of Japan Law (1998) gave the Bank considerable instrument and goal independence.Japans Ministry of Japan can exert authority through its budgetary approval of the Banks non-monetary spending.

European Central BankFounded (as it currently exists) in 1999 by a treaty between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).Executive board consists of the president, vice president, and four members, all serving eight-year terms.The policy group consists of the executive board and governors from the 11 member countries central banks.The ECB is the most instrument and goal independent central bank in the world. It was given independence in the treaty, and that policy can only be changed by amending the treaty.

Explaining Central Bank BehaviorTwo competing theories try to explain the observed behavior of central banks:Public Interest View: the central bank serves the public interest.Theory of Bureaucratic Behavior: the central bank will seek to maximize its own welfare.The Fed often fights to maintain autonomy while avoid conflict with Congressional power groups. These seem to favor the latter theory, but this view is probably too extreme.

Should the Fed Be Independent?Every few years, the question arises in Congress as to whether the independence of the Fed should be reduced in some fashion. This is usually motivated by politicians who disagree with current Fed policy. Arguments can be made both ways, as we outline next.

Case for IndependenceThe strongest argument for independence is the view that political pressure will tend to add an inflationary bias to monetary policy. This stems from short-sighted goals of politicians. For example, in the short-run, high money growth does lead to lower interest rates. In the long-run, however, this also leads to higher inflation.

Case for IndependenceThe notion of the political business cycle stems from the previous argument. Expansionary monetary policy leads to lower unemployment and lower interest ratesa good idea just before elections.Post-election, this policy leads to higher inflation, and therefore, higher interest rateseffects that hopefully disappear (or are forgotten) by the next election.

Case for IndependenceOther arguments include:The Treasury may seek to finance the government through bonds purchased by the Fed. This may lead to an inflationary bias.Politicians have repeatedly shown an inability to make hard choices for the good of the economy that may adversely affect their own well-being.Its independence allows the Fed to pursue policies that are politically unpopular, yet in the best interest of the public.

Case Against IndependenceSome view Fed independence as undemocratican elite group controlling an important aspect of the economy but accountable in few ways.If this argument seems unfounded, then ask why we dont let the other aspects of the country be controlled by an elite few. Are military issues, for example, any less complex?Indeed, we hold the President and Congress accountable for the state of the economy, yet they have little control over one of the most important tools to direct the economy.

Case Against IndependenceFurther, the Fed has not always been successful in the past. It has made mistakes during the Great Depression and inflationary periods in the 1960s and 1970s.Lastly, the Fed can succumb to political pressure regardless of any state of independence. This pressure may be worse with few checks and balances in place.

Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance Throughout the WorldEmpirical work suggests that countries with the most independent central banks do the best job controlling inflation.Evidence also shows that this is achieved without negative impacts on the real economy.

BANK INDONESIA:THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDONESIAwww.bi.go.id

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