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The Negative Theology of Maimonides and AquinasAuthor(s): Joseph A. BuijsSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Jun., 1988), pp. 723-738Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20128659

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THE NEGATIVETHEOLOGYOF MAIMONIDESAND AQUINASJOSEPH A. BUMS

J-N A RECENT article, the late Isaac Franck presented both Maimonides (1135-1204) and Aquinas (1225-1274) as prominent proponents of negative theology; he went on to defend negative theologyagainst a number of contemporary criticisms.1 More specifically,Franck set out to defend what he called "a radical negative theology." By this he meant

the doctrine that no affirmative or positive attributes of any kind arepredicable of God, that God is completely unknown and unknowable,that we can meaningfully say about God only what he is not (to speakof Him in negative attributes); the doctrine that man's highest knowledge of God is to know that we are unable to know Him.2

He distinguished this radical version from a moderate, or lessthan-thoroughly, negative theology. A moderate negative theologyonly holds that "nothing predicable of man is predicable of God."3In this version, a negative theology, presumably, could claim specialattributes, applicable to God but not to human beings, if there weresuch divine attributes; and, correspondingly, it could claim somespecial knowledge of God, if that were accessible to human beings.In its radical version, however, negative theology claims the divinereality to be utterly unknowable. It allows no knowledge whatsoever of what God is; only of what he is not. Correspondingly, aradical negative theology urges an exclusively negative language ofGod. There is no intelligible positive language about God whatsoever; we can only meaningfully say what he is not.

1 Isaac Franck, "Maimonides and Aquinas on Man's Knowledge ofGod: A Twentieth Century Perspective," Review ofMetaphysics 38 (March1985): 591-615.2 Ibid., 593.3 Ibid.

Review of Metaphysics 41 (June 1988): 723-738. Copyright ? 1988 by the Review ofMetaphysics

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724 JOSEPH A. BUIJSFranck himself clearly wants to defend negative theology in its

radical version. But noting what he takes to be an ambivalence andeven inconsistency in the views of both Maimonides and Aquinas,Franck hesitates to attribute this version to either of their theologies, "for fear of projecting on them the extreme view espoused inthis [Franck's] paper."4

It is my contention, however, that Franck's analysis misconstrues both Maimonides and Aquinas. It does so by conflating twodistinct theses: an epistemic one concerning the unknowability ofGod with a semantic one concerning the intelligibility of languageabout God. As a result, his characterization of a thoroughly negative theology is ambiguous and his classification of Aquinas alongside Maimonides is flawed.

Franck is not alone inmerging the theologies of Maimonidesand Aquinas. In an early study, M. T. L. Penido suggests that, indenying positive attributes to God, Maimonides overstates hiscase. Thus he considers the agnosticism reflected in Maimonides'negative theology the result of linguistic excess rather than philosophic intent.5 Harold Johnson similarly suggests that differencesbetween the via negationis of Maimonides and the via analogiae of

Aquinas are more a matter of style than of substance. On thecentral issue, which Johnson considers the formation of theologicalconcepts, he uncovers an agreement between both thinkers "so closeas to make differences appear tenuous by comparison"; nevertheless he concludes that there is a "residual contrast of emphasis,"explained culturally in terms of differing religious pressures andphilosophical resources.6 Alexander Broadie, likewise, questionswhether in the end there is a substantial philosophical difference.Analyzing how Maimonides and Aquinas apply their respectivetheories of divine attributes, he too concludes that "the difference isone of formulation rather than of substance."7

Although there are obvious similarities and indeed an influence of one on the other, I want to argue that there remain signifi

4Ibid. For the source of this ambivalence see pp. 600-01.5M. T. L. Penido, "Les attributs de Dieu d'apr?s Ma?monide," Revue

N?o-scolastique de philosophie 26 (1924): 144-48.6Harold Johnson, "Via negationis and Via analogic^: Theological Agnosticism in Maimonides and Aquinas," Actos del V Congresso Internacional de Filosofa Medieval, vol. 2 (Madrid: Nacional, 1979), 844.7Alexander Broadie, "Maimonides and Aquinas on the Names ofGod," Religious Studies 23 (1987): 170.

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MAIMONIDESAND AQUINAS 725cant philosophical differences between Maimonides and Aquinaswith respect to both knowledge and language about God. Neithercan Maimonides' views be absorbed into the theology of Aquinasnor Aquinas's views into the theology of Maimonides without distorting or ignoring some of their fundamental philosophical claims.

First, I will sketch the distinction within negative theologybetween its epistemic thesis and its semantic thesis. Next, byoutlining the main features of their respective theologies, I willshow how Maimonides differs from Aquinas with respect to thesetheses. Finally, Iwill outline what I take to be the philosophicaldifferences on negative theology between Maimonides, Aquinas,and Franck and bring out a criticism against Franck's radical version of negative theology, which both Maimonides and Aquinasavoid. I conclude, on the one hand, that with respect to languageand knowledge of God Maimonides is more thoroughly negativethan Aquinas and, on the other, that Maimonides' negative theology is defensible, whereas Franck's more radical negative theologyin the end is not.

I

Franck takes the unknowability of God to be the principle tenetof negative theology. This iswhat he repeatedly calls the doctrineof negative theology.8 The tenet refers to our inability to knowGod's essence, not the fact of his existence. But Franck interchanges this tenet with the view that we can only talk meaningfullyabout God in negative terms, that positive talk about God is literally meaningless.9 Of course, he may be taken to mean that negative theology advances a claim both about our knowledge of God andabout our language of God. He may intend to imply that bothclaims mutually entail each other or that both derive independently

8See Franck, "Maimonides and Aquinas," 519, 592, and 603.9See, for instance, his characterization of radical negative theologyquoted above on p. 1. He conflates the two theses in his reading of AntonC. Pegis, "Penitus Manet Ignotum,"Medieval Studies 27 (1965): 212-26?the acknowledged basis of Franck's interpretation of Aquinas. But Pegisonly addresses the issue of the unknowability of God. Even Pegis's conclusion that "Man must come to unsay the whole universe in order to sayGod exists properly" (ibid., 219 and quoted by Franck, "Maimonides andAquinas," 603) leaves open the question how this is to be done and thusneed not preclude Aquinas's developed theory of analogy.

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726 JOSEPH A. BUIJSfrom some other claim about the reality of God. But neither doesFranck offer an explicit argument nor is it clear that Maimonidesand Aquinas would agree.

Conceptually, our ability or inability to talk about God?oranything else for that matter?is not the same as our ability orinability to know God. And it is not obvious that these claims mustentail each other. There are situations, it seems, in which ourability to know something does not go along with our ability to talkabout it. Knowledge of our own emotional states, for example,often goes together with an inability to talk about them. We can beaware of experiencing emotional distress yet, at that time at least,not be able to describe the emotions we are experiencing. Conversely, there are situations in which our ability to talk about something is not matched by knowledge. Children often talk aboutissues?moral or religious ones, for example, involving such notions

as justice, rights, and God?in which they do not know the meaningof the concepts employed. And philosophy teachers are familiarwith students?perhaps themselves at one time?who are adept attalking about philosophical views without knowing what thesemean. Nevertheless such talk is intelligible to others.

Admittedly the examples are troublesome. They may overlookan important distinction between nominal talk in which we merelyuse words and significant talk in which we understand the words weuse. However the examples are handled, they do raise questionsabout the relationship between language and thought, questionsthat are relevant to talk about God. Is the way we talk about Goddetermined by what we can know of God? Or conversely, is whatwe know of God determined by the way we can talk about God?Moreover, can we meaningfully talk about God without someknowledge of what God is? Or, for that matter, can we know Godor know of God without being able to talk meaningfully about Godat all? An answer to such questions is significant, first, in order toelucidate different versions of negative theology and, second, inorder to situate the theological position of Maimonides vis-?-visthose of Aquinas.

Let us call the claim about the unknowability of God the epistemic thesis of negative theology (ENT) and the claim about negative language the semantic thesis of negative theology (SNT).10 An

10For completeness we should add a third claim, which Franck clearlyacknowledges. It is the metaphysical view, not only that God exists but

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MAIMONIDESAND AQUINAS 727initial formulation of both theses, suggested by Franck's characterization of negative theology, is the following:

ENT: With respect to God's existence, we can know that God is;with respect to his essence, we can not know what he isand thus we can only know what he is not.

SNT: Only terms predicated negatively of God are meaningful;terms predicated positively of God are meaningless.11

Now, the conjunction of ENT and SNT may well serve to characterize Franck's radical negative theology, but it fits neither Mai

monides nor Aquinas. As will become clear below, neither onewould see an inconsistency in admitting ENT while denying SNT asformulated. This is of course the reason why Franck concludesthat their respective theologies are not thoroughly negative. But italso suggests that an alternative formulation for SNT is required,so as to capture the sense in which Maimonides and Aquinasespouse negative theology.

Indeed, SNT can be refined to refer to two somewhat differentviews. On the one hand, it can be taken to mean:

SNTi: 'God' cannot stand as the subject term in an affirmativeproposition; 'God' can only stand as the subject term ina negative proposition.

On the other hand, it can be taken to mean:SNT2: We cannot meaningfully talk about God by saying what

he is; we can only meaningfully talk about God by saying what he is not.

that the divine reality is totally different from anything else that does orcould exist; see Franck, "Maimonides and Aquinas," 597. Formulated anddefended in different ways, it is this metaphysical claim that logicallyimpels the negative theologian to draw conclusions about our knowledgeand language of God. This claim we could call the metaphysical thesis(MNT) of negative theology. For an initial development of these distincttheses in Maimonides see my "Maimonides and the Problem of Divine

Attributes," forthcoming in Thought.11That is, when we talk positively of God, we apply terms not justfalsely, but mistakenly to God. Such God-talk is akin to saying "Soundsare red" or "The number two is just." The Aristotelian distinction, recognized in medieval logic, between negation and privation also captures thelater (Russellian) trichotomy of true, meaningless, and false propositions;see, for instance, G. H. Von Wright, "On the Logic of Negation," SocietasScientiarum Fennica, Commentationes Physico-mathematicae 22, 4 (Hel

sinki, 1959): 3-30.

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728 JOSEPH A. BUIJSSNTi is more restrictive than SNT2 in that, according to SNTi,

God cannot be the referent at all for any positive propositions. Theonly true and intelligible propositions are those that take the form'God is not P' where T' stands for predicates that are otherwise

descriptive of human and other creatures. SNT2, however, like theparallel epistemic thesis ENT, restricts itself to talk about God'sessence. Consequently, SNT2 allows the possibility of positivetheological language, provided it is not descriptive specifically of

what God is. Whether there are such descriptions is an open question, which Maimonides at least explicitly addresses. The point ofSNT2 is that when we attempt to describe intelligibly what God is,to talk about his essence and only about his essence, then we are left

with descriptions in negative terms that say what God is not.

II

Where do Maimonides and Aquinas stand with respect to thesetheses of negative theology? A brief outline of their respectivetheologies will show that, despite some differences, they both admitENT and deny SNTi. But they part company on SNT2, for whileMaimonides would admit to SNT2, Aquinas would not. Here liesthe root of their philosophical difference.

For Maimonides, a demonstration along the lines of the traditional cosmological arguments can establish the fact that Godexists as a necessary existent.12 But 'a necessary existent' and itsequivalent formulations are taken to mean "having no cause of anykind," neither for its existence nor for its essence.13 From this

Maimonides concludes that God is absolutely simple (having nocomposition whatsoever) and absolutely incomparable (havingnothing in common with other beings).14 Consequently, we can

12The Guide of the Perplexed 2.1, especially the "third philosophicspeculation," pp. 247-49. All references are to the English translation byShlomo Pines (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963). For aninformative exposition of Maimonides' proofs see William Lane Craig, TheCosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz (London: The MacmillanPress, 1980), pp. 131-57.13See Guide 2.1, p. 248; 1.57, p. 132.14See Guide 1.57, pp. 132-33; 2.1, pp. 243-52. This is Maimonides'formulation and defense of MNT; see note 10 above.

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MAIMONIDESAND AQUINAS 729know the fact that God is without thereby knowing what God is.15Since the divine essence cannot be directly apprehended by abstraction from experience, as other essences are, knowledge ofGod's essence would minimally require some defining characteristics in God that are in some way comparable to the characteristics

we know in other things. But this condition cannot be satisfied,given the absolute simplicity and incomparability of God. And soat best we are left with knowledge of what God is not.In answering how we can truthfully and intelligibly talk aboutGod, Maimonides starts by classifying predicates into five kinds:those that signify (i) a definition, (ii) parts of a definition, (iii)qualities, including quantities, habits, and dispositions, (iv) relations, and (v) actions.16 The first four kinds of predicates describe

what a thing is, either essentially or accidentally; they also presuppose a multiplicity in whatever is described. Predicates of action,instead, refer to the results or productions of an agent's efficacy.

They describe what an agent did, rather than what the agent is.Only these predicates of action, Maimonides argues, can be truthfully predicated of God. Other kinds of predicates, namely, (i)-(iv),are to be denied to God. Their affirmation would contradict God'sabsolute simplicity.17 Predicates of action identify an agent; theydo not describe its essence. Hence, such predicates would not contradict God's absolute simplicity. Nor do they provide any knowledge of God's essence.18

Aquinas similarly concludes his proofs for the existence of Godwith the recognition that we do not, as a result, know what God is;we only know that he is and what he is not.19 How does he thenhandle the problem of theistic language? Initially he follows Mai

15See Guide 1.58, p. 135: "we are only able to apprehend the fact thatHe is and cannot apprehend His quiddity."16See Guide 1.52, pp. 114-18. For the logic behind this classificationsee Harry A. Wolfson, "The Aristotelian Predicables and Maimonides'Division of Attributes," in Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R.Miller, ed. Israel Davidson (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary ofAmerica, 1938), 201-34; and his "Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attri

butes," Jewish Quarterly Review, n.s. 7 (1916): 1-25.17See Guide 1.52, pp. 116,118.18See Guide 1.52, pp. 118-19; and 1.54, pp. 123-24.19See Summa Theologiae 1, Q. 3, preamble; Summa Contra Gentiles 1,chap. 14, and chap. 49. For an informative exposition of some of hisproofs and their implications see Craig, Cosmological Argument, 158-204,especially 193.

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730 JOSEPH A. BUIJSmonides and others in the tradition of negative theology. Someattributes, such as those implying corporeality and potentiality, aresimply denied to God.20 Other attributes that already have a negative connotation may be ascribed to God. Thus "God is infinite"and "God is eternal" are said truthfully, because they mean for us,in the first case, that God is not limited or not finite and, in thesecond case, that God is unending in having neither beginning norend.21 But what of such attributes as goodness and wisdom whichneither imply corporeality nor carry a negative connotation? Arethese predicable of God, and in what way? Aquinas considers suchattributes to signify pure perfections and allows them to be predicated of God substantially.22 However, he draws a distinction between what is signified (res significata) and the way inwhich it issignified (modus significandi). Consequently, such attributes areboth affirmed and denied. They are affirmed of God with respectto what is signified, a perfection that is present in God in a pre-eminent way; they are denied to God with respect to the way inwhichthey signify, because we can only understand them in deficienthuman terms.23 Such attributes are predicated analogically of Godand other creatures; for Aquinas, they constitute an authentic alternative to both univocal and equivocal predication.24 And whilethese attributes do not provide a comprehensive knowledge of God'sessence, they do provide an imperfect, limited knowledge of what

God is.25

20See Summa Contra Gentiles 1, chap. 14, which in general argues forthe via negativa because God is unlike any other substance, and the subsequent chapters which apply this principle; see also Summa Theologiae 1,Q. 13, a. 2 and Q. 3, a. 1.21See Summa Theologiae 1, Q. 7, a. 1 and Q. 10, a. 2; also SummaContra Gentiles 1, chap. 15.22See Summa Theologiae 1, Q. 13, a. 2; and De Potentia Dei Q. 7, a. 5.23See Summa Contra Gentiles 1, chap. 30; Summa Theologiae 1, Q. 13,a. 3; and De Potentia Dei Q. 7, a. 5, obj. 2. See also Broadie, "Maimonidesand Aquinas," 165. For a more detailed textual analysis see John F.

Wippel, "Quidditative Knowledge of God According to Thomas Aquinas,"in(Graceful Reason, Essays

in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presentedto Joseph Owens, CSSR, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Toronto: Pontifical Instituteof Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 292-93, 296.24See Summa Theologiae 1, Q. 13, a. 5; Summa Contra Gentiles 1, chap.34; De Potentia Dei Q. 7, a. 7; and De Veritate Q. 2, a. 11.25See De Potentia Dei Q. 7, a. 5, ad 1; and Summa Theologiae 1. Q. 13, a.2, ad 1 and 3. In "Quidditative Knowledge," Wippel refers to "comprehensive and defining knowledge" and insists that the imperfect knowledge

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MAIMONIDESAND AQUINAS 731Clearly, Aquinas does not espouse Franck's radical negative

theology, although he may be taken to represent its moderate version. Aquinas does allow special attributes to be predicable of Godin a sense in which they are not predicable of human beings. Thoseattributes are truly predicable of God's essence and provide someknowledge, albeit deficient, of what God is. Thus the theology ofAquinas admits the epistemic thesis ENT with the proviso that onlyan adequate comprehensive or defining knowledge is excluded. Butit denies the semantic thesis in both the formulation of SNTX andSNT2. It denies SNTi in that 'God' can stand as the subject term inaffirmative propositions, namely, those in which the predicatessignify attributes of pure perfection. And the Thomistic theologydenies SNT2 in that we can talk meaningfully, albeit inadequatelyand imperfectly, about what God is. Neither in formulation, norcontent, nor intent does language and knowledge of God, for

Aquinas, remain negative.The theology of Maimonides, by contrast, admits the semanticthesis in the formulation of SNT2 in that when it comes to God's

essence, we can only say what God is not.26 Yet, like the Thomistictheology, the Maimonidean theology rejects the semantic thesis inthe formulation of SNTi. For Maimonides, too, 'God' can stand asthe subject term in affirmative propositions, namely, those in

which the predicates signify attributes of action.27 Similarly, Maimonides acknowledges without any proviso the epistemic thesisENT; to human beings God remains completely unknowable in hisessence. Yet the theology of Maimonides fits neither the moderatenor the radical type of negative theology as characterized byFranck. Because he denies special attributes that would be descriptive of God's essence, Maimonides is not moderate in his nega

Aquinas defends is "not purely negative in content" ("Quidditative Knowledge," 291; see also pp. 295-96, 298).26See Guide 1. 58, p. 134: "Know that the description of God ... bymeans of negations is the correct description ... we have no way ofdescribing Him unless it be through negations and not otherwise."27Maimonides also allows 'God' to stand in affirmative propositionsin which predicates signify perfections, but he takes these propositions toexpress a statement of identity. They amount to saying that God is Godand hence remain uninformative about God's essence. See, for instance,Guide 1.51, pp. 112-13; and Harry A. Wolfson, "Maimonides on Negative

Attributes," Louis Ginsberg Jubilee Volume (N.Y.: American Academy forJewish Research, 1945), 411-46; reprinted in Essays in Medieval Jewishand Islamic Philosophy, ed. Arthur Hyman (N.Y.: Ktav, 1972), 180-218.

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732 JOSEPH A. BUIJStive theology; and because he nevertheless allows some positiveattributes to be predicable of God, he is not radical in his negativetheology in the way Franck would want.Once the epistemic thesis of negative theology is sorted outfrom its semantic thesis it becomes clear that, contrary to Franck,

Maimonides and Aquinas do not fit the same understanding ofnegative theology.

IllWhat can be said of the philosophical differences between

Maimonides, Aquinas, and Franck?First, we can clearly formulate the difference among them in

terms of the epistemic and semantic theses elucidated above.Whereas Maimonides' theology amounts to the conjunction ENT

and SNT2, Franck's radical negative theology claims the conjunction ENT and SNTi. Aquinas's theology, instead, claims ENT andneither SNTi nor SNT2. One obvious conclusion is that, when itcomes specifically to the divine nature or essence, Maimonides re

mains thoroughly negative in a way that Aquinas does not; anotherconclusion is that the negative theology Franck defends is moreextreme than both. It upholds the utter unknowability of God?except the fact that God exists sui generis?and urges an exclusively negative language as the only way to talk about God truthfully and meaningfully.What then of Franck's defense of this theology? The criticisms he lists, in one way or another attempt to reduce negativetheology to either mysticism and silence in its intent, or to positivelanguage about God after all in its content. The first renders thistheology useless to religious practice; the second renders it internally inconsistent. Franck's reply to this dilemma?one that canbe made on behalf of Maimonides as well?is correct. The reply tothe first horn is that negative theology does allow talk about God,although such talk is to be correctly understood in negative terms.The reply to the second horn is that it begs the question.28 The

28See Franck, "Maimonides and Aquinas," especially his reply to (5)and (6), pp. 613-14; see also my "Comments on Maimonides' NegativeTheology," New Scholasticism 49 (1975): 87-93. Franck misrepresentedmy view by associating it with the criticisms of George Englebretsen

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MAIMONIDESAND AQUINAS 733criticism implicit in the second horn of the dilemma argues for aninternal inconsistency in the thesis of exclusively negative languageabout God, on the grounds that any negative language is intelligibleonly if it entails positive language. But the premiss of this argument presupposes that only positive language is intelligible, whichis precisely the issue that negative theology contests. Thus thethesis of exclusively negative language of God cannot be charged

with internal inconsistency.29Yet even if exclusively negative language about God need notentail positive language, the question still remains whether it isindeed intelligible. A serious logical objection argues that it isnot. The objection takes negative theology to hold that only propositions of the form 'God is not P' are true predications and thus

meaningful. Consequently, it follows that any and all terms maybe truthfully predicated of God provided they are denied to God.While we cannot truthfully say "God is wise" or "God is corporeal,"according to the negative theologian we can truthfully say "God isnot wise" and "God is not corporeal." But if any and all terms canbe denied to God, then there are no restrictions on what is or is notpredicable of God. Thus there are, in effect, no rules of predicationand a language with no rules of predication remains unintelligible.This line of criticism was raised by Levi ben Gerson (1288-1344)against Maimonides' insistence that terms are predicated equivocally of God;30 it is suggested by Aquinas against a negative interpretation of divine attributes.31 It is also implicit in the conten

("The Logic of Negative Theology," New Scholasticism 47 [1973]: 228-32),against whom I was presenting an argument similar to that levelled byFranck in the end.29This point is more formally argued by Joseph M. Bochenski in hisThe Logic of Religion (New York: New York University Press, 1965),113-14, and 32-34.30See Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, Treatise Three: On God's

Knowledge, translation and commentary by Norbert Max Samuelson (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1977): "if the things thatwe affirm of him . . .are said of Him . . .and of us in absolute equivocation, (then) not one of the terms for things which are (known) to us wouldbe more appropriate in negation from God . . . than in affirmation, or(more appropriate) in affirmation than in negation" (p. 197). Samuelsoncomments: "if divine attributes are absolutely equivocal, there are no rulesfor their use, which is to say that they have no intelligibile use" (p. 32).31See Summa Theologiae 1, Q. 13, a. 2: "on neither view [i.e., on acausal or a negative interpretation of divine attributes] can there be any

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734 JOSEPH A. BUIJStions of George Englebretsen and of Fred Sommers, whose criticisms Franck considers.32 But Franck seems to miss the radicalthrust of their critique. Indeed, his radical negative theology fallsprey to this charge of unintelligibility, precisely because it impliesthat any and all predicates are to be denied to God, just as a positivetheology would be unintelligible if itwere to claim that any and allpredicates could be affirmed of God. Neither the Maimonidean norThomistic theology, however, falls prey to this charge, because forMaimonides as well as Aquinas there are rules of predication re

garding language of God. Not all terms are simply denied to God.And even those that are, according to Maimonides, are governed bycertain restrictions.33

Finally, what of the difference then between Maimonides andAquinas?One difference is the way in which Aquinas and Maimonidesapproach the logical relation between the epistemic thesis and thesemantic thesis of negative theology. Maimonides argues from oneto the other. That is, given the epistemic thesis ENT, he concludes

with the semantic thesis SNT2. If God's essence remains unknowable to us, then we cannot meaningfully describe it either. Since,for Maimonides, attributes of action do not describe an essence?although they flow from it?predicating such attributes of God wouldviolate neither ENT nor SNT2. And whereas SNT2 derives from

ENT, the latter in turn derives from Maimonides' metaphysics;

reason why we should use some words about God rather than others . . .we could say 'God is a body' because we want to deny that he is merelypotential being like primary matter." See also Broadie, "Maimonides andAquinas," 162.32See Englebretsen, "Logic," 228-32: "If all talk about God is negativein sense (i) [i.e., "God is not P"], we cannot circumscribe God. We cannotknow anything about God. There is no point in talking about Him" (p.231). See also Fred Sommers, "What We Can Say About God," Judaism15 (1966): 61-73: "For negative theology itmakes no more sense to say ofGod that He ismerciful than it does to say of Him that He is brown or thatHe is round" (p. 63). For Franck's discussion of their views see "Maimonides and Aquinas," 604-06 and 613-15.

33See Wolfson, "Negative Attributes," 446; and Broadie, "Maimonidesand Aquinas," 162-63. Maimonides singles out perfections, as well. Butthese are applied meaningfully to God, only ifwe deny their correspondingprivation or imperfection to God; Guide 1.55, pp. 128-29; 1.58, p. 136; and 1.60, pp. 142-43. This refinement inMaimonides' theory of negative attributes calls for further elaboration, especially in light of Gersonides' sustained criticisms.

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MAIMONIDESAND AQUINAS 735ENT is claimed to be true because of proofs for the existence of Godand what these entail about God's nature.34 In other words, for

Maimonides language is contingent on thought and thought is contingent on reality.

Aquinas, instead, either handles the epistemic claim and thesemantic claim independently from each other, though both arederived from his metaphysics of God; or if he does see a logicalconnection, he uses it to argue against the implication of Maimonides' theology. For in effect Aquinas seems to argue from the

denial of SNT2 to a modification of ENT. That is, becausesome

attributes imperfectly yet truly describe God's essence, we can alsoimperfectly yet positively know something of that essence.35 Here,it seems that both language and thought are directly contingent onreality or else, in the case of God at least, language determinesthought.

The main difference, however, centers on the theory of analogyon the part of Aquinas, and on a theory of action on the part of

Maimonides. The problem for both thinkers is not only to satisfythe philosophical question of how to talk truthfully and meaningfully about God in human terms but also the religious demand tospeak of God in positive terms. And both thinkers recognize thatthere are inherent limitations in our human capabilities. Mai

monides sees a solution in attributes of action, which allow positive34Logically formulated, Maimonides argues thus:

1) MNT2) IfMNT, then ENT3) IfENT, then SNT24) Hence, ENT and SNT2

In my "Comments," I alluded to the metaphysical underpinnings of Maimonides' negative theology in contrast to Englebretsen's logical focus.Maimonides' fully developed negative language about God which movesfrom equivocal predication to the negation of the privation of humanperfections?a point not explored in Franck's interpretation?is contingent on his metaphysics.35Wippel suggests as much when he contends that Aquinas refinedhis views to exclude only defining knowledge of God "because Thomascame to take Moses Maimonides' restrictive position concerning the divinenames very seriously" ("Quidditative Knowledge," 299). In other words,

Aquinas argues thus:1) MNT2) If MNT, then not-SNT23) If ENT, then SNT24) Hence, not-SNT2 and not-ENT

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736 JOSEPH A. BUIJStalk that is not descriptive of God's essence. Aquinas sees a solution in his theory of analogy, which allows positive talk that isdescriptive of God's essence. Detailed analyses of the underlyingissues and argumentation here would uncover fundamental philosophical differences. While I do not propose such an analysis here,let me hint at some of the issues.36

Maimonides' attributes of action derive from his theory of action in conjunction with his theory of causation and emanation.

While Aquinas seems to accommodate such attributes by interpreting them to refer to divine agency as their cause, he, like otherscholastics, misses the unique thrust of Maimonides' theory.37 Thetheory of emanation, unlike that of natural causation, purportedlyexplains agency without a relation of likeness or similarity. Theagency of natural causation presupposes an active disposition in theagent similar to the effect that is produced, whereas agency byemanation does not. The agency of immaterial beings, such as thatof the agent intellect with respect to knowledge, is of this kind.38The agency of God in the world is described in similar terms.39 Yet

Maimonides further distinguishes divine agency from necessaryemanation, as well as natural causation.40 Thus attributes of action are neither causal nor relational. They are not the result ofany specific cause; nor do they set up a relation in any spatial,

36Harold Johnson recognizes a number of differences in Aquinas'sand Maimonides' logical and metaphysical commitments, attributingthem to differing religious pressures and intellectual resources; see his"Via negationis," 848-55. The philosophical differences are more explicitly explored, and defended in favour of Aquinas, by David Burrell; see hisKnowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (NotreDame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), especially 51-70.37See the study of Seymour Feldman, "A Scholastic Misinterpretation of Maimonides' Doctrine of Divine Attributes," Journal of JewishStudies 19 (1968):23-39.38See Guide 1.53, p. 121; 2.12, p. 279; and 2.18, pp. 299-300.39See Guide 1.58, p. 136; 1.69, p. 169; and 2.12, pp. 279-78.40See Guide 2.18, pp. 301-02; 2.22, p. 319; 2.25, p. 329; 3.25, p. 505. Seethe detailed analysis of Arthur Hyman, "Maimonides on Causality," inMaimonides and Philosophy, ed. S. Pines and Y. Yovel (Dordrecht andBoston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 157-72. Two other recent contrastingdiscussions on similar themes in Maimonides are these: Alfred L. Ivry,"Providence, Divine Omniscience and Possibility: The Case of Maimonides," inDivine Omniscience and Omnipotence inMedieval Philosophy, ed.T. Rudavsky (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985), especially 147-53; and Alvin J.

Reines, "Maimonides' Concept of Miracles," Hebrew Union College Annual45 (1974), especially his summary on 277-79.

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MAIMONIDESAND AQUINAS 737temporal or ontological sense. At best they merely identify anagent as the one who has produced a certain effect. It is for thisreason that talk about God's actions as manifested in the world isnot also talk about God's essence.

For Aquinas, analogy is more than linguistic metaphor; it isrooted in a metaphysical theory of relations between differentkinds of entities, their nature, capabilities, and activities. Maimonides, instead, insists on an equivocal use of terms when predicated of God and other creatures, also on metaphysical grounds.41If Maimonides' insistence is simply a veiled way of capturing theinsight later developed by Aquinas?as some suggest?then Maimonides is in intent, if not formulation, Thomistic.42 And if

Aquinas's theory of analogy remains negative and agnostic aboutGod?as others suggest?then he, conversely, retains a Maimonidean intent.43 But the first overlooks Maimonides' explicit critiqueof analogical language and the second minimizes the positive content of analogy.

On analogical predication, as on that of attributes of action, amore fundamental, ontological issue emerges that concerns the wayboth thinkers approach the very status of the divine nature, theconcept of creative activity, and, consequently, the supposed "relation" between God and other creatures. In Maimonides, the distance between God, as a necessary (uncaused) existent, and creatures, as contingent (caused) existents is not broached at all. In

Aquinas, it is, because creatures by way of their very being (esse)participate in the divine being (ipsum esse per se subsistens) as theirvery source.44 On Maimonides' view, creatures receive their exis

41See Guide 1.56, p. 131: "Accordingly this is a cogent demonstrationthat the meaning of the qualificative attributions ascribed to Him and themeaning of the attributions known to us have nothing in common in anyrespect or in any mode; these attributions have in common only the nameand nothing else."42See, for instance, Penido, "Les attributs," 144-48.43See, for instance, Johnson, "Via negationis," 847-48; and Broadie,"Maimonides and Aquinas," 166-67.44Aquinas adopts the principle that every agent produces somethingthat is in someway like itself (omne agens agit sibi simile) and views thecreative activity of God as directed only to being (esse). See, for instance,Summa Theologiae 1, Q. 3, a. 2, ad 3, a. 3, and a. 5, ad 1;Q. 19, a. 3; Q. 44, a. 1;Summa Contra Gentiles 1, chap. 22 and chap. 29; De Potentia Dei Q. 3, a. 1;Libros Sententiarum 2, dist. 18, Q. 2, a. 1, ad 4. See also the development ofthis issue in Burrell, The Unknowable God, especially, 31-32 and 93-99.

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738 JOSEPH A. BUIJStence as a result of divine agency, but once in existence, they standat a distance, so to speak, from God. Despite often similar terminology, Aquinas and Maimonides remain fundamentally and philosophically different.

IVIn conclusion, Franck's appeal to Aquinas alongside Maimon

ides as being among the historical roots of negative theology uncovers the need to distinguish carefully two distinct theses withinnegative theology. A formulation of those theses, moreover, reveals a wider spectrum of negative theology than Franck's classification initially recognized. It also serves to uncover a number ofphilosophical differences on negative theology between Aquinasand Maimonides on the one hand, and between Maimonides andFranck on the other. And while Franck's defense of negative theology falls short in the case of his own radical version of negativetheology, it is nevertheless by and large plausible when applied to

Maimonides.

St Joseph's College, The University of Alberta