clipping_04-11-clipping de notícias de 04 de novembro de 2015
DESCRIPTION
Clipping de noticias do brasil e do mundo, compilados em 04 de novembro de 2015TRANSCRIPT
SELECcedilAtildeO DIAacuteRIA DE NOTIacuteCIAS NACIONAIS
01112015
SELECcedilAtildeO DIAacuteRIA DE NOTIacuteCIAS NACIONAIS 1
AMEacuteRICA LATINA E CARIBE 2
Foreign Affairs - The Rise of Vigilantism and the Right Wing in
Peru | Foreign Affairs 2
The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell 4
The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace agreement
that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential
it will need to make big changes argues Michael Reid 6
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager 9
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot | 10
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA 12
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous 12
CHINA 16
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like 16
RUacuteSSIA 19
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations 19
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue 22
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR 25
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs 25
DIREITOS HUMANOS 29
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance 29
AMEacuteRICA LATINA E CARIBE
Foreign Affairs - The Rise of Vigilantism and the Right Wing in
Peru | Foreign Affairs
On September 15 the people of Andas a small community in the mountains of central
Peru caught two men suspected of fatally shooting a local 57-year-old father of six
Since the nearest police station was two hours away the mob took justice into their own
hands they stripped the alleged criminals naked bound their hands and feet drenched
them in gasoline and burned them alive As Andasrsquo mayor later told the newspaper La
Repuacuteblica ldquoLa muerte de ellos fue la solucioacutenrdquomdashTheir death was the solutionThis was
not an isolated incident A new wave of vigilantism has been sweeping Peru since the
late summer starting in the cities and then spreading outward There is even a Twitter
movement ChapaTuChoro a slang term that translates to ldquoCatch Your Thiefrdquo that has
sprung up and encourages citizens to go one step beyond civilian arrestsmdashto take justice
into their own hands and punish suspected criminals through public humiliation and
even mob lynchings Documentation of the gruesome behavior is often uploaded to
YouTubeBut Peruvian citizens feel that their brand of street justice is justified ldquoItrsquos not
that we are barbariansrdquo Someya Rojas Leivas a supporter of the movement told me
ldquoItrsquos that we are tired of being at the mercy of criminals and the bloody authorities do
nothingrdquo Around the time of the Andas incident national support for the movement
hovered at around 53 percent by early October it had soared to 72 percent ldquoRun run
runrdquo singer Rony warns criminals in ldquoChapa Tu Chorordquo a catchy new pop song ldquoThe
village is after yourdquo VIRAL VIGILANTISM By any measure this is a distinctly
twenty-first-century phenomenonmdasha genuinely viral reaction to crime in a country
whose battered mineral-based economy and stagnant minimum wage have made locals
especially in cities feel starkly less safe than they did a year ago According to a survey
released in mid-October 90 percent of people living in Lima do not feel safe walking
the cityrsquos streets Citizens are fed up with their unresponsive state In that sense the
Chapa phenomenon is as much a call for government action as a cry of
helplessnessAnd thatrsquos exactly what the trend was designed for It began earlier this
year in Huancayo one of Perursquos largest cities Cecilia Garciacutea Rodriacuteguez a journalist
and businesswoman started the Chapa movement when she became outraged after
police arrested a man who had broken into her neighborrsquos home with a knife only to
release him 30 minutes later The communityrsquos sense of frustration was so palpable that
Rodriacuteguez had no trouble corralling them to make and post signs around their
neighborhood ldquoCrooks if we catch you we wonrsquot call the policerdquo they read ldquoWe are
going to lynch yourdquoRodriacuteguezrsquos efforts however and the Chapa movement in general
may be a front for more political activitiesmdashit is cleverly timed given Perursquos upcoming
general elections in April 2016 and candidates have already begun campaigning
Although Rodriacuteguez has never sought political office before she is now considering a
run for Congress in the spring She was later revealed to have been a vocal supporter of
Perursquos controversial former right-wing president Alberto Fujimori who was convicted
in 2009 of embezzlement and human rights violationsIf Rodriacuteguez does run she would
find herself in good companymdashFujimorirsquos daughter Keiko Fujimori is running for
president again after having lost to the current left-wing president Ollanta Humala in
2011 Keikorsquos brother Kenji Fujimori a sitting congressman tweeted that the Chapa
movement points to ldquothe ineffectiveness of the government to provide security to the
populationrdquo Not coincidentally Rodriacuteguezrsquos movement feels largely derived from
Fujimorism it relies on right-wing populism brutal pragmatism and the attitude that
Humalarsquos government doesnrsquot know what itrsquos doing Leftist politicians have either
denounced the movement or kept mummdashtheyrsquore on the losing side of the public opinion
battleIndeed this past June a spate of vigilante attacks erupted shortly after Humalarsquos
approval ratings sank to an all-time low of 17 percent in part because of his silence on
raising the $230 monthly minimum wage one of the lowest in Latin America Peruvian
police earn nearly double that but itrsquos still a fraction of copsrsquo salaries in neighboring
Chile and Ecuador To compensate Peruvian officers can be legally hired as private
security guards theoretically working part-time at both jobs in reality many work up to
25 days a month in the private sector thanks to institutional corruption a former interior
minister revealed to The Economist In turn the publicrsquos needs fall by the wayside It is
no wonder that there is such public distrust toward the police especially when the
governmentrsquos official response to Chapa is a tired-sounding plea to stop lynching and
let officers do their jobs ldquoTherersquos been this long history of self-defense forces and
communities responding to either the unwillingness or the inability of the state to
address these thingsrdquo according to Steven T Zech a postdoctoral research fellow at the
University of Denver who has spent the last five years researching Perursquos rural militias
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Peruvian Presidents Alan Garciacutea and Fujimori
armed roughly 4000 willing civilian militias to help fight the Maoist Shining Path
terrorist groupmdasha move widely credited as having been crucial to defeating the Path
But the civilians received their arms only after state military and police officials had
been deployed to these rural communities like an occupying force rather than
government aid For many locals the military-police presence soured their relations
with the Peruvian government It was at that time that Peruvians decided theyrsquod rather
handle issues of justice and security themselves ldquoTherersquos this huge pride in resistance
nowrdquo Zech says ldquoThere are these massive movements in rural populations theyrsquore
making demands on the state right now to be recognized and compensated for their
effortsrdquo After the Shining Path threat died down in the mid-1990s the civilian militias
evolved into political forces neighborhood watch groups and on-call security forces
often involving local politicians and community leadersTHE LONG ROAD TO
PEACEIf the government could find a way to work with street justice advocates
ChapaTuChoro could potentially become a productive progressive force for reducing
crime But there are two problems with this approach One is that unlike the countryrsquos
myriad rural militias Chapa supporters are divided on tactics Some mobs turn to
murder others stop short at public humiliation Therersquos little sense of community
among themmdashonly a manic thirst for justice Once theyrsquore done everyone goes
home The second problem with vigilantism is that the government faces a ldquodamned if
you donrsquot damned if you dordquo scenario when responding to the problem To accept
vigilantes is to admit the failure of the police to fight them is to digress from larger
crime-fighting issues such as rampant theft and drug trafficking The Mexican
government is currently struggling with that very dilemma on a much larger scale its
militias ostensibly formed to keep communities safe from cartel wars operate similarly
to Perursquos rural defense forces But with little government intervention those Mexican
groups occasionally spiral into drug trafficking human rights abuses and wanton
murder Many Mexican policymakers and academics condemn these crimes but the
state is helpless to prevent them until their dysfunctional national justice system
modernizesmdasha process that could take decades There are similar instances of
vigilantism elsewhere in Latin America This past May citizens of Riacuteo Bravo
Guatemala chased down and attacked a 16-year-old girl who allegedly shot a
motorcycle taxi driver she was drowned in gasoline and burned alive in the street In
Boliviamdashwhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a
public defendermdashthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005
and 2012 The Brazilian sociologist Joseacute de Souza Martins who has written a book on
the subject suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day often in Satildeo
Paulo Each of these governments condemns these actions but none is able to stanch
themmdashif they canrsquot catch criminals how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters
Brazilian officials have tried albeit in a ham-fisted way After a national newscaster
defended a recent example of street justice on the air the countryrsquos public prosecutor
launched a civil complaint against her television network accusing her of violating
human dignity But on the ground with such a glaring lack of police presence
governments are far less effective Across Latin America murder rates have
consistently grown since 2000 while systemic extortion and robberies cost people
untold amounts Few locals have faith in any countryrsquos criminal justice system and for
good reason Latin Americarsquos homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100 less
than half the global average Guatemala ranks among the lowest with a meager six
percent conviction rate This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians whose
level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country
according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project Itrsquos too
early to tell whether the social mediandashfueled trend will fade away or develop into
something larger and more politically organized Rodriacuteguez may well use it as a
political platform But the tide could also flow in the other direction On October 4 a
25-year-old father of two mistaken for a criminal was beaten for three hours by a mob
of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province His aunt a lawyer has since
filed a lawsuit on her nephewrsquos behalf alleging that Rodriacuteguez is condoning crime ldquoFor
the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru which is punishing the innocent
I have made the complaintrdquo she announced to the press But Rodriacuteguez isnrsquot worried
After all far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president
If the situation remains the same come springtime itrsquos likely that Peru will witness
Fujimorism version 20mdashon social media and beyond Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesperu2015-11-02perus-pitchfork-politics
The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell
From the print edition
MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death Pablo Escobar has become an object of
fascination ldquoNarcosrdquo a new series from Netflix is just one of a crop of films books
and television shows about Colombiarsquos most notorious drug-trafficker the cause of so
much violence in Medelliacuten in the 1980s and 90s
Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer For anyone who lived through those days the
attention he is receiving is distasteful But if he can now be seen as a mere historical
curiosity that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on Outsiders have
often fastened on the countryrsquos failures But over the past quarter-century it has been
surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems Escobar and his like
were taken down their successors today are ldquounknownrdquo notes Mr Gaviria Medelliacutenrsquos
mayor ldquoThey donrsquot last more than three or four years and canrsquot consolidate their
powerrdquo
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Colombiarsquos response to the drug mafias was to reform and strengthen a national police
force that along with Chilersquos is widely regarded as the most professional in Latin
America The 1991 constitution gave new powers to the courts as well as promoting
more inclusive politics and heralding social advances such as the provision of universal
health care
Progress has not always been linear Ten years ago Bogotaacute was a beacon of successful
urban management but under three mediocre mayors from the left it has become more
congested and less efficient Too often local politics is financed by corrupt ties to
construction companies Yet other cities such as Barranquilla are rising
The judiciary too has achieved some successes The removal of parliamentary
immunity by the 1991 constitution combined with powerful new legal instruments that
allow the seizure of illegally obtained assets has curbed the infiltration of politics by
drug money The courts jailed 32 national legislators and five regional governors for
their links with the paramilitaries And in a demonstration of political independence the
Constitutional Court blocked Mr Uribersquos re-election bid
Judging the judges
But the judiciary has itself become politicised and tainted by corruption despitemdashor
perhaps because ofmdasha proliferation of busybodies as well as its fiscal (attorney-
general) Colombia has a procurador (inspector-general) an auditor-general and an
ombudsman All are chosen by the higher courts The office of the fiscal has become an
empire with 29000 staff Instead of dedicating themselves to applying the law both
Eduardo Montealegre the fiscal and Alejandro Ordontildeez the procurador offer almost
daily opinions on political issues
Aside from such flaws though Colombiarsquos political system and its institutions have
proved capable of meeting many of the challenges posed by the crises of the 1980s and
90s Above all the state was able to extend its writ over a much bigger swathe of the
national territory offering greater security and opening the road to peace The bitter
rivalry between Mr Uribe and Mr Santos could yet derail peace but that looks less
likely now Still a government in which many ministers harbour presidential ambitions
will become increasingly distracted as the 2018 election approaches The hatred and
mistrust left by 50 years of conflict will not dissipate quickly even if Colombians come
to accept Mr Santosrsquos compromise between peace and justice
Another unknown concerns the FARCrsquos entry into politics Notwithstanding its recent
electoral success in Bogotaacute the left in Colombia has been extraordinarily weak
politically because part of it embraced violence That along with the effect of the
conflict itself helps explain the countryrsquos yawning socio-economic inequalities Despite
its deep unpopularity the FARC will doubtless get to govern some municipalities The
question is whether it will come to terms with democracy and the modern world
Colombia was forced to engage with the world when it found itself at the centre of the
international illegal-drug business Plan Colombia was one result It has since signed
trade agreements with Europe as well as the United States and it recently formed the
Pacific Alliance with Chile Mexico and Peru countries united by a commitment to free
trade and free-market economies
But most Colombian politicians and businesses remain introverted and the country is
still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond It failed to join the Asia-Pacific
Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members thus it is not
part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal And it has yet to take full advantage of
such trade deals as it has struck
Admittedly Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours Ecuador has
erected protectionist barriers to its exports Under the chavista regime Venezuela has
harboured guerrillas served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once
a big market for Colombian manufacturers In August Venezuelarsquos president Nicolaacutes
Maduro closed the border and summarily expelled 1000 Colombians causing another
20000 to flee He accused them of smuggling a business boosted by Venezuelarsquos price
and exchange controls and without evidence of being ldquoparamilitariesrdquo Yet Venezuela
also played a part in getting the FARC to the table and Colombia has benefited from
the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital
The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombiarsquos isolation it narrowly
failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of
the American States Colombiarsquos lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a
high price The countryrsquos problems and achievements are little understood even in its
own region which offered scant solidarity let alone help in the struggle with illegal
armies
Colombia will need the worldrsquos support for whatever peace deal it strikes It will also
need the worldrsquos help to monitor the FARCrsquos disarmament and aid for rural
development But it must do its bit too For example it will never become properly
developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes
But Colombia too has something to offer the world It already provides security advice
in Central America With luck it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end
seemingly intractable conflicts Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676958-colombia-needs-climb-out-its-shell-halfway-successfsrc=rss|spr
The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace
agreement that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential it will need to make big changes argues Michael
Reid
From the print edition
LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos the ceremony on
September 23rd started late by an hour and 37 minutes But it was worth waiting for
Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on
the thorniest issue they had had to resolve transitional justice or what sort of penalties
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombiarsquos long armed conflict should
face
This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba
that began three years ago Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his
first official meeting with Rodrigo Londontildeo better known to Colombians as
ldquoTimochenkordquo the FARCrsquos top commander (this report will use the guerrillasrsquo noms de
guerre) The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months and the FARC
undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that Despite some subsequent
bickering these deadlines look plausible
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Mr Santos (pictured left) was visibly uncomfortable when Rauacutel Castro Cubarsquos
president encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras
Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb kidnap and extort Mr Santos
knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow
most FARC commanders to escape going to jail But he also knows that peace
represents a huge prize for Colombia And because the FARC will be held to account
for their crimes in the countryrsquos own courts the agreement will offer a potential model
for other conflict-ridden countries
Colombiarsquos armed conflict has been remarkably bloody complicated and long-running
According to the National Centre for Historical Memory a public body set up by Mr
Santos in 2011 between 1958 and 2012 around 220000 people died as a result of the
clash between guerrillas right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces Of these
about 80 were civilians The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see
chart) And violence or the fear of it dislodged some 6m Colombians from their
homes mainly in the countryside
Over and above the saving in human life Mr Santos has said that peace together with
his infrastructure programme could add more than two percentage points a year to his
countryrsquos economic growth rate from 2018 In 2014 the economy grew by 46 In a
more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodriacuteguez an economist at Bank of
America put the boost to growth at only 03 percentage points Whatever the precise
figure peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields So
the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher
The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year
In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire ambushing an army platoon
killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks That and the lack of
progress with the talks prompted Humberto de la Calle the governmentrsquos chief
negotiator to warn the FARC in July that ldquoone day they could well find that we are not
at the tablerdquo
This served to concentrate the FARC leadersrsquo minds but the attack undermined public
confidence in the president and the talks At the start of the negotiations in October
2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement ldquowithin monthsrdquo In a national
poll published in May Mr Santosrsquos approval rating fell to 29 and 69 of respondents
expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed
In some ways Colombiansrsquo pessimism is surprising Much of the country has already
benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years The
FARCrsquos unilateral ceasefire resumed in Julymdashand matched by government ldquode-
escalationrdquomdashhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975
according to CERAC a think-tank in Bogotaacute
It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes
rose by 7 annually in dollar terms the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the
oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues
Exceptional violence
With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country
after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos
oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three
chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN)
Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the
country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They
attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20
In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism
and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to
2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States
provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected
Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the
FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic
securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing
several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise
Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
AMEacuteRICA LATINA E CARIBE
Foreign Affairs - The Rise of Vigilantism and the Right Wing in
Peru | Foreign Affairs
On September 15 the people of Andas a small community in the mountains of central
Peru caught two men suspected of fatally shooting a local 57-year-old father of six
Since the nearest police station was two hours away the mob took justice into their own
hands they stripped the alleged criminals naked bound their hands and feet drenched
them in gasoline and burned them alive As Andasrsquo mayor later told the newspaper La
Repuacuteblica ldquoLa muerte de ellos fue la solucioacutenrdquomdashTheir death was the solutionThis was
not an isolated incident A new wave of vigilantism has been sweeping Peru since the
late summer starting in the cities and then spreading outward There is even a Twitter
movement ChapaTuChoro a slang term that translates to ldquoCatch Your Thiefrdquo that has
sprung up and encourages citizens to go one step beyond civilian arrestsmdashto take justice
into their own hands and punish suspected criminals through public humiliation and
even mob lynchings Documentation of the gruesome behavior is often uploaded to
YouTubeBut Peruvian citizens feel that their brand of street justice is justified ldquoItrsquos not
that we are barbariansrdquo Someya Rojas Leivas a supporter of the movement told me
ldquoItrsquos that we are tired of being at the mercy of criminals and the bloody authorities do
nothingrdquo Around the time of the Andas incident national support for the movement
hovered at around 53 percent by early October it had soared to 72 percent ldquoRun run
runrdquo singer Rony warns criminals in ldquoChapa Tu Chorordquo a catchy new pop song ldquoThe
village is after yourdquo VIRAL VIGILANTISM By any measure this is a distinctly
twenty-first-century phenomenonmdasha genuinely viral reaction to crime in a country
whose battered mineral-based economy and stagnant minimum wage have made locals
especially in cities feel starkly less safe than they did a year ago According to a survey
released in mid-October 90 percent of people living in Lima do not feel safe walking
the cityrsquos streets Citizens are fed up with their unresponsive state In that sense the
Chapa phenomenon is as much a call for government action as a cry of
helplessnessAnd thatrsquos exactly what the trend was designed for It began earlier this
year in Huancayo one of Perursquos largest cities Cecilia Garciacutea Rodriacuteguez a journalist
and businesswoman started the Chapa movement when she became outraged after
police arrested a man who had broken into her neighborrsquos home with a knife only to
release him 30 minutes later The communityrsquos sense of frustration was so palpable that
Rodriacuteguez had no trouble corralling them to make and post signs around their
neighborhood ldquoCrooks if we catch you we wonrsquot call the policerdquo they read ldquoWe are
going to lynch yourdquoRodriacuteguezrsquos efforts however and the Chapa movement in general
may be a front for more political activitiesmdashit is cleverly timed given Perursquos upcoming
general elections in April 2016 and candidates have already begun campaigning
Although Rodriacuteguez has never sought political office before she is now considering a
run for Congress in the spring She was later revealed to have been a vocal supporter of
Perursquos controversial former right-wing president Alberto Fujimori who was convicted
in 2009 of embezzlement and human rights violationsIf Rodriacuteguez does run she would
find herself in good companymdashFujimorirsquos daughter Keiko Fujimori is running for
president again after having lost to the current left-wing president Ollanta Humala in
2011 Keikorsquos brother Kenji Fujimori a sitting congressman tweeted that the Chapa
movement points to ldquothe ineffectiveness of the government to provide security to the
populationrdquo Not coincidentally Rodriacuteguezrsquos movement feels largely derived from
Fujimorism it relies on right-wing populism brutal pragmatism and the attitude that
Humalarsquos government doesnrsquot know what itrsquos doing Leftist politicians have either
denounced the movement or kept mummdashtheyrsquore on the losing side of the public opinion
battleIndeed this past June a spate of vigilante attacks erupted shortly after Humalarsquos
approval ratings sank to an all-time low of 17 percent in part because of his silence on
raising the $230 monthly minimum wage one of the lowest in Latin America Peruvian
police earn nearly double that but itrsquos still a fraction of copsrsquo salaries in neighboring
Chile and Ecuador To compensate Peruvian officers can be legally hired as private
security guards theoretically working part-time at both jobs in reality many work up to
25 days a month in the private sector thanks to institutional corruption a former interior
minister revealed to The Economist In turn the publicrsquos needs fall by the wayside It is
no wonder that there is such public distrust toward the police especially when the
governmentrsquos official response to Chapa is a tired-sounding plea to stop lynching and
let officers do their jobs ldquoTherersquos been this long history of self-defense forces and
communities responding to either the unwillingness or the inability of the state to
address these thingsrdquo according to Steven T Zech a postdoctoral research fellow at the
University of Denver who has spent the last five years researching Perursquos rural militias
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Peruvian Presidents Alan Garciacutea and Fujimori
armed roughly 4000 willing civilian militias to help fight the Maoist Shining Path
terrorist groupmdasha move widely credited as having been crucial to defeating the Path
But the civilians received their arms only after state military and police officials had
been deployed to these rural communities like an occupying force rather than
government aid For many locals the military-police presence soured their relations
with the Peruvian government It was at that time that Peruvians decided theyrsquod rather
handle issues of justice and security themselves ldquoTherersquos this huge pride in resistance
nowrdquo Zech says ldquoThere are these massive movements in rural populations theyrsquore
making demands on the state right now to be recognized and compensated for their
effortsrdquo After the Shining Path threat died down in the mid-1990s the civilian militias
evolved into political forces neighborhood watch groups and on-call security forces
often involving local politicians and community leadersTHE LONG ROAD TO
PEACEIf the government could find a way to work with street justice advocates
ChapaTuChoro could potentially become a productive progressive force for reducing
crime But there are two problems with this approach One is that unlike the countryrsquos
myriad rural militias Chapa supporters are divided on tactics Some mobs turn to
murder others stop short at public humiliation Therersquos little sense of community
among themmdashonly a manic thirst for justice Once theyrsquore done everyone goes
home The second problem with vigilantism is that the government faces a ldquodamned if
you donrsquot damned if you dordquo scenario when responding to the problem To accept
vigilantes is to admit the failure of the police to fight them is to digress from larger
crime-fighting issues such as rampant theft and drug trafficking The Mexican
government is currently struggling with that very dilemma on a much larger scale its
militias ostensibly formed to keep communities safe from cartel wars operate similarly
to Perursquos rural defense forces But with little government intervention those Mexican
groups occasionally spiral into drug trafficking human rights abuses and wanton
murder Many Mexican policymakers and academics condemn these crimes but the
state is helpless to prevent them until their dysfunctional national justice system
modernizesmdasha process that could take decades There are similar instances of
vigilantism elsewhere in Latin America This past May citizens of Riacuteo Bravo
Guatemala chased down and attacked a 16-year-old girl who allegedly shot a
motorcycle taxi driver she was drowned in gasoline and burned alive in the street In
Boliviamdashwhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a
public defendermdashthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005
and 2012 The Brazilian sociologist Joseacute de Souza Martins who has written a book on
the subject suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day often in Satildeo
Paulo Each of these governments condemns these actions but none is able to stanch
themmdashif they canrsquot catch criminals how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters
Brazilian officials have tried albeit in a ham-fisted way After a national newscaster
defended a recent example of street justice on the air the countryrsquos public prosecutor
launched a civil complaint against her television network accusing her of violating
human dignity But on the ground with such a glaring lack of police presence
governments are far less effective Across Latin America murder rates have
consistently grown since 2000 while systemic extortion and robberies cost people
untold amounts Few locals have faith in any countryrsquos criminal justice system and for
good reason Latin Americarsquos homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100 less
than half the global average Guatemala ranks among the lowest with a meager six
percent conviction rate This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians whose
level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country
according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project Itrsquos too
early to tell whether the social mediandashfueled trend will fade away or develop into
something larger and more politically organized Rodriacuteguez may well use it as a
political platform But the tide could also flow in the other direction On October 4 a
25-year-old father of two mistaken for a criminal was beaten for three hours by a mob
of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province His aunt a lawyer has since
filed a lawsuit on her nephewrsquos behalf alleging that Rodriacuteguez is condoning crime ldquoFor
the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru which is punishing the innocent
I have made the complaintrdquo she announced to the press But Rodriacuteguez isnrsquot worried
After all far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president
If the situation remains the same come springtime itrsquos likely that Peru will witness
Fujimorism version 20mdashon social media and beyond Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesperu2015-11-02perus-pitchfork-politics
The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell
From the print edition
MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death Pablo Escobar has become an object of
fascination ldquoNarcosrdquo a new series from Netflix is just one of a crop of films books
and television shows about Colombiarsquos most notorious drug-trafficker the cause of so
much violence in Medelliacuten in the 1980s and 90s
Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer For anyone who lived through those days the
attention he is receiving is distasteful But if he can now be seen as a mere historical
curiosity that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on Outsiders have
often fastened on the countryrsquos failures But over the past quarter-century it has been
surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems Escobar and his like
were taken down their successors today are ldquounknownrdquo notes Mr Gaviria Medelliacutenrsquos
mayor ldquoThey donrsquot last more than three or four years and canrsquot consolidate their
powerrdquo
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Colombiarsquos response to the drug mafias was to reform and strengthen a national police
force that along with Chilersquos is widely regarded as the most professional in Latin
America The 1991 constitution gave new powers to the courts as well as promoting
more inclusive politics and heralding social advances such as the provision of universal
health care
Progress has not always been linear Ten years ago Bogotaacute was a beacon of successful
urban management but under three mediocre mayors from the left it has become more
congested and less efficient Too often local politics is financed by corrupt ties to
construction companies Yet other cities such as Barranquilla are rising
The judiciary too has achieved some successes The removal of parliamentary
immunity by the 1991 constitution combined with powerful new legal instruments that
allow the seizure of illegally obtained assets has curbed the infiltration of politics by
drug money The courts jailed 32 national legislators and five regional governors for
their links with the paramilitaries And in a demonstration of political independence the
Constitutional Court blocked Mr Uribersquos re-election bid
Judging the judges
But the judiciary has itself become politicised and tainted by corruption despitemdashor
perhaps because ofmdasha proliferation of busybodies as well as its fiscal (attorney-
general) Colombia has a procurador (inspector-general) an auditor-general and an
ombudsman All are chosen by the higher courts The office of the fiscal has become an
empire with 29000 staff Instead of dedicating themselves to applying the law both
Eduardo Montealegre the fiscal and Alejandro Ordontildeez the procurador offer almost
daily opinions on political issues
Aside from such flaws though Colombiarsquos political system and its institutions have
proved capable of meeting many of the challenges posed by the crises of the 1980s and
90s Above all the state was able to extend its writ over a much bigger swathe of the
national territory offering greater security and opening the road to peace The bitter
rivalry between Mr Uribe and Mr Santos could yet derail peace but that looks less
likely now Still a government in which many ministers harbour presidential ambitions
will become increasingly distracted as the 2018 election approaches The hatred and
mistrust left by 50 years of conflict will not dissipate quickly even if Colombians come
to accept Mr Santosrsquos compromise between peace and justice
Another unknown concerns the FARCrsquos entry into politics Notwithstanding its recent
electoral success in Bogotaacute the left in Colombia has been extraordinarily weak
politically because part of it embraced violence That along with the effect of the
conflict itself helps explain the countryrsquos yawning socio-economic inequalities Despite
its deep unpopularity the FARC will doubtless get to govern some municipalities The
question is whether it will come to terms with democracy and the modern world
Colombia was forced to engage with the world when it found itself at the centre of the
international illegal-drug business Plan Colombia was one result It has since signed
trade agreements with Europe as well as the United States and it recently formed the
Pacific Alliance with Chile Mexico and Peru countries united by a commitment to free
trade and free-market economies
But most Colombian politicians and businesses remain introverted and the country is
still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond It failed to join the Asia-Pacific
Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members thus it is not
part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal And it has yet to take full advantage of
such trade deals as it has struck
Admittedly Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours Ecuador has
erected protectionist barriers to its exports Under the chavista regime Venezuela has
harboured guerrillas served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once
a big market for Colombian manufacturers In August Venezuelarsquos president Nicolaacutes
Maduro closed the border and summarily expelled 1000 Colombians causing another
20000 to flee He accused them of smuggling a business boosted by Venezuelarsquos price
and exchange controls and without evidence of being ldquoparamilitariesrdquo Yet Venezuela
also played a part in getting the FARC to the table and Colombia has benefited from
the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital
The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombiarsquos isolation it narrowly
failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of
the American States Colombiarsquos lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a
high price The countryrsquos problems and achievements are little understood even in its
own region which offered scant solidarity let alone help in the struggle with illegal
armies
Colombia will need the worldrsquos support for whatever peace deal it strikes It will also
need the worldrsquos help to monitor the FARCrsquos disarmament and aid for rural
development But it must do its bit too For example it will never become properly
developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes
But Colombia too has something to offer the world It already provides security advice
in Central America With luck it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end
seemingly intractable conflicts Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676958-colombia-needs-climb-out-its-shell-halfway-successfsrc=rss|spr
The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace
agreement that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential it will need to make big changes argues Michael
Reid
From the print edition
LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos the ceremony on
September 23rd started late by an hour and 37 minutes But it was worth waiting for
Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on
the thorniest issue they had had to resolve transitional justice or what sort of penalties
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombiarsquos long armed conflict should
face
This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba
that began three years ago Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his
first official meeting with Rodrigo Londontildeo better known to Colombians as
ldquoTimochenkordquo the FARCrsquos top commander (this report will use the guerrillasrsquo noms de
guerre) The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months and the FARC
undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that Despite some subsequent
bickering these deadlines look plausible
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Mr Santos (pictured left) was visibly uncomfortable when Rauacutel Castro Cubarsquos
president encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras
Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb kidnap and extort Mr Santos
knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow
most FARC commanders to escape going to jail But he also knows that peace
represents a huge prize for Colombia And because the FARC will be held to account
for their crimes in the countryrsquos own courts the agreement will offer a potential model
for other conflict-ridden countries
Colombiarsquos armed conflict has been remarkably bloody complicated and long-running
According to the National Centre for Historical Memory a public body set up by Mr
Santos in 2011 between 1958 and 2012 around 220000 people died as a result of the
clash between guerrillas right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces Of these
about 80 were civilians The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see
chart) And violence or the fear of it dislodged some 6m Colombians from their
homes mainly in the countryside
Over and above the saving in human life Mr Santos has said that peace together with
his infrastructure programme could add more than two percentage points a year to his
countryrsquos economic growth rate from 2018 In 2014 the economy grew by 46 In a
more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodriacuteguez an economist at Bank of
America put the boost to growth at only 03 percentage points Whatever the precise
figure peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields So
the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher
The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year
In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire ambushing an army platoon
killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks That and the lack of
progress with the talks prompted Humberto de la Calle the governmentrsquos chief
negotiator to warn the FARC in July that ldquoone day they could well find that we are not
at the tablerdquo
This served to concentrate the FARC leadersrsquo minds but the attack undermined public
confidence in the president and the talks At the start of the negotiations in October
2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement ldquowithin monthsrdquo In a national
poll published in May Mr Santosrsquos approval rating fell to 29 and 69 of respondents
expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed
In some ways Colombiansrsquo pessimism is surprising Much of the country has already
benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years The
FARCrsquos unilateral ceasefire resumed in Julymdashand matched by government ldquode-
escalationrdquomdashhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975
according to CERAC a think-tank in Bogotaacute
It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes
rose by 7 annually in dollar terms the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the
oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues
Exceptional violence
With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country
after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos
oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three
chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN)
Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the
country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They
attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20
In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism
and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to
2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States
provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected
Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the
FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic
securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing
several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise
Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
Fujimorism it relies on right-wing populism brutal pragmatism and the attitude that
Humalarsquos government doesnrsquot know what itrsquos doing Leftist politicians have either
denounced the movement or kept mummdashtheyrsquore on the losing side of the public opinion
battleIndeed this past June a spate of vigilante attacks erupted shortly after Humalarsquos
approval ratings sank to an all-time low of 17 percent in part because of his silence on
raising the $230 monthly minimum wage one of the lowest in Latin America Peruvian
police earn nearly double that but itrsquos still a fraction of copsrsquo salaries in neighboring
Chile and Ecuador To compensate Peruvian officers can be legally hired as private
security guards theoretically working part-time at both jobs in reality many work up to
25 days a month in the private sector thanks to institutional corruption a former interior
minister revealed to The Economist In turn the publicrsquos needs fall by the wayside It is
no wonder that there is such public distrust toward the police especially when the
governmentrsquos official response to Chapa is a tired-sounding plea to stop lynching and
let officers do their jobs ldquoTherersquos been this long history of self-defense forces and
communities responding to either the unwillingness or the inability of the state to
address these thingsrdquo according to Steven T Zech a postdoctoral research fellow at the
University of Denver who has spent the last five years researching Perursquos rural militias
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Peruvian Presidents Alan Garciacutea and Fujimori
armed roughly 4000 willing civilian militias to help fight the Maoist Shining Path
terrorist groupmdasha move widely credited as having been crucial to defeating the Path
But the civilians received their arms only after state military and police officials had
been deployed to these rural communities like an occupying force rather than
government aid For many locals the military-police presence soured their relations
with the Peruvian government It was at that time that Peruvians decided theyrsquod rather
handle issues of justice and security themselves ldquoTherersquos this huge pride in resistance
nowrdquo Zech says ldquoThere are these massive movements in rural populations theyrsquore
making demands on the state right now to be recognized and compensated for their
effortsrdquo After the Shining Path threat died down in the mid-1990s the civilian militias
evolved into political forces neighborhood watch groups and on-call security forces
often involving local politicians and community leadersTHE LONG ROAD TO
PEACEIf the government could find a way to work with street justice advocates
ChapaTuChoro could potentially become a productive progressive force for reducing
crime But there are two problems with this approach One is that unlike the countryrsquos
myriad rural militias Chapa supporters are divided on tactics Some mobs turn to
murder others stop short at public humiliation Therersquos little sense of community
among themmdashonly a manic thirst for justice Once theyrsquore done everyone goes
home The second problem with vigilantism is that the government faces a ldquodamned if
you donrsquot damned if you dordquo scenario when responding to the problem To accept
vigilantes is to admit the failure of the police to fight them is to digress from larger
crime-fighting issues such as rampant theft and drug trafficking The Mexican
government is currently struggling with that very dilemma on a much larger scale its
militias ostensibly formed to keep communities safe from cartel wars operate similarly
to Perursquos rural defense forces But with little government intervention those Mexican
groups occasionally spiral into drug trafficking human rights abuses and wanton
murder Many Mexican policymakers and academics condemn these crimes but the
state is helpless to prevent them until their dysfunctional national justice system
modernizesmdasha process that could take decades There are similar instances of
vigilantism elsewhere in Latin America This past May citizens of Riacuteo Bravo
Guatemala chased down and attacked a 16-year-old girl who allegedly shot a
motorcycle taxi driver she was drowned in gasoline and burned alive in the street In
Boliviamdashwhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a
public defendermdashthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005
and 2012 The Brazilian sociologist Joseacute de Souza Martins who has written a book on
the subject suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day often in Satildeo
Paulo Each of these governments condemns these actions but none is able to stanch
themmdashif they canrsquot catch criminals how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters
Brazilian officials have tried albeit in a ham-fisted way After a national newscaster
defended a recent example of street justice on the air the countryrsquos public prosecutor
launched a civil complaint against her television network accusing her of violating
human dignity But on the ground with such a glaring lack of police presence
governments are far less effective Across Latin America murder rates have
consistently grown since 2000 while systemic extortion and robberies cost people
untold amounts Few locals have faith in any countryrsquos criminal justice system and for
good reason Latin Americarsquos homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100 less
than half the global average Guatemala ranks among the lowest with a meager six
percent conviction rate This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians whose
level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country
according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project Itrsquos too
early to tell whether the social mediandashfueled trend will fade away or develop into
something larger and more politically organized Rodriacuteguez may well use it as a
political platform But the tide could also flow in the other direction On October 4 a
25-year-old father of two mistaken for a criminal was beaten for three hours by a mob
of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province His aunt a lawyer has since
filed a lawsuit on her nephewrsquos behalf alleging that Rodriacuteguez is condoning crime ldquoFor
the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru which is punishing the innocent
I have made the complaintrdquo she announced to the press But Rodriacuteguez isnrsquot worried
After all far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president
If the situation remains the same come springtime itrsquos likely that Peru will witness
Fujimorism version 20mdashon social media and beyond Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesperu2015-11-02perus-pitchfork-politics
The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell
From the print edition
MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death Pablo Escobar has become an object of
fascination ldquoNarcosrdquo a new series from Netflix is just one of a crop of films books
and television shows about Colombiarsquos most notorious drug-trafficker the cause of so
much violence in Medelliacuten in the 1980s and 90s
Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer For anyone who lived through those days the
attention he is receiving is distasteful But if he can now be seen as a mere historical
curiosity that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on Outsiders have
often fastened on the countryrsquos failures But over the past quarter-century it has been
surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems Escobar and his like
were taken down their successors today are ldquounknownrdquo notes Mr Gaviria Medelliacutenrsquos
mayor ldquoThey donrsquot last more than three or four years and canrsquot consolidate their
powerrdquo
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Colombiarsquos response to the drug mafias was to reform and strengthen a national police
force that along with Chilersquos is widely regarded as the most professional in Latin
America The 1991 constitution gave new powers to the courts as well as promoting
more inclusive politics and heralding social advances such as the provision of universal
health care
Progress has not always been linear Ten years ago Bogotaacute was a beacon of successful
urban management but under three mediocre mayors from the left it has become more
congested and less efficient Too often local politics is financed by corrupt ties to
construction companies Yet other cities such as Barranquilla are rising
The judiciary too has achieved some successes The removal of parliamentary
immunity by the 1991 constitution combined with powerful new legal instruments that
allow the seizure of illegally obtained assets has curbed the infiltration of politics by
drug money The courts jailed 32 national legislators and five regional governors for
their links with the paramilitaries And in a demonstration of political independence the
Constitutional Court blocked Mr Uribersquos re-election bid
Judging the judges
But the judiciary has itself become politicised and tainted by corruption despitemdashor
perhaps because ofmdasha proliferation of busybodies as well as its fiscal (attorney-
general) Colombia has a procurador (inspector-general) an auditor-general and an
ombudsman All are chosen by the higher courts The office of the fiscal has become an
empire with 29000 staff Instead of dedicating themselves to applying the law both
Eduardo Montealegre the fiscal and Alejandro Ordontildeez the procurador offer almost
daily opinions on political issues
Aside from such flaws though Colombiarsquos political system and its institutions have
proved capable of meeting many of the challenges posed by the crises of the 1980s and
90s Above all the state was able to extend its writ over a much bigger swathe of the
national territory offering greater security and opening the road to peace The bitter
rivalry between Mr Uribe and Mr Santos could yet derail peace but that looks less
likely now Still a government in which many ministers harbour presidential ambitions
will become increasingly distracted as the 2018 election approaches The hatred and
mistrust left by 50 years of conflict will not dissipate quickly even if Colombians come
to accept Mr Santosrsquos compromise between peace and justice
Another unknown concerns the FARCrsquos entry into politics Notwithstanding its recent
electoral success in Bogotaacute the left in Colombia has been extraordinarily weak
politically because part of it embraced violence That along with the effect of the
conflict itself helps explain the countryrsquos yawning socio-economic inequalities Despite
its deep unpopularity the FARC will doubtless get to govern some municipalities The
question is whether it will come to terms with democracy and the modern world
Colombia was forced to engage with the world when it found itself at the centre of the
international illegal-drug business Plan Colombia was one result It has since signed
trade agreements with Europe as well as the United States and it recently formed the
Pacific Alliance with Chile Mexico and Peru countries united by a commitment to free
trade and free-market economies
But most Colombian politicians and businesses remain introverted and the country is
still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond It failed to join the Asia-Pacific
Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members thus it is not
part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal And it has yet to take full advantage of
such trade deals as it has struck
Admittedly Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours Ecuador has
erected protectionist barriers to its exports Under the chavista regime Venezuela has
harboured guerrillas served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once
a big market for Colombian manufacturers In August Venezuelarsquos president Nicolaacutes
Maduro closed the border and summarily expelled 1000 Colombians causing another
20000 to flee He accused them of smuggling a business boosted by Venezuelarsquos price
and exchange controls and without evidence of being ldquoparamilitariesrdquo Yet Venezuela
also played a part in getting the FARC to the table and Colombia has benefited from
the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital
The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombiarsquos isolation it narrowly
failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of
the American States Colombiarsquos lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a
high price The countryrsquos problems and achievements are little understood even in its
own region which offered scant solidarity let alone help in the struggle with illegal
armies
Colombia will need the worldrsquos support for whatever peace deal it strikes It will also
need the worldrsquos help to monitor the FARCrsquos disarmament and aid for rural
development But it must do its bit too For example it will never become properly
developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes
But Colombia too has something to offer the world It already provides security advice
in Central America With luck it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end
seemingly intractable conflicts Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676958-colombia-needs-climb-out-its-shell-halfway-successfsrc=rss|spr
The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace
agreement that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential it will need to make big changes argues Michael
Reid
From the print edition
LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos the ceremony on
September 23rd started late by an hour and 37 minutes But it was worth waiting for
Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on
the thorniest issue they had had to resolve transitional justice or what sort of penalties
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombiarsquos long armed conflict should
face
This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba
that began three years ago Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his
first official meeting with Rodrigo Londontildeo better known to Colombians as
ldquoTimochenkordquo the FARCrsquos top commander (this report will use the guerrillasrsquo noms de
guerre) The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months and the FARC
undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that Despite some subsequent
bickering these deadlines look plausible
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Mr Santos (pictured left) was visibly uncomfortable when Rauacutel Castro Cubarsquos
president encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras
Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb kidnap and extort Mr Santos
knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow
most FARC commanders to escape going to jail But he also knows that peace
represents a huge prize for Colombia And because the FARC will be held to account
for their crimes in the countryrsquos own courts the agreement will offer a potential model
for other conflict-ridden countries
Colombiarsquos armed conflict has been remarkably bloody complicated and long-running
According to the National Centre for Historical Memory a public body set up by Mr
Santos in 2011 between 1958 and 2012 around 220000 people died as a result of the
clash between guerrillas right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces Of these
about 80 were civilians The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see
chart) And violence or the fear of it dislodged some 6m Colombians from their
homes mainly in the countryside
Over and above the saving in human life Mr Santos has said that peace together with
his infrastructure programme could add more than two percentage points a year to his
countryrsquos economic growth rate from 2018 In 2014 the economy grew by 46 In a
more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodriacuteguez an economist at Bank of
America put the boost to growth at only 03 percentage points Whatever the precise
figure peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields So
the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher
The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year
In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire ambushing an army platoon
killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks That and the lack of
progress with the talks prompted Humberto de la Calle the governmentrsquos chief
negotiator to warn the FARC in July that ldquoone day they could well find that we are not
at the tablerdquo
This served to concentrate the FARC leadersrsquo minds but the attack undermined public
confidence in the president and the talks At the start of the negotiations in October
2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement ldquowithin monthsrdquo In a national
poll published in May Mr Santosrsquos approval rating fell to 29 and 69 of respondents
expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed
In some ways Colombiansrsquo pessimism is surprising Much of the country has already
benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years The
FARCrsquos unilateral ceasefire resumed in Julymdashand matched by government ldquode-
escalationrdquomdashhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975
according to CERAC a think-tank in Bogotaacute
It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes
rose by 7 annually in dollar terms the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the
oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues
Exceptional violence
With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country
after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos
oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three
chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN)
Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the
country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They
attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20
In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism
and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to
2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States
provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected
Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the
FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic
securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing
several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise
Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
Boliviamdashwhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a
public defendermdashthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005
and 2012 The Brazilian sociologist Joseacute de Souza Martins who has written a book on
the subject suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day often in Satildeo
Paulo Each of these governments condemns these actions but none is able to stanch
themmdashif they canrsquot catch criminals how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters
Brazilian officials have tried albeit in a ham-fisted way After a national newscaster
defended a recent example of street justice on the air the countryrsquos public prosecutor
launched a civil complaint against her television network accusing her of violating
human dignity But on the ground with such a glaring lack of police presence
governments are far less effective Across Latin America murder rates have
consistently grown since 2000 while systemic extortion and robberies cost people
untold amounts Few locals have faith in any countryrsquos criminal justice system and for
good reason Latin Americarsquos homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100 less
than half the global average Guatemala ranks among the lowest with a meager six
percent conviction rate This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians whose
level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country
according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project Itrsquos too
early to tell whether the social mediandashfueled trend will fade away or develop into
something larger and more politically organized Rodriacuteguez may well use it as a
political platform But the tide could also flow in the other direction On October 4 a
25-year-old father of two mistaken for a criminal was beaten for three hours by a mob
of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province His aunt a lawyer has since
filed a lawsuit on her nephewrsquos behalf alleging that Rodriacuteguez is condoning crime ldquoFor
the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru which is punishing the innocent
I have made the complaintrdquo she announced to the press But Rodriacuteguez isnrsquot worried
After all far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president
If the situation remains the same come springtime itrsquos likely that Peru will witness
Fujimorism version 20mdashon social media and beyond Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesperu2015-11-02perus-pitchfork-politics
The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell
From the print edition
MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death Pablo Escobar has become an object of
fascination ldquoNarcosrdquo a new series from Netflix is just one of a crop of films books
and television shows about Colombiarsquos most notorious drug-trafficker the cause of so
much violence in Medelliacuten in the 1980s and 90s
Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer For anyone who lived through those days the
attention he is receiving is distasteful But if he can now be seen as a mere historical
curiosity that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on Outsiders have
often fastened on the countryrsquos failures But over the past quarter-century it has been
surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems Escobar and his like
were taken down their successors today are ldquounknownrdquo notes Mr Gaviria Medelliacutenrsquos
mayor ldquoThey donrsquot last more than three or four years and canrsquot consolidate their
powerrdquo
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Colombiarsquos response to the drug mafias was to reform and strengthen a national police
force that along with Chilersquos is widely regarded as the most professional in Latin
America The 1991 constitution gave new powers to the courts as well as promoting
more inclusive politics and heralding social advances such as the provision of universal
health care
Progress has not always been linear Ten years ago Bogotaacute was a beacon of successful
urban management but under three mediocre mayors from the left it has become more
congested and less efficient Too often local politics is financed by corrupt ties to
construction companies Yet other cities such as Barranquilla are rising
The judiciary too has achieved some successes The removal of parliamentary
immunity by the 1991 constitution combined with powerful new legal instruments that
allow the seizure of illegally obtained assets has curbed the infiltration of politics by
drug money The courts jailed 32 national legislators and five regional governors for
their links with the paramilitaries And in a demonstration of political independence the
Constitutional Court blocked Mr Uribersquos re-election bid
Judging the judges
But the judiciary has itself become politicised and tainted by corruption despitemdashor
perhaps because ofmdasha proliferation of busybodies as well as its fiscal (attorney-
general) Colombia has a procurador (inspector-general) an auditor-general and an
ombudsman All are chosen by the higher courts The office of the fiscal has become an
empire with 29000 staff Instead of dedicating themselves to applying the law both
Eduardo Montealegre the fiscal and Alejandro Ordontildeez the procurador offer almost
daily opinions on political issues
Aside from such flaws though Colombiarsquos political system and its institutions have
proved capable of meeting many of the challenges posed by the crises of the 1980s and
90s Above all the state was able to extend its writ over a much bigger swathe of the
national territory offering greater security and opening the road to peace The bitter
rivalry between Mr Uribe and Mr Santos could yet derail peace but that looks less
likely now Still a government in which many ministers harbour presidential ambitions
will become increasingly distracted as the 2018 election approaches The hatred and
mistrust left by 50 years of conflict will not dissipate quickly even if Colombians come
to accept Mr Santosrsquos compromise between peace and justice
Another unknown concerns the FARCrsquos entry into politics Notwithstanding its recent
electoral success in Bogotaacute the left in Colombia has been extraordinarily weak
politically because part of it embraced violence That along with the effect of the
conflict itself helps explain the countryrsquos yawning socio-economic inequalities Despite
its deep unpopularity the FARC will doubtless get to govern some municipalities The
question is whether it will come to terms with democracy and the modern world
Colombia was forced to engage with the world when it found itself at the centre of the
international illegal-drug business Plan Colombia was one result It has since signed
trade agreements with Europe as well as the United States and it recently formed the
Pacific Alliance with Chile Mexico and Peru countries united by a commitment to free
trade and free-market economies
But most Colombian politicians and businesses remain introverted and the country is
still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond It failed to join the Asia-Pacific
Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members thus it is not
part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal And it has yet to take full advantage of
such trade deals as it has struck
Admittedly Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours Ecuador has
erected protectionist barriers to its exports Under the chavista regime Venezuela has
harboured guerrillas served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once
a big market for Colombian manufacturers In August Venezuelarsquos president Nicolaacutes
Maduro closed the border and summarily expelled 1000 Colombians causing another
20000 to flee He accused them of smuggling a business boosted by Venezuelarsquos price
and exchange controls and without evidence of being ldquoparamilitariesrdquo Yet Venezuela
also played a part in getting the FARC to the table and Colombia has benefited from
the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital
The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombiarsquos isolation it narrowly
failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of
the American States Colombiarsquos lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a
high price The countryrsquos problems and achievements are little understood even in its
own region which offered scant solidarity let alone help in the struggle with illegal
armies
Colombia will need the worldrsquos support for whatever peace deal it strikes It will also
need the worldrsquos help to monitor the FARCrsquos disarmament and aid for rural
development But it must do its bit too For example it will never become properly
developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes
But Colombia too has something to offer the world It already provides security advice
in Central America With luck it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end
seemingly intractable conflicts Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676958-colombia-needs-climb-out-its-shell-halfway-successfsrc=rss|spr
The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace
agreement that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential it will need to make big changes argues Michael
Reid
From the print edition
LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos the ceremony on
September 23rd started late by an hour and 37 minutes But it was worth waiting for
Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on
the thorniest issue they had had to resolve transitional justice or what sort of penalties
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombiarsquos long armed conflict should
face
This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba
that began three years ago Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his
first official meeting with Rodrigo Londontildeo better known to Colombians as
ldquoTimochenkordquo the FARCrsquos top commander (this report will use the guerrillasrsquo noms de
guerre) The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months and the FARC
undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that Despite some subsequent
bickering these deadlines look plausible
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Mr Santos (pictured left) was visibly uncomfortable when Rauacutel Castro Cubarsquos
president encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras
Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb kidnap and extort Mr Santos
knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow
most FARC commanders to escape going to jail But he also knows that peace
represents a huge prize for Colombia And because the FARC will be held to account
for their crimes in the countryrsquos own courts the agreement will offer a potential model
for other conflict-ridden countries
Colombiarsquos armed conflict has been remarkably bloody complicated and long-running
According to the National Centre for Historical Memory a public body set up by Mr
Santos in 2011 between 1958 and 2012 around 220000 people died as a result of the
clash between guerrillas right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces Of these
about 80 were civilians The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see
chart) And violence or the fear of it dislodged some 6m Colombians from their
homes mainly in the countryside
Over and above the saving in human life Mr Santos has said that peace together with
his infrastructure programme could add more than two percentage points a year to his
countryrsquos economic growth rate from 2018 In 2014 the economy grew by 46 In a
more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodriacuteguez an economist at Bank of
America put the boost to growth at only 03 percentage points Whatever the precise
figure peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields So
the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher
The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year
In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire ambushing an army platoon
killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks That and the lack of
progress with the talks prompted Humberto de la Calle the governmentrsquos chief
negotiator to warn the FARC in July that ldquoone day they could well find that we are not
at the tablerdquo
This served to concentrate the FARC leadersrsquo minds but the attack undermined public
confidence in the president and the talks At the start of the negotiations in October
2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement ldquowithin monthsrdquo In a national
poll published in May Mr Santosrsquos approval rating fell to 29 and 69 of respondents
expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed
In some ways Colombiansrsquo pessimism is surprising Much of the country has already
benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years The
FARCrsquos unilateral ceasefire resumed in Julymdashand matched by government ldquode-
escalationrdquomdashhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975
according to CERAC a think-tank in Bogotaacute
It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes
rose by 7 annually in dollar terms the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the
oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues
Exceptional violence
With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country
after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos
oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three
chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN)
Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the
country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They
attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20
In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism
and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to
2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States
provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected
Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the
FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic
securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing
several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise
Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Colombiarsquos response to the drug mafias was to reform and strengthen a national police
force that along with Chilersquos is widely regarded as the most professional in Latin
America The 1991 constitution gave new powers to the courts as well as promoting
more inclusive politics and heralding social advances such as the provision of universal
health care
Progress has not always been linear Ten years ago Bogotaacute was a beacon of successful
urban management but under three mediocre mayors from the left it has become more
congested and less efficient Too often local politics is financed by corrupt ties to
construction companies Yet other cities such as Barranquilla are rising
The judiciary too has achieved some successes The removal of parliamentary
immunity by the 1991 constitution combined with powerful new legal instruments that
allow the seizure of illegally obtained assets has curbed the infiltration of politics by
drug money The courts jailed 32 national legislators and five regional governors for
their links with the paramilitaries And in a demonstration of political independence the
Constitutional Court blocked Mr Uribersquos re-election bid
Judging the judges
But the judiciary has itself become politicised and tainted by corruption despitemdashor
perhaps because ofmdasha proliferation of busybodies as well as its fiscal (attorney-
general) Colombia has a procurador (inspector-general) an auditor-general and an
ombudsman All are chosen by the higher courts The office of the fiscal has become an
empire with 29000 staff Instead of dedicating themselves to applying the law both
Eduardo Montealegre the fiscal and Alejandro Ordontildeez the procurador offer almost
daily opinions on political issues
Aside from such flaws though Colombiarsquos political system and its institutions have
proved capable of meeting many of the challenges posed by the crises of the 1980s and
90s Above all the state was able to extend its writ over a much bigger swathe of the
national territory offering greater security and opening the road to peace The bitter
rivalry between Mr Uribe and Mr Santos could yet derail peace but that looks less
likely now Still a government in which many ministers harbour presidential ambitions
will become increasingly distracted as the 2018 election approaches The hatred and
mistrust left by 50 years of conflict will not dissipate quickly even if Colombians come
to accept Mr Santosrsquos compromise between peace and justice
Another unknown concerns the FARCrsquos entry into politics Notwithstanding its recent
electoral success in Bogotaacute the left in Colombia has been extraordinarily weak
politically because part of it embraced violence That along with the effect of the
conflict itself helps explain the countryrsquos yawning socio-economic inequalities Despite
its deep unpopularity the FARC will doubtless get to govern some municipalities The
question is whether it will come to terms with democracy and the modern world
Colombia was forced to engage with the world when it found itself at the centre of the
international illegal-drug business Plan Colombia was one result It has since signed
trade agreements with Europe as well as the United States and it recently formed the
Pacific Alliance with Chile Mexico and Peru countries united by a commitment to free
trade and free-market economies
But most Colombian politicians and businesses remain introverted and the country is
still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond It failed to join the Asia-Pacific
Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members thus it is not
part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal And it has yet to take full advantage of
such trade deals as it has struck
Admittedly Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours Ecuador has
erected protectionist barriers to its exports Under the chavista regime Venezuela has
harboured guerrillas served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once
a big market for Colombian manufacturers In August Venezuelarsquos president Nicolaacutes
Maduro closed the border and summarily expelled 1000 Colombians causing another
20000 to flee He accused them of smuggling a business boosted by Venezuelarsquos price
and exchange controls and without evidence of being ldquoparamilitariesrdquo Yet Venezuela
also played a part in getting the FARC to the table and Colombia has benefited from
the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital
The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombiarsquos isolation it narrowly
failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of
the American States Colombiarsquos lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a
high price The countryrsquos problems and achievements are little understood even in its
own region which offered scant solidarity let alone help in the struggle with illegal
armies
Colombia will need the worldrsquos support for whatever peace deal it strikes It will also
need the worldrsquos help to monitor the FARCrsquos disarmament and aid for rural
development But it must do its bit too For example it will never become properly
developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes
But Colombia too has something to offer the world It already provides security advice
in Central America With luck it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end
seemingly intractable conflicts Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676958-colombia-needs-climb-out-its-shell-halfway-successfsrc=rss|spr
The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace
agreement that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential it will need to make big changes argues Michael
Reid
From the print edition
LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos the ceremony on
September 23rd started late by an hour and 37 minutes But it was worth waiting for
Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on
the thorniest issue they had had to resolve transitional justice or what sort of penalties
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombiarsquos long armed conflict should
face
This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba
that began three years ago Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his
first official meeting with Rodrigo Londontildeo better known to Colombians as
ldquoTimochenkordquo the FARCrsquos top commander (this report will use the guerrillasrsquo noms de
guerre) The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months and the FARC
undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that Despite some subsequent
bickering these deadlines look plausible
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Mr Santos (pictured left) was visibly uncomfortable when Rauacutel Castro Cubarsquos
president encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras
Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb kidnap and extort Mr Santos
knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow
most FARC commanders to escape going to jail But he also knows that peace
represents a huge prize for Colombia And because the FARC will be held to account
for their crimes in the countryrsquos own courts the agreement will offer a potential model
for other conflict-ridden countries
Colombiarsquos armed conflict has been remarkably bloody complicated and long-running
According to the National Centre for Historical Memory a public body set up by Mr
Santos in 2011 between 1958 and 2012 around 220000 people died as a result of the
clash between guerrillas right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces Of these
about 80 were civilians The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see
chart) And violence or the fear of it dislodged some 6m Colombians from their
homes mainly in the countryside
Over and above the saving in human life Mr Santos has said that peace together with
his infrastructure programme could add more than two percentage points a year to his
countryrsquos economic growth rate from 2018 In 2014 the economy grew by 46 In a
more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodriacuteguez an economist at Bank of
America put the boost to growth at only 03 percentage points Whatever the precise
figure peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields So
the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher
The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year
In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire ambushing an army platoon
killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks That and the lack of
progress with the talks prompted Humberto de la Calle the governmentrsquos chief
negotiator to warn the FARC in July that ldquoone day they could well find that we are not
at the tablerdquo
This served to concentrate the FARC leadersrsquo minds but the attack undermined public
confidence in the president and the talks At the start of the negotiations in October
2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement ldquowithin monthsrdquo In a national
poll published in May Mr Santosrsquos approval rating fell to 29 and 69 of respondents
expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed
In some ways Colombiansrsquo pessimism is surprising Much of the country has already
benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years The
FARCrsquos unilateral ceasefire resumed in Julymdashand matched by government ldquode-
escalationrdquomdashhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975
according to CERAC a think-tank in Bogotaacute
It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes
rose by 7 annually in dollar terms the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the
oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues
Exceptional violence
With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country
after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos
oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three
chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN)
Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the
country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They
attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20
In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism
and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to
2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States
provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected
Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the
FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic
securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing
several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise
Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond It failed to join the Asia-Pacific
Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members thus it is not
part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal And it has yet to take full advantage of
such trade deals as it has struck
Admittedly Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours Ecuador has
erected protectionist barriers to its exports Under the chavista regime Venezuela has
harboured guerrillas served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once
a big market for Colombian manufacturers In August Venezuelarsquos president Nicolaacutes
Maduro closed the border and summarily expelled 1000 Colombians causing another
20000 to flee He accused them of smuggling a business boosted by Venezuelarsquos price
and exchange controls and without evidence of being ldquoparamilitariesrdquo Yet Venezuela
also played a part in getting the FARC to the table and Colombia has benefited from
the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital
The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombiarsquos isolation it narrowly
failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of
the American States Colombiarsquos lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a
high price The countryrsquos problems and achievements are little understood even in its
own region which offered scant solidarity let alone help in the struggle with illegal
armies
Colombia will need the worldrsquos support for whatever peace deal it strikes It will also
need the worldrsquos help to monitor the FARCrsquos disarmament and aid for rural
development But it must do its bit too For example it will never become properly
developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes
But Colombia too has something to offer the world It already provides security advice
in Central America With luck it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end
seemingly intractable conflicts Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676958-colombia-needs-climb-out-its-shell-halfway-successfsrc=rss|spr
The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace
agreement that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential it will need to make big changes argues Michael
Reid
From the print edition
LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos the ceremony on
September 23rd started late by an hour and 37 minutes But it was worth waiting for
Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on
the thorniest issue they had had to resolve transitional justice or what sort of penalties
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombiarsquos long armed conflict should
face
This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba
that began three years ago Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his
first official meeting with Rodrigo Londontildeo better known to Colombians as
ldquoTimochenkordquo the FARCrsquos top commander (this report will use the guerrillasrsquo noms de
guerre) The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months and the FARC
undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that Despite some subsequent
bickering these deadlines look plausible
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Mr Santos (pictured left) was visibly uncomfortable when Rauacutel Castro Cubarsquos
president encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras
Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb kidnap and extort Mr Santos
knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow
most FARC commanders to escape going to jail But he also knows that peace
represents a huge prize for Colombia And because the FARC will be held to account
for their crimes in the countryrsquos own courts the agreement will offer a potential model
for other conflict-ridden countries
Colombiarsquos armed conflict has been remarkably bloody complicated and long-running
According to the National Centre for Historical Memory a public body set up by Mr
Santos in 2011 between 1958 and 2012 around 220000 people died as a result of the
clash between guerrillas right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces Of these
about 80 were civilians The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see
chart) And violence or the fear of it dislodged some 6m Colombians from their
homes mainly in the countryside
Over and above the saving in human life Mr Santos has said that peace together with
his infrastructure programme could add more than two percentage points a year to his
countryrsquos economic growth rate from 2018 In 2014 the economy grew by 46 In a
more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodriacuteguez an economist at Bank of
America put the boost to growth at only 03 percentage points Whatever the precise
figure peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields So
the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher
The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year
In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire ambushing an army platoon
killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks That and the lack of
progress with the talks prompted Humberto de la Calle the governmentrsquos chief
negotiator to warn the FARC in July that ldquoone day they could well find that we are not
at the tablerdquo
This served to concentrate the FARC leadersrsquo minds but the attack undermined public
confidence in the president and the talks At the start of the negotiations in October
2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement ldquowithin monthsrdquo In a national
poll published in May Mr Santosrsquos approval rating fell to 29 and 69 of respondents
expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed
In some ways Colombiansrsquo pessimism is surprising Much of the country has already
benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years The
FARCrsquos unilateral ceasefire resumed in Julymdashand matched by government ldquode-
escalationrdquomdashhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975
according to CERAC a think-tank in Bogotaacute
It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes
rose by 7 annually in dollar terms the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the
oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues
Exceptional violence
With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country
after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos
oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three
chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN)
Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the
country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They
attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20
In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism
and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to
2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States
provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected
Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the
FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic
securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing
several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise
Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
The promise of peace
This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Mr Santos (pictured left) was visibly uncomfortable when Rauacutel Castro Cubarsquos
president encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras
Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb kidnap and extort Mr Santos
knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow
most FARC commanders to escape going to jail But he also knows that peace
represents a huge prize for Colombia And because the FARC will be held to account
for their crimes in the countryrsquos own courts the agreement will offer a potential model
for other conflict-ridden countries
Colombiarsquos armed conflict has been remarkably bloody complicated and long-running
According to the National Centre for Historical Memory a public body set up by Mr
Santos in 2011 between 1958 and 2012 around 220000 people died as a result of the
clash between guerrillas right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces Of these
about 80 were civilians The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see
chart) And violence or the fear of it dislodged some 6m Colombians from their
homes mainly in the countryside
Over and above the saving in human life Mr Santos has said that peace together with
his infrastructure programme could add more than two percentage points a year to his
countryrsquos economic growth rate from 2018 In 2014 the economy grew by 46 In a
more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodriacuteguez an economist at Bank of
America put the boost to growth at only 03 percentage points Whatever the precise
figure peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields So
the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher
The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year
In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire ambushing an army platoon
killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks That and the lack of
progress with the talks prompted Humberto de la Calle the governmentrsquos chief
negotiator to warn the FARC in July that ldquoone day they could well find that we are not
at the tablerdquo
This served to concentrate the FARC leadersrsquo minds but the attack undermined public
confidence in the president and the talks At the start of the negotiations in October
2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement ldquowithin monthsrdquo In a national
poll published in May Mr Santosrsquos approval rating fell to 29 and 69 of respondents
expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed
In some ways Colombiansrsquo pessimism is surprising Much of the country has already
benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years The
FARCrsquos unilateral ceasefire resumed in Julymdashand matched by government ldquode-
escalationrdquomdashhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975
according to CERAC a think-tank in Bogotaacute
It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes
rose by 7 annually in dollar terms the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the
oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues
Exceptional violence
With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country
after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos
oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three
chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN)
Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the
country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They
attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20
In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism
and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to
2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States
provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected
Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the
FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic
securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing
several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise
Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country
after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos
oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three
chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN)
Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the
country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They
attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20
In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism
and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to
2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States
provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected
Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the
FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic
securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing
several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise
Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
the Constitutional Court
Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant
backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and
managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year
This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But
the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security
the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore
political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr
Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay
appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager
Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident
uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique
latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-
parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut
de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car
lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique
avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un
langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique
latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture
notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le
christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des
deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute
jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe
Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient
une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il
deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les
indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se
fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde
Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les
Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des
pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu
eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire
face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour
continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la
prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord
transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la
Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions
pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et
pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai
terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin
des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur
ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par
lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les
questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et
lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans
lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel
plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager
Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |
Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay
however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth
The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again
by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of
Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past
decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong
economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos
economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has
been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased
recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But
over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto
parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total
exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to
power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many
of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are
plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two
primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main
industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national
port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years
This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-
end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-
bright-spot
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias
Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme
si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs
Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous
lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit
eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave
leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave
deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui
se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure
actuelle
De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner
corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas
neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique
eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un
succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop
srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations
Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte
tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du
gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par
une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes
de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par
lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du
bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides
critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun
doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant
Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du
produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de
manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question
drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en
investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi
pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces
reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave
la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash
qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute
Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance
qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur
drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique
Un si long printemps
Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement
sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du
geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et
espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires
reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie
Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se
jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-
vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre
adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous
avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections
andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons
de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin
Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous
reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave
deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se
sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter
Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le
PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous
Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus
comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force
politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes
Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave
une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc
nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois
Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique
car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les
eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit
ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En
mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population
ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur
Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle
de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous
demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de
systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce
mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle
option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos
La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais
eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre
capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les
sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des
reacutesultats entre 15 et 25
En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous
avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement
reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de
lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au
Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques
haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des
hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de
gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de
manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave
une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un
centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos
La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait
directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil
affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil
nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe
deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents
puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela
nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos
Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois
En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un
nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au
cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace
disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique
Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme
de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite
traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement
en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave
deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos
organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche
ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la
nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement
un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des
outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en
force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons
impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne
au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une
question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit
drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere
geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste
agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous
nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans
lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene
instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et
indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien
reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en
Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons
coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de
possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui
revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes
ou que sais-jehellip
Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer
agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le
protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de
Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of
Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces
contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une
position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
CHINA
The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen
Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military
concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what
implications does it have for the region
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to
augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits
and escalatory severity
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army
navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-
400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijingrsquos wishes
At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese
Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs
More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-
range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus
Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an
outcome the United States would like to avoid
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
RUacuteSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015
Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the
process he says
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War
Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant
differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a
full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and
Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent
Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part
in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing
it in not allowing it to go out of control
This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is
literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very
strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the
Russian side
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine
First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it
very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated
into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades
neighbors
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment
Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to
Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns
they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind
I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great
powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding
to domestic influences
Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed
taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies
Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a
loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim
population
I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which
seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate
it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals
and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would
have to make some hard choices
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the
European Union
I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the
migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative
But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very
carefully
Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be
watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria
operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from
sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to
make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem
aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation
Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a
recession
If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not
being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And
they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a
very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And
itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin
himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional
predisposition
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions
Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem namely terrorism
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This
is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy
So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with
Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low
oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some
extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive
We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria
and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear
arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue
Khyber Sarban
Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have
worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence
of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream
is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are
understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the
first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing
Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces
The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-
advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state
relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of
regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in
vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in
sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United
States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet
Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central
Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly
leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day
Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action
Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond
However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
materialize this strategy
First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge
On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For
instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods
Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as
showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular
ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local
Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries
and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama
administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary
detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by
contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come
to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic
politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash
whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian
nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself
however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have
been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos
nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response
is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War
Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while
in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and
North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before
them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth
Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts
however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One
of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the
North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North
Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this
reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital
Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States
has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by
contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it
clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the
way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified
feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering
response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade
later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian
ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for
credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French
President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and
Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any
European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but
the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even
without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such
responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with
deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating
US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale
then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past
decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly
during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold
War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the
United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold
War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the
United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed
In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an
inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South
During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of
Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to
individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications
which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos
human rights implications are not yet known
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and
other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo
(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care
Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced
inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo
However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist
First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage
sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-
purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft
surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to
employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also
be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest
attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos
transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the
individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual
participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet
governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance
view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach
At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred
inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights
However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights
While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to
international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based
approach should ensure
Equality and non-discrimination
True participation and inclusion
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative
human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular
transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance