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Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR64261, 26 December 1984]

En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part

Facts:

On 7 December 1982, Judge ErnaniCruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then CFIRizal [Quezon City],

issued 2 searchwarrants where the premises at 19, Road3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C& D,

RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,Quezon City, business addresses of theMetropolitan Mail and WeForumnewspapers, respectively, were searched,and office and printing machines,equipment,paraphernalia, motor vehiclesand other articles used in the printing,publication and distribution of the

saidnewspapers, as well as numerous papers,documents, books and other writtenliterature alleged to be in

the possessionand control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, wereseized.A petition for certiorari, prohibitionand mandamus with preliminarymandatory and prohibitory injunction

wasfiled after 6 months following the raid toquestion the validity of said searchwarrants, and to enjoin the

JudgeAdvocate General of the AFP, the cityfiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using thearticles seized as

evidence in CriminalCase Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City(People v. Burgos).

Issue:

Whether allegations of possessionand printing of subversive materials maybe the basis of the issuance of

searchwarrants.

Held:Section 3 provides that no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to

bedetermined by the judge, or such otherresponsible officer as may be authorizedby law, after

examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce,

andparticularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to beseized. Probable causefor a search isdefined as such facts and circumstanceswhich would lead a reasonably discreetand prudent

man to believe that anoffense has been committed and that theobjects sought in connection with

theoffense are in the place sought to besearched. In mandating that no warrantshall issue except upon

probable cause tobe determined by the judge, afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses hemay produce; the Constitution requiresno less than personal knowledgeby thecomplainant or his witnesses of the factsupon which the issuance of a searchwarrant may be

justified. Herein, astatement in the effect that Burgos is inpossession or has in his control

printingequipment and other paraphernalia, newspublications and other documents whichwere used andare all continuously beingused as a means of committing theoffense of subversion punishable under

PD885, as amended is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirementsof probable cause.Bereft of suchparticulars as would justify a finding of theexistence of probable cause, saidallegation

cannot serve as basis for theissuance of a search warrant. Further,when the search warrant applied for

isdirected against a newspaper publisher oreditor in connection with the publication of subversive

materials, the applicationand/or its supporting affidavits mustcontain a specification, stating

withparticularity the alleged subversivematerial he has published or is intendingto publish. Mere

generalization will notsuffice.

People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222,17 June 1999]

En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 onleave

Facts:In response to reports of rampantsmuggling of firearms and othercontraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief

of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of LaUnion began patrolling the Bacnotancoastline with his

officers. Whilemonitoring the coastal area of BarangayBulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted aradio

call at around 12:45 p.m. fromBarangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting

policeassistance regarding an unfamiliarspeedboat the latter had spotted, whichlooked different from the

boats ordinarilyused by fisherfolk of the area and waspoised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cidand 6 of

his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua,proceeded forthwith to Tammocalaobeach,

conferred with Almoite, andobserved that the speedboat ferried a lonemale passenger. When the

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speedboatlanded, the male passenger alighted, andusing both hands, carried what appeared amulticolored

strawbag, and walkedtowards the road. By this time, Almoite,Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuousin

their uniform and issued side-arms,became suspicious of the man as hesuddenly changed direction and

broke intoa run upon seeing the approachingofficers. Badua, prevented the man fromfleeing by holding

on to his right arm.Although Cid introduced themselves aspolice officers, the man appearedimpassive.

Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid thenrequested the man to open his bag, but

heseemed not to understand. Cid thenresorted to sign language, motioning

with his hands for the man to open thebag. The man apparently understood andacceded to the request. A

search of thebag yielded several transparent plasticpackets containing yellowish crystallinesubstances. As

Cid wished to proceed tothe police station, he signaled the man tofollow, but the latter did not

comprehend.Hence, Cid placed his arm around theshoulders of the man and escorted thelatter to the

police headquarters. At thepolice station, Cid then recited andinformed the man of hisconstitutionalrights to remain silent, to have theassistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting noresponse fromthe man, Cid ordered hismen to find a resident of the area whospoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. Inthe

meantime, Badua opened the bag andcounted 29 plastic packets containingyellowish crystalline

substances. Theinterpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finallyarrived, through whom the man wasapprised of hisconstitutional rights.When the policemen asked the manseveral questions, he retreated to hisobstinate

reticence and merely showed hisID with the name Chua Ho San printedthereon. Chuas bag and itscontents weresent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at CampDiego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, LaUnion

for laboratory examination. In themeantime, Chua was detained at theBacnotan Police Station. Later,

Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist TheresaAnn Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducteda

laboratory examination of 29 plasticpackets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that herqualitativeexamination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, tobe positive

of methamphetaminehydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.Chua was initially charged with

illegalpossession of methamphetaminehydrochloride before the RTC (CriminalCase 4037). However,

pursuant to therecommendation of the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, LaUnion, the

information was subsequentlyamended to allege that Chua was inviolation of Section 15, Article III of

RA6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegaltransport of a regulated drug). At hisarraignment on 31 July

1995, where theamended complaint was read to him by aFukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entereda plea

of not guilty. Trial finally ensued,with interpreters assigned to Chua (uponthe RTCs direct request to theTaipeiEconomic and Cultural Office in thePhilippines, after its failure to acquire onefrom the Department

of Foreign Affairs).Chua provided a completely differentstory, claiming that the bags belong to

hisemployer Cho Chu Rong, who heaccompanied in the speedboat; that theydecided to dock when they

were low onfuel and telephone battery; that thepolice, with nary any spoken word but onlygestures and

hand movements, escortedhim to the precinct where he washandcuffed and tied to a chair; that thepolice,

led by an officer, arrived with themotor engine of the speedboat and a bag,which they presented to him;

that thepolice inspected opened the bag, weighedthe contents, then proclaimed them asmethamphetamine

hydrochloride. In adecision promulgated on 10 February1997, the RTC convicted Chua fortransporting

28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride withoutlegal authority to do so. Chua prays for thereversal

of the RTC decision and hisacquittal before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and othercontraband articles, Chuaswatercraftdiffering in appearance from the usualfishing boats that commonly cruise overthe Bacnotan

seas, Chuas illegal entryinto the Philippines, Chuas suspiciousbehavior, i.e. he attempted to flee whenhesaw the police authorities, and theapparent ease by which Chua can returnto and navigate his speedboat

withimmediate dispatch towards the highseas, constitute probable cause.Held:

No. Enshrined in the Constitution isthe inviolable right to privacy of home andperson. It explicitly ordains

that peoplehave the right to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers and effectsagainst unreasonable

searches andseizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose. Inseparable, and not merelycorollary or

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incidental to said right andequally hallowed in and by theConstitution, is the exclusionary principlewhich

decrees that any evidence obtainedin violation of said right is inadmissible forany purpose in any

proceeding. TheConstitutional proscription againstunreasonable searches and seizures doesnot, of course,

forestall reasonablesearches and seizure. This interdictionagainst warrantless searches and

seizures,however, is not absolute and suchwarrantless searches and seizures havelong been deemed

permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of Courtrecognize permissible warrantless arrests,to wit: (1)

arrests in flagrante delicto, (2)arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3)arrests of escaped prisoners.Theprosecution and the defense paintedextremely divergent versions of theincident, but the Court is

certain that Chuawas arrested and his bag searchedwithout the benefit of a warrant. There areno facts on

record reasonably suggestiveor demonstrative of Chuas participation inan ongoing criminal enterprisethat couldhave spurred police officers fromconducting the obtrusive search. The RTC

never took the pains of pointing to suchfacts, but predicated mainly its decisionon the finding that

accused was caughtred-handed carrying the bagful of shabuwhen apprehended. In short, there is

noprobable cause. Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and othercontraband articles,

Chuas watercraftdiffering in appearance from the usualfishing boats that commonly cruise overthe

Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entryinto the Philippines, Chuas suspiciousbehavior, i.e. he attempted toflee whenhe saw the police authorities, and theapparent ease by which Chua can returnto and navigate his

speedboat withimmediate dispatch towards the highseas, do not constitute probable cause.None ofthetelltale clues, e.g., bag orpackage emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,

20confidential report and/or positiveidentification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the

time and placewhere they will transport/deliver thesame, suspicious demeanor or behaviorand suspicious

bulge in the waistaccepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in thecase.There was no classified informationthat a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing

prohibiteddrug on the date in question. Chua wasnot identified as a drug courier by a policeinformer or

agent. The fact that the vesselthat ferried him to shore bore noresemblance to the fishing boats of thearea

did not automatically mark him as inthe process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore

bedenominated as incidental to an arrest. Toreiterate, the search was not incidental toan arrest. There was

no warrant of arrestand the warrantless arrest did not fallunder the exemptions allowed by theRules of

Court as already shown. From allindications, the search was nothing but afishing expedition. Casting

aside theregulated substance as evidence, thesame being the fruit of a poisonous tree,the remainingevidence on record areinsufficient, feeble and ineffectual tosustain Chuas conviction.People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19February 2001]

En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur

Facts:

Sometime in June 1996, SPO1Marino Paguidopon, then a member of thePhilippine National Police (PNP)

detailed atPrecinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,received an information regarding thepresence of an

alleged marijuana pusherin Davao City. The first time he came tosee the said marijuana pusher in

personwas during the first week of July 1996.SPO1 Paguidopon was then with hisinformer when a

motorcycle passed by.His informer pointed to the motorcycledriver, Gregorio Mula y

Malagura(@Boboy), as the pusher. As to NasarioMolina y Manamat (@ Bobong), SPO1Paguidoponhad no occasion to see himprior to 8 August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m.of 8 August 1996, SPO1

Paguidoponreceived an information that the allegedpusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, DavaoCity anytime that morning. Consequently,at around 8:00 a.m. he called forassistance at the PNP, Precinct 3,

Matina,Davao City, which immediately dispatchedthe team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (teamleader),

SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1Pamplona, to proceed to the house

of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where theywould wait for the alleged pusher to passby. At around 9:30 a.m.,

while the teamwere positioned in the house of SPO1Paguidopon, a trisikad carrying Mula andMolinapassed by. At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina asthe pushers. Thereupon, the

teamboarded their vehicle and overtook thetrisikad. SPO1 Paguidopon was left in hishouse, 30 metersfrom where Mula andMolina were accosted. The police officersthen ordered the trisikad to stop. At

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thatpoint, Mula, who was holding a black bag,handed the same to Molina. Subsequently,SPO1 Pamplona

introduced himself as apolice officer and asked Molina to openthe bag. Molina replied, Boss, if

possiblewe will settle this. SPO1 Pamplonainsisted on opening the bag, whichrevealed dried marijuanaleaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina werehandcuffed by the police officers. On 6December 1996,

the accused Mula andMolina, through counsel, jointly filed aDemurrer to Evidence, contending that

themarijuana allegedly seized from them isinadmissible as evidence for having beenobtained in violation

of their constitutionalright against unreasonable searches andseizures. The demurrer was denied bythetrial court. A motion for reconsiderationwas filed by the accused, but this waslikewise denied. The

accused waivedpresentation of evidence and opted to filea joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997,the trial

court rendered the decision,finding the accused guilty of the offensecharged, and sentenced both to suffer

thepenalty of death by lethal injection.Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised PenalCode and Rule 122,

Section 10 of theRules of Court, the case was elevated tothe Supreme Court on automatic review.

Issue:

Whether Mula and Molinamanifested outward indication that would justify their arrest, and the seizure

of prohibited drugs that were in theirpossess

of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These menwere acting suspiciously with"[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast."Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and

observedboth groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached onegroup of men, who

then fled in different directions. As the policemen gavechase, Yu caught up with and apprehendedpetitioner. Upon searchingpetitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's

"frontwaist line.

Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehendedAbdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber

revolver was recovered. Petitioner andCasan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed

an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.The trial court then

ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner wasincidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner

"[l]ater voluntarily admittedsuch fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the

MercuryDrug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner'sguilt beyondreasonable doubt.ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.RULING:Even granting

ex gratia

that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrestand search of petitioner were invalid, as will be

discussed below.The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant isneeded in

order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition againstunreasonable arrests, searches and

seizures refers to those effected without avalidly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards

valid warrantlessarrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads,in

part:Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a

warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrestedhas committed, is actually

committing, or is attemptingto commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,and he has personal knowledge of facts indicatingthatthe person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner whohas

escaped . . .A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been

denominated as one "

in flagrante delicto

," whilethat under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.Turning to valid warrantless

searches, they are limited to the following: (1)customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)

seizure of evidence in plainview; (4) consent searches;

33

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(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;

34

and (6)a "stop and frisk."

35

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stopand frisk" with "the

seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriateincident to his arrest," hence necessitating a

brief discussion on the nature ofthese exceptions to the warrant requirement.At the outset, we note that thetrial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These

two types of warrantlesssearches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may

bevalidly effected and in their allowable scope.In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent

arrest determines thevalidity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a

largemajority of these cases,

e

.

g

., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires

that there first be a lawfularrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. Atbottom,

assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person ofthe arrestee and the area within

which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or propertyfound which was used inthe commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be

usedas evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing

violence.Here, there could have been no valid

in flagrante delictoor hot pursuit arrestpreceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part ofYu, the

arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,indicating that a crime had just been

committed, was being committed or wasgoing to be committed.

Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, thesearch conducted on

petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawfularrest.We now proceed to the justification for and

allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as

laid downinT

erry

, thus:We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusualconduct which leads him

reasonably to conclude in light of hisexperience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the

personswith whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,where in the course of

investigating this behavior he identifieshimself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and

wherenothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel hisreasonable fear for his own or

others' safety, he is entitled for theprotection of himself and others in the area to conduct a

carefullylimited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt todiscover weapons which

might be used to assault him. Such asearch is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . .Other

notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not requiredto conduct a "stop and frisk," it

nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or ahunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reasonmust exist, inlight of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, towarrant the belief that

the person detained has weapons concealedabout him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold

interest: (1) thegeneral interest of effective crime prevention and detection, whichunderlies the

recognition that a police officer may, under appropriatecircumstances and in an appropriate manner,

approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even withoutprobable cause;

and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take

steps to assure himselfthat the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weaponthat could

unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why

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the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a

member ofthe group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claimis neither

supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by anyother police officer who allegedly chased

that group. Aside from impairing Yu'scredibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that

a genuinereason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the

credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and hiscompanions had to be chasedbefore being apprehended, the affidavit ofarrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise,

i

.

e

., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately

collared."Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could havereasonably

elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "movingvery fast" an observation which

leaves us incredulous since Yu and histeammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30

p.m., thuspresumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at thecorner and were

not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitlydeclared on cross-examination:Q And what were

they doing?A They were merely standing.Q You are sure of that?A Yes, sir.Q And when you saw them

standing, there werenothing or they did not create any commotion.A None, sir.Q Neither did you see themcreate commotion?A None, sir.Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe

thatpetitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as headmitted, the alleged

grenade was "discovered" "

inside the front waistline" ofpetitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu andpetitioner, any telltale bulge,

assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding agrenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted

by the trial court:When the policemen approached the accused and hiscompanions, they were not yet

aware that a hand grenade wastucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in[

sic

] his person.What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rightssolemnly

guaranteed in Sections

2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

SAMMY MALACAT vs. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS:On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in

response to bomb threats reportedseven days earlier, Police officer Yu and company were on foot patrol

(all ofthem in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the MercuryDrug store at Plaza

Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-lookingmen, with each group, comprised of three to

four men, posted at opposite sides

of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These menwere acting suspiciously with

"[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast."Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points andobservedboth groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached onegroup of men, who

then fled in different directions. As the policemen gavechase, Yu caught up with and apprehended

petitioner. Upon searchingpetitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's

"frontwaist line.

Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehendedAbdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber

revolver was recovered. Petitioner andCasan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed

an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.The trial court then

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ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner wasincidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner

"[l]ater voluntarily admittedsuch fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the

MercuryDrug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner'sguilt beyond

reasonable doubt.ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.RULING:Even granting

ex gratia

that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrestand search of petitioner were invalid, as will be

discussed below.The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant isneeded inorder to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition againstunreasonable arrests, searches and

seizures refers to those effected without avalidly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards

valid warrantlessarrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads,in

part:Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a

warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrestedhas committed, is actually

committing, or is attemptingto commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating

thatthe person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner whohas

escaped . . .A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been

denominated as one "

in flagrante delicto," whilethat under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.Turning to valid warrantless

searches, they are limited to the following: (1)customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)

seizure of evidence in plainview; (4) consent searches;

33(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;

34

and (6)a "stop and frisk."

35

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stopand frisk" with "the

seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriateincident to his arrest," hence necessitating a

brief discussion on the nature ofthese exceptions to the warrant requirement.At the outset, we note that the

trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Thesetwo types of warrantlesssearches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may

bevalidly effected and in their allowable scope.In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent

arrest determines thevalidity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a

largemajority of these cases,

e

.

g

., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires

that there first be a lawfularrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. Atbottom,

assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person ofthe arrestee and the area within

which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property

found which was used inthe commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may beusedas evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing

violence.Here, there could have been no valid

in flagrante delicto

or hot pursuit arrestpreceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part ofYu, the

arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,indicating that a crime had just been

committed, was being committed or wasgoing to be committed.

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Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, thesearch conducted on

petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawfularrest.We now proceed to the justification for and

allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as

laid downin

T

erry

, thus:We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusualconduct which leads himreasonably to conclude in light of hisexperience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the

personswith whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,where in the course of

investigating this behavior he identifieshimself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and

wherenothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel hisreasonable fear for his own or

others' safety, he is entitled for theprotection of himself and others in the area to conduct a

carefullylimited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt todiscover weapons which

might be used to assault him. Such asearch is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . .Other

notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not requiredto conduct a "stop and frisk," it

nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or ahunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason

must exist, inlight of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, towarrant the belief that

the person detained has weapons concealedabout him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold

interest: (1) thegeneral interest of effective crime prevention and detection, whichunderlies therecognition that a police officer may, under appropriatecircumstances and in an appropriate manner,

approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even withoutprobable cause;

and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take

steps to assure himselfthat the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weaponthat couldunexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why

the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a

member ofthe group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claimis neither

supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by anyother police officer who allegedly chased

that group. Aside from impairing Yu'scredibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that

a genuinereason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the

G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,

vs.

ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and

GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.

FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker

room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in

barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly

opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open

the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.

Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that

instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions.

Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio

and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if

they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.

As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police

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conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the

Fiscals Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the

decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.

RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,

defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another

person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x

In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal

activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and

their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample

time for them to obtain one.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners violation of individual

respondents constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of

damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office

had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation

of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for

damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury

caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva,

the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and

exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent

provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6)

Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

DECISION: Denied.

The Anti-Wiretapping Law

Republic Act 4200 is probably the most quoted law nowadays. Thus, it is worthy to examine the

said law and discuss its pertinent provisions.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and OtherRelated Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides that it shall be

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unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or

spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretlyoverhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly

known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or

however otherwise described.

In Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 93833 (Sept. 28, 1995)], petitioner Ramirez

vigorously argues, that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to thetaping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the

provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than

those involved in the communication. In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance orcontent of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged

would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes

the taping of a private communication, not a private conversation and that consequently, her

act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioner. It stated that Section 1 ofR.A. 4200 clearlyand unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any privatecommunication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law

makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a

party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statutesintent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of

the qualifier any. Consequently, .even a (person) privy to a communication who recordshis private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a

violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.

The Supreme Court held further that the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation

of the statute. It held that:

The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200

penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communicationsby means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret

recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an

offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT

before the respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can beregarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third

person should beprofessed.

Curiously, in Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, [145 SCRA 112 (1986)], a case

which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, the Supreme Court held that the use of atelephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization

did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those

device(s) or arrangement(s) enumerated therein, following the principle that penal statutes

must be construed strictly in favor ofthe accused.

WHEN IS WIRETAPPING ALLOWED?

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Under Section 3 of R.A. 4200, a peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the

Court, may execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in

cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of

war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit

rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,

kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth ActNo. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security. Such written

order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or

affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there arereasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been

committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases

involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting torebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall

be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have

actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that

evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to

the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available forobtaining such evidence.

INADMISSIBILITY OF WIRETAPPED EVIDENCE

Section 4 of R.A. 4200 declares that any communication or spoken word, or the existence,

contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any

information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding

sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,

legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.