conf 2011 jinn-yuh hsu

8/3/2019 CONF 2011 Jinn-Yuh Hsu

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StateTransformationandtheMutationofUrbanRenewalPoliciesinTaiwan

Thispaperexploresthedynamicsbehindthechangingregimesofurbanrenewalin

Taiwan.Atfirstsight,itappearsthattheemergenceofpublic-privatepartnershipin

Taiwansurbanrenewalpolicyrendersneoliberalizationpossible,whichleadstothe

conclusionthatTaiwanjoinstheglobalgentrificationclub.Insteadofactinginthe

spiritofurbanmanagerialismofwelfarestate,theauthoritariandevelopmental

Taiwanesestateshoulderedthejobofevictingsquattersandurbanrenewalwithan

aimtopromoteurbanandeconomicdevelopment.Theevolutionofurbanrenewal

policy,fromapublicinfrastructureprojecttoaprofitablebusinessmodel,reflects

thestatestransformationinurbandevelopment.Thesuccessivewavesofurban

renewalinTaipeiCitydemonstratethechangingstate-societyrelations.Itfindsthat

Taiwansstatepolicies,incomparisonwithpoliciesofAnglo-Americanstates,evolve

throughdivergenttrajectoriesbutconvergeinpromotinglandedcapital,andleadtosocialandspatialinjusticeinTaiwanscities.

Keywords:urbanpolicy,gentrification,neoliberalization,statetransformation,social

andspatialexclusion,Taiwan


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Introduction

Duringthe20thcentury,neighborhoodchangeandtheevictionoflow-income

residentshasoccurredinavarietyofways;fromthedemolitionofentireareasto

morerecentrevitalizationeffortsemphasizingthebuildingofcommunityandnew

governancestructures.Gentrificationinadvancedindustrializedeconomiesis

directlyrelatedtohowcitiesexperienceeconomictransformationandpolicy

interventions.Theurbandisinvestmentresultingfromeconomicchangeandurban

policyalongwiththeindividualpursuitofthesuburbandreamlaidthegroundwork

fortheappearanceofthegentrificationmovement.

Therenewedpositionofcitiesintheglobaleconomyhasfuelledtheexpansion

ofgentrification.Whilegentrificationraisesanumberofissuesinthecorecountries,

suchassocialexclusion,evictionandresistance,ithasspreadtocitiesaroundthe

globesincethe1960s.Sincethe1980sthegentrificationmovementacceleratedand

gainedgeographicalscopeduetothefiercecompetitionofworldcitycup

(AtkinsonandBridge2005).Gentrificationdiffusesinthenationalurbansystemfrom

primarycitiestolower-tieredcities,andintheglobalsystemfromtheGlobalNorth

totheGlobalSouth,andfromcapitalistsocietiestopost-socialistcountries.Atkinson

andBridge(2005)havedocumentedthisprocessextensively,covering,among

others,theUS,theUK,Canada,Australia,Japan,EasternandSouthernEurope,

Turkey,Brazil,Germany,andPoland.Theglobalizationofgentrificationalsoaffects

Taiwan,anEastAsiannewlyindustrializedcountry.Taiwanispartofagroupoflate-

industrializingdevelopmentalstatesintheGlobalSouth.Thesecountriesare

characterizedbyastronginterventionalistgovernmentcenteredoneconomic

growth.Thispaperprovidesamissingpieceintheglobalgentrificationstory,by


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examiningthegentrificationprocessinTaiwan,comparedtothatinWestern

industrializedwelfarestates

Anintriguingpuzzleforstudentsofurbanandregionaldevelopmentiswhy

Taiwansstatechangeditsperspectiveonurbandevelopmentsoradicallyoverthe

past30years.Beforethe1980sthestatewaswillingtosolelyshoulderthejobof

urbanrenewalwithawhollysupportivefinancialbudgetandlandappropriationlaw,

whileinthe1990sitbecamefinanciallyoverburdenedduetoitsgentrificationpolicy.

Ataroundtheturnofthecenturythestateturnedtowardpromotingurban

gentrificationasakeybusinessmodel.Thistransformationofstatepolicywascrucial

forthechangingfateofpublic-privatepartnershipforurbanrenewalthroughoutthe

period.Whatkindsofpoliticalandeconomicforcesdrovethesechanges?Werethe

changesdrivenbytheforceofneoliberalization,andtheactivationofthemarket

mechanism,asinstatetransformationintheWesternworld?Inwhatexactforms

didtheliberalizeddevelopmentalstatebecomeinvolvedinurbandevelopment,and

howdoesthatcomparewithstatetransformationinWesternFordistsocieties?

Finally,howwillthepoliticalprocesses,inwhichtheinheritedinterventionalstate

interactswithneoliberaldiscoursesandpractices,intheEastAsiandevelopmental

statesimpacturbanrenewal?Thesequestionsarecriticalfor(anti-)gentrification,as

thefailuretodistinguishbetween(post-)Fordiststatesand(post-)developmental

statesleadstomisunderstandingthesocialdynamicsinvolved,and,atworst,the

misplacementofresistanceinthesocialtransformation.

Thegeneraltendenciesofgentrificationworkoutdifferentlyinparticular

national,regional,andurbansettings(Lees,SlaterandWyly,2008),whichrequires

anawarenessofthecontingentgeographiesofgentrificationbytheresearcher.Only


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inthiswaycantheresearcheravoidmissingthediversityofgentrificationprocesses

atdifferentspatialscalesandindifferenturbanandnationalcontexts.Gentrification

cascadesintonewlocalitiesdrivenbyglobalforcessuchastheinstitutionalizationof

neo-liberalization(Smith2002),theformationoftransnationalcapitalistclasses

(Sklair2001),andthetravelingofgentrificationdiscursivepractices(Clark2005).

Gentrificationconstitutesanapparentlyuniversalphenomenoninthelandscapes

ofurbanredevelopmentacrosstheworld.Investigatingthegentrificationprocessin

eachparticularlocalityaddressesthediversityofpoliticalcontextsandthewide

rangeofdivergingeffectscausedbythegentrificationprocessintheactually

existingneoliberalstates.Ananalysisofthediffusionofgentrificationthroughthe

historicallydependenttrajectoriesofnon-westernstates,whichpathsdivergefrom

WesternFordistregimes,enrichesourunderstandingoftherestructuringofthe

currentcapitalistsystem.FollowingMassey(2005),wetakethecaseofTaiwanasa

relationalspaceintheshapingoftheglobalmappingofgentrificationby

interconnectionswiththedynamicforcesinWesterncities,whilesimultaneously

remainingsensitivetoTaiwansdivergentgeographicalandhistoricalmanifestations

andeffects.

Inthenextsection,wedrawontheoreticalreviewsofthedevelopmentalstate,

gentrificationandinstitutionalchangetoconstituteananalyticalframework.

Followingthat,thehistoricaldevelopmentofgentrificationisexploredintheprocess

ofstatetransformationinTaiwaninthethirdsection.Inthefourthsection,we

criticallyexaminetheinstitutionalchangeofgentrificationinTaiwan.More

importantly,webringthesocio-spatialrelationsofthegentrificationprocesstothe

foreandexposetheimpactofthelaterwavesofgentrification.Anumberof


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concludingremarkswillwrapupthecaseinthefinalsection.

TheoreticalReview:WavesofGentrification,theDevelopmentalStateand

InstitutionalChange

Giventhecomplexityofgentrificationineachsocialcontextgentrificationhas

evolvedinthreewavesintheadvancedindustrialcountries(HackworthandSmith,

2001).Thefirstwavebeganinthe1950sandlasteduntilthe1973globaleconomic

recession.Gentrificationinthiswavewasoftenfundedbythepublicsectorbecause

gentrificationwasthoughttobetooriskytoleavetotheprivatesector.State

involvementwasjustifiedthroughthediscourseofamelioratingurbandecline.The

secondwaveoccurredinthepost-recession1970sand1980s,andwascharacterized

bytheintegrationofgentrificationintoawiderrangeofeconomicandcultural

processesatglobalandnationalscales(HackworthandSmith,2001;Wylyand

Hammel,2001).Thiswavewitnessedanincreasedconnectionbetween

gentrificationandglobalsystemsofrealestateandbankingfinance.Itwasalso

characterizedbypublic-privatepartnerships,theincreasingroleofdevelopers,and

laissez-fairesubsidies(Gotham,2005).Itwaslargelymarket-led,withlocalstate

efforts,wheretheyexisted,mainlyconfinedtostimulatetheprivatesector.The

1987stockmarketcrashandtheinner-cityresidentiallandmarketcrashtwoyears

laterputanendtothesecondwave.Thethirdwavebeganinthemid-1990sas

Westerneconomiesexperiencedalongperiodofsustainedgrowththatlasted

throughoutthedecade.Thethirdwavewasdistinctivefromthefirsttwowaysin

fourways(HackworthandSmith,2001):itisexpandingwithinpartiallygentrified

neighborhoodsandoutwardsinmuchmorecomprehensiveways;itinvolveslarger-


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scaledevelopers;resistanceisdecliningastheworkingclassiscontinuallydisplaced

fromtheinnercity;andfinally,thestateismoresystematicallyinvolved.

Whatdrivesthedynamicsofthewaves?HackworthandSmith(2001)attribute

thecurrentroleofthestateasfacilitatinggentrificationmainlytotheglobalshift

awayfromKeynesiangovernanceandregulatoryobstaclestoneoliberalpolicies

pursuingeconomicgrowth.Urbangovernancehasshiftedfrommanagerialismto

entrepreneurialism(Harvey,1989),whichleadstothereductionofnational

fundingtolocalgovernmentswhichmakesthelattermorereliantontheattraction

andretentionofthemiddleclassestostrengthenitstaxbase.Thenewurbanpolitics,

asCoxandMair(1988)claim,changestheroleofcitiesfromwelfareprovidersto

economicmotorsthatengageinfiercecompetitionwitheachothertoattract

inwardinvestments.Gentrificationinneoliberalcitiesinadvancedindustrialized

countriesmorethaneverrepresentsurbanentrepreneurialism,andbecomeslinked

tolarge-scalecapital.Theneoliberalstateshiftsfromtheroll-backtypeofthe

minimalistnightwatchmanstateofneoliberalideology,totheroll-outtypeofthe

actuallyexistingneoliberalstatethatusesitsstrongdisciplinarypowertoenforce

marketdisciplineintheeconomy.Suchstatesalwaysmanifestsocialstruggles

amongdifferentclassesatvariousgeographicalscalesinthegentrificationprocess.

Giventhattherolechangeofthestateingentrificationprocessesis

conceptualizedinthecontextofthedynamicsofAnglo-Americanneoliberalregimes,

itstillisunclearhowcitiesintheEastAsiancontextareaffected.TheEast-Asian

developmentalstatesfollowsomehowdifferent,aswellassimilar,trajectoriesof

transformation.Suchastaterestructuringprocessimpliesadifferentdynamicina

differentcontextofstate-societytransformations.


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Incontrasttothewelfaremodelofmarketeconomieswhichoffsetsthe

povertyoftheloserswiththewealthaccumulatedbythewinnersthroughsocial

securitytransfers,theeconomyofdevelopmentalstateembedsthisredistributionof

resourcesinitsownfundamentalinstitutions(UnderhillandZhang2005,Kwon

2005).Tosomeextent,socialwelfareandsocialpolicyaresacrificedforthepriority

ofeconomicdevelopmentwhichisreflectedinthelackofsocialandurban

infrastructureandunemploymentcompensationinEastAsiandevelopmentalstates.

Consequently,whilecitiesandcommunitiesunderWesternwelfarestateregimes

playaroleaswelfareproviders,urbanareasinTaiwanneverhavetheluxuryof

welfareredistributionandsufferfromover-urbanizationduetosuccessivewaves

ofmassrural-urbanmigrationanddilapidatedhousingconditions.Asaresult,city

centersarecongestedwithsquattersinpoorhealthandlivingconditions.Rather

thanengaginginsocialreformtosolvetheurbanquestionofcollectiveconsumption

(Castells1973)astheirWesterncounterpartsdo,thestateinEastAsianNICs(Newly

IndustrializingCountries)seesurbansquattersandrun-downareasasaproblemof

publichealthandphysicaldecay.

Insomesense,theengineeringapproachtosocialandurbanproblemsalso

reflectsthedevelopmentalismofEastAsianstateswhich,unliketheirWestern

counterparts,gainedlegitimacynotfromthedemocraticsupportofthecivilsociety,

butfromaseriesofsuccessfuldevelopmentprojects(Castells1992).Such

development-basedlegitimacyisparticularlycriticalforregimeswhicharenew

rulersandkeepweaktiestolocalsociety,suchastherulingKMT(Kuomintang)

regimewhichmovedfromMainlandChinatoTaiwanin1949afteritsdefeatbythe

CommunistPartyintheChinesecivilwarfollowingWorldWarII.Ahighlycentralized


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authoritarianregimeensurestheEastAsiandevelopmentalstateofcontroland

coordinationovertheprocessofeconomicdevelopment(Winckler1984,Pempel

1999).Insimilarvein,urbanrenewalshowstheomnipotenceofthestate

bureaucracyingoverningtheurbanchaosorpathologiescausedbymassrural-urban

migrationintheprocessofrapidindustrialization.

Undersuchcircumstances,thedevelopmentalstatedoesnotregardurban

renewalasabusinessmodelofurbanredevelopment,buttakeitaspartofpolitical

favoritism(cf.LatinAmericancitiesinPortesandWalton1981).Infact,the

developmentalstateisaproductiviststate.Thedevelopmentalstateisinasensea

childofitstime:historicallyspecifictothesecondindustrialrevolution,mainly

focusedonmanufacturing,inapost-warsystemofinterconnectedbutstilldistinct

nationalcapitalisms(Cumings,1999).Intheeyesoftheproductiviststateland

development,anditsrelatedfinancialsector,arepotentiallyparasitic,andatworst

subversive,tothemissionofindustrialization,andshouldthereforebestrictly

controlledbythestate(Johnson1987).InsomeEast-Asiandevelopmentalstates,

suchasTaiwanandSouthKorea,landreformswereevenenforcedbythestate.The

developmentalstateseesgentrificationaspartofpublicworks,andthegovernment

hastoshoulderthejobtoavoidlandspeculation.

However,inspiteofpositivefeedbackmechanismsenhancingcontinuity,

institutionsareneverfixed.Mostdevelopmentalstates,suchasKorea(Pirie2008)

andTaiwan(Hsu2009),engagedininstitutionalrestructuringsincethelate1980s,in

whichwavesofpoliticaldemocratizationandeconomicliberalizationsweptacross

thepoliticallandscape,replacingauthoritarianregimeswithpopulistones.Inwhat

directiondidinstitutionschange?Asimpleanswerisprovidedbytheglobalpolicy


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diffusionmodelinthecontextofglobalcompetition.Gentrificationpolicy,for

example,migratedcentrifugallyfromthemetropolesofcorecountriestonon-

Westerncitiesthroughpolicylearning(AtkinsonandBridge,2005).Smith(2002)

attributesthediffusionoftheentrepreneurialbusinessmodelforgentrification

policytotheforcesofglobalneoliberalismshapedonaglobalscalebythemedium

ofcapitalflows.

Notwithstandingtheeffectsofglobaldiffusion,localpoliticalprocessesof

institutionalchangearemorecomplicated.Institutionalchangeisaprocessof

reshufflingofinterests,inwhichdivergentactorstrytoachieveadvantageby

interpretingorredirectinginstitutionsinpursuitoftheirgoals,orbysubvertingor

circumventingrulesthatclashwiththeirinterests.Divergentstrategiespursuedby

actorsleadtohybridformsofinstitutionalchange,whichareembodiedinspatial

restructuringprocesses.Takinginstitutionsastheobjectofongoingskirmishing

amongactors,Weiss(2003)arguesthatinthetransformativeprocess,the

developmentalstate,facingglobalizationpressures,isnotsimplyapuppetofthe

allianceofforeignanddomesticcapital.Onthecontrary,basedonthepolitical

constellationofinstitutedforces,thestateisanenablingactorconstructingwaysto

negotiateinterestsatdifferentscalelevels,fromlocaltoregionaltonationalto

globalinterests.

Giventhispoweranalysisofthestate,thetransformationofthe

developmentalstateanditsspatialrestructuringpolicy,suchasurbangentrification,

isacontestedandindeterminateprocess.Thecaseofthetransformationof

Taiwansgentrificationpolicyillustratesthepowerdynamicsandevolutionofurban

governanceinthetransitionoftheauthoritariandevelopmentalstate.Insteadof


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arguingthattheexperiencesofurbangentrificationinWesternneoliberalpolitical

economiesareirrelevanttounderstandingthegentrificationprocessinEastAsian

cities,thispaperaimstoembedthedynamicsofurbangentrificationinthe

divergentprocessesofpath-dependentstatetransformationswithintheirparticular

socialcontexts.Bydoingso,itfleshesoutthediversityandinterplaybetween

modelsofurbangovernanceintheglobalNorthandSouth,whichshapeurban

developmentsintheworldscities(Robinson2011).

TheProcessofStateTransformationandUrbanRenewalinTaiwan

Thispaperconcentratesonurbanrenewalpolicies,ratherthangentrification

ingeneral,todealwiththematerialandsymbolictransformationofworking-class

(orlowerclass)neighborhoodsintozonesdominatedbyupper-middle-class

residentsandconsumersinTaiwan.Lees(2000)demonstrates1 thatgentrificationis

toobroadaconcept,includingvariousrestructuringprocessessuchasnew-built

gentrificationandsuper-gentrification.Moreover,thetermgentrificationisnever

usedinofficialorjournalreportsinTaiwan.Mostly,theprocessofdemolishing

clustersofoldhousesandconstructingnewonesiscalledurbanrenewal(dushi-

gengxin)tosignifythemodernandengineeringmeaningsofthetransformation

process.2 Focusingonurbanrenewalpoliciesillustratesthetransformationofthe

1 Typesofgentrificationhavebecomecomplicatedsincetheearly21 stcentury.Notonlytheclassictypeoftransformationfromlow-statusneighborhoodstoupper-middle-classplaygrounds,butalso

newlybuilttownhouses,high-riseapartments,retailandcommercialdesignershopsandevenart

galleryareincludedinthegentrificationschema(Zukin1995). 2 Theuseofthetermurbanrenewal,ratherthanurbanredevelopmentwashotlydebatedinthe

law-makingprocessintheLegislativeYuan(thecongress)in1998.Somelawmakersarguedthatthe

termrenewalremindspeopleoftheimageofbulldozerincontroversialhousingdemolishing

processesandintendtoreplaceitwithurbanredevelopment.ThechiefoftheBureauofConstruction,whichisinchargeofnationalurbandevelopment,assertsthaturbanrenewalisa

technicaltermwithoutanynecessarynegativeimplication(LegislativeYuan1998)


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stateintheliberalizationprocesswhichisfraughtwithclass-basedandplace-based

politics,andsocialexclusionandresistance(Slater2006).Accordingly,urbanrenewal

processesinvolvevarioustypesofinstitutionalembeddednessindiversesocial

contexts,fromthemarket-led,roll-backtypeneoliberalstatetotheroll-outpublic-

privatepartnerships.Eachinstitutionalsettingisdistinguishedbyitsdistinctformof

interactionbetweenthestate,privatedevelopers,anddisplacedresidents,and

demonstratesthetransformationofthestructuralandstrategicrolesofthestate

(Jessop2002).Threestagesofurbanrenewalpoliciesillustratethechangingstate-

societyrelationshipsinTaiwan.

Stage1State-ledUrbanRenewal:1950s-mid1980s

ThefirstsignificantgentrificationmovementoccurredinTaipeicitywiththe

aimtoevictillegalsquattersinthe1970s.Theissueofsquattersstemmedfromtwo

sources:ontheonehand,morethantwomillionpeoplefollowedtheKMTinits

retreatfromMainlandChinain1949.Themajorityofthesepoliticalrefugeessettled

inurbanareas,particularlyTaipeicity.Thecityplanningsystemcouldnotabsorbthe

abruptlyincreasedin-migrantpopulation,sothatashortageofhousingoccurred

(Huang2002).Ontheotherhand,earlyindustrializationinthe1950sledtoan

exodusfromruralareastourbanlocales.Manyoftheruralmigrantscouldnot

affordadecentunitintheformalhousingmarket.Asaresult,theinformalhousing

marketgrewrapidlyinthecities.Lu(1963)foundthatonapopulationoflessthan

onemillionpeople,morethan15,000squatterslivedinTaipeicityattheendofthe

1950s.Thepresenceofsquattersdeterioratedthequalityoftheurban

infrastructure,whichwasnotprovidedbythestateasitconcentrateditsresources


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onnationalsecurityandeconomicgrowthsincethe1950s(Huang2002).Zhu(1977)

estimatesthatbytheearly1960smorethan50,000illegalhousingunitscouldbe

foundinTaipeicity.Withtherapidindustrializationinthe1960surbangrowth

skyrocketedandurbanquestionssuchasthelackofaproperinfrastructure,traffic

congestion,andpoorpublichealthbecameobstaclesforthecities.Thiswas

especiallysalientforthecapitalTaipeiCityasitstrivedtomaintainitssymbolic

functionastheseatofpoliticalpowerandthemotorofeconomicgrowth.Underthe

adviceofChiangChing-kuo,thepoliticalstrongmanandpremieratthattime,the

TaipeiCitygovernmentlaunchedtheWan-daplanin1972toevictsquatterareas

andrenewtheurbaninfrastructureoftheinnercity.

TheWan-daplanwasquitecomprehensiveandincludednotonlythe

demolitionofrun-downhouses,butalsotheconstructionofpublichouses,or

resettledhouses(zhengjianzhuzhai),toaccommodatetheresidentsofthe

demolishedhousing.Underthepolicyofconstructionfirst,demolitionlater(CFDL)

mostofthelow-incomeresidentswereallocatedtonewresettledhousesinnearby

areas.Morethan4,000oftheseresettledhousingunitswereconstructed.The

majorityofthefundsneededforthisroundofurbanrenewalcamefrom

governmentalbudgets.Residentsweregrantedapreferentialmortgagerateto

amortizethecostofnewhousing.Toexpandtheeffectoftheplan,theTaipeicity

governmentspentmorethan50millionUSdollartomaintaintheinfrastructurein

therenewalareas(Huang1974).

ThecoreoftheWan-daplan,accordingtoitsofficialreport,wastorefurbish

theurbaninfrastructure,andgivethecityacleanimage(Zhu1977).TheWan-da

planalsoshowedthepoliticalwilloftheauthoritarianstateanditsaimtomaintain


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FollowingtheWan-daplan,thecitygovernmentcouldnotaffordtorenewthe

innercityareaduetoitstightfiscalsituation.3 Thecoreofurbandevelopment

shiftedfromthedemolitionofinner-citysquatterareastotheexpansionofurban

areatoneighboringlands.ThiswasclearlyindicatedinPremierChiangscomment

onthedevelopmentofTaipeicity:TaipeiCityhasgrowntobecomeaninternational

metropolissincethelate1960s.Thelandsoftheinnercityarenotsufficientforthe

shapingofthemetropolis,andwehavetoexpandtheurbanizedareastocoverthe

neighboringtownships.(Chiang1972:54)Underthesecircumstances,thesitesof

gentrificationnolongerconcentratedintheinnercity,butshiftedtotheouterrings

ofthecity.Between1970and1976thecitygovernmentspendmorethan500

millionUSdollartoinitiategentrificationinfourareasintheexpandedurbanzone.

Thefourcaseswereseriouslycriticizedasinefficientbythebureaucrat-ledmodel

(Zhang1991).

Inbrief,thefirststageofgentrificationwasfinanciallysupportedand

practicallyinitiatedbythestate.Urbanpolicyrespondedtothedemandsofrapid

urbanizationinTaipeicity.Thisstagewitnessedurbantransitionintheinnercityand

urbansprawltoneighboringareas.Thestateviewedgentrificationasameasureto

solveurbanproblems,andtomaintainthepositionofTaipeiasamotorfor

economicdevelopment.Inshort,thefirststageischaracterizedbyaformofstate-

ledgentrification.

3 TheKMTgovernmentengagedinthetengreatprojectsintheearly1970s.Theseprojects,similartoaTaiwaneseversionoftheNewDeal,aimedtoeconomicallyupgradetheindustrialinfrastructure

toovercometheeconomicdepression,andpoliticallypromotethepopularityofthepremierChiangChing-kuowhowaspreparedtosucceedhisfather,ChiangKai-shek,asthepoliticalstrongman.The

projectsranfrom1974to1979,andthecostsexceededabillionUSdollar.


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Stage2:Failedstate-fosteredUrbanRenewal:mid1980s-mid1990s

In1983,theTaipeicitygovernmentpassedalawonurbanrenewal.It

encouragedtheprivatesectortoparticipateinurbanrenewalprojectsbyoffering

taxcutsandFloorAreaRatioBonus(FARB).Thegovernmentpromisedtomatchthe

initiativesofprivateprojectsbysettingupaspecialfundforurbanrenewal.Whydid

thestatepolicychangefromstate-ledgentrificationtopublic-privatepartnershipin

urbanrenewalprojects?

Firstly,apoliticalcrisisoccurredintheearly1980sthatthreatenedthe

legitimacyoftherulingpartyandservedasanomenoftheendoftheeraofpolitical

strongman.AfterthedeathofChiangChing-Kuoin1988,arealignmentofpower

groupswithintheKMTstateoccurred,whichdramaticallychallengedtherelative

autonomyofthestate.Thepoliticalbureaucracywastraditionallyseparatedfrom

businessgroups(Wang1996),butafterChiangpassedawaytheprivatesector

startedgaininggroundinpolicy-making.Thisalsooccurredinthepolicyarenaof

urbanlanddevelopment.TheTaipeicitycouncilpushedpublic-privateinitiatives,

whichwaswelcomedbyprivatedeveloperswhoneededinvestmentoutletsfortheir

accumulatedcapital(Wang1998).

Secondly,theinefficiencyofthestate-ledinitiativesofthe1970sandofstate-

ownedenterprisesbecameopenlycriticized,astheKMTstatecalledforaspecial

committeeforeconomicrecoveryin1985.Thecommitteereachedaconsensusto

raiseliberalization,internationalizationandinstitutionalizationasthepillarsof

economicdevelopmenttorecoverfromtheeconomicrecessionofthelate1980s.4

4 It was proclaimed by then-premier, Yu Kuo-hua, as the major policy package to lead thecountry away from recession. Milton Friedman, a key advocate of the dominant neoliberal


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Thegentrificationprojectsofthe1970swerecriticizedastime-consumingand

inefficient,andprivatesectorinputwasseenasthecurefortheproblemsofthe

autocraticstate.

Againstthisbackdrop,thestatepassedalawtoencourageprivatesector

participationinurbanrenewalprojects,andthenewmodelofpublic-private-

partnership(PPP)wasappliedtothreeexperimentalcases.Thefirstoneofthese

casesistheDesignatedNo.12parklandrenewalwhichallowedprivatedevelopers

toconvertpartoftheNo.12Parktocommercialusewhenthedevelopersalso

evictedthesquattersfromtheparklandarea.Itwasinitiallydevelopedbya

constructioncompanyin1978,butfailedtoachieveitsgoalin1986.Finally,itwas

takenoverbythecitygovernment,whichevictedthesquattersin1994.Sixteen

yearswerespentforasimpleparklanddevelopment.Similarpatternsoccurredin

theothertwocases,thePalaceMuseumneighborhoodrenewalandJing-hua

redevelopmentproject.Morethan15yearswereneededforeachcase;clearlythe

PPPmodelwasnotasefficientasexpected.

InreviewingtheefficiencyofthePPPmodel,theTaipeiCityGovernment

concludedthatitsfailurewasmainlycausedbythedifficultyofgettingpermissions

fromallthepropertyownersinvolved,whichwasrequiredbylawbeforeland

developmentcouldproceed(Zhang,1991).Moreovertheincentivesfortheprivate

sector,particularlytheFloorAreaRatioBonus,wereconsideredtoolowtoattract

ownersanddeveloperstojoininurbanrenewalprojects.Finally,theroleofthe

state,providingroll-backstatesupport,wasconsideredtoomeagerforpromoting

thePPPmodel.TheTaipeiCitygovernmenturgedthecentralstatetoaggressively

doctrine, was invited to visit Taiwan and advised the Taiwan government to abolish the

Central Bank and the Economic Planning Council (Sun 2003).


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engageinpartnershipbuildup,andtoplayanactive,ratherthanpassiveincentive-

providing,roleinreducingrisksandloweringbarriersforprivatesectorinvolvement.

Accordingly,in1992theTaipeiCityGovernmentproposedtoincreasecompensation

undertheFARBincentivewith50%,andtoupgradetheauthorityoftheurban

developmentdepartmenttoafirst-tierdepartmentinthecitygovernmentin1993.

Besidesencouragingprivateparticipationinurbanrenewalprojects,thestate

continuedtoevictsquattersfromcitycenterresidentiallocales.Infact,themost

controversialstate-ledurbanrenewalprojectsaimedtoevictsquattersfrompublic

landsinthecitycenter.Mostofthesquattersconsistedoflowerclasspeople,and

includedveteranswhofollowedtheKMTretreatfromMainlandChinain1949,rural-

urbanmigrantslookingforjobsinthecity,andaboriginalpeopleforcedtomoveto

thecityforsurvival.Itwasestimatedthatmorethan28%ofthecityresidentslived

inthesquatterareasbytheearly1990s(Huang2002).

ConsecutivecityadministrationsunderbothKMTandDPPruleconductedtwo

majorbulldozer-typesquatterevictions.Thefirstoneoccurredin1992underaKMT

Mayor,andsawthedemolitionofmorethan2,000housesandtheevictionofmore

than16,000peoplefromtheNo.7ParklandintheDa-anDistrict,amostlymiddleto

higherclassresidentialarea.Asaresult,neighborhoodsaroundtheNo.7Park

becamethesiteofexpensivegatedcommunities,comparabletotheneighborhoods

aroundNewYorksCentralPark(UnitedNews,November9,1992).

Theotherstate-ledsquatterevictionprojecttookplacein1997underDPP

MayorChenShui-BianwholaterbecamePresidentin2000.Heusedcitizensfirst

ashis1994electioncampaignslogan,andintheheydayofhisadministrationwas

supportedbymorethan70%ofthepopulation.Inhistermasmayor,community


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regenerationinitiativesmushroomedthroughoutthecity,andwereembracedby

theemergingmiddleclass.TheMayorvowedtosolveTaipeisurbanproblems,

particularlythesquatters,andincreasegreenlandareasforurbandevelopmentin

thecitycenter.Todoso,hestartedamassiveprojecttoclearsquattersfromtheNo.

14&15Parklands.Morethan900housesand3,000peopleweredisplaced.Around

12%belongedtothesociallyweakestgroupsinthecity,includinglowerclass

members,thehandicapped,andthetemporarilyemployed.Sympathizingresidents

andthestudentsresistedfiercelyagainsttheruthlessbureaucrats.But,eventhe

tragedyofanoldveterancommittingsuicide,couldnotstoptheeviction.Aftera

seriesofsquatterevictions,mostofthesociallyweakestgroupswereexcludedfrom

thecitycore.Thesocialmixwhichhascharacterizedthecitycentersincethepost-

Warurbanizationmovementhasbecomeathingofthepast.Deluxeapartment

buildingsboomedaroundthegreenlandspacesafterthedisplacementofthepoor

(Huang1997,Zhang2000).

Stage3:Aggressivestate-engineeredUrbanRenewal:Late1990s-

Therealthrustforurbanrenewalcamefromthecentralstatedevelopment

strategiesinthelate1990s.In1996thegovernmentproposedtheambitiousAsia-

PacificRegionalOperationCenter(APROC)projecttorelievethedomesticand

internationalpressureontheKMTstate.TheAPROCprojectaimedtoturnTaipei

intoahubforregionalmanufacturingindustries,seaandairtransportation,the

financialsector,andtelecommunicationandmediaactivities.Thegovernment

arguedthatAPROCrequiredanopenandcompetitiveeconomywhichincludedthe

privatizationofstate-ownedenterprises,theliberalizationofthedomesticmarket,


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theinstitutionalizationofBOT(Build,OperateandTransfer)servicesandthe

encouragementofprivatecapitalparticipationintheconstructionofpublic

infrastructure.APROCsawurbanrenewalprojectsasthekeyforthedevelopmentof

theconstructionindustrieswhichinturnwerebelievedtobethecrucialforthe

entireeconomy.InthespiritofAPROC,then-PremierLianZhanevenclaimedthat

Urbanrenewalshouldbeoneofthethreekeyareasfornationalcompetitiveness5

andpassedtheUrbanRenewalSchemeintheExecutiveYuanin1997(CEPD1997).

UndertheAPROCinitiative,thecharacterofurbanrenewaltransformedfrom

providingtheinfrastructureofurbandevelopmenttoanimportanttoolfor

economicdevelopment.

Afterafact-findingvisittoJapanbyMr.ChangLong-Sheng,formercabinet

memberandmemberoftheCouncilforEconomicPlanningandDevelopment

(CEPD),thegovernmentproposedtosetupapublic-privatecooperativecompanyto

facilitatethetaskofurbanrenewal.ChangmimickedtheJapanesegovernment,

whichhearguednolongerallocatedbudgetsdirectlyforurbanrenewal,but

delegatedthetasktopublic-privatecooperativecompanies.Hepersuadedthe

governmenttoset-upanurbanrenewalcompany,theJu-zhongcompany.The

companyneededfundstotaling500millionNTdollars,ofwhich75%wouldberaised

bytheprivatesector,whilethegovernmentwouldchipin25%(UnitedNews,

September4,1997).Sixlanddeveloper-cum-constructiongroupsparticipated,and

choseMr.Changasthecompanypresident.TheJu-zhongcompanywould

monopolizethebusinessofpubliclyownedlanddevelopment,andtherenewalof

5 Theothertwokeyareasaretheprivatizationofstate-owned-enterprisesandtheconstructionofnationalinformationinfrastructures.


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20

urbanareas.

However,theestablishmentofanon-governmentalcompanyforurban

renewalwasfiercelycriticizedbytheoppositionparty(theDPP)andthemediafor

itsanimuslucrandi.ThefiercestcriticastersoftheJu-zhonginitiativewere

lawmakerswhowerereportedtobeendorsedandfinanciallysupportedbyland

capitalgroupswhichwerenotinvitedbythegovernmenttojointheJu-zhong

initiative.Inresponsetothecriticisms,thegovernmentwasforcedtoretreatfrom

theJu-zhonginitiative,andclaimedJu-zhongwouldnotmonopolizethe

developmentofpubliclandsinthecity(UnitedNews,November14,1997).

Consequently,theJu-zhongcompanywasdissolvedintoathirdsectorfoundation,

theUrbanRegenerationResearchDesignFoundation(URRDF),andMr.Chang

resignedfromtheCEPDtobecomethechairmanoftheURRDF.Infact,theURRDF

stillplaysaroleasasemi-officialbody,chosenbythegovernmenttopromotethe

businessofurbanrenewal.TheJu-zhongcompanysignaledthefirsttimethe

governmenttransformeditselffromanexecutingroletoacoordinatingroleinurban

renewaltasks.However,itfailedtorebuffpublicconcernandcriticismofthe

preferentialtreatmentofcertaindevelopersbythestate.Ironically,theDPP,which

criticizedthepublic-privateJu-zhongcompanyinitiative,wouldproposeanother

urbanrenewalcompanyafteritcametopowertenyearslater.Wewillreturnto

thatissuelater.

TheAPROCprojectwasabruptlyabandonedafterthesurprisingvictoryofthe

oppositionparty,theDPP,inthe2000presidentialelection;avictorythatended

morethan50yearsofsingle-party-rulebytheKMT.TheDPPadministrationwas

worriedbyitslackofexperienceineconomicaffairs,anareainwhichtheKMT


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21

developmentalstateenjoyedagoodtrack-record.Anewpolicypackagewas

proposed,theChallenge2008NationalDevelopmentPlan(ExecutiveYuan2003),

whichfunctionedtodistinguishtheDPPseconomicpolicyfromtheKMTsAPROC

project.However,theDPPmostlycopiedtheKMTinliberalizationandprivatization

policies(Hsu2009).Inurbanrenewalpolicy,theDPPgovernmentpassedthe

ProgramforExpeditingtheImplementationofUrbanRenewalin2005.This

programaimedtoattractinvestmentsexceeding80billionNTdollarsfromthe

privatesector.Tospeedupthebusinessofurbanrenewalthegovernmentsetitself

thetaskofstreamliningproceduresforappropriatingpublicandprivately-owned

lands.Bydoingso,thegovernmenthopedtorendertheeconomyinvulnerableto

economicrecessionsandavoidhousingbubbles(CEPD2006).

Despitethechangeofregimes,thethirdstagewitnessedthestateaggressively

pushingurbanrenewalprojects.Insteadofonlyprovidingincentives,thestatewas

activelyinvolvedinlandappropriation,incentiveamplificationandmoreimportantly,

protestcontainmentbyresorttopoliceforces.Thegovernmentsawthe

requirementforurbanrenewalprojectstoacquirepermissionfromallinvolved

propertyowners,whoweremostlysmallanddecentralized,asthemainbarrierfor

urbanrenewal.Hence,achangeinthejurisdictionrequiringfullpermissionwas

unavoidable.

Thegovernmentinitiatedwavesoflawmodificationfrom2003onwards,

whichmainlytargetedtwoarticles;article25-1andarticle27.Ontheonehand,

Article25-1,announcedin1998,stipulatedthatrenewalprojectshadtocollectallof

thelandownerssignaturesbeforethegovernmentgrantedagreenlight.In2003

thisrequirementwasloweredto80%oftheownersinvolved,undertheinitiativesof


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22

lawmakersrelatedtotheTaiwanSolidarityUnion(TSU)whichwasaclosepolitical

allyofthethen-rulingDPPregime.Thegovernmentcouldusefinancialappraisal

institutionstoevaluatethevalueofthepropertyoflandownersthatdidnot

acquiescewiththerenewalprojects,andsettleontheamountofcompensationin

courtwithoutpermissionfromthelandownersinvolved.

Ontheotherhand,asstate-ownedlandswitholdbuildingsstillcoveredpartof

theurbanarea,theArticle27stipulatedthatallofthestate-ownedlandsinthe

vicinityoftherenewalprojectmustjointheprivately-initiatedproject.Moreover,

thisarticleloweredthethresholdofrenewalfrom80%ofthelandownersto80%of

theinvolvedlandarea.Asthemajorityoflandownersholdonlysmallplotsofland,

thethresholdchangeallowedthestate-ownedlands,whichwerecontrolledbythe

government,tobecomethecriticalactorinpassingtherenewalproject,and

speededupthejudiciaryprocessinrenewalprojects.Duetotheselawchanges,

renewalprojectsgainedlegislativepower,andtheirnumberexpandedgreatly,as

showninfigure1.

Fig.1.abouthere

Moreover,topromotepublic-privatepartnershipinurbanrenewalthe

governmentactivelystudiedthesepoliciesinothercountries.TheUKwasoneofthe

majorrolemodelsastheNewLaborRegimesturdilyimplementednewpoliciesfor

urbanregeneration(Lees2001).TheTaiwanesegovernmentinvitedexpertsfrom

theUKforlecturesessions,workshops,advisorygroups,andspecialtaskforces,and

dispatcheditscivilservantstotheUKforsiteandprojectobservation,andcourse


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23

training(WangandHuang2009).Oneofthemainoutcomesofthislearningprocess

wastheestablishmentoftheUrbanDevelopmentCorporations(UDC)modeled

aftertheJointPublic-PrivateCompanyforHousingandLandDevelopmentintheUK.

TheinitiativeoftheUDCaimedtoraisemorethan6billionNTdollar,ofwhich

thegovernmentandstate-ownedbankscontributed49%whileprivatedevelopers

contributedtheremaining51%.SuchaninstitutionaldesignallowedtheUDCto

operateasaprivatecompanywithpublicsupport.However,theoppositionparty

(theKMTthistime)criticizedtheUDCinitiative,andpushedthegovernmenttoallow

itsretreatfromthecompanyincasetheDPPwouldlosethe2008presidential

elections(UnitedNews,March52008).Notsurprisingly,theinitiativewasaborted

withtheendoftheDPPadministration.

UrbanrenewalprojectsflourishedaftertheKMTregainedpowerin2008.

PresidentMaYing-JiouproposedTheI-Taiwan12Project(TIT12P)inhiselection

campaign,andimplementeditafterhisinauguration.TIT12Pseesurbanrenewalas

akeytoolofeconomicgrowth,andcoversabudgetexceedingUS$3.8billionfor

urbanrenewalprojectsfrom2009to2012.Theprivatesectorisexpectedtocover1

billionUSdollaroftheentirebudget(CEPD2009).

Followingthecentralgovernmentsgentrificationpolicy,theTaipeiCity

governmentproposedtoincreasetheFARB(FloorAreaRatioBonus)with200%for

therenewalofhousesconstructedbefore1980.Ratherthantargetingrun-down

areas,thisnewpolicyprovideshugeincentivesforrenewingtheoldhouses

locatedinthecitycenter.TheTaipeiCityMayorHauLung-Pinclaimsthatthisisone

ofthemostinnovativeurbanpolicieseverproposedbythecitygovernment.The

policywillincreasehousingsupplytoprovidehousingtothoseeagertoowntheir


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ownplacebutsufferfromthesky-highhousingprices(TCG2010a).However,figure

2showsthattherenewalprojectsconcentrateintheDa-anandZhong-zheng

districtswheremostmiddle-to-upperclassesliveandaretheleastinneedofurban

renewal.Consequently,insteadofsuppressinghousingprices,thepolicy-ledurban

renewalprojectsbecomespeculativebusinessprojectsforlanddeveloperstoinvest

inthecitycenter.InmayorHaustermtherulingparty,theKMT,andtheopposition

party,theDPP,reachedconsensusabouttheimportanceofpromotinggentrification.

Theonlycontroversyamongthepartiesinvolvedconcernsthespeedof

implementationandthescopeofareacovered.TheDeputyMayorevenclaimsthat

thegentrificationpolicyisawin-winsituationforallpartiesinvolved;thecity

governmentrealizesabettercityview,citizengaincommunitieswithbetterhousing

andinfrastructure,anddevelopershaveprofitablebusinessopportunities(Lin2010).

Issuchamiraclepossible?

Fig.2.abouthere

ACriticalExamination:theIssueofDisplacement

IndefendingTaipeisgentrificationpolicyfromtheaccusationof

marginalizingthesociallyweakestgroups,particularlythemiddle-lowerclasses,

DeputyMayorLinarguesthatmostoftheTaipeicity-centerresidentareasare

inhabitedbythemiddleandhigherclassesandareowner-occupied,aswearean

87%house-ownershipsociety,sogentrificationprojectsdonotdisplacethepoor

peopleasoccurredinWesterncities(Lin2010).Ironically,suchadefenseexposes

theself-contradictionofthegentrificationpolicy.Thepolicyvowstorestructure


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25

dilapidatedurbanareas.However,30yearoldthehousingunitstargetedbythe

policycanhardlybecountedasrun-down.Neithercanmiddleandhigherclass

residentialareasbedesignatedasdilapidatedareas.Inotherwords,thereisno

justificationforthenecessityofurbanredevelopment.Infact,TaipeiCitysurban

renewalpolicyhasastrongspeculativenature.Thisspeculativepro-landdeveloper

policyattractedtheattentionoftheControlYuan,whichtookcorrectivemeasures

tocorrecttheTaipeicitygovernmentsurbanrenewalpolicyandworriesaboutthe

abuseoftheFARBincentivewhichleadstoaneglectofpublicinfrastructure(Control

Yuan2010).ThreeotherissuesareparticularlyatstakeinTaipeisgentrification

policy.

Firstly,whilethecitygovernmentclaimsthatitsgentrificationpolicywillnot

marginalizethelowerclasses,therealityisthatthesepeoplehavebeenexpelled

fromthecitycenterastheearlytwowavesofgentrificationpoliciescameoverthe

cityasshownabove.Thepeoplewhostayedininformalhousingorsquatterunits

wereevicted,andforcedtomoveoutofthecitycenter.Theyweredispersedtothe

urbanfringe,andwillbepushedfurtheroutofthecityifthegentrificationwaves

keeprollingoverthecity.

Secondly,despitethegovernmentsboastingofhighhousingownershiprates,

thiscouldalsoreflectashortcomingintheinstitutionsonthehousingmarket.6 In

fact,accordingtoHuaChang-I(2010),aseniorandrespectablehousingeconomist,

thisgovernment-claimedownershipratecannotreflecttherealityofhousing

ownershipinTaipeicity.Huaestimatesthatabout30%ofthehouseholdsare

tenants,and60%ownonehouse,7%owntwohouses,and3%own3ormore

6The housing ownership rate is calculated as the total house units divided by the total

number of household.


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26

houses.Inotherwords,theapproximaterateofhouseownershipliesaround70%.

Moreover,multiple-unithouseownersdonotleasetheirextrahousestotenants,so

thattheyremainvacant.Ownersdonotrentouttheirpropertyduetoaloopholein

Taiwanslandtaxregime.Accordingtothelandtaxlaw,onlywhenthelandproperty

changeshandswilllandvalueincrementtaxesbeleviedagainsttheproperty

owners.Thisleadstoanextremelylowlandtaxrate,sothatcostofholdinglandis

low.Somelandlordspreferkeepingtheirpropertyvacantforspeculativepurpose

withouttheburdenswhichrentingoutthepropertytotenantsbrings..Asaresult,

againsttheofficialrhetoricwhichexaggeratestheownershiprate,tenantssuffer

fromrentincreasesorevictioncausedbyurbanredevelopment.

Thirdly,evenifdirectdisplacementcausedbythegentrificationprojectis

relativelyinsignificant,othertypesofdisplacementareinevitable.Marcuse(1986)

indicatesthatexclusionarydisplacementfromgentrificationoccurswhenany

householdisnotpermittedtomoveintoadwelling,duetoachangeinconditions,

beyondthehouseholdsdirectcontrol,whichaffectsthatdwellingoritsimmediate

surroundings.Asshownintable2,landpricesincreaseonaverageby424.06%after

urbanrenewalwhichcreatesahugepressureforthecurrenttenantstomoveout

andpreventthosewhoareatsimilarsocio-economicstatustomovein.Moreover,

eventhoughtenantswhoareabletoresistthesedirectdisplacementpressuresmay

benefitfromneighborhoodimprovements,theymaystillsufferascritical

communitynetworksandlocalculturesaredisplaced(FreemanandBraconi,2004;

Atkinson,2000).Byfocusingitsdefenseoftheurbanrenewalpolicyontheissueof

directdisplacement,thegovernmentintentionallyignoresthefactthatthe

gentrificationprojectisspeculativeinnature,ratherthananurbanrenewalproject


27/32


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28

incorporateintourbanrenewalprojects.Providingincentivestoencourageprivate

developerstoparticipateingentrificationprojectsprovedfutile,astheinstitutional

system,includingaproperlegislativeframework,wasnotyetinplace.Thisis

reflectedinthefailureoftheestablishmentoftheJu-zhongcompanyasthestate

wasstillexpectedtoleadandexecuteurbanrenewal.Theideaofpublic-private

partnershipwascriticizedforitstendenciestorent-seekingbehaviorandraised

publicconcern.Notwithstanding,thegovernmentliberalizeditspoliciesinresponse

tothepoliticalandeconomiccrisesofthe1980s.Theprivatesectorwasgradually

grantedacriticalroleinurbanmanagementanddevelopment.

Underthelobbyoflanddeveloperinterestgroups,thestateengagedina

seriesoflawmodificationsinthethirdwavetoexpediteurbanrenewalprocedures

andlimitinterferencefromstubbornresistanceofanti-gentrificationresidents.

Ratherthanplayingtheroleofanimpartialinstitutionalmoderator,thestate

obviouslyprivilegedlandownersanddevelopersinsacrificeofthetenantsrightto

stayput.Consequently,thecentraldistrictsareregenerated,whilethedilapidated

areasaresidelined.Theurbanterritorybecomesadiscontinuousspaceconstituted

bythecollusionoftheliberalizedstateandprivatelandownergroups.

Thetransformationoftheroleofthestateisreflectedintheevolutionofits

urbanrenewalpolicyfromapublicinfrastructureprojecttoaprofitablebusiness

model.Inappearance,thestagesofgentrificationandthestatesroleinthemin

Taiwanaresimilartotheirwesterncounterparts(HackworthandSmith,2001).But,

detailedscrutinyrevealssubtledifferences.Insteadofactinginthespiritofurban

managerialisminwesternwelfarestateregimes(Harvey,1989),theKMTstate,an

authoritariandevelopmentalstate,shoulderedthejobofevictingsquattersand


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urbanrenewalwithanaimtopromoteurbanandeconomicdevelopment.Focusing

onurbaninfrastructureconstructionpoliticallylegitimizesthedevelopmentalist

regime.LikemanyotherThirdWorldcountries,theKMTstate,arulingregime

transplantedfromMainlandChinaisendowedwithanoverdevelopedpatriarchic

statemachinery,builttoextract,coerce,andpenetratesociety.Consequently,the

constructionofeconomicandurbaninfrastructurecanbeusedtoconcretely

demonstratethecaringforthepeopleunderthedevelopmentalstate.7

But,whoarethepeople?Thecapitalistdevelopmentalstateeventually

protectsthecapitalist(land)propertyrights.Bydoingso,thestatesecurespolitical

supportfromlandowner-cum-citizens,sothatapoliticalcultureofproperty

developsinwhichlocalcitizenshipispredicatedonownership(Blomley2004).Only

thosewhoownsharesoflandedpropertyinthecityarerecognizedascitizenswho

havetherighttostayputanddecideontheuseofurbanspaces.Suchapro-

propertyownershipviewisalsoreflectedinurbanpoliciestowardssocialhousing

construction.Asneighboringcommunitiesprotestagainstdesignatedsitesoflow-

incomerentedsocialhousing,MayorHauLung-Pinassures,contrarytohisre-

electioncampaignpromises,landowner-cum-citizensthatTaipeiCitywillnotallow

constructionprojectswithoutsupportfromtheneighboringcommunities(United

News,December13,2010).Landedpropertytrumpssocialconcernsandcoherence

inTaipeisliberalizedurbanpolicies!

7

Asato Saito (2002) calls such a developmental state as the public work state, which isbased on huge amount of public work projects constructing industrial infrastructure to winpeoples supports in Japan.


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