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MOBILIZATION OF GROUND ARMY 219

General McNair received authorityto suballot personnel to overhead estab-lishmentsas he saw fit.22

Overhead in the Army Ground Forces in the spring of 1943, as calculatedat that time, consisted of some 80,000 officers and enlisted men. 23 It comprised4 percent of the total strength of the ArmyGround Forces. It was mainly con-centrated in the service schools, the trainer personnelof replacement trainingcenters,and theheadquartersof theArmored Force, the AntiaircraftCommand,the Replacement andSchool Command, and other such nontactical establish-ments. At the headquartersof the Army Ground Forces therewere about 260officers and 750enlisted men. General McNair believed that during 1943, withthe training program at its peak and with the prospect for 1944 of training 20percent more tactical units than were specified in the 1943 Troop Basis, little ifany saving of AGF overheadwould be possible. He imposedclose restrictionsonsubordinatecommands.24 Overhead was somewhatreduced through reorganiza-tion of the Armored Force, the AirborneCommand,and the Tank DestroyerCenter. 25 But it was clearthat if the War Departmentwished tomake extensiverecoveries from overheadit wouldhave to look almost entirely toother elementsof the Army than the Ground Forces.

In January 1943 the War Department created a Manpower Board under

the presidency of Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser. G-3, WDGS, pointed out toGeneral Gasser various possible sourcesof manpower savings, including ord-nance, signal andtransportationtroops,ports of embarkation, theAlcan High-way, the defense commands, replacement training centers, medical personneldesigned to remain permanentlyin the United States, Zone of Interior militarypolice, AAF hotel schools, andheadquartersorganizations in theArmy AirForces and the Services of Supply.26 GeneralMcNair told General Gasser of hisbelief that "the Services of Supply was very, very fat, particularly in head-quarters," and that the ManpowerBoard, since it would obtain voluntaryreductionsfrom no one, would have to institute thorough inquiries of its own. 27

22 WD ltr (C) AG320.2 (2-4-43) OB-I-SP to CG AGF, 6 Feb 43,sub: Suballotmentof Mil Pers forOverhead Installationsand Activitiesof AGF. 320.2/262 (C).

23 AG F mem o (C) for G-3 WD, 17 Apr 43,sub: Reduction of Tng Establishments and Other ZIActivities.320.2/262 (C).

24 AG F ltr (C) to CGs, 1 Apr 43, sub: Economy of Manpower. 320.2/262 (C).25 See below, "Organization andTraining of New Ground Combat Elem ents."26 WD memo (S) WDGCT 220 (1-21-43) for Maj Gen Gasser, sub: Possible Sources ofManpower

Reductionsin the Army. 320.2/575 (S).27 (1) AGF M/S (S), CG to Plans, 23 Feb 43. AGF Plans Secfile 224 (S). (2) Memo of GenMcNair

for CofS USA, 2 Jan 43.320.2/5761.

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220 ORGANIZATION OF GROUND COMBATTROOPS

The principalsavings obtained by the Army Ground Forces in1943 camethrough reduction ofT/O's of AGF units.With these reductions, agiven num-ber of units in the AGFTroop Basis could be brought to full strength withless manpowerthan before or, conversely,a given amountof manpowerallottedto the ArmyGround Forces in theTroop Basis would producea larger numberof units. The aim of the reductions, inaccord with the desire of both the WarDepartmentand the Army GroundForces, was to place a larger percentageofthe Army in combat positions.This aim was not realized. The need for increasingthe numberof combat units was not urgent in the first part of 1943, since moresuch units were on hand than were intended for early employment. Para-doxically, while GeneralMcNair labored to make possible a larger number ofcombat units, he was also laying plans to reduce the number of combatunitsto be mobilized in1943.

Further Deceleration and the AGF Pool Plan of April 1943

In the winter of 1942-43, divisions movedoverseas less rapidly than hadbeen expected.Hence they accumulated in the United States. In January theActivation Schedulefor divisions was slowed down; three divisions planned

for activation in May, June, and August weredeferred to the last months of1943.28 On 5 February the WarDepartment, foreseeing difficulty in meeting

the 1943 Troop Basis, advised the Army Ground Forces that 10 of the 100divisions planned for 1943 might have to be deferred to 1944. 29

One difficulty was in obtainingsufficient equipment for training.Anotherwas the crowdingof housingfacilitiesby retentionof troops in the United States.The productionboth of equipmentand of newhousing for ground troops hadbeen severely cut when the Joint Chiefs modified the procurementprogram.30

In March 1943 it was also decided tofurnish weapons of American manufactureto a French army of 250,000men in North Africa.31 The Allies thus obtained alarge fighting force in a combatzone without having to ship personnel,but lessequipment was available for American forces in training. Delay in providing

28 WD memo (C) WDGCT 320.2 Activ (1-16-43) to CG AGF, 16 Jan 43, sub: Scheduleof Activationof Divs, TB 1943. 320.2/15 (TB 43) (C).

29 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (2-5-43) to CG AGF, 5 Feb 43, sub: Tr Basis Planning.320.2/575 (S).

30 See AGF M/Ss (S) written between 10 Dec 42 and 27 Jan 43.320.2/22 (TB 43) (S).31 AGF M/S (S), Plans to CofS, 8 Mar 43. AGF Plans Sec file 185 (Victory Program TB) (S).

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MOBILIZATIONOF GROUND ARMY 221

equipment,observed an AGF staff study, "will continue to be reflected in presscomments on the training and 'inexperience' of UnitedStates troops in ac-tion . . . . The training lag occasionedby delayed distributionof equipmentwill cause every intelligentsoldier to concludethat his inductionwas prematureand chargeableto poor planning." 32

At any rate the Arm yGround Forceswas not satisfied with the allowancesof equipment and ammunition hitherto available for training. Since early in.1942, divisions while in the United States had receivedonly 50 percent of theirauthorized equipment in certain critical items, nondivisional units only 20percent.Thesepartialallowances hadbeen acceptedby the Army GroundForcesas unavoidableduring the early stages of rapid expansion.But shortcomingsshownby American troops in combat in North Africa and the SouthwestPacificwere attributed by the ArmyGround Forces in large measure to lack ofoppor-tunityto train with enough weaponsand ammunition. 33

On 1March 1943 theArmy Ground Forcesproposed revisionsof the pro-curementprogram to the War Department.34 It requestedthat full allowances ofequipment be made available to nondivisional unitsby the fourth month oftraining and to divisions by the sixth month, thus permitting greater realismin combinedtrainingand maneuvers.It also asked that ammunitionallowances

be raised to the point where all personnel mightqualify in the firing of theirindividual weapons. Finally, it requested that procurement be modified tocorrespond with AGF plans to increase, out of personnel saved by reducedT/O's, the number of certaintypes of units in theTroop Basisbelievednecessaryto achievebalanced forces. These were chiefly heavy and medium artillery,tankbattalions,nondivisional infantry, engineers,and tank destroyer and ordnancemaintenanceunits.

Negative replies were received to these proposals.35 The War Departmentheld that no general change of theprocurement program was practicable inthe near future. Distribution of equipment as it left the production lineswasin any case controlled by the Munitions Assignment Board. The War Depart-ment preferred that personnel saved by reduction of T/O's should revert to

32 Memo (S) of ColWinn (AGFPlans) for CofS AGF, 10 Mar 43, sub: Revision of Victory ProgramTB. AGFPlans Sec file 185 (Victory Program TB) (S).

33 Ibid.34 AGF memo (S) for OPD, 1 Mar 43, sub: VictoryProgram TB. 320.2/22 (TB 43) (S).

35 OPD memo (S) 400 WMP (3-1-43) to CG AGF, 22 Apr 43, sub: Victory Program TB. 320.2/22(TB 43) (S).

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All these ideas came together in a proposal made by General McNair tothe War Department on 14 April 1943 for a general revisionof mobilizationproceduresin the GroundForces.The aim was tocontrol the Activation Sched-ule by relating it more closely to shipping capacities,receipt of equipmentandmanpower, time necessary for training, and types ofunits most immediatelyneeded for a balanced mobilization.

39

In this plan the Army Ground Forces was considered to be apool oftroops mobilized in theUnited States and awaiting employment inoverseasoperations.The size of the pool was to be 1,500,000 (the approximate strengthof AGF tactical units at this time), and was to bemaintained continuously atthis level until some future date when the War Department,with transfer of

troops to overseas theatersand the attainmentof mobilizationobjectives,wouldallow the level of the pool in the United States to decline. Meanwhileactivationof new units should be suspendedwhen the pool rose to 10 percentabove itsprescribed level. To activateunits beyond this point,explained GeneralMcNair,would makenecessary more housingconstruction, tie upmanpowerunproduc-tively, spread training equipment toothinly among activated units,and resultin having units gostale from remaining in the United States after the conclu-sion of their training. New units should therefore be activated only as old units

were shipped.If shipmentswere less rapid than expected, activationswould beslower. Unitschosen for activationshould be, not necessarilythose set up in theinitial 1943 Troop Basis, but those of the types judged necessary by the ArmyGround Forces to obtain a properbalanceof forces.

To obtain thedesired balance within a total of 1,500,000 the plan includedrecommendations,for each type of unit in the Army Ground Forces, of theexact number which should be added to or deleted from the existing TroopBasis of 1943. Units dropped from the 1943 program might, if desired,be acti-vated in 1944. The chief readjustmentsrecommended wereto drop 5 infantryand 4 armored divisions,adding 8 light divisionsin their place, and todrop 38tank destroyerand 118 antiaircraft battalions,adding 21 tank battalions and 32battalions ofheavy and medium artillery, togetherwith certain engineer, signal,and quartermasterunits of types which were used in close support of combatforces but which remainedscarce in spite of the steady growth of the servicebranches.The total inductions neededto maintain a1,500,000pool, at the mostfavorable shipping rate,would be 102,000 less than were called for by the exist-ing Troop Basis.

39

Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 14 Apr 43,sub: Modification of Mob Procedures.381/177 (S).

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MOBILIZATIONOF GROUND ARMY 225

Revision of the Military Program: the 90-Division Army

The War Department took no direct action on this plan. Instead, a Com-mittee on the Revision of the Military Program was appointed in the WarDepartment General Staff to consider, among other matters, the dangers ofovermobilization. Meanwhile the Army Ground Forces continued to activateunits under the existing Troop Basis. On 21 April the Army Ground Forces,calling attention to the pool plan submitted on 14 April, and anticipatingdifficulties in the receipt of personnel, requested permission to defer the in-fantry divisionscheduledfor activationin August.The War Department repliedthat no action would be taken on the AGF pool plan for over a month,

and that meanwhile the preactivation process for the August division shouldbe launched. The Chief of Staff, AGF, fearing a repetition in the summer of1943 of the personnel crisis of 1942, took care to place this decision of the WarDepartment in the record.

40On 14 May the War Department announced that

the pool plan would probably be approved "in principle," and that inducteeswould in the long run suffice to fill AGF units. 41

In June 1943 shortages beganto reappear.

42 (See Chart.)The Committee on the Revision of the Military Program reported early

in June. Since the year before, when the Operations Division, WDGS, hadhoped for 140 divisions by the end of1943, the strategical picture had greatlybrightened. The German advance in Russia had been checked, and bombingof Germany from Great Britain was assuming larger proportions. It was de-cided to reduce the strength authorized for the Army by the end of 1943from 7,500,000 to 7,000,000 enlisted men. Ultimate size of the Army was tobe determined later: "This will depend, to a large extent," observed the Com-mittee, "on the outcome of theRusso-German operations this summer andthe effectiveness of the Combined-Bomber Offensive, the trends of whichshould be sufficiently apparent by early September to warrant a decision." 43

40(1) AGF memo (C) for G-3 WD, 21 Apr 43, sub: Activation of Divs in August 1943. 381/41 (C) .

(2) WD memo (C) WDGCT 320.2 Activ (4-21-43) for CG AGF, 29 Apr 43, sub: Activation of Divs inAug 43. 381/41 (C).

41 (1) Immediate ActionAGF (C) memo for G-3 WD, 14 May 43, sub: Shortage of Enl Pers. (2) WDmemo (C) WDGCT 220 (5-14-43) to CG AGF, 22 May 43, sub asabove. Both in 320.2/36 (TB 43) (C) .

42 See papers in 320.2/42 (TB 43) (C).43 (1) Memo (S) of Comm ittee onRevision of Mil Program forCofS USA, 7 Jun 43, sub: Revision of

Current Mil Program. (2) WD memo (S) WDCSA (6-8-43) for G-1, G-3, G-4, OPD, AAF, AGF, ASF,8 Jun 43, sub as above.Both in 381/177 (S).

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226 ORGANIZATION OF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS

Troop Basis as of 31 December 1943(Enlisted Strength)

*Increase.

The Committee sought to obtain the500,000 reductionalmost entirelyby deleting combat ground troopsfrom the Troop Basis. It recommendedthe

following changes in allotments:44

It was proposed that 12 divisionsbe deleted from the 1943 program, leaving 88to be mobilized. Over 350,000 men were to be takenfrom divisional strength,reducing divisional strength about 25 percent, an economy made possible inpart by the deletion of 12 divisions, inpart by the reductionof divisionalTablesof Organization.Whether the 12 divisions should be restored to theTroopBasis in 1944 was to be decidedlater. From "combat support" (nondivisionalcombatunits) only 100,000were to be taken.The proportionof combatsupportto divisionswas to be increased,with a larger allotmentfor heavy artillery andfor tank battalions, as desired by General McNair. In antiaircraft artillery thecommitteeproposed no significant reductions. Allotment for servicetroops con-tinued to grow. The gross number of men per division (not counting AirForces) was about 55,000.

General McNairwas willing to check the growth of the Ground Forces,though his own proposals hadbeen lessdrastic, but heviewed with disfavor an

44

Memo (S) of Committeefor DCofS USA, 13 Jun 43,sub: Tr Unit Basis 1943. 320.2/31 (TB 43) (S).

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Individual AGF units required less manpower after the middle of 1943 thanpreviously becauseof reduction in Tables of Organization. New units were

added withoutincrease of combined unit strength. When the war ended inEurope, T/O strength of all AGFtype units (2,502,000 enlistedmen on 31March 1945) was about the same as for all AGFtype units alreadymobilizedon 30 June 1943 (2,471,000 enlisted men on that date). Combined strengthof all AGF units of combat types only, in March 1945, was hardlygreater thanthat of combat units already mobilized on 31 December 1942, although manycombat units were added after 1942. (See Tables Nos. 4 and 5, pp. 210-11.)

It is importantto keep inmind that, while the Army as awhole showed anet increase of almost 3,000,000 in 1943 and 1944, and while the combatantarms, as arms, continued to expand, the combined strength of combat units(other than the AirForces) scarcelygrew after 1942, and the combinedstrengthof all AGF units, includingservice units, hardly grew after the middle of 1943.

It was notintended in July 1943 that expansion of AGFunit strengthshouldcease. The Troop Basis of 1 July 1943 allotted an enlisted strength of 2,822,000for all AGF units, both combat and service, by 31 December 1943. Cut fromthe corresponding allotment of 3,157,000 in the Troop Basis of November1942, the new figure representeda Troop Basis reductionof 335,000. But since

only 2,471,000 were as yet mobilized on 30 June, the figure of 2,822,000 calledfor an increase of351,000 in AGF units in the last six months of 1943. SinceAGF units were at about the same T/O strength inMarch 1945 as in June1943, in the long run AGF units notonly suffered a Troop Basis reductionof 335,000 on 1July 1943 but also in net result failed to receive the incrementof 351,000 which even the reduced Troop Basis of 1 July 1943 provided.

Difficulty in meeting the 1 July Troop Basis was not long in becomingapparent. Inductions did not meet stated requirements. The 42d Division,

activated in July, waited until September to receive enough personnel to beginbasic training.The 65th Division, activated in August (the last infantry divi-sion to be activated), waiteduntil January 1944 for the samepurpose.46 It wasthis division whose activationthe Army Ground Forcesin the precedingAprilhad proposed to defer. In general, Ground Forceunits in the United States,after a brief period at full strength in the spring of 1943, suffered from per-sonnel shortages until August 1944, despite continuingdeletion of units fromthe mobilizationprogram.

46

AGF G-3 files, 333.1, for 42d and65th Divs.

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On 21 September 1943, having been short-shipped 26,710men from recep-tion centers in August, the ArmyGround Forces described its situation to the

War Department.47

Within the last few weeks,10,817

men had beentaken frominfantry divisions as overseas replacements. Wholesalelosses were occurringunder liberal discharge policies recently adopted. Approximately55,000 menhad recently been transferredfrom the Ground Forcesto the ArmySpecializedTrainingProgram in the colleges. In thepreviousthree monthssome 15,000hadbeen transferred to the Air Forces as aviation cadets. Hence shortages werespreading;newly activated unitswere short 75,000;even units alertedfor over-seas movement wereunderstrength.One expected source ofpersonnel,the sur-pluses left by application of reduced Tables of Organization, would yieldrelatively little,becausewith units short under the old tables little surpluswouldbe created by reorganizationunder the new tables. The ArmyGround Forcestherefore requestedfull shipmentof newly inductedmen. The War Departmentreplied thatsome of thecausesof shortagewere temporary(as indeed theywere,though new temporarycauses seemed alwaysto be appearing),and announcedthat the situation wouldsoon be relieved by a reissue of theTroop Basis, inwhich the number of units to bemobilized by the Army Ground Forces wouldagain becut.

48

It had been planned in June to reexamine the mobilization program inSeptember,after evaluation of thebomber offensive and the Russiansummercampaign. A newTroop Basis was issued as of 4 October, again projectingtheArmy to 31 December 1943. Strength of combat-typeunits was cut by190,000,AGF service units beingsomewhat increased. Despitethe efforts of the Opera-tions Division,WDGS, to impose a ceiling onservice units,49 about 125,000en-listed men were addedto forces of this type,of whom only 25,000were for AGFservice units designed for close associationwith combat troops. The fears feltat AGF headquarterscame true; largely for want of servicetroops the California-Arizona ManeuverArea and other maneuverareas were gradually shutdown inthe winter of 1943-44, to the considerable detriment of advanced training ofcombat troops.

47 AGF memo (C) for G-1 WD, 21 Sep 43, sub: Allocation of Reception Center Pers to AGF.327.3/13 (C).

48 WD memo (C) WDGAP 320.22 for CGAGF, 27 Sep 43, sub: Allocation of ReceptionCenter Persto AGF. 327.3/13 (C).

49

OPD M/R (S), 24 Aug 43,sub: Percent of Serv Units in theOver-all TB. AGF Plans Sec file 185 (S).

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The Troop Basis of 4 October slashed the tank destroyer program, andapplied the major amputation desiredby General McNair to the antiaircraftprogram. Units of these two arms were inactivated and their personnel con-verted to other branches, in whichthey were used, not so much toform newunits, as to fill shortages in units in the United States or to furnish replace-ments for units overseas. The artilleryobjective, raised in theTroop Basis of1 July, was now somewhat lowered;but activation of field artillery battalionshad to becontinued to meet even this more moderateaim, so small had beenthe artilleryprogram in the earlier stages of mobilization. The combatengineerprogram was also cut. The program of 90 divisions for 1943 remained un-changed,all reductions incombat troopscoming in nondivisional units, whose

projected strength, per division,fell from about 15,270 in the Troop Basis of1 July to about13,000in the Troop Basisof 4 October.

In summary, the 4 OctoberTroop Basis, the final form of the Troop Basisfor 1943, dealt with the manpower shortage by reducing therequirementforground combat troops. Whereas on 24 November1942 it had been planned tohave 2,811,000 enlisted men in ground combat units by the end of1943, on 4October 1943 it was planned tohave only 2,284,000.This figure was substan-tially realized.T/O enlisted strength of ground combat unitsactive on 31 De-

cember 1943 was 2,282,000. Actual strength was less, because of continuingshortages. T/O strength was to be further reduced in 1944 by inactivations.

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IV. The 1944-45 ArmyWhen the detailed drafting of a Troop Basis for 1944 took place, in the

later months of 1943, therole of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, in TroopBasis planning was very much diminished. During 1943 the overseas theatershad rapidly grown, especially the North African Theater of Operations,theEuropean Theater of Operations,and the SouthwestPacific Area. The com-mandinggeneralsof these theaters estimatedthe size and compositionof forces

necessary for their respective missions. The Operations Division, WDGS, co-ordinating the activities of the theaters, mediating the requests of the theatersto the War Department,and schedulingthe shipmentof troops to theater com-manders, announced operational requirements as of successive future dates.G-3, WDGS, in charge of drafting the Troop Basis, followed chiefly the ex-pressed desires of the OperationsDivision.The ArmyGround Forces was sim-ply requested, in the fall of 1943, to estimatewhat troops it would need in 1944for training overhead in the Zone of Interior. These overhead troops, plusGroundForce units called for by theOperationsDivision, plusreplacementsasdetermined by the WarDepartment,constituted theGround Forceportion ofthe 1944 Troop Basis. The role of Headquarters,Army Ground Forces, wasmore than ever purely advisory.1

At the end of 1943 the WarDepartment considered activating 15 newdivisions in 1944 and reducing the allotment to the Army Air Forces to afigure in the neighborhood of 1,850,000 enlistedmen. This would have givena total of 105 divisions, inplace of the 120 or 125which had been estimatedearly in 1943 (before total enlisted strength was cutfrom 7,500,000to 7,000,000)

as attainable in 1944. But the Air Forces at this time was developing itsprogram for Very Long Range Bombers (B-29's). It was deemed impossibleto reduce the Air Force allotment or to find the personnel for the new pro-gram by economiesor conversionswithin Air Force organizations. To providemanpowerfor the B-29 program, and for certain lesser needs of the WarDepartment, including continuation of the Army college program on a re-

1 (1) WD memo (C) WDGCT 320 TB (21 Sep 43) for CGs AGF, ASF, AAF, 7 Oct 43, sub: TB1943-44. 320.2/52 (TB 43) (C). (2) Memo of G-3 WD forDCofS USA, 21 Sep 43,sub: Revised TB 1943.AGO Records,320.2 (14 Jul 42) (36) Sec 1b. (3) WD memo (C) WDGCT320 TB (7 Oct 43) forCGs,7 Oct 43, sub: TB 1943-44. 320.2/55 (TB 43) (C).

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TABLE NO. 6

Development of the Heavy Artillery Program,

1942-44(Showing Number of Nondivisional Field Artillery Battalions in Successive Proposals)

Sources: Same as for thetable in the preceding study,"Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945."

duced basis, and allowances for rotation of personnelbetween overseas stationsand the United States, the idea of adding 15 divisions in 1944 was abandoned.The ground army would remainat 90 divisions.2

2 Memo (S) of ADCofS USA for G-3 WD, 15 Jan 44,sub: TB 1944. 320.2/12 (TB 44) (S).

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TABLE NO. 7

Ratios of Nondivisional to Divisional Field Artillery,

30 June 1943-1 July 1944(Number of Battalions, by Type, per Division)

In nondivisional unitsthe first tentativeproposalsof the War Department

for the 1944 Arm y contemplatedno extensivechanges from the plans for 1943,except that more combat engineers and more artillery of the lighter caliberswere to be organized, certain seacoast artillery units inactivated,and an addi-tional 125,000enlisted men allotted to serviceunits.

Army Ground Forces renewed, this time with success, its plea for moreheavy artillery. (See Tables Nos. 6 and 7.) In 1942 and 1943 it had soughtto have a considerable increaseof heavy artillery incorporated in the1943Troop Basis as necessary to the creation of a balanced force. In September 1942

it had recommended101 battalions (armed with 240-mm.,8-inch,and 155-mm.guns), in addition to 140battalions of medium artillery (4.5-inch gun and155-mm. howitzer) and the medium artillery organic in divisions.3 The WarDepartment, reducing the number of mediumbattalions to 81, waswilling atthat time to authorizeonly 54 heavy battalions.4 In April 1943 General McNairexpressed his belief that "the amount of heavy artillery in the 1943 Troop

3 AGF ltr (S) to TAG, 30 Sep 43, sub: TB 1943. 320.2/4 (TB 43) (S).4 WD memo (S) WDGCT320.2 Gen (11-24-42) for CGs AGF andSOS, 24 Nov 42,sub: TU B 1943.

AGO Records,320.2 (14 Jul 42) (36) Sec 1 (S).

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Basis is ... dangerously smallif any major operations are to be undertakenby United StatesTroops prior to January 1945." He observed that"the pro-duction of such weapons is a slow process, involvingan elapsed time of ap-proximately one yearafter the development is completed and the numericalrequirement is established."5 After discussions with General Somervell, whoshared his view, General McNair renewedhis recommendation for an in-crease.6 The War Department hadbeen reluctant to planbeyond foreseeablestrategic requirements, apparentlyinfluenced by a belief that the mission ofheavy artillery couldbe performed inpart by bombardment aviation.7 But on1 July 1943 it authorized an increase in the number ofheavy battalions from54 to 77. 8 As late as 1 January 1944 only 61 were in fact active, someof themin very early stages oftraining. 9 When the Troop Basis for 1944, as proposedin October 1943, provided only small increasesin heavy artillery, Headquarters,Army Ground Forces, returned to the charge, believingthat both OPD andover-seas commanders had underestimated the amount ofheavy artillery that wouldbe needed in a major offensive. They appeared to be giving too much weight tothe nature of ground operations hitherto engagedin by American forces. TheWar Department thereupon authorizedan additional 30 battalions ofheavyartillery, making a total of111. 10 Since the number ofdivisionshad been cut to

90, the proportion of medium andheavy artillery to divisional strength nowcame within the ratio which the Army Ground Forceshad estimated as anecessaryminimum, though still only two-thirds of the ratio whichit regardedas ideal in a study publishedin July 1943. 11

In April 1944a special board of officers (Lucas Board) reviewed artilleryrequirements.Its recommendations wereinfluenced by the operations at Cas-sino, Italy, which had indicated that reliancecould not be placed on bombers

5 Par 5, AG F M/S (S), CofS to Plans Sec,7 Apr 43.320.2/22 (TB 43) (S).6 (1) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CG ASF, 12 Apr 43, sub: Heavy FA. 320.2/22 (TB 43) (S). (2)

Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 14 Apr 43, sub: Modification of Mob Proceedings. 381/177 (S).7 Memo (S) of Col Winn forCofS AGF, 10 Mar 43, sub: Revision of Victory Program TB, sum-

marizingviewsexpressed in conferenceswith WD staff officers. AGF PlansSec file 185 (S).8 TB 1943, revision of 1 Jul 43 (S).9 See column 13, line 44, of the table in "Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: a

StatisticalStudy," in this volume.10 (1) TAB I to notes (S) by Col J. B.Sherman, Plans Sec, AGF,on WD tentative 1944TB. AGFPlans

Sec file 185 (S). (2) TB 1944, 15 Jan 44 (S).11

See Table No. 6.

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as a substitute forheavy cannon.GeneralMcNair renewedhis recommendationfor more heavy battalionsand the War Departmentincreased the artillery pro-

gram by 32 battalions,chiefly of 8-inch and 240-mm.howitzers.12

This broughtthe total number of heavy battalions authorized up to 143. Over 100 artillerybattalionsof calibersabove 105-mm.were activated in 1944. Conversionof unitsof seacoastartilleryand use ofpersonnelfrom arms in which inactivationwas inprogress made the formation of new units relatively easy.The production ofguns and ammunitionproved to be a more difficult problem.

Implementation of the 1944Troop Basis

The 1944 Troop Basis was published under date of 15January 1944. Itcalled for an army of 6,955,000enlisted men, slightly reduced from the earlierfigure of 7,004,000to allow for passage ofenlisted men into the warrant officerand commissioned grades.With officers, who werehenceforth included in theTroop Basis, the authorized strengthof the Army aggregated 7,700,000.Thisstrength was attained byApril 1944. But while the Army as a whole was nowat its planned ultimate strength, shortages continued to exist invarious com-ponents. The Army therefore continued to grow. Actual strength reached

8,000,000 byJuly 1944 and was approaching 8,300,000at the time of victory inEurope in May 1945. The War Department, while obtainingspecial authoriza-tions tocarry this overstrength, attemptedthrough1944 to cutback the strengthof the Army to the 7,700,000 authorized in theTroop Basis.With the continu-ance of war in Europe thisidea was given up. In May 1945 the Troop Basiswas raised to 8,290,993.Thus actual strength was finally covered with a TroopBasis authorization.This figure became the point of departure for reductionssubsequentto victory in Europe.

It was doubted from the beginning whether the Troop Basis of January1944 could be implemented,that is, whetheractual needs could be met withinthe 7,700,000 ceiling. The main reason was that the Troop Basis made inade-quate allowance for the "pipeline"—menin hospitals, in replacement centersand depots, in reassignmentcenters, and in transit or onfurlough under poli-cies of rotation between the United States and overseas stations. "I doubt,"

12 (1) Rpt of Special Board of Offs for CofS USA, 4 May 44, sub: Adequacy of FAProgram andDoctrine. 320.2/12 (TUB 44) (TS) (separate folder). (2) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 30Apr 44,

sub:Increase in

Mediumand Heavy Artillery. 320.2/32 (TB 44) (S).

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wrote General McNairin February 1944, "that the troop basis can be balancedbecause there is an insufficient allowance for pipeline—the invisiblehorde of

people going here and there but seeminglynever arriving."13

With more alwaysin thepipeline than the Troop Basisallowed for, men were not available,withinthe 7,700,000 ceiling, for anticipated requirements.These requirements wereconsiderable.

Even after the idea of adding fifteen divisions wasabandoned, the TroopBasis of 15 January 1944 called for new unitsrequiring half a million men inthe three major forces. The Army Ground Forcesrequired a net increase ofabout 150,000 for new units—chiefly AGF service units, combat engineers,andheavy artillery. For some of these units the Army Ground Forces had beenwholly unable to plan. When the Troop Basis of 15 January 1944 was deliv-ered to headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, on 27 January, it wasfound to contain unitson which no previous information hadbeen received,though they were scheduled for activation by the Army Ground Forces inFebruary and were needed for the invasion ofFrance the following June.Certain activations scheduled for 1943, but deferred becauseof shortages inreceipt of personnel, also remained to be carried out in 1944. Some old unitswere also short; divisions on the Six MonthsList were short almost 10,000

infantrymen; divisions not on the Six MonthsList were short 32,500; non-divisionalengineers were short 12,000. Heavy losses overseasin 1944 were ex-pected,for which replacements had to bemade ready.14

In addition, further demands on the Troop Basis, not provided for inJanuary, developed in 1944. The number of heavy artillery battalions was sub-stantially increased, forreasons thathave beenpreviously explained.15 Require-ments for infantry replacements, in1944 as in 1943, also exceeded alladvanceprovisionsmade by the War Department.

Since theTroop Basisof January1944authorized

no increasein thestrengthof the Army over that authorized for 1943 (though not attained until April

1944), and since the War Department did notintend to exceed this authoriza-tion, it was desired that manpower for new requirements in1944 should beobtained byredistribution withinthe Army. Since 1942 the War Departmenthad looked forward to a time whenpersonnel could be redistributed to increase

13 Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Maj Gen L. E. Jones, CG 10th Lt Div, 15 Feb 44. McNairCorrespondence.

14 AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 15 Feb 44, sub: 1944 TB. 320.2/12 (TB 44) (S).15

See above, pp. 232-34.

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tactical forces. Measures of economywere initiated in the winter of 1942-43,including the establishmentof the War Department ManpowerBoard. It hadbeen hoped that the desired readjustment,within a fixed ceiling,might occurin 1944.

Plans for economywere again stated on 20January 1944, in a memorandumof G-3, WDGS, for the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, circulated in photostat tothe headquartersof the Army Ground Forces. 16 Proposed economies included"inactivation of units rendered surplus by thechanging pattern of the war"(meaning chiefly antiaircraft and tank destroyer units as far as the ArmyGround Forces was concerned), "reductionin Zone of Interior activities dueto decrease in the training load"(such activitieswere relativelysmall in AGF),and "the exerciseof drastic economy in the use ofmanpower bothin the UnitedStates and overseas."It was stated thatconsiderabletransfer of personnel amongthe major commandsin the United States would benecessary,with a net balanceof transfers from the Air Forces to theGround and Service Forces. The WarDepartment Manpower Board was to extend its investigations tooverseastheaters.

Economies and Conversions in 1944

Very great economieswere, in fact, accomplishedin 1944. Certain luxuriesof an earlier day, and installations onceuseful but now surplus,were stringentlycurtailed. Many kinds of establishments set up for other purposestended toliquefy into the replacementstream, thus providingeither combat replacementsfor old units or filler replacementsfor new units due for activation.

The Army SpecializedTraining Program,which held almost 150,000partlytrained troops on college campuses,was virtually dissolved.About 73,000 of itsstudents were transferred to the Army Ground Forces.17 Some 24,000 surplusaviation cadets were reassignedfrom the Air Forces to the Ground Forces inthe spring of 1944. 18 The flow into the Ground Forces from these two sourcesdid notconstitutealtogether aquantitativegain in m anpow er, since theGround

16 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 TB (30 Dec 44) for CofS USA, 20 Jan 44, sub: Implementation of TB1944.320.2/8 (TB 44) (S).

17 (1) Memo (S) of Gen Marshall for SW, 10 Feb 44, sub: Serious Pers Shortages. (2) AGF M/S (S),G-1 Control Div to G-1, 26 Feb 44, sub: Conference Concerning Distribution of ASTP Students. Both in353/100 (ASTP) (S).

18 (1) WD memoWDGCT 220.3 (24 Mar 44) for CGAGF, 29 Mar 44,sub: Almt of Pers Released byAAF. 220.3/2119. (2) A GF ltr toCGs, 6 Apr 44,sub: Distribution ofAviation Cadet Tn g Pers. 220.3/2129½ .

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Zone of Interior Military Personnel

*Increase.

izations, and, in addition, reserves of replacements morethan 100,000 inexcessof War Department authorizations. These overstrengths, while adding to theimmediate combat powerof the theaterswhich enjoyed them, were compen-sated for by corresponding understrengths in units and replacements in theUnited States,and therefore compromised theability of the War Department toreinforce the theaters at future dates. Broadly speaking, a theater which ex-ceeded its authorizationin combat troops was either deprivinganother theaterof combat troopsat the time or robbing itself as of afuture date—exceptinso-far as additional combat troops might be formed from noncombat organiza-tions. But it was found that overhead was also overexpanded."Overhead"meant troops who were neither in tactical headquarters (army, corps, etc.)nor in combat units, T/O service units, or replacementpools. Overhead in theEuropean Theater of Operations, for which 93,227 men were authorized,actually absorbed114,137. Overhead in the UnitedStates, authorized 1,272,323men, absorbed 1,297,688. Gross overstrength in overhead throughout theArmywas almost 50,000. 24

Attempts to economize onoverhead in the United States met with limitedsuccess. Overhead couldbe reduced only partly as troops moved overseas.Zone of Interior overhead, composedof officers and men in jobs which would

never take them overseas,fell about 15 percent between 30 June1943, roughlythe date atwhich troops in the United Stateswere at their maximum, and 31March 1945, at which date the proportion of the Army left in the UnitedStates was approaching the minimum. Figures were as follows:25

24 Appendix"A," Chart 3, WD GenCouncilMin (S), 4 Sep 44.25 (1) Summary of ZI Operating Pers, Changes in Str June 43-Feb 45 and Jan-Feb 45, WDMB Form,

Table 1 of 8, 15 Mar 45, in Appendix "D," WD Gen Council Min (S), 26 Mar 45. (2) Same (R), Strengths

31 Mar 45, Table 1 of 8,dated 30 Apr 45, in Appendix "B," WD Gen Council Min (S), 30 Apr 45.

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Men Qualified for Immediate Overseas DutyBut Assignedto Zone of Interior Jobs

Over 200,000 were thusrecovered foroverseasassignment, whetherfor tacticalforces, replacements,or overseas overhead;but recovery was rather slow, for

reduction in AirForceZone ofInterior personnel,whichcomprisedover half theZone of Interior personnelin the Army, did not reach substantialproportionsuntil the last monthsof 1944.

On 14January1944 the War Department orderedthat enlistedmen assignedto Zone of Interior positions be in general those not qualified for overseasservice.26 These included men disqualifiedby age or physicalcondition,or thosewho had already served overseas.In February1944 there were about600,000en-listed men qualified for overseas dutyemployed in theZone of Interior. About400,000 were in the Air Forces, and 200,000 in the Ground and Service Forces.The latter wererapidly transferredto other positions during 1944. The 400,000in the Air Forces remainedvirtuallyuntoucheduntil October 1944. At that timethe prolongationof the war inEuropeadded to thedrive to get able-bodied menoverseas.The Air Force figure fell to 262,000,but the reduction representedforthe most part transfer of physically qualifiedmen to the category of"criticalspecialists," in which they became temporarilydisqualified for overseasduty,and hence remained at their Zone of Interior jobs. Figures were as follows:27

On 30 June 1944, during the most critical days of the Normandy beachheadoperation,the number of enlisted men in the United States qualified for over-seas duty but assigned toZone of Interior jobs exceeded the number of enlisted

26 WD ltr AG 220.3 (14 Jan 44)OB-C-A to CG AGF, 14 Jan 44, sub: Enl Men—Utilizationof Man-power Based on Physical Capacity.220.3/305 (LD).

27 (1) Rpts tabulated in WD Gen Council Min (S), 14 Aug 44, p. 3. (2) Appendix "E," Chart 3, ZI

Operating Pers,in WD Gen Council Min (S), 30 Nov 44. (3) WD GenCouncil Min (S), 8 Jan 45.

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infantrymen in the European andMediterranean Theaters. It exceeded thenumber of Air Corpspersonnel,enlisted and commissioned, in the twotheaters.It was 92percent of the number of enlisted men in theinfantry, armored andtank destroyer forces, cavalry, field artillery, coast artillery, and antiaircraftartillery in the EuropeanTheater. 28 Many combat soldiers in the theaters werephysically inferiorto men scheduled to remain at home. This situationwas notone which the Army Ground Forces approved,but it wasdifficult for the WarDepartment to correct it in 1944. Since the early days of mobilization manyprime physical specimens had been trained as technicians in Zone ofInteriorassignments.They now occupied key positions. Underpressure of combat in1944 the Ground and Service Forces,but not the AirForces, generally replacedthese men with men who were not qualified for overseas service or had alreadyserved overseas.

Meanwhilethe War Departmenturged economy on overseascommanders.Attempts in this direction since 1942 had not been very successful. In April1944 representatives ofoverseas theaters attended a conference in Washington.The Deputy Chief of Staff declared that in thepast the War Department hadliberally granted the requests of the theaters butthat these requests had fre-quently beenimmoderate.He said that use ofcommunications-zonetroops had

been extravagant and thatwaste in one theater would mean insufficiency inanother. He urged the theaters to practice the same economies—inactivation,conversion,retraining—thatwere in progress in theUnited States.29

It became increasinglydifficult for the Zone of Interior to meet the replace-ment needs of the theaters. The situationwas recognized as critical even before

28 On 30 June 1944 there were 456,032 POR-qualified enlistedmen in Zone of Interior assignments.(Tabulation of G-1 Rpts on Utilization of Manpow erBased on Physical Capacity, WD Gen Council Min(S), 4 Sep 44, p. 5.) Onthat date other figures were as follows (Strength of the Army (S) 30 Jun 44,p. 16.314.7 (AGF Hist) (S ) ) :

29

WD GenCouncil Min (S), 3 Apr 44.

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the German breakthroughin the Ardennes on 16 December 1944. Officers ofthe War Department GeneralStaff and Headquarters,Army Ground Forces,met in conference on 7 December.30 Battle losses in the EuropeanTheater alonewere running to 3,000 a day, or 90,000 a month,while the Arm yGround Forceswas receiving only 53,000 a month from reception centers. Not all thesewerephysically fit for training as combat replacements.To raise the induction ratewould raise the proportion of physically unfit.Older sources of economy werevanishing: it was stated at the conference that the Ground Forces had reachedthe limit of inactivation,the Service Forces in the United States were drainedof physically high-grade personnel,and the Air Forces, if called on to supplymore men for retraining as infantry, would have to furnish Air Force specialistsin the grade of sergeant. The Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces,was askedpoint-blankby G-3 of the WarDepartmentwhether he believed that the WarDepartmentwas providingsufficient replacements tocarry on the war. He re-plied that he didnot. He recommended that thecapacity of AGF replacementtraining centers be raised by 160,000 infantrymen, adding that the GroundForces, even with reduced overhead,could find means to conducttheir training.It was decided that the Service and Air Forces must meet their quotas fortransfers, that the AAF quota mighthave to be raised, that steps should be

taken to raise the inductionrate, and that ifnecessary the replacementtrainingprogram should be cut tofifteen weeks.

The German counterattack of 16December,suddenly subjectingAmericantroops to still higher losses, therefore produced a downright emergency. TheG-1 of the European Theater of Operations flew to Washington. The lastdivisions were rushed toEurope and hence were not available for supplyingreplacements. The WarDepartment insisted that the Zone of Interior wasincapable of meeting the full requirementof ETO for replacementsand thatthe theater must greatly accelerateits own program of conversion andretrain-ing. The bulk of the Army, it was pointed out, was now overseas,principallyin Europe; such manpowerresources as the Army had within itself were nowin the theaters, and especially in the European Theater of Operations. It wasagreed that henceforth the War Departmentshould simply announce to eachtheater the number of replacementsto be expected from the United States, andthat each theatermust meet allrequirementsabove this number by redistribu-

30

M/R (S) Enl Div G-1 AGF, sub: Overseas Repl Requirements. 320.2/170 (O'seas Repls) (S) .

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In other words,the main problem of the Ground Forces after the close of1943 was not toactivatenew units but to preservethe units already activeat theend of 1943, and inparticularto hold togetherthe 90 divisionsalreadymobilized.One of these, the 2d Cavalry Division,was inactivated immediatelyafter reach-ing its overseasstation in 1944. In effect, the remaining89 divisionsrepresentedthe planneddivisionalstrength of the Army. The problem was tohold togetheran Army of 89divisions.

By the inactivations,conversions,and retraining described above, and bythe assignment of themajority of newly inducted men to AGFreplacementtraining centers in 1944 and 1945, the War Departmentsucceededin preservingthe 89 divisions and avoided repeating the experience of 1918, when almostathird of the divisions then activated became hardlymore than paper organiza-tions. But theprocess was a complexone, in whichsome divisionsin the UnitedStates werealmostlost. The personnelneeded byoverseasunits was not providedmerely from replacementcenters or from special installationsfor reconversiontraining, but to a large extent from units destined soon to enter combat them-selves. Some divisions virtually went out of existence as combat organizations(as in 1918), only to be rebuilt at thelatestpossiblemoment.

The last division had hardly been activated in August 1943 when a crisis

developed in the replacement system.32

This was essentially an infantry crisis.Infantry componentsof divisions of the various types,by which virtually allinfantry fighting was done, numbered about 700,000 officers and men, wellunder a tenth of the strength of the fully mobilized Army. The figure changedlittle after the close of 1943. But to maintain 700,000 officers and men indivisional infantry units, the strength of the Infantry as an arm rose to1,800,000by April 1945.

With the opening of operations inSicily in July 1943, and the commit-ment of ground forces to battle in increasing numbers thereafter, a demandarose for replacements in the Infantry, which suffered most of the casualties,far beyond the capacity of infantry replacement training centers to produce.Nondivisionalinfantry regimentswere depleted and inactivated,their person-nel being sent as replacements to the Mediterranean.Divisions also weretapped. By January 1944 approximately 25,000 men had been taken frominfantry divisions in theArmy Ground Forces not earmarked for early ship-

32 The replacementsproblem is dealtwith in two reports prepared by the AGFHistorical Section, Pro-

vision of Enlisted Replacements, andMajor Developmentsin theTraining

of Enlisted Replacements.

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246 ORGANIZATIONOF GROUND COMBATTROOPS

ment.33 These divisions in January were, on the average,2,000 understrength

in their infantry elements.As each division wasearmarked in its turn, it had

to be brought to T/O strength by transfer of trained personnelfrom divisionsof lower priority. The divisions of lowestpriority, generally those most re-cently activated,and chronicallyshort or partly refilled with men direct fromreception centers,could with difficulty proceed beyond basic training. Thetroublesof 1942 were repeatedat the beginning of 1944.

The first weeks of 1944 were a time of extreme difficulty in replacementplanning.On 4 January General McNair, reviewing the shortages ininfantrydivisions,expressed a fear that one or more divisionsmight have to be brokenup. 34 On 12 January the War Department,anticipating theinvasion of France,announced that within twomonths, in the early summer, ETO wouldrequire50,000more infantry and field artillery replacementsthan replacementtrainingcenters couldproduce. 35 The Army Ground Forces wasdirected to plan accord-ingly, with minim um disruptionof units in theUnited States,minimum delayin activation of newunits, and reduction of replacement training if necessaryto thirteen weeks. On 19January substantiallythe reverse policy prevailed:theArmy Ground Forces was directed to submit a plan bywhich overseascombatreplacements should be men with at least nine months' training, taken from

all units of theArmy Ground Forcesnot due forearly shipment.36

This directivereflected the school of thought which had long believed seventeen weeks oftraining insufficient to produce agood replacement. In addition, it wasthoughtundesirableto send into combat men with only seventeen weeksof training at areplacementcenter, and who in manycases were 18-year-oldsor "pre-Pearl Har-bor fathers," while othermen who had been in the Army two or three yearsremained in units in theUnited States—someof which, in an optimisticview,might never be required in battle. The justice of this policy can hardly bedis-

puted. Its inconveniencewas equally clear. The situation was an awkward one,owing to the postponementof invasionplans,as a result ofwhich units hadbeenready longer thannecessary before their dates of commitment.

33 (1) AGF Historical Section, TheBuildingand Training of Infantry Divisions. (2) Memo (S) of GenMcNair for CofS USA, 4 Jan 44,sub: Tng of Repls.320.2/101 (O'seasRepls) (S).

34 Memo (S) of Gen McNair forCofS USA, 4 Jan 44,sub: Tng of Rpls. 320.2/101 (O'seas Rpls) (S).35 WD memo (TS) WDGCT 370.5 (12 Jan 44) for CGAGF, 12 Jan 44,sub: Repls. 320.2 (O'seas

Repls) (TS).36 WD memo (S) WDCSA 320.2 (16 Jan 44) for CGAGF, 19 Jan 44,sub: Combat Repls. 320.2/105

(O'seas Repls) (S).

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On 25 January General McNair, in a carefully documented reply to theWar Department,showed that it wasmathematicallyimpossibleto hold enoughdivisions in the United States to give nine months' training to the requirednumber ofreplacements,and at thesame time to ship divisionsoverseas on theschedulelaid downfor 1944. Since 80 percentof replacementshad to be infan try,it waschiefly infantry divisionsthat wereaffected. All butnine infantry divisionswere due forshipmentby the end of1944. To givenine months'training,includ-ing a period within divisions,to the number of replacementsestimated by theWar Departmentas needed in1944 would tie up sixteen divisionsin the UnitedStates. For the number of replacements estimated asnecessary by the ArmyGround Forces (which was 50 percent higher, and nearer to the requirement

that actually developed),twenty-six divisionswould have to beheld at home.The program proposed by the War Department,if adhered to as a continuingpolicy, would therefore relegate about a quarter of theinfantry divisions to thestatus of replacementtraining organizations.37

On 7 FebruaryGeneral McNairpointed out that, even under a seventeen-week program for training replacements,a severe shortage was to beexpected.He declaredthat to provideoverseasreplacementsas needed,togetherwith theirtrainer personnel, and to fill shortages in units alreadyearmarked for shipment,

the Army Ground Forceswouldhave to receive500,000men in the remainder of1944. Adding requirementsfor new units in the troop basis, and allowing forattrition, the Ground Forceswould need 1,000,000 in the remainder of 1944.If this figure could not be met, and assuming it to becorrect, wrote GeneralMcNair, theonly recourse would be tocurtail the Troop Basis. He added: "Inshort we may beover-mobilized,or have an unbalancedmobilization in lightof presentconditions." 38 The AGF Troop Basiswas in fact curtailed, as hasbeennoted, by 250,000 between 15January 1944 and 31 March 1945, chiefly throughinactivationof antiaircraftunits.

At this point, on 10 February 1944, General Marshall went directly to theSecretary of War with a proposal to liquidate the Army Specialized TrainingProgram. Measures of economyalready undertaken, he said, would providemen for units to be shipped after 31 August 1944. The need was for filling,with men already basically trained, shortages in units due for shipment before31 August.These units were required for the forthcominginvasion of France.

37 AG F memo (TS) for CofS USA, 25 Jan 44, sub: Repls. 320.2 (O'seas Repls) (TS).38 Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 7 Feb 44,sub: Repl Situation. 320.2/106 (O'seas Repls) (S).

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Men basically trained were available on college campuses in the Army Spe-cialized Training Program. General Marshall offered a choice betweendrasti-

cally reducing the college program and disbanding ten divisions andcertainnondivisionalunits. The Army SpecializedTraining Program was immediatelyreduced.39

Of the 35 divisionsamong which ASTP trainees were distributed,only 7actuallywent overseas before31 August.ASTP traineeswere generallyassignedto lower-prioritydivisions,to fill vacancies caused byapplicationof a six-monthrule for overseasreplacements.

The War Departmentabandoned the nine-month project but was stilldetermined to draw replacementsfrom divisions and other units before usingthe newcomers to theArmy currentlygraduating from replacementtrainingcenters.On 26February 1944 the War Departmentdirected theArmy GroundForces to obtain overseasreplacements in all the combat arms bystripping unitsnot on the SixMonthsList.40 Men chosen were to have had at least six monthsof service, those withthe longest service to be chosen first. No 18-year-oldsorpre-Pearl Harbor fathers with less than six months of training were to be sentoverseasas replacementsuntil all other sourceswere exhausted.

Units not earmarked were now systematicallystripped.Although thesix-

month policy applied to replacements in all combat arms,comparativelyfewreplacementswere required except in the Infantry, so that it was mainly in-fantry units that lost their men. Divisionssurrendered theirprivates and a per-centageof their noncommissionedofficers until a date about four monthsbeforesailing. Thusthe divisions which enteredcombat in thelatter part of 1944 weredivisions which had been intraining for periods averagingtwo years but werecomposed in large part of men new to the division, new to the infantry, oreven new to theArmy. In some ways divisions profited, for they received newmen of higher quality than had been previously obtainable by theGroundForces; but unit spirit andunit training, carefully built up in theprecedingyears, and generallyadmitted to bevital in combat, had to berecapturedat thelast moment. 41

39 Memo (S) of Gen Marshallfor SW, 10 Feb 44, sub: Serious Personnel Shortages. 353/100 (ASTP) (S).40 WD memo (C) WDGCT 200 (26 Feb 44) for CGAGF, 26 Feb 44,sub: Repls. 320.2/107 (O'seas

Repls) (C).41 (1) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 13 Mar 44, sub: Repls. 320.2/114 (O'seas Repls) (S) . (2) AGF ltr

(C) to CGs, 29 Mar 44, sub: O'seas Enl Repls. 320.2/110 (O'seas Repls) (C). (3) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 30

Apr 44,sub: Refilling of Certain AGF Units 220.3/123 (R).

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The six-month replacement training policy lasted for only about twomonths in the spring of 1944. The War Department, in view of the majoroffensive impending, would not decelerate theshipping schedule for divisionsand other combat units. Unitstherefore soon became unavailableas producersof replacements.There were not enough divisions in the Army for the WarDepartment to gain both itsobjectives:namely, to shipdivisions to theaters asrapidly as was feasible; and to ship replacements to theaters from divisionsremainingin the United States.By the summerof 1944 replacements wereagainbeing sent overseas with seventeenweeks of training.But the internal composi-tion of infantry divisions in the United States had in the meantime beenrevolutionized.

While the six-monthpolicy was given up, the 18-year-old policywas con-firmed anew. On 24 June 1944 the War Departmentordered categoricallythatno 18-year-oldshould be sent overseasas an infantry or armored replacement. 42

Over 20,000 18-year-olds, curren tlyin training in infantry and armored replace-ment centers,were assigned to divisionson completing theircourse, sincetherewas no bar on 18-year-olds going overseas as members oforganized units, andsince manyof the menconcerned wouldbe nineteen by the time theirdivisionssailed. Meanwhile,to fill the void in the replacementstream, divisions lost an

equal numberof older men—older both in being over eighteen and in beingtrained members oftheir units. At this timeabout half the menbeing inductedinto the Army were 18-year-olds. At thesame time virtually all inducteeswerebeing assigned to AGF replacementcenters as the Army was completelymobilizedand in general neededonly to replacelosses,of which over 80 percentwere infantry and armored. The 18-year-old rule was, therefore, difficult toapply. To find enough men over eighteen to fill infantry and armored replace-ment centersall availableinducteesover eighteenhad to beused, regardlessofage or physical condition. Many men received at the front as infantry andarmored replacementsin the later months of 1944 were therefore inadequatephysically. Meanwhile the rule was abolished as unworkable.Beginning asearly as August, 18-year-olds wereagain put into the infantry and armoredreplacementcenters, from which, beginning in November,they were shippedoverseaswith seventeen weeksof training—reducedin January1945 to fifteen.

During 1944 about 40 divisions yielded overseas replacements.Seventeenlost most oftheir infantry privatesand many of their noncommissionedofficers.

42 WD memo (C) WDGCT 370.5 (24 Jun 44) to CGAGF, 24 Jun 44,sub: Repls. 320.2/107 (O'seas

Repls) (C).

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Divisions werereconstructed,in part by assignment ofreplacement trainingcenter graduates during the period when seventeen weeksof replacementtrainingdid not qualify a man as anoverseasreplacement,in part by personnelreceived through economies and conversions.ASTP trainees,transferredaviationcadets,and 18-year-oldsfrom replacementtrainingcenterssupplied37 divisions,from April to July, with about 100,000 men. Men volunteeringfor transfer toinfantry and men converted from tank destroyerand antiaircraft artilleryunitswere also assigned to divisions,but most of these, along with men from the Airand Service Forces at the end of 1944, were assigned to special replacementcenters or special infantry regimentsfor six weeks of infantry training.

For a time at the end of1944 it seemed that certain infantry divisionswouldbe broken up despite all the effort to preservethem.Operations in theEuropeanTheater, after proceeding ahead of schedule,met with strong resistance at theSiegfried Line in September. The infantry troops of divisions in action sincethe landings in France were desperatelyin need of relief.It wasdecided to adopta system ofunit replacement.Recommendationsof the ArmyGround Forcesin 1943 to provide more nondivisional regiments forthis purpose had not beenadopted. Instead, nondivisionalinfantry regiments had been dissolved in con-siderable numbers to furnish individual replacements.Now, in October 1944,

it was decided that the infantry regiments of most infantry divisions still leftin the United States were to be shipped to Europe separately.43 But theplan wasaltered before going fully into effect. Only certain regiments wereshippedseparately. In anycase all division headquarters andauxiliary elements wentoverseas, where they were reunited with their infantry and reappeared asstandard organizations.The crisis of December was likewise passed withoutdissolution of any divisions. The need for divisions as units was even greaterthan the need for their personnelas individualreplacements.By February 1945all divisions hadleft the ArmyGroundForces.

A year earlier, in January 1944, 57 divisionswere still in the UnitedStates.Most of them were more than a year old. But instead of havinga stock of unitsfrom which to meet at leisure, after a long period of waiting, the calls of theOperations Divisionfor shipment of divisions and other units to theaters, theArmy Ground Forceshad to make exact calculations inorder to have themreadywhenneeded.The period of waitingin 1943 was followedby a raceagainst

43 (1) AGF M/S (S), G-3 toCofS, 19 Oct 44,sub: Pers Status ofCertain Divs.320.2/760 (S). (2) Memo

(S) of GenLear for G-3 WD, 23 Oct 44,sub: Separate Inf Regts.320.2/58 (TB 44) (S).

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time in 1944. Units scheduledto go overseas receivedtheir permanentpersonnelat the latest possiblemoment.Some went over less fully trained than the ArmyGroundForcesdesired.Seven infantry divisionshad never engaged in a divisionversus division maneuver. Ten had engaged in such a maneuver with fromonly 30 to 60percentof the personnelwhich they took overseas.Not all calls ofthe OperationsDivisionfor nondivisional units couldbe met. In June 1944, forexample,of 1,304 AGF-type unitsthen put by the Operations Division on theSix Months List, 214 were reported as unavailable.44 With the influx of newpersonnel, they could not be trained (orretrained) by the dates desired. Thesituationwas like that of early 1942, when the Army Ground Forces struggledto provide unitstrained and at T/O strengthfor the invasionplan of that date.

44 WD Gen Council Min(S), 26 Jun 44.

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twelve divisionsscheduledfor the last half of 1943 (including the three deferredhitherto)were deferred to 1944. But the WarDepartment,while postponingtheactivation of more divisions to 1944, did not defer to 1944 the attainment ofthe full strength of the Army. TheTroop Basis of 1943 used up the full strengthwhich the Army could expect to reach. This strength, including officers, was7,700,000after June 1943, when the ceiling was lowered from the 8,200,000 setin 1942. It was largely to accommodatethe Army within the lowered ceilingthat activation of the twelve divisions wasdeferred in 1943. Despite loweringof the ceiling the Army infact grew to a strength of over 8,200,000 as hadoriginally been planned.Nevertheless,the defermentof divisions provedto bea postponement to theGreek calends,for the time never came when manpowerwas available for more divisions. The onlyhope of adding divisions in 1944was through redistributionwithin the Arm y.Redistributionto divisionswas notachievedfor variousreasons: the demand for overhead andreplacements provedto be persistently inexcess of estimates; the increase of service units seemedimpossible to check; and certain combat requirements, such as the B-29 aridheavy artillery programs,had to be metafter the Army wasalready formed.

As a result, not only did thehope of raising ground combat strength to3,000,000 enlisted men never materialize, but ground combat strength in the

end hardly exceeded the strength already mobilized at the end of 1942. On 31December 1942,T/O enlisted strengthof ground combat unitsalready mobi-lized was 1,917,000. Strength of such units mobilized on 31 March 1945 wasonly 2,041,000. T/O enlisted strength of divisions mobilized on 31 December1942 was 1,056,000—on 31 March 1945only 1,125,000.More units did exist in1945 than at the end of 1942.Sixteen divisions were added in thefirst eightmonths of 1943, and almost 200 nondivisionalfield artillery battalionsand over150 engineer battalions in 1943 and 1944. (See Table No. 5.) But units wereadded without increase of total strength of ground combat unitsof all types.In other words, the added units were not obtained by redistributionand econ-omy within the Army as a whole but principally by redistribution andeconomywithin the combat elements of the ArmyGround Forces.These redistributionsand economies took the form of inactivation of ground combat units of cer-tain types,and ofdecreasein the size ofground combatunits of all types throughdownward revision of Tables of Organization.With these inactivations andreductions thetotal strength of ground combat units in 1945 wasapproximately1,000,000 below what had been planned in the winter of 1942-43. Combat

ground forces grew to only two-thirds of their anticipatedstrength.

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Although the total strength of combat ground units did not materiallyrise after 1942, the total strength of the Army rose byalmost3,000,000 after thatdate, increasingfrom about 5,400,000 to almost 8,300,000.These 3,000,000 offi-cers and men wentinto the Air and Service Forces, intonondivisionalserviceunits of theArmy Ground Forces, into overhead in all forms, into the hospitalpopulation, and into organizationsof all kinds designed for the training andstorage of replacements.

Ground Combat Units in Planned Troop Basis, 1942-46

Date PercentAugust 1942 a

4 1 . 0

November 1942 37.3

January 1943 a 4 0 . 5

July 1943 35.3

January 1944 32.9

January 1945 29.4

April 1945 b 27.0

December 1946 (Projected for Japanese War) 22. 6a Estimate from pertinent War D epartmentdocuments.b Estimate on basis of actual strength.

Thus in the Army ofover 8,000,000 inexistence in April 1945 only aboutone-fourth were combatantground soldiers, not counting men currently intraining as replacements (approximately500,000) who would eventually joincombat units but not increase their numerical strength. Excluding the AirForces, which numbered 2,300,000,the strength of combat units was about 37

percent of the strength of the Army. Comparison may be made with WorldWar I. In November1918 combat ground forces numbered 1,660,000 officersand men, within 600,000 of the correspondingfigure for 1945. If from the 1945figure one deducts theantiaircraft artillery, whichscarcely existed in 1918 andwhich in 1945 was not allused on the battlefield,the strength of ground combatunits in 1945 was only 300,000 greater than in 1918. Ground combat units in1918, numbering 1,660,000, constituted 45 percent of the total strength of3,700,000 thencarried on the books of the War Department. Excluding avia-

tion, which in 1918 numbered 190,000, ground combat units constituted almost

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Indeed General McNair, especially in 1942 and 1943, had urged more attentionto the air support of ground troops than he wasable to obtain. But inEurope,

despite extensive use of air andmechanizedforces, a larger use of infantry hadbeen required than had been planned. This situation might conceivablyrecurin the FarEast. On theother hand, it could reasonablybe calculated that successagainst Japan would depend heavily on naval and air power and on thelargeground forces of foreign armies—especiallythose ofChinaand the SovietUnion.

The foregoing narrativeraises two general questions which reach beyondthe jurisdiction of the ArmyGround Forces,but on which its experiencewithmobilizationmay be of value. Onequestionrelates to the timing of mobilization,the other to its quantitative aspects.

As for timing, it is evident that if the War Department had found itpossible to accelerate thepreparationof air and service forces in 1940 and 1941,it would have produced a smoother mobilizationin 1942 after the declarationof war. As seen in 1941, the 36 divisionsmobilized before Pearl Harbor hardlyseemed too many for anarmy totaling 1,600,000,the strength attainedat theend of 1941. But they proved to be far out ofproportion as the Army developed.In 1942 emphasiscontinued to fall on divisions;37 divisionswere activated inthat year alone. It was believed that correspondingnondivisionalunits could

be activated somewhat later than divisions, since they required less time fortraining. This policy proved to have serious disadvantages. Activation ofdivi-sions and of supporting nondivisionalunits got out of step. Since the1942 TroopBasis at first made too little provision for service units, and since it developedthat serviceunits were in fact needed in the theatersbefore combatunits arrived,many serviceunits were activated in 1942 without Troop Basis authorization.Activation of service units became irregular, uncoordinated,and difficult tocontrol. The Troop Basis, instead of forecasting mobilization, had to be

changed repeatedly toauthorize mobilizationex post facto. At the same time,with divisions intentionallylaunched some months before their correspondingnondivisional units, future commitments for nondivisional units, especiallyserviceunits,were continuallybuiltup. Thus the serviceprogram alwaysseemedto be lagging, and to find manpower forservice units many combat units werekept understrength for months after activation. Meanwhilethe Army AirForceswere also rapidly growing.

The timing of mobilizationdepended directly on strategic plans. In 1942,until mid-July, planning called for an invasion of western Europein conjunc-

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tion with the British either in the fall of 1942 or in the spring of 1943.Rapid activation of divisions in 1942 was necessary to implement this plan.

Then in the summer of 1942 it wasdecided to confine ground operations to aninvasion of North Africa, and to concentrate meanwhile on an airoffensiveagainst Germany.The date for invadingwestern Europe with land forces waspostponed.The mobilizationobjective for ground troops wasreduced,and therate of mobilization was slowed down. Still, two theaters had to be built up inthe European area, each with a large requirement for overhead and servicetroops, though there was no groundfighting in theEuropeanTheateruntil June1944, and in the MediterraneanTheater the number ofUnited States divisionsemployed in combatseldomexceededhalf adozen.

Combatant ground forces were virtually mobilized in over-all strengthby the end of 1942, and thereafter improved their striking power by economyand reorganization within themselves. Changes in war plans brought abouta long period of waiting before commitmenton a large scale. With three ex-ceptions, the divisionsactivated after Pearl Harbor did not enter combatuntil1944. For strategic plans as finally adopted and carried out, mobilization ofground forces was premature and mobilizationof air forces somewhat tardy.The Army Air Forces, having to be built from the small beginnings of 1941,

continued to expand rapidlywhile the Ground Forces essentiallymarked time.All types of serviceunits, some remainingfrom 1942,had to beformed in 1943and 1944. The ArmyGround Forces felt that the assignmentof manpower inthe period following 1942, when the Army showed a net growth of almost3,000,000,mainly to air andservice units and overhead establishments, insteadof combatantground forces,might create a dangeroussituation in thefuture.

This leads to the question ofquantity.The question isessentiallythis: Whatare the decisivefactors that limit the capacity of theUnited States to deploycom-bat ground forces overseas? In World War II the UnitedStates,with 12,000,000men in its armedservices including those in the Navy, produced only 95 divi-sions, includingthose in theMarine Corps.This fact must be weighed wheneverground operations overseas on any considerable scale are contemplated. Theevidence surveyed in the presentstudy indicates that the United States foundits projects for ground operationsoverseas limited by manyfactors. One was theproportion ofnational resourcesneeded to control the sea and theair. Anotherwas the allocationof resources to strategicbombardmentand to the supportofallies. A third was theneed of maintaining supply lines with streams ofpersonnel

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and equipment constantly in transit over immense distances. A factor whichproduced problems not clearly foreseenwas the demand for shipping, personnel,

and overhead created by supplies which included a mass of heavy and com-plicated mechanicalequipment,and also the materiel needed toprovideAmeri-can soldierswith something correspondingto the American standard ofliving.These demands,and the controls that seemed to be necessary to coordinatethecomplex of specialized units usingvarious types of mechanical andmotorizedequipment,led to a prodigious growthof service and administrativeunits, andin part account for theunprecedentedand alarming proliferation ofoverheadin the Army ofWorld War II. Certainof thesefactors seem likely togrow withfurther advancesin mechanization.Others,such as the pressure to enableAmeri-can soldiers to take their standard of livingwith them, will at least not decline.The strikingforce that the United States can deliver in ground combatoverseasis likely always to depend on the degree towhich economy in these limitingfactors is achieved.

How much economy ofthis sort was achieved in World War II is difficultto determine, but certainly by the beginning of 1945 the Army was amoreeconomical and a leaner organization thanin any previousyear of the war.Indeed the fat stored up in previousyears proved to be a useful reserve. It was

found that much could be dispensed with under pressure: soldiers on collegecampuses whoformed a pool over half as large as the armored forces; surplusesof aviation cadets; an antiaircraft artillery halfas large as all infantrydivisionscombined;personnelengagedsolely in post housekeepingduties; andallowancesfor margins of overstrengthand for basic privates in tacticalunits. In 1944-45troops were convertedfrom these uses to combat jobs,with the consequence,however,that retraininghad to be regrettably hasty.

These economies were produced for the most part by emergency, and menthus recaptured were used mainly as replacements,going to maintainbut not toincrease the number of existingunits. Maintenanceof units at effective strengthwas a considerableachievement.If only for this reason the 89Army divisionsoverseas in 1945 were the equivalent, apartfrom superiorityof fire power, of alarger number of enemy divisions.As for increase in number of combat units,all increaseoccurring after 1942 could be traced to economywithin the ArmyGroundForces ratherthan in the Army as awhole.

Smooth and economicalmobilization, bothin training and in quantitativedistribution,is probably impossibleto achieve in any war. It would appear to

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requireprimarily two conditions. One is aconsistentstrategicplan, in which suc-cessive phases of operations are foreseen well in advance and substantiallyadhered to. The other is an authorityable to adjudicate the rivalclaims ofground,service, air, and naval forces, and to apportion to each of them, in the light ofstrategic plans, such a share of the national stock of manpower and resourcesas would assure to each the means for attaining maximum efficiency in its as-signed role.Since noplan is infallible and no centralagency omniscient, mobil-ization can never be perfectly smooth and perfectly economical.The problemis to find the best middle ground between rational foresight and short-runadjustments. Some of the costs and sacrifices incurred in following a coursethrough this middle ground in World War II have been indicated in the fore-going study. The fact remains that the pursuitof that course led to victory.

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Reorganization

of Ground Troops for Combat

by

Robert R. Palmer

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No. Page

3. Organic Compositionof the Armored Division,1942-45 . . . . . . . . 3204. Composition of the "Type" Army and "Type" Corps, 31 July 1942 . . . 3545. Evolution of Corps Headquarters,1942-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3616. Compositionof the Third Army, 1 October 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . 3667. Compositionof the Third Army, 10 November 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 36 8

ChartThe Armored Division, 1 March 1942 and 15 September1943. . . . . . . . 330

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I. Tactical OrganizationBefore 8 March 1942

The mission of the ArmyGround Forces, as stated by War Department

Circular 59, 2 March 1942, was "to provide ground force units properly organ-ized, trained and equipped for combat operations." Organizationof units forcombat, often called "tactical organization," involved two interrelatedactivities.One was to divide men and materialsinto standard parts of known and cal-culable capabilities,such as "the" infantry division, "the" ordnance light main-tenancecompany,etc. The other was to combinetheseparts into largerwholes—task forces, corps, or armies—which werethe controlling agencies of large-scale combat.

Structureof the standard parts, from the division down,but including theheadquartersof corps and armies, was prescribed inTables of Organizationand Equipment. Known (1945) as "T/O&E's," these establishedthe type units,or standard patterns, according to which actual units were formed in suchnumbers and atsuch times as mobilizationpolicy might determine.

1 For eachunit the T/O&E prescribed the number of its officers and men, the grade andjob of each, the proportion of various militaryoccupational specialists,thearrangementof command and staff and administrativepersonnel, the meansof transportand communications,the provisionsfor supply, maintenance,con-

struction, and medical care, and the kind and quantity of individual andunitarmament, together with the relationship between supporting weapons andconsequentlythe normal tactics of theunit. These features of the unit in turndetermined the degree to which it wasdependent, for combat oradministration,on other unitsfor support.The provision of interlockingsupport throughasso-ciation of units of various types was a principalfunction of corps andarmies.

1 In 1942 organization and equipment were expressed in T/O's and T/BA's (Tables of Basic Allow-ance s). The T/E was substituted for theT/BA by AR310-60, as revised on 12 October 1942. The difference,briefly, was that a T/E was set up for each standardunit, whereas there had been asingle T/BA for eachcombat arm, covering all standard units of that arm. With the revision of AR 310-60, published on 28August 1943, a consolidated T/O&E was issued for each standard unit.

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T/O&E's prescribed the standard form of units wherever stationed,whether in the United States or overseas.It was desirable tohave a uniform or-

ganizationfor purposes ofplanningand procurementand to preserve a flexiblesituation in which units could be dispatched to any theater atwill. But the cir-cumstances in theseveral theaterswere widely different. It was notexpected thatthe organizationdevelopedin the Zone of Interiorwould exactly meet the needsof all theaters under all conditions of combat.Theater commanders,when au-thorizedby the War Department,were free to modify their tacticalorganization.Unit commanders inactual operations might rearrange theirmen and equip-ment or obtain additionalmen andequipmentif possible, accordingto their bestjudgment of the immediate situation.The problem for the Zone of Interiorwas to provide basic minimum units. The standard units prescribed byT/O&E's were designed to be basic in the sense of being adequate to a reason-able variety of conditions and of requiring as little readaptationas possible bycommanders charged with the actual fighting. The units were conceived asminimum in the sense of havingno more men andequipmentthan were neces-sary for normal operations,so that the largestpossiblenumberof units mightbeformed. Requirementsfor basic minimum units changed with the changingexperience of battle. The agencies charged with organization in the Zone of

Interior received reports of battle experience, comparedreportsfrom the severaltheaters, balanced therequests of theater commanders against availability ofmen and materials,and decided whether or not tomake changesin T/O&E'swhich wouldaffect the structure ofunits in all parts of the world.

Tactical organization,while designed for combat,was indispensableto thepreparatory effort as well. Tables of Organization and Equipment were thebasic guides to mobilization.T/O units were the blocks out of which the Armywas built. The total of all T/O units constitutedthe major portion of theTroopBasis.2 The internal character of each unit, as fixed by its tables, dictated thetotal number ofsimilar units required.The tabular strength and compositionofeach division,for example,determined thenumberof divisionsrequired to makeup a desired total ofcombat power. The internal limitations of thedivisionlikewise determined the amount of supporting field artillery, ordnance, etc.which had to bemobilizedconcurrently.The numberof unitsneeded to producethe required nondivisionalsupport depended in turn on theunit tables in eacharm andservice.

2 The use of theTroop Basis in mobilization is traced above in the study, "Ground Forces in the Army,December 1941-April 1945: a StatisticalStudy."

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REORGANIZATIONFOR COMBAT 267

Through the medium of the Troop Basis, Tables of Organization andEquipmentestablishedprocurementobjectivesfor personneland materiel.The

number of men required for the initial filling of units, the number of replace-ments requiredto keep units at tabularstrength, and thenumber needed for eacharm and service and for every military occupationalspecialty were ascertainedthrough consolidationand analysis of Tables of Organization.The listing of anitem of equipment in a unittableset up an automaticdemandon the appropriatesupply service. Multiplication by thenumber of units in theTroop Basis, withthe addition of factors for replacementand reserve,gave the requirementto beincorporatedin theArmy SupplyProgram.

Training also was determined by tactical organization. Basic individualtrainingcould begiven apart from tactical units, and was sogiven in replacementtraining centers. But the number of men to be sotrained dependedon theapplicationof loss ratios to the Tables of Organizationof tacticalunits. Purelytechnical training could likewise begiven apartfrom tactical units. Here againthe number to be trained depended largely onunit tables; the technician,moreover, unless intended for rear-area assignment,was not fully proficientuntilhe had beentrained underfield conditionsin a tacticalunit.As for studentsat the serviceschools—whetherofficers,officer candidates,or enlistedspecialists—

the content of their instruction and the number instructed,particularly in theArmy Ground Forces, reflected the requirements of T/Ounits.

Unit and combinedtraining and the establishment oftacticaldoctrinewerenaturally inseparablefrom tacticalorganization,since doctrine statedthe properemployment of personnel and equipment, and training was essentially theinculcation ofdoctrine. It was a principle of the training program for units totrain in the UnitedStates with the same organization, personnel, and equipmentas they would have in combat. Actually, because of great turnover, recurrent

shortages of personnel, and reduction of allowances of equipment, units intraining were not exactly like units in combat. Nevertheless,the commanderof an infantrybattalion,for example, learnedto handlehis three rifle companies,to use thesupporting fires of his antitank guns and heavyweapons company,tocall for assistance from the additional weapons available in regiment anddivision, to carry on his administrativebusiness with the personnelmade avail-able to him, and to draw uponagencies outside the battalion when necessary.At the same time, all personnel,from army commandersto members of anti-tank platoons and rifle squads, learned the part prescribed for them in theorganizationalscheme.

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Stability was desirable in Tables of Organization and Equipment, sinceto change them meant changes in methods ofcombat,tacticaldoctrine, training,

mobilization objectives,procurementand assignment ofmanpower, and pro-curement and issue of equipment. Yet changes were frequently necessary.Organizationhad to bekept abreast of combat experience.Adoption of a newweapon, substitutionof one weapon for another, transfer of weaponsfrom oneechelon to another, and modifications in tactical employment, as when anincrease of infantry inproportion to tanks was demanded, likewisemade neces-sary the readjustment of tables. Tables of different types of units were inter-locking, sinceunits were planned to supply each other's needs; hence changeinone might send reverberationsthrough several others. In addition, every tablerepresented a compromise between conflicting desiderata, such as economy,self-sufficiency, fire power, mobility, and ease of supply. In every table some-thing was sacrificed; hence there was a constant tendency to amendment.T/O&E's were inherently unstable. Theywere subject to a continuingprocessof review andrevision.

Role of the Army Ground Forces

In March 1942 the Army Ground Forces took over from the Chiefs ofInfantry, Cavalry,Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery (including antiaircraft),whose offices were suspended,the task of preparing Tables of Organizationforunits of these arms.3 The War Departmentassigned this function to the Require-mentsSection of the AGFheadquartersstaff. For armored units the Chief of theArmored Force, who survived the changes of March 1942 with functionsunchanged, remained responsible for organization. Since the Armored Force,formerly independent, now became a component of the Army Ground Forces,the commanding general of the Army Ground Forces obtained authority overarmored organization and equipment; but this authority was not explicitlyassigned by the War Department in Circular 59 and was atfirst less direct thanin the case of the older arms. For units of theservice branches assignedto theArmy Ground Forces—engineer, signal, ordnance, quartermaster, medical,chemical, and military police—responsibility for Tables of Organization andEquipmentwas divided in March 1942 between the Army Ground Forces andthe Servicesof Supply. InOctober 1942 these powers with respect to serviceunits

3 (1) Cir 59, WD, 2 Mar 43. (2) WD ltr SPXPC320.2 (3-13-42) to CGsAGF, AAF, SOS, 31 Mar 42,sub: PoliciesGoverningT/O&E's. 320.3/123.

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REORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT 269

of types assigned to the Ground Forces were concentratedin the commandinggeneral of theArmy Ground Forces. 4 With this change, andwith the elimination

of the Chief of the Armored Force in 1943 and the assimilationof armor to thestatusof the olderarms, the headquarters of the ArmyGround Forces obtained auniform degree of control over the organization and equipment of all unitsdesignated asGround Forces.The RequirementsSection,Headquarters,ArmyGround Forces, became the agencyresponsiblefor reviewing about 400Tablesof Organization and Equipment, assisted in practice byother sections of AGFheadquarters, theschools of the arms, the Armored, Tank Destroyer, andAirborne Centers, the Antiaircraft Command, and the relevant branches ofthe Arm y ServiceForces. 5

Before March 1942 the War Department GeneralStaff had beenresponsiblefor coordinatingand harmonizingthe tablespreparedby the chiefs of thevariousarms and services,and fordevelopingthe organizationof units of the combinedarms—armies,corps, and divisions.These tasks were decentralizedin 1942 bydelegation to the Army Ground Forces, which, however, could noteffectivelyplan the organization of armies, corps, and divisions until, in October 1942,control was obtained over the organization of service units within these com-mands. In general, the work of the Army Ground Forces in tacticalorganiza-

tion representedan integration of certainfunctionsof the oldbranch chiefs and adevolutionof certain functions of the WarDepartment GeneralStaff.

The Army Ground Forces never had final authority over organization.Approval of the WarDepartment GeneralStaff continued to be required forall T/O&E's before publication by The AdjutantGeneral, and for policies oforganizing T/O units into armies and corps.Final authoritycould hard ly reposeelsewhere than in the War Department itself, since organization profoundlyaffected all stages of the militaryeffort from procurementto combat.The Army

Ground Forces developed,prepared, planned, reviewed,and recommended. Inpractice, withexceptions to be seen below, the recommendations of theArmyGround Forces were almost automaticallyaccepted by the War Department.This was because the Army Ground Forceshad the skilledpersonnelfamiliarwith the details oforganization—apersonneloriginating in 1942 in the physicaltransfer of individuals from the offices of the chiefs andfrom the War Depart-

4 See below, pp. 288-89.5 (1) AGF memo for G-4 WD, 1 Dec 43, sub: T/E's. 320.3/674. (2) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD,

24 Jan 44, sub: Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for Processing TO&BA's. 320.3/103 (S). The Organi-

zation Division, RequirementsSection, was headed by Col. Leonard H. Frasier, GSC.

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ment General Staff—and because AGF personnel, before recommendingchangesin tables,made the necessary study of repercussions on theTroop Basis,the supplyprogram,and thecombatvalueof units.

The activitiesof the Army Ground Forces with respect to tacticalorganiza-tion can bedividedfor convenienceinto four successiveperiods.

The first lasted from March to about October 1942. It was characterized bythe incompletenessof authority exercised by thecommandinggeneral of theArmy Ground Forces, by piecemealmodification of thetables of certain units,chiefly in the direction of reduction of motor vehicles, and by an increasingrealizationof theneed for economy.

The secondperiod, extendingroughly from October 1942 to October 1943,was a year of assiduousand systematic activityin which the ArmyGround Forcesreviewed theorganizationof armies, corps,divisions, and nondivisionalunits,clarified the mission and functions of each, and strove to obtain an economicalorganization, to the end that available men and equipmentmight be shapedinto the largest possible number of units, and that each unit, after being labor-iously shipped overseas, might deliver a maximum of combat power. In thisperiod the headquarters of the Arm yGround Forcesassumeda strong leadershipin matters oforganization. It was during the secondperiod thatthe shape and

structure offorces used in World War II were to a large extent determined.In the third period, extendingfrom the end of1943 into 1945, the organiza-

tional changesof the secondperiod were put increasinglyto the test of combat,chiefly in Europe. Initiative in matters of tactical organizationpassed from theArmy Ground Forces to thetheater commanders. The role of the ArmyGroundForcesconsistedlargely in analyzing,comparing, evaluating,and recommendingaction upon theater requests for increases or modifications in allowances ofpersonnel andequipment.

The fourth period saw organizationalchanges incident to redeploymentfor a war concentrated in the Pacific. The changes proposed in this period,reflecting the experience acquired in thethird, are described in the study in thisvolumeentitled "Reorganizing for Redeployment."

In the first two periods the great bulk of ground combat forces remainedin the United States awaiting commitment to battle. The combat experienceof Americanforces was limited in scope, and confined to the specialconditionsof island, desert,and mountainwarfare.Planningof tacticalorganizationcouldbe based only in small part on recent experience ofUnited States forces. It

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therefore had to bedetermined largely from an analysis offoreign experience,intimate understandingof the United States Army, and interpretationof themore fundamentalprinciples of militaryart.

Guiding Ideas of General McNair

In these circumstancesit was of the utmostimportancethat in the formativeperiod the Army Ground Forces was commanded by Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair,who was by experience andinclination an expert in tactical organization,certainly one of the foremost experts in theArmy. He personally directed hisstaff on this subject, and the organization with which Americanground forces

entered combat inWorld War II was to alarge extent theproduct of his mind.General McNair's understanding of tactical organization, while drawnfrom many previous experiences and from study and recollection of WorldWar I, was especiallystrengthened in the field exercisesof 1937 and 1939, inwhich War Department plans for tactical reorganization were tested. Fromthese exercises hadcome the triangular infantry division used by the UnitedStates in World War II. General McNair had beenchief of staff of the divisionwhich had conducted the tests. These were perhaps the most searching andthorough tests evermadeof so largea unit in theUnited Statesduringpeacetime.They were planned to be asrealisticas conditionsof peace and the lack offundsand of sufficientmodern equipmentpermitted. GeneralMcNairhad determinedhow thegeneral questions set by the WarDepartmentshould be broken downinto specific problems for testing, how personnel, armament, and equipmentshould be apportioned for each problem, and how the problems should beumpired and the resultsappraised. Beginning with the fundamental study ofthe infantry rifle squad,an entire divisionalorganizationwas put together pieceby piece.Matterson which alternativeideas were tested included the following:

frontages and fire power per man and per unit; ammunition allowances;transportation capacities;motor columns; the requirement for artillery in pro-portion to infantry, with consideration ofcalibers, ranges, trajectories, andcapacities forconcentration;the echeloning of automaticrifles, machine guns,and mortars in the infantry regiment, battalion, company,and platoon; the per-sonnel, time, and equipment needed for maintenanceof weapons and vehicles;the time elapsed in transmissionof orders from division headquartersto front-line units; the time elapsed in hauling ammunition and supplies to front-line

units from the railhead; and the amount of service support to beincorporated

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in the division and the degree to which the division, in the interests of its ownmobility and striking power, should depend on corps andarmy for supportingservices and reinforcing weapons.Findings on these and other questions, inthe form of concrete dataand statistics,were embodied in an extensive reportdrafted by General McNair. 6 By no means all the recommendations in thisreport were adopted. The War Department, while reducing the old squaredivision of 22,000 men to a triangular division totaling about 15,000, did notreduce to the strength of 10,275 recommendedin the report. (See Table No. 1 .)

General McNair carried over into his command of the Army GroundForces not only the mass of knowledge acquired in the tests of 1937 and 1939but also a rigorous sense ofwhat was meant by fact as distinguished from theoryor speculation, a tendency todeflate claims not based on full attention to de-tail, and a grasp of principles of organization developed bylong reflection onthe subject and by having seen the application of these principles in the field.He was peculiarly qualified to assimilate into a balanced judgment the frag-mentary combat experience of American forces in 1942 and 1943, the experi-ence of foreign armies so far as it wasknown, and the views of specialistsunderhis own command. He attempted to keep inproper perspective the views ofthe specialist and of the man on thespot, believingboth too much inclined to

forget the larger team. Specialists, particularly in thenewer fields such as avia-tion, armor, psychologicalwarfare, psychiatry,morale-building, and the moreelaborate forms of military intelligence, easily exaggerated the importance oftheir own contributionand were frequently impatientof criticism from outsidetheir own circles. The evaluation and control of a multitudeof specialtiescon-stituted one of the most difficult and important problems of World War II.The man on thespot, locallyresponsible for aparticularmission, likewisetendedto resist control, strive for self-sufficiency,and assure thesuccess of his missionby gathering under his own command as large a proportion of the manpowerand resources of theUnited States as possible.The theater commandersrepre-sented this tendency on the largestscale. With so many theaters it wasimpos-sible to give any one theater commander the freedom given to General Pershingin World War I. The evaluation and control of theater demands was thereforeanother major problem of World War II. GeneralMcNair always insisted thatthe only final test of military organization, as of training and equipment, wascombat. One of his first steps was to request the War Department to obtain

6 "Report of the Field Service Test of the Proposed Infantry Division," with appendices A-F, 21 Mar 38.

Army War College Records,McNairPapers.

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These ideaswere widely accepted.They were applications of thetraditionalprinciple ofeconomy of force. Some of them, such as theemphasis on mobile

warfare,the streamliningof the division,and the use ofpools,had been acceptedas basic by the War Departmentsince 1935. 9 No one advocatedwaste, unwieldi-ness, or dispersion. Disagreement arose in thejudgment of concrete cases.Characteristic ofGeneralMcNairwas theclose attention hegave to the concreteand the strictness withwhich he defined, interpreted,and applied the principleswhich no one questioned in theory. In practice therewere many obstacles tosuccessful achievementof an economy of force. There was the disposition ofevery unit to demand additional men andequipment. There was the habit of"empire building," the tendency of an arm, service, or specialty to multiplyits functions as if in an effort to win the war alone. There was a tendency,deeply rooted in American life, to encumber the military establishmentwithcomforts an d conveniences,machines and inventions, technicians andexperts,specialized services,and complex agenciesof control. Effects were cumulative;an increasein the numberof dentists,for example,involvedan increaseof dentaltechnicians; dentistsand technicians had to befed; dentists, technicians, andcooks had to be transported;dentists,technicians,cooks, and drivers requiredmedical care; dentists, technicians,cooks, drivers, and doctors needed clothing;

hence quartermasters had to beadded; since allpersonnel requiredcoordination,headquarters staffs would have to be enlarged; in the end a demand for stillmore dentists developed.General McNair resolutely set himself against suchproliferation,which added nothing to the fighting strength of the Army.

Tactical Organization in March 1942

The accepted principles of organization were announced by the War De-

partment in a directiveof 31 March 1942.10

To guide the three major commandsin the drafting ofTables of Organization certain rules were laid down whichcame to becalled the "Ground Rules," setting ceilings on overhead personnel

9 (1) WD ltr AG 320.2 (11-4-35) Misc F-M, 5 Nov 35, sub: Reorgn of the Div and Higher Units.

(2) Army War College, Rpt of Sp Committee,2-1936-12, Vol I, 21 Dec 35, sub asabove. (3) WD staffstudy, 30 Jul 36, sub: Initial Rpt of the Orgn Committee on Modernizationof the Army with Sp Ref to theInf Div. All in AWCRecords, 52-72 .

10 WD ltr SPXPC 320.2 (3-13-42) to CGs AAF, AGF, SOS, 31 Mar 42, sub: Policies GoverningT/O&BA's. 320.3/123. Reissued memo W 310-9-43, WD, 22 Mar 43, sub asabove, and memo W 310-44,WD, 26 Jan 44, sub asabove.

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such as cooks, orderlies, mechanics, and chaplains' assistants, andencouragingother economiessuch as the substitution of trailers for trucks. Everything de-

pended on thedefinitionand enforcement ofthese rulesby themajor commands.Large-unit organization in March 1942 embodied the outcome of the re-forming ideas of the 1930's and of the establishmentof the Armored Force inJuly 1940. The March directive enumerated six types of divisions: infantry,motorized, armored, airborne, mountain,and cavalry.

Infantry divisions werebarely emerging from a tumult of reorganization.The main features of the new plan—triangularstructure through eliminationof the brigade, adaptation to conditions of open warfare, and use of motortransportation only—had been discussed in the Army since theearly thirties.They had in fact been urged by General Pershingin 1920, tentatively endorsedby the War Department in1935, and tested in the field in 1937 and 1939. Notuntil 1940, however, after the collapse ofFrance, did these ideascrystallize inan approved Table of Organization.The Regular Army divisionswere thenphysically reorganized. Not until after Pearl Harbor did it prove feasible tobring the National Guarddivisionsinto conformity with the newsystem.Thepurely wartime divisions, whichbegan to be activated in March 1942, followedthe new pattern from the start.

The infantry division was stated by the War Department on 31March1942 to comprise approximately15,500 men, to be "a generalpurpose organiza-tion intended for open warfare in theaters permitting the use of motor trans-port," and tohave organicallyassigned to it aminimum of artilleryand auxiliaryelements, "on the assumptionthat the division is part of a larger force fromwhich it can obtain prompt combat and logisticalsupport." The division innormal employmentpresupposed corpstroops and army troops. It used motortransport only. It had riditself of the mixed horse andmotor transportwhichcomplicated theproblem of troop movement and supply and which still char-acterized the German infantry division. But it did not have transportation tomove all personnel and equipment simultaneously.

The motorized division was aninfantry division equipped to move all ofits elements simultaneously bymotor. It was designed for use in conjunctionwith armored divisions.No actual motorized divisionsexisted until April 1942,at which time the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Infantry Divisions were converted tomotorized divisions. The 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions were motorizedshortly thereafter. Motorized divisions were planned at this time in a ratio of

one motorized to two armored divisions.Their organic strengthwas over 16,000,

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and they were somewhat moreliberally providedwith auxiliary elementsthanthe infantry division,"on the assumptionthat the division may operate inde-

pendentlyfor limited periods."The armored division, introduced into the Army in September 1940, wasundergoing reorganizationunder the auspices of the Armored Force in March1942. In its new form it had a strength ofalmost 15,000and included 390tanks.Six armored divisions had been activated;there were expectations ofhavingalmost fifty. The armored division was strong in auxiliary elements, "on theassumption that the division may operate independentlyfor long periods."

Airborneand mountaindivisionsin March 1942 existedonly on paper.Theairborne division had noTable of Organization.It was viewed as a task forceto be formed for aparticular missionby assigningair transportationto elementsof a normal infantry division reinforced by parachutetroops. The mountaindivision, for which a T/O had beendeveloped,was stated to consist of threemountain regimentswith appropriatesupport, using pack transportation andnumbering about 15,000 men. Cavalry divisions, of which two were activein March 1942, preserved the oldsquare or brigadeformation but were smallin size, totallingabout 11,000 men. It was decided in May1942 to maintain thecavalry divisions ashorse units, extending mechanizationin the cavalry only to

the nondivisional regimentsand squadronsand to the cavalry componentsofinfantry and armored divisions.

It was thepolicyof the War Departmentto assignorganicallyto the divisiononly such forces as were neededfor normal operations.The concept of normaloperations variedfor the several types of divisions. It was thought that thearmored division might normally operate at a considerabledistance from themass of the forces, the motorizeddivision somewhatless so, the infantry divisionleast so. Hence what the armored or motorized division needed in the way of

organic elements of maintenance,supply, road repair, and other functions wasmore than whatthe infantry division needed, since the infantry division couldhabitually draw support from corps and army. But even the armored divisionwas in principle heldto a minimum.

The policy ofminimum organicassignmentto the division resulted in theaccumulation of alarge number of nondivisionalunits. The more the divisionwas streamlined,the more nondivisional supportwas required.The strength ofnondivisionalforces, solely of types required in the combat zone, was greaterthan the strength of all divisionscombined.By the end of1944 it was 1,541,667

as comparedwith 1,174,972for divisionsof all types.

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In March 1942, nondivisional unitswere grouped at three levels—corpstroops, army troops,and the GHQ reserve. Armyand corps eachhad a normalquota of units. As the division had an organic contentset forth in its Table ofOrganization,so the army and corps each had an organic content set forth inTroop Lists describing the "type" army and the "type" corps. As the T/O in-fantry division consisted organically of three infantry regimentsplus divisionunits of other arms and services,so the type corps consisted organicallyof threedivisionsplus specified corps troops,and the typearmy consistedorganicallyofthree corps plus specified army troops. Units not organic in division,corps, orarmy constituted the GHQ reserve. Such units,relatively few in number, wereavailable for attachment asneeded to armies,which in turn might attach themto corps or divisions.

The type army and type corpswere like the division in having an organicstructure.Their purpose, like that of the division, was to combine dissimilarelements into balanced wholes.Unlike the division they were used chiefly forplanning, to facilitate the mobilization and training of balanced forces. It wasunderstood that in actual operations armies and corps would consist of suchforces as might be assigned orattached in the immediate situation.

In addition to the normal corps there existed the cavalry corps, provided

for in the tacticaldoctrine of the Army butnever activatedin World War II,and the armored corps, introduced in 1940 and physically represented by theI and II Armored Corpsin March 1942. The armored corps was not a typeorganizationfor planning; it was thought of as a combat force to control theoperations of two ormore armored divisions,together with such supportingtroops asmight be providedfor specific missions. The idea of an armored army,put forward from time to time by the ArmoredForce,had never been approvedby the War Department.

Changes madeby the Army Ground Forces in tactical organization,fromMarch 1942 to the close of the formative period at the end of 1943, will beconsidered in the followingsections in some detail. Bydefinition,organizationimpliesmutual and simultaneousrelationships, and itdoes not lend itself readilyto verbal presentation.In whatevermanner the subject is arranged,parts of itbelonging together will be separatedby many pages. The basic facts in a massof complexities may be stated inadvance.

The organizationdevelopedby the Army Ground Forces represented theimpactof GeneralMcNair'smost firmly held convictionsupon principlesalready

basically accepted by the WarDepartment.The aim was toobtain flexibility

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and economy, whichwere essentially the same since flexibility meant freedomto use personnel and equipmentwhere they would producethe most effective

results. The trend may be described as away from the idea of the type forceand toward the idea of the task force. In other words, it was away from theorganic assignment ofresources to large commands according toready-madepatterns,and towardvariable orad hoc assignmentto commands tailor-madeforspecific missions.The tendency away from organic assignmentwas evident inthe disappearanceof the type army and the typecorps, in the dissolutionof bri-gades and nondivisional regiments,and in thereshapingof divisions andotherT/O units according to organicminima redefinedat lower levels.The tendencytoward tailor-madecommands, that is, task forces, was evident in the emphasisplaced on theidea that armies and corps should consist of whatevertroops werenecessary for the mission, thatthe division would normally enter combat rein-forced by attachment of nondivisional elementsaccording to circumstances,and that actual fighting would be carried on, not so much by the T/Oinfantryregiment, for example,as by a combatteam made up of the infantry regimentwith attached artillery, engineers, andother elements. Theemphasison attach-ment, the virtualdisappearanceof organic troopsfrom the corps and army, andthe confinementof organic troops of the division to a strictlydefined minimum

made necessary extensive pools of nondivisional units. These nondivisionalpools became in effect GHQ reserve troops; they functioned as army troopsor corps troops whenspecificallyallotted to an army or corps.Divisions likewisebecame in effect GHQ reserve, since they were no longer organic in corps butwere assigned as needed.The whole Army became,so to speak, a GHQreservepool from which task forces could be formed—whethercalled by this name,like the Task Force "A" which sailed for North Africa in October 1942, orcalledmore conventionally corpsor armies.

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and of administrative overhead in alltypes of units to save cargo space." 5 Inaddition, it was estimated in May 1942 that because of shortages of materials,

notably rubber, the expected use ofmotor vehicles in 1942 and 1943 would becut 20 to 33percent. 6

Until October 1942 the Army Ground Forces laboredunder handicaps inits efforts to economize.New Tables of Organization had been approved bythe War Department immediately before the reorganization of 9 March.7

These had enlarged the infantry division and added 219 motor vehicles byexpandinginfantry battalionheadquartersdetachmentsinto headquarterscom-panies and by adding a cannon company toeach infantry regiment. The tablesjust decided upon could not immediately bereconsidered.Attempts to reducemotor transporttherefore went forward without a corresponding review ofper-sonnel and equipment.

8 The Army Ground Forces lacked full control evenover the infantry division, sincethe Services of Supply shared responsibilityforservice elements in the division,with the chief of each technical service feelinga primary interestin units of his own branch. It was the naturalambition ofeach chief to supply everything requested of himwith unstinting hand. Tablesof Basic Allowances (T/BA's) were not closely coordinated with Tables ofOrganization. The Services of Supply, while it referred T/O's of AGF service

units to the ArmyGround Forces, for a time settled T/BA's of such unitswith-out consultation.9 Not until 1943 was the publicationof Tables of Organizationand Tables of Equipmentcombined in a single document.

Four days after the reorganization of the War Department the Servicesof Supply issued a directive authorizing automotivemaintenanceofficers on thestaffs of large AGF units—onefor each infantry division, two for each armoredand motorized division and for each corps, four for each army, and eleven forthe headquartersof the Army Ground Forces. 10 Several hundred officers were

thus required. General McNair immediately protested. Such measures,he said,"go far beyond any demonstrated necessities. They are establishinga military

5 Memo (S) of Col Winn, AGF for Col Parks,AGF, 11 Jun 42, sub: Bolero Conference, 11 Jun 42, AGFPlans Secfile, 20/30 (Bolero) (S).

6 WD memo (C) WDGS 451 (5-10-42) for CGs AAF, AGF, 12 May 42, sub: Reduction in Require-ments of Motor Vehicles.451/13 (C).

7 Published tables dated 1 Apr 42.8 AGF M/S (S), Rqts to G-4, G-3, CG, 27 Oct 42. 320.2/383 (S).9 M/R on cpy of AGF memo for CGSOS, 17 Jun 42, sub: T/O &T/BA's for units of SOS withAGF.

320.3/348.10

WD ltr SP 320.2(2-20-42) OP-A-M, 13 Mar 42,sub: Allotment ofOffs as Assts to G-4. 320.2/1914.

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and civilian overhead,and a mass of paper work andritual, which I know frompersonal experienceare unwarranted."11 General Marshall, in a personal reply,

explained that thedirective,prepared before the reorganization,had not origi-nated in theServices of Supply, but heinsisted that a solution for theproblemof motor maintenancemust be found.12 The incident illustrated two theories ofadministration.One way tohave new duties performed was to provide addi-tional personnel.General McNair's way, an outgrowth of his experience andpersonalhabits, was to assign the new duties, especiallynew supervisoryduties,to men already on the job. He believed that most people could work harderthan they did.

General McNair, who as Chief ofStaff of General Headquarters,U. S.Army, had had nodirect authority over organization,turned his attention to itimmediatelyon assumingcommand of theArmy GroundForces. He wrote toLt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General of the Servicesof Supply,as follows:13

The triangular division was initiated some five years ago with the primary purpose ofstreamlining theorganization and rendering it more effective in combat.Since the reorgani-zation there has been a steady succession of changes, all in the direction of returning to thecumbersome andimpracticableorganization of the old square division.It is felt mandatorythat every proposalwhich increases overheadmust be resisted if the division is to be effectivein combat.

The strength of the triangular division, as suggested by a War Departmentcommittee in 1936, had been 13,552; as recommendedin the report drafted byGeneralMcNair in 1938, 10,275; as adopted in 1940, 14,981; as amended in1941,15,245;and under the new 1942 tables, 15,514. 14

Success in trimming down the division,before October 1942, was confinedlargely to reduction in the infantry and artillery components, the armsoverwhich the Army Ground Forces hadcontrol;and, within these,to reductions ofmotor transport, since personnel andequipment other than vehicles were notconsidered.Truck transport was examined inmicroscopicdetail.

General McNair believed that the currenttables wereextravagant intheirprovision of transportation for motor maintenance, that is, of vehicleswith

11 Memo of Gen McNair forCofS USA, 17 Mar 42, sub: WD ltr SP 320.2 (2-20-42) OP-A-M-13Mar 42. 020/28. (Correct symbol for letter discussed in memo is SP 320.2 (2-2-42) OP-A-M-13 Mar 42.)

12 Personal memo of CofS USA for Gen McNair, 31 Mar 42, sub asabove. 320.2/1914.13 (1) Memo of Gen McNair for CG SOS, 29 May 42, sub: Coordinated Automotive Maint,451/666.

(2) Memo of Gen McNair for CG FF, 2 Feb 42,sub: FA Orgn, Triangular Div. GHQ Records,320.2/37

(FA)-F.14 See Table No. 1, pp. 474-75.

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accompanyingtools used for the repair and upkeep of other vehicles.He wroteto GeneralSomervellon 21April 1942: 15

We discussed this matter briefly the other day by telephone.As a result, you designatedone of your officers to investigate thepossibility of reducing the number of trucks devotedto motor maintenance. The particular case studied—the infantry regiment—was broughtto a much more rational basis, in my judgment, but I still feel that too much transportationis devoted to motor maintenance. The matter can be corrected only by something approachinga major operation. Everyone appreciates that operations now definitely in view call forthe maximum possible use of every available ship ton. Luxuries must go, and all echelonsof the military organizationmust be imbued with the idea of functioning effectively withreduced personnel and transportation. Especially is itapparent that each unit tends to seek

self-sufficiency, although this procedure multiplies overhead beyond all reason.When the present triangulardivision was under development, notmore than five years

ago, it was found, by over two million vehicle miles of field operations, that motor mainte-nance could be effected properly with a½-ton pick-up truck of parts and tools for each 64vehicles to bemaintained.The principaldifficulty in maintenance then, as now, was thatthe personnel concerned, principally motor officers and motor mechanics, did not workhard enough. There was complaint about tools andparts, some of it justified, but theprincipaldifficulty was as stated.

Admittedly themaintenancevehicles advocated by theQuartermasterCorps for propermotor maintenance areutilized fully. There are very complete tool equipments and sur-prisingly abundant stocks of parts. This superabundantequipment no doubt is the resultof insistent demands by the using arms, and the desire of the QM Corps to meet thosedemands. They amount substantiallyto providing on wheels something approaching themotor shop in garrison. Such a conception is unreal under the conditions we face. Partsare sufficiently available if carried in the division. The number needed in a company orsimilar unit is limited. Many tools are a great convenience, but few are indispensable.The best data that I know indicate a repair in about 700 vehicle miles during tacticaloperations,and in about 3,000 vehicle milesof road movement. Underthese conditions, thenumber of repairs to bemade is not too formidable. Preventivemaintenancecalls for hardwork, rather than elaborate equipment and transportation.

AGF and SOSofficers in conferencesettledupon 9 trucksand 3trailers for main-tenanceof the 260vehiclesin the infantry regiment. This equaled about 1 ton ofmaintenance per 13vehicles maintained, a ratio considered liberal by GeneralMcNair,contrastingas it didwith the ratioof ½ ton per 64 vehiclesestablishedinthe testsof 1937.

15

Memo of Gen McNair for CGSOS, 21 Apr 42, sub: Trans for Mtr Maint. 451/464.

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The transportation required for ammunition supply of the infantry regi-ment was scrutinizedwith the same minuteness.GeneralMcNair took the view,

familiar to railroadmen, that wheeledvehiclesshould bekept in circulation, notused for storage.He noted for the RequirementsSection of his staff:1 6

The transportation set-up in the new tables oforganization is excessive because pro-vision is made to carry with the regiment what apparently is intended to be an adequatesupply for one day ofactive combat.This procedureresults in a gross wasteof transportation.There can be no question thatprovisionmust be made for anabundant supply of ammuni-tion—even a super-abundant supply—since fire dominates the battlefield. However, thereserve ofammunition,or any other supply for that matter, is mainly in the hauling capacityof its motor transportation.

Hauling capacity was investigated thoroughly andpractically under a variety ofcondi-tions during the test of theProposed Infantry Division in 1937. Without going into details itmay be stated generally that the number of 2½-ton trucksrequired is one-twelfth of thetotal tonnage required. The basis of this rule is:

One-way hauling distanceof 30 miles to the army supplypoint.Period of hauling of 20 hours—thenight preceding the engagementand during the

engagement itself.Dumps near combat positions, from which the units are supplied byweapons carriers

or similarvehicles.The test referred to above, together with certain war experience,has afforded reasonably

reliable data as to the ammunition consumption of theseveral weapons in battle. Whileall weapons are not usedthroughout a battle it isimpossible to foresee which weapons willbe used; hence it is necessary to provide for all weapons alike, based on. the maximumconsumptionby every weapon. Again, it is impossible to predict theduration of an action.It may be for a fewhours only, or again it may be throughoutdaylight hours. In order tobe on the safe side, the ammunition supplyconsidered here will be ten times the maximumhourly consumption. Certainly therecan be noquestion th at sucha basis is superabundant—even extravagant.

Detailed computationsfollowed,showing thatabout a third of the ammunition

required in a day's combatby a battalioncould be carried as the normal loadofbattalion vehicles,and that the remaining two-thirds could be hauled fromsupply points immediately before and during battle by battalion vehicles andregimental service trucks. GeneralMcNair estimated that twenty-five truckscould besaved from the currentallotment to the infantry regiment.

Savings accomplished in April and May 1942 consisted mainly in replace-ment of ¾-ton trucks in the infantry by ¼-ton trucks ("jeeps") and ¼-tontrailers, on the basis of one jeep and trailer foreach ¾-ton truck replaced;

16 AGF M/S, CG to Rqts, — Apr 42. AGF Orgn Div, Rqts Sec files.

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and in drastic reductionof 2½-ton trucks and1-ton trailers in the artillery,withonly partial replacement by trucks and trailers of lighter types.17 Roughly a

quarter of the 2½-ton trucks were removedfrom field artillery units, divisionaland nondivisional.The infantry reductions saved about 6,500 pounds of rubberand 15,360cubic feet of ship space for each regiment. 18 But the savingwas offsetby the recent enlargement of battalion headquarters units and addition ofcannon companies to the infantry regiments.With all the effort to economize,little netprogresshad been made.19

Crucial Decisions: September-October 1942

In the later months of 1942 decisionswere made which vitally affected thesubsequentcourse of the war andbrought into view more clearly than ever theneed for economy in theGround Forces.In part becauseof the shortageof cargospace,plans for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe werepostponedin the sum-mer of 1942. Air and ServiceForces,greatlyexpanded,filled mostof the outgoingship space in the following year. Such restricted ground combat operations aswere launched in 1942 emphasized thevalue of compactness in Ground Forceorganization. Task Force "A," dispatched from the United States to North

Africa in October, was obliged to leave some of its heavy equipment behind.Action initiated in the SouthwestPacific put an unprecedentedstrain on ship-ping facilities in proportion to the number ofcombat troops maintainedin thetheater. No division left the American continentduring the five months begin-ning with November 1942. Only seven divisions left during the ten monthsbeginning withNovember 1942. No infantry or armored division formed afterPearl Harbor left the United States until December1943—two yearsafter thedeclarationof war.

On 28September 1942 GeneralMarshall againraised with GeneralMcNairthe question of economizing motor vehicles as ameansof conserving rubberandship space.20 "I have felt for a year or more," he wrote, "that our figures as to

17 Sec published T/O's of 1 Apr 42 with changes.18 Incl 1 to AGF memo (S) for DCofSUSA, 10 May 42, sub: Substitution of Trailers for Trucks in

T/BA's. 400.34/9 (S).19 (1) AGF M/S (C), CG to G-4, 29 Sep 42. 451/66 (C). (2) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for OPD,

9 Jun 42,sub: Reduction of Trans and Substitution of Light for Heavy Vehiclesin Bolero.451/28 (S).20 Memo (C) WDCSA 451(9-28-42) of CofS USA for Gen McNair, 28 Sep 42, sub not given.

451/66 (C).

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divisionaltransportation wereextravagant, thatthey representedwhat a divisioncommanderasked for rather than meeting the problem on the basis of over-all

requirements.I might say right here that if we gave each theater commanderwhat he asks for we would have only one theater and all the rest would haveto be evacuatedfor lack ofmeans."On 2 October the War Departmentdirectedthe three major commandsto review their Tablesof Organization,eliminatingunnecessaryvehicles andexcess noncombatant personnel.A cut of 20percent inmotorvehicles and of 15 percent in personnel wasindicatedas agoal. 21

Replying to General Marshallon 8 October, General McNairnoted theunfairness of levying a flat percentagereduction,since some unitshad alreadybeen cut. Broadeningthe issue of motor transportinto the larger issue of tacticalorganization, he wrote asfollows:22

The present regrettableexcess of motor transportation is due to chiefs of arms an dservices seeking heavily and thinking narrowly, tofield commanders who seek to maketheir units too self-contained,and to an over-indulgent WarDepartment. It is futile now toexhort the same agencies asbrought about the existing condition. It is believedthat theremedy is one or agroupof no-menempoweredto:

a. Review organization and eliminate those elements—particularly headquartersand auxiliary and serviceunits—whichdo not pay their way definitely in combat effec-tiveness.One example: there are too manyechelons of reconnaissance.

b. Cut the transportation of a given organization to aminimum by prescribingthe most economical type of vehicle, substitutingtrailers formotor vehicles, and elimi-nating vehicles which are not essential. One example: numerous army units need no tmove simultaneously,but can move byechelon.Such a person or group will cause loud complaints from the field, and conceivably

can go too far in itsefforts to economize in transportation. Nevertheless,drastic counter-measures arenecessary to correctpresentconditions, and the W arDepartment mustempowersuch an agency to go into allkinds of units, and back up itsfindings.

A reply from G-3, WDGS, to this recommendationrevealed that the mainhope of economy in the Army was the Army Ground Forces :23

Since the reorganization of the War Department, the G-3 Division has not had anorganization section adequate in either numbers or experience togive Tables of Organiza-

21 WD ltr (S) AG 400(9-30-42) OB-S-C to CGs AGF, AAF, SOS, 2 Oct 42, sub: Review of Orgnand Equip Reqmts.320.2/383 (S) .

22 Memo (C) of Gen McNair forCofS USA, 8 Oct 42, sub: Excessive Number of Mtr Vehicles.451/66 (C).

23

WD memo (S) WDGCT (10-8-42) for CG AGF, 30 Oct 42, sub asabove. 451/66 (C) .

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tion the careful and detailed analysis necessary for the judicious elimination of unnecessaryequipment and individuals.

As a result, its efforts in this direction are of necessity confined to general directives

exhorting the major commands to review their Tables of Organization. . . . This generalapproach is admittedly inadequate.The three major commands,and in particularthe ArmyGround Forces, must be depended upon to furnish the group of "No-Men" empowered toruthlessly and, if necessary, arbitrarilyeliminatenonessentialelements and equipment. G-3will stand squarely behind yourefforts to this end.

Existing Tables of Organization were apparently designedwith little appreciation ofthe fact that every soldierand piece of equipment mustbe moved by ship to a combat zone.

In brief, General McNair's request for a strong central agency was deemedimpossible to fulfill at this time; he must be his own"No-Man."

The War Department strengthened General McNair's hand by grantinghim full authority over service units in the Army Ground Forces. 24 All serviceunits (other thanthose pertainingexclusivelyto the Air Forces) were dividedbetween the Army Ground Forcesand the Services of Supply for activationand training and for determinationof organization and equipment.

25 Thoseintended for the combat zonewere assigned to theArmy Ground Forces."Thiswill permit you to control motor equipment," wrote General Marshall. 26 "Onthis basis," observedGeneral McNair to his staff, "we arebeing handed the job

of placing the organic transportationof the Arm y on arationalbasis, which it isnot at present." 27

A Reduction Board was established on 7 November 1942 at AGF head-quarters, composed of oneofficer each from the Requirements,G-3, and G-4sections of the staff.28 Its mission was to reduce Tables of Organizationof AGFunits as desiredby the WarDepartment.

The need of streamlining Tables of Organization was driven home by otherpolicies adopted by the WarDepartmentin Septemberand October1942. With

the postponement of plans for an early ground invasion of Europe it wasdecidedto build up the air offensive at once. Plans were laid to place an airforce of1 million menoverseas by the end of1943. The number of ground troops to be

24 (1) Memo of Gen Paul for CofS AGF, 18 Sep 42.337/29. (2) AR 310-60, 12 Oct 42.25 AGF memo (with attached papers) for CGSOS, 24 Oct 42,sub: T/O&E's for SOS Units. 320.3/507.26 Memo (S) of Gen Marshall for Gen McNair, 21 Oct 42, sub: Reduction in Transportation.

320.2/383 (S).27 AGF M/S (S), CG to G-4, Rqts, 23 Oct 42. 320.2/383 (S).28 The Board was composed of Col. J. L. Whitelaw, Lt. Col. W. J. Eyerly, Lt. Col. A. D. MacLean.It was

dissolved 23 June 1943. See 334/3 (R).

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shipped in this period depended on the availability of remaining shipping. 29

It became necessaryalso to reduce the procurementprogram for 1943, which in

its originalform exceededthe estimated productivecapacityof theUnited States.In view of the strategic decision to postpone theemploymentof ground troops,the planned procurementof AGF equipmentfor 1943 was cut 21percent.30 Pro-curementof heavy artillery, tanks, mortars,and antiaircraft and antitank gunswas revised downward. On 25October 1942, in connection withmobilizationplans for the coming year, the War Department notified the Army GroundForces that

31

shipping considerations may dictate aconsiderable change in our strategic concept with a

consequent change in the basic structure of ourArmy. Since from the shipping capabilitiesindicated above, it appears that early employment of amass Army, which must be trans-ported by water, is not practicable, it follows that the trend must be toward light, easilytransportableunits. . . . Recent indicationsare that a further expansion of the Air Forcesmay be expected whichnot only will reduce the number of men available for thegroundforces but will complicate, if notcurtail, the procurement ofheavy equipmentfor other thanthe Air Forces.

Fourteen divisions weredropped from the mobilization program for 1943. Only100 divisionswere now projected for1943. Hopes of adding more in 1944 never

materialized.With the number of units inprospect diminishing,it was clearthat each unit must carry a maximumof effective force.

29 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (10-25-42) for CGs of AGF, SOS, 25 Oct 42, sub: Troop Basis1943. 320.2/5 (TB 43) (S). (2) AGF M/S (S), DCofS to staff sections, 26 Oct 42. AGFPlans Sec file 185(TB 42) (S) .

30 (1) Annex A to memo (S) JCS 134/3, 26 Nov 42,sub: Rpt of Joint Staff Planners. 040/8 (JointChiefs) (S). (2) Sec also "Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: a Statistical Study,""Mobilization of the Ground Army," and "Organization and Training of New Ground Combat Elements,"in this volume.

31 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (10-25-42) for CGs AGF, SOS, 25 Oct 42, sub: TB 1943.

320.2/5 (TB 43) (S).

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III. The Period of EconomyOctober 1942-October 1943

Although the strength of American armedforces in World War II reachedapproximately 12,350,000,the strength of combat units of the Army GroundForces, includingcombat engineer andsignal troops, never exceeded 2,300,000,and the strength of all ground units intended for the combatzones, includingclose-supportservices,never exceeded2,700,000.1

There were conceivably two ways in which the headquarters of the ArmyGround Forces mighthave sought to increase the combatstrength of thegroundarmy. One would have been to protest against ceilings set by the WarDepart-ment, to demand with insistence that men and materials be furnished moreliberally. General McNair, while he repeatedlyrecommended increasedauthori-zations for combatantground troops, was not one totake issue indefinitelywiththe decisionsof higher authority.In anycase more men or materialswould havebeen difficult to obtain, so enormous werethe calls of the AirForces, the Service

Forces, and the Navy upon the national stock of manpower and productivefacilities, to which must be added the requirementsof foreign powersfor equip-ment produced in theUnited States.Until 1944, the requirements of theGroundForces did not enjoy a high relativepriority.

The other way was to organize men and materials, in thequantityprovided,in such amanneras to producea maximumof fightingpower.It was the methodof economy, entirely congenialto General McNair. Economy, properly under-stood, does not mean getting along with the least possible butgetting the most

out of what one has—not a minimizingof effort, but a maximizingof results.General McNairhoped, by reducing the size ofunits, to make it possible tomobilize and ship a large number of units. He hoped also, by pooling and byflexible organization, to make every unit available for maximum employmentat all times.

The need of drastic economy was notusually clearto theatercommanders,1 See "Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945 : a Statistical Study," and "Mobilization

of the Ground Army," in this volume.As noted in the latter, the figure 2,700,000 does not include all themen trained fo r ground combat.In World War I, according to the Report of the Superior Boardon Organiza-tion and Tactics, AEF, 1 July 1919, 3,000,000 U. S.troops were scheduled to be in Franceearly in 1919, ofwhich 640,000were to be SOS troops,leaving 2,360,000combat-zonetroops.

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who could notfully understand that thebottom of the barrel was in sight, atleast for practical purposes,as far as combatantground troopswere concerned.Nor was General McNair'ssense of urgency in the matter always fully sharedby his subordinatecommanders in the field or by officers of the War Depart-ment General Staff. By the close of1942 it was evident toGeneralMcNair thatevery man, weapon,and ship-ton madeavailable to the Ground Forces must beused to the utmost, at whateverstrain to individualsconcerned, andthat economyof ground forces was vital to winning the war, insofar as large ground operationsby American troops might be essential to victory. How far this might be wasnot clear in advance even toofficers of the Army Ground Forces,but it was thebusiness of the Army Ground Forces to assume that large-scale ground combatwould develop.

The twin aspects of economy were streamlining andpooling. They werephases of the same organizationalprocess. To streamline a unit meant to limitit organically to what it needed always, placingin pools what it needed onlyoccasionally.A pool, in the sense here meant, was a mass of units of similartype kept under controlof a higher headquarters for the reinforcement orservicingof lower commands,but not assigned tolower commandspermanentlyand organically. Pooling occurred at all levels, from the GHQ reserve pools

which reinforced armies down through army pools, corps pools, anddivisionpools to the companypool,which, in theinfantry,providedmortars andmachineguns to reinforce rifle platoons. Like streamlining,pooling was a means ofdealingwith the overwhelmingvariety and specialization ofequipment.It wasalso a corrective to standardization, providingflexibility to an army made upof standard parts. When reinforced from pools, a standardunit with a fixedTable of Organization could be shaped into the task force required in aparticular situation.

One reason for pooling,as for streamlining,was wide fluctuation in require-ments from day to day. No unit was organicallyequipped to meet peak loads.Any unit which habitually carriedenough bridging equipmentto cross the mostbroken terrain, or enough truck transport to meet rare demands forstrategicmovement, orenough medical and ordnance personnel todeal with the humanand mechanicalcasualtiessuffered on days of intensive combat, wouldnot onlybe wasteful of the nationalresources but so loadeddown with usually unwantedappurtenancesas to be disqualified to perform itsnormal role. Such a unit

was streamlinedby removal ofbridging equipment,trucks, doctors,and repair

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men not needed normally; and those needed to meet peak loads wereconcentrated in pools.

Another basis for pooling was difference in the potential frontage ofweapons,with the consequentpossibilityof massingfires. For example,60-mm.mortars couldcover more frontage than any single rifle platoon, and were there-fore pooled in a weapons platoon of the rifle company, by which their firescould be shifted, distributed,or concentratedfrom the front of one rifle platoonto another. Similarly81-mm.mortars and heavy machine guns were pooled inthe battalion, antitankguns in the regiment, field artillery in division artillery.The longest-rangeartillery, whichcould cover more frontage than was normalfor a division and hence beconcentrated from various directions to support adivision making a major effort, was organized in nondivisional unitsundercorpsor armycontrol.

Differences in mobility producedthe same effect. A mechanized cavalrysquadron performing distant reconnaissance,which could cover a wider frontthan that of an infantrydivision, would be too restrictivelyemployedif controlledby a division commander, and was therefore assigned to corps. Tanks, tankdestroyers,and mobile antiaircraft artillery were capableof rapid concentrationat any point along a widefront. They also lent themselves to employment in

mass attack. General McNair therefore opposed assigning themorganicallyto divisions. The extremeapplication of the same principle was in aviation,which, as the most mobileof all weapons, with a potential "frontage" extendingfar in all directions,was notcommandedorganicallyby even the highestgroundcommanders.

Units whose mobility differed on the side of slowness likewiserequiredseparateorganization. Supply depotswith supplies laidout, evacuationhospitalsfilled with patients,heavy maintenancecompaniessurroundedby disassembled

equipment,were temporarily immobile,though operating close to combattroopsor even located within division areas.They were organized nondivisionallysothat the division, if opportunity presented itself, could move forward freelywithout them. In this case higher headquarters, drawingon its pools, sentforward withthe advancing divisionnew depots,new hospitals,and new main-tenance units temporarilyin a mobile condition, leaving the old ones to clearthemselvesat leisure of the stockpiles,wounded men, and repair work whichtemporarily held them back.

To summarize,diversity in time and space—variationsof daily need and

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differences in range and mobility—underlay thedecision in each case as towhere an item should be organically assigned. A unit wasstreamlinedwhen ithad no elements (personnel,weapons,or vehicles) not needed continually,noelements notprimarilyuseful against itsnormal objective, no elements so slow-moving as to impair its mobility, or so fast-moving as to be frequently usableelsewhere.Pools existed to make these disparate elementsavailable when andwhere they could most profitably be employed.The advantagesof streamliningand pooling were economy, mobility, flexibility, and the capacity for massedemployment. The disadvantage was in the dependency of commanders ofstreamlined units, who were obliged to call for support, in all but the mostcommonplacesituations,on highercommanderswho mightnot alwaysbe able toprovide it. Another disadvantagewas that units only temporarilyassociatedfound it difficult to developinto smoothly functioning teams. There was there-fore much disagreementon many particularsof organization;nor was itpossible,with difficulties so fundamental, to find a permanentsolution which all wouldaccept.General McNair judged , in thecircumstancesof 1942 and 1943, that theneed of economyand flexibilitywas paramount.

While pooling occurred at all levels, it was especially significantin theseparation of nondivisional unitsfrom divisions, since the division was the

primaryunit of large-scalecombat.In 1920 GeneralPershinghad recommendedextensive pooling under corps andarmy to streamline the division.2 To obtaina division suited for open warfare, the War Departmentin 1936 laid down theprinciple that mechanizedforces, motor transport, bands, reserves of suppliesand ammunition, replacements,reinforcing artillery, engineers, and medicaland quartermaster personnel should be pooled. 3 General McNair, and theReduction Boardworkingunder his supervision, stood directly inthis tradition.

Pooling: the Critical Cases—Tank, Tank Destroyer,and Antiaircraft Artillery

Over pooling in principlethere was little or nodisagreement. Differences ofopinion aroseover particular cases. The most controversial ofthese concernedtanks,tank destroyers, andantiaircraftartillery.

2 1st ind, Gen J. J. Pershing to TAG, 16 Jun 20,sub: Rpt of theSuperior Bd on Orgn and Tactics, AEF.AW C Library, UA 10 U3 1919.

3 WD staff study, 30 Jul 36,sub: Initial Rpt of the Orgn Committeeon Modernizationof the Orgn ofthe Army. AWC Records, 52-72.

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These highly mobile weapons werephysicallycapable of assembly in largemasses for asingleassault, or of dispersion inclose supportof many smallopera-

tions. It was desirableto developa commandorganizationcapable of using suchphysicalmobility to advantage,capable,that is, of alternatelygatheringtogetheror spreading apartlarge quantities of tanks, tank destroyers, and antiaircraftartillery. Not only mobility butalso the specialized character of these weaponscalled for a flexible organization.Tanks were of limited value in certain typesof terrain, indispensablein others.Antiaircraft guns wereuseful where enemyaviation was strong, less necessary where friendly aviation was superior.It was desirable to have a command organization that could concentrate

weapons inplaces

or situationswheretheir characteristics

could be mostfully

exploited.These weapons were therefore not assignedorganically to divisions, with

the major exception that the armored division of course had tanks, and theminor exceptionthat the airbornedivisionpossesseda smallantiaircraftbattalion.The infantry division had organically no tank battalion,no tank destroyerbattalion, and no antiaircraft battalion.The armored divisionhad organicallyno tank destroyer or antiaircraft battalion. Both had antitank and antiair

weapons oflighter types. But alltank destroyers, allantiaircraft guns except thesimple .50-caliber machinegun, and all tanks not in armoreddivisions ormechanized cavalry werepooled in nondivisional battalions.These battalionswere designedfor attachmentto divisionsas needed.

Demand for the organic inclusion of tanks in theinfantry division hardlyarose until 1944. Pooling of mechanizedforces was a collateral doctrine in thedevelopmentof the triangulardivision in the1930's; after the German victoriesin 1939 and 1940, and the formation of armoreddivisions and of the Armored

Force in the United States in 1940, the idea of thetank as an auxiliary to infantryreceived a further setback. It wasplanned to attach tank battalions to infantrydivisions when needed. Fewer tank battalions wereformed for this purposethan were desired by the Army Ground Forces. But it was felt generally thatinfantry would not need tanks and that tanks should beheld apart for massedarmored action wherepossible. Use of tanks against enemy tanks was notfavored.Against small-scaleuse of tanks by the enemy, all troops had organicantitank weapons. Againstenemy tanks assembledin large numbers,the inten-

tion in 1942 was to rush tank destroyers to the threatened spot.Friendly tanks

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would thus be kept free for action against targetsvulnerable to armor. Thisquestion did not becomecontroversial generallyuntil 1944.

Strong demands were made in 1942 and 1943 for the organic inclusion oftank destroyersand antiaircraft artilleryin both infantry and armored divisions.GeneralMcNair resisted thesedemands for two reasons.First, experienceindi-cated that the most dangerousenemy air or tank attack would occur in massedformations,against whichit was impossible forevery division tohave individualprotection, and which must be met by masses of antitank and antiaircraftartillery held in mobilepools. Second,the loadingof the division with defensive"anti" weaponswent counter to GeneralMcNair'sdesire to encourageaggressivetactics and psychology in the divisionsand to avoid diversionof resources to theproduction ofmere countermeasures.These reasons were the stronger in 1942and 1943, since tank destroyersand antiaircraft guns had not yet developed a"secondary mission" as general-purposeartillery.

In May 1942 the Under Secretary of Warurged organic assignmentof anti-aircraft artillery to divisions. Not convinced by General McNair's explanations,he applied to theSecretary,who requested from General McNaira statement ofhis views.GeneralMcNairgave his reasons,concluding thatexisting policy wasonly a starting point pendingthe lessons to be gainedfrom combat.4 The Secre-

tary acceptedthis explanation.Among the numerous officers who believed that the division requiredstronger antiair and antitank protection, some of the most importantwerearmored officers, and among these a leading figure was Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers,then Chief of the ArmoredForce. GeneralDeversquestioned thelength to whichthe pooling principle was carried. He was notsimply making a plea for hisspecialty but advancing arguments of general application. Heheld that occa-sionalattachment ofnonorganicunits to divisionswould producepoor combinedtrainingand poor battlefieldteamwork,and that it was a doubtful way ofachiev-ing either unity of command or economy of force. He wrote to GeneralMarshall:5

Economy of force is not gained by having a lot of units in a reserve pool where theytrain individually,knowing little or nothing of the units they are going to fight with. It is

4 (1) Memo (S) of USW for CGAGF, 18 May 42,sub: AA Protection for InfDivs. 321/78 (CAC) (S).(2) M emos (S) of Gen McNair for SW 13 May and 29 Jul 42, sub notgiven. 321/78 (CAC) (S). See alsoAGF memo (C) for G-3 WD, 5 Nov 42,sub: AA Defense. 320.2/12 (AA) (C ) .

5 Memo (C) of Gen J. L.Devers for CofS USA, 1 Nov 42,sub: Ge n McNair's and Col Feller's Com-ments. 354.2/8 (Desert) (C ) .

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The question arose in different form in May 1943, when the ArmyServiceForces proposedchanges in War Department policy on the arming of serviceunits. Over four times as man y.50-calibermachineguns as were scheduledwererecommended for antiaircraft protection for installation ontrucks; and 3-inchantitank cannon were proposedboth for stationarydepotsand for truck convoys.9

The Army Ground Forces, in a memorandum to theArmy Service Forces inJune 1943, pointed out that 288,134 additional .50-caliber machineguns wouldbe required by the end of 1943 to carry out these recommendations,althoughonly 81,683 were expected to be available by that date for combat and serviceunits combined. Some 50,000 additional 3-inch guns would be required. Thememorandum stated: 10

At the presenttime the greater portion of our nationalresources is being used to gainair superiority. We are engaged also in building an army foroffensive action, not defensive.. . . Any additions of personnel, armamentor equipment for purely defensive measuresmust be held to the bare minimum . . . .

A hostile armored threat will be countered by massing our antitank guns at the threat-ened point, not by dissipating our3-inch self-propelled antitankguns by organicassignmentto serviceunits.

The War Department continued to support General McNair.11

The principleof pooling antiaircraft and antitank weapons was confirmed.

Streamlining: Work of the AGF Reduction Board

Streamliningof units, the obverse of pooling, was accomplished throughthe work of the Reduction Board created at theheadquarters of the ArmyGround Forces in answer to the War Department directive of 2 October 1942calling fordownwardrevisionof Tables of Organization.The Boardconstitutedthe committeeof "No-Men" desired by GeneralMcNair. It aimed to effectuatethe cut of 20 percent inmotor vehicles and 15 percent inpersonnel, set as agoalby the War Department,without lessening the combat strength of any unit orupsetting the doctrine of its tacticalemployment.In this task, which required

9 (1) WD memo 700-9-43, 11 Feb 43, sub: Armament of Serv Trs. AGO Records. (2) Memo (S)SPOPI 470 (5-1-43) for CGs AGF, AAF, 8 May 43, sub: Armament of Serv Units. 470/16 (S).

10 AG Fmemo (S) forCG ASF, 15 Jun 43, sub asabove. 470/16 (S).11

WD memo 310-44, 23 Feb 44, restatesWD memo 700-9-43, 11 Feb 43.

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exact knowledgeof every item and every individual inunit tables,the Board wasdirected and assisted by General McNair, who scrutinized every proposal of

the Board down to the lastjeep and the last mechanic,frequently saying "No"to his own"No-Men."Reductionswere governed by the AGF"Ground Rules," whichwere those

set by the War Department on 31 March 1942 with certain exceptions andclarifications. Theproportionof orderlies to officers was slashed;cook'shelperswere eliminatedwherechauffeurscould help in kitchens;chauffeurs (alsocalledlight truckdrivers) were toreceiveadditional dutieswhere possible.All "luxury"items were ruled out. Tents were withdrawn from company headquarters.Companieswere limited to one portable typewriter.No chairs, tables, or safeswere providedto headquarters below the division. Nowatches were issued toofficers. Transportation was allotted for specified personnel and equipmentonly, with no reserve vehiclesin the unit. Ammunitionvehicles were providedonly as necessary tohaul from supply points established byhigher echelons.More use of trailers was prescribed.Closely similarunits were to be combinedinto single types. Elements whose only function was to make a unit moreself-sufficient in security or supply wereprohibited.But no offensive weaponswere to be removed from units, and proper organizationwas to be developed

for new weaponssuch as the antitank rocket launcher ("bazooka") then beingissued.12

In the eight months of its life, from 7 November 1942 to June 1943, theReduction Boardreviewed all AGF units with a handful of exceptions,methodi-cally squeezingout the "fat," tha t is, items not allowed by theGround Rules, orconsiderednonessentialafter clarification of the mission of the unit and in viewof the support providedin pools. 13 Cuts werenot appliedpiecemealor in anega-tive mood. The whole theory of army and corps organization, and hence of

pooling and of inter-unit support, was undergoing constructive revision at theheadquarters of theArmy Ground Forcesat the same time. Each unit wasreshaped with an eye to itsplace within corps or army.

The Board found that, while basic organization was sound, there hadbeen "many variations between tables in the men and equipment considerednecessary to do a standard job," with a general tendency "to build up our

12 Cpy of AGF GroundRules in AGF Orgn Div, Rqts Sec file; also attached to AGF ltrs (C) to Armd Fand TDC, 12 Nov 42,sub: Reduction of Pers and Vehicles.320.2/340 (C).

13 Memo of Col W. J. Eyerly for CG AGF, 26 May 43, sub: Status Rpt of the Reduction Bd.(Hereafter

referred to as Red Bd.) 334/8 (AGF).

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organization around a luxurious concept of operations," and a tendency "toassign single duties to personnel and equipment andthus compartmentalize

personnel and equipment withinsections and platoons of organizations," aprocedure which led directly to unnecessaryduplication.14 The Board assumedthat no unit smaller thanthe field army could generallybe self-sufficient andthat T/O units would be madesufficient for particular missions throughattach-ments. To facilitateattachment, and aspart of thearmy and corpsreorganization,practically all nondivisionaltroops were placed undernew Tables of Organiza-tion, with regimentaland brigade tables abolished,new tables for group andother headquarters devised, andtables for separate (detachable) battalions andcompanies provided.

In general, theBoard effected the desired cut of 15 percent inpersonneland20 percent inequipment.The tank destroyer battalion, for example, was reducedin aggregate strength from 898 to 673, and in ¼-ton trucksfrom 82 to 34.

The economies proposedby the Army Ground Forces producedthe "loudcomplaints from the field" which GeneralMcNair had predicted.AlthoughG-3, WDGS, had promised to "stand squarelybehind your efforts to this end"and attempted to do so, the proposals of theArmy Ground Forces were infactsubjected to long discussion and eventual compromise. New T/O&E's were

finally issued for most AGF units in July 1943. They represented for some ofthe most important units an upward adjustment of General McNair'srecommendations.

14 AG F M/S, Red Bd to CofS, 8 Feb 43. AGFOrgn Div, Rqts Sec, 320.30 (Red Bd).

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IV. The Infantry DivisionReadjustments in the infantry division in 1942 and 1943 constituted a

shrinking process, not areorganization.The conception of the division em-bodied in the reforms of the thirtiesremained basicallyunaltered,namely, thatthe division shouldbe a compact offensive force, carrying a minimum of de-fensive weapons, streamlined for open warfare, and backed up by units ofother types in corps andarmy. The infantry division was the fundamentalper-

manent combined-armsteam, intended to have the right amount of organicartillery and auxiliaryelements to enable its infantry riflemento move forwardagainst average resistance.General McNair hopedto emphasizeand clarify thisconceptionby paring away the growth which tendedto obscure it. His viewswere formulated in a set of Tables of Organizationsubmitted to the War De-partment in February and March 1943. (See col. 5, Table No. 1, pp. 274-75. )

It should be borne in mind that at this time, in the winter of 1942-43,although the number of divisions to bemobilized in 1943 had been curtailed,it was still expected that new divisions would be mobilized as late as 1944. 1

The AGF tables outlined a division of 13,412 officers and men, over 2,000 lessthan the 1942 tables currently in effect. For a total of 100 infantry divisions,which still seemed a reasonableprospect,the savingof 2,000 men ineach wouldsave 200,000 men. On a 100-divisionbasis, the saving of 150 men inevery divi-sion wouldprovide more than enoughmanpowerfor a new division.

The AGF Tables of March 1943

The smallest infantry unit, the rifle squad, remained unchanged in the newAGF tables.2 It remained a team of twelve men, armed with ten M1 (Garand)

1 (1) WD memo (C) WDGCT 320 Gen (1-29-43) for CGs AAF, AGF, SOS, 29 Jan 43, sub: Reduc-tion of Tng Establishmentsand other ZI Activities.320.2/262 (C). (2) WD memo (S)WDGCT 320.2 Gen(2-25-43) for G-1, G-4, OPD, AGF, SOS, AAF, 25 Feb 43, sub: TB Planning. 320.2/18 (TB 43) (S).Th e expectation is here stated of eventually having from 120 to 125 divisions within an enlisted strength of7,500,000. Of these, some would be armored, airborne, etc., not standard infantry.See also above,"Mobiliza-tion of the Ground Army."

2 This whole section is based mainlyon comparisonof publishedT/O's of 1 March 1943 with thoseof1942, and on relevant materialsin AGF files. On the infantry regiment and itscomponents see (1) T/O7-11 and related tablesand (2) AGFmemo for G-3 WD, 4 Feb 43,sub: T/O&E's, Inf Regt. 321/674 (Inf).

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rifles, one automatic rifle, and one M1903 (Springfield) rifle. Three such squadsformed a rifle platoon. Three rifle platoons were grouped witha weapons platoonto form a rifle company.The weapons platoonwas modified slightly.It retainedtwo .30-caliber light machine guns and three 60-mm. mortars as its primaryweapons. It lost two automaticrifles but gained three an tita nk rocket launchers(bazookas) and one .50-caliber machine gun,the latter for antiaircraft defense.Personnel of the rifle company was cut from 198 to 192 through removalof atransportation corporal,a truck driver,a cook's helper, a messenger, an orderly,and a basic private.The 27 rifle companiesof the division retaineda strengthof5,184—the close-in fighters around whomthe rest of the division was built.Saving 6 men in each company meant saving 162 in the division, or 16,200 if 100infantry divisions shouldbe mobilized.

The heavy weapons company, with which threerifle companies weregrouped in the infantry battalion,was cut into more deeply thanthe rifle com-pany, being reduced from 183 to 162officers and men. Thirteen of the twenty-one men removed were truck drivers. Armament was strengthened by addingseven antitank rocket launchersand three .50-caliber machine gunsto theprior quota of six 81-mm. mortars and eight .30-caliber heavy machineguns.

The headquarters companyof the battalion, falling from139 to 112, was cut

proportionately more thanthe line companies, on the principle that head-quarters overhead shouldbe trimmed. The loss was largely in the antitankplatoon,on the principle thatdefensivepersonnel shouldbe held to a minimum.General McNair particularly frowned upondefensive weapons earmarkedfo rthe security of headquarters. Thefour 37-mm. antitank guns assigned to theantitank platoon were reduced to three. The 37-mm. gun wasretained despiteadverse reports from North Africa, on the ground that it was easier to handlethan the57-mm. gun proposed in its place, that it waseffective when used within

its proper range, and that in any case 57's were not yet available to replace it.Three .30-caliber machine guns, one .50-caliber machine gun, and eight anti-tank rocket launchers were addedto the battalion headquarters company, whichthough reduced 20 percent in personnel obtained a net augmentation ofarmament.

By these changes, the personnel strengthof the infantry battalion was re-duced from 916 to 850—a saving of 66, of which only 18 were in the riflecompanies.

Grouped with threeinfantrybattalions in theinfantry regiment were certain

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hesitation, because needs of the battalions hadbeen calculated closely andreviewed as lately as the preceding A pril,but under extremepressure toecono-mize transportation,General McNair approved the replacement of2½-ton by1½-ton trucks in the newtables, the difference being made up by an increasein 1-ton trailers.4 Servicecompanypersonnel,currentlyequippedwith only smallarms,received ten antitankrocket launchers andeight .50-calibermachinegunsin addition.

The medical detachmentof the infantry regiment, divided into three bat-talion sections, included the aid men and litter bearers who accompaniedfront-line fightersinto action,and the medical officers who worked at the aidstations to which casualties were first brought. General McNairbelieved theMedical Departmentvery liberal in its consumptionof manpower.The follow-ing case, typical of his relationswith the ReductionBoard, illustrates hisrelent-less attention to detail. TheReductionBoard recommendedtwelve litter bearersfor each infantry battalion. General McNair held out for eight. The Boardadhered to twelve.The Commanding General then replied: 5

The proposal of 8 litter bearers was not made loosely, but with a considerablefactorof safety and was based on factual data. The losses assumed were the extreme maximu mof

theWorld War—15%

per day ofsevere

combat.Onthis basis

a battalionshould

haveabout

50 litter cases. If 4 litters cannot evacuate this number from the field to the aid station thereis something wrong with the set-up. The average littering distance was taken as 600 yards.Admittedly there may be cases indifficult terrain where the organic personnel will beinadequate, bu t reinforcements,not organic increases, are the answer in thiscase. Reduce12 litter bearers to 10 as acompromise.

The Board explained that a litter team was now four men, not two. GeneralMcNair scrawled in pencil:"I give up. I was basing on two men per litter. . . .

The MedicalDepartmenthas run too far tochange now. Fix it as you seefit.LJM." Twelve litter bearers wereretained,but they operated onlythree litters inplace of the four desired by General McNair, a disadvantage presumablyoffsetby more rapid turnover of littersthrough lessening the fatigue of the bearers.The detachment as awhole was cut 18percent through removal of 1 medicalofficer, 7 drivers, and 16technicians.The regiment,for a personnelof approxi-mately 3,000, retained 7doctors, 2 dentists, and 103 enlisted medicalmen, rein-

4 T/O 7-13 and AGFM/S, CG to Rqts, 2 Dec 42.321/270 (MP).5

AG F M/S, CG to Rqts, 28 Dec 42. 320.3/636.

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forced when necessary from the division medical battalion orfrom sourcesoutside the division.

Total reduction in personnel of the infantry regiment was 384. Personnelwas cut 11 percent;vehicles, 36percent;ship tonnage, 14 percent.Only half thecut in the regimentwas accomplishedat the expense of the battalion. Halfwasin regimental overhead in the broadsense. In general, from the rifle platoonback the axefell more heavily as one movedaway from the front-line soldier.The same was true in the remainder of the division. Reduction in infantryalone, totalling 1,080 for the three regiments, accounted for a little over halfthe 2,000 saved in the division as awhole, although infantry comprised almostthree-quartersof the division. Theother half was in the division artilleryandin division overhead.

The new tables for division artillery, asprepared by the ReductionBoard,were called by General McNair"a monumental advance in de-fatting."6 It isnoteworthy that General McNair, an artillerymanby training, and hence par-ticularly fitted to judge the requirements of that arm, attempted to reducedivision artillery units bymore than 20 percent both in 1938 and in 1943—bothtimes without complete success.

Firing batteries in the artillery, like rifle companies in the infantry, lost

proportionatelythe least. The 105-mm. batteries were each cut from 111 to 93,saving 18 men, of whom only 4 were inactual gun crews, the remainderbeingheadquartersand maintenance personnel. The155-mm. batterieswere each cutfrom 120 to 98, a saving of 22 men, of whom only 8 were in gun crews, theremainderbeing headquarters andmaintenancepersonnel.

In each battalion, economiesin the three firing batteriesaccounted forlessthan half the saving.The mainsavingwas accomplishedthrough the consolida-tion, in each battalion,of the headquartersbattery and the service battery in acombined headquartersand service battery. Sotrimmed down wereboth com-ponents that the new combined headquarters andservice batterywas hardlylarger than the old headquartersbattery alone. Twenty truck drivers, 4 me-chanics,3 cooks,and 3 orderlieswere saved in the combined battery.The mainsavingwas in theelimination of the antitank andantiaircraftplatoonof fifty-twomen, currently in theheadquartersbattery for theprotectionof battalion head-quarters.The platoon's six 37-mm. antitank guns disappeared.Sixteen antitank

6 (1) AGF M/S, CG to Rqts, 27 Nov 42. 320.3/78 (FA). (2) AGF memo for G-3 WD, 8 Feb 43,

sub: T/O&E for Div Arty, Inf Div. 321/471 (FA). (3) T/O 6-10 and related tables.

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rocket launchers and an increase of .50-calibermachine gunswere furnished thebattery for protection in emergencies,fundamentalprotectionof artilleryhead-

quartersbeing left to surroundinginfantry units. The medical detachment wascut almostone-third.Primary armament of the division artillery remainedunchanged—twelve

155-mm. howitzers and thirty-six 105-mm. howitzers. Personnel, including at-tached medical, was reducedfrom 2,555 to 2,002 (22 percent); vehicles, from603 to 495 (18percent); and ship tonnage from about 12,000 to about 9,400(22 percent).

Infantry and artilleryconstitutedthe combat elements of thedivision,whileeverythingelse was in thenature of overhead.Before proceedingwith a discus-sion of this overhead, it is well torecall that additional combat elements,heldin nondivisionalpools, might be attached to the division for particular opera-tions. A divisionmight thus be reinforced by amechanizedcavalry squadron,by one ormore field artillery battalionsof anyappropriate caliber,by a chemicalbattalion manning 4.2 mortars, or by tank, tank destroyer, or antiaircraftbat-talions as described above. Attachmentof some of these units, especially tank,tank destroyer,and antiaircraftunits,became the normalpracticewhen combatdeveloped on a large scale in 1944, with the result that a division commander

usuallycommanded wellover 15,000men.A word of review is in order on protection againsttanks and aircraft.These

weapons,if massed,could not threaten all divisionssimultaneously. A divisionmost threatened was best protected by the pooling of counterweapons.For"normal" daily protection against occasional aircraft or small tank units thedivision had organic defenses.For antiair defense,224 .50-calibermachinegunswere distributed through all components.For antitankprotectionmore than 500rocket launchers werewidely distributed,with a pooling of antitank gunsin

battalion headquartersand in the regimental antitank companies.In organicdivisional antitank defense, the tendency was to placeless reliance on specialantitank units, and to provide weapons bymeans of which individual soldierscould rely more largely on themselves.Antitank guns were reduced innumberat infantry battalion headquartersand were removed altogether from fieldartillery battalionheadquarters.The infantry antitank companywas "de-fatted."Concurrently,rocket launcherswere issued as farforwardas theweaponsplatoonof the rifle company. Individualsof the rifle platoonswere equippedwith anti-

tank rifle grenades.Thus an echelonedantitank defense was set up,beginning

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with the rifleman's grenades and improvised weapons, passing through rocketlaunchers and antitank guns, including artillery pieces of thedivision, most ofwhich could be used against tanks, andculminatingin mobile tank destroyersto be attached in theevent of heavy armored attack.

In passing to overhead elements of the division, itshould be noted at oncethat the term is used with reservation,since all elements of the divisionwerestatistically classified as combat troops. All except the medical battalion werestrongly armed.But the engineer, signal, ordnance,quartermaster,medical, andmilitary police units within the division,however indispensableand howeverclose to the fighting, were notcombat troops in the samesense as the infantryand artillery. Even the mechanized reconnaissance troop was not intendedprimarily to fight. General McNair, following a doctrine that had been moregenerally preached than observed, wished to keep the proportion of theseauxiliaryelementsto combat elementsas low aspossible.

This was done in twoways. First, line troops served themselves.Infantry-men of the infantry regiment and artillerymenof the field artillery battalionsperformedsimpletaskscommon to allbranches. M edicalservice was anexceptionin that, althoughall infantrymenand artillerymenwere trained in first aid, eachinfantry regiment and artillery battalion had, as "attached medical" in its Table

of Organization,a number of medical officers and enlisted men trained by andbelonging to the Medical Department. Units had no attached personnel ofother branches, thoughsome (for example, theSignal Corps)had attemptedinthe past to have their personnel included.7 Infantrymenand artillerymenoper-ated their own telephones andradios without signal corps specialists, rantheirown trucks andsupply systemswithoutquartermasters,engaged in rudimentaryconstructionand mineremovalwithout recourse to the engineers,and providedfirst-echelonmaintenance (by the individualuser) and second-echelonmain-tenance (by a mechanic in theusingunit) for their weapons andvehicleswithoutrecourse to technicians of the OrdnanceDepartment.The infantry regimentwas virtually a small division.It served itself;it had a reconnaissanceplatoon;it had proportionatelyfar more antiaircraft and antitank weapons thanthedivision;and after the inclusionof howitzers it had its ownartillery.

The other method of holding down the auxiliary elements of the divisionwas extensivepooling of auxiliaryunits in corps and army. (See Table No. 2.)So pooled, they were availablein the varyingquantitiesneeded from time to time

7 "Attached Signal" troops were provided, forexample, in the proposals of1936; see staff study cited

in footnote 3, p. 293.

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by this or that division.In addition, for routine supply of food, gasoline, andammunition,General McNair wished the regimentsand battalions of divisions

to deal directly with nondivisionalservice units under army control. "It is in-tended,"read an AGF directiveafter the system came into effect, "that suppliesmove with as much freedom aspossible through as few channelsas necessary.Division and corps are not in the channel of supply except in emergencies."8

The using units—regimentsand battalions—hauledsupplies in their owntrucksfrom army supply points expected to be from twenty to thirty miles in the rear.It was thebusiness of army headquartersto push supplypoints withinreach offront-line units, employingarmy trucks when necessary to go beyond therail-head or head of navigation.Armywas also expected toprovidelaborersat supplypoints tosort supplies into unit lots and load theminto unit vehicles.The usingunits brought nopersonnel except drivers to the supply points, thus avoidingwaste of vehicle space bytransportationof laborers.The part played by the divi-sion quartermaster,ordnance officer, engineer, and other service elements wassimply to consolidate and forward unit requisitions for items supplied by hisbranch, determine theshares of division units when stocks were limited, andprovide liaison with army headquarterswhen necessary. The new supply pro-cedure,which theGround Engineer called a "revolution," was embodied in a

revisionof FM 100-10, the newpassagesbeing largelywrittenby GeneralMcNairhimself.9

Betweenconcentrationof functions in line personnel on the onehand, andin army personnel on the other, many functions of auxiliary units within thedivisionwere squeezed out.

Reconnaissance, forexample,was conductedat all levels: bypatrols of theforward infantry elements; by the intelligence and reconnaissanceplatoon ofthe infantry regiment; and by mechanized cavalry squadrons in the corps. It

seemed to General McNair that there were toomany echelons of reconnais-sance. 10 In 1938 he had notrecommendedanyreconnaissanceunit for the divisionat all. A mechanizedcavalry troop had nevertheless beenadded, which from

8 AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 8 Oct 43, sub: Engr Serv in the Fld. 321/212 (Engr) (R).9 (1) AGF M/S (R), Engr to G-4, CofS, 4 Sep 43. 321/212 (Engr) (R). (2) AGF M/S, CG to G-4,

20 Feb 43, sub:Changes in FM 100-10. 461/12 (FM 100-10). (3) Memo of G-4 AGF for CGAGF, sub:Rpt on Progress of FM 100-10. 461/12 (FM 100-10). (4) AGF memo for G-3 WD, 10 Mar 43, sub: T/O10-17. 321/1243 (QM).

10

Memo (C) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 8 Oct 42, sub: ExcessiveNo. of Mtr Vehicles. 451/66 (C).

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1941 to 1942 grew in strength from 147 to201. GeneralMcNair now proposed atroop of 153. 11

Serviceunits in the division occupiedthe narrowinggap between line unitsand army troops. Each,in addition to itsoperating functions, carried a smallreserve of supplies and spare parts peculiar to its branch and providedthird-echelonmaintenancefor equipmentfor which its branchwas responsible.

The medicalbattalion included somewhatless than half the medical per-sonnel of the division, the larger half being "attached medical" with the in-fantry, artillery, and combatengineers.All told, medical personnel numberedabout 1,000, more than any other arm orservice in the division exceptinfantryand artillery. The division medicalbattalion backed up the unit detachments.The latter brought in casualties to battalion or regimental aidstations,assistedwhen necessary by collecting companies of the medicalbattalion.These com-paniesevacuatedthe woundedfrom aid stations toclearingstations,from whichthose needing further treatment were transferred to evacuationhospitals oper-ated by army. Divisionmedical officers worked duringcombat at the clearingstations or reinforced medicalofficers attached to units farther forward. Littlereduction was made in the revised table for the battalion, andthere was noreduction in doctors. The veterinary officer was dropped; when the office of

The Surgeon General protested, the Army Ground Forces explained that thedivision had no animals and that meat inspection was a function suitablyrelegated to army. The AGFtables likewisecombined the positionsof divisionsurgeon and ofcommandingofficer of the medicalbattalion,on the theory thatthe surgeon should notremain at division headquarters butshould operatewith hishospitalsin the field.12

The combat engineer battalion of the division, between 1941 and 1942,had grown in strength from 634 to 745. The AGF tables brought itback to 647.Functionsof the battalion,such as road repair, bridge building, demolition,andconstruction,were unchanged.A reconnaissancesection wasadded to the bat-talion headquarters andservicecompany to enable the engineer toform his ownestimatesof the need forbridging and road repair. Removal ofcertain bridgingequipment from the organic impedimenta of the battalion, on the principlethat itcould be readilydrawn from army when needed,was theprincipalmeansused to reduce the battalion. Identical battalions,kept in pools under higher

11 T/O 2-27 and AGF memo for G-3 WD, 4 Feb 43, sub: T/O&E ReconnaissanceTroop. 321/157 (Cav).12 T/O 8-15 and AGFmemo for G-3 WD, 16 Feb 43,sub: T/O&E, Med Bn.321/725 (Med), with

accompanyingpapers.

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headquarters,together with otherengineerunits such as light ponton companiesand heavy ponton battalions, wereavailable for support of the division whenneeded.13

The divisionsignalcompany wasreduced almostone-third. From a strengthof 232 in 1940 it hadswollen to 322 in 1942, although bothinfantry and artilleryhad radio operators, linemen,communicationssergeants, and similar categories.The main function of the signal company was to construct and operate thecentral communicationssystem of the division,coordinating and joining themain elements of the division with each other and with division headquarters.In part the signalcompany was cut bystraightapplication of theGround Rules;forty-five truck driverswere eliminatedand their duties were assigned to variousothers.To someextent this company was cut by abolition of theradio intelligenceplatoon,whose functions were judged by the Arm yGround Forces to be moreappropriate for corps. A radio intelligence platoonwas accordinglyincludedin the corps signal battalion. The division signal company wasbroughtback toa strengthof 226, approximately thatof 1940. 14

The ordnance light maintenance company, made organic in the divisionafter transfer of motor maintenance from the Quartermaster Corps to theOrdnance Department, was an especially good illustration of the economies

made possibleby pushing functions forward toline units or rearward to armyshops. Battlefield recovery of disabled equipmentand elementaryrepairs andmaintenance wereresponsibilities ofusing units. Rather than lose control byturning over equipment to another agency for repairs, a procedure especiallyhazardous in combat, units were also expected to carry third-echelon main-tenance to the limit of their tools and skill. No ordnancecompany, GeneralMcNair noted for his staff,15

can even make a dent in thetrucks of a division, but must confine their activities to thosewhich cannot be performed in units for lack of tools or special knowledge.There is noquestion in my mind that much of the so-called third echelon work in campaign must beperformed by units in some degree. . . . No practicable ordnancecompany can be set upwhich will takecare of motor repairs. The great mass of them must be either handled inthe units or passed on toarmy establishments. However, it is sensible to cut out [i. e.hold,as in cutting a car out of a railroadtrain] at the division echelon thoserepairs which requirenot too much time butonly special tools or knowledge.

13 T/O 5-15 and AGF memo for G-3 WD, 21 Feb 43, sub: T/O&E Engr Combat Bn, Inf Div.321/712 (Engr).

14T/O 11-7 and AGF memo for G-3 WD, 3 Mar 43, sub: T/O&E 11-7 Sig Co, Inf Div. 321/756

(Sig).15

AGF M/S, CG to Rqts, 15 Dec 42. 321/714 (Ord).

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The division ordnancecompany, as provided in the AGFtables, was thereforeintended to provide only 60 percent of the third-echelon maintenance requiredin the division under quiet conditions,and only 30 percent of such main-tenancerequired duringcombat. 16 The companywas held to a strength of 147.

The division quartermastercompanyretained very limited responsibilities.Motor maintenance had been transferred to ordnance. Supply of food andgasoline wasdecentralized to regiments and separate battalions. With truck-ing done by using units, the trucks of thequartermastercompany constitutedchiefly a reserve.Their functions were to assure water supply, to carry reservesupplies,includingone reserve ration for the entire division, and to be capableof transporting tactically one battalion of infantry. Except for five trucks towhich no load wasassigned, keptas spare vehicles for immediate replacementof vehicle casualties,all trucks had organic loads, which they dumped whencalled upon to carry troops or providereserve transportation to units.Labor-ers were eliminated,since sorting and loading at supply points were done byarmy, and unloadingat receivingpoints by receivingunits. The quartermastercompany,in the March tables,was cut to 152officers and men. 17

By attachment of six quartermaster truck companies, kept in an armypool, the division proposed by the Army Ground Forcescould be motorized

completely. Six companies weresufficient because only the infantry requiredsupplementarytransportation, all other elements of theinfantry division beingorganicallymotorized. 18

The military police unit consisted of oneplatoon. The AGF tables ofMarch 1943 cut it from eighty to seventy-three men. Its functions were toguide traffic, maintain stragglerlines, and escort prisoners. In these functionsit was supported by MP units of corps and army and could besupplementedby detail of individuals from other units of the division.To prevent detail ofsoldiers for this purpose was, however, one of themain reasons for havingmilitary police organic in the division. 19

The remaining element of division overhead was the headquarters andheadquarters company. Since June 1941 these had greatly expanded. Division

16 AG F M/S, Red Bd to CG, 19 Dec 42.321/714 (Ord). See also AG F memo for G-3 WD, 2 Feb 43,sub: T/O&E 9-8, Ord Co, Lt Maint . 321 /714 (Ord ) .

17 (1) AGF M/S, CG to Rqts, 2 Dec 42. 321/270 (MP). (2) AGF memo for G-3 WD, 13 Feb 43, sub:T/O&E 10-17, QM Co, Inf or MtzDiv. 321/1243 (QM), with accompanying papers.

18 Se e pp. 337-38 below on the motorized division.19

AGF memo for G-3 WD, 16 Feb 43, sub: T/O&E 19-7, MP Plat, Inf Div. 321/270 (MP).

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headquarters,on 1 June 1941, consisted of 26officers, 2 warrant officers, and 74enlisted men, totaling 102; on 1 August 1942, of 44 officers, 9 warrant officers,and 116 enlisted men, totaling 169.The headquarterscompany consisted on 1June 1941 of 4 officers and 59 enlisted men; on 1 August 1942, of 7officers, 3warrant officers, and 134 enlisted men. The division headquartersestablishmentalmost doubled in fourteen months. The general staff had grown from sevenofficers to twelve; the simple headquarters company of1941 had more thandoubled through addition of a transportation platoon and adefense platoon.The total increment, on a 100-division basis, took as much manpower as anentire division.

General McNair believed that the commander shouldwork through per-sonal contact andverbalorders,especiallyat the division level.Overgrownstaffs,in his opinion, were the principalcause of long written ordersand unnecessarypaper work, through which the division lost mobility and responsiveness tocommand in fast-changingconditionsof battle.

The AGF tables of March 1943 cut the headquarterscompany 50 percent,bringingit almost back to the strength ofJune 1941, through removal ofvehiclesand drivers, economy inorderlies,and abolition of the defense platoon.

20 The56-man band was assigned,as an additional duty,the localprotectionof division

headquarters.General McNairrejected proposals to increasepostal personnelto the level authorized by the War Department (1 per 1,000 troops), despiterecommendations of his ownstaff, The Adjutant General,and the theaters,anddespite informationfrom the DesertTraining Center thatdivision postal clerkswereobliged towork day andnight. 21

Division headquarters,cut about 25percent in both officers and enlistedassistants,remained well above the level of 1941. Commandingofficers of themedical battalion and the ordnancecompany were required to act as specialstaff officers for their branches, a practice already establishedin the artillery,engineer, signal, and quartermasterelements of thedivision. Chaplains andspecial service officers at division headquarters wereeach cutfrom three to two.By GeneralMcNair'sexpressorder, the assistantG-4, automotive,added in 1942,was eliminated.GeneralMcNair felt that the ordnance officer could do most ofthe staff work connected with maintenance, an activitywhich, as he nevertiredof pointing out, profited more from elbow greasethan from forms and reports.

20 On Div Hq & Hq Co see (1)various AG F M/Ss, Jan 43. 320.3/166 (Inf) and (2) AGFmemo forG-3 WD, 9 Mar 43, sub: T/O&E, Inf Div. 321/688 (Inf).

21

AG F 3d ind (C) to TAG, 7 Apr 43, with attachedpapers.

320.3/17 (C).

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Percentage of Personnel Reduction in the Infantry Division:AGF Proposals of March 1943

Units Percentage Reduced

Infantry:Rifle Squad 0.0Rifle Company 3.0Infantry Battalion 7.2Infantry Regiment 11.0

Field Artillery (105-mm.) (155-mm.)Howitzer Section 10.0 15.4Howitzer Battery 17.7 19.7Field Artillery Battalion 21.2 25.4Division Artillery 22.2

Auxiliary UnitsReconnaissanceTroop 23.9Engineer Battalion 13.7Medical Battalion 7.1Signal Company 29.8QuartermasterCompany 26.2OrdnanceCompany 5.2MP Platoon 8.8

Headquarters Company (without Band) 52.1Division Headquarters 21.3Entire Division 13.5

To summarize,the reduced divisionproposed by the Army Ground Forcesmet the terms of the War Departmentdirectivevery closely. Personnelwas cutmore than13 percent,vehiclesmore than 23 percent.In addition,size of vehicleswas reduced and number of trailers increased. Counting the ship-ton as 40cubic feet, about 6,000 ship-tons (15 percent)were saved in tonnage neededfor transport of equipment. Only a few platoons were wholly obliterated,though the infantry cannon companyand the artillery servicebattery had beentelescoped into other organizations.As the followingtable indicates,personnelcuts wereecheloned towardthe rear:

Fire power was notlessened.The main loss in armamentwas the removal of324 automaticrifles. Whereas formerly all units of the infantry regiment hadpossessed a few of these weapons, they were now confined exclusivelyto therifle squad, the 243 automaticrifles remaining in the divisionbeing distributed,one each, to the 243rifle squads.Provisionof antitank gunsand antitank mines

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was likewise cut. But more than 500 antitank rocket launchers were added,and the allotment of .50-caliber machine gunswas substantially increased.Self-propelled infantry howitzers gave way to towed howitzers, in slightlyreduced numbers,but the 75-mm.howitzerswere replacedwith 105's. In sum,increased fire power offset the reductions in weapons. With fire power thesame, and with manpowercut over 13 percent, the ratio of fire power to man-power increased.Hence with a given outlayof men, food, maintenance, trans-portation, and administrative effort more combat power could be delivered.

Reaction to the AGF Tables

All tables prepared by the Army Ground Forces for component unitsofthe infantry division were immediately approvedby the W ar Departmentandpublished in April under date of 1 March 1943. When the consolidated tablefor the entire division was submitted it met a different fate.G-3, War Depart-ment General Staff, recommended approval,all component elements havingalready been approved.22 The Chief of Staff directed tha tthe consolidatedtablefirst be submitted to the overseas theaters for comment.General McNair wroteprivately:23

The Chief is reserving final decision until Edwards [G-3, War Department] andI get back from Africa, where we hope to go this week. I am not clear as to the purpose ofthis step, but we shall do our darnedestto check up onvarious features of the organizationby consultation with those who have been through the mill. However, I have little hopeof convincing any division commanderthat he can spare 450 trucks or 2,000 men.

Wounded a few days after his arrival in North Africa, General McNairmissed the opportunityfor a full discussionof the proposed division withofficersin the theater. It is doubtful whether representativesof the War Departmentput thematter in quite the light in which he saw it. Thepositive sideof economy,the possibilityof increasing the number of divisionsthrough reduction in size,was the easier to overlook since up to this time onlyfour United States divisionshad been employed in North Africa, with some sixty in training at home.

22 (1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (6-4-43) for CofS USA, 8 Jun 43 sub: Revised Inf Div.AGO Records,320.3 (8 Jun 43) (1) (S). (2) M/R on cpy of WD memo WDGCT 320.2 T/O (18 Jun 43),18 Jun 43,sub: Revisionof T/O&E's for InfDiv. AGO Records,320.3.

23

Personalltr of GenMcNair to Gen F. L.Parks, 12 Apr 43.McNairCorrespondence.

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That the savingin personnel should be utilized for new divisions wasnot, indeed,the policy of the War Departmentat this time.In June 1943, when final decisionson the

reduced divisionweremade, the

numberof divisions in the mobilization

programfor 1943 was not raised butlowered.24

The North African Theater of Operations disapproved of the new divisionin entirety. 25 General Eisenhowerreported unanimous rejection by his corpsand division commanders. Thedivision was said to be already at an absoluteminimum,providing norelief for worn out personnel—asomewhat irrelevantargument since the reductions mainlyaffected personnel leastsubject to thewear of battle.The theater reportedthe defense platoonat divisionheadquartersto be essential in combat; asked for more military police, not fewer; warnedthat reduction of theengineer, signal, and other auxiliary un itswould seriouslyimpair their operations; deplored the telescoping of cannon companies andservice batteries;and in generalpronouncedreduction anywhereto be unfeas-ible. Organic assignment of antiaircraft and tank destroyer battalionsto theinfantry division was alsodesired.

GeneralMcNair wrote at length to the War Department whenasked to com-ment on the view taken by the theater. Henoted that the reductionshad beenordered by the War Department itself,and continued:

26

I know of no instance where a commander has recommended a reduction of the meansat his disposal—eitherpersonnel or material—and of but few cases where a commanderwas satisfied with what he had. Invariably commanders seek more and tend always to maketheir unit self-contained. It was suchproclivities that brought about the present wastefuland unwieldy organization. Commanders do not consider the large picture. For example,the Commanding General, 1st Division, told me during my recent visit overseas that heneeded organically a military police battalion, a reconnaissancesquadron, a tank destroyerbattalion, and an antiaircraft battalion. I asked him whether he would be willing to giveup four infantry battalions in exchange, to which he replied No, vehemently. Nevertheless,such an addition to his division would deplete or eliminate other divisions, since the bottomof the manpower barrel is in sight.

The big question in the case of the mass of streamlined units before the War Departmentfor decision is notwhat it would be nice to have in the way of a com plete andperfect organi-zation, but what is the very minimum organization which can fight effectively. It would

24 See "Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: a Statistical Study " and "Mobilizationof the Ground Army," in this volume.

25 (1) Radio (S) CM-In-550, Algiers [Eisenhower] to WD, 1 Jun 43. (2) Radio (S) CM-In-9356,London USFOR [Devers] to WD, 14 May 43. WDClassified Message Center.

26

Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 3 Jun 43, sub: Reduced Inf Div. 322/2 (Divs) (S ) .

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be comfortableto have 12 men in an organic gun squad, but the gun can be served readilyby 8 men and 12 men certainly will not be 50% more effective than 8 men.

Our theaters now are developed sufficiently to make it quite apparent that there is gross

extravagance in both human and material resources everywhere. Theater commandersnaturally seek to make themselvesas secure against eventualities asthey possiblycan. Theyexpect the War Department to find the resources which they demand, and thus far theWar Department has met their expectations obligingly. However, sooner or later, the WarDepartmentwill be forced, byinadequatetotal resources,to decide the form and substanceof theater allotments,and direct theatercommanders to carry onwith what isgiven them, notwhat they would like to have. There is no doubt in my mind that the total resources nowin the North African theater could be changed in form with an enormousgain in fightingpower.

My study of operations in the North African theater particularly, by both observationon the ground andfrom reports and dispatches, convincesme thoroughly that the combatforces there are too much concerned withtheir own security and too little concerned withstriking the enemy. The infantry is displaying a marked reluctance to advance against fire,but they are masters of the slit trench—a devicewhich is used habitually both in defenseand attack. Regimental and higher commanders are not seensufficiently in the forwardareas, and battalions show the lack of this first-hand supervision.Commanders are in theircommand posts. I found that infantry battalions in the assault have their command postsorganized in forward and rear echelons, the latter thestronger.Commandersof all echelonscry for both antiaircraftand ground defense. Onehigh commander seized thereconnaissance

company of atank destroyerbattalion for his personal guard, therebyrendering the destroyerbattalion virtually ineffective. This attitude is everywhere and isundermining the offensivespirit by which alone we can win battles. I maintain that our organization must be an offen-sive one, not cringinglydefensive.We cannot providethousands of purelydefensive weaponswith personnel to man themwithout detracting from our offensive power. Nothing can bemore unsound than to provide a headquarters guard organically for a high command post.If the commander feels so much concern for his own safety, let him withdraw a battalionfrom the front line for his own protection, but do not provide him with such a unitorganically.

It is to be emphasized that the proposed organization, in this and other similar cases,

does not weaken thefighting power of the unit, but merely strips away unessential overheadand weapons which are not usable against the enemy in offensive action. When field com-mentators see that the unit has been reduced in strength, they charge immediately thatthe revised unit is weak and lacks stayingpower. The facts are the reverse, since the unithas more fighting powerper man than the extravagantunit which it supersedes.There willbe more of the reduced unit for a given manpower, hence greater total fighting and stayingpower.

The reduced organizations are based on the sound fundamental that the division orother unit should be provided organicallywith only those means which it needs practically

always. Peak loads, and unusual and infrequent demands obviously should be met from a

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pool—ordinarilyin the army or separate corps. Such a principle is particularly applicable,for example, to engineer and medical units. In both such cases demands vary widely withthe situation, and it is uneconomical in the extreme to provide the division organically

with the means of meeting extreme demands which occurseldom.General Eisenhower's comments in this case can be replied to in detail, but such dis-

cussion seemshardly appropriate. It is clear that his viewpoint is so wholly different fromthat upon which the reduced division is based, that it is small wonder that the reducedorganization is unacceptable to him. The issue does not lie in these details but rather is,whethe r we are tobase our militaryorganization on comfort and convenience or on offensivefighting power.

At this very time, in June 1943, the manpower situation was so criticalthat500,000men weredropped from the proposedstrength of the Army and twelvedivisionswerecanceledfrom the mobilizationprogram for 1943. 27

A middle groundbetween GeneralMcNair and General Eisenhowerwasfound by G-3 of the WarDepartment.

28 Although thecompromise,by addingover 800 men toGeneralMcNair'sfigures for thedivision,made the mobilizationof any given number of divisionsmore difficult, it produced an individualdivi-sion of considerable soundness andstrength, used without substantial changein the Europeancampaignsof 1944 and 1945. Ingeneral, the auxiliaryunits ofthe division were held downto General McNair'sfigures.One exceptionwas the

division headquarterscompany, towhich the defense platoon was restored (asa guard againststray tanks, parachutists,and disaffected civilian inhabitants).Anotherexceptionwas thequartermaster company,to which the serviceplatoonwas restoredon the ground that the division quartermaster had noother pooloflabor. In general, the combat elements of thedivisionwere modified in thedirec-tion desired by General Eisenhower. The cannon companywas restored to theinfantry regiment, and the service battery to thefield artillerybattalion. In viewof developments inNorth Africa, the37-mm. antitank gun wasdefinitely aban-doned in favor of the 57-mm.,the mine-laying platoonwas restored to the regi-mental antitank companies, and infantry regiments received increased allow-ances of mine detectors. Otherquestions of armamentremained as decided byGeneralMcNair. Infantry regimentskept their 2½-ton trucks. About 400 vehi-cles were restored to the division. A medical detachment was added for the

27 See the twopreceding studies in this volume.28 (1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (6-4-43) for Cof S USA, 8 Jun 43, sub: Revised Inf Div.

AGO Records320.3 (8 Jun 43) (1) (S). (2) WD memo (S) WDGCT320.2 T/O (18 Jun 43) to CGAGF,18 Jun 43,sub: Revisionof TO&E's for the Inf Div321/63 (Inf) (S). (3) AGF memo for G-3 WD, 9 Jul43, sub as above. 320.3/661. (4) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 1 Jun 43, sub: RecommendedChanges in

T/O's. 322/3 (Divs) (S).

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"special troops," or smaller auxiliaries,of the division. A division surgeon wasprovided in addition to the commandingofficer of the medical battalion.This

compromised the principle, stressed by General McNair, of reducing specialstaffs through combinationof staff and command positions. To these amend-ments madeby G-3, the office of the Chief ofStaff added another, directingthat a headquarters,special troops,be included for administrationof the signal,ordnance, and quartermaster companiesand the military police platoon. Thisheadquarters, revived from the old square division, was regarded by GeneralMcNair as a wholly unnecessarypiece of overhead.29

But for the most part the cuts made by General McNair in headquartersestablishments,especiallyat the regimentaland battalionlevels,weremaintained.Restorationsmade by the War Department were chiefly in combat elements,largely defensive, and in service elements operating in the closest conjunctionwith combat troops. In addition, the Army GroundForces, actingon reportsfrom the theaters andwithout instructionsfrom the War Department,restoredthe medical detachment of theinfantry regiment to its old figure. The disputedpostal clerks were likewise added.

The divisionwhich emerged consistedof 14,253officers and men, about850more than desired by General McNair, but about 1,250 fewer than currently

authorized.The Army Ground Forces prepared new Tables of Organizationas directed. These were published as of 15 July 1943. Infantry divisions in theUnited States were physically reorganized as of 1 September 1943, those over-seas by installments in the following months. Since in the long run only 66infantry divisions weremobilized,it may be saidthat the T/O's of 15 July 1943,saving about 1,250 in each,saved altogether 82,500 men. Conversely, thenumberof men formerlyrequired for 60 divisions nowproduced 66.

The reorganizationof the infantry division effected important economies.

But to General McNairthe failure of the War Departmentto accept his views,or to stand firmly by its own announced policiesof economy, was a source ofgrave disappointment and concern. He saw in it an indicationthat the WarDepartmentwould yield to the theatersto a degree whichhe believed destructiveto central control. "Since the War Department'sdecisions in connection withthe infantry division," he wrote on 23 June 1943, when reviewing the T/Ofor army headquarters,"I have much less sting in me than heretofore."30

29 (1) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 1 Jun 43, sub: Recommended Changesin T/O's. 322/3 (Divs) (S) .(2) AGF memo for G-3 WD, 27 Nov 43, sub: Revisionof FM 101-5. 322.01/5.

30 AGF M/S, CG to Rqts, 23 Jun 43, sub: Reduc of Offs, Ord Sec, Army Hq. 320.2/191 (AGF).

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V. The Armored Division

The armoreddivision, unlikethe infantry division,underwent not merelya shrinking but a thoroughgoingreorganization at the hands of the ArmyGround Forces. (See Table No. 3.) The process was complicatedby the semi-independent status of the Chief of the Armored Force, who was responsiblefor Tables of Organization for armored units.The Armored Force, establishedin July 1940 to do a rush job of creating armored divisions,retained a greatdeal of prestige and vitality after it came under the headquartersof the ArmyGround Forces in March 1942. For over a year relations between AGF head-quarters and Armored Force headquarters were in practicemore on the levelof negotiation than of militarycommand.It was not that the two headquarterswereat odds.There was considerabledifference of view amongGeneralMcNair'sstaff officers on the use ofarmor, and he did not insistthat they presenta unitedfront during discussions with Fort Knox. 1 Armored Force officers also repre-sented various shades of opinion on the tactics, andhence the organization,oftanks. But the differences of opinion tended to polarize in the respectivepointsof view of the twoheadquarters.

Of one thing General McNair was convinced from the start: that theArmored Force, accustomedby the circumstancesof its birth to doing big thingsin a hurry, was the mostwasteful of the groundarms in its use ofmanpowerand

equipment. "Profligate," "luxurious,"and "monstrous" were terms he fre-quentlyapplied to armored unitsin 1942 and 1943. 2 "The present armoreddivi-sion," he wrote, "is fairly bogged down by a multiplicity of gadgets of allkinds. ... In the matter of size, cost and complication,as compared with thenumber of tanks which can be used against the enemy, the armored division

1 AGF M/S (S), CG to Red Bd, 10 Mar 43. 320.2/24 (Armd F) (S).2 For example, (1) AGF memo (C) for G-3 WD, 5 Nov 42, sub: AA Defense. 320.2/12 (AA) (C) .

(2) Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Col J. A.Consadine,4 Jun 42.McNair Correspondence.

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presents anamazingpicture ofunjustifiedextravagance."3 The AGF ReductionBoard went to work on the armored division in January 1943. Certain of thedivision tables were pronounced by GeneralMcNair "so fat there is no placeto begin"; others were to be"combined and debunked—a majoroperation";and he instructed theBoard, "before I personally struggle further with theseterrible tables,"to recastarmored divisionelementsalong the lines of comparableelements in the reducedinfantry division.4

Meanwhile the question of reorganization had arisen, overshadowingthequestionof mere reduction.Concurrentlywith the removal of"fat," the anatomyof the division was transformed.Economy was a major objective,but changeswere also dictated by modificationsin tacticaldoctrine.

Conceptionsof the armored division passed through several stages duringthe war, largely as a result of the activityof the Germans,whose successesmadeit possible forvarious schoolsof American officers to get their ideas adopted.The Americanarmored divisions were at first modeled on the German Panzerdivision of 1940 and were made up overwhelminglyof tanks with relativelylittle infantry support. Virtually all tanks in the Army were placed in armoreddivisions.One school thought that these heavy armored divisionswould operatewell ahead of the mass of friendly forces. Divisionsof foot infantry were left a

modest role. "The triangular division," wrote the Chief of the Armored Force,on 18 July 1942, "has its place in thescheme of affairs to protect lines of com-munication, tohold ground, to assist the armored units in supply and the cross-ing of obstacles such as rivers, defiles, etc. They do not carry thespearhead ofthe fight and never will when tanksand guns are present." 5 The belief thatarmored divisions were a kind of elite troops, capable of peculiarly decisiveaction, was the basis for furnishing them so liberally with personnel andequipment.

But the successful employmentof antitank guns and mines, notably by theGermansin the African campaignsfrom 1941 to 1943, but also by theRussiansand British, confirmed the position of those Americanofficers, includingGen-eral McNair, who had always doubted theinvulnerabilityof the tank.It becameclear that tanks would frequently have to be escorted byfoot troops sent aheadto locate and destroy antitank defenses. It was recognized that the armored

3 Memo (S) of Gen McNair (dictated by Gen McNair, signed by Gen J. G. Christiansen) forDCofSUSA, 20 Jul 43, sub: Comments on Maj Gen Harmon's Rpt . 319.1/13 (NATO) (S).

4 AG FM/S, CG to Red Bd, 23 Feb 43. AGFOrgn Div, Rqts Sec (25893).5

Personal ltr of GenDevers to Gen McNair, 18 Jul 42. McNairCorrespondence.

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division, internally, required moreinfantry in proportion to tanks and, ex-ternally, would usually operatein closer proximity to infantry divisions thanhad beensupposed.The increasingrapprochementbetween tanks and infantryraised not only thequestion of the internal structure of thearmored divisionbut also that of the number of armored divisionswhich ought to be mobilized,as distinguishedfrom the nondivisionaltank battalions bywhich infantry divi-sions could receive tank support.General Devers, two years after making thestatementquoted in thelast paragraph,wrote of the Italian campaignin 1944:"Of special importancehas been thework of tank battalionsattachedto infantrydivisions. . . . Throughout the entirecampaignthe infantryhas been the majordecisive element in the advance . . . . It is team play which has assuredsuccess."6

Armored divisions were being reorganized, under tables prepared by theArmoredForce and dated 1 March 1942, at the time when the ArmoredForcebecame acomponentof the Army Ground Forces. 7 The tank-infantryratio inthe new tables remained substantially as in 1940. The total strength of thedivision was14,620,of which 4,848was in tank units,2,389 in armored infantry,and 2,127 in armoredartillery. Tanks were organized in 2 regiments of 3 bat-talions each; infantry in a regiment of 3 battalions; artillery in 3 battalions.

Armored infantry differed from foot infantry,which was notorganicallymotor-ized, and from motorized infantry, which was equipped to move in trucks, inthat all personnel could move simultaneously in lightly armored half-tracks.Armored artillery consisted of self-propelled 105-mm. howitzers; it was or-ganized in 6-piece batteries,so that 3 battalions had 54 pieces. The engineerbattalionof the armored division comprised4 companies plus atreadwaybridgecompany. A strength of 1,948 was in division trains, which included a main-tenancebattalionsix timesas large as the correspondingcompany in theinfantrydivision, and asupply battalion organically included on theground that armysupply establishments wouldusually lag far behind the fast-moving armoreddivision. Divisionheadquarters included 2 "combat commands,"each a sub-headquarters under a brigadier general,to either of which the division com-mander might assign such forces as he chose for specific tactical missions.Taskforces could thus be made up flexibly within the division, embodying, withinlimits, any desired ratio of tanks toinfantry and other arms.

6 Lt Gen J. L. Devers,Deputy Commander of the NorthAfrican Theater of Operations,"Tactical Notesfrom the ItalianCampaign," Military Review, XXIV (1944), 3.

7

See Table No. 3.

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General McNairin 1942, in view of therecent reorganizationof thedivision,and considering the unsettled state of armored doctrine, wished to postponeanother reorganization untilcombat experiencehad been gained.

8 In Augusthe called the attention of General Devers to thefact that the German armoreddivision,having been substantially reorganized since 1940, now had five timesas high a ratio of infantry to tank troops as did theUnited States armoreddivision.9 General Devers,convinced of the need of more infantry, proposedthat the motorized infantry divisionsbe "armorized," that is, that their infantrybe organized and equipped as was the infantry of armored divisions.

10Large

tank masses in armored divisions would thus operatealongside largeinfantrymasses carried in half-tracks. AGF headquarters,however, believedthat thesolution to the problem was not thearmorizing of motorized divisions butrather the placing of small infantry units in closeassociation with small tankunits. 11

General McNair (as though to show the semi-independentstatus of theArmored Force) laid General Devers' proposalsbefore the War Departmentalong with his own on 7December 1942." He himself, not wishing simply toput an armorized infantry division alongsidearmored divisions in an armoredcorps or simply to add infantry to the existing armored division which he

believed alreadyunwieldy,and not yet ready tobreak down the armoreddivisionand recombine theparts, proposed a temporary expedientpendingexperienceto be gained incombat. He recommended that a pool of twenty-five separatearmored infantry battalions be establishedfrom which armored divisionscouldbe reinforced as necessary. He likewise recommended curtailment of thepro-gram for motorized divisions,believing that armored infantry battalionswouldbest fill the need for close support of advancing tanks, and that other forms ofinfantry support, such as the taking over of positions won byarmor, could be

8 See (1) AGF 2d ind (S) to Armd F, 24 May 42, on AGF ltr to CofArmdF, 2 May 42, sub: LightArmd Divs.320.2/1 (Armd F) (S). (2) Memo of 7 Dec cited in footnote 12 below.

9 Ltr (C) of Gen McNair to CG Armd F, 24 Aug 42, sub: Proportion of Inf in Armd Div. 320.2/18(Armd F) (C).

10Ltr (C) of Gen Devers to CG AGF, 6 Nov 42, sub: Grenadier Brigs of Panzer Divs. 320.2/18

(Armd F) (C).11 Papers, includinga study by Col R. F. Ennis (item 4 of AGF M/S, CG to G-2, 12 Nov 42). 320.2/18

(Armd F) (C) .12 Memo (R) of Gen McNair for G-3OPD, 7 Dec 42, sub: Orgn of Armd Units.320.2/18 (Armd

F) (C) .

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furnished bystandard infantry divisionsmoved when necessaryby trucks froman army pool.

The fate of the motorized division is traced below. The War Departmenthesitated to abandon this unit but did authorize themobilization of fifteenbattalionsof armored infantry. It was felt also in the War Department GeneralStaff, after further study offoreign armies, that reorganizationof the Americanarmored division must be immediatelyconsidered.13 The commanding generalof the Army Ground Forceswas instructed, on 26 January 1943, to prepare newtables at once. 14

GeneralMcNairsubmitted,on 28January,one of hismost careful statementson the use ofarmor: 15

1. The basic memorandum presentsclearly and impressivelya broad picture of tremen-dous significance—onewhich, in my view, we have not yetfaced adequately.

2. It is believedthat our general concept of an armoredforce—that it is an instrumentof exploitation, not greatly different in principle from horse cavalry of old—is sound.However, some, particularly armored enthusiasts, have been led away from this conceptby current events which have been misinterpreted. The German armored force of 1940 wasorganized for a particular situation, and was brilliantly successful for that reason. It wasused at the outset as a force of exploitation, since it was well known that nothing in Europeat that time was capable of stopping it; the antitankmeasures then in vogue werewholly

and hopelesslyinadequate.3. The struggles in Libya—particularlythe battles of late May and early June, 1942—

demonstrated conclusively that armor could not assault strong, organized positions exceptwith prohibitive losses. The German 88 ruined the British armored force, which was em-ployed unsoundly. The German armored force then exploited the success obtained andruined the entire British force.

4. The battle of El Alamein demonstrated the correct employment of the Britisharmor, which was held in reserve until the infantry, artillery, and air had opened a hole.The British armor then exploited thesuccess and destroyed the German force.

5. Thus, we need large armored units toexploit the success of our infantry. We needsmall armored units also, in order to assist the infantry locally. The Russians appear tohave devoted their armor largely to thelatter principle,influenced undoubtedlyby the factthat until recently they have been on thedefensive strategically. It seems doubtfulthatthey will need large armored units in the near future. If they do, such units can be formedreadily.

13 WD memo (S) MID 904 (1-11-43) for CofS USA, 11 Jan 43, sub: Trends in Orgn of Armd Fs.320.2/20 (Armd F) (S).

14 This paper has not been located, but is cited in General McNair's memo, 28 January 1943, andelsewhere.

15 Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 28 Jan 43, sub: Trends in Orgn of Armd Fs. 320.2/20

(Armd F) (S).

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In redesigningthe armored division, inadvance of combat experience andin view of wide differences of opinion,both the Army Ground Forces and theArmored Force desired as elastic and adaptable a structure aspossible. 19 Thesame principles of flexibility were applied as were currently being applied tonondivisionalarmy and corps troops. The regimental echelon in the armoreddivision was abolished. The battalionbecame the basic unit. The division re-ceived organically three battalions of tanks, three of armored infantry, andthree of armored field artillery. Infantry strength in proportion to tanks wasthereby doubled.At the same time separate tank battalions, separate armoredinfantry battalions, and separate armored field artillery battalions were set upin nondivisional pools. These battalions were made identical with the corre-spondingbattalionsorganic in the armored division.Hence they could readilybe attached to thearmored division.

To make possible ready attachmentand detachment all battalions ofarmored types—tank,infantry, and artillery, both those organic in the armoreddivision and those which were nondivisional—weremade administrativelyself-contained. Eachreceived a service company (or battery) to bring suppliesfrom army supplypoints, and a headquarters company (orbattery) large enoughto carry the burden of administration.All tank battalions becamealike and

hence interchangeable.Previously there had been battalions ofmedium tanksand battalions oflight tanks; plans for the heavy tank battalion were suspendedearly in 1943 and in any case did not apply to the armored division. The newcomposite tank battalion was much strongerthan the old medium battalion.Like the old medium battalion it had three companies ofmedium tanks;inaddition it had a company of light tanks for reconnaissance orother missionsrequiring speed, and six medium tanksmounting 105-mm. howitzers.

"The fundamental objective,"General McNairwrote to General Patton,"is to provide moreinfantry than at present. However,the organizationis suchthat battalions of either armor or infantry may be added or subtracted from adivisionat will. Although the divisionorganicallyprobablywill aggregate some-

19 On this andfollowing paragraphs: (1) Personal ltr of GenDevers to Gen McNair, 1 Dec 42. 320.2/42 2(Armd F). (2) Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Patton, 21 Aug 43.McNair Correspondence.(3) Per-sonal ltr of Gen McNair to GenHarmon, 3 Apr 44. McNair Correspondence. (4)Correspondence betweenAGF and Armd F. 320.2/66 (Armd F) (R). (5) Armd F ltr to AGF, 11 Jun 43, sub: T/O&E's for ArmdF Units. 320.2/487 (Arm d F). (6) AG F memo (R) for G-3 WD , 23 Jun 43,sub: Reorgn of Armd Divs.320.2/66 (Armd F) (R). (7) AGF mem o for G-3 WD, 1 Sep 43, sub asabove. 320.2-66 (Armd F) ( R) .

(8) PublishedT/O 17 and related tables of 15 Sep 43.

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328 ORGANIZATIONOF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS

thing like 11,000, you maymake it 20,000 if you sodesire, simply by adding ar-mored orinfantry battalions." 20 He might have said armoredartillerybattalions

also, or, indeed, engineer, ordnance, or other units, since all nondivisionalunitsin the Army Ground Forces were being reorganized in thesame way. In Gen-eral McNair'smind the distinctionbetweenthe armored divisionand temporaryarmored formations tended to fade. He envisaged the possibility that armoredgroupsmight perform therole of armoreddivisions.Battalionsof tanks,armoredinfantry, and armored artillery, takenfrom nondivisionalpools, could, insteadof being addedto armored divisions, be combinedwith each other under groupheadquarters and with such service units as were needed, and thus in effectconstitutesmall temporary armoreddivisions.21

In practice no such over-all flexibility was obtained.While some twentyseparatebattalionsof armored artillery remained in existence,all but one of theseparatearmored infantry battalionswere inactivatedin 1943 in the face of themanpower shortage. Nor were enough separate tank battalions mobilized toprovide an effective pool. The need of infantry divisions fortanks, in the cam-paigns in Italy,western Europe, and elsewhere,proved to be more constantthanwas anticipated in 1942 and 1943. Hence virtually all available tank battalionsbecame more or less permanently attached toinfantry divisions.Interchange-

ability broke down. Armored divisions could not bereinforced by tank orarmored infantry battalions. Nor could armoredbattalions be combined intoarmored groups.The armored group in the theaters lost its functions.22

Flexibilitywithin the armored division was enhanced by thereorganization.Elimination of the tank regimentsand the infantry regiment, and creation ofself-containedbattalions,made all battalionsdirectly attachableto the combatcommandsor to the "reserve command" set up as a third subheadquarters inthe reorganized division. General McNair desired that the two combat com-

mands be redesignated "groups."23

As headquarters to which battalionscouldbe variably attached by thedivision commander they strongly resembled thegroup headquartersthen being widely introduced for flexible control of non-divisional units. Adoption of theterm "group" would have emphasized thetendency for the armored division to lose divisional identity. But "combat

20 Personal ltr of GenMcNair to Gen Patton, 21 Aug 43.McNairCorrespondence.21 See below, pp. 333-35.22 For example, ObserversRpt M-1 (Lt Col F. Bacon on Luzon Operations), 1 Mar 45. AGF G-2 Files.23 (1) AGF M/S ( R ) , CG to Rqts, 2 Feb 43. AGF Orgn Div, Rqts Sec file. (2) Items in footnote 19

above. (3) G-3 WDmemo (R) for CGAGF, 22 Jul 43,Sub: Reorgn of Arm dDivs. 320.2/66 (Armd F) (R) .

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pool, despite projects for their employment inarmored groups or in reinforce-ment of armored divisions, inpractice became habituallyattached to infantrydivisions in the theaters.With the infantry division gaining tanks, and thearmored divisiongaining infantry, the two cameslightly together. But thediffer-ence remained radical: the armored division had a battalion oftanks for eachbattalion of infantry; the infantry division, with an attached tank battalion,had a battalion of tanks for nine battalions of infantry. The two divisionsremained suited for altogether different roles, since their infantry also wasdifferently equipped.

General McNair continued to consider the armored division anexpensivemilitaryinvestment.The new tableshad not long been publishedwhenhe noted,on 9 October 1943, that the "slugging component"of the division (tanks andinfantry) numbered only 5,190, the remaining 5,747 being supporting and over-head elements.37 To maintain sixteen armored divisions seemedto him a luxuryin the circumstances then obtaining, with manpower so short that plannedactivationswere being cancelled and infantry divisions were being stripped fo rreplacements needed inItaly. Eventsof 1943 had confirmed him in the belief,stated on 28 January 1943 in the memorandum quoted at length above, that theproper function of armored divisionswas to exploit a success already won. For

this purposehe thought, in October1943, that an army aggregatingonly ninetydivisionsof all types needed nomore than ten armored divisions. "An armoreddivision," he wrote, "is of value only in pursuit or exploitation. For plain andfancy slugging against an enemy who isunbroken or at least intact the tankbattalion or group is adequate." He thought that tank and infantry battalionscould engage in close fighting with less overhead than the armored division pro-vided. He recommended to the War Department that six armored divisionsbeinactivated,their tank and infantry battalions retained as nondivisionalunits,and their remaining personnel used either as overseas replacements or as fillersfor new units in the mobilizationprogram. 38 The War Department rejected thisproposal,and the Arm y retained itssixteen armored divisions.

It was felt by some that General McNair took a negative and unfriendlyattitude toward armor. That he was a severe critic of armored organization can-not bedoubted. Challengedon these matters in February 1944, he declaredflatlyto the Assistant Secretaryof War, speakingof the forthcom ing invasionof west-

37 AGF M/S (C), CG to Plans, 1 Oct 43. AGFPlans Sec file (C).38

AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD , 16 Oct 43,sub: TB 1944. 320.2/1 (TB 44) (S).

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VI. Experimental Divisions

Infantry and armored divisionsbore the main burden of the land fightingin World War II: they came to number eighty-twoout of theeighty-ninedivi-sions mobilized. Motorized, cavalry, airborne, mountain, and light divisionswere in varying degree experimental—evenmore so than the armored division,although they were in substance infantry divisions, differing from standardinfantry chiefly in their meansof transport to the scene of combat.

Cavalry and Motorized Divisions

The cavalry division may seem an exception. Far from being a novel ex-periment, the cavalry division was an old organization, and its cavalrymenremained in principle horsed, not mechanized. 1 But transportation of horseswas so costly in ship tonnage, and their feeding and upkeep presented suchgreat difficulties to a motorized army, thatno plans were made for shipmentof cavalry divisions with their mounts.Of the two divisionsmobilized, the 2dCavalry Division was dispatched toNorth Africa early in 1944 only to beinactivated and broken up.Suitable employment for the 1stCavalry Divisionwas found in the SouthwestPacific, where it fought dismounted as infantry,under special Tables of Organization and Equipment which raised it almostto the size of an infantry division. It retained the basic squareformation of thecavalry division and lacked the155-mm. howitzer battalion found in the in-fantry division,but was supplied with special allowancesof heavy weapons andother equipment of infantry type. It should be noted that the single cavalry

1 (1) Memo of SW for USW, 21 Jul 42, sub not given. 321/99 (Cav). (2) AGF memo for G-3 WD,

5 May 42, sub: Cav Orgn. 321/51 (Cav).

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division included only a fraction of cavalry units in the Army, for over 20,000cavalrymen, allmechanized, were present in infantry and armored divisions,and almost30,000 in nondivisionalcavalry squadrons, chiefly mechanized.

The motorized division was adopted shortly after Pearl Harbor, with theintention that one be mobilized for each tw o armored divisions, the three toform a normal armored corps.The division in its short life went through vari-ous stages of planning,but in general it was conceived as aninfantry divisionequipped organically with trucks for simultaneousmovement without shut-tling, and with large elements for reconnaissance,maintenance,and supplyto give it tactical independence.From the beginningGeneral McNairadvisedagainst this type of division,believing itwasteful to assign so much transporta-

tion organically, and preferring that improvementsin infantry be made avail-able to allinfantry divisionsalike. 2

Five infantry divisions were ordered converted to motorized in 1942, andfive more were planned for 1943; but in practice only the 4thDivision wasfully outfitted with the appropriate equipment, and it received sogreat anadditional quantity ofequipment and personnel, over the established Tableof Organization, as to constitute a specialtask force. It was earmarked inAugust 1942 for overseas shipment. But it required so much ship tonnage—as

much as an armored division without having thesame hitting power—that notheater commander requested it in the followingmonths. 3 Even at T/O strength,the motorized division included almost3,000 vehicles, over 1,000 more than thereduced infantry division as planned by the ArmyGround Forces. Its tiresconsumed almost twiceas many tons of rubber—318compared with 166. Itsequipmentrequiredalmost twiceas much ocean tonnage—approximately60,000compared with 32,0000. The motorized division was, therefore, viewedwithextreme disfavor by the AG F ReductionBoard. GeneralMcNair recommendedits abolition.

4

The question was not whether infantry should be motorized,but how motorvehicles should beorganized to motorize it most effectively. Infantry could not

2 Memo for Gen Moore, 19 Jan 42, sub: Conservationof Mil Equip.McNair Correspondence.3 AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 4 May 1943, sub: Reorgn of the Mtz Div. 322/5 (4th Div) (S).4 (1) WD ltr AG 320.2 (1-19-42) PC-C, 20 Feb 42, sub: Orgn of the Mtz Div. AGO Records. (2) T/O

77, 1 Aug 42. (3) Table, undated (Jan 43 ) sub: Comparativefigures between Mtz and InfDivs. AGF OrgnDiv, Rqts Sec files. (4) AGF M/S (S), Red Bd to CG, 23 Jan 43,sub: Mtz Div. AGF Orgn Div, Rqts Secfiles. (5 ) Memo (C) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 7 Dec 42,sub: Orgn of Armd Units. 320.2/18 (Armd F)

(C). (6) Memo (S) of GenMcNair for G-3 WD, 28 Jan 43,sub: Basisof Orgn of MtzDiv. 322/1 (Divs) (S).

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fight from trucks; trucks were used only to put it into position for battle. Itwas desirable that a given number of trucks provide this form of mobility for

a maximum number of troops. In 1936 the War Department, whenplanningto triangularize thedivision, had laid down the principle that motor transportfor infantrymen should be pooled. General McNair clungto this principle.Shipping considerations nowgave it added weight.

The standard infantry divisionwas by no meansimmobile. All elementsbut the infantry were motorized. With its organic trucks the divisioncouldmove in short bounds by shuttling, its trucks dumping their organic loads,moving the infantry, then returning to bring up the loads. Asreduced by theArmy Ground Forces in the months following November1942, the divisioncould move all personnel and equipment simultaneously ifreinforced by sixquartermaster truck companies,each operating forty-eight 2½-ton trucks. Sixsuch companies,even with forty-eight1-ton trailers apiece, requiredonly 15,000ship tons, roughly half the difference between the standard infantry and themotorizedinfantry division.With a pool of suchcompaniesan armycommandercould operate flexibly, either using the trucks to motorize infantry divisionsatwill or employing them for altogetherdifferent purposes if more urgent.

For a time the Operations Division (OPD), War Department General

Staff, was unwilling to do away with the motorized division,believing it neces-sary as a means ofgiving infantry support to armored divisions. The decisionto raise the infantry-tank ratio within the armored division reduced this need.OPD withdrew itsobjectionson 18February1943, contingentupon reorganiza-tion of the armored division as proposedby theArmyGround Forces. All motor-ized divisionsexcept the 4thwere reconverted to standard infantry in March1943. 5

The Army Ground Forces, understandingfrom OPD that there was no

prospectiveemploymentfor a motorizeddivision,requestedpermission torecon-vert the 4thalso. 6 OPD decided that "the 4th MotorizedDivisionshouldbe main-tained for the present as a nucleus ofpersonnel trainedfor a function, thevalueof which has not beenconclusivelydisproved." 7 The EuropeanTheater, queried

5 (1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 (12-7-42) for CofS USA, 16 Jan 43, sub: Orgn of Armd Units.AG O Records 320.2 (1-16-43) (5) (S). (2) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 (2-24-43) to CofS USA, 24Feb 43, sub: Reorgn of the Mtz Div. AGO Records,320.2 (12-7-42) (S) .

6 AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 4 May 43, sub: Reorgn of Mtz Div. 322/5 (4th Div) (S) .7

WD D/F (S) OPD 320.2 ETO (5-4-43) for G-3 WD, 6 May 43, sub as above. 322/5 (4th Div) (S) .

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on the subject, stated on 16 June 1943 that no motorized division was includedin itsplansfor 1944 but that all infantry divisionsshould receive training in motormovement.8 The 4th Division was then reconverted.A standingoperatingpro-cedure for motor movementof infantry divisionswas developedby the InfantrySchool. 9 Motor movement with attached trucksbecame a standard part ofinfantry division training.

Disappearanceof the motorized division as a special unit was an incidentin the reorganizationof infantryand armored divisions. Its loss was notregrettedlater. Understress of combat,units accomplishedfeats of transportnot foreseenby the most economical planners. The 18th Infantry, during the rush acrossnorthern France, after having required100 quartermaster trucks for thesametype of job, found that it could move more than thirty miles a day without addi-tional transportation,remaining at all times in condition to fight, simply bypiling infantrymen on the howitzers, tanks, and tankdestroyers attached tothe regimentalcombat team. 10 By similar improvisedmethods the entire 36thDivision passed through the city of Rome in tenhours. 11

Airborne, Mountain,Jungleand "Light" Divisions

It was clear in 1942 that the Army mustprepareitself for a varietyof special-ized operations,both operations underextreme conditionsof climate,exempli-fied in Norway, Libya,and Malaysia, andoperationsby specialmeansof assault,such as amphibious andairborne.The practicalquestion was how far to go inorganizing special-typeunits for these operations.GeneralMcNair did not wishto go very far. Following the principlesof flexibility and economy, he wasdis-inclined to organize manpowerand resources for special needswhich mightnever materialize,or which, if they did, might be less urgent than the need forstandard forces. He believed that training inspecial-typeunits almost invariablytaught particular skills ("tricks") at the expenseof general militaryproficiency.He emphasizedthe futility of perfecting men in thetechniquesof skis,gliders,or

8 Radio (S) CM-In-10004, 16 Jun 43 (S). WD Classified MessageCenter.9 AGF ltr to TIS, 27 Aug 43, sub: SOP for Inf DivsProvided with Mtr Trans for Foot Elements.

321/696 (Inf).10 "BattleExperiencesPublishedby Hq 12th Army Group,"No. 64 (R), 13 Oct 44. AGF G-2 Records.11 Maj Gen F. L. Walker, "Experiences with the 36th Division in Italy," Military Review, XXIV

(1945), 15.

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landing craft if after meeting the enemy theywere not competent all-roundsoldiers. He preferred, therefore, to have the Army Ground Forces concentrateon production of standard units and give special training only to unitswhichhad completed their standard training, and only when operationsrequiringspecial training could be definitely foreseen.Much of such training, he thought,could best be given in the theaters.Training for specialized operationscould bemore realistic in the theater where theoperations wereto take place, and suchoperations usually required a long enough period of preparation to make appro-priate training feasible.12

In the sixmonths from March to September1942 the Army Ground Forceslaunched four special installations:the Desert Training Center, the AirborneCommand (later "Center"), the Amphibious Training Command (later "Cen-ter"), and the Mountain Training Center. 13 Each had the mission of testingequipment and formulatingrequirements within the field of its specialty, and ofsupervising the specialtraining of such standard units asmight be entrusted toit for the purpose. The Airborne Commandalso produced special-typetroops, atfirst mainly parachutists butincludinga gliderbattalion.At the MountainTrain-ing Center a few specially designatedmountainunits were assembled.No spe-cially designateddesertor amphibiousforces developed. Airborne andmountain

troops were not organized in units aslarge as the division.The airborne and the mountain divisions, though not yet physically organ-

ized, were among the six types of divisions recognized by the War Departmentin March 1942. The mountain division was a true division, with a publishedTable of Organization. The airborne divisionwas not thought of as a truedivi-sion but rather as a task force to be assembledwhen neededby combiningpara-chute regiments with standard forces trained in air transport for the occasion.This conceptionof the airbornedivisionkept reappearingin the followingyears.

The strategic plansinitiated in March 1942, looking to invasion of westernEurope in April 1943, included the use of one United States airborne division. 14

GeneralMcNair, after consultationwith the Airborne Command,became con-vinced of the need for a formally organized airborne division, activated andtrained as such. "An airborne division should be evolved," he noted for his staff

12 See for example AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 24 Oct 42,sub: Jungle Tng. 353/1 (Mtn& Jungle) (S).13 See studiesof each of these installationsprepared by the AGFHistoricalSection.14 Memo (S) of ColLemnitzer for CofS AGF, 17 Jun 42,sub: A/B Div forBolero. AG F Plans Sec file,

20/1 (Bolero) (S) .

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in June 1942, "with a stinginess of overhead and in transportationwhich hasabsolutely no counterpartthus far in our military establishment."15 The WarDepartmentapproved an AGF proposal to activate two such divisions,and inAugust 1942 the 82d and the101st Airborne Divisions wereformed by con-versionof the 82dInfantry Division,with added parachuteregiments.16 A Tableof Organization for the airbornedivision, prepared at the headquarters of theArmy Ground Forces in August, was publishedunder date of 15October 1942. 17

Five airborne divisions wereeventually activatedunder this table.As conceivedin 1942 (and until the end of 1944) the airbornedivision was

a miniature infantry division, with an aggregate strength of only 8,500, butcomplete withall normal divisional partsplus a small organicantiaircraft bat-talion. Each division had one parachute infantry regiment, and two gliderinfantry regiments, numbering 1,958 and 1,605 men respectively, in contrastwith the 3,000 troops in the standardinfantry regiment.Weapons were those ofthe infantry division, with a predominance of the lighter types; the divisionartillery consisted of thirty-six75-mm. pack howitzers. Vehicles numbered only408 motors and 239 trailers, a total of647, in contrast with some 2,000 in thestandard infantry division.The division had noorganic aircraft, dependingformovement on thepool of transportplanes controlled by the Army Air Forces.

Tables for the airborne division remained substantiallyunchangedfor twoyears. On enteringcombat, however, theairborne divisionsdeparted consider-ably from their tabular organization, rearranging their resources to meet thecircumstancesof each case.

In the summer of 1942, with an offensive in the SouthwestPacific in view,the War Departmentturned its attention to the preparation of mountain andjungle troops.The standard infantry divisionhad too many heavy weapons andvehicles to move easily through roadless, mountainous, or densely woodedcountry. In A ugust1942 OPD urged consideration of a lightly equippedjungledivision of some 10,000 officers and men. 18 War Department plans for mobiliza-

15 (1) AGF M/S (S), CG to CofS 19 Jun 42. (2) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 2 Jul 42,sub:Policy re Tng of A/BTrs. (3) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 17 Jul 42,sub: Activation of A/B Divs. All in320.2/3 and 4 (AB) (S).

16 AGF ltr (R) to CGsThird Army and A/B Comd, 30 Jul 42, sub: Activation of 82d and 101st A/BDivs. 320.2/9 (AB) (R).

17 T/O 71, 15 Oct 42, and allied tables.18 WD memo (S) OPD 320.2 (8-7-42) for G-3 WD, 7 Aug 42, sub: Trs for Jungle Combat. 353/3

(Mtn & Jungle) (S) .

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tion in 1943, though not fully crystallized atthis time, contemplated two orthree mountain and jungle divisions. 19

General McNair, while believing jungletraining to be possible in certainparts of Florida and Louisiana,had no desire to establish a jungle center inthe United States. This view received support from General MacArthur, whonotified the War Department that he preferred his units to receive standardtraining at home, and jungle training in the SouthwestPacific under his ownsupervision. At thesame time General MacArthur agreed that an experimentwith a lightly equippedinfantry divisionmight be profitable.General McNairsaw the formation of mountain and jungle units as two aspects of a singleproblem, namely, the creation of a unit dependent in large measureon humanand animal transportation.He wished a minimum of animals in the Army'stransport and advised against theformation of "light divisions,"which includedanimal units, of unsuitable power for employment in many theaters. Hethought that for the time being the whole enterprise shouldbe kept on anexperimental basis,confined to research on mountain and jungle requirementsand to the special training of a few infantry regiments and supporting units.Mountain training on this scalewas already beginning at the Mountain Train-ing Center, and jungletraining was conducted inPanama. By using personnel

so trained as cadres and drawing on the results of research,mountain andjungle divisions couldbe formed in the future if and when prospects of theiremployment became more certain. 20

Both the AGF G-3 Section and OPD, however, favored the formation oflight divisions atonce.

21 The whole problem of reducingGround Force needsfor ship space was under discussion in October 1942. 22 It was also felt thatstandard divisions would haveto be virtually reorganized, reequipped, andretrained for amphibious operationsand for mountain or jungle warfare.Thishad been the experience with divisions sentto England in the summer of 1942

19 WD ltr (S) AG 320.2 (8-27-42) MS-C-M to CGs AGF, A AF, SOS, 28 Aug 42, sub: TB 1943.320.2/3 (TB) (43) (S).

20 See papers in 353/1 and 3 (Mtn & Jungle) (S), especially AG F memo for G-3 WD, 24 Oct 42,sub:JungleTng.

21 (1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (10-1-42) for OPD, 1 Oct 42, sub: Revisionof Certain TypeUnits in TB. (2) WDmemo (S) OPD 320.2 (10-1-42) for G-3 WD, sub asabove, 12 Oct 42.Both in OPDRecords320.2 Sec IX (9) (S).

22 See above, pp. 286-89.

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for the early cross-Channelplans,with divisionspreparingfor amphibiousland-ings in North Africa, and with divisions initiating the offensive in the SolomonIslands and New Guinea.OPD, to avoid such special refitting of standard divi-sions, proposed an all-purpose light division, to beusable in any conditionswhererelatively littleequipment couldbe carried . Suchconditionswere thoughtby OPD to exist not only in mountain and jungle warfare but also in amphibi-ous and airborne undertakings.It was felt by OPD that thelight division,likecertain Japaneseforces, should be able to operate withoutmotor transport andeven withoutanimals.23

In January 1943 the War Department directed the Army Ground Forcesto prepare tables for such a unit.24 The light division now proposed was moreacceptable to General McNairthan the light division previously envisaged. Itwas less subjectto the disadvantage ofoverspecialization.At the same time thegeneral program for economizingmanpower andequipmenthad begun. TheArmy Ground Forceswas engrossed in the reduction ofunits of all types. Shipspace for ground troops wascritically short. Thesewere the monthswhen nodivisionswere leaving the United States. Without having initiated or promotedthe idea of the light division, the Army Ground Forces assumed the task ofdeveloping it and had genuineinterest in its success.It washoped that the light

division, though admittedlyweaker than the standard infantry division,wouldneverthelessbring to bear, in thecircumstancesin which it was used, as muchfire power as would a standard divisionin the samecircumstances.It could beshipped overseas more readily than the standard division, would be easier tosupply and maintain,and like all divisionsit could be reinforced as needed fromnondivisionalpools.

Preliminarytables for a light division were submitted to the WarDepart-ment on 2 March1943. 25 The division asoutlined had a total strength of about9,000. It had the same parts as an infantry division, except thatall parts weresmaller, no reconnaissance troop was provided, andfield artillery was limitedto three battalionsof 75-mm. pack howitzers. Thedivision was meant to be

23 WD memo (S) OPD320.2 (12-30-42) for G-3 WD, 30 Dec 42,sub: Light Divs. OPD Records, 320.2Sec IX (9) (S).

24 (1) WD D/F (S)WDGCT 320.2 Gen (12-30-42) for CG AGF, 5 Jan 43,sub: Light Divs. (2) AGFmemo (S) for G-3 WD , 29 Jan 43, sub as above.322/2 (Divs) (S).

25 (1) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD , 2 Mar 43, sub as above. 32 2/2(Divs) (S). (2) T/O&E 72 T,21 Jan 44. (3) AGF M/S (C), CG to CofS, 5 Jul 43, sub: Rpt on WinterOpns of 2d Inf Div, 1942-43.353/1 (Winter) (C).

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usable for mountain, jungle, airborne, or amphibious operations through at-tachment of appropriate transportation. Organic transportation was limited tohandcarts (together with toboggan sleds for cold-weather mountain oper-ations), except that the field artillery had either pack mulesor ¼-ton trucks.Other elements than the field artillery would receive transportationby attach-ment in the form needed—pack mules, light trucks, or native bearers—inquantity sufficient to bring supplies from army supply points (or their equiva-lent) five miles in the rear, or in larger quantity if supply lines were longer.For airborne operationsthe light division would train with gliders and wouldbe combined with nondivisional parachuteregiments to form an airborne strik-ing force of divisionalsize. In mountainsthe division could be reenforced by theattachmentof ski troops. Used amphibiously,the divisionwould of course trainwith landingcraft. Armamentwould vary slightly accordingto the operation,with special issues of submachineguns for jungle fighting, automaticrifles forairborne and amphibiousassaults, and M1rifles for the mountains.

Organization was now ready, but mobilization remained problematical.Whether or not to convert airborne to light divisions long remained an openquestion. Conversion of the cavalry divisions was likewise anissue.

26General

McNair in April 1943 recommended the formation of eight light divisions.27

Ten light divisions were proposed in May byG-3, WDGS, to be formed byconversion of sixinfantry and four airbornedivisions—allthe airborne divisionsexcept the 82d, which wasalready overseas preparingfor the landing in Sicily.28

General Eisenhowerthoughtthe light division might have a limited usefulnessin such terrain as in Tunisia.29 Col. F. D. Merrill, then representingGeneralStilwell in Washington, called the proposed light division almost identicalwiththe Chinese divisions as reorganized in India and believed that light divisionswould be valuablein jungles andmountains and in undevelopedcountries suchas China. 30 General MacArthur, for whose theater the light division hadbeen

26 (1) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 25 Feb 43,sub: Light Divs. 322/2 (Divs) (S) . (2) WDmemo OP D 320.2 (12-30-42) for G-3 WD, 3 Feb 43, sub asabove.OPD Records.

27 Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 14 Apr 43, sub: Modification of Mob Procedures.381/177 (S) .28 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (5-17-43) for CofS USA, 17 May 43, sub: LightDivs. OPD

Records, 320.2 Sec IX (9)(S).29 Radio (S) CM-In-550, Algiers to War, 1 Jun 43. WD ClassifiedMessageCenter.30 Memo (S) of Col F. D. Merrill for Chief, Tr Sec, Logistics Gp, OPD, 22 May 43. Written on OPD

letterhead, signed "For Lt. Gen. Stilwell." OPD Records,320.2 Sec IX (9) (S ) .

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primarily designed, thought the proposed light division too deficient in firepower and too weak logistically for employment in thePacific islands.31

Proceeding cautiously, the War Department in June 1943 authorized theformation for test purposes ofonly one light division, to be obtained by con-version of one of the standardinfantry divisions alreadymobilized.32 Attachedtransportationwas to be trucks. The Army Ground Forces, believing that thetime hadcome to give divisionalorganizationto units at the MountainTrainingCenter, recommendedthe formationof a second light division,using pack mules.This was approved by the WarDepartment. 33 Coming back to the idea of ajungle division, the ArmyGround Forces also recommended and obtainedapproval for the formation of athird light division, totrain as a pack unit.34

Three light divisions were therefore authorized in June 1943. The 89thLight Division (Truck) was formed by conversionof the 89th Infantry Division.The 10th Light Division (Pack, Alpine) was activated mainly from elementstrained at theMountain Training Center, centering about the 87th MountainInfantry Regiment.The 71st Light Division (Pack, Jungle) was activated frommiscellaneous elementsalready mobilized, mainly the 5th Infantry and14thInfantry, which had received jungle training in Panama. Each was toengagein tests and maneuvers at the earliestpracticablemoment. Each was in effect

a specialunit, hardly embodyingthe flexible principleswhich lay behind earlierplans. Indeed, themountaineersand skiexperts now incorporatedinto the 10thLight Division could ha rdly beused in tropicalwarfare without excessivewasteof human material.

Activationof the three light divisionsadded no strength to the Arm y, beingsimply a reorganization of elementsalready in existence.The three light divi-sions were included in the total of ninetydivisions of all types towhich themobilizationprogram was reduced in June 1943. With the number of standarddivisions thus restricted,no more was heard of converting standardinfantry tolight. In September GeneralMcNair again raised the question of converting

31(1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (5-21-43) for CofS USA, 21 May 43, sub: Light Divs. AGO

Records 322 (21 May 43)(22) (S). (2) For Gen McNair'scomments on Gen MacArthur 'sviews, see memoof Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 24 May 43,sub: Proposed Light Div. 322/2 (Divs) (S).

32 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (5-21-43) fo r CofS USA, 21 May 43, sub: Light Divs. AGORecords 322 (21 May 43)(22) (S).

33 WD memo (S ) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (5-21-43) for CG AGF, 3 Jun 43, sub as above, withmemofor record. AGO Records 322 (21 M ay 43)(22) (S).

34 AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD , 15 Jun 43,sub: 89th and 71st Light Divs, 10th M tn Div. (Approvedby DCofS USA, 21 Jun 43.) 322/2 (Divs) (S).

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the airbornedivisions.35 Airborne operations inSicily had been disappointing.Three airborne divisions were still in the United States, with their usefulness

limited to special activities the value of which was currently in doubt. GeneralMcNair proposedthat the airbornedivisionsbe broken up, with their parachuteelements set up asnondivisionalunits, and their remainingelementsorganizedas light divisions and given a broad general training. Training for airborneoperations, he proposed, should take place in the theater foreach operationand should begiven to combinations of parachute units and light divisionsselected for thepurpose.This proposalwas notacceptedby the WarDepartment.In October 1943, while the idea of expandingthe Ground Forcesto 105divisionswas under consideration,the War Departmentproposed activatingfour morelight divisions, to make a total ofseven.36 It was now General McNairwhoopposed an increase of light divisions.37 He did so even before the collapse ofthe 105-divisionprogram, after which in any case no increase oflight divisionswould probablyhaveoccurred.

General McNair advised against further activation of light divisions be-cause of opposition from the Southwest Pacific. Officers of this theater pro-nounced the light division uselessfor amphibiousoperationssince thefirst land-ing waves had to be immediately reinforced in all possible strength.They said

that heavier artillerythan 75-mm. pack howitzers andmore capaciousvehiclesthan ¼-ton jeeps were indispensable at whatever cost ofocean shipping orroad-building effort. The theater preferred to use the standarddivision, evenwhen only a fraction of the division was committed, and to employ theremain-der of the division as a source of reinforcement and supply.Commandersin thetheater declared thatthe best policyfor fighting in remote localities suchas thenorth shore of New Guinea, at the end of long airborne and seaborne supplylines, was to put in a standard division, and use it to thepoint of exhaustion.The SouthwestPacific Area Commandwas unwilling toreceive any light divi-sions except as additions to thestandard infantry divisions allotted to it. 38

35 AGF memo (S) forCofS USA, 22 Sep 43,sub: Rpt of Bd on A/BOpns. 353/17 (AB) ( S ) .36 Tentative TB 1944. AG F Plans Sec file 185 (S) . See above, "Ground Forces in the Army, December

1941-April 1945: a Statistical Study."37 AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 17 Nov 43, sub: Proposed Light Div. 322/2 (Divs) (S ) .38 (1) Memo (S) of CofS AGF for CG AGF, 24 Mar 43, sub: Summary of Statements by GenSuther-

land. 320.2/149 (PTO) (S). (2) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (5-21-43) for CofS USA, 21 May 43,sub: Light Divs. AGO Records 322 (21 May 43) (22) ( S ) . (3) Hq USAF in Far East ltr (S) to TAGthrough C-in-C, SWPA, 2 Oct 43. 322/2 (Divs) (S).

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General McNair believed this attitude short-sighted and wasteful. Hewrote to the War Department on 17 November1943: 39

The SouthwestPacific Area now has aUnited Statesforce aggregating some 272,000,including 124,000 service forces (46%). The maintenance of this force probably involvesover 270,000 shiptons per month—one ton per man. There are five combat divisions whichhave reached there over a considerable period of time. These divisions are substantiallyequivalent to eightlight divisions, without consideringth e supporting units required. Fivestandard divisionsrequire 173,000 ship tons forequipment while eight light divisions requ ire54,000 tons. Thus, the light divisions would effect a saving for equipment of 119,000 tons—a fairly negligible amount in comparisonwith the shipping required tosupport the presentgreat garrison.

Under current W ar Department policies allowing the theatercommanderswide latitudein utilizing th e shipping available to them, it is clear that the Southwest Pacific Area hasno intention of accepting alight division of whatever organization, unlessforced to do so bythe War Department. The 1st Cavalry Division now has a reported aggregate strength of13,258, practically the same as the standardinfantry division.

. . . upon completionof the current tests of light divisions,it will be necessary to decide,not only the details ofsuch organization, but whether theater commanderswill be requiredto accept a light division when they prefer th e heavier standard infantry division. In themeantime, it appears highly inadvisable to contemplate the activation oflight divisions inaddition to thethree already in being.

The 10th, 71st, and 89th Light Divisions therefore remained the onlyunits oftheir kind. They were experimentalorganizations rather than units known tobe forming for combat. They continued with their tests with the outcome al-ready partly decided againstthem.

Tests of the 71st and 89th Light Divisions (Pack and Truck respectively)culminated in maneuvers of the twodivisionsagainst each other from Februaryto April 1944. The terrain chosen was themountainous,virtually roadless, rela-tively warm area of theHunter Liggett Military Reservationin California. TheIII Corps, which supervised the maneuvers, reported unfavorably. Handcarts,used by both divisions, were found to be inadequate and excessively fatiguing.Additional pack and truck transportationwas provided during th e maneuversto permit continued action,and additional engineers were furnished to buildtrails needed by both mules and jeeps.Infantry regiments, only two-thirds thestrength of the standard regiment to start with, employed a third or a half

39 (1) AGF memo (S) (rewritten by Gen McNair) for G-3 WD , 17 Nov 43,sub: Proposed Light Div.322/2 (Divs) ( S ) . (2 ) Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Maj Gen C. H. W hite, 27Dec. 43 . McNair Cor-

respondence.

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their combat soldiers to build trails and bring up supplies. Neither divisionmanaged to deploy more than six battalions ofinfantry. Reconnaissanceunits

had to be improvised. The III Corps, concluding that the light division wasincapableof sustainingitself for a period of any length, recommendeda returnto the organization and equipment of the standard infantry division, withtransfer of organic pack units (field artillery andquartermaster)to the nondivi-sional pool, from which they might be attached to standard divisions formoun-tain warfare.40

After these recommendations wereaccepted by General McNair and bythe War Department General Staff, which had lost faith in the light divisioneven before the tests were concluded,41 the 71st and 89th were reconverted tostandard divisions. Receivingadditional personnel from inactivation ofanti-aircraft battalions,and retraining as standard divisions at thelast moment, bothwere among the last divisions to gooverseas,leaving the command of theArmyGround Forces in January 1945.42 The 71st Division, despite its jungleback-ground, was dispatched to the EuropeanTheater to help meet the emergencyof the German breakthroughof December 1944. The incident illustratedthewisdom of avoidingoverspecializationof forces.

Tests of the 10th Light Division (Pack, Alpine) produced equallynegative

results. Personneland equipment were found to be insufficient in quantity.The Army Ground Forces in May 1944 recommended that the 10th LightDivision also be reorganized as a standardinfantry division.It was pointed outthat standard infantry divisionswere fighting successfully in the Italian moun-tains. The Army Ground Forces feared administrativecomplicationsin main-taining a single special-type mountain division, but suggestedthat the moun-taineer and ski personnel of the 10th Light Division be kept together for useas needed and expressed a readiness to organize an enlarged mountain division

if this wasdesired.43

The War Departmentdecided to retain the 10th as a special

40 (1) Hq III Corps ltr to CG AGF, 7 Apr 44, sub: Sp Rpt on ManeuverTest, 71st and 89th Light Divs.321/808 ( Inf) . (2) III Corps ltr to CG AGF, 12 May 44, sub: Final Rpt on Hunter Liggett ManeuverNo. 1.354.2/42 (Hunter Liggett 44).

41 Memo (S) of Col R. P. Reeder,OPD, for ACofS OPD, 27 Mar 44, sub: Proposed LightDiv. 322/2(Divs) (S).

42 (1) AGF memo for G-3 WD, 14 Apr 44, sub: 71st and 89th Light Divs. 321/808 (Inf). (2) WDmemo (S) WDGCT 322 (7 Apr 44) for CGAGF, 22 Apr 44, sub as in(1). 320.2/34 (TB 44) (S).

43 AGF memo (C) (inclosing report) for G-3 WD, 10 May 44, sub: Reorgn of 10th Light Div (Alpine).

322/1 (10th Div) (C).

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mountain division. The ArmyGround Forces prepared the tables,outlining adivision of 14,101 officers and men, using over 6,000 mules and horses,but withmotor transport forheavy hauls. 44 The new T/O 70, published as of 4 Novem ber1944, in generalresembled,in the size andstructureof the division itauthorized,the correspondingtable of 1942 whichhad never been used.The 10th MountainDivision embarkedfor Italy in December 1944.

Airborne divisions developedin a direction opposite to that favored byGeneral McNair in 1943. His desire to convert them to light divisions hasbeen noted. In November1943 GeneralRidgway, thencommandingthe battle-tested 82d AirborneDivision,proposed an enlargementof the airbornedivisionalmost to the size of theinfantry division.45 The European Theater concurred.GeneralMcNair, clingingto the idea of aneasily transportableairbornedivisionand restatinghis doubtsas to theneed of airbornedivisionsat all, advised againstthe proposal,and no action was taken.

46 The EuropeanTheater continued tofavor a larger airbornedivision,believingin the employmentof airborne forcesin mass. The influenceof the EuropeanTheater naturally becamedominant in1944. The Organization Division, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, proc-essed new airbornedivision tables in December1944, withsuch expeditiousnessas to draw a commendationfrom the War Department. 47 The new tableclosely

resembled the Ridgway proposal of a year earlier. Whereas the old divisionaggregated about8,500, with infantry in one parachute and two glider regi-ments, with noartilleryheavier than the75-mm. howitzer,and with supportingelements at thebarest minimum, the new division totaled 12,979, had two para-chute infantry regiments, a glider regiment virtually identical with standardinfantry, a battalion of 105-mm. howitzers, and more fully developed support-ing units. The four airborne divisions in Europe were reorganized under thenew table, the one in the Southwest Pacific remaining under the old.

To summarize,by the beginning of 1945 all the experimentaland special-type divisionsof 1942 had e ither disappeared or to alarge extent lost their special

44 (1) AGF memo for G-3 WD, 24 Oct 44,sub: T/O&E for Mtn Div. 320.3/779. (2) T/O&E 70,4 Nov 44.

45 WD memo (S) OPD 320.2 Afr (1 Dec 43) (with inclosures) for CG AGF, 1 Dec 43, sub: ProposedT/O for A/B Divs. 320.3/75 (S).

46 AGF memo (S) for OPD, 17 Dec 43,sub: Changesin T/O, A/B Div. 320.3/75 (S).47 WD memo WDGCT 320.3 (18 Dec 44) for CGAGF, 18 Dec 44, sub: T/O&E for A/B Div.

330.13/156 (Commendations).

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features. The motorized and the lightdivision had come and gone. Thejungle division had never developed except as aform of light division.The mountain division wassubstantiallyan infantry division in which motortransportationwas largely replaced bymules.The cavalry division wasfightingas infantry. Both themountain division and thecavalry division wereuniqueorganizations,not types. With one exception, the airborne divisions resembledinfantry divisionsin strength and structure, with modificationsmade necessaryby their mode of reaching the scene ofcombat.The tendency was tohave onlytwo whollydistinct types of divisions—infantryand armored.With increasingdemands for organic tanks in infantry divisions, and formore infantry inarmored divisions (beyond the infantry increase of 1943), even the distinctionbetween these twotypes was becoming less pronounced.

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VII. Army and CorpsThe preceding discussion of divisions, though fundamental,refers to only

a minority of troops of the Army Ground Forces. Less than half the tacticaltroops of the Army Ground Forceswere organic in divisions.More than halfwere in nondivisional combat andserviceunits.The ratio on 31 March1945 wasapproximately 15 to12—1,468,941officers and men in nondivisionalunits as

against 1,194,398 in divisions.There were also 1,204,976other officers and men inASF-typeunits in the communicationszone. None of these figures includes re-placements in training or personneldesignatedas overhead in the Troop Basis.In general ASF unitswere designed to operate in communications zones, AGFunits in combat zones. It clarifies the picture to keep in mind that the total ofground troopswas about 4,000,000, ofwhich roughly30 percentwas in divisions,40 percentin nondivisionalunits of AGF typeintendedfor the combatzone, and30 percent in nondivisionalunits of ASF typeintended for the communications

zone. Each of the 89divisions, with an average T/O strength of about 13,400,was backed by some30,000in nondivisional units,of whom 16,500weredesignedfor close support in thecombatzone and 13,500for rear-areaemployment.Of the16,500,about 11,300 were combat troops and about 5,200 service troops of AGFtypes, such as depot and maintenance companiesof the several supply branches.Thus, toward the end of thewar, each division hadbehind it about 11,300 non-divisionalcombat troops and approximately18,700nondivisionalservice troops. 1

The present discussion deals only with nondivisionalunits of AGF types,numberingclose to 1,500,000troops,or 16,500per division (as of 31 March1945),and includingunits of all arms andservices exceptthe Air Corps and the Trans-portation Corps.The large number of these troops was a result of systematicapplication of the principles of streamlining and pooling, by which divisionswere held to strictly defined minima and allelse were centralizedunder higherheadquarters.Examples of the methods bywhich nondivisionalforces wereincreased are the policy ofgathering a maximum of supply and maintenanceservices in the combatzone under army control, the withholdingof antiair-craft and tank destroyers from organic assignmentto divisions, thetransfer of

1

All figures are from the Troop Basis of 1 April 1945 (S). See Table No. 2, p. 306.

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tank battalions from armored divisions to a nondivisional basis,the removalofthe treadway bridge company and the supply battalion from the armoreddivision, and the abolition of the organically motorized division,with trucktransport pooled in nondivisional quartermaster companies.There are still otherexplanations for thegrowth of nondivisionalunits. All field artillery heavierthan the 155-mm. howitzer was pooled at levels above the division, as wereconsiderable amounts of the medium and lighter pieces. Most mechanizedcavalry and all chemical troops were similarly pooled. The pool of engineerswas very large, providing a strength of more than 2,300 per division, almostfour times the strength of the engineer battalion organic in the division.Therewere three times as many signal troops in nondivisional unitsof the ArmyGround Forces as in divisions, ten times as many quartermaster troops, andtwelve times as many ordnancetroops. Among the services,only the MedicalDepartment had more personnelin divisionsthan in supporting medical units.These comparisons do not include ASF units in the communications zone.

The reorganization of thisgreat mass offorces,a major problem, took place,roughly, in the year extending from October 1942 to October 1943. The processfollowed the same linesas with the divisions. TheReductionBoard meticulouslyreviewed and trimmed all T/O&E's of nondivisional units.At the same time

the means of combining T/O units into larger wholeswas restudied. Theobjectives were always economy andflexibility. The problem was essentially aproblem in the organization of armies and corps. Except for certainforces usedto garrison small detached bases and certain antiaircraftand coast artillery usedto defend airfields andfixed installations,all nondivisionaltroops of the ArmyGround Forces were intended for assignment toarmies or corps.

Abandonmentof the "Type" Army and "Type" Corps

In 1942, as already explained, 2 military planning was conducted in termsof the type armyand the typecorps. The type army and corps had been developedin the preceding years, concurrentlywith the development of the triangulardivision, as a means of determining how many nondivisional units of variouskinds would be required to supplement a given number of divisions. In the typearmy and the type corps, as in a T/O unit, there were elements conceivedtobe "organic." The organic composition of army and corps inJuly 1942 is indi-

2

See above, p. 279.

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cated in Table No. 4. For example, if 99 divisions were to be mobilized, itcould be determined from the type organizations that 33 corps and 11armieswould be needed. Multiplying thenumber of nondivisional unitsorganic ineach corps by 33, and thenumber of nondivisionalunits organic in each armyby 11, and adding the two products,would give the number of nondivisionalunits required to produce a balanced combatforce of 99 divisions.By a similarcalculationthe compositionof a task force built around any numberof divisionscould be projected. It would benecessary in either calculation to consider theneed for GHQ reserve troopsnot organic in army or corps,such asparachutists,tank battalions,and certainkinds of heavy artillery and service organizations.

On 31 July 1942 the War Department directed the Army Ground Forcesto present recommendationsfor revision of the type army and the type corps.3

It was desired, in the interests ofeconomy, that the necessity of all organicunits be reviewed. TheArmy Ground Forces was instructed to consult withthe Army Air Forces and the Services of Supply. The Army Air Forces wasconcerned because observation aviation wasorganic at this time in both armyand corps; the Services of Supply, because it shared the responsibility atthistime for service units assigned to the Arm yGround Forces. The idea of separateair command had already developed to the point where organic assignment

of air units to ground commands inpractice was not contemplated.In October1942 the Services of Supply was to lose itsauthority over the organization,equipment, and training of service units operating within corps and armies.Hence army and corps organization soon became a problem to be dealt withby the Army Ground Forces alone, subject to War Department approval.

The ArmyGround Forceson 21 September1942 proposed that the conceptof the type army and type corps beabandoned.4 General McNairbelieved thatthe type army andcorps, though avowedly used only for planning,set up falsepreconceptionswith regard to tactics and logistical operations. It wasunder-stood that an arm y or corps incombatwould contain such forces as weredeemednecessary in the immediatesituation.General McNair believed that the sameflexibility should govern planningand training,especiallywith the Armyfacingoperations inwidely different theaters stillunknown. He cited German tacticalorganization, by which task forces could be formed at will from standard parts.He feared that, just as manpowerand equipmentmight be wasted byorganic

3 WD memo WDGCT 320.2 (T/O) (7-31-42) for CGs AAF, AGF, SOS, 31 Jul 42, sub: Revision ofType Army Corps andArmy Troops. 320.2/5816.

4

AGF memo for G-3 WD, 21 Sep 42, sub as above.320.2/5816.

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TABLE NO. 4

Composition of the "Type" Army and "Type" Corps, 31 July 1942

Source: Memo WDGCT 320.2 (T/O) to AGF, AAF, SOS, Sub:Revision of Type Army Corps

and Army Troops, 31 Jul 1942. In 320.2/5816.

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assignment to divisions,so they might also be wasted by organic assignmenttoa type corps or atype army. He wished to have no elements frozen, by faultyorganization,in places where maximum employment was notpossible.Giventhe limitationson shipping,and theheavy requirements of theArmy Air Forcesand the Servicesof Supply for ship space,he wished every unit sent overseasbythe Arm y Ground Forces to be readilyavailablefor use at thedecisive spot.

The organization advanced by the Army Ground Forcesdid away withorganic army troops and corps troops and made all nondivisionalunits organ-ically GHQ Reserve.Army and corps retained no organicelementsexcept thosenecessary for command—chieflyheadquarters andsignal units. Troops wereorganized in interchangeableparts, in permanentunits of the smallest sizecom-

patible with efficiency. For combat unitsthis was judged to be thebattalion.From the mass of battalions, allorganically GHQ Reserve, forces would beassigned or attached toarmies and corps as needed.There would be two kindsof permanent T/O units—divisionsand separate battalions. A corps w ould be avariable combination of divisions and battalions; an army, a combination ofcorps withadditionalbattalions and perhapsdivisions.The brigade disappearedas a fixed nondivisionalunit, as it had already disappeared from thedivision.The fixed regiment likewise ceased to exist as a nondivisionalunit; it was soon

to disappear from the armored division as well, andremain, in general, as anechelon known only to infantry, mainlyin infantry divisions.In its place wasput the group.

This plan, before its submission to the War Department on 21 September1942, was strongly advised against by some officers of General McNair's staff.5

They held that team training wouldsuffer if units were so highly interchange-able; that, with so much basic equipmentremoved from the division bystream-lining, a definite and fixed corps pool was necessary as a form of insurance;and that confusion would result from such radical departure, during mobiliza-tion, from the organization,functions, and nomenclaturemade familiar in theyears of peace. They argued that in the planning of balanced forces plannersmust have in mind, whether consciously or not, some large-scale"type" organ-ization; and that with so many persons involved in planning there must besome pattern generallyunderstood and agreed upon. These arguments, thoughrecognized as cogent,were outweighed in GeneralMcNair's judgment by theeconomy and flexibility obtainableunder the system proposed.

5

See the staff studies and M/S in320.2/5816 and in AGF Plans Sec file 95, 320.2/111.

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The proposalof 21 Septemberwas returned without action by the War De-partment. 6 OPD stressed the argumentsagainst it.7 GeneralMcNair wasunwill-

ing to push thematterat this time, although, as he said, the existingorganizationhad never been tested in war orpeace,and the need of economizing inorganiza-tion and equipment had beenrepeatedly statedby the Chief of Staff.8 Indeed,atthis very time the War Department dispatched a letter to alloverseas com-mandersurging economyupon them.It washere affirmed that a wastefulserviceorganizationhad resulted in some overseas establishmentsfrom use of the typearmy and corps (and type airforce and communicationszone) in the planningof overseas forces.9

Although never approved formally and explicitly as a whole, the systemas outlined above wentintoeffect piecemealduring 1943.

The Battalion-and-Group System

One feature of the AGF proposalof 21 September 1942 was immediatelyapproved. The WarDepartmenton 24 December1942 granted permission toconvert nondivisional regimentsin antiaircraft artillery, field artillery, mech-anized cavalry, and combat engineers to separate battalions, and toactivate

group headquartersin each ofthesearmsin a ratioof one toeach four battalions.10

The group was a form of organization already employed with certain newerweapons, notably tankand tank destroyers.It differed from the regimentin thatcomponent battalions wereself-sufficient for supply and administration(in themanner describedabovefor battalionsof the reorganized armored division),andthat the battalions werenot assigned organicallyto the group, but attached toand detachedfrom it as circumstancesdictated. Thegroup was not a T/O unit.It might contain, at a given moment,no battalions or a half-dozen battalions,

though three or four were considered normal. Group headquarters were sup-6 WD memo WDGCT 320 (12-17-42) for CG AGF, 24 Dec 42, sub: Reorgn of Units of the Army.

320.2/5816.

7 WD memo OPD 320.2 (9-21-42) for G-3 WD, 16 Nov 42, sub: Revisionof Type Corps & ArmyTroops. 320.2/5816.

8 (1) AGF M/S, CG to DCofS, 3 Dec 42, sub as in note 7. (2) AGF M/S, DCofS to G-3, 31 Dec 42,sub: Reorgn of Units of the Arm y. Both in320.2/5816.

9 WD ltr (C) AG 320.2 (12-7-42) OB-S-D-M to theater comdrs,10 Dec 42, sub: Economyof Forces.320.2/233 (C).

10

See footnote 6 above.

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posed toavoid administration,to be tactical only, tocontrolbattalions incombat,and to supervisetheir training. Battalionsin principledealt directly with armyon administrativematters and brought their own supplies from army supplypoints.

The conversionsauthorizedby the War Departmenton 24 December1942were gradually effected in 1943. They involved not merely the dissolution ofregimentsbut also the internal reorganizationof battalions to provide adminis-trative self-sufficiency. With antiaircraft artillery, field artillery, cavalry, andcombatengineersconverted, andtanks and tankdestroyers alreadyso organized,the result was to place all nondivisional unitsof the combat arm s exceptinfantryon the flexible battalion-and-groupsystem. Since very little infantry wasnon-divisional theexceptionwas minor. Nor was thefurther exception ofcoast artil-lery significant. The same principles,as explained above, were applied withinthe armored division. 11

Service units were similarly reorganized.On 29 December 1942 GeneralMarshallinformallyexpressedthe opinion that the organizationof servicetroopswas wasteful.12 He noted tha t largeorganic units,such as theregiment,were satis-factory for large missions,but that there was no economical meansof sendingsmall units on small missions, forexampleto islandbases,and no means,except

through excessiveheadquarters overhead,of controllingnumeroussmall serviceunits of diverse types. "It seems to me," he wrote, "that we should have theseserviceunits so set up that we can puttogether compositebattalions,compositeregiments andcompositebrigades."The system proposed by theArmy GroundForces on the preceding21 September had been designed to provide theflexi-bility desired by General Marshall.In addition, in connection with ordnanceunits, the Army Ground Forces had recently proposed that a battalion head-quarters be created for control of variable numbers of ordnance companiesofdissimilar types such asheavy maintenance,evacuation,and depot. Such a bat-talion was in effect a "group" of companies.GeneralMcNair recommendedthatthis scheme begeneralized to meet the problem raised by General Marshall.13

During 1943 the regiment virtually disappeared from the organization ofservice troops. Truck regiments formerly organic in the type army were

11 AG F ltr 35 (R), 20 Jan 43, sub: Orgn & Asgmt of Gp Hq andBns. 320.2/165 (R) .12 Memo of Gen Marshall forGens McNair, Somervell,Edwards,29 Dec 42, sub notgiven. 320.2/5773.

13

See unused draft and AGF memo to CofS USA, 5 Jan 43, sub: Orgn of Serv Trs. 320.2/5773.

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broken up into administratively self-sufficient separate battalions. Medicalregiments formerly organic in the type army were broken up into administra-

tively self-sufficientcompaniesof various types such as collecting,clearing, anddepot. Quartermaster and ordnance troops, and some engineer and signaltroops, were likewise organized in separate companies. Ingeneral, in the serv-ices the company becamethe basic T/O unit, as was thebattalion in the arms.For command over several companies,within the same service though of dif-ferent types if desired, battalion headquarters and headquarters detachmentswere created to which companies could be attached as needed. There werethus two kinds of nondivisionalbattalions:fluid battalions for ordnance,quar-termaster, and medical troops; fixed battalions for combat troops and for cer-tain kinds of medical, signal, engineer, and military police units. For com-mand over several battalions ofeither type, group headquarterswere providedin all arms andservices of the Ground Forces except chemical, militarypolice,and signal, in which so large a massing bybranch was consideredunnecessary,and except in the infantry, where the regiment survived to perform thisfunction."

For commandover several groups it was theintentionof the Arm yGroundForces to provide brigade headquarters.The old T/O brigade, withan organic

componentof regiments,found in antiaircraft artillery, field artillery, and cav-alry, was abolished. The troops of these brigades were reorganizedin self-sustaining battalionsand squadrons. The newbrigade, like the group, was or-ganicallyonly a headquarters and headquarters company, towhich subordinateunits could be flexibly attached. It was expected that such brigades could beformed in any arm orservice in which a demand for so large a single-branchorganization might arise. In fact, the Army Ground Forces organizedbrigadeson the new plan only for antiaircraft, field artillery, and tank destroyer units.One infantry airborne brigadewas also created.Actuallyonly one tank destroyerbrigade went overseas;field artillery brigades were not needed in quantitybecause groups were attached directly to corps artillery headquarters; andbrigades became common only in the antiaircraft artillery,in which theirnumber declinedas antiaircraft battalionswere inactivated.15

14 The system was formally explained, in answer to arequest by G-4 WD, in AGFmemo for G-4 WD,25 May 43, sub: Comd for Nondiv Units. 320.2/6009. See also the AGFltrs to the field on the use of serviceunits of each branch: (1) 30 Mar 43, sub: Ord Serv in the Fld, AGF. 321/74 (Ord). (2) 8 Oct 43, sub: EngrServ in the Fld, AGF. 321/212 (Engr) (R). (3) 14 Oct 43, sub: Sig Orgn. 321/786 (Sig). (4) 16 Oct 43,sub: QM Serv in the Fld. 321/266 (QM) (R). (5) 22 Oct 43, sub: Med Orgn. 321/766 (Med).

15 Annex IX to AGF ltr (R) toCGs, 21 Jul 43,sub: Orientationwith Ref to Revised Orgn. 320.2/242 (R).

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The breaking up of nondivisionalforces into T/O battalionsor companies,held together in temporary non-T/O combinations under flexible group andbrigade command,or under flexible battalion commandin the case of the serv-ice companies, in effect produced the revolution of organic army troops andcorps troops which theArmy Ground Forces had originally proposed. If therewas no such thing as an organicallyconstitutedregimentor brigade, there couldhardly be, within reason, an organicallyconstituted corps or army. The prin-ciple of flexibility had prevailed.

Higher Headquarters

One of GeneralMcNair'sprincipal goalswas tohold down the size of head-quarters staffs. Substitutionof the group for the regiment, with the group head-quartershandlingfour battalionsand passingadministrative matters on toarmy,was intended to economize headquarters overhead. The same objective wasaimed at in elimination of the regiment from the armored division, in thegeneral cuttingof division staffs by the Reduction Board,and in theparing ofheadquarters companies at alllevels.

General McNair's reasons for cutting all staffs applied especially to the

staffs of higher headquarters—thoseof armies and corps. One reason was toconserve manpower, the other to speed up operations. Higher staffs tended toabsorb large numbersof the most experienced officers. By 1943 only one officerin fifty was a professional soldier. "I wish wecould givegreen divisionsmoreexperienced officers," General McNair wroteto General Patton, "but they arejust not available.One primary reason—almostthe only one—is the great massof Regular Armyofficers who are serving in the unimaginable array of com-mand echelons with their staggering large staffs."16 Moreover, large staffs, inGeneral McNair's opinion, produced a mass of paperwork, liaison, and unnec-essary coordinationwhich threatenedto block the very rapidity of action forwhich modernarmies werephysically equipped. "Operations cannot possiblybe swift and effective if staffs are large and clumsy. Lack of staff training andfitness cannotbe compensated for byincreasing size." 17

General McNair limitedhis own staff to about 250 commissioned officers, in a headquarters controllingat the maximum sometwo million troops.

16 Personalltr (S) Gen McNair to Gen Patton, 23 Oct 43. McNairCorrespondence(S).17

AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 21 Jul 43, sub: Orientation with Ref to Revised Orgn. 320.2/242 (R).

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One method by which he hoped to reduce army and corps headquarterswas to combine staff and command positionsin the manner well establishedin

the divisionartillery.18

Here the artillery commander was at thesame time theartilleryofficer on the staff of the divisioncommander.General McNairbelievedthat special staffs could be greatly reduced by general application of this plan.He held that if a corps, for example, had notank destroyers attachedto it, itneeded no antitank section on the corps staff; if it did possess tank destroyers,then the senior commanderof attached tank destroyer units(probablya colonelcommandinga group) was better qualified than anyone else to act as staffadviser to the corps commander on antitank matters. Similarly, at the armylevel, the brigadier generalcommandingthe antiaircraft brigade, if the armypossessed one, and the brigade orgroup commander in every other arm andservice represented among army troops, would be the special staff officer formatters of his branch. But because the duties of certain officers were multipliedto a point considered impracticable bysome, with consequent doubt as towhether real economy would result,the plan met with resistanceboth in theWar Department and in the field and was not systematically followed inpractice.

Another means of economizing staffs was to limit their work to strictly

defined essentials.General McNair wished the corps to be a combatunit only,with administrativeactivities concentratedin army. He held down his own staffby leaving amaximum of administrativework to the War Department.

But the more the principleof flexible organizationof army and corps troopswas adopted the heavier was thework load imposedon army and corps head-quarters. These headquarters,under combatconditions,carried the major re-sponsibility forshifting separate battalionsand companiesabout,combiningandrecombiningthem in temporaryformations,attachingthem to divisions,detach-

ing and attaching them elsewhere,determiningwhere they could best be used,ordering their movement, andkeeping the record of theirwhereabouts andavailabilityat all times.With nondivisionalunits dissolvedorganicallyinto bat-

18 See draft written by General McNair fordirectiveof 21 Jul 1943, sub: Orientation with Reference toRevised Orgn, par beginning, "The revised organization places command abovestaff." This paragraph didnot appear in the directive, because the principle involved was notfully enough accepted by the WarDepartment to justify its inclusion.Draft in 322/1 (Corps) (R). See also (1) AGF memo (C) for G-3 WD,13 Apr 43, sub: A/T Pers. 321/6 (TD) (C). (2) AGF M/S (S), G-3 to CofS, 20 Apr 43, sub: A/T Sec forDiv Corps and Army Hq. 320.2/23 (NATO) (S). (3) AGF M/S, CG to G-3, 7 Sep 42, sub: Revision ofType Army Corps and Army Trs. 320.2/5816.

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talions andcompanies, under lieutenant colonelsand captains (in contrastto thedivision with its major general),and with the intermediategroup and brigade

headquarters exercisingno administrativefunctions, a great deal of assistanceand control of many small units by army andcorps headquarterswas required.

TABLE NO. 5

Evolution of Corps Headquarters, 1942-45

Source: T/O's 100-1 and 100-2

* Augmentation of 14 officers, 1 warrant officer, 17 enlisted men provided in T/O when

authorized by theater commander.

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It was therefore difficult to reduce higher headquarters as much as GeneralMcNair desired.

In view of the difficulties the Table of Organization for armyheadquarterswas not materiallymodified in 1943. Corpsheadquarters was drastically reducedby the ArmyGround Forcesin March 1943, though thereductionsdid notlast.19

(See Table No. 5.) The principleadoptedwas that the corps consistedessentiallyof its commanderand a small headquarters,with anorganicheadquarterscom-pany, an organicsignalbattalion, and an organicheadquartersand headquartersbattery for thecorps artillery,which in turn possessed organicallyonly a fieldartillery observation battalion.Thus the means of corpscommandwereorganic;troopswould be put in andtaken out accordingto the shifting needsof combat.The brigadiergeneral com manding the corpsartilleryand thecolonelcommand-ing the corps signal battalion would function as corps staff officers; hence theartillery and signal sections of the old headquarters weredropped. The anti-aircraft section was dropped also, the commandingofficer of corps antiaircrafttroops (if any) being expectedto dischargestaff duties.Staff adviceon armored,tank destroyer, or other matterspertainingto a single arm would be procuredin the same way. Since the corps was intended to be tacticalonly, the staff sec-tions for technical and administrativeserviceswere reduced.Column 1 of Table

No. 5 shows the corps headquarters of1942; column 2, the reductions desiredby the Army Ground Forcesin March 1943; column 3, theless drasticreductionsapproved by the War Departmentand incorporatedin a Table of Organizationin July 1943. Corps in the Army Ground Forces were reorganizedaccording tothis table in August. They received an augmentationfor training since it wasbelieved by the Army Ground Forces that corps in training carried agreaterburden of inspection and supervisionthan they should carry in combat. Protestsagainst the new tablewere received from the theaters.General McNair was ac-

cused of proposing for overseasuse a smaller corpsheadquartersthan he wouldhimself use intraining. The War Departmentordered anupward revisionof thetable,with resultsshownin column4. 20

19 AGF memo for G-3 WD, 20 Mar 43, sub: T/O&E Corps. 320.2/5983,and published T/O 100-1,29 Mar 43.

20 (1) AGF memo (C) for OPD, 10 Aug 43, sub: Reorgn of Corps Hq and Organic Trs. 320.2/247 (C).(2) WD memo (R) WDGCT 320.3 (1 Oct 43) for CG AGF, 5 Oct 43, sub: T/O&E's for Corps. 322/4(Corps) (R). (3) Personal memo (S) of GenMcNarney for Gen McNair, 17 Dec 43, sub: T/O's for Type

Corps Hq. McNair Correspondence(S).

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Before submitting the revisions calledfor, General McNairwrote to theWar Department on 15 October1943: 21

The present strength can be increased to any figure desired by the War Department.This headquarters is opposed to such increase.

The overhead of headquarters in this war is viewed as staggering. We have theadvantage of the most modern equipment incommunicationsand transportation,whichshould operate to reduce overhead but actually is operating to increase overhead instead.General Bradley stated to me recently that the present corps headquarters was too smallbecausehe required each of his staff sections to visit the troops daily. Thus he was demandingin substance a double corps headquarters. General Fredendall stated that the present corpsheadquartersis more than adequate. General Patch expressed the same view. . . . The lasttwo commanders voiced the view that large corps headquarters not only were unnecessarybut would hinder mobile active operations. I concur in such views.

If commanders are allowed toindicate their ownneeds, experience hasshown repeatedlyand almost invariably that there will be no end to theincreases demanded.Headquarterswill go on increasing solong as this policy is followed. The results are apparent in ourtheaters allover the world.

The reply of G-3, WDGS, made no commenton these remarks. Thecorps, asagain reorganized,was about aslarge in commissioned strengthas in 1942.

Theory of Army and Corps

The division, the largest T/O unit, was the largest unit shipped to thetheaters in the form in which it wasmade up in theUnited States.Armies andcorps were not shipped as such.What was shippedwere the elements—divisions,separate battalions and companies, group headquarters, corps headquarters,and army headquarters.Overseascommanders made uptheir armies andcorpsfrom these elementsas they chose. Armiesand corps (also groups) were simplyso many containers, between which the actual contents of the Army—T/Odivisions, battalions,and companies—werepassed back and forth at will. Unitswere taken out of containers in the United States, shipped overseas, and putinto new containers onarrivingin the theater. Armies and corpswere shippedseparately.

With a few exceptions, all the armies and corps were supplied by the ArmyGround Forces.The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armieswere activated overseas.

21

Memo (R) of GenMcNair for G-3 WD, 15 Oct 43,sub: T/O&E's for Corps.322/4 (Corps) (R).

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So too were all army groups and the First Allied Airborne Army.The FirstArmy went to Europe directly from the Eastern Defense Command, never

having been under the commanding general of the Army Ground Forces.These were the only exceptions.All corps were trained by the Army GroundForces or its predecessor,GHQ, and all thoseactivated after 9 March 1942 wereactivated by the ArmyGround Forces. By 1945 there were twenty-four corps,of whichonly oneremainedin theUnitedStates.

On the matter of armies GeneralMcNair proceeded slowly. Herejectedadvice of hisstaff, in 1942, to activate additionalarmies under his own com-mand.22 Using the principle offlexibility to its utmost, he employedonly theSecond and Third Armies (and four independent corps) even when troopsunder his command reached their maximum,in August 1943, of sixty-sevendivisions with correspondingnondivisional units. For ashort time at the endof 1943 the Second, Third, and Fourth Armies were in the Army GroundForces. The Third (that is, its headquarters) then proceededoverseas. Nonew armies were activated by the Army Ground Forces until 1944, when theEighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Armieswere activated and shipped inquick succession.Meanwhile the Second and Fourth Armies remainedin theUnited States in the Army Ground Forces.The identityof these armiespersisted

in name only, for it waslargely their headquarters personnel,trained in armyfunctions, which went overseas under new army designations. By January1945 not a single division was left in the Second andFourth Armies, which,virtuallyexhaustedof troops of every kind, remained as empty containers await-ing the return of units to theUnited States.

The Army Ground Forces, though it shipped no armies orcorps as such,neverthelesslargely determinedthe form taken by armies and corps in thethe-aters. Theater commanderscould build armies andcorps as they pleased, butthey worked with prefabricated materials. Every unit, whether troop unit orheadquartersunit, was shaped by itsT/O&E to perform certain functions andstand in a certain relation to other units, and it was for these functions andthese relationsthat its personnelwere trained in the United States.

The idea insisted upon by General McNairwas that the army wasboth acombat and an administrativeagency, the corps acombat agency only, unlessoperating independently,in which case it should be reinforced tofunction as a

22 AGF M/S (S) DCofS to G-1, G-3, G-4, 28 Oct 42,sub: Revision of AGF Orgn. AG F Plans Sec file

132 (S).

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small army.23 In administrationand supply the army was intended to bypassthe corps and, to a certain extent, the division. For supply of food, fuel, and

ammunition,in the words of an AGF directive alreadyquoted, "division andcorps are not in thechannel of supply, except in emergencies."24 Nondivisionalbattalions and separate companies, and the regiments and battalionswithindivisions, wereprovidedwith supply machineryexpected to mesh directlywiththat of army. Army was to push forward supply points to positions accessibleto the trucks of small using units.Army personnelsorted supplies into unit lotsand loaded the trucks arriving at supply points. To enable army to dischargethis role the Troop Basis includeda great mass of units for assignmentto armiesor independent corps as needed—quartermastertruck, railhead and gasolinesupply companies, ordnance ammunition companies, and depot companies ofthe several services. Similarly, army provided third-echelonmaintenance forboth divisionsand nondivisionalunits, a function for which a mass ofordnancemaintenance,engineer maintenance,chemical maintenance, andsignal repaircompanieswere provided. Armylikewise evacuateddisabled or capturedequip-ment, provided hospitals,and furnished reinforcing medical collecting andclearing companies for units whoseneeds exceededtheir organic means. Facil-ities for major undertakings inbridge building,water supply, mapmaking,

photography,and other functions were likewise provided in engineer andsig-nal units assigned toarmy.

The corps was conceived as consisting essentially of a commander and ahandful of staff officers who gave unityof direction and continuity of purposeto a mass of units in combat,howevermuch the individualunits might be usedup, exchanged, or replaced. All combatunits in an army,except those in armyreserve, were intended to be passed on to theseveral corps, shifting from onecorps to another at the discretion of thearmy commander.Corps operated thepools of nondivisional combatunits—corpsartillery, cavalry squadrons, engi-neers, tanks ,tank destroyers,chemical battalions,etc.—distributingthem to di-visions by attachment, usingthem to support a division most inneed, assem-bling them for mass action,or holding them in reserve.With the divisionslack-ing many weapons organically,and held down by T/O's to the minimum re-quired for "normal" operations, the corps became the keyheadquarters foremploying allcombat elementsin proper tactical combinations.

23 AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 21 Jul 43, sub: Orientation with Reference to Revised Orgn. 320.2/6031 ( R ) .24

AGF ltr (R), 8 Oct 43,sub: Engr Serv in theFld. 321/212 (Engr) (R) .

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TABLE NO. 6

Composition of the Third Army, 1 October 1942

(Illustrative of Army and Corps Organization in the Army Ground Forces)

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TABLE NO. 6—Continued

Source: 320.2 A ssignment Lists(R).

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With all corps made flexible and the type corps abolished, the armoredcorps became an unnecessary special unit. General McNair in1943 assignedarmored divisions, asthey completed their training under the Armored Force,to ordinary army corps as well as to armored corps, in order that all higher com-manders might gain experiencewith armor. At the same time the abolition ofthe motorized division,designed for use in an armored corps, and theconcen-tration of service functions in army, including the servicing of armor, deprivedthe armored corps of its specific functions.As a result, although four armoredcorps had been activated,they were not very different from ordinary armycorps. The armored corps was abolished as a special unit in August 1943. 25

Under the flexible system, anycorps could be made into an armored corps byassignment of officers experienced inarmor to its headquarters, and by assign-ment of armored divisions, truck companies tomotorize its infantry divisions,and other suitable units. It was believed that services necessary to armored andfast-moving forces—gasoline supply, bridging, and maintenance—could bemoved forward by army with sufficient speed.

The Army Ground Forces, to obtain the structure in training which wasintended to be used in combat, carried out ageneral reorganizationof its armyand corps troops in 1943, at which time the great bulk of combat units and

close-support services was under AGF command. In 1942 the headquarters ofthe Army Ground Forces had assigned some units, but merely attachedothers,to its subordinatearmies and corps. Assigned units had generally been thoseorganic in the type organizations. Beginning in January 1943 the Army GroundForces assigned all units to its subordinate commands, which in turn mightattach them to their own subordinate echelons.26 Virtually all nondivisionalserviceunits wereassigned by the ArmyGround Forces to armies and separatecorps, virtually all combat units tocorps. The ordnance battalion and themed-ical battalion formerly assigned to corpsdisappeared.Their places were takenby self-sustainingordnance and medical companies, grouped in flexible bat-talions and assigned to armies (or separate corps). Reassignment became generalin August 1943. At this time a mass of new T/O&E's was published, consum-mating the work of the ReductionBoard, and reshapingunits in the light of

25 (1) Staff studies in 320.2/16 (Armd F) (S). (2) AGFmemo (C) (with related papers) for G-3 WD,17 Aug 43,sub: Redesignation ofArmd Corps. 320.2/247(C).

26

AGF ltr (R) toCGs, 16 Jan 43,sub: Asgmt and Attachment ofUnits. 320.2/167 (R).

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their intended positionwithin armies and corps.At one sweep, as ofmidnight8-9 August,about 200 nondivisional combatunits were reassignedfrom armiesto corps. Corps comm anders were instructed not toattach theseunits to divisionsexcept for specified periods for combined training, but to hold them in corpspools.27

Effects of army and corps reorganizationare illustrated in Tables Nos. 4 ,28

6, and 7, which show, first, the type organizationsof 1942, second, the actualcompositionof theThird Army as of 1October 1942, and, third, the compositionof the Third Army as of 10 November 1943, after readjustments asdescribedabove had been made. Attention iscalled particularly to Table No. 7. The con-centrationof service elementsunder army isevident, as is also the distributionof combat elementsto corps. The use ofbrigade and group headquarterscanbe seen, as well as that of the flexible battalion for medical, ordnance, andquartermaster companies. Thecavalry brigade and the mechanized cavalryand quartermasterregimentswere survivalsof the older organization,due forgradual elimination. The assignment ofseparate tank battalions to corps insignificant numberswas at this date a newphenomenon:to the great detrimentof combined infantry-tank training of smaller units, few such battalions hadpreviouslybeen available. Themixing of infantry and armored divisions in the

same corps for combinedtraining at higher levels can be noted. The fact thatthe XIX Corps had until recently beenthe III Armored Corpsis indicated bythe presence in this corps of twoarmored divisions and of atreadway bridgecompanyand two separatearmored infantry battalions.It will be observed thatthe VIII Corps had virtually no troops whatsoever.This was because the VIIICorps had been alerted for overseas movement and was awaiting shipment asan emptycontainer.

27(1) AGF ltr (C) to CGs, 5 Aug 43, sub: Asgmt of Combat Units to Corps. 320.2/300 (C). (2) AGF

ltr (R) to CGs, 29 Oct 43,sub: Asgmtof Combat-TypeUnits. 320.2/267 (R).28 See above, p. 354.

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VIII. Summary

The principles underlyingthe new tactical organization, in all aspects oftheir application to armies, corps, divisions, and nondivisional units, were set

forth in a letter on"Orientation with Reference to Revised Organization" whichGeneral McNair himselfwrote and issued to his commanders on 21July1943. No summary can take the place of this letter, the fullest statement onorganization made by him during his command of the Army Ground Forces.Since it is indispensable to a thorough understanding of the subject, it isreproducedin itsentiretyat the end ofthis study.

Reduction of unit personnel and equipment had many implications. Itundoubtedly increasedthe combat power delivered per ton of shipping. Itlightened the problem of supplying fuel, spare parts, and replacementsof menand vehicles. Forces became more compact and maneuverableby loss of im-pedimenta. But operation at minimum levels naturally produced stresses andstrains. Tables of Organization and Equipment received piecemeal augmenta-tions, thependulum thus swingingagain in the oppositedirection.Fundamentaltables (for example, thoseof the infantry and armored divisions) remainedsubstantiallyunchanged untilthe end of the war inEurope. There were manycases,however,of augmentationby special allowance,outside theT/O&E's, butin effect enlarging the units.

Applicationof the neworganizationin the theatersafter 1943 broughtnewdevelopments.1 In general, a reaction set in against the extreme emphasis onflexibility and economy. Nor did it provepossible to confine corps and groupheadquarters to tacticalfunctions only.

Great economies were accomplishedby the ArmyGround Forces in con-sumptionof manpower. Because of reduction in division tables, the 89divisionsactive in 1945 required only 70,000 more enlisted men than the 73 divisionsactive at the end of1942. Sixteen divisions were thus obtained with an outlay

1 See below, "Reorganizing for Redeployment."

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of manpowerwhich in 1942would haveproducedless than five. In nondivisionalfield artillery the 142 battalionsmobilized at the end of 1942required almost

exactly 100,000 enlistedmen for themselves andtheir overheadof higherartillerycommand.In February1945 the 329mobilized battalionsrequired only 182,000.Under the 1942 tables 182,000 men would have produced approximately 260battalions. Hence 69 battalions were gained without use of additional man-power.

2

But it cannotbe said that the economiesachievedby GeneralMcNair wereused as he preferred and intended, thatis, to increase the number of groundcombatunits.In general,no more ground units,but in fact fewer,were mobilizedunder the reduced tables than had been set up formobilization underthe unre-duced tables. InJune 1943, as the work of unit reduction neared itscompletion,more than 300,000 men were cancelled from the AGF Troop Basis.3

Given conditionsand expectationsprevailing in the summer of1943, it isprobable that the total planned strength of ground forces would have beencut at that time whether AGF units were reduced ornot. With still further cuts,and with the failure of expected restorations to materialize, the authorizedstrength of all AGF-type units on 31 March1945 was approximately1,000,000less than had been projected two years before. The fact that unitswere reduced

in size meant that this loss in number of men did notproduce a correspondingloss in number of units. This was of immeasurable importance,for certainlythe totalnumberof ground combatunits finally mobilizedwas none too many.By producinga fightingarmy out of ashrinkingstock of allotted manpowerthemost extreme policiesof economywould seem to havebeen abundantlyjustified.

2 Calculations basedon Troop Basis (S).3 See "Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: a Statistical Study " and "Mobilization

of the Ground Army," in this volume.

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AGF Letter on Revised Organization,21 July 1943

HEADQUARTERSARMY GROUND FORCES

ARMY WAR COLLEGEWASHINGTON25, D. C.

320.2/6031 (R) (21 Jul 43)GNGCT 21 July 1943Subject:Orientationwith Reference to RevisedOrganization.

TO: CommandingGenerals,Second and Third Armies,IV and XIIICorps,II Armored Corps,Airborne Command,Antiaircraft Command,

Armored Command,Desert Training Center,Replacementand SchoolCommand,Tank DestroyerCenter.

General

1. The following information and comments are transmitted by way oforientation in connection with pending revision of theorganizationof largeunits.

2. The organizationof combat andsupportingserviceunits is being revisedextensivelyand necessary Tables of Organizationand Tables of Equipmentwillbe issued in near future. See paragraph 2,letter,Hq AGF, 320.2/185 (R) (3 Mar43) GNGCT, 3 March 1943, Subject: "Reorganizationof Units under NewTables of Organization." The purposesof this revisionmay bestated generallyasfollows:

a. To economize manpower, in order that the overall needs of armed

forces, of industry, and of agriculture may be met in the max imumdegree.

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b. To permit availableshipping to transportoverseasa maximumof fight-ing power.

c. To provide amore flexible organization, permittingfull applicationofthe principle of economy offorce and massing of military might at the decisivepoint.

d. To reduce headquarters and other overhead to speed up command.Command functions must keep pace with fast transportationand signal com-munication.

e. To devote strength as fully as possible toelementswhich can bemadeeffective offensively against the enemy and reduce those elementswhich arepassivelydefensive.

Organization of Large Units

3. The army is a tacticaland adm inistrativeunit. The revised organizationcontemplates that administrative functions be more extensive and completethan at present. In exercise of such administrativefunctions, the army shouldby-pass the corps inevery way possible in order that the corps may devote itselfso far as practicable to tactical andtraining functions. Corps currently in train-ing in the United States are in generaloccupying themselves too much withadministration.Army commandersmust takethe steps necessaryto correct thiscondition. The reduced administrativeprocedureapplied in some headquartersand headquartersdetachments,special troops, could well be applied tocorps.A separate corpswillhave a statussimilarto thatof an army.

4. a. The corps will consist essentially of a headquarters andhead-quarters company, a signal battalion, headquarters and headquartersbattery,corps artillery, and a field artillery observationbattalion. Its functions will beprimarily tactical. It will be reinforced according to the combatsituation by

divisions, groups of artillery, antiaircraft, tank battalions, tank destroyer bat-talions, engineer battalions, engineer companies, andreconnaissancesquadrons.In combat, accordingto the situation, non-divisionalunits (exceptreconnaissancesquadrons) may be putunder division control. In principle, they are passed onto divisionsunless they may beemployed effectively for more or less simulta-neous support of more than a single division.Grouping battalionsfor trainingprovides essential supervisionby higher commanders. Suchtraining must notpreclude close association ofbattalions,and perhaps groups, with divisions forcombined training. However,permanentattachments ofbattalionsto divisions

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is undesirable sincesuch action will prevent training in mass employment.Seeletter,Hq AGF, 353/2209(1 Apr 43) GNGCT, 1 April 1943, Subject:"Assign-

ment and Training of Group Headquarters and Battalions of Tank, TankDestroyer, andAntiaircraft Artillery."b. The artillery commander commands all reinforcing artilleryreceived

and not passed on to divisions and has theadditionalfunction of corpsartilleryofficer. The corpsartillery headquartershas a large staff. For training purposes,it will be advisable to usepart of it to performtrainingfunctionsof presentcorpsartillery section,thereby permitting the artillery commander to devote hisattentionduring training periods toconsiderablenumber ofgroupsand separatebattalions attachedto the corps. Inthis way, the existingsatisfactory organiza-tion for training may continue. (See paragraph 12, below.)

5. Orders to reorganizeinfantry and armored divisionsunder newTablesof Organization and Equipmentwill issue at a later date. The followinginformation is furnished on the new organizations.

a. The motorized division as a distinctorganization has been eliminated.An infantrydivisioncan be transportedby the attachmentof a troop transportbattalion consistingof six truck companies.It follows that the training of allinfantry divisionswill includedevelopmentof a Standard Operating Procedure

for motor movementand the execution of such movements.b. The infantry division has been reduced in aggregate strength by ap-

proximately 8 per cent and infuel consuming motorvehicles by 14 per cent.c. The armoreddivision will be reorganizedinto two combat commands

or groups of flexible compositionof self-sustainingtank and armored infantrybattalions.The organic total strength includesthree tank battalions and threearmored infantry battalions.The artillery strengthremains at three battalions.The infantry and artillery strength of thedivision,in comparison withthe tank

strength, will be increased greatly.d. It is planned that all tankbattalionswith certain exceptionswill be in-

terchangeable—includingthose of armored divisionsand of GeneralHeadquar-ters Reserve.The battalionwill include three medium companies and onelightcompany.Thus there willbe a pool of tank battalions available for bothsupportof the infantry and asreplacementunits of armored divisions. Similarly,a poolof armored infantry battalionsis being organized so that replacementand re-inforcing infantry units will be available for armored divisions.Again the re-

connaissance squadrons of armored divisions and separate reconnaissance

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squadronswill be identicalexcept for the number of reconnaissancetroops, per-mitting interchangeof suchunitsas necessary.

e. A new light division,suitable for amphibious,airborne, mountain andjungle operationis being tested. The aggregate strength ofthis light division isapproximately9,000 and its equipmentvaries with the type of operations inwhich it is toengage. There will be a minimu m oftransportation. The divisionwill be on foot, with hand carts, exceptfor those essential loadswhich cannotbe transported in this manner. Such loads will be handled by pack animals or¼-ton trucks. Approximately400 men will be subtracted from strength of thedivision when motortransportationis used.

f. The radio intelligenceplatoon is being removed from division signalcompanies because it is felt that such activities pertain more properly to thecorps signal battalion,at least until equipment for such operation has beendevelopedmore fully, its capacities measuredand operationalneeds determinedmore completely thanat present. Trained traffic analysts have been providedin the corps signal battalion to evaluate informationobtained by the radio in-telligence platoons.An effort is being made to reduce and simplify the set-upof signal equipment without sacrificing the essential effectiveness of signaloperations.

g. The division engineers willhold to a strengthwhich some commandersmay regard as too small. There is no lack ofappreciationof the numberof engi-neering functions or of the considerable overall strength of engineers needed.However, a division ofwhatever type is supposedly amobile unit and natureand extent of engineer operations under such conditionsnecessarily must belimited. If and when operations do not move sorapidly, it is readily possibleto introduce engineers from the corps and army, reinforcing or relieving thedivisionengineersof functions which are beyond their capabilities.Bridge trainsare excluded from division engineers because they are not needed under allconditions. The need of bridges can be foretold from maps, air photographsand ground reconnaissanceand bridges can be provided by companies andbattalionsfrom the army.

Comments on Organization

6. Staffs are being revised downward. They are to be provided solely forcombatneeds. Operations cannotpossibly beswift and effective if staffs are largeand clumsy. Lack of staff training and fitness cannot be compensatedfor by

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increasing size. The development of suitable Standard Operating Procedureslightens the burden of staffs and expeditesoperations.In general,field orders in

maneuvers still are far too lengthy. The average formalmimeographed fieldorder, prepared underconditions which would be impractical in service, canbe replacedby messagesof a few lines, expediting operations greatlyand largelyeliminating the frequent capture of elaborate orders by the opposing forces.Field orders should be oral or in messageform habitually for all elements ofdivisions and frequently for the corps. The practice ofassembling subordinatecommandersfor issuance oforders is pernicious,since it takes commandersaway from their units atcritical timesand delaysoperationsintolerably. Liaisonofficers shouldbe used for disseminationof orders.

7. a. The revised organization takes extensiveadvantageof the poolingprinciple.For example, thereare General Headquarterspools of artillery bat-talions, tank destroyer battalions, reconnaissance squadrons, antiaircraft bat-talions, engineercompanies and battalions, armored infantry battalions, tankbattalions;group headquartersfor artillery, tank destroyer,engineer, cavalry,antiaircraft,armored infantry, and tank units;necessaryand appropriate brigadeheadquarters;and serviceunits. In general, group headquarterswill be providedin the ratio of one to every three or four battalions; brigade headquartersin

appropriatecasesone toevery threeor four groups.b. Unlike the old regimentand brigade,which had organic battalions and

regiments,the newgroupsand brigadeshaveno organicunits.Battalions,of anyor various types,and in anynumber,may beattached to a group headquarters;varying number of groups to a brigade headquarters.The flexibility of the neworganization makes it readily possible to form task forces to meet particularneeds, thus effecting economy and permitting massing of means according tothe situation.Except in the infantry regiment, battalions are self-sustaining,

that is they are self-administeringin the same senseas the regiment heretofore.8. Organicantiaircraftand antitankdefense of divisionsis a mootquestion.It is entirely natural thatdivision commandersdesire such defensivemeans instrength sufficient to defeat all attacks.Provisionsof this kind are impracticaland unsound from the standpointof economy of force. At the sametime it isreasonableto furnish a limited defense organicallyand providea pool of meanssufficient to reinforce threatenedpoints so as to afford full protection.The in-fantry has antitank guns, but the pool of tank destroyer units affords a more

powerful reserve tomeet a massed tank attack.Similarly, all units haveorganic

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antiaircraft protection in the form of caliber .50machineguns on ring mountsof vehicles,but the major antiaircraftprotection is in the form of self-propelled

or mobile, automaticweapons,antiaircraft battalionsassigned organically to aGeneral Headquarterspool, which are highly suitable for this purpose. Theemployment of special pool units is a command decision,according to thesituation.

Supply and Maintenance

9. All organicprovisionsfor supply arebasedon theprinciplesof paragraph38, FM 100-10, 9 December 1940. The following commentsare made:

a. The army isbeing provided with abundantand flexible means of plac-ing supplies within convenientreach of the transportationof using units, regi-ments, self-sustainingbattalions, andsmall separate units.

b. The army handlesall supplies upon their arrival in the combat zone,using army personnel and transportation.It establishes and mans all supplypoints down to includethose which deliver to using units. The usingunits needno personnelspecifically detailed for loading the suppliesand bring only trans-portation and personnelnormally assigned to the vehicle to the supply point.

c. Unit reserves of rations and water normally are confined to kitchentrucks and trailers.Resupply of both rations and water is by anyavailableunittransportation.

d. Unit transportation generally includes no provisions for areserve offuel and lubricants, exceptin the case of tanks or similar vehicles consuminglarge quantities. Motorvehiclesin generalhave an adequatereserve in fuel tankand canscarried in vehicles. Resupplyof fuel and lubricants is by any availableunit transportation, in the discretion of theunit commander.

e. There is no change in the presentsystem of ammunition supply. The

reserve of ammunition of a unit consists primarily of hauling capacity of itsvehicles.In general, the numberof ammunitionvehiclesassigned aunit is basedon hauling,rather than carrying capacities.The unitcommandermust see thatammunitionvehiclesare employedactivelyand continuouslyto the extentneces-sary to insure an adequatesupply of ammunitionat all times.

10. Adequateprovisionis made for motor maintenance,provided that allechelons are employed effectively. Admittedly, third echelon maintenanceofdivisions is inadequateof itself to handle all third echelon repairs under severeoperatingconditions. The excess of such repairs mustbe made bythird echelon

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REORGANIZATION FORCOMBAT 381

13. The following allotment, in addition to training allotment, is beingfurnished in order to provide adequatepersonnel foradministrativerequire-

ments for corpsoperating directly under Army Ground Forces.

Functions of Army and Corps

14. The following conception of functions is believed themost suitableunder the pending organization and in view of the problems of armies andcorps in the United States:

a. In general, combat units in training in the United States will be as-signed or attached tocorps, service units to armies and separate corps.

b. The army should absorbthe maximum ofadministration,endeavoringin every possiblemanner to simplify proceduresand eliminate paperwork andreports. The army'srole in connection withtraining should be general super-vision of all units without duplicating or interfering with the more detailedsupervisionby subordinateheadquarters.

c. In accordancewith letter,Hq AGF, 320.2/93 (R) (15 Oct 42) GNGCT,15 October 1942, Subject: "Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments,SpecialTroops, Army and Corps," (as amended), each armyand separate corpshas been authorizedcertain headquarters and headquartersdetachments,specialtroops, to direct and superviseboth tactical and administrativeinstruction andtraining of its componentunits, with the exception ofdivisions, brigadesandgroups. Each group commander ischarged with supervisingtraining of indi-vidual units of thegroup, as well as of the combination as a team. Groups willnot be attached to headquarters and headquarters detachments,special troops.

d. The corps has the primaryfunction of as close and frequent super-vision of training as is possible in view of size of itsheadquartersand numberand dispersionof its units. The more importanttraining tests preferably should

be conducted by the corps staff. See paragraph 7a,letter, Hq AGF, 319.22/22

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(1 Jan 43) GNGCT, 1 January 1943, Subject: "Conduct of Training." A sep-arate corps combinesthe functionsof army andcorps.

e. The tabularorganizationof army and corpsstaffs shouldbe disregardedin connectionwith traininginspections inwhateverdegree isnecessaryin orderto utilize the entire staff as wholly aspossiblefor training supervision.Activitiesof the headquartersshould be reduced to aminimum, and all personnel sentto the field in connection with trainingand in capacities best suited to meettraining needs. Particularlyin the corps, it is important that organicstaff com-partmentation be overriddenwith this end in view and major proportion ofall personnel be kept in the field. See paragraph 1, "Conduct of Training"referred to ind, above.

15. Paragraph 2, letter Hq AGF, 320.2/187 (R) (1 Mar 43)GNGAP-A,1 March 1943, Subject: "Personnel Administrationin 'Assigned' and 'Attached'Units," and all other instructionsin conflict with the principles statedabove arerescinded.

By command of LT.GEN. McNAIR:Signed: J. R. DRYDEN,

Lt.Col., A.G. D.,

Ass't Ground Adjutant General.

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Organization and Training

of New Ground Combat Elements

by

Robert R. Palmer

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Contents

I. NEW WEAPONS AND OLD PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7The Idea of Balance in AGF Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388Mobilization Planning i n 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 1Tactical Reorganization fo r Economy and Balance . . . . . . . . . . . 394

II. ORGANIZATION FOR TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396Growth of the Special Establishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 6Decline of the Special Establishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8

Organization f o r Combined Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 1

III. PROBLEMS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . 41 8T he Antiaircraft Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418T h e Tank Destroyer Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 3Tanks, Tank Destroyers, and Antiaircraft Guns as Field A r t i l l e ry . . . . . 430

I V . SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 33

TablesNo.1. Assignmentof Armored Divisionsin the Army Ground Forces, 1942-44. . 3982. Assignment of Tank Battalions (Other than in Armored Divisions) in

the Army Ground Forces, 1942-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 93. Assignment of Tank Destroyer Battalions in the Army Ground Forces,

1942-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 04. Assignment of Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions in the Army Ground

Forces, 1942-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 1

ChartsNo.

1. Arms and Quasi Arms in the Army Ground Forces, May 1943 . . . . . 4062. Arms and Quasi Arms in the Army Ground Forces, May 1944 . . . . . 407

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mobility for reasoned objectives, was enhanced by parallel progressin com-munications,partly in wire, chiefly in radio, whichin various forms from the

"walkie-talkie" to new developmentsin short wave could furnish commandersof all echelonswith immediate information.The Germans, in the air-tank blitz of 1939 and 1940, used the new devices

to effect what seemed at thetime a revolution intactics. Americans wereeasilypersuaded, bothwithin and outsidethe armed services,that modern warrequireda profusion of machines and that personnel employingthe machines mustreceive highly specialized training in their use. It was more difficult to holdsteadily in view the end forwhich the machines existed, and thetotal combinedeffect to which forms of specialization weremeant to contribute.

The problem resolved itself into the integrationof new techniquesof war-fare with the old, but stillbasic,principles oftactics and strategy.Many, includ-ing GeneralMcNair, insisted on keeping such principles constantly in mind.Greater mobilitygave new meaning to the old tactical ideas of surprise,flexi-bility, and concentration.The old idea of balanced forces became more im-portant, rather than less,becauseof technicalspecialization andinterdependencein the armed services. The need ofunity of over-all commandwas more urgent,rather than less, because of the freedom which had to begranted to specialists

for the promotion of their chosen arms. Unity of command was also the morenecessaryas forces became more mobile, if all were to be engaged in fightingthe same war. Economy of force remained a basic necessity even for acountrypriding itself on the superiority of itsresources.

The Idea of Balance in AGF Policy

GeneralMcNair stated hisbasic views on the "Evaluationof ModernBattleForces" in an exchange of papers with G-2 of the War Department GeneralStaff in March 1941. G-2 had suggested that the infantry-artillery team mightbe renderedobsoleteby the air-tank team employed by theGermans. 1 In reply,General McNairexpressed a continuing belief in the central importanceofinfantry. He doubtedwhether aviation would replacefield artillery, howevermuch it might extend the depth of attack.He stated hisviews as follows:2

1 WD memo G-2/2016-1297 for CofS USA, 1 Mar 41, sub: Evaluation of Modern Battle Forces. GHQ

Records, 059/1.2

Memo of Gen McNair forCofS USA, 12 Mar 41, sub as above. GHQ Records,059/1.

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ORGANIZATION OF NEW COMBAT ELEMENTS 389

March 12,1941MEMORANDUMFOR THE CHIEF OFSTAFF:

Subject: Evaluation of Modern Battle Forces.

The following commentsare submitted in connection with G-2 memorandum, March1, 1941, this subject, as directed by your memorandumof March 3:

1. G-2 is to be congratulatedon this study.2. It is felt that the picture presented is hardly a balanced one. The German mechanized

army was not alone and supported only by aviation, as might be inferred, forexample,from the second paragraph of the G-2 memorandum.It is my understanding that overtwenty infantry divisions formed a long finger from Sedan to Abbeville along the Aisne,backing up the armored force, protecting its communications, andthus making possible itsheadlong rush. In m akin g this comment, there is nothought of detractingfrom the b rilliancyand importance of the operation of the armoredforce.

3. As to the weaponswhich are heralded assupplanting infantry and artillery:a. The tank was introduced to protectagainst automatic small arms fire, which

was developed so greatly during and since the World War. Its answer is fire againstwhich the tank does not protect—theantitank gun. That this answer failed was dueprimarily to thepitifully inadequate number and power ofFrench and Britishantitankguns, as well as their incorrectorganization. The tank is a conspicuous target andcannot cope with a sufficiently powerful gun in position. Theantitank minealso is athoroughly effective antitank weapon.

b. Air supportof armored elements depends on air superiority, which theGermanspossessed overwhelmingly.4. The picture to be studied is not alone that presented by the G-2 memorandum,

bu t rather one in which tanks are met by reasonably adequate countermeasures,and inwhich the aviation supporting the tanks is unable todrive its adversaries from the air. Insuch a picture, armored legions quite conceivablymight emerge from such an all-outattackan almost total loss. It is unsafe to stake the nationaldefense on such an uncertain prospect.

5. As to action to meet thesituation presented:a. With reference to the air threat, sufficient aviation is theprimary need, and is

being procured. Antiaircraft fire to protect ground troopsalso is needed in amobilemass sufficient to meet concentratedair attacks, but is not being procured.b. The need of a greatly expandedmobile force of suitable antitank guns has been

pointed out repeatedly, but is not being procured.c. An armored force is being developed as rapidly as possible. It is unnecessary

to decide now wherethis development shouldstop, w ith reference to infantry divisions.Subsequent war experience should throw further light on this question.

d. The operation in question and others in the present war do not point to anincrease in the numberof cavalry divisions.6. Given proper action along the foregoing lines, the infantry division will continue

to be thebackboneof an army.

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In short, in General McNair's opinion,the infantry division, backed byartillery, would remain the basic instrument of warfare if the proper newforces were developedto support it and if a degree of air superioritycould beobtained.Balance between different weapons was the essential. Detailsof thebalance should bedeterminedby experience.

This remained General McNair'sview. In 1941, when he felt that the bal-ance inclined too little to the newforces, he strongly urged their development.In 1942, when the United States had fully entered the war, and the balanceseemed to swing towardan undue developmentnot only of aviation butalsoof antiaircraft artillery, armored and motorized divisions, and specializedunitsof many types, General McNair frequently appeared in a more conservative

position,urging the importanceof the foot soldier and thefield gun.By the time of the establishmentof Army Ground Forces in March 1942,

the War Department had taken steps to provide the forces enumerated byGeneral McNair in paragraph 5 of his memorandum ofMarch 1941. 3 TheArmy Air Forces was created under that name in June 1941. The developmentalfunctions of older ground arms were grouped under the Replacement andSchool Command of the Army Ground Forces. Newertactical elements, be-cause of their special problemsof developmentand expansion,were eachgiven

an independent organizationdirectly subordinate to Headquarters, ArmyGround Forces.4

These newer tactical elements—armored,tank destroyer, antiaircraft, andairborne—trained their personnel and developedtheir equipment and tacticsin special establishments,known variously (in an order of descending impor-tance) as a force, command, or center. Each establishment, since its function wasto develop the maximumpossibilitiesof given weapons, was operated by officerswho believed strongly in these possibilities, who spent their whole time inexploring them, and who therefore developedbranch spirit to a high degree.The commanding generals—Lt.Gen. Jacob L. Devers of the Armored Force(not the first commander, but the first under Army Ground Forces), Maj. Gen.John A. Green of the Antiaircraft Command, Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce ofthe Tank Destroyer Center, and Maj. Gen. William C. Lee of the AirborneCommand—were all officers who had struggled to get their programs more

3 (1) See above, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, UnitedStates Army,1940-42," especially Sections III and VII. (2) See also AGF Historical Section, A General History of theArmy Ground Forces.

4 Ibid.

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fully incorporatedinto the Army. Each organizationhad a spirit of enthusiasmfor its own role, a valuableand creative spirit, but one which General McNairwished to direct toward the over-all interests of the Army as he understoodthem.

One aim of thereorganizationof 9 March 1942was to subdue the spirit ofbranch independence.The trend of AGF policy with respect to the Air Forceswas to cooperateon mattersof common interest; withrespect to theolder arms(Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery), to administer themcentrally through the Replacementand School Command or directly throughthe AGF headquartersstaff; and with respect to the newerestablishmentsorquasi arms (Armored, Tank Destroyer, Antiaircraft, and Airborne), at firstto allow a degree of independence,later to assimilatethem to the status of theolder arms by subordinating them morefully to AGF headquarters,eitherdirectly or through the Replacement andSchool Command.The fulfillmentof this policy took about two years,except tha t cooperationwith the headquartersof the Army Air Forces was never as completeas General McNair desired.Theaim of the policy was tosecurea balanceof forces: first,a balancein mobilization,for example,between armored andinfantry troops (the higher balancebetweenaviation and ground forces being of necessity left to the War Department);

second,a balanced training in the senseof combined trainingto weld theseveralarms into teams; and consequently, third, the production on the battlefieldof a complexbut unifiedfightingforce.

In this way each arm would be developed in the mostuseful ratio to otherarms. None would grow simply for its own advantage or in an enthusiasticbelief in the peculiardecisiveness of its operations. None would consumeresourceswhich might more effectively be assigned to another. Balance meantan economyof force, or a maximizingof the militarypower of the United States.

Mobilization Planning in 1942

Mobilization policy in 1942 inclined heavily toward the expansion ofnewer tactical specialties, andtoward the endowmentof all unitswith a greatarray of mechanicalequipment, especially in motor transportation. The inade-quacy of prewar provisions madesuch a program necessary. There was also atendency tobuild heavily equipped units and to furnish American troops witha quantity of conveniencescorrespondingto the living habits of theAmerican

people. Towardthe end of 1942,after the first rush of rearmament,the basic

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problem oflogistics inherent in the situation of theUnited States asserted itself.American military power was not a mere matter of what could be assembledin the United States but rather of what force could be exerted at distances offrom three to twelve thousand miles.5 However much the world may haveshrunk with the developmentof aviation or the course of politicalthinking,for logistical purposes the oceans were about as wide in 1942 as in 1917. Thebulkier the equipment, the less could be sent overseas. The more auxiliarypersonnel and materiel put onshipboard, the less was the offensive powerwhich could be delivered.

In May1942 the War Departmenthad ordered theconversionof 7 infantrydivisions provided in the 1942 Troop Basis into 4 armored and 3 motorizeddivisions.6 The OperationsDivision (OPD), War Department General Staff,estimated that, by the end of1943, 46 armored and 23 motorized divisions outof a total of 140 divisions should bemobilized.7 Army Ground Forces pro-nounced this program feasible but judged the proportion of armored andmotorized to infantry divisionsexcessive and "not in consonancewith existingtransportationshortages." 8 Army GroundForcesadvised against mechanizationof the two cavalry divisions,holding that the nondivisionalcavalry regiments,which were all mechanized (with light tanks, armored cars,self-propelled

howitzers,and trucks), weresufficient.9

Two airbornedivisionswere organizedin the summer of 1942. Tank destroyer battalions were rapidly activated.Antiaircraft battalions were activated even more rapidly, frequently out-running the 1942 Troop Basis. General McNair doubted the value of anti-aircraft artillery as an offensive weapon, since much of it was used to protectrear-area installationsor airfields, and since thoseunits which operated withmobileground forces were useful primarily only so long as Americanair powerwas undeveloped. 10

5 WD memo (C) WDGCT 451 (10-8-42) for CG AGF, 30 Oct 42, sub: Excessive Number of MotorVehicles. 451/66 (C).

6 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 (4-28-42) for CG AGF, 4 May 42, sub: Armd and Mtzd Divs.320.2/165 (S).

7 WD memo (S) OPD 320.2 (5-10-42) (2-12-42) for G-3 WD, 23 May 42, sub: Maj Tr Unit Reqtsfor 1942, 1943, 1944. 320.2/190 (S).

8 AGF memo (S) for OPD WDGS, 28 May 42, sub: Maj Tr Unit Reqts for 1942, 1943, 1944.320.2/190 (S).

9 (1) AGF memo for G-3 WD, 5 May 42,sub: Cav Orgn. 321/51 (Cav). (2) Sec also memo, SW forASW, 21 Jul 42.321/99 (Cav).

10 (1) See above, in "Ground Forcesin the Army, December 1941-April 1945: a Statistical Study," cols

16 and 21 of thetable. (2) See abovealso, "Mobilizationof the GroundArmy."












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By the fall of 1942 the need of economybecameevident. Estimates obtainedby the War Departmentdisclosed the limits in the capacityof the United Statesto produce warmaterial,

11 and for the first time the ceiling on the manpoweravailable to the Army came into view. The limitations on shipping capacitywere felt as the submarine menacecontinued unabated.In addition, and inpart because of these limitations,the strategic plansof the Combined Chiefsof Staff had changed; the idea of early ground operations in western Europehad been abandoned.The War Department dispatched along memorandumto the commandinggenerals of the Army Ground Forcesand the Services ofSupply, reading in part asfollows:12

The above shipping considerationsmay dictate a considerablechange in our strategicconcept with a consequent change in thebasic structure of our Army. Since, from theshipping capabilities indicatedabove, it appearsthat the early employment of amass Army,which must be transported by water, is not practicable,it follows that the trend must betoward light, easily transportableunits rather thanunits of the heaviertype. Likewise, theproportion of Air Forces may have to be increased. . . .

Indications are that the 7,500,000 men allotted to the Arm y for 1943 approaches themaximum manpower level that the Army is going to be able to reach. If this is the case,it is highly necessary that we not commit the type of Army which we shallbuild in 1943too definitely to a single strategic concept such as 5440 [the now postponed plan for theinvasion of Europe] which mayprove impracticable ofaccomplishment.Recent indicationsare that a further expansion of the Air Forces may be expected which no t only will reducethe number of menavailable for the ground forces but will complicate, if not curtail, theprocurement ofheavy equipment for other than the Air Forces.

In other words, it was decided to push the development of air powerratherthan a fuller development of theground army.

In consideringhow to reduce the originallyplanned strength of the groundarmy for 1943, Army Ground Forcesand the War Department agreed thatshipping capacity should be a governing factor. The Army Ground Forcesfavored reduction in those units,whether light or heavy,whose shipment addedthe least to combat power overseas. The War Department favored reductionin the heavy units which were the most difficult to transport. Army GroundForces recommended that reduction be made preferably in antiaircraft and

11 Rpt (R) of ASF forFiscal Year 1943, p. 19.12 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (10-25-42) for CGs AGF, SOS, 25 Oct 42, sub: TB 1943.

520.2/5 (TB 43) (S).

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service units and in armored and motorized divisionsrather than in infantryand airborne divisions. By late 1942 there were strong tactical reasons forreviewingthe ratio of armored to infantry strength.Army Ground Forces alsorecommended that an appropriate balance among units of different types(whether light orheavy)be maintained in thereductions.13

The War Department,applyingcuts chiefly in heavier units, reduced theoriginallyproposednumberof armored and motorizeddivisions,though not asmuch as the Army Ground Forcesdesired. Cuts weremade also in theplannednumber of other heavy units: nondivisionaltank battalions (more useful thanarmored divisionsfor close supportof infantry); tankdestroyerbattalions;andnondivisionalfield artillery, especiallyheavy artillery. The figures adopted forthese units were wellbelow thoserecommendedby the ArmyGround Forces—in the case of heavy artillery 50 percent below whatthe Army GroundForcesbelieved necessary. The planned strength of antiaircraft artillery (half thestrength contemplatedfor infantry) remained virtually unchanged for anotheryear. Nor was the expansion ofservice units effectively checked.The resultingmobilization program, embodied in November 1942 in the first version of the1943 Troop Basis, was regarded by the Army Ground Forces as seriouslyunbalanced.14

Tactical Reorganization for Economy and Balance

When, in October 1942, the War Departmentempowered GeneralMcNairto reorganize the ground forces on a basis of the strictest economy, he tookadvantage of theopportunity to apply his conceptions of a properly balancedforce. The application and its effect on the compositionof the ground forces atsuccessive stages of World War II have been described in the two precedingstudies,15 and need be onlybriefly summarizedhere.

Carryingout with rigor his mandate to cut back the number of vehicles inthe ground army, which in his opinion had become excessive to the point of

13 (1) Ibid. (2) AGFmemo (S) for G-3 WD, 29 Oct 42, sub asabove. (3) WD memo (S) WDGCT320.2 Gen (10-25-42) for CG AGF, 19 Nov 42, sub as above. All in320.2/4 and 5 (TB 43) (S). (4) Seeabove, "Mobilization of the GroundArmy."

14 See above, "Mobilization of the GroundArmy," p. 217.15 See above, "Reorganizationof Ground Troops for Combat," pp. 297-99, and "Mobilization of the

Ground Army," pp. 217-220. For earlier developments, see above, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces:General Headquarters, UnitedStates Army, 1940-42," pp. 51 ff .

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impairing mobility, General McNairalso reduced the proportion ofunits incategoriesthat were not onlydifficult to ship becauseof their massiveequipment,but which he believed had been developed to a point inexcess of tacticalrequirements. The two mostimportant of these categories weremotorized andarmored divisions. Hesought, w ith less success, to cut down the proportion ofantiaircraft artillery, not only because of itsmass of specializedequipmentbutalso because antiaircraft artillery was primarily a defensive arm. At the sametime, to offset the effect of these cuts,he proposed a reorganizationof the wholestructure of tactical commandin the ground forces, with the object of intro-ducing a maximum of economy and flexibility into the employment of allcategories of specialized and mobile units so that they could be brought into

action when andwheremost criticallyneeded. The recommendations ofGeneralMcNair for a reduction in the proportion of armored and antiaircraft unitsand for an increase in theproportionof field artillerywere,in general,followed,after delaysand debateswhich are describedin the precedingstudies.Motorizeddivisions disappeared.The organic motor transportationof all ground unitswas cut to thebone. The twin principlesof streamlining and poolingwere putinto effect in a drastic reorganizationof tactical commands.The net result wasa ground army whose parts wereless self-sufficient, but which was lighter in

equipment and more flexible in its capacity to mass its fire power at criticalpoints on a wide front. Its fire power as a whole was increased, withoutreducing that of its front line units. It was not aforce built aroundmotorizedand armoredunits, as some had anticipated and desired, but onewhose mainstrengthwas in infantry, backedby guns of all kinds whichcould bemassedordetailed to support in attack, and supplemented byless encumberedarmoreddivisions designed to exploit a breakthrough. The infantry division con-tinued to be the backbone of theUnited States ground army as organized inWorld War II.

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possessed a service board and a service school, including an officer candidateschool, and each trained individual replacements for itsunits. Each exercised

jurisdiction over personnel administration,operated replacementpools,

andcontrolled assignments. Each hadcommand of tactical units: virtually allarmored units in the United States were assigned to the Armored Force, andall antiaircraft units in the United States except thosein defense commandswere assigned to the Antiaircraft Command.2 (See Tables Nos. 1 to 4.)

The Armored Forceenjoyed also certain otherpowers.Unlike othergroundarms, it dealt directly with War Department agencies and private manufac-turers in matters of procurement.It controlled the distribution of tanks to themotorizeddivisions, the mechanizedcavalry, and the fewarmored units which

in 1942 were not under its own command. It helped to establish theDesertTraining Center and sought toshare in itscontrol. In May1942 it wasconfirmedin its authority over the promotion and assignmentof all armored officers inthe Army Ground Forces.Requisitions forenlisted personnelof other groundarms were filled in 1942 by The AdjutantGeneral,but requisitionsfor armoredpersonnelwere filled by the Chief of theArmoredForce.3

Because of this wide jurisdictionand for various other reasons—thefactthat the tank was a prime offensive weapon, thatthe unitsunder its command

were as large as divisions and corps, and that its chief (from September 1942to May 1943) held, like GeneralMcNair, the rank of lieutenant general—theArmored Force was by far the strongest and mostautonomousof the specialestablishments in the Army Ground Forces.With a strength ranging from100,000 to 200,000, it compared to a field army in size. There was a tendencyamong armored officers to believe that large armored units could operatetactically alone, far ahead of moreslowly moving groundtroops. The habit ofthe Armored Force in 1941 of comparingitself to the Air Forces has alreadybeen noted. 4 This ambition had been dampened by the War Department.

2 (1) AGF ltr to Maj Gen J. A. Greene, CofCA, 9 Mar 42,sub: Advance Directive, Activation of AAComd. 320.2/2 (AA). (2) For the ArmoredForce sec above,"Origins of the Army Ground Forces: GeneralHeadquarters, United States Army, 1940-42," Sec. III.

3 (1) See papers in 470.8/143. (2) See AGF Historical Section, The Desert Training Center and C-AMA.(3) AGF ltr to CGs, 20 May 42, sub: Admin Jurisdiction overOffs of Armd Force Units While UnderTemp Control of Other Comdrs.320.2/121 (Armd F). (4) See AGF Historical Section, Provisionof EnlistedReplacements.

4 See above, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, United States Army,1940-42,"

p. 72.

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TABLE NO. 1

Assignment of Armored Divisionsin the Army Ground Forces, 1942-44

Source: AGF records, 320.2 Assignment Lists (C).

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TABLE NO. 2

Assignment of Tank Battalions (Other Than in Armored Divisions)in the Army Ground Forces, 1942-44


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TABLE NO. 3

Assignment of Tank Destroyer Battalionsin the Army Ground Forces, 1942-44


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TABLE NO. 4

Assignment of Antiaircraft Artillery Battalionsin the Army Ground Forces, 1942-44


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By 1943, withthe detachmentof armored unitsfrom its command,and with thetremendous expansionof antiaircraft artillery, the Armored Forcewas not aslarge as the Antiaircraft Comm and.Nor was itever as geographically extensive,being concentratedat Fort Knox, Ky., whereasthe Antiaircraft Command,from its headquarters at Richmond, Va., controlledat one time as many aseleven training centers throughoutthe United States.

The Airborne Command was not provided for in the War Departmentreorganization, but it was activated by the Army Ground Forces on 23 March1942, replacing the Provisional Parachute Group organized in1941.

5 The Para-chute Schoolwas transferredfrom the Infantry Schoolto the new command,aswere all airborne units then existing in the United States—two incompleteparachute infan try regimentsand one glider infantry battalion.6 Airborne divi-sions, when later activated, were placed underthe Airborne Comm andfor train-ing only, under army headquartersfor administration and supply.7 No replace-ment training center, board,or school (other thanfor parachutists)was createdfor the Airborne Command; these functions, along with personnel adminis-tration, were performedfor airborne troopsby other agenciesof the GroundForces.

8 The Airborne Command remained primarilya training centerand didnot developas far as the other special establishmentsin the direction of being

an arm.The statusof tank destroyers remained undecidedfor several months.The

War Department reorganization placeda Tank Destroyer Command directlyunder Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. This comm and possessed only thelimited functions of theTank Destroyer Tactical andFiring Center activated inthe preceding December.9 Many officers questioned whetherthe tank destroyerwas a weapon around which a separate organization should be built. GeneralDevers wished to annex the training of tank destroyers,as well as that of

5 (1) Memo of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 17 Mar 42, sub: A/B Comd. 320.2/1 (AB). (2) AGF ltrsto A/B Comd, 23 and 24 Mar 42, sub asabove. 320.2/1 (AB). (3) AGF ltr (R) to CO A/BComd, 8 Apr42, sub as above.320.2/1 (AB) (R).

6(1) AGF ltr to A/B Comd and R&SC, 6 May 42, sub: Pcht Sch. 320.2/21 (AB ).(2) A/B Comd ltr

(C) to CGAGF, 18 Apr 42,sub:A/B Comd Tng Situation. 353/1 (AB) (C ).7 (1) AGF ltr (C) to CGs A/B Comd, Secondand Third Armies,21 Oct 42, sub: Directive for Tng

A/B Divs. 353/11 (AB) (C). (2) Personal ltr (S) of Brig Gen F. L. Parks, CofS AGF to Brig Gen M. B.Ridgway, 29 Jul 42, 322.98 (S).

8 The request of the Airborne Commandfor establishmentof a service board was disapproved.AG F1st ind, 7 Jun 43, to AB Comd ltr, 15 May 43, sub: A/B Bd. 320.2/225 (AB).

9 TDC Info Bull10, a statement by TDC of its ownfunctions,30 Mar 42.020/34.

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mechanizedcavalry, to the ArmoredForce. 10 This transfer of the tank destroyerswas favored by the chief of the Operations Section,Headquarters,Army GroundForces;he also recommendedthat airborne training should be conducted by thefield armies, believing that Army Ground Forces wasdealing with too manydirectly subordinate headquarters.11 General McNair had long thought thatantitank andantiaircraft training in their initial phases shouldbe separatefromthe Armored Force and from the Air Force, largely on psychologicalgrounds. 12

But he had not yet decided how far theseparate organizationof tank destroyertraining should go. On 11July 1942, observing that the Tank Destroyer Com-mand hardly constituted more than a service school, havingno command au-thority like that of the Armored and Antiaircraft establishments, he recom-

mended to the War Department thatit be placed with the schools of theolderarms and under the Replacementand School Command.13

There were at this time about seventy tank destroyerbattalions in variousparts of the country, attachedprincipallyto the field armies.They were in differ-ent stages of incompleteness inorganization and equipment, most of them beinglineal descendants of the provisionalantitank battalions created in 1941 by aredistribution of artillery weapons. AGF staff officers, after inspecting thesebattalions, reported on 13 July 1942 that all were confused by uncertainty of

organization, that none had agood firing range, and that since tank destroyertactics were not crystallized each battalion followed its own ideas of training.The report urgedthe necessityof a unit trainingcenter through whichbattalionscould berotated for standardization at thehighest level. 14

Instead, therefore, ofbeing curtailed,the Tank Destroyer Command wasexpanded in thelatter half of 1942. Anadvancedunit training center was estab-lished for the battalionsalready active, together with a basic unit training centerfor the numerous newbattalions calledfor in the Troop Basis. Step by step,General Bruce receivedfull command authority overthe tank destroyer bat-

10 Memo (C) of CofArmdF for CG AGF, 21 Mar 42, sub notgiven. 320.2/7 (Armd Center) (C).11 Memo of Col Ott, Opns Div AGF for CGAGF, 27 May 42,sub: Orgn of Hq and Fld Elements of

AGF. 020/73.12 (1) See above, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces:General Headquarters, United States Army,

1940-42," p. 81. (2) Memo of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 2 Sep 41, sub:Orgn of AT Units in the Army.GHQ Records, 353/15 (AT).

13 (1) Memo of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 11 Jul 42, sub:Change in Status of TDC. Approved byWD. 320.2/69 (TDC). (2) AGF 4th ind (C) to CG SOS, 1 May 42. 320.2/2 (TDC) (C).

14 Incl to memo of Maj F. T. Unger, 13 Jul 42,sub: Summary of Inspection of TD Bns.353/42 (TDC).

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talions sent to him for training. His requestsfor a replacementtraining centerand anofficercandidate schoolwere granted.With these enlargementsthe TankDestroyer Command, although redesignated as a"Center," and although itsschool and replacement center was putunder the Replacement andSchoolCommand,neverthelessreached the stature of aquasi arm. 15

In October 1942 the Tank Destroyer Center was empowered to inspect, asan agency of Army Ground Force headquarters,all tank destroyer battalionsattached to armies and other subdivisions of the Army Ground Forces. Thepurpose of these inspectionswas to maintain uniform standardsof training,acquaint field units with the latest doctrine, and estimate status of equipment,degree of combatefficiency, and readiness foroverseas shipment. The Tank

Destroyer Center was the first of the special establishments toreceive thisauthority to inspect units not under its owncommand.The others in 1942 hadvirtuallyno units attached to thefield forces.16

While the powers of theTank Destroyer Center expanded in1942, those ofthe Armored Force were gradually restricted. General McNair came increas-ingly tobelieve that the ArmoredForce, as he said, "should join the Army." Inthis respect theArmored Forcepresented,in accentuatedform, a problem raisedby all the special establishments. Sincethe Armored Force was the oldest and

strongestof these establishments,it was the first to feel the restrictionsimposedby the Army Ground Forces on branch independence. On 19March 1942theI Armored Corps was transferred from the ArmoredForce to the DesertTrain-ing Center.17 The complete separationof the Desert Training Center from theArmored Force was effected. Plans were launched forincreasing the infantrystrength within the armored division,and for assigning armored corps, divi-sions, and battalions to nonarmoredhigher command. In December1942 theArmored Force yielded to the Army Ground Forces its jurisdiction over thedistribution oftanks. 18

By the end of 1942 the operationsof the special establishments hadbecomevery similar. The armored, antiaircraft, and tank destroyer organizationsgave

15 (1) AGF ltr to R&SC, 14 Aug 42, sub: Opn of TDC. 320.2/87 (TDC). (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 16 Aug42, sub as above. 320.2/69 (TDC). (3) Papers in 320.2/4 (TDC) (C), 320.2/14 (TDC) (R), 353/72 (S),and 320.2/69 (TDC).

16 AG F ltr to CGs, 21 Oct 42, sub: Tng Inspections,TD Units. 331.1/9 (TDC).17 AGF ltr (C) to CGs, 19 Mar 42, sub: Asgmt of I Armd Corps. 320.2/4 (Armd Center)(C).18 AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 27 Dec 42, sub:Allocation and Distribution of Tks. With related papers.

570.8/133 (R).

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basic training, officer and specialist training, and other forms of individualinstruction.The Armored Forceand Antiaircraft Command controlled assign-

ment of their personnel,a function assumedby the Tank Destroyer Center, bydelegation from the Replacement andSchool Command,in March 1943.19 Allthree activated units of their respective types and provided the cadres and unittraining programs.The three, together with theAirborne Command,acted asunit training centers, giving initial orbranch training to their respectivebat-talions and divisions. All four were responsible for theprogress of tacticaldoctrine,training methods,and equipmentin their severalfields.

For combinedtraining, by plans madelate in 1942,unitswere to bedetachedfrom their special establishmentson the completion of their branch training,and attached(later assigned) toarmies and corps.20 The questionpresenteditselfof how the special establishments should exercisetheir functions with regard topersonnel, doctrine, and equipment after their units were withdrawn from theirrespective commands. Airborneunits were so few, and the functions of theAirborne Command so restricted,as to present no problem. For the ArmoredForce, Antiaircraft Command,and Tank DestroyerCenter, identical solutionswereadopted.

In personnel administration, these three retained the responsibility for

maintainingthe recordsnecessary to classify and assignpersonnelof their arms.In procuringcadres for newunits which they activated,and for other purposesof their own, they were forbidden, without the approval of ArmyGroundForces, to withdraw personnelof their arms from units attached to tacticalcommandersfor combined training. In the interest of unity of authoritycom-manders of these tactical units received jurisdiction overpersonnel adminis-tration of the attachedunits, except where permanent transfer or change ofstation was involved.21

To link the trainingestablishmentswith the field forcesin matters oftrain-ing, doctrine,and equipment,the system of inspections originally appliedto thetank destroyer battalions was extended toarmored and antiaircraft units. Like

19 R&SC ltr to CG AGF, 15 Mar 43, sub: Asgmt of TD Off and Enl Men.320.2/211 (TDC). (2) Seepapers in 320.2/7 (TDC) (C).

20 (1) Memo (S) of Col Winn for GenMcNair, 2 Oct 42, sub: Revision of AGF Comd Orgn.320.2/493 (S). (2) AGF M/S, CG to G-1 and G-4, 5 Nov 42, with related papers.320.2/396. (3) Papersin AGF Plans Secfile 154.

21 (1) AGF ltr (R) toCGs, 16 Jan 43, sub:Pers Administrationin "Assigned" and "Attached" Units.

320.2/167 (R). (2) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 1 Mar 43, sub as above.320.2/187 (R).

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the Tank Destroyer Center, the Armored Force and the AntiaircraftCommandbecame inspecting agencies for Headquarters,Army Ground Forces. 22 Officers

of the three organizations—preferablygeneral officers accordingto GeneralMc-Nair's intention23—were to inspect units of their respective arms in the fieldarmies or separate corps and to submit comments in the form of letters to bedispatchedby ArmyGround Forces to thetactical commanders concerned.Thesystem did not work well at first; inspections wereinfrequent (except those ofthe AntiaircraftCommand), or were conducted by juniorofficers, or turned intotechnicalinspectionsof equipment,notably in the case of the Armored Force. 24

Since armies would conduct their own technicalinspections after reachingtheaters ofoperations, GeneralMcNairwished them to do thesame in training.A new directive wasissued in August1943,clarifyingthe aims of theinspectionsdesired.25

Throughout 1943 the functions of the special establishmentsremained gen-erally stabilizedas describedabove. (See Chart No. 1.) However,activation andunit training became less important in practice because activationof combatunits in the Ground Forces (except in the Field Artillery) virtuallyceased withthe revision of theTroop Basis in July 1943. Units producedand trained by thespecial establishmentspassed in increasing numbersto the field forces for com-

bined training. (See Tables Nos. 1-4.) As time went on, thespecial establish-ments wereless busyas unit trainingcenters andproportionatelymore occupiedwith inspections andwith the functionswhich they shared with the olderarms—the perfection of equipment and doctrine, individual training, and administra-tion of personnel.

Decline of the Special Establishments

The first to feel the changewas theArmoredForce,which in June 1943 wasredesignated the Armored Command.26 The new name, implying a greaterdegree of subordination,was an indication of aprocess long in development

22 AGF ltr to CGs, 10 Dec 42, sub: Tng Inspections,AA, Armd, and TD Units. 333/82.23 AGF ltr to CGs AAComd, ArmdF, TDC, 21 Feb 43, sub asabove.333/82.24 Series of AGFM/Ss in 333/82 and 333.1/1504.25 AGF ltr to CGs, 22 Aug 43, sub: Tng Inspections,AA, Armd,and TD Units.333.1/1504.26 (1) AGF M/S (C), CG to CofS, 11 May 43,sub: Armd Force Reorgn. (2)Memo (C) of Gen Lear

for CofS USA, 14 May 43, sub asabove.Both in 320.2/30 (Armd Center) (C).

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chute and airborne units, and acted as the agency of the Army Ground Forcesin dealing with theTroop Carrier Command of the Army AirForces. 32

The armored and tank destroyerorganizations,which had beenrespectivelythe strongest and the weakest of thespecial establishments twoyears before,became identical in February 1944.33 Both were placed under the Replacementand School Command, which, together with theAntiaircraft Command, re-mained the only developmental agencyin the Ground Forcesenjoying the statusof a command.The Armored Command wasredesignatedthe Armored Center.Only about thirty officers were allotted to it.About twenty officers were allottedto theTank DestroyerCenter.

The Armored and Tank Destroyer Centers ceased to function in unittraining. Each lost control of its service board.Both boards wereplaced,as werethe boards of the older arms,directly under the RequirementsSection of theArmy Ground Forces General Staff. In plans drafted by the AGF staff it wasat first proposed thatthe two Centersshould lose control over their respectiveservice schools and replacement installations aswell. They would in this eventhave been left with no subordinateechelons at all. General McNair preferredthat each center under the Replacement and School Command retain juris-diction over its service school and replacement center.34 On routine matters

of training and assignment the Replacement and SchoolCommand bypassedthe two Centers anddealt directly with the ArmoredSchool, ArmoredReplace-ment Training Center, Tank Destroyer School, and Tank DestroyerReplace-ment Training Center in the same way that it dealt with the schools andreplacement centers of the older arms inwhich no Center intervened.On ques-tions of policy involving armoredor tank destroyer affairs, the Replacementand SchoolCommandconsultedthe centerconcerned.

In some matters the Armored and Tank Destroyer Centers retained avestige of their old separate identity, reportingdirectly to Headquarters,Army

32 (1) AGF M/S (C), CG to G-3, 4 Oct 43. 320.2/12 (AB) (C). (2) AGF M/S (C), CG to G-3, 23 Oct43, sub: A/B Comd. 320.2/12 (AB) (C). (3) WD D /F (C) 322 (7 Feb 44) to CG AGF, 11 Feb 44, sub:Redesignation of A/B Comd. 320.2/101 (AB) (C). (4) AGF ltr (C) to CG A/BComd, 22 Feb 44,sub:Reorgn of A/B Comd. 320.2/100 (AB) (C) . (5) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD , 23 Feb 44,sub: Pcht Repl.320.2/112 (O'seasRepls) (S).

33 (1) AGF ltr (R) to CGArmd Comd, 13 Feb 44, sub: Reorgn of Armd Comd. 320.2/87 (ArmdComd) (R). (2) AGF ltr (R) to CGTDC, 13 Feb 44,sub: Reorgn of TDC. 320.2/34 (TDC) (R). (3)Papers in 320.2/12 (TDC) (S) and 320.2/100 (Armd Center) (C).

34

AGF M/S (C), CG to CofS, 7 Jan 44.320.2/100 (AB) (C).

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Ground Forces. They continued to inspect armoredand tank destroyer unitsand tosubmit commentsin the form ofdrafts of lettersto bedispatchedby ArmyGround Forces to tactical commanders.They continued also to review andmake recommendationson the tactics, doctrine,and training literature of theirarms.

After the reorganization of February 1944 the Army Ground Forcesadministered its armored, tank destroyer, and airborne elements in almostexactly the same way as it administered theolder arms. All schooling andreplacementtraining (except antiaircraft)were conductedthrough the Replace-ment and School Command.All service boards (except antiaircraft) weredirect projections of the Requirements Sectionof the Ground Force headquar-ters staff. The AGF staff had alwaysincludedofficers responsiblefor training lit-erature,visual aids, review ofdoctrine and organization,and similar m atters,forall the arms. For the armored, tankdestroyer, and airborne "arms" they wereassisted by officers at the three centers.AGF staff officers had always inspectedunits in the field and submitted reports in theform of comments to be incor-porated in letters to tactical commanders. For armored and tank destroyerunits these officers were supplemented byothers at the Armored and Tank De-stroyer Centers. The officers at the Armored and Tank Destroyer Centers were

in effect Ground Force staff officers stationed in the field, with the additionalrole of adv ising theReplacementand SchoolCommand,which itself was hardlymore than a large annex to Headquarters,Army Ground Forces.

Organization for Combined Training

In the best of circumstances theintegrationof the new forces into a tacticsof combined arms wouldhave presented an exceptionallydifficult problem oftraining.The relativenovelty of the new forces, together withthe rapid change

to which their doctrine and equipment were constantly subject, meant thathigher commanders often did not understand howbest to employ them inconjunction with other arms. Units trained initially in special branch establish-mentswere in danger of acquiringa somewhatparochialoutlook.Organizationon a nondivisionalbasis or in divisionsof special type (armored and airborne)meant that even after a unit passed to thefield forces it might have infrequentcontactwith other elementsof theArmy.

Moreover, until late in 1943 the circumstances w ere unfavorable.Prior to

the reorganization of the armoreddivisions

in September1943

there were

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never enough separate tank battalions for combined training with infantrydivisions.35 Combined training of antiaircraft and airborne unitswas gravelyhandicapped by lack of airplanes.36 Shortages of equipment and manpower,common to all the ground arms, delayed the initial branch training of units,postponingthe date at which such units could be assigned to tactical organiza-tions for combined training. Some units, especially antiaircraft, had to behurriedlyshipped overseas in the first year of hostilities,and even later, with nocombined trainingat all.37

As a consequence,by the latesummerof 1943,after the campaigns inNorthAfrica and Sicily, it was generallyagreed that combined training had beenunsatisfactory.Antiaircraft artillery shot down friendly planes; airborne opera-tions were confused; infantry andarmored officers told AGF observersthat theirtraining in each other's operations had been wholly inadequate. Higher com-manders and staffs showed inexperience in the planning and coordinatingofoperations,sometimes unnecessarilyemploying tanks, tankdestroyers,or air-borne troops in inappropriate missions, orusing them in such driblets that theireffectivenesswas lost. 38

For combined training in the United States variousmeans wereat hand.One wassimply to bring together,for lectures,discussions, anddemonstrations,

the commanders and staff officers of armies, corps,and divisions.Many suchconferenceswere held: at the Tank DestroyerCenter in 1942for the initiationofhigher commands in thenewest antitank doctrines;at Fort Benning in1942 forthe exhibition of air support of ground troops; and again at Fort Benning inApril 1944 to review and improvethe teamworkof infantry, tanks,and artillery.These conferences, however realisticallythe demonstrationsmight simulatecombat, and however thorough the explanations and discussions might be,were believed byGeneralMcNairto have only alimitedvalue.39 Exceptfor smallselected units, the troops played no part; the assembled officers enlarged theirknowledge but had nochance to practiceit.

35 For the numberof tank battalionsin AG F seeabove, Table No. 2.36 (1) AGF memo (C), G-3 to CofS, 18 Jan 43, sub: Rpt of Inspection of A/B Installations. 353.02/7

(AGF) (C) . (2) A GF mem o (S) for G-3 WD , 23 Jun 43,sub: Plans for A/B Tng forBalance of 1943.353/15 (AB) (S). (3) See AGFHistorical Section,Th e AntiaircraftCommand and Center.

37 See below, pp. 425-26.38 See rpts of AGF obsrs in 319.1 (Foreign Obsrs) (C) and (S).39

See AGFHistoricalSection,The Procurementand BranchDistributionof Officers.

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ORGANIZATIONOF NEW COMBAT ELEMENTS 413

Another means was provided by the inspectionsof units in thefield forcesconducted by higher officers of the various special establishments,acting as

representativesof Headquarters, Army Ground Forces.The system openedchannels of understandingand information between tacticalcommandersandthe agencies concerned with development,and it had the advantage ofalwaysfunctioningin reference to particularunits which were actuallypassing throughthe combined phaseof their trainingcycle.

Maneuvers offered a third method. Maneuver areas, especially theDesertTraining Center, were the schools in which higher commanderslearned tohandle complex forces under tactical conditions,and in which individual unitsobtained practicalexperiencein meetingtheir responsibilities toother units andin turn received their support. For large operations, maneuvers were theclosestapproximationto combat. Butthere were disadvantages: anindividualor unitcould not correct mistakesimmediatelyor drill repeatedly in weak points; liveammunitionwas generally not used; and the maneuverperiod was short.

A fourth means of combined training,for which noneof the others was anadequate substitute, was the close and habitual associationof special-typeunitsin larger units of combined arms.The divisionwas the primary combined-armsunit, but none of the units here under discussion was organic in the standard

division. Theproblem was, therefore,essentiallya problem in theorganizationof army and corps.

In August 1942 General McNairdirected the Plans Section of hisstaff todraft a scheme for theattachmentof nondivisionaltank battalionsto armiesandcorps for combinedtraining. The scheme was broadened toinclude tankde-stroyer battalions, antiaircraft units, and nondivisional field artillery. "Non-divisionalunits," observed the Plans Section,"shouldbe distributedso as toplaceall typesat or nearevery division.They can then be used by one ormore divisionsin combinedtraining. The supportingunits should be availableto each divisionabout five months after activation of the division." 40 This seemingly obviousarrangement had to be dismissed except as anideal aim. The stationing of aunit depended on many considerations otherthan convenience of combinedtraining—on place of activation, imminence of overseas shipment, railroadfacilities, housing accommodations, andother factors. In practice, asmobiliza-tion developed, no one couldanticipatehow far a divisionwouldhaveprogressed

40 (1) Memo (S) of Col Winn for Gen McNair, 2 Oct 42, sub: Revision of AGF Comd Orgn. With

related papers.320.2/493 (S). (2) See AGFPlans Sec files 154 (S) and320.2/167 (R).

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in its training five months after activation.In any case the matter was of littlepractical urgency in 1942, since most units of thetypes in question either werestill undergoing branch training in their respective specialestablishmentsor wereshipped overseasbefore combined training could be given.

In March 1943, with an increasingnumber of unitsgraduating from theirspecial establishments,General McNairagain raised the question oftheir com-bined training. A difficulty peculiar to thenewer arms was that their units hadto be trained not only for close combinedoperationswith divisionsbut also formass action with other units of their own type. The higher commander mustbe left free to disperse or assemblesuch units at will—toattach them locally todivisions or to gather them for a unified blow. To neglect combined training

with divisionswould be bad—sobad that Brig. Gen. John M. Lentz,AGF G-3,came to doubt the wisdom of the nondivisionalorganization. But to neglect thepossibility ofconcentrated actionof mobile forces would be to ignore one of themain lessonsof thewar. General McNairhad in mind not only the comparativelysmall actionshitherto engagedin by American ground forces but also the needsof an ultimate major offensive. He repeated his fundamental conceptions ina note for GeneralLentzdated 10 March 1943 : 41

It appears that the question is arising more or less generallyas to the policy in assigningand training TD—also AA—battalionsand groups after they leave the training centers andbefore they go overseas.

The underlyingprinciple,it seems to me, is that such units organicallyare a pool fromwhich tactical needscan be met where and when they arise. Since such flexibility of employ-ment may and probably will require massed employmentof battalionsand groups, it followsthat such employment must be included in training as a primary requisite.

The foregoing . . . must not preclude the close associationof battalions, and perhapsgroups, with divisions for combined training. It must not be overlooked, however, that thepermanent attachment of battalionsto divisionswill prevent training in massed employment,

hence is inadvisable. It is deemed far preferable—infact, imperative— that the battalions betrained together most of the time, and that combined training with divisions be arranged asappropriate according to what the division is doing. It is not too frequently that divisiontraining will lend itself to combined training with TD and AAbattalions.

These views were embodiedin a directive tocommandersof armies and separatecorps in the Army Ground Forces,dated 1 April 1943, governing the advancedtrainingnot only of tank destroyer and antiaircraft battalionsbut also of non-

41AGF M/S, CG to G-3,10 Mar 43. 353.02/103 (AGF).

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divisionaltank battalions,to which the same principles applied. 42 The directivewas largely anticipatory in nature, since the number of tank and antiaircraftbattalionsavailable for assignment tohigher tactical commands in theGroundForcescontinuedto be small.Tank destroyerbattalionswere availablein largernumbers.

A new army andcorps organization,after a year of preparation at AGFheadquarters, wasannouncedin July 1943. 43 The "type" army and "type" corpsdisappeared. Armies and corpswere henceforthto consist of such divisions andother units as might be assigned for specificpurposes.The army remained bothtacticaland administrative.The corps becameprimarilya fightingorganization.Service troops formerly assigned to corps weretransferred to armies. Combat

troops formerly assigned to armies were transferred to corps.44

At the sametime, with the abolitionof the armored corps, there remained only one kind ofcorps. The corps commandersbecame the officers immediately responsibleforthe combined training of armored divisions with infantry divisions, and of alltypes of nondivisional combat units with both armored and infantry divisions.The corps, in training as in combat, was supposed to be a balanced force inwhich a variablenumber of divisions wassupported by appropriate proportionsof field artillery, mechanizedcavalry, combatengineers, tanks, tankdestroyers,

and antiaircraftunits, all organized flexibly in battalions and groups.Not until some months after announcementof the new organizationwereenoughunits of all typesavailableto implementit. In thefall of 1943 antiaircraftunits for the first time becameavailable in significant numbers for combinedtraining with other elements of the Army Ground Forces. It was also in thefall of 1943, with the reorganization of thearmored divisions,that the ArmyGround Forcesfor the first time obtainedseparate tank battalions in numbersapproximately equivalent to thenumber of infantry divisions,making it possibleto pair battalions and infantry divisionsfor combined training. At the sametime the last of the armored divisions completed their initial organization andtraining under the Armored Command, and the last of the tank destroyerbattalions passedthrough the Advance Unit Training Center at Camp Hood.

42 AGF ltr to GSs, 1 Apr 43, sub: Asgmt and Tng of Gp Hq and Bns of Tk, TD, andAAA. 353/2209.43 AGF ltr (R) toCGs, 21 Jul 43, sub: Orientation with Reference to Revised Orgn. 320.2/242 (R) .44 (1) AGF ltr (C) to CGs, 5 Aug 43, sub: Asgmt of Combat Units to Corps. 320.2/300 (C ) . (2) AGF

ltr (R) to CGs, 29 Oct 43, sub: Asgmt of C ombat-typeUnits. 320.2/267 (R). (3) See AGFHistorical Section,Problems ofNondivisionalTraining in the Army Ground Forces.

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The neteffect is apparent in Tables Nos. 1-4 above,showing the assignmentof armored, tankdestroyer, andantiaircraft units at successivedates in thehis-

tory of the Army Ground Forces.The tendency is clear in the physicalmassingof the figures in each table from upper left to lower right. Thereis a kind ofnatural history to which each type of unit conforms with variations: first, aperiod of concentration under the special training establishments;second, aperiod in which assignmentto armies wascommon;and third, a period ofdis-tribution among corps. For reasons already made clear, the second periodprecedes thefirst in the case of the tank destroyers. In general, thethird periodwas not clearlypresentuntil 1944,by which time the armoredand tankdestroyerunit training centers were closed down and units were widely distributed tothe corps stillremainingin the Army Ground Forces.

Combined trainingimproved toward the close of 1943, both because of thenew organization and because equipmentand ammunition had become some-what less scarce. Specialconsiderationsaffecting the antiaircraft and tank de-stroyer arms are setforth below. Of the mechanizedweapons, theprincipalonewas the tank.

An AGF directive of 16 October1943 outlined the duties of corps com-manders in combined training of tanks with infantry.45 Shortcomings ob-

served in both maneuvers and combat weresummarized: tankshad failed togive full fire support to infantry advancing in front, or had been used as sta-tionary "pill boxes," or had been committed without proper support by otherarms; and infantry had failed to engageantitankguns,or to follow tanks closely,or to consolidate gains. Each corps commander was instructed tohave tankbattalions train with infantry divisions in both the combined-training and thepost-maneuver phasesof the divisionalcycle. In maneuvers eachinfantry divi-sion was to have one or more tankbattalions in support.The ArmoredCom-

mand inFebruary

1944,on thebasis

of its inspections,declared

thatattachment

of tank battalions toinfantry divisionswas not receiving enoughemphasis, andrecommended aconferenceof high commandersat Fort Knox.46 Army GroundForces arranged instead a conference under the combined auspices of theArmored Command, the Infantry School, and the Field Artillery School. 47

45 AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 16 Oct 43, sub: Inf-Tk Tng. 353/9 (Inf) (R).46 Ltr (C) of CG Armd Cen to CGAGF, 16 Feb 44,sub: Inf-Tk Cooperation.353/100 (Armd Cen) (C).47 (1) AGF ltr (C) to CGArmd Cen, 4 Mar 44, and to CGR&SC,5 Mar 44.353/100 (Armd Cen) (C) .

(2) AGF ltr toCGs, 24 Mar 44,sub: Conferenceon Inf-Arty-Tk Cooperation.337/415.

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This conference, held in April at Fort Benning, and centering about realisticdemonstrationsof the three arms in coordinated action,was so successful that itdrew a commendationfrom General McNair and approval from G-3 of theWar Departmen t GeneralStaff.48

A new AGF directive was issued on 14 June 1944. It applied to tank de-stroyersas well as totanks.49 The attachment ofbattalions to infantry divisions,hitherto left to the discretion of higher commanders,was now explicitly or-dered, for periods not to exceed two months for each battalion. Divisionswereto conduct combat firing of infantry, artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers to-gether as far as possible. The directive notonly provided that whole battalionsshould operate with whole divisions,but for the first time stipulatedthat tankdestroyer un its assmall as the company, and tank units as small as the platoon,should engage inclose teamworkwith small units ofinfantry. Such localizationreflected combat conditionsin Italy and the Pacific islands.

General McNairhad long held tha t tankunits must betrained in two ways:first, for action inarmoredmasses, secondfor close combinationwith other arms.The whole tactical organizationof armor was designed tomake possible rapidshifting from one role to the other. Through 1943, as is shown in the directiveof 1 April 1943 cited above, the emphasishad tended to fall on massed employ-

ment. This tendency, since not all things arepossible simultaneously,had per-haps impeded combinedtraining.With the directive of 14 June 1944 the em-phasis moved toward the close association ofarmor, tank for tank, with smallgroups of men on foot. Carried to an extremeconclusion, thiswould meanatacticalorganizationof armor of thekind which went down in France in 1940before the German armoreddivisions,and which the United States abandonedin 1940 with the establishmentof the Armored Force. It was carried to no suchconclusion;in training, the attachment oftank battalions to divisions formorethan two months was forbidden. Massedemployment was not forgotten. Thebalance was simply alittle less in its favor.

48(1) Ltr of Gen McNair to CG R&SC, 29 Apr 44, sub: Inf-Arty-Tk Conferences and Demonstrations.

337/415. (2) WD GenCouncilMin (S), 25 Apr 44.49 AGF ltr to CGs, 14 Jun 44,sub: Combined Tng for Tk and TDUnits with Inf Divs. 353/2311.

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III. Problems of Weapons

and Equipment

The Antiaircraft Question

Special difficulties presented themselves in thetraining of antiaircraft artil-lery. Gen. George C. Marshall frequently expressed dissatisfactionwith thisphase of the training program,and in October 1943 directed GeneralMcNairto make it, together with the replacementsquestion, the objectof his concentratedattention.

1 On two occasionsa movement to transfer antiaircrafttraining to theArmy Air Forces gained considerable headway in the War Department.

Most of the shortcomings could be traced to the fact that AntiaircraftArtil-lery faced an exceptionally largeprogram of expansionwhile having at the sametime toprovidenumerous unitsfor operational needs.In the three yearsfollowing31 December1940 the Infantryincreasedby 600percent,the Field Artillery by 500percent, but Antiaircraft Artilleryincreased by 1,750 percent, and if plans ineffect until October 1943 had been carried out the increase would have beenover 2,400 percent.While the other newly developedarms also expanded many

times, no other ground arm had to ship its units to combat areas as rapidly asantiaircraft. In the earlier and defensive phase of the war thedemand forantiaircraft artillery was exceptionally heavyboth in overseas theaters and basesand in defense commandsin the United States.Units were shippedafter acquir-ing a minimum proficiency with their weapons andbefore receiving com binedtraining with other Ground armsor with aviation. Throughout 1942 it was usualfor antiaircraftbatteriesto reach combatstations after only twelve weeksof unittraining and with individualmemberswho, becauseof personnel turnovercom-

1 Memo (C) of Gen Marshall for Gen McNair, 13 Oct 43, sub not given. 353/123 (C).

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mon to all theground arms, had had even less than twelve weeks. Improperlytrained themselves, these units neverthelessremoved from the Army GroundForces much of the best personnel from which cadres could be drawn. Theyalso took much of the bestequipment.

2

In these circumstancesnew units had to start with small and half-trainedcadres. The proportion ofnovice officers was even higher than in other groundarms. Equipment for training had to be spreadvery thin. In addition, commandsupervision was generallyless effective than, say, in an infantry division, bothbecause antiaircraft units were small, and because the background of higherantiaircraft officers lay in the CoastArtillery, in which opportunity to gaincommand experience had been less extensive than in other arms. 3

A furtherdifficulty was that the Arm y AirForces, which controlled the aviation on whichthe Antiaircraft Command was dependent for realistic training, could never in1942 and 1943 supply enough tow-target missions, particularly in view of thequantity of antiaircraft units which the War Department had decided tomobilize.

4

The AntiaircraftCommandwas handicappedin itssupervision overtrainingby the wide dispersionof its training centers, madenecessary in turn by thelarge number of its units. Having to meet urgent calls in the earliest period

of the war, the Antiaircraft Command failed to regularize and stabilize itstraining policies to the degree achieved by most other elements of the GroundForces. The shortest possibletraining period, a 13-week Mobilization TrainingProgram, was adhered tothroughout 1942. A notable system of inspections wasworked out by theAntiaircraftCommand;but for along time no standard testsat the closeof unit training, similar to thosegiven in other arms, were developed. 5

Combined training remained a rare luxuryuntil late in 1943.These facts were wellknown at AGF headquarters.In November1942 G-3,

Army Ground Forces, urged variousmodifications.General McNair at first feltthat in view of the needs of expansion the training program should not belengthened, and that in any case an tiaircraftunits, because their functions were

2 (1) Sec AGF Historical Section,The Antiaircraft Command and Center. (2) AGF M/S (S), AA Brto G-3, 17 Oct 43.353/195 (S). (3) AGF memo,CofS to Gen McNair, 23 Sep 42,sub: SW's CouncilMeeting.

3 Memo (C) of GenMcNair for CofS USA, 22 Oct 43, sub: Tng of Repls and AA Units. 353/123 (C).4 See AGF HistoricalSection, Air-GroundCooperation.5 (1) AGF M/S, G-3 to CofS, 3 Nov 42, sub: Visit to AATC's. 353.02/1 (AGF). (2) AGF M/S (S),

Tng Div to G-3, 20 Oct 43. 353/195 (S).

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technical andrelatively limited,could if necessaryget along with an abbreviatedtraining. 6 But in December 1942 the unit training period (includingbasic) wasneverthelesslengthenedto eighteenweeks,and in July 1943 to twenty-twoweeks.By the latter date the functions of antiaircraft artillery were becoming morevaried and the training problemcorrespondinglymore complex,as combat ex-perience showed thevalue of antiaircraft guns in their "secondaryrole" againstground targets.Attemptswere made in 1942 to give antiaircraft units combinedtraining,7 but until October 1943 the majority of antiaircraft units went overseaswithoutcombinedtrainingwith either ground arms oraviation.8

In the theaters antiaircraft guns brought down a gratifying number ofenemy planes,9 but also fired too frequently on friendly craft.The effects werefelt not only of hurried trainingat home but also of the lack of satisfactory train-ing in the theaters during the long periods ofinaction.Command organizationin the theaters wasdeficient both for the supervision ofantiaircrafttrainingandfor the coordinationof antiaircraftguns withfriendly fighter aviation incombat.

A proposal therefore gained ground in Washington for the transfer of theAntiaircraft Command to the Army AirForces.The issue first came to aheadin February 1943. G-3, War D epartment GeneralStaff, made the proposal,sup-ported by G-1 and G-4 and by Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold. 10 The main argument

was that antiaircraft artilleryand fighter aircraft should be trained togetherbe-cause they should operate as a team incombat. GeneralMcNair had himself, in1941, strongly urged upon the Army Air Forces that antiaircraft artillery,whenused in area defense in conjunction with fighter aviation, should beunder thecommand of the fighter commander.Air officers had finally consented to theinclusion of this point in FM 1-25, which, however, was not being generallyobserved in the theaters in 1943. 11 Of the need for combined trainingof antiair-craft units with air units General McNair had no doubt; but he believed

6 AGF M/S, CG to G-3, 12 Nov 42.353.02/1 (AGF).7 (1) WD memo (C) WDGCT 353 (6-17-42) for CG AGF, 17 Jun 42, sub: Tng of AA Units. With

indorsements.353/55 (C). (2) AGF memo (C) forCofS USA, 31 Oct 42,sub: Attachment of AA AW Bnsto Div for Joint Tng. 321/75 (CA) ( C ) .

8 See AGF Historical Section,The Antiaircraft Command and Center.9 Fo r statistics see AGF HistoricalSection, TheAntiaircraftCommand and Center.10 WD memo (S) for CGsAGF, AAF, 8 Feb 43, sub: Integration of AAA withAAF. With concurrences.

321/224 (CA) (S ) .11 See above,"Origin of the Army GroundForces: General Headquarters,United States Army,1940-42,"

pp. 121-27.

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ORGANIZATIONOF NEW COMBAT ELEMENTS 421

also that there was a need forcombined training with mobile groundtroops,though the need was obscured by thefact that few ground troops had yet beenengaged in mobile operations.In any case General McNaircould not see howthe branch or unit training of antiaircraftartillery, a necessary preparationforcombined training of any kind, would be improved by atransfer of the Anti-aircraft Command to the AirForces.

12 The OperationsDivision,War Depart-ment General Staff, agreed, and the proposalwas dropped.

13

It arose again in September 1943, when the War Department,after Ameri-can planes had been shotdown by friendly antiaircraft guns in the Siciliancampaign,appointed a board underMaj.Gen. Homer L. Oldfield to survey theantiaircraft problem. The board submitted a number of findings,among them

the following: (1) that air commanders,in the defense of fixed installations inthe theaters, should exercise command over their supportingantiaircraft units(which General McNair had urged since 1941); (2) that air commandersshould control the allocation of all antiaircraft units (to which ArmyGroundForces could not agree, since many antiaircraft units were needed for supportof mobile ground troops); (3) that the Army Ground Forces regardedanti-aircraft artillery as adefensiveweapon (which was true, but was abelief heldeven more positivelyby theoristsof air power); (4) that combinedtraininghad

been bad (the causes for this have been mentioned above); and (5)that thedisseminationof technicalknowledgeand training doctrine in the theatershadbeen inadequate (a fact which was regarded as outside the jurisdictionof theArmy Ground Forces).The board recommended as aremedy the transfer ofantiaircraft training to the Army Air Forces. 14

The War Departmentdisregarded the board's recommendation15 but didbring pressure on the Army Ground Forces for improvement.16 "The CofS,USA, lacks confidence,to put it mildly, in the antiaircraft training that we aregiving," General McNair notedfor his chief of staff on 15 October 1943.

17 The

12 Memo (S) of Gen McN air for G-3 WD, 19 Feb 43,sub: Integration of AAAwith AAF. 321/224(CA) (S).

13 OPD m emo for G-3 WD, 23 Feb 43, sub as above.321/224 (CA) (S).14 Memo (S) of Maj Gen H. L .Oldfield and others for G-3 WD, 27 Sep 43,sub: AAA. 321/224 (CA) (S).15 WD memo (S) WDCSA353.17 (13 Oct 43) of GenMcNarney for Gen McNair, 13 Oct 43, sub as

above. 321/224 (CA) (S).16 Memo of GenMarshallfor GenMcNair, 13 Oct 43, sub notgiven. 353/123 (C).17 AGF M/S (S), CG to CofS, 15 Oct 43. 321/224 (CA) (S).

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422 ORGANIZATION OF NEW COMBAT ELEMENTS

Inspector General was at this time rejecting about 25 percentof the antiaircraftunits presentingthemselvesfor overseasmovement.18

General McNair, while believingthat the Chief of Staff had been given anunduly unfavorable impression of antiaircraft training, directed officers of hisown staff and of the Antiaircraft Command to consider reforms.19 Trainingtests of the kind used in the field artillery had been introduced by the Antiair-craft Command in the precedingJuly. In response to criticisms made by AGFheadquarters these testswere now made morefactual,searching,and detailed.They were published inJanuary 1944 as AGF tests appended to the generalAGF training directive in effect since 1 November 1942. 20 Readiness testswerealso developed by which commandersof antiaircraftunit training centers couldapply to units scheduled for overseas shipment the same standards that TheInspector General employed.21 On the whole thesituation tended to correctitself. By the end of1943 equipmentfor training was somewhatmore plentifuland the supply of antiaircraft unitswas coming into a more favorable ratio tooverseas demand; in consequence an increasingnumber of units could remainin the UnitedStates long enough to receive training withother ground armsor with the Air Forces. Many proposed changes were rejected by GeneralMcNairas irrelevantor useless. He continued tobelievethat the existingsystem

was workable,given the conditions withoutwhich no system would work; andhe continued to place confidence in General Green.22

General Greenproposed that the Army Ground Forces, through the Anti-aircraft Command, have agents in the theaters to supervise the training ofantiaircraft units, the testingof equipment,the disseminationof training litera-ture, and other matters. 23 General McNair considered such action "wrong inprinciple, and contrary toCircular59 as I seeit." 24 It violated the basic ideaof theWar Departmentreorganizationof March 1942, to which GeneralMcNair stilladhered. To obtain the resultsaimed at,generalofficers were exchangedbetweenthe Antiaircraft Command and the theaters.Responsibility was left with the

18 AA Comd ltr (C) to CGs Tng Centers, 8 Nov 43,sub: DeficienciesReported by TIG. 321/410 (CA)(Sep binder) (S).

19 AGF M/S (C), CG to G-3 andG-1, 15 Oct 43,sub: Tng of Replsand AAUnits. 353/123 (C).20 AGF ltr toCGs, 30 Jan 44,sub: Tng DirectiveEffective 1 Nov 42.353.01/107.21 See footnote 18 above.22 AG F M/S (C), CG to G-3 andG-1, 15 Oct 43,sub: Tng of Repls and AA U nits.353/195 (S).23 Memo (S) of Gen Green for GenMcNair, 30 Oct 43, sub notgiven. 321/410 (CA ) (Sep binder) (S).24 AG FM/S (S), CG toCofS, 2 Nov 43.321/410 (CA) (S).

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theatercommanders.Following another of GeneralGreen's recommendations, aWar Department circular of November 1943 provided thateach theater or task

force headquarters shouldinclude anAntiaircraftOfficer, "of appropriaterank,"who would function as staff adviser onantiaircraftmatters, supervisingtraining,inspecting equipment,determining requirements, andadvisingon the allocationof units within the command. 25

Combined training of antiaircraft units with other elements of the ArmyGround Forces was regularized by an AGFdirectiveof 8 May1944.

26 To improvecombined training with aircraft the War Department instructed ArmyGroundForcesand ArmyAir Forces,at the end of1943, each to appointa generalofficeras AntiaircraftArtilleryLiaison Officer. Brig.Gen. RupertE. Starr wasassignedto thispositionby theArmy GroundForces.

While efforts to improve training proceeded, the number to betraineddeclined. 27 At first over 800 battalionsof antiaircraftartilleryhad beenplanned.In October 1943, simultaneouslywith its criticism of antiaircraft training, theWar Departmentreduced the plannedfigure to 575, thus checkingthe expansionwhich was the main cause of training deficiencies.Even after this reductiontheantiaircraft units active at the end of 1943 had an authorized strength almostfour times that of the nondivisionalfield artillery, and overtwo-and-a-halftimes

that of all armoreddivisions andtank battalionscombined. About 100 battalionswere inactivated,until the total fell to 460 in 1944. Many of the antiaircrafttroops whose training caused such concern wound up in the infantry.

The Tank Destroyer Question

The problem of tank destroyers, like that of antiaircraft artillery, becamecritical in 1943. After the Germanoffensiveof 1940 the stoppingof tanks becameone of the mostseriousproblemsfaced by the Army.There were in general twoschools.One held that the best antitank weaponwas anothertank. Officers whohad devoted themselves to armored development tended tofavor this school.The other school, of which General McNair was a founder and moving spirit,

25 Tng Cir 124, WD, 13 Nov 43,sub: AAA. 321/410 (S).26 AGF ltr (S) to CGs, 8 May 44,sub: Combined Tng of AAA Units withOther Elements of AGF.

353.01/116. See also papers in 353/208 (S).27

See above, "Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: a StatisticalStudy."

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held that one's own tanks should be kept free for action against unarmoredenemy troopsand that enemy tanks should be opposed chiefly by a mobile massof unarmoredguns.

In 1941, under pressure from General McNair, then at GHQ, and on thestrong initiative of General Bruce, then lieutenant colonel in the War Depart-ment General Staff, the War Department took steps to realize the ideas of thesecond school.Artilleryusable againsttankswas withdrawnfrom organicassign-ment to armies, corps, and divisions,organized into GHQ antitank battalions,and employed experimentally inmaneuvers.The effectiveness of the gun as anantitank weapon was demonstrated.Work began on thedevelopmentof self-propelled mounts, toward which General McNair maintainedan attitude ofsuspended judgment,detecting a degree of faddism in the enthusiasm for self-propelled artillery, and doubting that enough was gained in useful mobility tooffset the disadvantages of greater size and less accurate fire. The guns wereorganized in GHQ battalions to permit concentration in mobilemasses whennecessary to meet massed formations oftanks. Throughout the maneuvers of1941 General McNair insisted that the antitank battalions be employedmoreaggressively. His aim was todispel the defensivepsychologywhich the Germansuccesseshad created.At the end of 1941 the antitank battalions were redesig-

nated tank destroyer battalions,the new name savoringmore of the offensive.28

In 1942 the Tank DestroyerCenter, underGeneral Bruce,developedstep bystep, as described above, into one of the new mechanized quasiarms, despitemoves to annex it to the ArmoredForce or the Replacementand School Com-mand, and despite the skepticismstill felt by officers of the "tank vs. tank" school,who regarded the antitank gun as atbest a defensiveweapon around whichnoseparateorganizationshould be built. By the end of 1942 thestrengthof the newarm wasalmost 100,000;80 battalionswere activeand 64more were planned.

GeneralBruce made it his businessto inculcatea spirit of fearlessnessin thepresence of tanks. The tank, together with the dive bomber, hadcreated terrorborderingon panic in theGermancampaignsof 1940.The exorcising of thefeel-ing of helpless terror was perhaps in the long run the mainachievementof the

28 See above, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters,United States Army,1940-42,"Sec. IV. For Gen McNair's views on the towed vs. the self-propelledgun see (1) GHQ 1st ind to G-3 WD,16 Jan 41, on memo of ColKingman for CofS GHQ, 13 Jan 41, sub: MechanizedAT Orgn. GHQ Records,322.091/5 (Armd F). (2) Memo of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 2 Sep 41, sub:Orgn of AT Units in the Army.GH Q Records, 353/15 (AT). (3) Memo (C) of Gen McNair forCofS USA, 27 Oct 42, sub: Col Fellers'Commentson DTC. 354.1/8 (DTC) (C).

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Tank DestroyerCenter. GeneralBruce taught his men tofight tanks witheverymeans attheir disposal—tomove boldly ahead with their destroyersand shoot it

out with cannon, or on occasion to use "dismountedaction," creeping forwardin "tank-hunting parties"to dispatch the monsterswith antitank grenades.29 Atthe Tank Destroyer Center General McNair's desire for offensive antitanktactics was more than fulfilled.

As tanks put on heavier armor, tank destroyer battalions adopted heavierguns. The 37-mm. antitank gun had shownitself to possess onlylimited useful-ness. During 1942 the three types of tank destroyer battalionswith which theyear opened were convertedto a single type—heavyself-propelled,armed pri-marily with twenty-four 75-mm. guns mounted on half-tracks. The TankDestroyer Center confined its instruction to the operations ofthis standardbattalion. 30

By the beginning of 1943 the tank destroyerswere receiving their first realcombat test in North Africa. Reports were unfavorable. "The tank destroyershaveproveddisappointing," declared one high-ranking observerflatly.31 Lt. Gen.George S. Patton, an armored officer by background, pronouncedthe tankdestroyers unsuccessful in the conditions of the theater.32 General Devers, inthe report to the War Department mentioned above,affirmed that "the separate

tank destroyerarm is not apracticalconcept on thebattlefield."33

Commentingin February 1943 on General Devers'report, General McNairoutlined for the Secretary of War his ownconceptionof tank destroyer tactics,and elaboratedwhat he meant by offensive tank destroyeraction. He noted thatthe tank, though slow and ponderous,was bound to advanceif it was to performitsmission. 34

29 FM 18-5, 16 Jun 42,sub: Orgn and Tactics of TD Units, e. g.,pars 38ff., 176, 182, 210.30 (1) Ltr (C) of GenBruce to TAG, 6 Mar 42, sub: Amendment of Tr Unit Mobilization and Tng

Schedule, Jan 42, byElimination of Light TD Bns and Substitution of Heavy TD Bns. 320.2/1 (TD (C).(2) AGF 2d ind on above to TDC. 320.2/1 (TD) (C). (3) WD ltr (R) AG 320.2 (5-29-42) MR-M-GNto CGs, 31 May 42, sub: Reorgn of TD Units.320.2/1 (TD) (R). (4) See AGF Historical Section,TheTank DestroyerHistory,Sec. III.

31 (1) Rpt (C) of Maj Gen W. H. Walker, 12 Jun 43. 319.1/26 (Foreign Obsrs) (S). (2) Rpt (S) ofLt GenFredendall,10 Mar 43.319.1/1 (NATO) (S).

32 Personal ltr (S) of GenPatton to GenMcNair,26 Mar 43.319.1/1 (NATO) (S).33 Conclusions," #7, of rpt (S) of themission headed by Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers to examine the

problems of armored force units in the ETO. [Undated but Feb 43.] 319.1/32 (Foreign Obsrs) (S).34

Incl to mem o(TS) of Gen McNair for SW, 17 Feb 43, sub not given.400/4 (TS).

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Since the tank must advance, the TD needonly to maneuver for a favorable position,conceal itself thoroughly and ambush the tank. It iscorrect to think of the TD asactingoffensively, in that it does not sit passively on the chance that a tank may come its way,but on the contrary seeks out the tank and places itself where it can attack the tank effectively.However, the destroyer would befoolish indeed to actoffensively in the same manner as thetank, for such tactics would place the destroyer at a disadvantage, and would sacrificeunnecessarily theadvantageswhich the destroyer has by thevery nature of things.

The trouble in North Africa was that the tank destroyers, instead offiring from concealed positions,maneuveredtoo freely during combat. Insteadof being aggressive in their reconnaissance and preparatorydispositions, theywere aggressivein the face of the tanks themselves, andsuffered severe casual-ties because of their virtual lack of armor. Concealmentwas in any case diffi-cult. The heavy destroyer, with its 75-mm. gun on a self-propelled mount,proved to have too high a silhouette to beeasily adaptable to atactics of con-cealment and ambush. But the excessiveuse of maneuverduring combat wasdue in large part to the orders of higher commanders to whom the tankdestroyer battalions were attached.Becauseof the novelty of thetank destroyerand insufficiency of combined training at home,and because somecommanderswere unsympatheticto the tank destroyer idea, battalions were assigned mis-

sions for which they were unsuited.On 21 March 1943 Allied Force Head-quarters (AFHQ) at Algiers, in its Training MemorandumNo. 23, attemptedto clarify the subject both for tank destroyer personnel and for higher com-manders.The memorandum restated the doctrine of tank destroyeremploy-ment, putting emphasis on rapid reconnaissance,thorough concealment inpreparedpositions,and avoidanceof prematurefire.35

Army Ground Forces immediatelydirected the Tank Destroyer Center torewrite its manual governing tactical employment,FM 18-5, in the light ofAFHQ Training MemorandumNo. 23. 36 For guidancein the meantime,ArmyGround Forces published Training Circular No. 88,1943. The rewriting ofFM 18-5 was described as urgent. Officers at the Tank Destroyer Centerwereinclined to believe that the fault lay in the application,not the substance, oftheir published doctrine. In any case the developing uses of tank destroyerbattalionsin the theatershad to be studied.Changes of command at the Tank

35 AFHQ Tng Memo 23 (S), 21 Mar 43, sub: Employmentof TD Units. 319.1/1 (NATO) (S). See alsoobservers' report cited in footnote 33 above.

36 (1) AGF 1st ind (S) to TDC, 23 Apr 43, on TDC ltr 353 (TD)—GNGCT (4-3-43). 353/1

(TDC) (S). (2) Ltr (S) of Gen McNair to CG TDC, 7 Apr 43, sub: Visit to TDC. 353.02/6 (AGF) (S).

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Destroyer Center caused much rewriting.Over a year was consumed in revis-ing FM 18-5 to the satisfactionof all concerned.

The high silhouette of the self-propelleddestroyer led manyparticipantsin the North African operations, including Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendalland Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, to prefer the towed gun fortank destroyerbattalions,since the towed gun could be dug inwith only its muzzle protrud-ing. As early as 1 January 1943 Army Ground Forces directed the TankDestroyer Center to organize an experimental battalion with towed 3-inchguns.37 General McNairbelieved that the Tank Destroyer Center underratedthe mobility, for practical purposes, of towed weapons.38 Self-propelled bat-talions in the United States were gradually convertedto towed. 39 No towedbattalions wereused in combat in 1943. Following the requestsof theater com-manders (probably influencedby Britishexample) it was decided inNovember1943 to have half the battalions self-propelledand half of them towed.40

The total number of battalions to be mobilized was cut down. GeneralMcNair in 1942 had pressed for a large program, recommending222 battalions(in an army of 114 divisions) for theTroop Basis of 1943.

41 He anticipatedaneed of concentratingas many as twenty battalions at a time against massedattack by enemy armor, and accordingly urgedupon the War Department

the activation of a tank destroyer brigade headquartersfor each field army.42

General Bruce envisaged a brigade for every corps. 43 But massed armor wasscarcely used against American forces in 1943. No demand for tank destroyerbrigades came from the theaters; even the group headquarters wasscarcely

37 AGF ltr to TDC, 1 Jan 43, sub: Formation of Towed TD Bn for Test Purposes.320.2/180 (TDC).38 (1) Ltr (S) of Gen McNair to CG TDC, 7 Apr 43, sub: Visit to TDC. 353.02/6 (AGF) (S). (2) AGF

M/S, 5 M ay 43,note by "LJM." 320/8 (TDC).39 AGF memo (S) for OPD WD, 13 Apr 43, sub: Towed TD Bns. 321/11 (TD) (S). Other papers in

321 (TD) (C), 321 (TD) (R), and 321 (TD).40 (1) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for OPD, 8 Oct 43, sub: Ratio of Towed to Self-propelledTD Units.

(2) WD memo (S) OPD 320.2 (1 Nov 43) for CG AGF, 5 Nov 43, sub as above. Both in 321/13 (TD) (S).(3) AGF M/S, CG to G-3, Rqts, and G-1, 16 Nov 43, sub: Ltr from Gen Hester to Gen McNair. 320.2/226(TDC).

41 See above,"Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: a StatisticalStudy."42 (1) AGF M/S, CG to Rqts, 18 Aug 42, sub: TD Orgn. 320.2/99 (TDC). (2) AGF memo for CofS

USA, 19 Sep 42, sub asabove. 320.2/99 (TDC). (3) AGF ltr (R) toTDC, 21 Nov 42,sub: Activationof Hqand Hq Companies,1st and 2d TD Brigs. 320.2/18 (TDC) (R) . (4) AGF memo for CofS USA, 4 Mar 43,sub: T/O and T/E for Hq and Hq Co, TD Brig. 321/3 (TDC). (5) WD D/F 320.2 (2-10-43) for CG AGF,18 Mar 43, sub asabove. 321/3 (TDC).

43 TDC ltr to CG AGF, 11 Aug 42, sub: TD Orgn. 320.2/99 (TDC).

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used overseas,tank destroyer battalions being commonly attached todivisionsin the African and Italian campaigns, and littleused in the Pacific. The War

Department authorized only two brigades,of which one was inactivated earlyin 1944, the other shipped to the EuropeanTheater of Operations.In place of the 222battalionsfirst suggested by Army Ground Forces, the

War Department authorized only 144. In the changed circumstances of theearly part of 1943 General McNairaltered his position and assumedthe initiativein checking thegrowth of an enterprisewhich was in many ways his own child.On the one hand, it became clear from the limited operations in Tunisia thatincreases offield artillery, tank battalions, andcombat engineers were desirableand that tank destroyer units would not be requested by theater commandersin anything like the numbers thatwere becomingavailable.On the otherhand,with the continuing postponement of a major ground offensive, troops werecrowding the training centers in the United States to such a degree that thetempo of mobilizationhad to beslowed down. In proposingmeasuresfor deal-ing with this situation,General McNair on 14 April 1943 recommended acur-tailment of the tank destroyerprogram to 106battalions.44 This was substantiallythe numberalreadyactiveor in process ofactivation.In Octoberthe War Depart-ment planned to cut the number to 64,which would require the inactivation of

42 battalions.This reduction was believed excessive by Army Ground Forces,and wasteful of training and equipment.

45 Yet there were many trained menin tank destroyer units, as in antiaircraft, coast artillery, and other primarilydefensive arms, who could be betteremployed elsewhere. On 29 October 1943Army Ground Forces, observing that 39 divisionshad a total shortage of45,293(due mainly to the need ofreplacementsin Italy), asked authorityfrom the WarDepartmentto inactivate25 tank destroyerbattalions,using most of the person-nel to fill depleted divisions.46 This authority was immediatelyobtained. Inacti-vation went on into 1944 until only 78 tank destroyer battalionswere left.

Though the tank destroyerdevelopment did notturn out exactly as antici-pated by the schoolwhich promotedit, it played an importantpart in the mobili-

44 (1) Memo (S) of GenMcNair for G-3 WD, 14 Apr 43,sub: Modification for MobilizationProcedures.381/177 (S). (2) Ground Force Combat Units, TB 43, 23 Feb 43. Incl to WD memo (C) WDGCT 320.2Ge n (3-8-43) for WDGS and CGs, 8 Mar 43, sub: Ground TB 43. AGFPlans Sec file 185 (S).

45 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 TB (2 Oct 43) forDCofS USA, sub: Troop Basis 1943. AGF PlansSec file 185 (S).

46

AGF memo (C) for G-3 WD, 29 Oct 43, sub: Inactivation of TD Units. 321/12 (TD) (C).

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zation of the Army to meet the situationpresentedin 1940. The Tank DestroyerCenter exercised an influencebeyond the special-typebattalionswhich it trained.As the center of antitankactivity and research it was the main agency, as faras the United States was concerned,by which the tank menaceof 1940 was over-come, the idea of the invulnerability ofarmored forces exploded,and armoredforces consequently reintegratedinto a tactics of combined arms. Special tankdestroyer battalionsbecame proportionately less necessary as armored forceslost their ability (insofar as they had ever had it) to fight as a separatearm.As tanks came to be less commonly employed in armored masses there wasless need for tank destroyerbattalionscapableof rapid concentration.In general,the success of antitank developmentsby 1943 was as great as anyone wouldhavedared to expect in thedark daysof 1940.

More particularly, the tank destroyer battalions, though not activated inthe numbers originallyplanned, were fast and hard-hitting fighting units.They were among the most heavily mechanized units in theArmy. The com-pletely motorized battalion of 1944, with a strength of less than 800 men,occupied ten miles of road space,was largely self-sufficient for maintenanceandadministration,included strongelements of reconnaissance,radio, and antiair-craft protection,and carried thirty-six 3-inch or 76-mm. guns (towed or self-

propelled)—thesame number of light field pieces as in the three light artillerybattalions of a division. The battalions adopted, in addition to their primaryantitank functions,a general role of supporting artillery.As higher commandersgained skill in tank destroyeremployment,the battalions were put to avarietyof aggressiveuses, such as destroyingof antitank guns as well as of tanks, actingas an advanceguard and coveringwithdrawals,assisting in the clearingof minefields, and layingof interdictionand harassingfires in conjunctionwith divisionartillery.47

Here again the developmentwas not exactly what was expected. It wasin fact better; for it wasalways better, in General McNair's view, for acombatunit to escape from the limitations of too specialized arole. In a sense also thetwo antitank schools were reconciled.That the tank destroyer was a usefulweapon none could reasonablydeny. But those who hadargued that the tankdestroyers should not be a separate arm could draw comfort from the thought

47 For a vivid picture see "The TD Battalion in Action," a report preparedby Lt Col J. P. Barney, FA ,CO, 776th TD Bn, received by AGF through the AGFBoard, NATO, and circulated by Dissemination

Division, Hq, AGF, under date of 24 May 44. AGFBoard NATO file A Misc 21 .

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that they were successful in proportion as they took on the characteristics ofhighly mobile artillery.

Tanks, Tank Destroyers, and Antiaircraft Guns as Field Artillery

The tendency of tank destroyers, tanks, and antiaircraft guns to functionas auxiliary field artillery was one of themost interesting developmentsof 1943and 1944. To a certain degree the new special arms were broadened andstrengthened by a recourse to moretraditional methodsof warfare. The olderarm began to absorb the new quasiarms.

The tendency may besaid to have first appeared in a practical wayaboutthe middle of 1943, at which time Allied Force Headquarters informed theWar Departmentthat battle commanderswished the tank destroyerbattalionsto develop their capacities for indirect fire.48 Army Ground Forces enlargedthe suggestion to include tanks, for which no similar demand had arisen, butwhich General McNair regardedin principle as a special form of artillery.49

Early in September a board was convened at theArmy War College,composedof Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, successor to General Bruce in command of theTank Destroyer Center, Brig. Gen. Roland P. Shugg, Artillery Officer of the

Armored Command, andBrig. Gen. Jesmond D.Balmer, Commandantof theField Artillery School. Difficulties in the way of "artillerizing" the tanks andtank destroyerswere considerable.Indirect fire would necessitatemore refinedequipment, more mathematical training, and more complex arrangements forobservation, communication, andliaison.The board recommendeda minimumof innovation.

50 General Lentz, AGF G-3, believed that tanks should remainas they were but that tank destroyers should be virtually assimilated to fieldartillery. General McNair was cautious. While disappointedin the board, hewas inclined toshare its conclusion.He noted for General Lentz: 51

Our war experience in this connection has been misleading thus far, in that we havenot yet met the German Army in serious combat. . . . Thus it seems unwise to concludethat the tank and tank destroyerwill be unoccupied in their primary roles and can beusedas artillery.

48 Armd F ltr (C) to TAG, 5 Aug 43, sub: Reorgn of TD Bns. 321/9 (TD) ( C) .49 AGFmemo (C) for CofS USA, 31 A ug 43, sub asabove. 321/9 (TD) (C).50 Rpt (S) of Maj Gen Orlando Ward and others, 8 Sep 43. 353/194 (S).51

AGF M/S, CG to G-3, 9 Oct 43, sub: Arty Tng in TDs and Tks. 353/194 (S).

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On the otherhand, their fire power collectivelyis great and should be utilized whereverpracticable. . . . However, since I am unconvinced that such occasions will be other thanrare when the big show starts, Ifeel that for the presentequipment and personnel and use

of these weapons asartillery should be confined to the barest minimumin quantity and tothe simplest terms generally. . . .

In general I believe that my view does not go so far asyours toward the employmentof these weapons asField Artillery. However, I am willing, as always, to argue.

The question was, as usual, one of finding aproper balance between coursesof action each of which presented advantages.A directive issued by ArmyGround Forceson 6 November 1943 sought to gain theadvantagesof versatil-ity without losing those of specialization. A WarDepartment Training Cir-cular conveyedthe same doctrine to theArmy as a whole. 52

The emphasis in the action oftanks and tank destroyers waskept by thisdirectiveon their respectiveprimary missions. Each wasrecognized to have asecondarymission of reinforcing field artillery in circumstanceswhere no needof the primary mission could be foreseen. Decision in particular cases was leftto the higher commander.

Training in the secondary role was made additional to, and distinctfrom,training in the primary role. Each tank and tank destroyer unit, before receiv-

ing any field artillery instruction, had to proceedthrough its normal individualand unit training program, then participate in combined training or in ma-neuvers in its primary capacity, demonstrating by firing tests its proficiencyin tank or tank destroyer functions. This accomplished,a month of intensivetraining as reinforcing artillery followed under the supervision of army andcorps commanders.A training programwas supplied by theField ArtillerySchool, in collaboration with the Tank Destroyer Centerand the ArmoredCommand. The coordination of fires, designation of targets, maintenanceoftelephones, and similar matters were left to the field artillery unit, normallydivision or corps artillery, which the tanks or tank destroyers reinforced.Training was prescribed only insuch types of artillery missions astanks andtank destroyer units could accomplishwith minor additions of small items ofequipment and with no addition of personnel.Units were keptstreamlinedfor their primaryfunctions.

52 (1) AGF ltr toCGs, 6 Nov 43, sub: Employmentof Tks and TDs asArty. (2) Tng Cir 125, WD,13 Nov 43. (3) AGF ltr toCGs, 28 Feb 44, sub as in (1) above.Both in 353/2233.

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In antiaircraft artillery, tactical and training doctrine had long recognizeda secondary mission of fire against tanks, which were vulnerable to the high-velocity antiaircraft guns. In existing circumstances littlesuch training hadbeen feasible. In April 1944 an AGF directive (generalized by a War Depart-ment training circular) expanded the secondary role ofantiaircraft guns toinclude auxiliary field artillery functions. The same conditions and limitationswere set as for tanks and tank destroyers, except thata modicum of field artil-lery instruction was introduced into the antiaircraft gun unit training pro-gram, which was extended from twenty-four to twenty-six weeks for thepurpose. After functioning successfully in their primary role in combinedtraining, antiaircraft units were to receive, when practicable,a month of field

artillery training under army or corps command.53

Meanwhile, in the winter of 1943-44, the secondary roles were activelydeveloped in thetheaters.As enemy airpower declined, antiaircraft units thatwere attached to mobile ground troops looked increasingly to surface targets.The tank destroyers, in the temporarilystatic conditions of the Italian front,and in themountainousItalian terrain where massed armor could not beused,increasinglyoperated as reinforcingartillery.54

Tanks clung more to their pri-mary role, though they had to beused in driblets.In the United States the Army

Ground Forces, while incorporatingthe new development,kept it definitelysubordinate to the primarymissions of the three arms, in preparationfor the"big show" to come.

53 (1) AGF ltr toCGs, 15 Apr 44,sub: Employmentof AAA GunUnits (Mobileand Semimobile) in

SecondaryRoles. 353/610 (CA). (2) Tng Cir 23, WD, 8 Apr 44.54 (1) Incl 1 to AGF Bd NATO Rpt105, 8 Jan 44. (2) OPDInformation Bull, Vol I, No 8, 24 Apr 44.

Both in 314.7 (AGF Hist).

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IV. Summary

Certain generalizationscan be derivedfrom the preceding account of thepolicies ofHeadquarters,Army Ground Forces, toward the new combat forcesduring the formative period of the Armyfrom 1942 to 1944. Theproblem, ingeneral terms, was thehandling of new and specializedarms. The general solu-tion adopted was to promote the new arms while keeping them within aframework within which the older armsretained their due importance.Tac-tically, the new arms were organized flexibly to prevent overloadingof thestandard division and to enablehigher commandersto employunits of the newarms as circumstancesmight demand, either in masses of the same arm orseparately in conjunction with other arms and with the standard division.

For training, each new combat force received a branch organizationwith

more independence than in the older arms as long as rapid development was amajor aim. Later,as the new forces became well established and as abranchtraining of their units was accomplished,their branch organizationwas assimi-lated to that of the older arms,all arms being subordinated to the interests ofthe Army Ground Forces as a whole.For combined training,units of the newarms, as of the old, were assigned to the field forces—armies and corps. Butcombinedtraining of the new forces, though essential as a means ofintegratingthe new with the old, wasnever altogether satisfactory in practice. It suffered

not only from difficulties in personnel andtiming

which afflicted thewhole

Army, but also from certain handicaps due toorganization: the fact that untillate in 1943 the tank strengthof the Army was for themost part locked up inarmored divisions, so that infantry divisionscould with difficulty train witharmor; and the fact that the nondivisionalorganizationof antiaircraft artillery,tank destroyers, and tanks (except for tanks in armored divisions) had onlylimited opportunitiesfor combined training. In addition, theaters sometimesrequired that shipment take place before combined training could be under-taken. Mobilizationlikewise was uneven,producing more antiaircraft and tank

destroyer units andfewer heavy artillery units than proved to benecessary.

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As time went on more emphasisfell on the use ofantiaircraftand tank destroyerweapons,and to a lesser extent on tanks, in the role of field artillery.With thisdevelopment the tendency to specialization subsided, and more flexibility andeconomy in the use of artillerypieces were obtained.

In the organization and training of the new forces, the Army GroundForces aimed atsecuring the advantageswithoutthe disadvantagesof specializa-tion and branch spirit, keeping in mind the need ofbalanced forces and com-bined arms training, as well as economy,flexibility,and over-allunity in planningand command.

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I. Basic Redeployment Problems

In itsearliest stages,planning with reference to the disposition ofpersonnelat the terminationof hostilities was focused on demobilization.The first draftof the basic War Department program,issued in November 1943, was cap-tioned "DemobilizationRegulations1-1"; 1 not until about February1944 wasthe title changed to "Readjustment Regulation 1-1." 2 The initial emphasis ondemobilizationwas due to thefact that planners werethinking at first in termsof World War I, when anarmisticebrought an abrupt end to hostilitiesevery-where and when a speedy and orderly conversion of soldiers to civilians wasboth the immediate and the ultimate problem. As policy makers of WorldWar II proceeded with their plans, they soon realized that the situation wasdifferent from that of 1918: that the fighting would probablycease in Europebefore victory was won in thePacific, that demobilization after the defeat ofGermany would beonly partial, and that demobilizationmust be conditioned

by the requirementsfor conquering Japan.Hence, after the first few months,emphasis in planning shifted from demobilization to readjusting the Armyfor Pacific needs and redeployingforces in Europe for an all-out effort againstthe Japanese.3

Personnel Readjustment Planning

At first it appeared that the Army Ground Forces might play a leadingrole in the formulation of readjustment policy. Early in 1943, before receipt

of any instructions from the War Department, the Mobilization Division ofthe Ground G-3 Section initiated studies of World War I experience in

1 This draft is filed in 320.2/1 (Redepl) (separate binde r) (R).2 Special Planning Division WDSS, Monthly Progress Report (S) on Demobilization Planning, Feb

1944. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (S).3 These statements are based on a study of the following sources: (1) Monthly Progress Report on

Demobilization Planning (S) submitted by the Special Planning Division WDSS, June-December 1943.AGF Plans Sec file 157 (S). (2) Memo of Col Herbert B. Powell for Col H. T. Todd, 1 Mar 43, sub: DemobStudy. 314.7 (AGF Hist). (3) Memo (S) of Col Clinton I.McClure for G-1 AGF, 21 Jun 43,sub: Methodsof Demob. With related papers. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (S). (4) Memo (S) of Brig Gen Wm. F. Tompkins,Spec Planning Div WDSS for CG AGF, attn Brig Gen J. C. Christiansen, 6 Aug 43, sub: Demob Planning.With related papers. AGF Plans Secfile 158 (Demob) (S).

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demobilization as recorded in monographs preparedby classes at the ArmyWar Collegeand in otherpertinent sources.4

In April 1943 basic demobilization planning was made the responsibilityof the Army Service Forces and delegated to the Project Planning Divisionof the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands. 5 This divisionwas headed by Brig. Gen. William F. Tomkins. Col. Clinton I. McClure ofthe Ground G-1 Section was appointed to a subcommittee charged withdrawing up recommendations as to the basis of demobilization—whether byunit, civilian skill, length of service, or a combination of various factors.6

Colonel McClure,after an extensive survey of the experience of the UnitedStates and other countries in World War I, and after consulting G-3 and otherinterested staff sections, recommended for the Army Ground Forces that"demobilization in general should be by units."

7 The subcommitteeacceptedthis view and recommended to General Tompkins in July 1943 that for eitherpartial or final demobilization, tacticaland administrative units be releasedin toto.

The Army Ground Forces strongly advocatedunit demobilization becauseit was simple,flexible, more rapid than any individual plan, and, during theperiod of partial demobilization,would interfere lesswith the prosecution of

the war against Japan than would an individual "selection-out"plan. Moreover,the United States had used the unit plan with success both in the Civil Warand in World War I, while British experience with an individual selection-outscheme in World War I had notbeen satisfactory.For these reasons,Lt. Gen.Lesley J. McNair strongly favored demobilization by unit.

8

The Tompkins group, which on 22 July 1943 became the nucleus of theSpecial Planning Division of the War Department Special Staff, was at firstfavorably inclined toward the idea of unit demobilization but eventually re-jected the subcommittee's recommendationand adopted instead a plan which

4 Memo of Col H. B. Powell forCol. H. T. Todd, 1 Mar 43,sub: Demob Study. 314.7 (AGF Hist).5 (1) Project Planning Division Office of DCofS for Service Comds, ASF, Progress Report on Demob

Planning, 30 Jun 43 (S). AG F Plans Sec file 157 (S) . (2) WD memo (S) for Spec Planning Div WDSS,22 Jul 43,sub: Orgn and Functions, Spec Planning Div,WD. AGFPlans Sec file 157 (S).

6 (1) Memo (S) of Col Clinton I. McClure for G-1 AGF, 25 Jun 43,sub: Demob. 314.7 (AGF Hist)(S). (2) Memo (S) of Brig Gen J. N.Dalton, Director Pers ASF for DCofS Serv Comd, 14 Jul 43, sub: Basisfor Demob. WD G-1 file, binder marked "Basisof Demob" (S).

7 Memo (S) of Col Clinton I. McClure for G-1AGF, 21 Jun 43, sub: Methods of Demob. 314.7(AGF Hist) (S) .

8 AGF M/S (R), G-1 to Plans, 16 Dec 43, sub: Demob Regulations No. 1-1. With related papers.AGF Plans Sec file 153 (DemobRegulationNo 1-1) (S) .

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REORGANIZATIONFOR REDEPLOYMENT 441

called for demobilizationby a selection-outof individuals,based on length ofservice,dependency,combat, and other factors.9 The occasion forthis shift wasapparently a report of the National Resources Planning Board, published on30 June, which advocateddemobilization by individuals. 10

It was argued in favor of the individualselection-outplan that experienceafter World War I was not asafe guide for World War II becauseof the differ-ence in the compositionof units and the necessityin World War II ofcontinuingthe fight in the Pacific after it had ended inEurope. A second considerationwas that unit demobilizationwas unfair to the individual,since in consequenceof the replacementsystem there was a great variation inlength of servicewithineach organization. It was believed that public opinion would not support aplan which did not give preference to individuals who had a record oflongservice.For these reasonsthe NationalResourcesPlanning Board in June 1943,the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September1943, and the War Department itself in1943 decided in favor of an individualselection-out plan of demobilization. 11

When the draft of "Demobilization Regulations 1-1" was submitted tothe Army Ground Forces for comment inDecember 1943, the Plans Section,which in August 1943 had been designated as the coordinating agency fordemobilizationmatters in the Army Ground Forces, 12 drew up a nonconcur-

rence because thedraft failed to provide fordemobilizationby unit. But whenit was called to the attention of the AGFChief of Staff that both the JointChiefs of Staff and General of the Army George C. Marshall were firm intheir support of an individual selection-outplan rather than a unit plan ofdemobilization, thenonconcurrencewas withdrawn.

13

After creation of the SpecialPlanning Division in the War DepartmentSpecial Staff, and after failure to secure acceptance of theunit plan of de-mobilization, theArmy Ground Forces madeno attempt to take the initiativein the shaping of high-level policiesfor personnel readjustment. Butthroughrepresentation on WarDepartment committeescharged with preparation ofthe ReadjustmentRegulation (RR) series and through comment on successive

9 AG F M/S (R), Plans to G-1, 20 Dec 43, sub: Demob Regulation No 1-1. 320.2/1 (Redepl) (R).10 See AGF Historical Section, The DemobilizationPeriod.11 History of the Personnel and AdministrationBranch, SPD WDSS, 7 Dec 41-1 Sep 45. (Draft pre-

pared by Col Alan Richardson.) SPDWDSS Records.12 M/S (S), Gen Staff Sec to Plans, 4 Aug 43, sub: Orgn and Functions, Spec Planning Div. AGF

Plans Sec file 158 (Demob) (S).13 AGF M/S (S), Plans to CofS AGF, 28 Dec 43, sub: Proposed Demob Regulation No. 1-1, 30 Nov 43.

With related papers.AG F Plans Sec file 153 (DemobRegulationNo. 1-1) (S).

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drafts of this series, General McNair and, after his transfer to Europe for theOVERLORD Operation, his successors,Lt. Gen. Ben Lear and Gen. JosephW. Stilwell, were able to secure inclusion of some of their principles in thebasic War Departmentprogram. 14

Early in 1944 an officer of the Control Division of the Ground G-1 Sectionwas directed to maintainliaisonwith the War Departmentin personnelaspectsof redeployment.From that time until V-J Day this officer, accompaniedfre-quentlyby representativesof other interestedsectionsand TheAdjutant General,sat almost daily in conferencessponsoredby the SpecialPlanning Division forthe formulation of WarDepartment directives for personnel readjustment.15

In May 1945, when the War Departmentdirected creation of anad hoc com-

mittee composed of representativesof the three major commands to facilitatebulk transfersof personnelcalled for byReadjustmentRegulations,a G-1 officermoved to the Pentagon torepresentthe ArmyGroundForceson this committee.

16

The principal AGFcontributions to the War Department program wereas follows: 17

1. Adjustment of critical score multiples in such a way as to safeguardmilitary necessity and at the same time give ample recognition for participationin ground combat.

Maj. Gen. Frederick H. Osborn, who originated the service score plan inMay 1944, recommendeda weighting of credits asfollows: 18

a. Servicecredit—1point for each month in the serviceafter the beginningof the emergency.

b. Overseas credit—2points for each month overseas.

14 The complete series, filed in 300.8/1 (Redepl), is as follows:RR 1-1 Readjustment of PersonnelRR 1-2 PersonnelProcedure forReadjustment MovementsRR 1-3 Athletic and Recreation ProgramRR 1-4 Army Education ProgramRR 1-5 Readjustmentof OfficersRR 1-6 Demobilization ofCategory IV ElementsRR 1-1 and RR 1-5 deal primarily with personnel.

15 Statement of Lt Col J. U.Parker, AGF G-1 Sec to AGFHist Off, 29 Aug 45.16 Statementof Maj H. T. Sears to AGF Hist Off, 15 Jan 46.17 This summary of AGF contributions is based mainly on an interview by the AGF Hist Off of

Lt Col J. U. Parker, AGF G-1 Section, 29 Aug 45. Colonel Parker performed the liaison functions ofthe Army Ground Forces with the War Department in personnel aspects of redeploymentfrom May 1944until his departure from Headquarters, AGF, late in 1945.

18 ASF memo (R) SPMSD 327.02 for WDSPD, 31 May 44, sub: Suggested Changes in WD Plan

for Readjustment ofPers of the Armyafter the Defeat ofGermany. 320.2/4 (Redepl) (R) .

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c. Combat credit—3points for each month in combatzone.d. Number of wounds—6points for each wound (as recognizedby award

of PurpleHeart).e. Numberof children—12pointsper child under 18 years.The Army Ground Forces was of the opinion that the heavy weighting

given for overseas and combat service by General Osborn's plan wouldtakefrom the Army so vast a number of seasoned soldiersthat it would endangerthe effectiveness of operations against Japan. On AGF recommendation,over-seas credit combined with combat zone credit was reduced to 1 point permonth. 19 The Army Ground Forces was also responsible for theinclusion ofcredit for battle participation, consistingof 5 points for each campaign star. 20

When in the course ofdiscussions it was proposed that all battledecorationsbeincluded in the computation of combat credit, theArmy Ground Forcesde-murred on the ground that such a plan would give undue advantage to ArmyAir Forces personnel.It withdrew its objection when War Department repre-sentatives stated that the Army Air Forces mightbe given a higher eligibilityscore than Ground Forces—a prediction which did notmaterialize. Believingthat the point system as originally drawn would favor a man with many childrenover one with few children and much battle experience, the Army Ground

Forces also secured adoption of a provision limiting parenthood credit to amaximum of 36points. An AGF suggestionthat, in computingservice credit,time lost for misconduct should be deducted, while at first rejected "becauseof the complicationswhich mightarise and because the man would bepunishedtwice for oneoffense," was subsequentlyincluded in RR 1-1.

21

2. Location of initial assignment jurisdiction over surplus officers returnedfrom overseas in the major command with which they last served (commonlyknown as the "Source Major Force" plan).

Before adoption of the ReadjustmentRegulations all officers returning tothe United States forreassignment, regardless of their overseas connection,reverted to the assignmentjurisdiction of the branch (or more properly themajor command controlling the branch) in which they had been originallycommissioned.Thus, ordnance officers released for any reason from overseas

19 AGF M/S (S), Control to G-1, 6 Jun 44, sub: Changes in WD Plan for Readjustment of Persafter the Defeat of Germany. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (S).

20 AGF memo (R) forCofS USA [undated, but about 6 Jun 44], sub: Suggested Changes in WDPlan for Readjustmentof Pers of the Army after the Defeat ofGermany, 320.2/4 (Redepl) (R) .

21 (1) AGF M/S (S), Control for G-1, 6 Jun 44, sub: Changes in WD Plan for Readjustment of

Pers after the Defeat of Germany.314.7 (AGF Hist) (S). (2) RR 1-1, par12c.

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service with AGF units passed on arrival in a U. S.port to the control of theChief of Ordnance,and an infantry officer returned from overseas servicewithan Air Force unit reverted to the control of the ArmyGround Forces.

When the War Department proposed that all overseasofficers who becamesurplus in redeployment bereturned to the United States for disposition,theArmy Ground Forces became apprehensiveas to the effect of current reassign-ment policies on AGF units. It did notrelish the idea of getting back from theArmy ServiceForces large numbersof officers whose basic branch was one ofthe AGF arms, because it was thought that many of them whilein the ArmyServiceForces wouldhave become so"rusty" in their originaldutiesas to requireconsiderableretraining—and this was deemed undesirable and uneconomical.Moreover, it was believed that some of these officers, because of great aptitudesin technical specialties, had attained gradeswhich they could not satisfactorilyfill in command positionswith Ground troops—anddemotion was not consid-ered desirable.22

But even more disturbing was the prospect of losing to the Army ServiceForces large numbersof officers whose basic branch was one of the servicesbut who had served for long periods in Ground units. There was no sourcewithin the Army Ground Forces for the procurement of service officers, and

it was feared that requisitionson branch chiefs would not yield the highest-type officers; even if personnel of the highest quality were obtained, consid-erable training and indoctrination wouldbe necessary to fit them for theirGround duties.23

Prompted by these considerations, the ArmyGround Forces proposed inNovember 1944 that the Source Major Force plan be written into RR 1-5.This suggestion elicited a strong protest from the Arm y Service Forces, whichmaintained that theSource Major Force plan "would allow the AGF to divertany [ASF] officers so desired to other duties and to send the least desirableofficers back to the command of origin. Examples of this would be capableengineers or quartermasterofficers whom the AGF might desire to utilize asinfantry officers or [in] branch immaterial positions." Moreover, the ArmyService Forces contended that it was better able to determine the professionalqualifications andabilities of officers trained by the services, andthat the SourceMajor Force policy "creates an opportunity for unnecessary waste of training,

22 AGF M/S (S) , G-1 to CofS, AGF, 18 Nov 44, sub: Return of Offs to Source Major Force370.01/150 (Demob) (S) .

23 Ibid.

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skills,and manpowerand loweringof morale through misassignmentof officerspossessed of special technical abilities."

24

War Department G-1, G-3, Operations Division, and Special PlanningDivision supportedthe position of the Army Ground Forces,and the SourceMajor Force plan was incorporated in RR 1-5. In registering its nonconcur-rence with the Army Service Forces, the War DepartmentGeneral Staff citedthose provisions of RR 1-5 that required the ArmyGround Forces to pass onto the Army ServiceForces, for determinationof essentiality, suchofficers of theservices as were surplus to the needs of theArmy Ground Forces, as well asprovisions that call for liaison between the forces for disposition of officersin whom there was a joint interest.25

Applicationof the Source Major Force plan may be illustrated as follows.An officer whose basic branch was one of the services but whose most recentassignmenthad been in an AGF organization (as listed in the current "Analy-sis of the Present Status of the War DepartmentTroop Basis"),on return fromoverseasor on release as surplus by acontinentaldefense command, camefirstunder the control of the Army Ground Forces for assignment.If needed there,he was assigned to an AGF unit orinstallation. If deemed surplus to AGFneeds, he was turnedover to the Arm yServiceForces,who eithergave him an

assignment or declared himunessential and separated himfrom the service.In special cases of joint interest, eithercommand might relinquishinitialassignmentjurisdictionby arrangementssatisfactoryto both. 26

There was some sentiment in Headquarters, ArmyGround Forces, forapplying the Source Major Force principleto enlistedmen, but the matter wasnot strongly pressed. The plan as finally adopted provided that surplus servicepersonnel (that is, personnel whose basic branch was one of theservices) re-

24 ASF memo (R) SPOPD 370.01 for WD SPD, 26 Mar 45, sub: Par 8c RR 1-5 Tab B to mem o (R)of SPD forCofS USA, 30 Mar 45,sub: RR 1-5. SPD WDSS Records, binder RR 1-5 (R) .

25 Memo (R) of WD SPD forCofS USA, 30 Mar 45, sub: RR 1-5. SPD WDSS Records, binderRR 1-5 ( R ) .

26 (1) Statement of Lt Col J. U. Parker, AGF G-1 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 29 Aug 45. (2) Record

(S) of Conf on Redepl Policiesand Procedures,Hq AGF, 27-28 Mar 45. 337/1 (Redepl) (Separate binder)(S). (3) In May 1945 the Army Ground Forces requested authorization "to retain an overstrength ofengineer, ordnance, signal,quartermaster andchemical warfare officers—not to exceed 25 percent of thenumber of theofficers authorized Army Ground Forces at any time" in order to facilitate the preparationof Ground service-type units for redeployment. The War Department approved therequest, but the endof the war came before the plan could be put into operation. Statement of Lt Col J. U.Parker, AGF G-1Sec to AGF Hist Off, 20 Sep 45. See in this connection AGFmemo (S) for CofS USA, 31 May 45, sub:Authorization for Overstrength ofGround Serv Type Offs. 320.2/11 (Redepl) (S) .

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turned from overseas, whether from Ground Or Service type organizations,should go to appropriateASF trainingcenters for refresher training.The Army

Service Forces was to supply therequisitions of the Army Ground Forces forservice personnel, the requisitions specifying needs per month according tomilitaryoccupationalspecialties(MOS).

27

In addition to assistingin the preparation andrevision of the War Depart-ment's personnel program, the Army Ground Forces issued instructionsof itsown, known as Readjustment Memoranda (RM), to implement applicableReadjustmentRegulations.RM 1-1, Personnel Readjustment,prepared in theG-1, G-3, and AG (C&RD) Sections in the latter part of 1944 and the earlymonths of 1945, after passing throughseveral draft stages, was issued to sub-ordinate commands on 8 May 1945. A brief document, RM 1-3, Athletic andRecreationProgram, was issued on 19March 1945 to implementRR 1-3. RM 1-5,Readjustmentof Officers, was published on 5June 1945. 28 Army Ground Forcesdid not preparememorandaon the other War DepartmentReadjustmentRegu-lations,since they concerned subjects not essentiallya part of AGF operations.29

The RM series, while requiringmuch time and effort in preparation,wasdevoted largely to details of administrativeprocedure. Its principal functionwas to adapt toGround uses applicable portions of the WarDepartmentRead-

justmentRegulations.

Redeployment Movements

Procedurefor the return of units to the UnitedStates was laid down in twoWar Departmentdocuments:Annex B,RedeploymentMovements, publishedas an inclosure to a War Department letter dated 29November 1944, andReadjustment Regulation1-2, dated 15 September1944.30 Representativesof theArmy Ground Forces whoparticipated in War Departmentconferences calledin connection with the preparation of these documents, and Headquarters,Army Ground Forces, commented onsuccessivedrafts submittedprior to their

27 Statement of Col J. U. Parker, AGF G-1 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 29 Aug 45.28 These documentsare filed as follows: RM 1-3: 300.6/1 (RM 1-3) (Redepl)

RM 1-1: 300.6/1 (RM 1-1) (Redepl) RM 1-5: 300.6/2 (RM 1-5) (Redepl)29 Par 11, AGF Info Ltr No 3 (R), 25 Jun 45. 300.6/3 (AGF Info Ltrs) (R).30 (1) Incl to WD ltr AG 370.5 (24 Nov 44) OB-S-E-M, 29 Nov 44, sub: WD Policies and Procedures

Governing the Redeploymentof the Armyupon Cessation of Hostilities in Europe. (Revised editiondated 20Apr 45 issued on 2 May 45.) 370.5/05 (Redepl) (R). (2) RR 1-2, Personnel Procedure for Readjustment

Movements,15 Sep 44. (Revised 11 Apr 45.) 300.8/1 (Redepl).

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1. Delay in granting furloughs until after movement to theintermediatestation would havean adverse effect on morale.

2. The intermediate-stationmethod requiredmore rail travel and extrahandling of individual equipment, which would have to be unloaded at theintermediatestation and then reshippedto the training station.

3. In processing personnel at intermediate stations,the Army GroundForceswould have to duplicate thework and overhead of astaging area.

4. For processing large units the Army Ground Forces would have tomaintain one or more division camps. No such camp was available for use asan intermediate station in the vicinity of the NewYork Port of Embarkation,Camp Pickett, Va., being the nearest.

In order toresolve the matter, the War Departmentdirected thethree majorcommands to test the two methods. AGF representativesparticipated in ob-serving andreporting on the processingof several units under each of the plansthrough eastern ports in the latter part of 1944 and the early weeks of 1945.As a result of these experiments, the WarDepartment in March 1945 orderedadoption of the reception-stationmethod.

35

The second contribution of theArmy Ground Forces to redeploymentmovement procedurewas the suggestion that advancedetachments beprovided

for ground units returning from overseas. Believing thatearly and direct con-tact with units was essential to effective planning, the Army Ground Forcesrequested in April 1945 that theater commanders be directed to ordersuchdetachments to theUnited States about one month in advance of their units.The detachmentswere to becomposedas follows:

Type of Unit Officers Enlisted Mm

Army 20 67Corps 20 54Infantry Division 42 144Armored Division 35 109Airborne Division 40 130Separate Regiments 7 28Separate Battalions 3 7Evacuation and Convalescent Hospitals 3 7

35(1) AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 14 Feb 45, sub: Redepl Movements. (2) AGF M/S (S) , G-3

to CofS, 2 Apr 45, sub: Selection of a Method of Moving Units after Arrival in the U. S. during Redepl.

Both in 370.5/1 (Redepl) (S) .

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The Army Ground Forces proposed to use theadvance groups (1) to act asa planning staff for training purposes, (2) to furnish necessary informationregarding personneland equipment information of the unit, and (3) to providepersonnel for feeding andhousing individuals during the period when theywere assembling at the permanent stationfollowing their recuperation fur-loughs. 36

The Operations Divisionquestioned the necessity of advance detachmentsfor units as small as the battalion, but the original recommendation wasfinally approved by the War Department on 7 May 1945 with only minormodifications.37

Equipment

The War Department Supply Plan for the period after V-E Day providedthat units redeployed through the United States take with them from Europeonly the minimum essential equipment needed to preserve unit integrity.

38

Additionalequipment required for redeploymenttraining in the United Stateswas to be provided in theZone of Interior. 39

In the early stages of redeployment planning the Army Ground Forces,

fearing that the period for retraining would be inadequate,began to insist thateach unit be given a 100-percent allowance of equipment for redeploymenttraining, that the equipment be in combat-serviceablecondition, and that itbe laid down at training stations before the return of personnel from recuper-ation furloughs. Only thus, it was argued, could full advantagebe taken of thetime available for redeployment training. ASF authorities questioned thenecessity ofprovidingfull allowancesof equipment for redeploymenttraining.They took the position that units had been trained originallywith partialallow-ances and that retraining could be accomplished under a similar system. The

36 AGF memo (C) forCofS USA, 18 Apr 45, sub: Advance Dets for Units Returning to the U. S.370.5/2 (Redepl) (C).

37 (1) WD D/F (C) OPD 370.5 (18 Apr 45) to CG AGF, 26 Apr 45, sub: Advance Dets for UnitsReturning to the U. S. (2) AGFmemo (C) for CofS USA, 2 May 45, sub as in (1). (3) WD D/F (C)OPD 270.5 (18 Apr 45) to CGAGF, 7 May 45, sub: Advance Dets for Units Returningto the U. S. All in370.5/2 (Redepl) (C).

38 The WD Supply Plan wa s published in annex A to WD ltr AG 400 (30 Oct 44)OB-S-E-M, 4 Nov44, sub: WD Policies and Procedures Governingthe Redepl of the Army upon the Cessation ofHostilitiesin Europe. 370.5/15 (Redepl) (R).

39 Record (S) of Conference on Redepl Policies and Procedures, HqAGF, 27-28 Mar 45. Remarks ofLt Col J. H. Hanson.337/1 (Redepl) (S).

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Army Service Forcesalso objectedto the requirement that equipment becombat-serviceable and advocated instead that training serviceability should be the

standard prescribed.The Army Ground Forces countered this argumentwiththe statementthat no clear-cutdefinition of training serviceabilityhad ever beenestablishedand that if any standard shortof combat serviceabilitywere specifiedunits would lose precious training time in repairing and maintainingtheirequipment. 40

After a considerable period of argument, during which Ground officerspushed their case aggressively,the War Departmentupheld the position of theArmy GroundForces.In May1945 G-3 of the War Departmen tagreed to assignan equipmentpriorityof "A-2a" to units in redeployment, aprioritypreviouslygiven only tounits alerted foroverseasmovement.If this shouldbe found inade-quate to insure a complete supply of authorized allowances,the War Depart-ment G-3 proposed to give redeployed units a theater priority, the highest ofall equipmentpriorities. 41

The Redeployment Troop Basis

The Army Ground Forceswas not called on toassist in preparing the

redeploymentTroop Basis.42

But when the first edition of this document,dated15 March 1945, was issued to the major commands for guidance in planning,the Army Ground Forces submitted to the War Department abrief of recom-mended changes.

The redeploymentTroop Basis prescribed atotal of 65 divisions;infantrydivisionswere reduced from 65 to 50, and airborne divisionsfrom 5 to 3. TheArmy Ground Forces, assuming that the number of divisions had beenestab-lished "according to a definite plan," made no comment as to the aggregatespecified in the redeployment Troop Basis. But it did recommendthat twoinfantry divisions be substituted for the two airborne divisionsthat werescheduled forinactivation.The basis of this suggestionwas the high degree ofeffectiveness demonstratedby airborne units in Europe. Not only did anair-borne division have "fighting ability comparable to an infantry division,"according to the Army Ground Forces, but the mere presenceof an airborne

40 AGF M/S, G-4 for CofS, 30 Apr 45, sub: Equip for RedeplTng. G-4 TF files, binder "Chief of Staff."41

AGF M/S, G-4 for CofS, 30 May 45, sub: Conference on Equip Priority. G-4 TF files, binder"Chief of Staff."

42

Statementof Col H. T. Todd, AGF Mob Div G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 12 Oct 45.

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division was "a constantthreat which required the enemy to hold out deepreserves when such reserves may be needed on theactive front." 43 The WarDepartment thereupon restored one of the deleted airborne divisions to theTroop Basis.

Believing that provisions of the redeploymentTroop Basis covering com-bat support and replacements ran counter to some of the basic lessons ofexperience in ground combat, the Army Ground Forces made its strongestrepresentations on these points. For example, the redeployment Troop Basiscalled for large reductions in engineering units. Combat engineer battalionswere reduced from 211 to 129, treadway bridge companies from 31 to 17,and technical combatengineer teams from 20 to 4. The ArmyGround Forces

urged a less drastic reduction, citing the fact that 35 percent of the forceused in the Leyte operations wereengineers andthat in some other operationsengineers constituted as high as 40 percent of the participatingstrength.The War Department modified the original provisions onlyslightly:3 of thedeleted combat battalions,1 treadway bridge company, and 10 technical com-bat teams were restored. Action with reference to engineer categories forwhich the Army Ground Forces recommended increases is summarizedbelow: 44

Unit

Combat Gp HqCombat BnHvy Ponton BnLight Equip CoTreadway Bridge CoTech Combat TeamTech Int Research Team

Prescribedin Current

TB(1 Apr 45)

77211

15383120

5

Prescribedin Redepl

TB(15 Mar 45)

3612913331744

Recommendedby AGF forRedepl TB(27 Apr 45)

59

15119673412

5

Prescribedin RevisedRedepl TB(1 Jul 45)

40

13215381814

6

The Army Ground Forces also urged an upward revision of ordnancesupport, particularlyof ordnance maintenance. But the War Department didnot accept the AGF recommendation;instead, it specified further reductionsin

43 AGF memo (S) forCofS USA, 27 Apr 45, sub: WD Redepl TB . With related papers. 320.2/1(Redepl TUB) (S).

44 (1) Ibid. (2) WD Redepl TB (S), 15 Mar. 45. AGF G-3 Mob Div files. (3) WD TB (S), 1 Apr 45.320.2/78 (TUB) (Separate binder) (S). (4) WD TB (S), 1 Jul 45. 320.2/88 (TUB) (S). The remainder

of this section on the redeploymentTroop Basis is based on the same sources.

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all types of ordnance support. Actionwith reference to ordnanceunits of cate-gories in which the Army Ground Forces recommended increases is tabulatedbelow:

Unit

Gp HqBn HqAm CoDepot CoEvac CoHeavy Auto Maint CoHeavy Maint, FAMaint, TankMaint Co, AAMed AutoMaint Co


TB(1 Apr 45)

19155172110

50139584945

172

Prescribedin Redepl

TB(15 Mar 45)

22

14115210024

109424632

135

Recommendedby AGF forRedepl TB

(27 Apr 45)

27180155105

31162437743

217

Prescribedin RevisedRedepl TB( J45

19128128921587383929

129

Recommendationsfor increases ofcertain categoriesof medical and signalunits met with similar results.

There was wide divergence of opinion as to chemical mortar battalions:the regular Troop Basis of 1April 1945 provided for 25 of these units; the rede-ployment Troop Basis of 15 March 1945 raised the number to 29; the ArmyGround Forces on 27 April recommended55; the 1 July revision of theredeploymentTroop Basis authorized 32.

In the arms the story was about the same as in the services.The regularTroop Basis of 1 April 1945 called for 68 tank destroyer battalions; the rede-ployment Troop Basis, 15 March 1945, cut the numberback to 28; the ArmyGround Forces on 27 April recommended59; the July revision of the rede-

ployment Troop Basis authorized 48. The regularTroop Basis provided for 3field artillery rocket battalions;the first edition of the redeploymentTroopBasis, 15 March 1945, authorized 6; the ArmyGround Forces on 27 Aprilrecommended 17; the 1July revision of the redeploymentTroop Basis left thefigure at 6. The ArmyGround Forces wanted the number of tank battalionsraised from 43, as prescribed in the redeploymentTroop Basis of 15 March, to65 and recommended that one of these units be made an organic part of eachinfantry division. This recommendationwas turned down, and the numberof tank battalionswas reduced to 36 in the 1July revision.

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REORGANIZATION FOR REDEPLOYMENT 453

The Army Ground Forces thought that the War Departmenthad erredon the side of generosity inestimating redeployment needs in antiaircraftartillery units. While not proposing a specific figure, it took the position that"based on the superiority of air power in thePacific, substantial reductions canbe effected." The Army Ground Forces also recommendedthat the proportionof mobile battalions be increased so as to facilitate the use of antiaircraftunitsin the secondaryrole of supporting field artillery. The War Departmentin the1 July revision of the redeploymentTroop Basis reduced thenumber of anti-aircraft artillery units 19 percent, but it did not adopt the AGF suggestionfor increasing the proportion of mobile battalions. Details of adjustment aresummarizedin the followingtable:

Unit

AAA A Wpns, MblAAA A Wpns, SPAAA A Wpns, SemAAA Gun Bn, MblAAA Gun Bn, SemAAA MG Btry, A/B

(T/O&E 44-217)AAA MG Btry, A/B

(T/O&E 44-278)AAA MG Btry, A/B

(T/O&E 44-278T)

TOTAL


TB(1 Apr 45)

7930763876

14

15

0

328

Prescribedin Redepl

TB(15 Mar 45)

4618502062

14

15

0

225

Recommendedby AGF forRedepl TB(27 Apr 45)

4930353755

0

0

29

235

Prescribedin RevisedRedepl TB(1 Jul 45)

16

25561764

11

2

0

191

The redeploymentTroop Basis as first published on 15March 1945 pre-

scribed reductions of the AGF replacement training center (RTC) capacityfrom 370,000 to 180,000, a cut of 51 percent as against a reduction of only 26percent in the arms that were to be maintained by the replacementsystem.Calling attention to thefact that in the past "the inadequacy of the RTCpro-gram . . . has necessitated many expedientsto increase the number of replace-ments in an attempt to meet requirements," the Army Ground Forces urgedthe War Department to considerraising the specified RTC capacity.The 1 Julyrevision of the redeployment Troop Basis raised the figure from 180,000 to245,000.

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II. Changes in Organization

RedeploymentTables of Organization andEquipment (T/O&E's), com-monly referred to as "R" tables, had their origin in January 1945. At that timethe War Departmentabandoned for planningpurposes the policy of rejecting,on account of limitations of manpower, recommendations for increase in

T/O&E's, however strong the evidence of their need. Instead, a policy wasadopted which providedfor theconstructionof new tables,based on operationalexperience.These tables were to be suspended un tilsuch time as themanpowersituation permittedputting them into effect—whichpresumablywould be in theperiod following the defeat of Germany. Each table prepared under the newpolicy was to bedistinguishedby additionof the letter "R"following the number(e. g., T/O&E 11-7R) and prefaced with the statement: "This table will notbecome effective except upon notification from the War Department." 1

On 7 February 1945 the War Department informed the Army GroundForces thatthe infantry divisionwould be considered thebasic unit for applica-tion of the "R" tables and directed that initial recommendations for changesin the infantry division be submitted inchart form by 20February. The WarDepartment stated further that tables for other units would be prepared sub-sequently, in the following order: (1) units which normally support thedivision, (2) units which supportcorps, and (3) units which support army.The directive of 7 February also provided that the "R" tables would be pre-pared with a view to use, insofar as practicable, in thepostwar army. 2

The War Department directed specifically that two provisions bewritteninto the "R" tables: (1) elimination of dual assignments which required per-sonnel to perform secondary dutiesto the detrimentof their primarymission—for example, cook's helpers and switchboard operators werenot to be chargedwith the driving of vehicles; and (2) inclusion in T/O&E's of certain itemsordinarilyprovided to theaters in"special lists of equipment," but which experi-

1 WD ltr (R) AG 320.3 (12 Jan 45) OB-I-WDGCT-M to CGs, 20 Jan 45, sub: Redepl T/O&E's.320.3/1 (Redepl) (R).

2 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.3 (7 Feb 45) for CGAGF, 7 Feb 45, sub: Redepl T/O&E's. 320.3/1(Redepl) (S).

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ence had shown to berequired in normal operations of units, togetherwith suchpersonnel as wereneeded for manning the equipment in question. The WarDepartment also specified that consideration be given toinclusion in the newtables of the following changes repeatedly recommended by overseas com-manders: (1) provision of adequate communication in the signal company,artillery, infantry regiment, and the other components of thedivision; (2) re-placement of the military policeplatoon by a company; (3) substitution inthe cannon company of aself-propelled weapon for the towed howitzer; and(4) provision of amore effective weapon in the antitank company.The directiveof 7 February 1945 stated further: "If the consensus ofopinion of theaters favorsretention of the Cannon and Antitank Companies organically in theInfantryRegiment . . . [AGF's] commentsare desired on the inclusionof Tank, TankDestroyer and Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions organically in thedivision ascontrasted either with the present method of attachment or a proposed methodof assignment." 3

Subsequent instructions from the War Department stated that the newtables were "not intended to be special tables for operations in the Pacific" andthat changes proposed by the ArmyGround Forces should therefore not bebased on recommendationsfrom the Pacific alone but on suggestions of all

theaters.4

Supplementarydirectives also provided that the AGF recommenda-tions in chart form be submitted in threecategories,as follows:5

Plan 1. Changes generallyagreed upon by theaters,which did not involvereorganizationof the division and which (1) eliminateddual func-tions and (2) provided foraddition of adequatecommunication,personnel,and other modificationspreviouslydirected by the W arDepartment.

Plan 2. Same as Plan 1, plus recommended changes in the organization ofunits in the division,such as substitution of a militarypolice com-

pany for the platoon, and changes in thecannon company toinclude self-propelledweapons.Plan 3. Same as Plans 1 and 2,plus such over-all changesof the divisional

organization as were deemed desirable, including addition of atank battalion and other units with corresponding increases inthe serviceunits.

3Ibid.

4 WD memo (S) 320.3 (7 Feb 45) for CGAGF, 22 Feb 45,sub: Redepl T/O&E's.320.3/1 (Redepl) (S).5 (1) Ibid. (2) AGF M/S (S), Rqts-3 to Gen Staff Secs and CofS AGF, 27 Feb 45, sub: Redepl

T/O&E's. 320.3/1 (Redepl) (S).

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In sum, the War Department wanted three plans ranging from generally ap-proved minimum increaseswithin the existingframe of the infantry division to

a remoldingof the division into an organizationthat would reflect the acceptedlessonsof World War II.

The AGF "R" Tables

Spade work on the threeplans was done in the RequirementsSection,whosecumulative files of theater comments(broken downby T/O's and weapons)afforded excellent background material for the task at hand.6 Informationalready available wassupplementedby cablecommunicationswith theater com-manders and by conference with high-ranking personnel who had returnedto the United States after tours of duty overseas.Commanding generals of sub-ordinate centers and commands and commandants of the AGFschools werealso called on forsuggestions;in addition, a group of AGF officers visited FortBenning to discuss in detail with the commandant, Maj. Gen. Fred Walker,who had led the36th Division in Italy, and with his staff proposed changes inthe organizationand weapons of thedivision.7

In late February a special AGF committee of 9 officers (4 from Require-

ments, 1 from each of the other General Staff Sections, and 1 from the SignalSection), using data compiled in the Requirements Section as abasis, made anintensive study of proposed changes in divisionalT/O&E's. This comm ittee on1 March submitted to the AGF Chief of Staff three plans, which were trans-mittedon 8 March to the WarDepartment.8

Plan 1, following War Departmentinstructions, maintained the existingstructureof the division andprovidedonly such increasesin strength and equip-ment as were generally agreed on by theater commanders.Personnel changescalledfor bythis plan are shown in Table No. 1.

6 Statementof Maj R. N. Nye to AGFHist Off, 15 Nov 45.7 (1) Ibid. (2) Replies to questions sent to local and theater commandersare filed in 320.3 (Redepl)

(S) and 320.2 (Redepl) (S) .8 (1) Memo of Col J. P. Donnovin, Orgn and Equip Div for Brig Gen R. S. Ramey, 31 Oct 45, sub

not given. Files of Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-3 Sec. (2) Rpt (S) of Committee on "R" T/O's for theInf Div. 320.3/1 (Redepl) (S). (3) AGF M/S (S), Rqts-3 to CofS AGF, 1 Mar 45, sub: "R" T/O's forInf Div. 320.3/1 (Redepl) (S). (4) AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, attn G-3 Div, 8 Mar 45, sub: "R"

T/O's for Inf Div. 320.3/1 (Redepl) (S).

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TABLE NO. 1

Changes in the Division Proposed by AGF Plan 1, 28 February 1945

Source: Proposed T/O&E 7R and allied tables (mimeographed, tentative),Plan 1, 28 Feb 45. Files of Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-3 Sec.

The principalaugmentationswere as follows:1. Addition of truck drivers, so as toeliminate dualassignmentsfor truck

drivers,radio operators, and cook's helpers.2. Additional communications personnel forwire teams, switchboard op-

erators, andradio operators.3. Additional postal personnel.4. Additionalammunitionbearers.One of thesignificant changeswas the addition of a squad of seven men to

each rifle company to operate rocketlaunchersand flame throwers.The prin-cipal change in equipment under Plan 1 was the addition to each company,battery, or similar unit of a truck (¾- or 1½-ton) for head quarters andsupply.9

Plan 2 included all the increases of personnel and equipment providedin Plan 1 and specified additional augmentations. (See Table No. 2. )

9 AG F memo (S) for CofS USA, attn G-3 Div, 8 Mar 45, sub: "R" T/O's. With related papers. 320.3/1(Redepl) ( S ) . The charts settingforth the details of the three plans listed as inclosures 2 and 3 of this

memo are not filed with the memo, butcopies are on file in the Orgn and Equip Div of the AGF G-3 Sec.

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TABLE NO. 2

Comparison of Changes in the DivisionProposed by AGF Plans 1 and 2,26-28 February 1945

Source: Proposed T/O&E 7R and allied tables (mimeographed, tentative),Plans 1 and 2, dated respectively 28 and 26 Feb 45. Files of Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-1 Sec.

It substituted a military police companyfor the platoon,and a signal battalionfor the company; moreover,it stipulated important changes in the organiza-tion and armament of the cannon and antitank companies of the infantryregiment. Details of these organizational changes will be presented below inthe discussion of Plan 3. In general, the new plan called for replacement ofthe six towed 105-mm. M-3 howitzers of the cannoncompany by nine M-4tanks armed with 105-mm. howitzers, and substitution in the antitank com-pany of medium tanks carrying 90-mm. guns in lieu of the towed 57-mm.antitank guns.

Plan 3 included the changes outlined in Plans 1 and 2,called for addi-tional augmentations of personnel andequipment, and provided for theaddition of a tank battalion as an organic part of the infantry division. Thestrength of the division contemplated in Plan 3 was 18,285 (867 officers, 50warrant officers, and 17,368 enlisted men), an increase of 4,248 (104 officers, 6warrant officers, and 4,138 enlisted men) overthe DivisionT/O&E in effect on1 March 1945. (See Table No. 3 for details of Plan 3 and comparison with the

other two plans andthat currently ineffect.)

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TABLE NO. 3

Comparison of Changes in the Division Proposed by AGF Plans 1, 2, and 3,

26-28 February 1945

Source: Proposed T/O&E 7R and allied tables (mimeographed, tentative).

Plans 1, 2, and 3, dated respectively 28, 26, and 26 Feb 45. Files of Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-3Sec. Plan 3 as drawn on 26 Feb provided a chemical mortar battalion (36 officers, 1 warrant officer, 639enlisted men) in the division artillery, but since this battalion was later deleted it was not included in the

above tabulation.

Since Plan 3 incorporated the provisionsof the other two plans and sinceit was the one which the ArmyGround Forces recommended to the WarDepartment for adoption, on the ground that it embodied most fully theexperience of World War II, it will be considered in detail. 10 Comparisons,unless otherwise indicated, will be with organizations as prescribed in

T/O&E's in effect 1 March 1945. (For brevity the former will be referred toas "new" and the latter as "old.")

No changes were made in the rifle squad, but a rocket squad of sevenmen, armed with bazookas or flame throwers,was added to the rifle platoonto make theplatoon more effective in operations againstarmor and pillboxes.

10 The discussion of Plan 3 which follows, unlessotherwise indicated, is based on the followingsources:(1) AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, attn G-3 Div, 8 Mar 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's. With related papers.320.3/1 (Redepl) (S). (2) Inf Sch ltr (S) to CGAGF, 17 Feb 45,sub: Redepl T/O&E's. 320.3/1 (Redepl)(S). (3) Proposed T/O&E 7R and allied tables (mimeographed, tentative), Plan 3, 26 Feb 45.Orgn andEquip Div, AGF G-3 Sec files.

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The weapons platoon of the rifle company was augmented by a specialweapons section of 17 men (1 leader, 1 messenger, and 3 squads of 5 men each)

whose principalweapon was the57-mm. recoillessrifle. The light machine-gunsection of the weapons platoon was increased from 2 to 3 squads; this notonly gave added fire power but also permitted the attachment of 1lightmachine gun squad to each rifle platoon.The new rifle companyhad 6 officersand 241 enlisted men asagainst 6 officers and 187 enlisted men in the oldcom-pany; it wasbetter balancedand more effective.

The heavy weapons company, whose position in theinfantry battalionwas coordinate with that of the weapons platoon in the rifle company, wasmodified considerably. To increase flexibility and to provide a schemethatwould conform to the triangular organization of the infantry battalion, the2 heavy machine gun platoons,each having 4 squads, were combined into 1machine gun platoon of 3 sections, each having 2 squads. Under the oldorganization2 officers and 70enlistedmen manned 8 water-cooled mach ineguns;underthe newplan 2 officers and 63enlistedmen manned6 water-cooledmachineguns and 6 light machine guns. Thus the reorganization of the heavy machinegun platoons yielded more fire power per man, at the same time providingincreased flexibility.

Another changedesigned to increase flexibility and fire power was thetransfer of the antitank platoonfrom the headquarters companyof the infan-try battalion to theheavy weapons company, and replacement of thethreetowed 57-mm. guns by six 75-mm. recoilless rifles. It was thought that thesomewhat cumbersome,primarily defensive 57-mm. guns were not fully ef-fective in a fast-moving attack; moreover,it was deemed desirable toplace allof the battalion's supportingweapons in one company. In its newlocation theantitank platoon was redesignated as a gunplatoon. The new heavy weapons

company was atriangular organization, consistingof a machine gunplatoon,a gun platoon,and a mortar platoon, with a strength of 7 officers and 197 en-listed men.

The infantry battalion headquarterscompany receivedadditional radiooperators and wiremen. Moreover, an intelligence andreconnaissancesectionof 16 enlisted men was added tofulfill demands for a trained unit in thebattalion for intelligence andreconnaissance missions.Total strength of thebattalion (officers and enlisted men) was increasedfrom 860 to 1,060.

One of the most important changeson the regimental level was that

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affecting the cannon company. This unit had been added to the infantryregiment in 1942 to provide close-indirect-fire support for ground troops,

particularly in fast-moving operations.Original plans had called for armingthe cannon company with self-propelled howitzers (six 75-mm. and two 105-mm. howitzers per company), but in the revisions oforganization of 1943,various considerations,including economy of shipping space, led to the adop-tion of short-barreled towed 105-mm. howitzers (six per company—two ineach platoon) as theprincipal weapon. 11

Later reports from the theatersindicated that the cannon company in actualoperations was used onlyoccasionallyin its intendedrole. The towed howitzerswere not sufficiently maneuverable for closesupport of rapidly advancingrifleunits. In many if not in mostinstances normal employment was byindirectfire; in such cases it was common practice to tie thecannon company in withthe field artillery communicationssystem and to use it as anadditionalbatteryof artillery. To a large extent direct-fire missions wereperformed byattachedtank and/or tank destroyer units. Still, there was no indication that divisionswould willinglygiveup their cannoncompanies. 12

Polling of theaters in 1944 and early 1945 on the question of changingtheequipmentand organization of the cannon companyproduced a variety of re-

sponses.Preponderantopinion seemed to favor the self-propelled overthe towedmount.As to calibers, somecommandersfavored the 75-mm., some the105-mm.,and some the 3-inch; one report from the SouthwestPacific Area (SWPA)favored the 37-mm. gun. The commandinggeneralof the MediterraneanTheaterof Operations, U. S. Army (MTOUSA), offered this comment:

13

It is not expected thata unanimousopinion concerningthe best type of weapon for useby infantry cannon companiesin their normal role will be forthcoming in theimmediatefuture. ... It appears, as a general observation,that the most recent important engagementsometimes unduly influences the opinions of the participatingcommanders with respectto what may be termed average or normal requirements necessitating apermanent changein T/O&E's.

The AGF committee appointed in February to suggest changesin organ-ization and equipment adopted after considerablediscussion the recommenda-

11 See above, "Reorganizationof Ground Troops for Combat."12 (1) AGF M/S (S), (GNRQT-3 15197), Rqts-3 to G-3, 9 Feb 45, sub: Redepl Tables of Orgn and

Equip. With attached papers. Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-3 Sec files. (2) ETO ltr (C) AG 322.34 OPGCto TAG, 15 Feb 45,sub: Inf Cannon Co. 320.3/1 (Redepl) (S).

13 MTOUSA 1st ind (S), 16 Dec 44, on AGF ltr (R)350.05/110, 7 Dec 44, sub: Self-PropelledTD Bn

Organic toDivs. Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-3 Secfiles, binder marked "R" Tables (S).

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tion of the Infantry School thatthe cannoncompanybe organizedand equippedas a standard tank company (to bedesignated"Tank Company, Infantry Regi-

ment"), with its principal weapon the 105-mm. howitzer mounted ontankT26E2 (17 tanks in all—5 in each platoon and 2 in company headquarters).In his review of the committee's recommendations,Maj. Gen. Albert W. Wal-dron, Chief of the Requirements Section,rejected the proposal toconvert thecannon company into a standard tankcompany andspecified instead acompanyof 9 tanks (3 platoons,each equipped with3 tanks T26E2, 105-mm. howitzers).General Waldron based his action primarily on the fact that the maximumnumberof tanks for the cannon companyrecommendedby theatercommanderswas nine. To go beyond this he deemed a violation of a principlelong followedby the Army Ground Forces of proposingno revision ofT/O&E's which werenot backed by theaterrecommendations. 14

The AGF committee alsoaccepted as its own the recommendation of theInfantry School that the 57-mm. gun begiven up as the primaryweapon of theantitank company, thatthe name of this unit be changed to "InfantryDestroyerCompany," and that it be organized as a standardtank companyequippedwithseventeen T26E1 tanks carrying 90-mm.guns.

15 As in the case of the cannoncompany, GeneralWaldron substituted for the committee's recommendation

of a standard tank company aunit of 9 tanks (T26E1, 90-mm.gun) organizedinto 3 platoonsof 3 sections each.

16

One of General Waldron's reasons for reducing the number of tanks inthe cannon and antitank companies was his belief that the War Departmentwould not agree to placing in the infantry division the number of tanksprovided for in the committee'srecommendations.17 For when the 34 tanksin each of the infantry regiments (17 in the cannoncompany and 17 in theantitank company) were added to the 71 in the tankbattalion (made organicin the infantry division under Plan 3) the total number of tanks in the

14 Statement of Maj Gen A. W. Waldron to AGF Hist Off, 27 Nov 45.15 During the course of its study the committee considered a proposal to delete the antitank company

and to convert the cannon companyinto a combined cannon-antitank organizationconsisting of three platoonseach having five tanks—three armed with 105-mm. howitzers and two with 90-mm. guns. See Rpt of Com-mittee on "R" T/O's for the Inf Div in 320.3/1 (Redepl) ( S ) . This proposal was rejected on two grounds:(1) the missions of the antitank and cannon companieswere inherentlydistinct and should not becombinedin a single unit; (2) such an organization was withoutprecedent and had notheater indorsement.Statementof Maj Gen A. W. Wal dron to AGFHist Off, 27 Nov 45.

16 Rpt (S) of Committeeon "R" T/O's for the InfDiv. 320.3/1 (Redepl) (S) .17

Statementof Maj Gen A. W.Waldron to AGF Hist Off, 27 Nov 45.

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division was 173.This was almost two-thirds the number of tanksauthorizedthe armored division, forwhich T/O&E 17, dated 24 January 1945, authorized

195 medium tanks and 77 light tanks.18

General Waldron's reduction of tanksin the cannon and antitank companies from 17 to 9 cut down the totalnumber oftanks in the infantry divisionfrom 173 to 125.

The mission envisioned for the new cannon andantitank companiesasstated by the Infantry School and accepted by the ArmyGround Forces wasas follows:19

Cannon Company (redesignatedTank Company) . . . will take on the role of an assaultcompany, and should in addition be capable ofdestroying enemy armor. It is intended that

it should normallyengage,

by direct fire, targets which are tootough

forbattalion weapons,

to includepersonnel,pill boxes, and other targets of opportunity, fire on which is desirablebefore it can beobtained from the artillery.

Antitank Company ... its primary role will be to destroy enemy armor and its sec-ondary [mission] will be similar to that of the Tank Company. The regimental commanderwill have hischoice, according to the situation, as to whether thedestroyer companyor thetank companyshould lead.

The service company of the infantry regiment was changed very littleexcept for anincrease in enlisted strength from 96 to 141 to meet theenlarged

responsibilities resultingfrom the addition of tanks and other complicateditems ofequipment to the regiment.

The principal changes in the regimental headquarters and headquarterscompanywere as follows:

1. Addition of a countermortarsection of 1 officer and 23 enlisted menequipped with instrumentsfor the electroniclocation of enemy weapons.

2. Addition of the mine platoon transferred from the regimental antitankcompany as a result of the conversion of thelatter unit to a tank company. It was

contemplated that when not engaged in their primary activity personnel of themine platoon would be used to supplementdefense of the regimentalcommandpost.

3. Increase of intelligence and communicationspersonnel.These and other augmentationsgave the regimentalheadquartersand head-

quarters company a strength of 14 officers and 182 enlisted men as against 12officers and 91 enlisted men in the oldorganization.

18 See above, Table No. 3 in "Reorganization of Ground Forces forCombat."19

Infantry Sch ltr (S) to CGAGF, 17 Feb 45, sub: Redepl T/O&E's. 320.3/6 (Redepl) (S) .

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A 1½-ton cargo truckwas added to allcompaniesof the regiment to meetthe need demonstrated by combat experience for an additional vehicle to

transport baggage, headquarters supplies, andkitchen. Another change af-fecting the regiment as a whole was the changing of the MOS numbers forBasics to Riflemen; this action stemmed from the belief that the minimumqualification for Basics in any organization was the ability to perform thefunctions of the primary crewmen, whichin the Infantry was, of course, therifleman.20

The Infantry School recommended that an air-liaison section, equippedwith two Cub-type airplanes, be added organically to each regiment so thatthe regimental commander wouldalways have at hand air reconnaissanceandobservation.The AGF committee went along with the Infantry School, bu tGeneral Waldron was bound by the rule to reject all changes that had notbeen advocated by atheater commander.21

The new regiment was larger by 719 men, including attachedmedicalpersonnel and chaplains,than was the old. Details of the changes in strengthand weaponsare summarized in Table No. 4.

It is apparent from this table that the new regiment was not onlystrongerin men but also more mobile, better balanced,and (in view of the adoption

of recoilless weapons)harder-hitting than the old organization. Increase ofcommunicationsand intelligence personnel andaddition of tanks and othernew weapons also made the regiment more self-sufficient than formerly. Infact, it wasalmosta divisionin miniature.

No major change was made in the organization of the division artillery.Personnel,less attached medicaland chaplain,was increasedfrom 2,111 to 2,592officers and enlisted men. Augmentationswere mainly in the following cate-gories: communications (wiremen,switchboardoperators,and radio operators),fire-direction personnel, ammunition bearers, and forward observers.Sincereports from theatershad indicated that the number of pilots for liaison planeswas insufficient to provide necessary rotation and relief, two additional pilotswere provided for divisionartillery headquartersand two for each of thefourbattalions.Another significant change provided for deletion of the forwardobserversection from the battalion headquartersand the inclusionof a forwardobserver section in each of thefiring batteries.

20 Statementof Maj H. T. Sears, C&RD,GA G Sec, to AGF Hist Off, 31 Nov 45.21

Statementof Maj Gen A. W.Waldron to AGF Hist Off, 27 Nov 45.

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TABLE NO. 4

Changes in the Infantry Regiment Proposed by AGF Plan 3, 26 February 1945Personnel

Transportation and Weapons (Less Medical)

Sources: (1) AGF M/S (S), Rqts-3 to CofS, 1 Mat 45. sub: "R" Tables of Orgn for Inf Div.320.3/1 (Redepl) (S). (2) T/O&E 7 and allied tables, 24 Jan 45.

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Of specialunits in the division the reconnaissancetroop received the greatestincrease.The basis of the increase wasreports from theaters,particularlyfrom

ETO, that the troop as currently organized was not adequate for performanceof its primary mission. The Cavalry School recommendedthe addition of arifle platoon and a reconnaissanceplatoon to the old organization,but Head-quarters, ArmyGround Forces,deeming an additionalreconnaissanceplatoonnot essential, addedonly the rifle platoon.An air section of 4officer pilots and2 enlisted mechanics,equipped with 2 liaison planes,was added to extend thereconnaissancecapabilitiesof the troop. To increase its punch, amortar platoonof three sections,each armed withan 81-mm. mortar, was added in lieu of the60-mm. mortars previously includedin the reconnaissanceplatoon. Trailersandtruckswere added fortransportationof mortars,mortar crews,and ammunition.The over-all strength of the new reconnaissancetroop was 14 officers and 235enlisted men asagainst6 officers and 143 enlisted men of the oldorganization.22

Plan 3, like Plans 1 and 2, asstated above,called for substitutionof a com-pany of military police for the old platoon. This change accorded with theexperienceof commandersin all theaters who had found the platoon inadequatefor policeand traffic work and thehandlingof prisonersof war. The neworgan-ization consisted of 1military police platoon and 3 traffic platoons and had a

strength of 7 officers and 169 enlistedmen, compared with 4 officers and 102enlisted men of the old platoon.

The division quartermaster companywas augmented by 60 enlisted men(old company—10 officers, 176 enlisted men; new company—10officers, 236enlisted men). Theater experience had indicated the absolutenecessity of pro-viding relief drivers for 2½-ton trucks, and 24 of the menadded were for thispurpose. The augmentationalso included anadditionalservicesection for break-ing down supplies into unit lots, guarding division dumps, and assisting in theregistration of graves.

Reports of AGF observers in thevarious theatershad frequently registeredcomplaint againstthe inadequacyof the division's engineer facilities and indi-cated that it was common practice to augment the organicbattalion by moreor less permanent attachmentof a corps battalion.23 To meet partiallyat least

22 (1) Cav Sch ltr (S) to CG AGF, 27 Feb 45, sub: Proposed Changes in Redepl T/O&E's. 320.3/2

(Redepl) ( S ) . (2) AGF M/S ( S ) , Rqts-3 to CofS, 1 Mar 45, sub: "R" T/O's for Inf Div. 320.3/1(Redepl) (S) .

23 (1) Statementof Col J. B.Hughes,AGF Engr Off to AGFHist Off, 28 Apr 45. (2) AGF M/S(S),

Rqts-3 to CofS, 1 Mar 45, sub: "R" T/O's for Inf Div. 320.3/1 (Redepl) ( S ) .

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the engineer needs demonstrated by combatexperience, the Army GroundForces advocated the addition of a fourth company to the engineer battalion.

It was contemplatedthat this extra unit would support the three engineercom-panies normally attached to the regimentalcombat teamsand provide generalengineer service for other troopsof the division.A sufficient number of equip-ment operators wasadded to the battalion topermit the running of equipmenton a 24-hourbasis. The strength of the engineerbattalion,less attached medical,was increasedfrom 620 to 840officers and enlistedmen.

Theater commandershad also found divisional signal facilities inadequatefor normal operating requirements.To meet this deficiency the signal companywas changed to a battalion, with anincreasein strengthfrom 9 officers,4 warrantofficers, and 226enlisted men to 12officers, 6 warrant officers, and 353 enlistedmen. Personnel added to the signal organization consisted mainly of relayswitchboard operators,wire teams, and radio operators.

In furtherance of the idea of triangularization,and to provide essentialaugmentation of organic medical service, an additional clearing platoonwasadded in the clearing company of the divisionmedical battalion; thismodifica-tion made a clearing platoonavailable for attachment to each of the threeregimental combatteams. Other changes in medical personnelprovided for

consolidationof all division dental officers under the control of the medicalbattalion (to be attached to divisionalunits for dental service as required) andtransfer of the neuropsychiatrist from the medical section of divisionhead-quarters to theclearingcompany, wherecombat experience had indicatedthathis services were most needed. The newmedical battalion had 53 officers, 2warrant officers, and 552 enlisted men as against 34 officers, 2 warrant officers,and 407 enlisted men in theold.

The adding of vehicles and weapons tovarious elements of the division

increased the maintenanceload of the ordnancecompany. This unit receivedadditional men to meet its enhanced responsibilities inthird-echelon mainte-nance and ordnancesupply. Moreover,to fill a need revealedby combat experi-ence,a contactplatoonwas added,the mission ofwhichwas toprovide immediateand limited ordnance service in forward areas. The word "light" was deletedfrom the title of the company. The strength of the new unit was 11 officers,2 warrant officers, and 252 enlisted men ascompared with 9 officers, 1 warrantofficer, and 131 enlisted men in the oldorganization.

The principal changes in division headquarters wereas follows: (1) in-

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elusion organically of photo interpreters and order-of-battlepersonnel whoin common theaterpracticehad served on an attached basis;(2) increaseof the

G-3 and G-4 staffs each by a captain to provide the additionalassistancewhichcombat experiencehad indicated to be necessary;and (3) addition of a captainto the specialservicessection to act aspost exchangeofficer and toassist in athleticand recreational activities. The division headquarters companywas increasedby 28 enlisted men to eliminatedual functions and to provide additionalcooksand orderlies.

The AGF committee on the "R"tables also recommended inclusion of achemical mortar (4.2-inch) battalion (36officers, 1 warrant officer, and 639 en-listed men) as an organic par tof the infantry division.Theater experience hadindicated thatthe 4.2-inch mortars, whenattached to the division,providedvalu-able close-in support forinfantry units.The AGF committee deemed it desirablein the interest of teamwork to make amortar battalion an integral part of thedivision. 24 In his review of the committee's recomm endationsGeneral Waldronproposed thatthe mortar battalion be assigned to the division artillery in orderto take full advantageof the artillery's communicationand fire-direction facili-ties. At first, G-3 of the Army Ground Forceswould not support the plan toinclude the chemical battalionorganicallyin the division, butafter considerable

discussionhe withdrew the nonconcurrence.When Plan 3 wassubmittedto theAGF Chief ofStaff, he struck out the chemicalbattalion.The reason for thedeletion, accordingto GeneralWaldron,was thebelief that the divisionprovidedin Plan 3 was toolarge and that it wasmore practicableto eliminate thechemicalbattalionthan to makeother reductions.25

Another change which the Army Ground Forcesrecommendedin Plan 3was the inclusionof a medium tank battalion as anorganicpart of the infantrydivision.Reports from theaters indicated that the normal procedurein combatwas to

attacha

tank battalionto the division and that combat

commanderswere practicallyunanimous inurging that the armoredunit be made anintegralpart of the division to the endthat, in training as well as in fighting, adivisionmight work with the same units. Only thus, they held, could the necessaryteamwork between tank, infantry, and artillery unitsbe developed. Thefollow-ing commentsare typical: 26

24 Rpt (S) of Committeeon "R" T/O's for the Inf Div. 320.3/1 (Redpl) (S) .25 Statementof Maj Gen A . W.Waldron to AGF Hist Off, 27 Nov 45.26 AGF Bd MTOUSA Rpt 339 (S), 14 Mar 45, sub: Current Questions Regarding Inf Opns. Files of

DisseminationBr, AGF G-2 Sec.

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personnel available to the Army.28 On 13 April 1945 the AGF Chief of Staffwrote to his G-3: 29

The Commanding General [Stilwell] believes that we should go back to the WarDepartment with a strong letter urging the inclusion of a tank battalion as anorganic partof the division. Please prepare, with Requirements, a memo for submission to WarDepartment G-3 stating somewhat as follows:

Practically all reports we get from theaters indicate the desirability of having at leastone organic tank battalion in a division.Experience to date is overwhelminglyindicativeof this. Infantry troops need and should have tanks to go forward in the attack and thosetanks should be organic so that combined training may be continuous.

The Chief of Staff also directed that figures should be prepared showing thecost in personnelof includingthe tank battalions in thedivisionand at thesametime providing anadequateGHQ reserve.30

The Army Ground Forces submitted its plea for reconsideration of thetank battalion question in two communications for the WarDepartment, bothdated 27 April 1945. One, commenting on the redeployment Troop Basis,pointed out that sufficient tank battalions were active to include one in eachdivision and provide a GHQ reserve of approximatelyfifteen battalions.31 Theother stated the case for the organic battalion in greater detail,along the lines

directedby the AGF Chief ofStaff:32

Such procedure [shifting of tank battalions from division to division] asconfirmedin reports received from the Pacific has in many casesresulted in a lack of necessaryinfantry-tank coordination. Infantry troops need and should have tank support. In order that com-bined infantry-tank training may be continuous, it is believed that the only way to obtainsatisfactory coordination is to provide atank battalion as an organic part of the infantrydivision.

On 7 June 1945 the War Department G-3 replied that "advice from thetheatershas indicated theirdesire to retain theTank Battalionsas separate units

28 WD memo (R) WDGCT 320.3 (5 Apr 45) for CGAGF, 5 Apr 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Div.20.3/2 (Redepl) ( R ) .

29 AGF M/S (R), CofS to G-3, 13 Apr 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Div. 320.3/2 (Redepl) (R).30 Ibid.31 AGF memo (S) CofS USA, attn G-3 Div., 27 Apr 45, sub: WD Redepl TB . 320.2/1 (Redepl

UB) (S).32 AGF memo (C) forCofS USA, attn G-3 Div, 27 Apr 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Divs. 320.3/1

Redepl) (C).

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and not to provide forthem as an organic part of the Infantry Division." 33 Thisstatementcameas adistinctsurprise to the ArmyGround Forces, sincecommentspreviously received fromthe commandersof ETO andMTOUSAhad stronglyindorsed organic tank battalions in infantry divisions. General MacArthuradded his indorsementto the others early in June 1945, but his cablegram ap-parently was not received in the WarDepartment before its disapprovalof theAGF recommendation to make tank battalions organic parts of infantrydivisions.34

About 20 June 1945 Maj. Gen. James G. Christiansen,Chief of Staff, ArmyGround Forces, paida visit to Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards,G-3, War Depart-ment, and urged him, in view of the nearly unanimous advocacy of organic

tank battalions by high combat commanders,to reconsider his disapprovalof the plan.GeneralEdwards indicatedhis willingnessto reopen the matter andsuggested that the Army Ground Forcespresent additionalevidence to supportits recommendation. 35

Meanwhile, on 26June 1945, the War Departmentsent GeneralMacArthura cable in substance asfollows:36

1. Bearing thesefacts in mind, should 34 Infantry Divisions now in or scheduled for

the Pacific each include anorganic tank battalion?a. Currently 21 tank battalions are in orscheduled for the Pacific. Additionalbattalions to bring the total to 34, plus anydesired for use with corps or army, can bemade available by stripping Pacific reserve and utilizing divisional units.

b. No additional tank battalionsover those now set up for thePacific can be liftedprior to March 1946 unless a corresponding setback in units and cargo space is nom-inated by you.

33 WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 TB (27 Apr 45) for CGAGF, 7 Jun 45, sub: WD Redepl TB. 320.2/1(Redepl TUB) (S). This was in reply specifically to the AGF memoreferred to in footnote 31 above. Thecommunication referred to in footnote 32 was not answered until 31 Jul 45. (See WD memo (C) WDGCT320.3 (27 Apr 45) for CGAGF, 31 Jul 45, sub: Tk Bns in the InfDiv. 320.3/5 (Redepl) (C).) This memoof 31 Jul 45 rejected the organic tank battalionson the ground that (1) General MacArthurdid not favor itand (2) not enough tanks were available to permit inclusion of a tank battalion in each company and divisionand at the same time equip the cannon and antitank companies with tanks as provided in the recentlyadopted "R" Tables of Organization and Equipment.

34 (1) AGF M/S (S), Rqts-3 to CofS, 15 Jun 45, sub: Organic Tk Bns for Inf Div. With attachedpapers. (2) Paraphrase of rad (S) CM-In-7954 (9 Jun 45), signed MacArthur. Bothin files of Orgn andEquip Div, AGF G-3 Sec files (S).

35 AGF M/S (S), CofS to G-3, 21 Jun 45, sub: Organic Tk Bns for Inf Divs. 320.2/1 (Redepl TUB) (S).36

Paraphraseof rad (S) CM-Out-22195, 26 Jun 45.Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-3 Secfiles (S).

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When confronted with the alternative of leaving the tank battalions outof the infantry divisions or putting them in at the expense of depleting his

general reserve and breaking upsome

of his armored divisions,General Mac-

Arthur chose the former.37 The War Department G-3 interpreted this as awithdrawalby General MacArthurof his previous indorsementof the organictank battalion in the infantry division.

38 Believing further agitation futile, theArmy GroundForceslet thematter lie. 39

The AGF committeeconsidered the advisability of recommending theinclusion of tank destroyer and antiaircraft battalions asorganic parts of theinfantry division.40 Reports from theaters indicated that attachment of theseunits to divisions was not uncommon,and somecommandersfavored makingthem an integral part of the division. Sentiment for inclusion of the tank de-stroyer battalions apparentlywas stronger than for antiaircraft artillery, butin neither case was it asstrong as support for the organic tank battalions. 41 TheTank Destroyer Center favored making the tank destroyer battalion part andparcel of theinfantry division, and the AntiaircraftCommand tooka similarview with respect to theantiaircraft artillery battalions.42 But the AGF com-mittee and Headquarters,Army Ground Forces, took the position that theplacing of tanks in the cannon and antitank companiesof the infantry regi-

ment and the addition of recoilless weapons to the division's armament, asprovided in Plan 3, lessened the need ofhaving the tank destroyersand anti-aircraft guns habitually in support. Further objections were found in the sizewhich the division would attain if antiaircraft and tank destroyer battalionswere added to it. 43

The Army Ground Forces sent Plans 1, 2, and 3 to the War Departmenton 8 March 1945 and recommended theadoptionof Plan3. 44 The divisionwhich

37 Paraphraseof rad (S) CM-In-28225 (29 Jun 45), signed MacArthur,29 Jun 45. Orgn and Equip Div,AGF G-3 Sec files (S) .

38 WD memo (C) WDGCT 320.3 (27 Apr 45) for CGAGF, 31 Jul 45, sub: Tk Bns in the InfDiv.320.3/5 (Redepl) (C).

39 Pencilled notation dated 1 Jul 45 by Col H. S. Schrader on AGF M/S (S) , G-3 to CofS, 29 Jun 45,sub: Organic Tk Bns for Inf Div. 320.2/1 (Redepl TUB) (S) .

40 Rpt (S) of Committee on "R" T/O's for the Inf Div. 320.3/1 (Redepl) (S) .41 See tabulation (C) of opinion of combat commanders, "What Weapons Does the RCT Normally

Require in Combat?"320.2/1 (Redepl TUB) (S).42 (1) TDC ltr (S) to CGAGF, 16 Feb 45,sub: Redepl T/O&E's.320.3/1 (Redepl) (S). (2) AAC ltr

(S) to CG AGF, 17 Feb 45, sub: Redepl T/O&E's. 320.2/1 (Redepl TUB) (S).43 Statement of Maj Gen A. W.Waldron to AGFHist Off, 27 Nov 45.44 AG F memo (S) for CofS USA, attn G-3 Div, 8 Mar 45, sub: "R" T/O's for Inf Div. 320.3/1

(Redepl) (S) .

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incapable of meeting the demands habitually required of it in combat andthat as a result additional elements had to be attached on amore or less per-manent basis.It wasfound that attachment hadthese disadvantages:(1) Serviceelements of the division (particularly ordnance, quartermaster, and medicalunits), already taxed to the limit by the demands oforganic units,were in-capable of handling the increased load of work. (2) Attached organizationscould not be absorbed ascompletelyin the team as units moldedinto the divisionby training and continuingcombat association.

In 1943 General McNair had been following instructionsfrom the WarDepartmentin reducing the division,but from the time of his experimentationwith the proposed infantry division in 1937 he had shown hisbelief in the typeof division set up by his Reduction Board. Hisbasic concept in reorganizingthe division in1943 had been to give itself-sufficiencyonly fornormal situations.In his program of training, a basic concept had been the division as a battle team.The verdict of division commandersafter the experienceof combat,backed bythat of the theater commandersand ratified by his own headquarters,was thatthe infantry division as reorganized in 1943 could not meet normal situationsin combat without the habitual attachment ofcertain other elements; in otherwords, that it had been so reduced in1943 as to deprive it of maximum effective-

ness as a battle team. In any case the final decision of the WarDepartment in1945, as in 1943, was that the lack ofmanpower availablefor combat madeany-thing but a lean infantry division impracticable.46

One suggestion madeby the Infantry School in connection with the "R"tables deserves special mention, namely, the addition of certain commissionedpersonnel,and the upgrading of others, in thedivision. The Infantry Schoolrecommended,in view of the heavy casualtiesamong lieutenants,that a secondlieutenant,second in command,be assigned to each rifle platoon.The InfantrySchool proposed further that rifle, heavy weapons, tank, antitank, service, andregimental headquarters companiesshould be commanded by majors; theinfantry battalion by a colonel, witha lieutenant colonelas executive; and theinfantry regiment (combat team) by a brigadier general with a colonel asexecutive(S-1 and S-2 of theregimentto bemajors; S-3 and S-4 to belieutenantcolonels). In support of the recommendationto make the regimental com-

46 For sources of this discussion of the division proposed under Plan 3 see (1) footnote 10 above;(2) statement of Col J. S. Sauer, Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-3 Sec to AGFHist Off, 13 Nov 45; and

(3) statement of Maj Gen A. W.Waldron to AGF Hist Off, 27 Nov 45.

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manders brigadier generals the Infantry School submitted the followingargument:47

There is no reason why thecommander of the infantry regiment or combat team ofmore than 3,000 men (the rough equivalent of four battalions) should be discriminatedagainst in rank. The commander of thedivision artillery is a Brigadier General. He com-mands four battalions and less than 2,500 men. The fact that the infantry regimentalcom-mander must supervise anddirect,unde r mostdifficult conditions,not only his own regiment,bu t attached units, a command greater in strength and in responsibilitythan that of thedivisional artillery, should entitle him to equal rank with that of a division artillerycommander.

The Infantry School also proposed eliminationof the position of assistantdivisioncommander(statingthat "there is no real need for theBrigadierGeneralas assistantdivision commander") and increase of the divisional chief of staff'srank to brigadier general. 48

The AGF committee did notconcur in the proposals to assign additionallieutenants to the platoon and to increase thegrade of company and battalionofficers. However,it acceptedand forwarded the recommendationsfor eliminat-ing theassistant divisioncommander,raising the grade of the regimentalexecu-

tive to colonel,and making the regimental commandersand division chief ofstaff brigadier generals. 49 All these proposals were disapproved by GeneralWaldron, who gave as the primary reason for his disapprovalthe lack of anytheater recommendation to support them. Referring specifically to the matterof regimentalcommand, the Requirements Chiefobserved:50

The agitation tomake the regimentalcommandera general wasbased on the assump-tion that it was normal for him tolead a combat team in overseasoperations. This assumptionwas erroneous.Actually the employment of the division by regimental combat teams was the

exception rather than the rule.

The Ground Chief of Staff supported the position of General Waldron, andnone of the increases in rank proposed by the Infantry School was included inPlan 3 asforwardedto the War Department.

47 Inf Sch ltr (S) to CGAGF, 17 Feb 45,sub: RedeplT/O&E's. 320.3/6 (Redepl) (S) .48 Ibid.49 Rpt (S) of Committee on "R" T/O's for the Div. 320.3/1 (Redepl) (S) .50

Statementof Maj Gen A. W. Waldron to AGF Hist

Off,27 Nov 45.

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The WD "R" Tables

On 5April 1945 the War Departmentnotified the Army GroundForces thatthe three plans submittedon 8 March had been studied and that "if personnellimitations were less critical, one of the plans or a modification thereofcouldwell be adopted to provide a sound Infantry Division." But, stating its belief thatthe manpower situationwould continue to becritical during redeployment,the War Departmentlaid aside all three plans (though directingcontinuationof study of changes that might be made at a later date) and ordered sub-mission of tables at the earliest practicabledate providing the following specificchanges:

51

1. Signal Company—Addition of two construction teams and essentialoperation andmaintenance personnel (total augmentation—40enlisted men).

2. Hq and Hq Co.Infantry Regiment— Addition of comm unications personnel, counter-mortar section, and antitank mine platoon (total augmentationper regiment—2officers and61 enlisted men).

3. Cannon Company—Replacement of towedhowitzers, by 9 tanks carrying105-mmhowitzers (strength—5officers and 119 enlistedmen).

4. Antitank Company—Redesignation asInfantry Destroyer Company, equipped with

9 tanksarmed with 90-mm guns (strength—5officers

and 100enlisted men).

5. Rifle Company—Addition of one rocket squad(7 enlistedmen) to each rifle platoon(total augmentation—189 enlisted men per regiment).

6. Heavy Weapons Company—Transfer of antitank platoons from battalion head-quarters to heavy weapons company with no increase ofpersonnel.

7. Military Police Platoon—To be replaced by a company (total augmentation—3officers and 67 enlisted men).

8. Hq & Hq Battery, Division Artillery—Addition of counter-mortarpersonnel (totalaugmentation in division artillery—4 officers and 47 enlisted men).

9. Field Artillery Battalion 105-mm Howitzer— Addition of communications and

counter-mortar personnel; inclusion in an augmentation column of personnel and equipmentfor increasing the firing battery from 4 to 6 guns if/and when specifically directed by the

War Department.10. Field Artillery Battalion, 155-mm Howitzer—Addition of communications per-

sonnel (17 enlisted men).

The increases directed by the War Department on 5April amounted toapproximately900 officers and men for thewhole division,which was slightly

51 WD memo (R) 320.3 (5 Apr 45) for CGAGF, 5 Apr 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Div. 320.3/2

(Redepl) (R).

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less than half of the augmentation proposedby the Army Ground Forces underPlan 1— a plan which included only those increases deemed mostessential onthe basis of combatreports.52 Moreover,the instructions of 5Aprildid not includecertain changespreviously directedby the War Department such as (1) elimina-tion of dual functions, (2) increasedintelligencepersonnelin the infantry regi-ment, and (3) additional fire-direction personnel, ammunition handlers, andforward observersin the field artillery.Furthermore,no maintenancepersonnelwas added to the ordnancecompany to meet the increased loadresulting fromthe placing of tanks in the cannon and antitank companies.53

The action of the WarDepartment in trimming "R" tables to fit currentpersonnelresources came as asurprise to Headquarters, Arm yGround Forces,

since earlier instructions from the War Department had indicated thatin re-vamping the division permanentpostwar needs were to be considered.Evenpreviously declaredminimum essential increases were nowdisallowed.

54

During the weeks immediatelyprecedingand followingV-E Day, the WarDepartmentmodified the restrictionslaid down in the letter of 5April to permitthe setting up of a division approximately thesize of that prescribed in Plan 1.Tables for the new division were submittedto the War Departmenton 14 Mayand published shortlythereafter. The "R" tables were dated 1 June 1945, but

the specificWar Department authorityrequired for putting them into effect waswithheld untilOctober,when the 2d and 4thDivisionswere directed toreorga-nize under the new tables.55

The tables as publishedon 1 June 1945 incorporatedthe changesoutlinedby the War Department in theletter of 5 April mentioned above and providedadditional augmentationsas follows:56

1. Postal personnel (1 officer and 5 enlistedmen) and transport quarter-masterteams in divisionheadquarters.

52 AGF M/S (R), Rqts-3 to CofS AGF, 19 Apr 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Div. 320.3/2 (Redpl) (R) .53

(1) Ibid. (2) AGF M/S (R), G-4 to G-2, 20 Apr 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Div. 320.3/2(Redepl) (R).

54 These statements are based mainly on the following sources: (1) AGF M/S (R), Rqts-3 to CofSAGF, 19 Apr 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Div. 320.3/2 (Redepl). (2) AGF M/S (R), G-4 to G-2, 20Apr 45, sub and location as in(1). (3) Statement of Maj Gen A. W. Waldron to AGFHist Off, 27 Nov 45.

55 (1) Statement of Col J. S. Sauer to AGFHist Off, 13 Nov 45. (2) AGFmemo for CofS USA, 16Oct 45,sub: Reorgn of InfDivs.With related papers. 320.3/452 (Inf).

56 AG F memo (R) for CofS USA, attn G-3 Div, 14 May 45,sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Div. 320.3/2

(Redepl) ( R ) .

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TABLE NO. 5

Comparison of "R" Table Infantry Division with Old Divisionand That Proposed by AGF Plan 3

Personnel

2. Enlargement of the ordnancemaintenancecompanyby 9 enlisted men toprovide maintenancefor the tanks in the cannon and antitank companies.

3. Addition of 27 enlisted men to the signal companyand setting up ofaugmentation teams in the "Remarks" column to provide radio andmessage-

center facilities for unusualoperations.

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TABLE NO. 5—Continued

Equipment

Sources: (1) T/O&E 7R, 1 Jun 45.(2) T/O&E 7, 24 Jan 45.(3) Proposed T/O&E 7R and allied tables (mimeographed, tentative), Plan 3.

dated 26 Feb 45. In files of Orgn and Equip Div, AGF G-3 Sec.

4. Consolidationof all the division'sdentists in the medical battalion,forattachment tounits as required, and increase of themedical battalionby 5 enlistedmen (first sergeant, cook, mechanic,and 2 dental technicians).

The strength of the divisionprescribed in the 1 June tables was 15,838 (787officers, 44 warrant officers, and 15,007 enlisted men). Details of personnel andequipment are setforth in Table No. 5. Abreakdownof componentsis given inthe Chart "Organization and Equipment of Infantry Division, 1 June 1945." 57

The division which finally emerged on 1 June after months of study andplanning was an improvementover that which it supplanted in that it had

57 The discrepancy between the aggregate strength of the division indicated by the chart (15,868) and

the total of 15,838 indicated by Table No. 5 is due to the fact that attached medical personnelwere reducedby thirty enlisted men after preparation of the chart an d before issuance of the printed table (T/O&E 7R )on which the chart isbased.

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Organization and Equipment of Infantry Division,1 June 1945 (Proposed T/O&E 7R)

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more adequate communications, postal, and military police facilities; was lessvulnerable,in view of the radar teams,to enemymortars;was more mobileand

possessed ofmore striking powerby virtue of its tanks and recoillessguns. But itfell far short of the division which the Army Ground Forces envisioned in Plan3. Dual assignment was not eliminated; intelligence facilities of the infantryregiment were not augmented; and only small increases were made in thestrength of the ordnance and medical organizations and none at all in thereconnaissance troop, the quartermaster company, and the engineer battalion. 58

In short, the division set up inJune 1945 incorporated toonly a limited extentthe lessons learnedon the field of combat.59

On 27 May1945 the Army Ground Forces invited the War Department'sattention to thefact that personnelresources under Ground control were notadequate to supply the additional officers and men (1,801 for each division)required for reorganizing under the "R" Tables. 60

Two days later the WarDepartment directedETO and MTO either to reorganize the divisions underthe new tables prior to their departure from Europe or to ship the requiredaugmentations in separate detachments, in order that reorganization might beeffected in the United States. 61

In July plans were changed to provide the fol-lowing: (1) piecemeal reorganization of divisionsalready in the Pacific as

equipment and personnel became available and as operations permitted;(2)shipment of the first divisions redeployed through the United States with1,800 overstrength, for reorganization by General MacArthur; and (3) reorgani-zation in the United States of the last five divisionsredeployed from personnelprovided by ETO and MTO. But on account of delay in the departure of"augmentation packets" from Europe, it was necessary just before V-J Day to

change plans again and to order shipmentof the first redeployeddivisions tothe Pacific without additional strength.

62

While the "R" Tables were in preparation the War Department approved arecommendation made by the Army Ground Forces in January 1945 to add a

58(1) AGF memo (R) for CofS USA, attn G-3 Div, 14 May 45, sub: "R" Tables of Orgn and Equip

for Inf Div. 320.3/2 (Redepl) (R) .59 AGF M/S, Inf Branch to Col Frasier, 11 May 45, sub: "R" T/O&E's for Inf Div. Orgn and Equip

Div, AGF G-3 Secfiles.60 AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, attn G-3 Div, 27 May 45, sub: Pers for "R" Tables. 320.3/2

(Redepl) (C).61 WD D/F (C) WDGCT, 320.3 to CG AGF, 6 Jun 45, sub: Pers for "R" Tables. 326.3/2 (Redepl) (C) .62

AGF M/S (S) forRqts. 8 Aug 45,sub: CM-Out-37395. 370.5/25. (Redepl) (S) .

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fourth regiment to each infantry division scheduled forredeployment.63 Thischange was based on the necessity of giving infantry more respite from front-

line duty than had previously been practicable. It wasintended that the fourregiments should be rotated in such a way as to permit each to spend aboutone-fourth of thetime in rest andrecuperation.

In May 1945 the Army Ground Forces proposed tha tthe first of the twenty-nine additional regiments requiredfor implementation of the new plan beformed from the separate infantry regiments that had been used fortrainingreplacements and that others be organized from the replacement stream aspersonnel becameavailable. Thebasis of the suggestionwas thebelief that someregimentsshould be sent immediatelyto General MacArthur to providerelieffor units suffering from battle weariness andthat others should be availableforredeployment training with the first divisionsreturning from Europe. 64

The War Departmentdisapproved the proposal to utilize the separateinfantry regiments for rotational purposes and directed insteadthat the regi-ments required for implementationof the plan be taken from divisions con-stituting the strategic reserve. 65 The War Department justified this action onthe ground thatit would cause less disruption to supply phases ofredeploymentthan the AGF plan and that regiments takenfrom reserve divisionswould be

better fitted for relief missions than units formed from replacementpersonnelin theUnited States.66 In June 1945 the ArmyGround Forces notedwith concernthat the War Department plan would reduce to three the number ofreserveinfantry divisions; but because of the victory overJapan in August the WarDepartm ent proposal was not carriedout.

67

63 (1) AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, 6 Jan 45, sub: Improvementof Inf Fighting Power. (See par-ticularly Tabs B & I.) Separate inclosure. 000.7/121 (Inf Prog) (C). (2) AGF memo (S) forCofS USA,13 Mar 45, sub: Combat Tour of Inf Men. 000.7/12 (Inf Prog) (S). (3) AGF memo (S) for CofS USA,

10 May 45,sub: Inf Rqts for Rotation.320.2/14 (Redepl) (S). (4) WD D/F (S)WDGCT 322 (10 May 45)to CG AGF, 23 May 45,sub: Inf Rqts for Rotation.320.2/14 (Redepl) (S).

64 During the Italian campaign GeneralLucian Truscott reported: "The division [3d Infantry Division]was relieved from action on 17November after 59 consecutive days of offensive action against German forcesemploying delaying and defensive action. During this period of 59 days, the division sustained 3,144 battlecasualtiesand 5,446 nonbattle casualties,a total lossof 8,590." See AGF memo (S) forCofS USA, 1 Feb 44,sub: Inf Strength in the InfDiv. 000.7/5 (Inf Prog) (S).

65 WD D/F (S) WDGCT (10 M ay 45) to CGAGF, sub: Inf Regts for Rotation.320.2/14 (Redepl) (S) .66 Memo (S) of Gen J. E. Hu ll, OPD for GenHandy, DCofS USA, 30 May 45,sub: 4th Inf Regt per

Div. 322/7 (Divs) (S) .67 AGF M/S (S), G-3 to CofS AGF, 18 Jun 45, sub: 4th Inf Regt Proposed for Rotation in Inf Divs.

320.2/4 (Redepl TUB) (S) .

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becomes a permanent responsibility of another command.Effective orientation and care inassignment are of evident importance. . . . Many of these returneeswill be discharged dur-ing the redeployment period and it is highly desirablethat the final months of their militaryservice should leave no basis for bitterness in theyears to come, as was sofrequently the casein 1919.

General Marshallconcluded hisnote with this important statement:

The responsibilities placedon the Army Ground Forces when the army was reorganizedin 1942 were essentially those pertaining totraining.It may be that toaccomplishthe purposeI have in mind your responsibilitiesshould be restated.Please lookinto this matter and ifyou need modification of any War Department instructions let me have your suggestions.

General Stilwell, believing a restatementof AGF responsibilitiesunneces-sary, immediately tooksteps to accomplish theobject sought by General Mar-shall. On 29March the Army Ground Forceswrote to the Arm yServiceForcesasking for concurrence in the establishment of AGFliaison detachments atports of embarkationand debarkation. TheArmy ServiceForcespromptlygavea favorableresponse.6

Stationing of liaison personnelat ports was initiated in May 1945.7 Whileseparate staffs were commonlyset up for embarkationand debarkationliaisonat a given port, both were under the supervision of the senior AGF liaisonofficer stationed at that port,and there was considerableexchange of assistancebetweenthe twostaffs.8

On 10 May Headquarters,Army Ground Forces, instructed port liaisonofficers in their duties.Their mission with reference to debarking personnelconsisted mainly of the following matters: welcoming returnees; impressingupon them the interest of the ArmyGround Forces in their welfare; providingthem with available informationconcerning leaves or furloughs, new stations,and plans for reequipping units upon arrival at assembly station; obtaining

and forwarding toHeadquarters,Army Ground Forces,information on statusof personnel, equipment,and training; and furnishing publicity material onGround personnel to port public relations officers and to the AGF SpecialInformationSection.The missionwith respect to outgoing personnel includedmaking recommendationson training in staging areas (in coordination withthe AGF CommandGroup); filling equipment andpersonnel shortagesthat

6 AGF ltr to ASF, 29 Mar 45, sub: Ln Dets at Ports of Embarkation and Debarkation. With attachedpapers. 322/4 (AGF Ln Dets).

7 AGF ltr to CGASF, 4 May 45,sub: Asgmt of AGF Ln Off. 322/4 (AGF Ln Dets).8 Statementof Maj H. T. Sears, AGF AG Sec to AGFHist Off, 15 Jan 46.

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developedafter departurefrom the home station; correctingdeficienciesnotedin The InspectorGeneral's Preparationfor OverseasMovement (POM) inspec-

tion report;and assuring officers and men of theGround commander'sinterestin their future well-being. Liaison personnel were reminded that while repre-senting the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, they were subjectto the command jurisdiction of port authorities.They were warnedspecificallyagainst imposing any delay in the processing or movement of units ofindividuals.

9

Originalplans called for thestationingof two AGFofficers at eachport,but,as redeployment movement increased, liaison detachments wereenlarged.10

On 31 August 1945 port liaison officers totaled forty-eight.11

Liaison at Personnel Centers

Liaison at War Department personnel installations had its origin in October1943, with assignmentof AGF officers at reception stations.12 In May 1944liaisonwas established atreception centers; 13 but liaison staffs at these installationswere small and their functions were limited largely to matters of classificationand assignment.14 After the War Departmentestablished personnelcenters bybringing reception centers and other personnel agencies under smallsupervisory

9 AGF ltr to Port Ln Offs, 10 May 45, sub:Instructions to Ln Offs of AGF at Ports of Embarkationand Debarkation. 322/12 (AGF Ln Dets).

10 (1) AGF M/S, G-4 to CofS, 22 Feb 45, sub: Ln Dets at PEs. (2) AGF ltr to CGASF, 4 May 45,sub: Asgmt of AGF LnOffs. Both in 322/4 (AGF LnDets).

11 Roster of officers assigned to Hq AGF, 31 Aug 45. 330.3 (AGF). Distribution ofofficers was asfollows:

Port No. of OfficersNew Yo r k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

San F r a n c i s c o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8B o s t o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7S e a t t l e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Los A n g e l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Hampton R o a d s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3N ew O r l e a n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Miami (Port of. Aerial Embarkation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1New York (Port of Aerial Embarkation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Washington (Port of Aerial Embarkation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

12 Informationprovided AGF Hist Off by Maj H. T. Sears, AGF AG Sec, 15 Jan 45.13 AGF M/S, G-1 to CofS, 15 May 44, sub: Physical Profile Plan. With attached papers,220.01/3

(Phys Prof.14

Statement of Maj H. T.Sears, AGF AG Sec to AGFHist Off, 15 Jan 46.

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headquarters,the Army Ground Forcesextended liaisonfunctions to separationcenters and brought the previously established liaison activities at reception

centers and reception stations under the senior liaison officer, known as "theAGF LiaisonOfficer," stationedby War Departmentdirectiveat each personnelcenter.15

The War Department on 1 March 1945 prescribed in general terms thefunctions to beperformed by liaison staffs of the three major commandsatpersonnelcenters.16 The Army Ground Forces on 2 May1945 outlined in detailthe dutiesof its own liaisonteams.17 The effect of these directives was to extendliaison activities considerably beyond classification and assignment into largermatters of preparing returnees psychologicallyfor further andeffective partici-pation in thewar, or return to civilianlife, as thecasemightbe.18

Liaison functions may best be presented by describing the operations ofthe AGF liaison staff at a hypotheticalbut typicalWar Department center as ofearly July 1945. 19

Trains coming directly fromport unloaded the returnees at the receptionstation. After the men had cleaned up, turned in their uniforms for laundry orsalvage, and donned fatigue suits (which they were to wear until processingwas completed),they weredivided into groups, according tomajor command.

The group belonging to the Army Ground Forceswas escorted to anassemblyroom in the Ground area of thereceptionstation,where the AGF liaison officer,a lieutenant colonel, speaking on behalf of the Commanding General,ArmyGround Forces, delivered a brief address of welcome.Following this talk each

15 (1) Cir 329, WD, 10 Aug 44. (2) AGF ltr toTAG, 13 Apr 45,sub: Liaison Pers of the AGF at WDPers Cens. 322/5 (AGF Ln Dets). (3) AGF ltr to AGF LnOffs, 2 May 45, sub: Ln Pers of AGF at WDPers Cens. 322/9 (AGF Ln Dets). (4) Statement of Maj H. T. Sears, AGF AG Sec, to AGF Hist Off, 15Jan 46.

16

Cir 67, WD, 1 Mar 45.17 AGF ltr to AGF LnOffs, 2 M ay 45,sub: Ln Pers of the AGF at WD Pers Cens.322/9 (AGF Ln Dets).18 Ordinarily the Ground liaison staff at a personnel center was divided into three sections, one each

for the reception station, separation center, and reception center. Since processing of returnees constitutedthe major activity,most of the liaison staff served the reception station. If, for example, a staff consisted ofsix officers, four would have theirdesks at the reception station, one at thereception center, and one at theseparation center. But there was a considerable amountof collaboration among all elements of the liaisonstaff. Statement of Maj H. T. Sears, AGF AG Sec to AGFHist Off, 15 Jan 46, and of Lt ColJohn G. Bennett,AGF Ln Off, WD PersCen, Cp Shelby, Miss,6 Jul 45.

19 This account of liaison operations is based primarily on personalobservations of the AGF HistoricalOfficer at War Department Personnel Centers, Camp Chaffee, Ark., 3 July 45, and Camp Shelby, Miss.,5-6 July 45, and statements on those dates of members of the liaison staffs of these centers to the AGF

Historical Officer.

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man wasgiven a mimeographedletter of welcome whichit was presumedhewould readduring the courseof hisprocessing.20

20 The following is a copy of the letter of welcome issuedby the AGFLiaison Officer at the War Depart-ment Personnel Center, CampShelby, Miss., as of 6July 45:

ARMY GROUND FORCES WELCOMESYOU HOME

On behalf of General Jacob L. Devers, Commander of Army Ground Forces, I welcome you toReception Station #5. Your stay here will be brief; less than 24 hours. The more you cooperate in theprocessing, the faster you will leave. We want you to get out on furlough, have a swell time, forgetyour worries.But there are a fewhelpful hints and reminders for your furlough.

SECURITY. We are still at war with Japan and our buddies are over there fighting. Talk oftroop movements, new equipment, strength of units, training and the like, can be of great aid to theenemy and mayeven kill one of your own friends. So keep buttoned up as far as specific facts go. Ifyou are asked to make any sort of public statement, first clear it with an Army Public RelationsOfficer.

CONDUCT. Act like a man and a soldier! You can still have all the fun you want and stayout of trouble. Your family and friends are proud of you! Don't let them down. Play square with theMP's and you will find they're your friends. They'll give you help if you need it. Carry your orderswith you at all times. Don't waste your money on unauthorized uniforms—inmost places, youwon't beallowed to wear them. Stick to GIclothing—it'sthe best there is. Wear those decorationsand stripes—you've earned them.

COMPLIANCE WITH ORDERS. Your orders will tell you where to report and the date ofreporting. Make sure you get there on time. If youshould loseall your moneyand need transportation,turn into the nearest military post for transportation. This will be charged against your three cents per

mile, if you are paying your ownway.ILLNESS. If you are taken ill while en route or at home, report to the nearestmilitary hospital and

have them notify yournext station. Your furlough will be extended for thelength of time you are inthe hospital. If serious emergencyprevents your getting to a military hospital, have the military authori-ties notified at the first possible time. A word about extensions offurlough:—extensionswill be grantedonly when cleared through the Red Cross. DO NOT wire this station directfor an extension,but haveyour local Red Cross contact the Red Cross at the station to which you are toreport at the end of yourfurlough.

FURLOUGH ADDRESS. Any mail coming to this station will be forwarded to thefurlough ad-dress you give us. However,you may travel anywhere in the United States as long as you have a copy ofyour orders with you. Bu t keep in touch with yourfurlough address.

VENEREAL DISEASE. You all know the story onVD—it's trouble any way you look at it. Playit safe, the way you've been taught in the Army. Don't let VD ruin your furlough!

RATIONING. Rationingis a big word in civilian life today. Shoes, gasolineand food are rationed.Here's the way wehelp you out. You can get a ration coupon for one pair of shoes before you leave here.This coupon is good for 30 days in any civilian store or PX. Your local ration board will give you agallon of gasoline for each day of furlough and afull civilian allowanceof food ration points uponpresentation of your orders. Cigarettes are not rationed in civilian life,but like many other luxuries,you usuallycan't get them. You will be given a tobacco ration card here before you leave, so stock upat the PX.

If you have any further questions, don't hesitate to ask any of theofficers or men in the AGFLiaison Office. We're here to help you and make your furlough as pleasant as possible. Have a finefurlough and— GOOD LUCK!

JOHN G. BENNETT,Lt. Colonel,Infantry, AGF Liaison Officer

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After the address ofwelcomethe men were lined up for interviewby a crackcorps of enlisted liaison assistants, mostof whom were veterans ofseveralcam-paigns. The principal purpose ofthis interview was to examine thereturnees'service records—theForm 20 (which had been turned over to theliaison staff assoon as the train came in)—tosee that their SpecificationSerial Numbers(SSN)had beenproperly listed and tocheck the accuracyof Adjusted ServiceRating(ASR) scores. Returneeswhose status was such as torequire special attentionwere sent to one of theliaison officers for interview.

At the conclusion of the interviews, soldiers who had ASR scores of 85(the current "critical score") or above, and who did notfall into one of the 17"scarce categories"listed by the Arm yGround Forces, were escorted ingroupsof about 50 to the separation center, whichwas about a half-mile distant fromthe receptionstation. There the Ground returnees were received by the AGFofficer allotted to that installation.This officer made known his availabilityforassistance in all phases of the separation process. As the menwaited their turnfor medical examination, checked their souvenirsfor safekeeping, linedup forfinal payment, and performed various other details of the separation process,they werevisited occasionallyby the liaisonofficer, who circulatedamong themmaking inquiry as totheir progress and demonstrating insundry ways the

interest of the Army Ground Forces in theirwell-being. When bottlenecksslowed the flow of proceedings,the AGF officer did not hesitate to call thesituation to the attention ofresponsible separation-centerofficers. At the con-clusion of the processing,the men turned in their fatigues and drew a cleanuniform, a newpair of shoes, and aration check for a pair of civilian shoes.They were enroute home withinforty-eighthours oftheir arrival at thereceptionstation. 21

21 Personal ltr of Lt ColJohn G. Bennett to AGF Hist Off, 17 Jul 45. 314.7 (AGF Hist).SSN's listed as scarce inJuly 1945 were as follows:

187—RepeatermanTelephone077—PowerhouseEngr (Minimum 2Years

Power or Substation Opr Experi-ence)

080—Marine Engineer267—Translator (Asiatic Language)320—Interpreter(Asiatic Language)366—Orthopedic Mechanic538—Voice Interpreter (Asiatic Language)543—Radio IntelligenceControl Chief709—Traffic Analyst (Radio)

739—Intercept Operator, J

790—Weather Observer-Teletype Tech-nician

798—Transmitter Attendant,Fixed Station801—Cryptographic Repairman (Desig-

nated Equipment)808—CryptanalysisTechnician953—Radar Repairman, Reporting Equip-

ment (Designated Set) {Instr)Acoustic Technician (College Graduate with

Maj in Speech or Acoustics Plus Experi-ence in Fitting Hearing Aids)

Electro Encephalographic Specialist

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Men not eligible for separation went from their interview with the AGFliaison staff to adjoining rooms occupied by ASF reception-stationpersonnel.Here they received furlough ordersand pay. The final step in their processingwas the exchangeof the fatiguesuits for twoclean uniforms.If the men belongedto Units undergoing redeployment, their orders required their return to thereceptionstation at the end of therecuperationfurlough.If they were casualstheywere directed to proceed from their homes to an appropriate AGF camp fortemporaryassignmentto a casualbattalion.

Liaison officers at the reception station, as at theseparationcenter, made ita practice to move about among the men throughout the processingso that theywould bereadily availablein case assistancewas desired. The stay of mostrede-

ployees at receptionstationsdid notexceed twenty-fourhours.On V-E Day AGF liaisonofficers at War Department personnel centers

aggregated 80. 22 By 25August 1945 the number had increased to 119. 23

Liaison at Hospitals and Redistribution Centers

Liaison at hospitals had its inception in September1944 when a smallgroup of officers and men from Headquarters,Army Ground Forces, made an

informal visit to AGF patients at Walter Reed General Hospital. Reactions tothis and subsequentcalls were so favorable that the Army Ground Forces inFebruary 1945 obtained permission of theCommanding General, Army ServiceForces, to station an AGF liaison team of oneofficer and one enlisted man ateach general and convalescent hospital to assist Ground patients in mattersof pay, allotments,promotions,decorations,recovery of personal effects, andother personalaffairs.24

A PersonalAffairs Branch w as set up in the G-1Section of AGF headquar-ters to administer the newprogram. In addition,two officers were allottedto eachof the subordinatearmies, and one to the 1stHeadquarters and HeadquartersDetachment, SpecialTroops, Army Ground Forces, to inspect and report on the

22 AGF ltr to AGF LnOffs, 2 May 45,sub: Ln Pers of the AGF at WDPers Cens. 322/9 (AGF Ln Dets).23 Information furnished AGF HistoricalOfficer by Capt F. Docky, AGF AGSec, 28 Jan 46.24 (1) "History of MiscellaneousDivision, G-1 Section AGF." Prepared in November 1945 by Lt Col

P. J. Kopcsak,Chief of the Personal Affairs Branch,Misc Div, G-1 Section; this study will be cited hereafteras Hist of Misc Div. Files of Misc Div, AGF G-1 Sec. (2) AGF ltr to CGASF, 21 Feb 45, sub: AGF LnPers to ASF Gen Hospitals and Independent Convalescent Hospitals. With related papers. 322/1 (AGF

Ln Dets).

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liaison activities in their respectiveareas. In April 1945, eighty selected officersand eighty enlisted men, all of whom werecombat veterans,were assigned toHeadquarters,Army Ground Forces, and sent to the ASFSchool for PersonnelServicesat Lexington, Va., for a month of instruction in personal affairs guid-ance. By a special arrangementofficers of Headquarters,Army Ground Forces,gave orientation lectures to Ground liaison personnel attending thisschool. InMay 1945, 69 officers and 37 enlisted men, all of whom were graduates of theschool forpersonnelservices,were assigned to 63 general hospitals and 5con-valescent hospitals.In June liaison was extended to the 26Regional Hospitalsin the United States.To assist liaison staffs in accomplishingtheir missionthePersonal Affairs Branch of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, prepared amanual known as the Hospital Liaison SO P which incorporated data from thepersonal affairs course given atLexington, Va., and from War Departmentpolicies pertinent to hospitalizedand returned personnel.Liaison officers wereauthorized to supplement their staffs by selecting officers from ambulatorypatients to act as their assistants.All in all, 438 patients wereused as assistantsduring the period June through August.25

AGF liaison officers were busy people. They were called on for assistanceon questions ranging from marital difficulties to fleecings by used-car dealers.

It was not uncommon for their assistance to be invoked bypatients whoseprincipal need was thecompanionshipof a friendly listener. Because of theirservice in confessor roles, some of the liaison officers referred to themselvesasassistant chaplains.They were keptbusy with such problems as obtainingfullcredit for awards,decorations,and battleparticipation,since thepart played bythose items in computation of ASR scores madepatients particularlyanxiousto have them complete; location of baggage and personal effects delayed orlost in transit; conversion of insurance; adjustment of pay and allotments;securing of veterans benefits; and determination of the patient's status anddisposition. In June, July, and August 1945, liaison officers counselled 132,153AGF patients out of atotal of 510,297 AGF personnelhospitalizedduring thisperiod.

26

25 Hist of Misc Div. Files of Misc Div, AGF G-1 Sec.26 (1) AGF ltr (R) to CGsSecond and Fourth Armies and 1st Hq and Hq Dets, SpTrs, AGF, 12 May

45 , sub: Personal Affairs. 322/2 (AGF Ln Dets) (R) . (2) Personal observations of the AGFHist Off at theHospital Cen, Cp Carson, Colo, 29 Jun 45, and statement onthat date of Capt Paul W. Smith, AGF Ln Off

Hosp Cen, Cp Carson, to AGFHist Off. (3 ) Hist of Misc Div. Files of Misc Div, AGF G-1 Sec.

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Headquarters,Army Ground Forces,decided in July 1944 to place liaisonofficers at AGF-ASF redistribution stations.27 These, like the personnel centers,were War Department installationsoperated by the ArmyService Forces. Theywere established in thesummerof 1944 as aresultof GeneralMarshall'sexpresseddesire to provide recuperation and reassignmentfacilities for AGF and ASFreturnees comparableto those previously provided at his direction for AAFpersonnel. 28 The missionof the AGF-ASF redistributionstations as prescribed bythe War Department was "toobtain maximum utilization of personnel of theArmy Ground Forces and Army Service Forces returned to the United Statesfrom overseas stations forreassignment,by painstaking occupationaland physi-cal classification,mental and physicalreconditioning, orientation, reindoctrina-tion and reassignmentcarried on withouthaste in an environmentcharacterizedby mental and physicalrelaxation and comfort."

29

Redistributionstationssuperseded the WarDepartment Personnel Reassign-ment Centers created early in1944. Ground liaison staffs at these centers weretransferred to redistributionstations, and additional personnel was procuredfrom other sources asrequired by expansion of the redistributionsystem.30 Atthe peak of its growth this system consisted of six hotel-type stationsand twopost installations.31

Work of AGF liaison personnel at redistribution stations consisted largelyof greeting AGF returnees,advising them in the adjustment of their personalaffairs, answeringinquiries as to AGF assignment policies,and in sundry otherways seeking to impress uponthem the pride of the AGF commander intheirpast achievement and hisinterestin their future well-being.32

All returneesearmarked for service under the A r m y Ground Forces byredistribution station authorities wereturned over to AGF liaisonofficers, whoin turn referred them to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, (officers to G-1,

27 AGF M/S, G-1 to CofS, 8 Jul 44, sub: Ln Offs for AGF-ASF Redist Stations. 354.1/3 (Redist Sta).28 (1) Memo of Gen G. C. Marshall for Gen L. J. McNair, 12 Apr 44, sub not given. 354.1/1 (Redist

Cens) (C). (2) Cir303, WD, 17 Jul 44.353.02/666 (AGF).29 (1) WD memo (C) for CG ASF, 6 May 44,sub: Establishmentof Redist Cens. 354.1/4 (Redist Cens)

(C). (2) Cir 303, WD, 17 Jul 44. 353.02/666 (AGF).30 AGF M/S, G-1 to CofS AGF, 8 Jul 44,sub: Ln Offs at AGF-ASF Redist Stations. 354.1/3 (Redist

Sta).31 (1) ASF memo SPGAA 210.3 Gen (7 Aug 44)—300 for CG AGF, 7 Aug 44,sub: AGF and ASF

Redist Stations. 354.1/5 (Redist Sta). (2) ASF memo SPGAH 210.3 Gen (26 Feb 44)—300 for WD G-1,5 Mar 45,sub: Redist Stations.354.1/13 (Redist Sta).

32 Organizational and Functional Chart (as of 24 May45), AGF Ln Sec, Hot Springs, Ark. 354.1/16

(Redist Sta).

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enlisted men to theClassification and ReplacementDivision) for assignment.33

Officers of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, who visited the redistribu-tion

stations at Miami and Asheville in March 1945 reported that cooperationbetweenAGF liaisonofficers and redistribution stationpersonnelwas good. Theyfound deficiencies, however, in liaison administration:liaison personnelwerenot in sufficiently close touch with Headquarters,Army Ground Forces,toanswer adequately thequestionsput to them by returnees; and at Miami notall returning AGF officers were interviewed by the liaison staff. Steps weretaken to correct these deficiencies.34

On 19 May1945,G-1 of theArmy Ground Forces reportedthat the averagemonthly flow of AGF personnel throughall AGF-ASF redistribution stationsfor the previoussix monthshad been as follows:35

Ro tational Personnel 5,138Battle Casualties 1,409Casual Returnees 161Escaped Prisoners 11

TOTAL 6,719

In May 1945 the War Department suspended rotation of AGF and ASFpersonnel for all theaters.36 Because of this action and because it was deemedimpracticable to route the flood of individualsreturning from overseas in re-deployment through redistribution stations,steps were taken in thesummergraduallyto closedown AGF-ASF redistributionfacilities.37 On 25August1945the War Department ceased issuing orders directing personnel to hotel-typestations, in order to permit closing of these installationsby 15 October 1945.Army Ground Forcesrecommendedthat post-typestationsbe kept in operationuntil a later dateto processprisonersof war andlow-score hospitalconvalescents.38

33 (1) Ibid. (2) Statementof Maj Dwight F. Emmel, C&RD AGF AG Sec, 25 Jan 46.34 AGF mem o of G-1 forCofS AGF, 15 Mar 45, sub: Visit to AG and SF Redist Stations at Miami

Beach,Fla, and Asheville,N. C. With related papers. 353.02/988 (AGF).35 AG F M/S (S), G-1 to CofS, 19 May 45, sub: Redist Cens. 354.1/1 (Redist Cens) (S).36 Memo of WD G -1 for MPD ASF, 21 May 45, sub:Redist Stations. 354.1/17 (Redist Sta).37 (1) AGF memo for CofS USA, 19 Mar 45, sub: Redist Stations.354.1/13 (Redist Sta). (2) AGF

M/S, C&RD to G-1, 24 May 45, sub: Redist Stations.W ith relatedpapers. 354.1/17 (Redist Sta).38

M/R, Enlisted Div G-1 Sec AGF, 21 Aug 45, sub not given. 354.1/18 (Redist Sta).

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Administration of Liaison Activities

Until the spring of 1945 liaison personnel at allinstallationswere assignedto the Replacement and SchoolCommand. Withthe extension of liaison activi-ties in April and May1945, it wasdeemed advisable to centralizeadministrationof liaison personnelat Headquarters,Army Ground Forces.To this end, orderswere issued in Aprilassigningall liaisonpersonnelto that headquarters.39

In May 1945 a liaison personnel control division was established in theGroundAdjutantGeneral'sSection to coordinate supervision of liaison activitiesand to exercise administrative control over liaison personnel. This divisionassigned liaison officers and their assistants,issued periodic letters ofinformationfor their guidance,and collectedand processedreports oftheir activities.Promo-tions, efficiency ratings, and other administrativedetails were coordinated withinstallationcommanders.40

Contactwith liaison activitieswas maintainedby occasionalvisits of Head-quarters officers to the field and by personal and official correspondencewithliaison officers.41 As previouslynoted, immediatesupervision of liaison officersat hospitalswas delegated tosubcommands.

At its peak the liaisonsystem was an extensiveestablishment.Shortly after

V-J Day AGF liaison officers at ports, personnel centers, redistributionstations,and hospitals, all ofwhom were carried on the roster of Headquarters,ArmyGroundForces,aggregated337—40percent of the totalcommissionedpersonnelassigned to that headquartersat the time andslightly more than twice the totalnumber of officers on duty at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, at its incep-tion in March 1942. 42

39 AG F M/S, AG Pers to C&RD, 13 Apr 45, sub:Asgmt of AGF Ln Offs. With related papers. 210/21(AGF Ln Offs).

40 (1) Hist of Misc Div. Files of Misc Div, AGF G-1 Sec. (2) AGF ltr to Ln Offs, 3 May 45, sub:Admin of AGF Ln Pers.322/6 (AGF Ln Dets).

41 (1) For correspondencesee the following files:210 (AGF Liaison Offs)322 (AGF Liaison Dets)354.1 (Redist Sta)354.1 (Personnel Cens)

(2) For reports of inspection see 353.02 (AGF). (3) AGF Info ltrs are filed in 300.6 (AGF Info Ltr) ( R ) .42 (1) Roster of Officers assigned to Hq AGF, 31 Mar 45.330.3 (AGF). (2) See AGFHistorical Section,

A General History of the Army Ground Forces. The number of officers initially assigned to Headquarters,

AGF, in March 1942 was 164.

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IV. Redeploymentof

"D" Division

Note: "D" Division is ahypotheticalunit whose experienceis detailed tosummarize the impact of redeployment policieson units selected for the finalassault on Japan, after a period of rest and retrainingin the United States.Forthe sake ofdefiniteness and accuracy the experience of areal unit, the 5th In-

fantry Division,was used as aguide in tracing the course of redeployment.Butmaterials from other sources have beenincluded to round out the narrativewhen thesematerials were consideredrepresentative.1

The end of hostilities inEuropeon 8 May1945 found "D" Divisionholdinga line in Czechoslovakia near the Austrianborder. On 24 May the divisionassumedoccupationaldutiesin thevicinityof Passau in Bavaria.

Shortly after V-E Day the division began to transfer out men having ASRscores of 85 and above, selectingfor earliest removal those having the highestscores. Replacementswere requisitionedby MOS, but this was of little availon account of the depleted conditionof available replacement stocks;losses

1 The account of the Redeploymentof "D" Division, unlessotherwise indicated in subsequent referencenotes, is based mainly on the followingsources:

(1) Interviewby the AGFHistoricalOfficer (on dates indicated)of the following:Brig Gen A. D.Warnock, Asst Div Comdr, 5th Inf Div, 20 Nov 45.Col W. M. Breckinridge, CO 10th Regt, 5th Inf Div, 5 Feb 46.

Lt C ol R. C. Dickens,G-3, 5th Inf Div, 5 Feb 46.Lt Col V. M. Thackeray,G-2, 5th InfDiv, 5 Feb 46.Lt Col M. L.Rosen, Asst Liaison Officer, New York Port of Embarkation,6 Feb 46. (Colonel Rosen

witnessed the redeploymentprocessing of the 5th Division at the New York PE.)(2) Status Report on 5th Inf Div (prepared by Hq 3d Army, ETO) dated 12 Jun 45.319.1/51 (R).(3) AGF memo (R) of Maj L. A.Twomey for ACofS G-3, 10 Sep 45, sub: WD IG Inspections. Withrelated papers. 353/836 (Readiness) (R). (4) Second Army ltr, Asst G-4 to G-4, 23 Aug 45, sub: Function-ing of Automatic Supply for Redepl Tng Units, Cp Campbell, Ky. 333.1/221 (2d Army) (Sep binder).(5) ETO ltr (C) AG370.5 OPGC (49) to CGs 12th Army Group, etc, 16 Jun 45, sub: MovementOrders,Shipment 10197. Files of G-3 Mob Div (C). (6) Newspaper report of arrival of 86th Infantry Division,New York Times, 18 Jun 45. (7) Colonel Breckinridge, Lt.Col. Thackeray, and Lt. Col. Dickens read thepresent narrative in draft form and accepted it as representative in general oftheir experience in the rede-ployment of the 5th InfantryDivision.

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were replenishedby such odds and ends as reinforcementdepots happenedtohave at hand. By the middle of June the division hadlost about 1,800 men. On16 June 3,700 moremen, all having ASR scores of 85 or above,were sent toanother division,a unit which was to bereturned to the United States for in-activation,in exchange for anequal number of low-scoremen. This broughtthe total number of losses betweenV-E Day and 20June to 5,500.Early in Julythe division commander was informed that his unit was entitled to credit fortwo additional campaigns. This required the release of about 600 more men,bringing total losses in Europe to 6,100. Officer losses between V-E Day andreassemblyin the UnitedStatesaggregated103.

These losses stripped the division of most of its keyspecialistsand noncom-missioned officers. Replacements receivedfrom another division,while usuallyfurnished inequivalentMOS's, fell far belowthe menwhoseposts theyinheritedin grade, experience,leadership,and general"know-how." Unit headquartersfrom division to company were virtually swept cleanof experienced clerks,leaving to novices the keepingof records and theperformanceof other admin-istrativefunctions at a time when these activities, in view ofimpending redeploy-ment, were ofparticular importance.For example,in the first round of dischargethe G-3 Section of DivisionHeadquarterslost two master sergeants of more

than two years' experiencein their currentduties,and in asecond round ashorttime later had togive up a staff sergeantwith similarqualifications.These menwere replaced by T/4's and T/5's, none of whom had had more than twomonths' experience in thetype of work required of them in their new positions.

Field artillery, engineer, signal, and service elements of the divisionwerehardest hit by the turnover, for these units, by virtue of their relatively lowcasualty rates, had a much greaterpercentageof high-point men than the regi-ments. Becauseof the nature of their duties, they alsohad a considerablyhigher

proportion of technicalspecialists. Release of menhaving 85 or more points tookaway 91 percent of the quartermastercompany, 86 percent of the ordnancecompany,77 percen t of the signalcompany,and 71 percent of thefield artillery,as against37 percentof the infantry.

Serious as itwas, the loss in experience andtechnical proficiencywas not asdamaging to the division as theinjury done to teamworkand esprit de corps bythe turnoverof personnel.With more than a hundred of its veteran officers andalmost half of its battle-seasonedmen replaced by newcomers,and with many

of the remainder having joined onlya short time before V-E Day, the division

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as it stood at the threshold of redeployment training was a team only in name.So disruptive,indeed,was the turnover that the divisioncommanderestimated,

on the basis oflosses suffered prior to departurefor the port of Le Havre, thataminimumof four months' trainingwould be requiredbefore the division couldbe well enough integrated to operate efficiently on the field of battle.

On 25 May thedivision received warning that it was to be movedfromEurope in July. Immediatelyit began shedding excess equipment accumulatedby one means or another during its long period of combat service. On 13 Juneit relinquished its occupationalduties to another division and beganpreparingtrucks and other organizationalequipment for delivery to supply depots inFrance, since orders from higher headquartersdirected that movementfromEurope was to bemade with minimumessential equipmentonly.

On 16 June orderswere receiveddirecting immediatedispatch to theUnitedStates of an advanceparty of 42officers and 144 men topreparethe way for theremainderof the division.2 The ordersspecified that the party was to includetheassistant divisioncommander,representativesfrom the generaland special staffsections, and 1officer and 7 enlisted menfrom each of 20 "provisionalbattalions"into which units of the divisionwere groupedfor housekeepingpurposes; of the7 enlisted men, 4 were cooks,1 a 1st sergeant,1 a mess sergeant,and 1 a supply

sergeant.3The advance party sailedfrom Le Havre on 27 June and arrived at Camp

Shanks, New York Port of Embarkation, on 5 July. As the ship steamed intoNew York harbor it was boarded by the AGFPort Liaison Officer (a colonel)and his first assistant (a lieutenant colonel), both veterans of ETO, who ex-tended greetings and welcome for the Commanding General,Army GroundForces, and briefly oriented the assistantdivision commander and keymembersof the party in their mission. Two questionswere uppermostin the minds of

the group: (1) where is the division to bestationed, and (2) how long atraining period will it have. The liaison officer specified Camp Campbell asthe station but was indefiniteabout the training period; under the pressure ofquestioning, he ventured "one or two months" as a guess—a statement that inview of their knowledgeof the personnel situation was mostdisturbing to theadvance party. When the assistant division commander inquired about the

2 WD ltr (C) AG 370.5 (4 Jun 45) OB-S-E SPMOT-M to CGs ETO, AGF, ASF, 8 Jun 45, sub:Return of the 5th Inf Div to the U. S.370.5/1 (5th Inf Div) (C).

3 ETO ltr (S) AG370.5 OPGC (49) to CGs 12th Army Group, etc, 16 Jun 45, sub: MovementOrdersShipment 10197. Files of G-3 MobDiv.

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training program,the liaisonofficershowed him AGFTraining MemorandumNo. 1—the basic directive prepared several months before for guidance in re-deployment training. 4 This was the first copy of the document that anyonein the division hadseen, but since the liaison officer had no other he was notwilling to part with it. Only after his arrival at Camp Campbell amonth laterdid the assistantdivision commander obtaina copy of this directive.

The assistantdivision commandergave such information as was currentlyavailable about the division's personnel,equipment, and training status to theliaison officer, who passed it on to SecondArmy, the headquarterscharged withsupervising the redeployment training of "D"Division.The value of the infor-mation waslimited considerablyby the fact that the divisioncontinued to losepersonnelafter departure of the advancegroup from Europe.

Following a brief processing at the staging area, members of the advanceparty went in groups to reception stations,whence they proceeded individuallyon a 30-day furlough to their respective homes orother pointswhich they chosefor recuperation.

The advance party, reassembling at Camp CampbellAugust 10-12, im-mediatelylaunchedpreparationsfor the arrival twoweeks laterof the remainderof the division. This was a time of unrelenting activity, save only for a brief

pause on August 14 to celebrate V-JDay. One of the most pressing tasks wasthe sorting of three truckloads ofmail, official and personal, thathad accumu-lated during the recuperationperiod. Awaiting disposal also were several hun-dred telegrams addressedto officers and men of thedivision.The principalactivi-ties were checking withpost authorities on the status of supplies;drawingand unpacking of essential equipment, which current directives required tobe shipped to camp ahead of thedivision; keepingof morningreports;inspectingbarracks;preparing food for the advance group; and setting up messes for themain body of thedivision.

Post authorities and the 13th Headquarters and Headquarters Company,Special Troops, Second Army, assisted in the preparations; nevertheless,activitieswere hinderedby an inadequacy ofpersonnel—particularlyof driversand clerks—and adeficiencyof transportation. Manpowerwas sosparse,indeed,that officers of the advanceparty had to drive trucks,and the assistant divisioncommanderfound it necessary personally todelve into the mountain of mailbags in search ofessentialtrainingdirectives.

4 See AGFHistorical Section,Redeployment

Training,Sec.

I.

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A fundamental source of difficulty was the composition of the enlistedelement of the advanceparty. Drawing,checking,and conditioningof supplies

and equipmentproved to be themost important responsibilityof the advancegroup; only a few of themembers, however,were supplypersonnel,and becauseof the turnoverresultingfrom release ofhigh-pointmen a large portion of thosefalling in supply categories were inexperienced in their duties. One of theconsequencesof this circumstancewas that equipmentand supplymatterswerenot in good shape when the main body of the division arrived in camp. Theexperienceat Camp Campbellindicated that it would have been better to havesubstitutedsupply personnelfor some of the cooks in the advanceparty. Cookscould have been borrowed from local agencies, but supply personnel provedunobtainablein anythinglike the numbersrequired.

In the meantimethe divisionproper,which the advance partyleft in Bavariain mid-June,had troubles of itsown. Shortly after turning over its sector toanother division on 13 June, "D" Division, whichup to that time had beencompletely absorbed in occupational duties, attempted toinitiate a programof training. But the continual screening of personnel and thepacking anddelivery of organizationalequipment to remote and scattered depots were sodistracting as to limit training largely to drill, lectures on military courtesy,

orientation discussions, and physical-fitness exercises. Even in these subjects,trainingwas scanty.

Between 23 and 28 June the division moved to anassembly areaat CampSt. Louis. Here small arms and other nonorganizationalequipment not to betaken on shipboard by individualswere turned in for equivalent itemsalreadypacked for shipment.Here also an attempt was made to resume training,butwith disappointingresults. In fact, at no time during the two monthsspent inEurope after V-E Day was thedivision ableto participatein anythingworthyofthe designation of redeploymenttraining, as the term was understood in theArmyGround Forces.

On 4 July the division started moving from Camp St.Louis to the stagingarea at Camp LuckyStrike.Here it wasnecessaryto make out a second shippinglist, as the staging area commanderrequired a different procedure from thatprescribed for thefirst listingby thebase sectioncommander;at port the laboriouslisting had to bedonea third time,because the port commanderfollowed a formdifferent from that used in the first two instances.Preparation of the list wasthe more onerous on account of the dearth of experiencedclerks in the division.An attempt was made tocheck Form 20's and other individual recordsat port,

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REORGANIZATION FOR REDEPLOYMENT501

but results, mainlyon account of lack of experienced clerks,left much to bedesired.

Movement to the staging areawas completed on 7 July, and to port fourdays later. The first ship, carrying an infantryregiment, left Le Havre on11July; three other transports, two of which carried a regiment each, and thethird of which carried the field artillery and miscellaneous elements, sailedduring the following week.

Congestion andpoor facilities madethe passage unpleasantfor most of thedivision. One of theregiments, less fortunate than the other units,was trans-ported on a boat which had been seriously damaged on D Day by a mine andwhich had been pressed into redeployment service without adequaterehabili-tation. The ship had some 3,300 men on board; but it was equipped to bunk onlyabout 2,700,and itsmessingfacilities providedfull accommodationat one sittingfor no more than 250.The men were served two hot meals a day, but hot foodwas limited to stewed and boiled items, as kitchens were not equipped forbaking or frying; cooks were unableto prepare fresh bread of any sort duringthe eight-day voyage.But personnel generally borethe privations without com-plaint, mainly because home,with comfortable bedsand plentiful food,layat the end of thejourney.5

Activities on all theships were greatly restrictedby lack of space. An or-ganized programof physical exercise,for example, was not even attempted.One essential matter attended to on theship, which Redeployment Regulationscontemplated would be completed much earlier,was the breakdown of per-sonnel into reception-station groups. The main reasons for the postponementwere the disruption and confusion causedby turnoverof personnel, absorptionin other duties,and lack of informationas to procedure.

The three boats transportingthe regiments reachedNew York duringthe period July 19-21; the ship carrying the artillery wentto Boston, arriving27 July . Experiencesof the division fromthe time of entering home portandarrival at the assembly areamay be summarizedby following the activitiesof"R" Regiment. The boat carrying this regiment arrivedin New York Harboron 19 July. As the ship steamedup the bay a small craft laden with WACmusicians and dancers cameout to escort it to the pier. The returning soldiershailed this reception with a thunderous tumult of shouting and whistling andprolonged wavingof caps. After the cheering subsidedan official receptionparty consistingof representativesof the New York Port of Embarkation and

5 Statementof Col W. M.Breckinridge,CO 10th Regt,5th Inf Div to AGFHist Off, 8 Feb 46.

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the AGF liaison detachment went aboard (Ground liaison representativesnumbered5—3 officers and 2 enlisted men). Both the senior port officer andthe AGF liaison officer, the latter speakingfor theCommandingGeneral,ArmyGround Forces,broadcast a"Hello, Welcome Home!" over the ship'samplifyingsystem, after which they assembled key officers for a short orientation con-ference. At this meeting port authorities outlined high points of processingthrough the staging area, and the AGF liaisonofficer oriented the group as totheir activitiesafter arrival at receptionstations.The liaisonofficer was swampedwith questions aboutfurloughs,pay, clothing, ration coupons,training programs,and similar details.Returnees noted with approval the cooperative attitude ofthe liaison representatives, butlater they expresseddisappointment that answersto their inquiries were notmore definite and complete.

After the conference the liaisonstaff moved about ondeck for a while,extendinggreetings and answeringquestions,and then left the ship to preparefor meeting thegroupsat the piers and in thestaging area.

When the transportdocked, the men debarked by units inaccordancewithinstructions issued at the conference.After a brief stop on thepier for coffee anddoughnuts they proceededto trains which took them to CampShanks, one ofthe staging areas for the New YorkPort of Embarkation.On arrival atCamp

Shanks they threw their duffle bags on trucks and marched to theaters—atrainload to a theater—wherethey were greeted by port and liaison representatives.The AGF liaisonofficer addressed thereturneesas follows:6

FELLOW SOLDIERS:

The Army Ground Forces, which trainedmost of you and watched withpride andadmiration your magnificent achievementsoverseas, is happy to see you back and wantsto do everything it can to makeyour return home pleasant. GeneralStilwell, commandingthe Army Ground Forces, has sent me to give his personal greetings to all of you. TheGeneral has assigned Army Ground Force representatives to this area, and to the receptionstation to which you will go from here, with a specific mission—to help you get homequicker, to help you with your problems, and to absorb some of your gripes.

Here at Camp Shanks we are in BuildingX.You can easily recognize us by ourArmy Ground Force Shoulder Patch, and our

AGF name card.We are not magicians, but we're willing to try almost anything to give a hand.

Whether you need us or not, welcome home. And the best of luck to you all.

6 Incl 2 to ltr of ColJohn E. Adkins, AGF Ln Off NYPE to Lt ColLouis H. Coxe [undated, but about

25 Jun 45], sub not given. 322/219 (AGF Ln Dets).

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Following the theater meeting the returneeswere directed to their barracksand then to mess halls wherethey were served "steak with all the trimmings."After this surfeiting, the men were issued oneclean suitof summer clothing—a welcomeexchangefor the woolen clotheswhich they wore on thehomewardvoyage—and assembled into reception station groups of about twenty-fivepersons, inaccordancewith the breakdownaccomplishedon shipboard.Withintwenty-four hours of debarkation the returneeswere boarding trains for theirrespective receptionstations.

Excepted from the groups orderedto reception stations were organizationdetachments (usually oneofficer and one enlisted man per detachment)fromeach regiment, each artillery battalion, and each of theother principal com-ponents of the division, who were sent directly from port to Camp Campbellwith unit records deemedessentialto planningfor the administrationand train-ing of the division after its reassembly.When the records had been depositedwith responsibleauthorities atcamp, membersof the detachmentsproceededdirectlyto their homeson furlough.

Processingof the main body of the division at the reception stations wasrapid and smooth.7 One incident of the processingwhich brought considerablegrief to officers of the division was theseparationfrom the service bypersonnel

centers of scores of high-point men who had indicated a desire to go with thedivision to the Pacific; a large portion of those released were men of RegularArmy backgroundholding key positions intheir units.To make mattersworse,the divisioncommander was not informed of the separations. As late as 17 Oc-tober 1945 the division reported to Second Army that it was still carryingon itsrolls the names of 335 men who did notreport to duty after their recuperationfurlough and that "it was thought that they were discharged" at receptionstations.8

V-J Day cameduring the recuperationfurlough.Partly becauseof this fact,the assemblyof the men atCamp Campbellextended overan unduly long period.

Trains coming intocamp were met bymembersof the post personnelandthe division's advance party, who by means of loud speakers and placardsdirected returnees to unit assembly areas (one area for each of the three regi-ments, one for the artillery, and one for miscellaneousorganizations), where

7 See the precedingsection, "AGF Liaison at War Department and ASFInstallations."8 5th Div ltr to CG Second Army, 17 Oct 45, sub: Disposition of EM. With related papers. 220.3/1

(5th Div).

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they were brokendown into companies orother groups and were headed fortheir respectivebarracks.

Training was initiated on 5 September, butbecause of prevailing circum-stances theprogramwas greatlyrestricted.As previouslymentioned,the equip-ment situation left much to bedesired:some items, including 57-mm. gunsandgeneral-purposevehicles,had not beenreceivedby post authorities. Otherswerenot availablefor use because of theinabilityof the advancedetachmentand localagencies to get them unpacked and incondition.Uncertaintyas to the missionof the unit was also a hindering factor. Division authorities made persistentinquiries of higher headquartersas to modifications of the basicredeploymenttraining directive,but replies wereperforce indefinite.A third deterrent wasthe continuous turnover of personnel which came with the further loweringof points after V-J Day. The attitudeof men remainingin the division was notconducive to effective training. Those anticipating discharge had little heartfor any sort of training and low-pointmen wereunfavorablydisposed towardsa program whichhad patentlybeen designed for ashootingwar in thePacific.

In view of thesecircumstancesit was decided torestrict training,until thingssettled down, largely to athletic games and firing exercises. The menliked toshoot, and shoot they did for days upon end. Not until 1946 did conditions

becomesufficientlystableto permitlaunchingof a balancedprogramof training.

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Glossary of Abbreviations*

AA AntiaircraftAAA AntiaircraftArtilleryAAF Army Air Forces

A/B AirborneAFHQ Allied ForceHeadquartersAG(C&RD) AdjutantGeneral (Classificationand ReplacementDivision)AGF Army Ground ForcesASF Army ServiceForcesASR Adjusted serviceratingASTP Army SpecializedTraining ProgramAT AntitankETO European Theaterof OperationsFA Field ArtilleryGHQ GeneralHeadquartersMG MachinegunMOS Militaryoccupationalspecialty [specification serialnumber]MP MilitarypoliceMTO MediterraneanTheaterof OperationsMTOUSA MediterraneanTheaterof Operations,U. S.ArmyMTP MobilizationTraining ProgramOPD Operations Division[War DepartmentGeneralStaff]POM Preparation for OverseasMovementQM QuartermasterRM ReadjustmentMemorandumROTC ReserveOfficers' Training ProgramRR ReadjustmentRegulationRTC Replacementtraining center

*See alsoWar Department,Dictionaryof UnitedStates ArmyTerms (TM 20-205).

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SOP Standing operatingprocedureSOS Servicesof Supply

SSN Specificationserial numberSWPA SouthwestPacific Area [Command]TB Troop BasisT/BA Table of Basic AllowancesTD Tank destroyerT/O Table of OrganizationT/O&E Table of Organizationand EquipmentWAC Women'sArmy CorpsWD War DepartmentWDGS War DepartmentGeneralStaffWPD War PlansDivision [War DepartmentGeneralStaff]

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5. It was addressed to the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters (CofSGHQ), on 23 September1941,and discussed the trainingof the 1stDivisionand

supporting Army unitsfor amphibious operations.6. At GHQ theletter was filed with a groupof relatedpapers, all numbered

1, in the training file (353/1) under the cut-off heading "AmphibiousForce,AtlanticFleet (AFAF)." The entire file is or wasclassified Secret.

At all times theclassificationindicated is that given to thedocumentwhenissued: (S) forSecret, (C) forConfidential,and (R) for Restricted.Reclassifica-tion of documents, a continuous process accelerated sincethe termination ofhostilities, has not been takeninto consideration. Theclassificationof informa-tion in the textthat has been derivedfrom classified documents hasbeen removedby authority of the Commanding General,Army Ground Forces, or of theWar Department.

The file symbol at the end of thenote is given only as an aid to furtherinvestigation.It shows where the document, or. acopy of it, was locatedwhenlast consultedby the authors in late 1945.When this symbol is not preceded bythe initials of a War Departmentoffice, as in the example given above,it refersin the first study ofthis volumeto the files of GeneralHeadquarters,U. S.Army,maintainedby the Adjutant General of that headquarters;in all other studies,to the records of the Army Ground Forces. When the symbol is preceded by"AGO Records," it means that the documenthas been consulted in thefiles ofthe Adjutant General's Office of the War Department.In the case of documentsoriginating in neither General Headquarters, U. S. Army,nor the Army GroundForces, the original file symbolhas generallybeen incorporated in the title, andthe location at the time of consultation has been indicated at the end of thecitation.

The following list of the types of documentsused in the footnotes isadded

to assist the reader unfamiliarwith War Departmentand Armyusage:AR. Army Regulations are issued by the War Department andinclude

basicpoliciesand rules for the governingof the Army.They have the force andeffect of law to theArmy.

FM . Field Manuals are official handbooks containing information andinstructions for guidance intraining and in the operation and maintenanceofmateriel andequipment.

Cir. Circularsare more temporarydirectives issuedby the War Department

or specific headquarters.War DepartmentCirculars maylater be incorporated

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GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES 509

into Army Regulations.Even less permanentinstructionsare frequently trans-mitted as memorandaor letters,addressed respectivelyto all or aselectedgroupof agencieswithin a command.

GO. General Ordersincludeannouncementsof official acts of the Secretaryof War or thecommanding officer of aheadquarters.

Bull. Bulletins contain matter which is informativeor advisory in nature.They are usually employed fortransmittinglegislative or executiveactions ofimportanceto theArmy.

Memo. The memorandum form of correspondenceis normally employedwithin a headquarters for the transmittal of orders,advice,or information.Theterm "memorandum" is also used for thepublicationof instructionsin place of

circulars (see above,Cir.). In this case the memorandumis cited in the footnotesas a memo of the agency in question,for example,"WD memo."

Ltr. The letter form of correspondenceis used for the transmittalof orders,advice, or information betweendifferent headquartersor field agencies.Whenthe term "letter" is used in place of circular, the documentis cited as "WD ltr,"etc. (see above, Cir.). Personal letters, whenconsulted, areindicated as such.

Ind. An indorsement is used as a reply or forwarding note to a militarycommunicationand is added to the original communication.

M/S. A Memorandum Slipis used for informal interoffice communication.WD D/F. The War Department DispositionForm is the cover sheet forthe routingof a staff paper and maycontaininstructionsor comments.For moreinformaltransmittal Dispositionor RoutingSlips areused.

Telg, Rad, TWX. These refer respectively to telegrams,radiograms,andteletype messages. Usually no subject matter is indicated. Radre is used toindicate replies to radiograms("reference your radiogram").

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BibliographicalNote

The studies in this volume are based almost entirely on documents. Noprevious study of GHQ has been published. The AGF Command has beentreated in What You Should Know About Army Ground Forces,1 written byCol. Joseph I. Greene, editor of theInfantry Journal, to meet the needsof readersas yet unfamiliar with the 1942 reorganization. After the death of GeneralMcNair in July 1944the New Yorker, in its issues for 14 and 21October 1944,publisheda "Profile"writtenby CWO E. J.Kahn,Jr., then a memberof thestaffof Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. In revised form this was brought outas a little book entitledMcNair: Educator of an Army,2 which included thefirst general account of the activitiesof the Army Ground Forcesto the date ofGeneralMcNair'sdeath.A more extensiverecord of the functions and achieve-

mentsof that command,coveringthe wholeperiod of the war, is to befound inArmy Ground Forces, Report of Activities,3 submitted to the Chief of Staff bythe Commanding General,Army Ground Forces,10 January 1946.The twolast-named publicationswere based in part on materialscontained in draft studiesof the history of the Army GroundForces, prepared by its Historical Section,six of whichare publishedin thepresentvolume.

Research for the studies in this volume was devoted principally to thepapers in the central records files of GHQ andAGF, maintainedby the Adju-

tants General of those headquarters.This research was supplemented whennecessary by resort to the files of the staff sections of Headquarters,AGF, ortheir divisions,or to the central or staff section files of the War DepartmentGeneralStaff.

The central files of GHQ and AGF, maintained to furnish the basis forcurrent staff and command action, presenta remarkably completerecord of the

1 W. W. Norton and Co., New York, 1943.2 Infantry Journal, Washington, 1944.

3 Published by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICALNOTE 511

operations and decisions of the two commands, of the steps leading to theirdecisions, and of the information onwhich decisions were based. In general,the central records inboth cases contain the following types of documents:

1. Carbon copies ofletters,memoranda,and messagesdispatchedfrom thetwo headquarters.

2. Drafts of such letters,memoranda,or messages,often annotatedby hand,which were not used or were issued in arevised form.

3. Originals of staff memoranda or memorandum slips circulated onlywithin the headquartersstaff, and usually bearing dated notes or commentsofthe staff officers concerned,the Chief of Staff, or the CommandingGeneral—invaluable for tracing the course of a discussion and the ideas and influences

that werebrought to bear on adecision.4. Originals of letters, memoranda,or disposition forms addressed to the

headquarters byother agencies of the War Department or by coordinate orsubordinateheadquarters.

5. Copies of papers received at the headquarters for information, con-currence,or action.

6. Carbonsor typed copies ofpapers originatingelsewhere,receivedby theheadquarters for action, and returned to the sender or indorsed to a new

addressee.7. Mimeographed directives, generally letters,issued by The Adjutant

General, GHQ, or Headquarters, AGF, or the armies and other subordinatecommands.

In the papers relating to a given course of action most or all of thecategorieslisted above will be found. The central files also contain staff studies,the reports of boards responsibleto the headquarters,and annotated drafts oftraining circulars,manuals, and the likesubmitted to the War Departmentfor

approval.In the records of both headquarters the papersrelating to a certain courseof action were filed together in a group. Each paper in the group was given thesame number. This appears after the diagonal following the file classificationsymbol, for example, 320.2/135 or 335/9 (S). The series of related papers inthe group may cover a considerable period of time and in such cases oftenbreaks the chronologicalsequenceof the papersin a given binder of the generalseries within which it appears.But within each binder the groups arearrangedin chronological orderin accordancewith the dates of the basic papers through

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which the course of action was initiated. In general,each group contains, if notthe documents themselves,clues to the documents neededfor a study of the

action.Such records of staff sections of Headquarters, AGF, or their subdivisionsas were consulted in the preparation of the history orwere believed by theHistorical Section to be of possiblevalue for further research,and which werenot in the central records, have been transferred as far aspracticable to theHistoricalRecordsBranchof theAdjutantGeneral's Office. Includedwith theseare memorandaof the interviews conductedby the historical officers. NeitherGHQ nor Headquarters, AGF, was an officeof record.Before their centralfileswere transferred to the Adjutant General's Office, mimeographed lettersissuedby the War Departmentor its major commandsfor general distributionwereby order screened out of the records.Also removed were the cross-indexsheetswhich had originallybeen inserted to facilitatereference forstaff use. A referenceto the papers removed canusually be found by using the listing sheets on theface of each of the series ofbinders into which the papers in a given classificationare assembled.These sheets listthe individualpapersoriginallycontained in thegroups described above.The date ofeach paper appears in a separatecolumn.These dates are not in exact chronological order but are ofassistance in finding

a paper the date of which is known, and are often the only practicablemethodof findingsuch a paper.

The bulk of the central records ofboth headquarters is to befound in itsGeneral Correspondencefiles. Each also kept files for subordinate commands,for example,the Armored Command or theThird Army. In addition the recordsof GHQ originally included files for base and defense commands,representingits operational responsibilities. Undereach of these categoriespapers were filedin the appropriate decimalclassifications,for example,320.2 (for papersrelatingto organization and strength), or 353 (for papers relating to training). Withineach of these classifications"cut-off" series appear for important subjects, forexample, 353 (Training Directives), or 353 (Air-Ground). The listing sheetson the binders of the general series furnish referencesto all papers in thecut-offseries.

The classifications richest in material for the history of both headquartersare 320.2 and 353 and their various cut-offs. They contain half or more of therecords of primary historical or administrativesignificance. Together thesetwo series constitute the nearest approach to a master or policy file of both

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BIBLIOGRAPHICALNOTE 513

commands.In addition, the Records Division of the Adjutant General,AGF,collected in a Policy File copies of papers regardedby that office as definingthe policies of the Command. While useful as an initial guide, this series isnot asubstitutefor researchin the320.2and 353series.

Besides these two important series, files likely to repay research regardingthe centraldevelopmentand mainpoliciesof GHQ and AGF are thefollowing:

210 —Officers311 —TelephoneConversations314.7 —Histories

319.1 —Reports319.1 —(OverseasObservers)333 —Inspections337 —Conferences352 —Schools353.01—Training Directives353.02—InstructionVisits354.1 —RTC's354.2 —Maneuvers381 —War Plans461 —Publications

To assist further research,certain characteristicsof the two sets ofcentralrecords may bementioned.First, both headquarters,in filing papers receivedfrom outside, assigned theirown file numbers irrespectiveof the file numberswhich these papersmight already bear. Second, the central recordsof AGF

are, in general, in much better order than thoseof GHQ, which had to dependon a small and untrained Records Division working under the pressure ofemergency and rapid expansion. Someconfusion resulted. Furthermore theDivision resorted to a certain amount of improvisation,and some scatteringof related papers resulted. To curb the rapidly increasing bulk of certainseries, new files were opened or the old broken down into subheadings.Thedispersion was controlled,but only in part, by cross-indexing.

One unconventionaldevice usedby GHQ tocontrol bulky series mustbementioned. In certaincases in which the papers in agroup w ithina classification

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series became numerous, the group was put in aseparate binder and the papersin it were assigned an additional number. Theresult was such designations as320.2/158/27 and 353/27/14 (C).

A student desiring to trace a specialor technicalquestion in either the GHQor AGF recordswill find the followingprocedurehelpful:

1. Locate, in the alphabeticalsubject index to the file manual, the decimalsymbolthereassigned to thesubject.

2. Consult this number in the records.3. Work by cross reference,or by means of the listing sheet on the face of

each binder, to other parts of the records which were givendifferent decimalclassifications.

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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes havebeen published or are in press:

The War DepartmentChief of Staff: Prewar Plans and PreparationsWashington Command Post: The Operations DivisionStrategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945The Army and Economic MobilizationThe Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground ForcesThe Organization of Ground Combat TroopsThe Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service ForcesThe Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western HemisphereThe Framework of Hemisphere DefenseGuarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in thePacificThe Fall of the PhilippinesGuadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in PapuaCARTWHEEL: The Reduction of RabaulSeizure of the Gilberts and MarshallsCampaign in the MarianasThe Approach to the PhilippinesLeyte: The Return to the PhilippinesTriumph in the PhilippinesOkinawa: The Last BattleStrategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the WestSicily and the Surrender of ItalySalerno to CassinoCassino to the Alps

The European Theater of OperationsCross-Channel AttackBreakout and PursuitThe Lorraine CampaignThe Siegfried Line CampaignThe Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

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The Supreme CommandLogistical Support of the Armies, Volume ILogisticalSupport of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East TheaterThe Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India TheaterStilwell's Mission to ChinaStilwell's Command ProblemsTime Runs Out in CBI

The Technical ServicesThe Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for WarThe Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to FieldThe Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in CombatThe Corps of Engineers: Troops and EquipmentThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against JapanThe Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United StatesThe Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of InteriorThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

TheatersThe Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for WarThe Ordnance Department: Procurement and SupplyThe Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and BattlefrontThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IIThe Quartermaster

Corps:Operations in the War Against

JapanThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against GermanyThe Signal Corps: The EmergencyThe Signal Corps: The TestThe Signal Corps: The OutcomeThe Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and OperationsThe Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and SupplyThe Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special StudiesChronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945Rearming the FrenchThree Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and SchmidtThe Women's Army CorpsCivil Affairs: Soldiers Become GovernorsBuying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air ForcesThe Employment of Negro Troops

Pictorial RecordThe War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan

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IndexAbbeville,France, 389Activation

and shippingcapacity, 222-23deceleration, 207-08divisions, 199, 209, 231policy in 1943, 222-23

Activation ScheduleAGF policy, 207-08, 223defined, 196-97difficulties, 239serviceand combatelements, 256

Adjusted service ratingcritical score, 442, 490, 496-97loss of high-point men, 497

service score plan, 442-43AdjutantGeneral,The, 104, 269,397, 442Adjutant General's Section

AGF, 495GHQ, 12, 25

Advance detachments, 448-49Advance Unit Training Center, 415Africa, 89-90, 116. See also North Africa.Air. See also Air Corps; Air Force Combat

Command; Army Air Forces; GHQ AirForce.

relation to rest of Army, 99-100, 107-08under GHQ, 2, 6, 12, 99-127, 138-41

Air base security battalions, 209Air Corps, 2, 57, 64, 99, 115, 117, 134, 387

growth, 210organization of air districts, 117parachuteunits, proposed assignment,93size in 1941, 199transportplanes, 94-95

Air defense,305. See also Antiaircraftdefense.continental U. S., 33, 116-27, 135-38in overseas theaters, 418, 420, 422-23

Air Defense Board, 125Air Defense Command, 116-24Air districts, 16, 117, 119Air Force Combat Command, 72, 100,107, 126,

134, 140and defense commands,16and GHQ, 26, 19n, 107-08, 135-41supersedesGHQ Air Force, 100, 122

Air forces, 115-16, 119-23, 288. See also ArmyAir Forces.

Air ForcesFirst, 123, 140Second, 123Third, 106, 123Fourth, 123Royal (British), 112

Air groups, 108-10Air observation, 102, 113Air power

Allied, 190American,217, 392German, 432

Air reinforcements,base commands, 140-41

Air Staff, 100Air support of ground forces, 99-114, 256

and armored elements, 62, 389doctrine, 101-14tests, 102-10, 412

Air Support Board, 108-09Air supportcommands, 102-14Air Support Command,5th, 112Air support party, 114Air Support Section, Air Force Combat Command,

19, 26, 107, 126Air training, 99-100Air transport,94-96Airborne Center, 269, 409-10

Airborne Command,340, 402AGF policy, 390-91airborne training, 402, 405redesignated Airborne Center, 409service board disapproved,402

Airborne divisions,213, 340-41, 344, 346, 349,392, 394, 411

as task forces, 278, 340conversion to infantry recommended, 177creation recommended,96-97enlargement proposed, 349number reduced forredeployment,450Tables of Organization,341, 349tactical organization,341

Airborne Divisions82d, 98, 341, 344101st, 98, 341

Airborne Infantry Battalion, 550th, 98Airborne infantry brigades, 358Airborneoperations, 339, 343, 346, 377, 412Airborne training, 93-98, 346, 402, 405, 409-10Airborne units, 167, 340-41, 358, 411-12

mobilization,93-94organization and training, 93-101

Aircraft warning service, 117, 124Aisne River, 389Alaska, 16, 22, 23, 28, 29, 201Alaska Base Command, 20Alaskan Defense Command, 23n, 132

authority of GHQ, 129nreinforced byGHQ, 28Alcan Highway, 219Allied Force Headquarters, 430Allies

air strength, 190naval strength, 190

Americal Division,189 nAmerican ExpeditionaryForce (1917-18), 5, 128,

192Ammunition,34, 271, 285

allotted to GHQ control, 19increase recommended,221

AmphibiousForce, Atlantic Fleet, 86-89relation to GHQ, 32, 87unity of command, 91-02

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AmphibiousForce,Pacific Fleet, 32, 86, 91relation toGHQ, 32, 86unity of command, 91-92

Amphibiousoperations,339, 343-44, 346, 377Amphibious training,26-27, 85-92

Cape Henry, 89, 91Columbia River, 90Fort Devens, 89Fort Lewis, 38New River, 87Pacific Coast, 90Panama, 85

AmphibiousTraining Center, 92AmphibiousTraining Command, 340Amphibioustroops, 167Andrews,Brig. Gen. Frank M., 101, 103Antiaircraft Artillery, 125, 152. See also Coast

Artillery.Antiaircraft artillery, 12, 210, 289, 292, 356-57,

390, 394-95allotment of strength, 226as antitank guns, 75-77, 79as auxiliaryfield artillery, 420, 430-32, 434assignment to divisions,295-96, 329, 351coordination with pursuit aviation,123-27economy proposed, 237friendly planes shot down, 412, 420-21in defense commands, 100-01, 117in interceptor commands,100-01, 124in maneuvers,nopooling, 295-96, 351program cut, 230rapid expansion, 392, 418, 423reduced

inredeployment,

453requested for armoredcorps, 62training, 403, 418-23Troop Basis, 178-79, 191-92, 217value as offensive weapon, 392

Antiaircraftartillery battalions,341, 392,414assignmentand training, 413-16inactivated, 223, 238organic assignment proposed, 472

Antiaircraftartillery brigades, 358Antiaircraft Command,269, 403, 409

AGF policy, 390-91antiaircraft training, 405, 419-23assignmentof AAA units todivisions,472officers exchanged with theaters, 422-23overhead, 219powers and responsibilities,397, 405, 408transfer to AAF proposed, 421

Antiaircraft defense. See also Air defense.control, 124Greenland, 28view of Chief of Coast Artillery,125

Antiaircraft Force, 397Antiaircraft Section, GHQ, 25Antiaircraft training, 403

advanced, 414-16by Antiaircraft Command, 405, 419-23difficulties, 409, 418-19in theaters, 422-23

tests, 422

Antiaircraft training—Continuedtransfer to AAF proposed, 418, 420-21with fighter aviation, 420

Antiaircraft Training Center, 32Antiaircraft troops, 176-77, 423Antiaircraftunits, 395, 397, 413, 415,432Antitank artillery, 74-84, 295. See also Anti-

tank guns; Tank destroyers.Antitank battalions, 75,81-82, 424. See also

Tank destroyer battalions.activated under GHQ, 82-83divisional,77, 81-82provisional, 78-80, 403requested for armored corps,61-62tactical employment, 80-81

Antitank companies,301-02changesproposed for redeployment,455, 462-63retained in infantry regiment, 77-79

Antitank conferences,77-80

Antitank defense, 295, 305, 307, 322, 378, 412,423-26Antitank doctrine, 39, 73-75, 83-84Antitank Force, proposed, 77, 82. See also Tank

Destroyer Center.Antitank groups, 75Antitank Groups

1st, 262d, 263d, 26

Antitankguns, 73-79, 289, 305, 322British, 389faulty employment,33French, 389successful use in maneuvers, 60-61towed vs. self-propelled, 73-79, 424-27

Antitank mines, 74, 75, 80,322, 389Antitank organization, 78, 81-82Antitank training, 403-08, 410-11, 428, 433Antitank units, 12, 82-83. See also Antitank

battalions, companies, groups; Tank destroyerbattalions.

Anzio, Italy, 469Ardennes, Battleof, 215, 243,348Armies, 104, 107, 265, 270, 278, 282, 298,351-71,

375, 381-82. See also Field armies; Fieldforces.

Armies. See also First Army, Second Army, etc.First, 3, 22, 43, 66, 364First Allied Airborne,364Second,3, 43-45, 80, 96, 102, 364Third, 3, 43-46, 364, 371Fourth, 3, 43, 80, 96, 364Fifth, 326, 363Sixth, 363Seventh, 363Eighth, 364Ninth, 364Tenth, 364Fifteenth, 364

Armored arm,considered, 62-67Armored army, considered,62-67, 279Armored artillery, 409

Armored Board, 410

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INDEX 521

Armored Center, 269, 410. See also ArmoredCommand; ArmoredForce.

Armored Commandarmored training, 405, 409-10, 415

field artillery training, 431redesignated ArmoredCenter, 410supersedes Armored Force, 408tank-infantry cooperation, 41 7

Armored corps,297, 337, 370, 404abolished, 409, 415organization, 61-62, 67-72

Armored CorpsI, 43, 56, 60, 66-67, 70, 111, 279, 404II, 61-62, 69-70, 279III, 371

Armored divisions, 9, 57, 278, 282, 286, 294,319-35, 357, 390, 392, 404, 411,423, 433

antitank defense against, 74combat commands,323, 328number reduced, 393-94organization,68-70, 72, 323, 326-32, 333nproportion recommended 1941, 53readiness for combat 1941, 51, 59-60reduction recommended, 177-78, 223relation to infantry, 217, 333-34reorganization March 1942, 68strength, 192, 323, 332supply problem, 332tank-infantry ratio, 323-24, 327, 332training, 409, 415

Armored Divisions1st, 59-60, 77, 81, 326, 329, 4692d, 59-60, 77, 106, 3263d, 59, 66-674th, 59, 62, 66-679th, 207

Armored field artillery battalions,327-28Armored Force, 6, 52, 56-72, 268, 277-79, 319,

370, 397, 417, 424air-support tests 1941, 104-07allocation oftanks, 397, 404armored army proposed, 64-67autonomousdevelopment,57-67, 72, 203General McNair'sviews, 65-66, 69-71headquarters and headquarters company, 61,

67, 71-72organization,61-72overhead, 219powers restricted, 404proposed authority over antitankforce, 81-82redesignated Armored Command, 40 8relation to GHQ, 12, 25, 58-61status as "arm," 56-57, 62-68strength,268-69, 323, 327, 397, 402training, 57-61, 396-97, 402-03, 405under AGF, 152, 390-91

Armored Force Board, 57ArmoredForce Officer CandidateSchool, 57Armored Force Replacement Training Center,

57, 68Armored Force School,57Armored forces. See also Tanks.

air support, 389

developmentpromised, 389

Armored forces—ContinuedFrench,417German, 389, 417vulnerability,389, 423-24, 429

Armored groups, 328Armored infantry, 323Armored infantry battalions,324-25, 327-29, 378,

404, 409Armored infantry regiments,329, 331Armored ReplacementTraining Center, 410Armored School, 345, 410Armored training, 57-61, 396-97, 402-03, 405,

409-10, 415Armored units,416Arms, 2, 22, 32. See also Cavalry; Coast Ar-

tillery; Field Artillery; Infantry; Quasi arms.AGF policy, 390-91, 433-34and Antitank Force, 75-77and Armored Force, 62-64

boards, 2branch spirit, 154compared with quasi arms,396, 430cooperationwith GHQ, 22, 32reorganization, 153schools, 2

Army Air Forces, 98, 288-90, 390-91, 393, 397.See also Air Corps; Air Force CombatCom-mand.

adjusted service rating, 443advocatesWD reorganization,148-49, 153and Antiaircraft Command, 420-21and army and corps organization,353antiaircraft training,403, 409, 418-19, 423apportionmentof strength, 197, 213assignment ofpersonnel 1944, 250autonomy, 72, 99, 122-23, 136-38, 141, 149change of status 1942, 153command groups, 485demand for inductees, 202division of functionswith GHQ, 19, 134-40doctrine of operationalcontrol, 125-27liaison with GHQ, 19, 26rapid expansion,200, 210, 214, 257recruitment of cadets, 200reduction considered, 231reduction in Zone of Interior personnel, 240-41responsibilitiesin defense commands,16, 125-27shipping space for, 286strength in two world wars, 191strength recommended1943, 216-17transfer of strength to AGF and ASFproposed,

237transport planes, 341Troop Basis strength, 165, 172-74, 179, 191,

254understrength,208

Army Amphibious Training Center. See Am -phibious Training Center.

Army corps. See Corps.Army headquarters, 167Army Industrial College, 2Army Service Forces, 269, 290. See also Services

of Supply.

apportionment of strength, 197.

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INDEX 523

Bermuda Base Command—Continuedestablishmentof U. S.garrison, 27operational plans,20

Boards, of arms and services, 2, 397, 402, 410-11

BOLERO plan, 281n, 286BombardmentWing, 17th, 106Bomber command, 119Bomber planes

B-29, 173, 231development, 222, 231in test sector exercise, 124offensive of 1943, 229relation to artillery, 234requested for armored corps, 62under air support commands, 11 2

Bonesteel,Maj. Gen. Charles H., 27Boston, Mass., 501Bradley,Maj. Gen. Omar N., 363, 427Branch immaterial replacement training centers.

See Replacement training centers.Branch training, 405, 41 2Brereton, Brig.Gen. Lewis H., 106Brigades

airborne infantry, 358cavalry, 65, 358, 371field artillery, 79fixed brigade abolished,280, 355, 358organization of new, 358, 378

British Armyand invasion of western Europe, 256antitank guns, 389armored organization,64, 325, 329at Singapore, 198

demobilization experience,440early tank development, 56in Middle East, 112, 198tanks destroyed,79

British bases, 16, 130British garrisons, 27British Guiana, 20British Isles

GHQ commandof U. S.forces, 22, 140-41GH Q planning, 20reinforced by GHQ, 29

Bruce, Maj. Gen. Andrew D., 390, 402, 424-25,427, 430

Chief of Planning Branch, G-3 WDGS, 78Commanderof Tank Destroyer Center, 78-79

Bryden, Maj. Gen. William, 66Budget, Director of, 216

Cadres, 197, 199-200, 202, 405, 419demonstration, 42for new units 1940, 4, 10General McNair 's training plan, 53

California-Arizona ManeuverArea, 22 9Camp Campbell,Tenn., 498Camp Hood, Oreg., 415Camp Lucky Strike, 500Camp Pickett, Va., 44 8Camp St. Louis, 500Camp Shanks, N. Y., 498Canadian-U.S. PermanentDefense Board, 133

Cannon companies,286, 302, 317added to infantry regiment, 282changes proposed for redeployment,455, 460-

63, 476

Cape Henry, 89Carib amphibious force,26-27Carib Operation, 87-88Carib Plan, 86-88Caribbean area

authority of GHQ, 22-23, 129ndefense commands, 16task forces, 85-86

Caribbean CoastalFrontier, 23CaribbeanDefense Command, 22, 232-33

air plan, 141assignment to GHQ considered,28plans drawn by GHQ, 27plans submitted by, 20reinforcements, 29

Carolina maneuvers, 43-46air support, noantitank tests, 26, 80-81Armored Force tests, 60-61directed by GHQ, 25-26

Cassino, Italy, 178, 234, 236Casualties

European theater,243infantry divisions, 190, 193

Cavalry, 268, 278, 325, 336, 357, 358, 387AGF policy, 391development, 210faulty employment in maneuvers,34mechanized, 11, 213, 308, 337, 352, 356, 371,

397, 403, 415organization, 2reconnaissancetroops, 466relation to GHQ, 12, 25Russian, 336tank unitstransferred to Armored Force, 56training, 402-03

Cavalry brigades, 358, 37 1Cavalry Brigade, 7th Mechanized, 65Cavalry corps, 379Cavalry divisions, 278, 33 6

activated before 1940, 9antitank units inactivated, 83inactivation, 177, 189 nincrease unwarranted, 389

mechanizationopposed, 392readiness for combat 1941, 51reorganization as light divisions proposed, 344

Cavalry Divisions1st, 336, 3472d , 189n, 207, 227, 245, 336

Cavalry reconnaissancesquadrons, 292, 331, 337,365, 376-77

Cavalry regiments, 371Cavalry School, 466Cavalry units, 167, 337Central America, 22Central DefenseCommand

created, 119

relation to GHQ, 21n

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Chaffee, Brig. Gen. Adna R.and Armored Force tests, 59Chief of Armored Force, 56Commanding General I Armored Corps, 56urges autonomyof Armored Force,64-67

Chain of Command,GHQ, 20, 133Chaney, Maj. Gen. James E.

commander AirDefense Command, 116-17view on air defense, 119-25

Chaplains, 25, 312Chemical mortar battalions, 468Chemical mortar units

defined as combat troops, 167Troop Basis allotme ntto AGF, 166

Chemical troops,352, 365Chemical Warfare Section,GHQ, 26Chief of Air Corps, 94. See also Chief of Army

Air Forces.Chief of Armored Force, 58-59, 64, 67, 77, 105,

268-69, 319, 397Brig. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, 56Maj. Gen. JacobL. Devers,57, 111proposed authority, 65-67

Chief of Army Air Forces. See also Arnold, Maj.Gen. Henry H.

relation to GHQ, 19, 122-23, 126, 134-41, 143,147

view on authorityof GHQ, 148-49, 153Chief of Cavalry

in reorganization of WarDepartment,150opposed to autonomy of ArmoredForce, 62view on antitank organization, 77

Chief of Coast Artilleryantitank conference, 77in reorganization of WarDepartment, 150view on antiaircraft defense, 125

Chief of Engineers, 133Chief of Field Artillery

in reorganizationof War Department, 150parachute unit, 97view on air observation,111view on antitank organization,77-79

Chief of Infantry, 54, 67, 78air-support tests, 105antitank conference, 77authority over parachuteunits, 94, 97combat team doctrine,41in reorganization of War Department, 150

opposed to autonomyof ArmoredForce, 62Chief of Naval Operations, 87Chief of Ordnance,97, 444Chief of Staff, GHQ. See McNair, Lt. Gen. Les-

ley J.Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 5, 356. See also

Marshall,Gen. George C.; Office of the Chiefof Staff.

Chief Signal Officer, 125China, 256, 344Chinese divisions, 344Christiansen, Maj. Gen. James G., 151, 471Citizen Army, 34. See also Selective Service.Citizens' Military Training Camps, 2

Civil War, 440

Civilian Component, GHQ, 13, 26Clark,Maj. Gen. Mark W., 109, 126, 200

Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, 31, 90directs Louisiana maneuvers,26, 31, 45

view on functionsof GHQ, 31Classificationand ReplacementDivision,AGF, 446,494

Coast Artillery, 268, 419,427AGF policy, 391growth, 203, 210organization, 2view on airdefense, 125

Coast artillery, 124, 357. See also Antiaircraftartillery.

Coast Artillery Corps, 12Coast Artillery Section, GHQ, 126Coast artillery units

converted to field artillery, 238curtailment, 176defined as combat troops, 167

Columbia River, 90Combat arms,2, 22, 32,62-63, 152-54. See also

Arms.Combat aviation

and GHQ AirForce, 99, 139not available in 1941, 116

Combat commands, 323, 328Combat engineers, 309, 323, 331, 356, 377, 415,

42 8Combat support, 168Combat teams,11, 280

airborne, 97faulty employment,33, 41

Combat troops, 286, 290, 351, 373analysis of strength, 165-77apportionment,196decline in rate of growth,209-10large reserves in 1943, 252percentageof ground strength in,226-27proportion in two world wars, 191reduction opposed by General McNair,226-27requirement reduced, 229-30strength, 239, 252summaryof Troop Basis 1942-46, 254

Combat units, 167Combat zones, 288, 290, 351Combined Chiefs of Staff, 393Combined training,267, 333, 371, 376, 391, 396,

411-17AGF directives,414-17an d quasi arms, 40 5antiaircraft units, 412-16, 418-23armored units, 67conferences, 412, 416-17difficulties, 411-12, 415-16, 421, 433GHQ directives, 54, 58importance, 39-40infantry divisions, 412, 415organization,411-17responsibilityof corps commanders,415-16tank battalions, 410-11, 413-17, 431-33

tank destroyer battalions,413-17, 431-33

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INDEX 525

Command and General Staff School, 2, 53, 74commanded by GeneralMcNair, 6courses for divisionalofficers, 36, 38

Command post exercises, 9, 40, 51Command problems, GHQ, 22-23CommandingGeneralof the FieldForces,99Committee on Revision of the Military Program,

225Communicationszone, 9, 166, 352, 356Companies,360

antitank, 77-79, 301-02, 455, 462-63cannon, 282, 286, 302, 317, 455, 460-63, 476decontaminating, 62engineer, 331, 365headquarters,25, 62, 301, 311-12, 317heavy weapons,301, 460, 47 6medical, 309, 358, 365military police, 458, 46 6ordnance,265, 310-11, 365, 467, 478

ordnance maintenance,21 3quartermaster,68, 311, 317, 338, 365, 466radio intelligence,167rifle, 238, 301, 460service, 301-02signal, 167, 310, 377, 467tank, 462-63

Control Division,AGF G-1 Section, 442Corps, 61-62, 79, 82, 265, 270, 273, 278, 282,

298, 351-71, 375-76, 380-82, 396and air transportcommands,111-12, 114and combinedtraining, 413, 415-16, 433and four armies, 40, 65-66artillery, 365, 376functions, 265, 360, 365, 381-82

headquarters,359-63, 375, 380-82maneuvers, 10, 51, 103tests, 104training, 10, 34, 51

Corps. See also Armored Corps.III, 70, 347-48IV, 43, 96, 105-06VI, 70VII, 95VIII, 371XIX, 371

Corps areasand defense commands, 117-19and RTC's, 37cooperationwith GHQ, 32in mobilization, 3-4responsibility forsupply, 8separated from field armies,6-9, 115

Corps headquarters,167Corps of Engineers

on staff of GHQ, 12organization,2relation to SOS, 152

Corps troops, 355, 360, 370Counter Intelligenceofficers, 27Crete, 95Critical score. See Adjusted servicerating.Criticism

of Army by soldiers, 47

of GHQ organization,144-46

Criticism—Continuedof theory of JointAction, 91-92of training, 42of 1940 maneuvers,33-34

Critiques, 43-46Culebra, 85Curaçao, 27Czechoslovakia,496

D Day, 501"D" Division, 496-504Decontaminating company,62Defense commands, 16, 115-27, 418, 445

and reorganizationof War Department, 150authority, 116-17aviation, 100-01relation to GHQ, 9, 19-20, 139

Demobilizationby individuals, 441by

units, 440in Civil War, 440in World War I, 440

Demobilization Regulations, 439, 441. See alsoReadjustment Regulations.

Demonstrationcadres, 42Denmark, 1.Dental officers, 467, 479Depots, 292Desert Training Center, 70, 340, 397, 404, 413Destroyer-basedeal, 16Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.

and motorized division, 324Chief of ArmoredForce, 57, 69in North Africa, 296

view on air support, 111-12view on armored corps, 70view on mechanizedtraining, 402view on pooling, 295-96

Devers-Greenslade Board, 130Discipline. See Training.Dive bombers, 424

Army, 106German, 73Navy, 106

Divisional troop schools, 35Divisions, 266, 270, 273, 276, 289, 363, 396, 413,

433. See also Airborne divisions; Armoreddivisions; Cavalrydivisions;Infantry divisions;Motorized divisions.

activation, 199, 209, 231all overseasin early 1945, 250-51antitank battalionsin, 82as combat teams, 41comparison in twoworld wars, 192creation of new, 51-53deceleration of overseasmovement, 220distribution in Troop Basis, 171-73economy of T/O's, 176experimental, 336-50jungle, 341-42light, 223, 342-49, 377losses, 190maximum battleeffectiveness,193

mobilization ofnew, 199

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INDEX 527

Field artillery—Continuedfaulty employment, 33increase in medium andheavy recommended,

178

parachutes,tests,

97ratio of divisional to nondivisional, 233replacements in 1944, 24 6requested for armored corps, 62responsibility for antitank battalions,81-82training of units in ArmoredForce, 56-57

Field artillery battalions, 230, 304-05, 317, 47 6Field artillery brigades, 79, 358Field Artillery School, 430

conference on coordination,416-17training, 431

Field artillery uni tsdefined as combat troops, 167transferred to Armored Force, 56

Field forces, 32, 37, 66, 69,102, 139, 408, 413, 433

and GHQ Air Force, 99in Harbord Plan, 128in 1940, 2-4mobilization,5separated from corps areas, 115

Field Manuals1-25, Air Defense, 126, 42018-5, Tank Destroyers,42631-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces,

26, 104, 113-14100-10, Administration, 308, 379

Fighter command. Se e Air Defense Command.Filter boards, 124Finance Section,GHQ, 26Fire power, 268, 271Firing batteries, 304First Allied Airborne Army, 364First Army, 22, 66

and training offield forces, 3maneuvers, 43

Flanders, Battle of, 64Flexibility,279-80, 327-28, 339, 353, 355, 359-60,

364, 372, 374Fort Benning, Ga.

air-ground tests, 39, 95air-support tests,103, 105conference on air support, 412conference on infantry division,45 6conference on teamwork,412, 416-17faulty combat team doctrine, 41parachute units, 94

Fort Bragg, N. C., 42Fort Knox,Ky., 42, 58,319, 402, 409, 416

air-ground tests, 109armored organization, 63, 68

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 2, 12, 36, 42, 50Fort Lewis, Wash., 38, 42Fort Meade, Md., 83Four-armyplan of 1932, 7, 9-10Fourth Army

and trainingof field forces, 3maneuvers, 43

France, 1, 76, 101American troops 1918, 7

plans for invasion, 246

France—Continuedrelief for U. S. troops, 250situation in 1918 and 1942-45, 193sudden collapse, 73U. S. divisionsin World War I, 189

Frazier, Col. L. H., 269nFredendall,Lt . Gen. Lloyd R., 363, 425n, 42 7French Army, 220

armored organization, 64early tank development,56

G-1 Division, WDGSand Armored Force, 61-63antitank measures, 82reclassification of officers, 50reorganization of War Department, 144view on Source Major Force plan, 445

G-2 Division, WDGSand air support, 112and Armored Force, 62antitank measures, 76defense planning, 116"Evaluation of Modern Battle Forces," 388-89

G-3 Division, WDGSand activationof units, 197, 206, 212and air support, 103-04and amphibious training, 91an d Antiaircraft Command, 42 0and Armored Force, 58, 62-71antitank measures,76-77defense planning, 125drafting of Troop Basis, 231economy of manpower, 219, 237

equipment fo r redeployedunits, 45 0favors reduction of divisionalstrength, 20 6opposes curtai lmentof service un its,206proposes light divisions, 34 4proposes understrength of units, 200reorganization of WarDepartment, 144responsibility for Troop Basis, 163revision of T/O's, 287, 314, 317view on Source Major Force plan, 44 5view on tank battalions,470-71

G-4 Division,WDGSand Armored Force, 63antitank measures, 82control of logistics, 8, 90reorganization of War Department, 144, 147

G-1 Section, AGFdemobilizationstudies, 44 0liaison with W ar Department, 442readjustment regulations,446

G-3 Section, AGFdemobilizationstudies, 439-40favors light division, 342readjustment regulations,44 6represented on Reduction Board, 288

G-4 Section, AGFliaison with ASF, 48 5represented on Reduction Board, 288

G-1 Section, GHQorganized, 12

planning functions, 21

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G-2 Section, GHQdefense planning, 116functions, 21organized, 12

G-3 Section, GHQorganized, 12planning functions,21, 26

G-4 Section, GHQorganized, 12planning functions,21

G-5 Section, GHQobserves amphibious training, 89-92organized,29

Galveston,Tex., 90Gasser, Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D., 219General Council, War Department. See War

Department General Council.General Staff, War Department. See War De-

partment General Staff.German Army, 11, 39, 56, 430

air power, 432air-tank team, 388armored divisions, 73, 417armored forces, 60, 64, 322, 324-25, 329, 389equipment,11ground forces, 190infantry, 277, 389invasions, 85, 93, 94-95, 101, 215, 225, 243,

423-24number of divisions, 213task forces, 353

Germans, 79Germany

air offensive against, 208surrender, 193, 484

GHQ AirForceair-support tests,102-07and four air forces, 119-22command group, 65organization, 99responsibility fordefense, 117, 124superseded by AirForce CombatCommand,122

GHQ AirSection, 102GHQ antitankbattalions, 424GH Q Aviation

in mobilizationplan, 6responsibilityfor defense, 16

GHQ Diary, 21GHQ Minutes

plans and operations. 21status of GHQ, 150-51

GH Q Reserve,279, 280, 353, 355GH Q Reserve Group, 61GHQ Staff. See also Roster, GHQ officers.

in 1940, 12-13reorganization andexpansion, 24-26

GHQ tank battalions, 58, 326GH Q training directive, 1940, 34-35GHQ Umpire Manual, 44

amphibious training, 89Aviation Supplement, 109

Giles, Col. Benjamin F., 28Gillem,Maj. Gen. Alvan C., Jr., 332

Glider troopsinfantry regiments, 340-41training and organization, 93

Gliders, 96

Great Britain. See also British Army.air warfare, 116, 125, 225faced with invasion,1lease of Atlantic bases to U. S., 16position in Egypt, 201relief of garrisons in West Indies,27troops replaced in Iceland, 16use of American serviceelements,201

Green, Maj. Gen. John A., 390, 422Greenland, 28, 132Greenland Base Command

air reinforcement, 140established underGHQ, 23operational plans, 20

Griswold,Maj. Gen. Oscar W., 60Ground Rules, 276-77, 298Groups

air, 109antitank, 26, 75armored, 328battalion-and-group system,356-58, 378parachute,32, 94-96replace separate regiments, 355-57

Gruber, Brig. Gen. EdmundL., 36

Haislip, Brig. Gen. Wade H., 155nHandwerk,Lt. Col. Morris C.

air defense manual, 126test sector exercise, 124

Harbor defenses, 117Harbord Boardplans for GHQ, 115, 142, 143, 146, 149report of 1921, 5, 17, 128, 146

Harmon,Maj. Gen. Ernest N., 326, 329Harmon Board, 326Hawaii,12n, 94,189n

amphibious trainingproposed, 90authorityof GHQ, 23, 28, 129n

Hawaiian Department, 28Hays, Lt. Col. George P., 145Headquarters, 359-63, 375

army, 263, 359-63, 381corps, 263, 359-63, 375, 380-81division, 311-12, 317special troops, 318

Headquarters companies, 301-02, 311-12, 317Headquarters Company, GHQ, 25Heavy artillery, 289, 394. See also Field artillery.

and bombers, 222increase for 1944, 233-34increase recommended,178, 221, 223, 226program 1942-44, 232units inactivated, 227

Heavy ponton engineer battalions, 68Heavy weapons companies, 301, 460, 476Hospitals

AGF liaison, 491-92evacuation, 292, 309

strength absorbedin, 211

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INDEX 529

Housingavailablefor NationalGuard units, 10relation to activation, 223shortages, 37, 220

Howard,Maj. Gen. Edwin B., 104Hunter LiggettMilitary Reservation,Calif., 347

IcelandBritish troops replaced,16GHQ responsibilities,27-28Indigo Force, 27

Iceland Base Commandair reinforcement, 140operational plans, 20

India, 344Indigo Force, 27Infantry, 67, 167, 268, 327, 357-58, 387, 395,

418. Sec also Infantry divisions.AG F policy, 391

air-support tests,104-05airborne, 358antitank battalions,80-82apportionmentof troops to, 196armored, 323-31, 378crisis in replacements, 245curtailmentof nondivisionalunits, 176, 179-80growth, 210importance emphasized, 388-90in support of tanks, 60infantry-artillery team, 388, 390infantry-tankratio, 323-24, 327, 332motorized, 323on staff of GHQ, 12, 25organization, 2rifle companies,238tank units transferred,56training in Armored Force, 57volunteers, 238

Infantry Airborne Battalions88th, 95550th, 95

Infantry battalions, 282, 300-01changes proposed for redeployment,460training, 51

Infantry Battalion,3d (9th Division), 96Infantry divisions, 265, 282, 286, 294-95, 300-

318, 325, 333, 337, 339, 344, 392, 394, 433.See also Divisions.

activated before 1940, 9.activated in 1943, 228-29and armored corps, 70antitank defense, 76-77armament, 300-07, 313-14, 317basic instrumentof warfare, 388-90, 395changes proposed for redeployment,450, 454-82compared to armored divisions,333-34decrease recommended, 223dismemberment,217faulty employmentin maneuvers,33light divisions, 223personnel reduction,313readiness for combat in 1941, 51-52square converted to triangular, 11-12, 12n,

271-72, 277, 283, 294, 322, 352

Infantry divisions—Continuedstrength, 277, 282-83, 300, 318, 376stripped for replacements, 201-02, 245-46training, 54, 412, 415-17

Infantry DivisionsAmerical,189n1st, 85-86, 89, 91, 3152d, 4773d, 85, 90, 92, 190n, 483n4th, 190n, 277, 337-39, 4775th, 4966th, 2777th, 2778th, 2779th, 90, 92, 190n24th,189n25th, 189n27th, 12n30th, 36, 20131st, 20132d, 12 n

33d, 20134th,12n, 46936th, 190n, 339, 45637th, 12n38th, 20140th, 20142d, 22 845th,190n65th, 22871st, 347-4882d, 34188th, 46989th,

34890th, 277Infantry regiments, 300-04, 317, 341

ammunition supply,285-86changes proposed forredeployment,455, 460,

464, 476four-regiment divisionproposed, 482-83in effect a small division, 307

Infantry Regiments5th, 34514th, 34518th, 33987th, 345135th, 469168th, 469

Infantry School, 402, 416air-liaison section recommended, 464SOP for motor movement, 339upgradingof officers recommended,474-75view on tank company,462-63

InspectionsAntiaircraft Command,405, 408, 419Armored Force, 59-60, 405, 408, 410combined training, 405, 408, 413maneuvers, 45Tank DestroyerCenter, 404-05, 408, 410

Inspector General,The, 422and reclassificationof officers, 50report on Louisiana maneuvers, 45

representative atGHQ, 26

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Integrity of units, 41, 55Intelligenceunits, 460, 482Interceptor command, 119, 125, 126. See also

Air Defense Command.Interceptor commander, 100-01, 124, 127Invasion, cross-Channel,281, 286, 288, 334-35,

340early plans for, 201postponed, 208, 214, 256-57, 393

Italian campaign,323, 428, 432Italy, 1, 234, 236, 336

Japan, 128, 256, 439Japanese Army

forces in Manchuria, 190limited diet of troops, 206number of divisions, 213threat to Dutch Harbor, 29

Joint action, 91-92

Joint Army-Navy Board. See Joint Board.Joint Boardprocedure, 145training plans, 27, 86

Joint Chiefs of Staffdemobilizationplan, 441mobilization policy, 198procurement plans, 215, 220

Joint Strategic Committee of the Army and Navyamphibiousoperations,26-27defense plans, 88

Joint Training ForcesFirst, 86-87Second, 86-87

Judge AdvocateGeneral Section,GHQ, 26Jungle divisions, 341-42Jungle operations,343, 377Jungle training, 342

Kingman, Lt. Col. Allen F.view on air support, 112view on antitank defense, 77-78

Krueger,Lt. Gen. Walter E., 49

Large-unit training, 39, 40-41, 51-52Leadership, 33, 35, 48-51Lear, Lt. Gen. Ben

assumes command of AGF, 244redeployment plans, 44 2

Lee, Maj.Gen. William C., 390Commander AirborneCommand, 98CommanderProvisionalParachute Group,94recommends airborne divisions, 96

Le Havre, France,498, 501Lend-Lease, 147Lend-LeaseAct, 16Lentz, Brig. Gen. John M., 296

view on nondivisional organization, 414view on tanks as field artillery, 430

Lexington,Va., 492Leyte, 451Liaison

AGF officers, 491-94, 498between A GF andASF, 484-94

detachments,486-87

Libya, 76, 79Light BombardmentGroup, 3d, 106Light BombardmentSquadron,15th, 106Light bombers, 62Light divisions, 342-49, 377

fluctuation in plans, 177increase recommended,223

Light Divisions10th (Pack, Alpine),345, 347-4871st (Pack, Jungle),345, 347-4889th (Truck), 345, 347-48

Litter bearers, 303-04Logistics. See also Supply.

as factor in growth of Army, 214authority withheld from GHQ, 8base commands, 133General Malony's view, 130-31problem in 1942, 392

Losses. See also Casualties.

by attrition in AGF units, 20 7in European theater, 243shipping,214to aviationcadet program,200-02

Louisiana maneuvers, 43-46. See also Carolinamaneuvers; Maneuvers.

air-support tests, 108-10directed byGHQ, 25-26, 31

Lucas Board, 234Luftwaffe, 116Lynd, Col. William E.

air-support tests,106-09Chief of Air Support Section, 19nreport on readiness of airforces, 99test sector exercise, 124

Lyttleton, Sir Oliver, 112MacArthur, Gen. Douglas

Chief of Staff in 1932, 3view on functioning ofArmy, 3nview on jungle training, 342view on light division, 344-45view on organic tank battalions, 471-72, 471n

MacLean,Lt. Col. Allen D., 288nMaintenance

of equipment, 271, 282-84, 309-11, 365, 379-80of 90-division Army, 244-251

Maintenancebattalions, 32 3Maintenanceofficers, 282-83Malaysia, 339Malony, Maj. Gen. Harry J., 26

directs command and planning functions GHQ,21-22, 25, 32

on Munitions AssignmentBoard, 152nview on amphibious operations, 87-88, 91view on mission of GHQ, 28n, 31, 130-31, 145,

150-52Manchuria, 190Maneuvers, 54, 68, 347-48, 413, 416 , 431. See

also Carolina maneuvers; Louisiana maneu-vers.

airborne, 95-96amphibious, 85-92army and corps, 9-10, 51-52, 103

criticism, 33, 43

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INDEX 531

Maneuvers—Continuedfield armies, 40-43Regular andNational Guard Units, 3use of antitank guns,75use of armored units, 58-61

Manpower, 35, 290 , 303, 315 , 319, 372. Seealso Strength of Army.

and activationof units, 223as factor in growth of Army, 214crisis in 1942, 206-07cut in ground combat forces, 173-80distribution in two world wars, 190-93economy policies, 195, 219-20estimates, 163-65in foreign theaters, 243-44in 1943, 213, 221-23lack of economy 1942-43, 252ratio of assignment, 257redeployment plans, 499

shortages, 412transfers to AGF, 237Manpower Board, 219Marine Corps, 257

amphibious operations, 27liaison officer at GHQ, 26relation to Joint Training Forces, 86-90

Marine Divisions1st, 862d, 86

Maritime Commission, 215Marshall, Gen. George C., 3, 6, 38-39, 49, 53, 64,

90, 140, 418and ground combat strength, 255authority over Army AirForces, 134delegates training toGHQ, 32-33, 142demobilization plan, 44 1directiveson air support,101, 141emphasizes moraleand discipline,47-50influence on antitank organization, 78policy on age of GHQ officers, 12proposes liquidation of ASTP, 248supervision of Army, 128view on Armored Force, 66-67view on economy in motor vehicles, 283, 286-88view on organization of service troops, 357view on reorganization of War Department, 149

Martin,Lt. Col. Mark T., Jr., 469Maurice,Gen. Sir JohnFrederick,130McClelland,Lt. Col. Harold M., 101McClure,Col. Clinton I., 440McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 6, 13, 26, 36, 37, 41,

59-60, 86, 99, 100-01, 155, 219, 234, 244,308, 314-17, 387, 392, 408, 410, 412, 416,485

antitank doctrine, 74-79, 7 4 n , 82, 295-96,423-29

belief in unity ofcommand, 115, 138-39concentrationon training, 15, 29, 31, 32, 33, 93,

131, 199conception of army and corps, 7-9, 353, 355,

364-65considers complaints of soldiers, 47criticism of training, 42-44, 46

faith in infantry, 76-77, 388-90

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J.—Continuedinfluence on tactical organization, 271-76, 279-

80opposes specialismin Army, 38-40, 339-40, 342policies onTroop Basis, 200, 207, 220policy on armored organization,53, 58, 65-67,

69, 319, 322, 325-26, 331-32, 334-35realism in maneuvers, 44replacement policies, 246requests enlarged authority for GHQ, 131-32,

141tours of inspection, 42view on Air Corps organization, 117-18view on air support,102-05, 256view on airborne organization and training, 93-

98, 340-41, 345-46view on antiaircraft program, 230, 295-96, 403,

413-14, 420-21view on demobilization,440

view on distribution of manpower, 226-27view on economy, 235-36, 273, 276, 283-84,286-88, 307, 319, 322,337, 359-63, 474

view on fitness of officers, 48-51view on light division,344view on motorized division, 337view on offensive action, 296, 316-17view on "operational control," 125-27view on pooling, 223, 324view on reorganization of War Department,

144-48view on size of Army, 198

McNarney,Maj. Gen. Joseph T., 150Mechanizedcavalry, 308, 337, 352, 356, 371, 397,

403, 415Medical battalions,309, 467, 479Medical companies, 309, 358, 365Medical Department, 303, 352Medical Section, GHQ, 13, 25Medical troops

aid stations, 309clearing stations, 309, 358, 365detachments, 303-04, 318division surgeon, 309, 318number in division, 20 6personnel,291, 307, 309

Medical units, 213allotted to AGF inTroop Basis, 166in Armored Force, 57, 68redeploymentTroop Basis, 45 2requested for armored corps, 61-62

MediterraneanTheater of Operationsallotment of troops, 241-42comment oncannon company,461divisions, 257inactivation of 2d CavalryDivision, 189nreplacements, 245view on organic tank battalion, 47 1

Medium artillery. See also Field artillery.increase recommended,178, 221, 223reduction, 233

Merrill, Col. Frank D., 344Miami, Fla., 494

Middle East, 112, 198

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INDEX 533North Africa, 326, 336, 344

combined training deficient,412General Devers' inspection,296General McNair's inspection,314plans for invasion, 208shortcomings of troops, 221tank destroyer tactics, 178, 426TORCH operation, 20weapons supplied toFrench Army, 220

North African campaign, 280, 286, 317, 326, 343North African Theater of Operations

and reduction of infantry division,315-17growth in 1943, 231

North Atlantic DefenseCommand, 132Northeastern Defense Command, 20, 23, 119,

123, 129Northern Ireland, 22Norway, 1, 39, 339Nurses, 165

Observationplanes, 112Observers, AGF, 412Office of the Chief of Staff. See also War Depart-

ment GeneralStaff.and airborne troops, 93antitank measures, 82subjects proposed for study, 33

Officer candida te schools,11, 37, 397, 404and cadre system, 53assignmentto SOS recommended,150capacity increased, 213relation to GHQ, 32

Officer candidates, 200, 267Officers

antiaircraft, 423armored, 397coursesat Fort Leavenworth,36, 38fitness for combat leadership,48-51higher rank indivisions recommended,474-75maintenance,282National Guard, 11, 37, 48-50noncommissioned,42, 48over-age in grade, 48-50overstrength, 164reassignmentafter overseas duty, 443-45reclassification,49-50Regular Army, 11, 50, 359Reserve, 11special service, 312

training in troop schools, 42veterinary, 309Officers' ReserveCorps, 4, 11, 37Oldfield,Maj. Gen. Homer L., 421"Operational control," 125-27Operations Division, WDGS, 202, 255, 338, 341,

342-43. See also War PlansDivision,WDGS.coordination of theater activities, 231effort to curtail service units,229estimate of mobilization, 392plans for increase of Army, 212policy on divisions, 225replaces WarPlans Division, 152responsibilityfor Troop Basis, 163shipment of units overseas,250-51takes over planning functions of GHQ, 22

Operations Division—Continuedview on advancedetachments, 449view on AntiaircraftCommand,421view on SourceMajor Forceplan, 445view on "type" army and corps, 356

Operations plans, GHQ, 20-21, 24OperationsSection, AGF, 403Ordnance, 266Ordnance companies, 265, 310-11, 365, 467Ordnance Department,147, 310Ordnancemaintenancecompanies, 213, 478Ordnance Section, GHQ, 26Ordnance troops, 219Ordnance units

allotted to AGF in Troop Basis, 166requested for armored corps, 61-62strength, 452training inArmored Force, 57

Organic corps troops, 61-62

Organization Division, AGF, 349Organized Reserve,2, 4, 12, 33Organized Reserve Corps, 2Osborn, Maj. Gen. Frederick H., 442Over-age in grade, 48-50Overhead, 375, 409

AGF in 1943, 219analysis of strength in, 165in armored division, 331in corps, 363in defense commands, 119in European theater, 240in infantry division, 307-12in RTC's, 181in schools, 181increased requirements, 172, 175percentage ground strength in, 227reduction in 1943, 217-18

OVERLORDOperation, 442Overseas movement, 201, 223Overseas shipments, 412-13, 418-20Overseas theaters. See also European Theater of

Operations; Mediterranean Theater of Oper-ations; North African Theater of Operations;Pacific area; Southwest Pacific.

expansion, 163.relation to GHQ, 147transfer of troops to, 223view on cannon company, 461

Overstrength, 164-65advocated by AGF, 206-07concealed,239-40defined, 196policies on, 200

Pacific, South. See South Pacific.Pacific, Southwest. See Southwest Pacific,Pacific area

control of operations, 23infantry-tank coordination, 470Japanese threat, 128redeploymentfor, 439, 455, 503

Pacific Coastamphibious training, 90reinforced by GHQ, 29visits of General McNair, 42

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INDEX 535

Readjustment Regulationschecklist, 442n.RR 1-1, Readjustmentof Personnel, 439RR 1-2, Personnel Procedure, 446RR 1-5, Readjustment

ofOfficers,

445Reassignment of personnel, 443-46, 493-94Reception centers, 53, 199, 201, 487Reception stations

AGF liaison officers, 486-87in redeployment, 447

Reclassification ofofficers, 49-50Reconnaissance,33, 46, 287, 303Reconnaissancetroops, 466Redeployment, 270, 439-504

advance detachments,448-49, 498-500changesproposed for infantry division,454-82equipment,449-50intermediate-stationmethod, 44 7permanent-station method, 447

port method, 447reception-station method, 447-48Tables of Organization and Equipment,454-79training, 449-50, 498-99Troop Basis, 450-53

Redistribution stations,493-94Reduction Board, 288, 293, 297-99, 303-04, 329,

359, 370and armored division, 319and divisional artillery, 304and motorized division, 337and nondivisionalunits, 352

Regimental Combat Team, 116th, 89Regiments, 280, 355-59

cavalry, 37 1engineer, 89, 357infantry, 285-86, 300-04, 317, 339, 341 , 345,

455, 460-61, 464, 469, 476, 483parachute infantry, 98quartermaster, 371

Regular Army ,1, 9-11divisions reorganized, 277officers, 36, 48-51, 359reserve units, 52strength expanded,10

Reorganization of War Department, 1921, 5Reorganization of War Department, 1942, 143-

55, 391, 396view of Army AirForces, 144, 147-49view of General Marshall, 149view of GHQ, 144-52view of Secretary Stimson, 152nview of WPD, 145-46, 149-52

Replacementand School CommandAGF liaison personnel, 495and Armored Command,410-11and older arms, 390, 396, 403and Parachute School, 409and Tank Destroyer Center,403-05, 424overhead, 219replacement training, 410

Replacement battalions,62Replacement training centers, 2 4 5 , 2 6 7 , 4 0 4 ,

409-10

basic training, 35, 37

Replacement training centers—Continuedbranch immaterial,4expansion policies, 53, 199, 211, 243for cadre training, 53in redeployment,453overhead, 181, 219relation to GHQ, 32training of fillers, 4

Replacements,236, 242-45, 293, 428analysis of strength, 165, 180and Armored Force, 57, 68crisis in system,193, 245economies for, 258for redeployed units, 497policy on training time, 246-49stripping divisionsfor, 201-02, 245-46unit replacement, 179, 250

Requirements Section, AGF, 268-69, 273, 285 ,288, 410-11, 456

ReserveOfficers' Training Corps, 2, 4, 11Rhine River, 1Richmond, Va., 402Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B., 349Rifle companies, 238, 300-01, 460Rome, Italy, 339Rommel, Gen. Erwin, 112Roosevelt,President Franklin D.

appoints Base Lease Commission, 130signs SelectiveService Bill, 34-35

Roster, GHQ officers,13n, 156-57Rotation of personnel, 494ROUNDUP, proposed operation, 201Royal Air Force, 112Russell, Brig. Gen. Clinton W.

view on air reinforcements, 140view on operational control, 127Russia, 225Russian Army, 325, 336

campaign of summer,1943, 229number of divisions, 190stand in 1942, 198victories, 193, 252

Russians,201

San Antonio, Tex., 74San Diego, Calif., 90San Francisco, Calif., 90Schools, of arms and services, 2. See also Service

schools.Scott, Maj. Gen. Charles L.

Commander of I Armored Corps, 67view on armored organization,64

Seattle, Wash., 90Second Army

air-support tests, 102maneuvers, 43-45, 80, 96redeployment training, 49 9training of field forces, 3

Second Corps Area, 133Secretaryof War, 3, 295-96Sedan, France, 389Selective Service,32n, 46, 52

and mobilization, 54, 197, 252

basic training of recruits, 37

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Selective Service—ContinuedGHQ responsibility forinductees, 34policies for speeding up, 207political difficulties, 47

SelectiveService Bill, 10, 35Service boards. See Boards, of arms and services.Service companies,301-03Serviceschools, 2, 267, 269, 397, 402-03, 410

and National Guard officers, 11assignment to SOSrecommended,150for cadre officers, 53

Servicescoreplan. See Adjusted servicerating.Service troops

analysis of strength, 165-71, 175apportionment, 196, 213-14assigned to Armored Force, 56-57increases, 172, 226, 236lag in program, 256nondivisional, 199proportion in two world wars, 191-92reduction, 238-39shortages,229-30

Service units, 166, 288, 297, 309-11, 351, 357-58Services

boards, 2cooperation with GHQ, 22, 32organizationand function, 2-3reorganization, 152schools, 2, 11, 53, 150

Services of Supply, 148, 152, 288, 353. See alsoArmy Service Forces.

demand for inductees, 202economy proposed, 219

maintenanceofficers, 282-83nondivisional units, 213-14service schools, 150Signal Corps, 152T/O preparation, 268-69, 282understrength, 208

Shipping, 288-89, 342-43, 347, 355and cross-Channel invasion,286and motor vehicles,281-82, 335and strategic concept of war, 289, 393-94capacity in 1941, 116economy, 461effect on structure of Army, 289shortages, 222-23

Shortages

AGF personnel, 199-200Army housing,37, 220-21equipment, 220-21, 412, 416GHQ personnel, 28in various arms, 208manpower, 412radio, 106replacements,245-50service troops, 229-30shipping, 222-23temporary causes of, 228-29transport planes, 94troops for new divisions,236

Shugg, Brig. Gen. Roland P., 430Sicilian campaign, 326, 344Sicily, 245

Siegfried Line, 250Signal battalions, 458, 467Signal communications,33Signal companies,310, 377, 467

Signal Corps, 12assigned to SOS, 152organization, 2

Signal SectionAGF, 456GHQ, 25

Signal units, 290, 352, 358, 365allotted to AGF inTroop Basis, 166defined as combat troops, 167economy, 219increase recommended, 223redeploymentTroop Basis, 452replacements forArmored Force, 68requested for armored corps,62

Singapore, 198

Six MonthsListand replacements problem, 248divisionson, 236, 251

Ski troops, 344SLEDGEHAMMER,proposed operation, 201Small-unit training

deficiencies, 51importance, 39, 55in Armored Force, 57

Smith, Maj. Gen. Holland M.CommanderFirst Joint Training Force, 87director of maneuvers, 89view on amphibioustraining, 91-92

Solomon Islands, 343Somervell,Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 234, 283-84Sound-trucks, 44Source Major Force plan

favored by AGF, 443-44opposed by ASF, 444view of SPD, 445

South, the, 39South America, 22South Pacific, 201Southeast Air District, 106Southern Defense Command, 20, 119Southwest Pacific

replacements, 244shortcomings of troops, 221

Southwest Pacific Area Command, 286, 336, 341,

342, 349, 461opposes light division, 346strength, 347

Soviet Union, 256Spaatz, Brig. Gen. Carl, 135Special establishments, 397-411, 414. See also

Quasi arms.Special InformationSection,AGF, 486Special PlanningDivision,WDSS

demobilization planning, 440personnel readjustment, 442view on SourceMajor Force plan, 445

Special service officers, 312Special troops, GHQ, 25Specialism, 38-39Specialists, 267

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INDEX 539Training Circulars, WD—Continued

No. 125, tanks and tank destroyers as artillery,431

Training directivesAGF, 422GHQ, 34-35, 58-59subordinate units, 35

Training Memorandum No. 1, for redeployment,499

Transport planes, 94, 341Transport quartermaster teams, 477Transport Wing, 50th, 94

Unity of command—Continuedamphibious operations, 23, 91General McNair's view,115, 130-31

V-E Day, 4 49, 477, 496-97V-J Day, 442, 495, 499, 503Vehicles, 394-95. See also Motor vehicles.Very Long Range Bombers. See B -29 bombers.Veterinary officers, 309Visits of inspection,26, 42, 58Volunteers

infantry, 23 8

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