CON-QUER-ING

WORLDHUNGER

THE CASE STUDY OF BURKINA FASO

Source: book and original author

CONQUERING WORLD HUNGER

Dedicated to the next generat ion of Burk ina Faso, a country that has been act ive ly f ight ing against and s lowly overcoming hunger and poverty s ince the Burk inabe revolut ion (1983-1987 ) , one of the most profound revolut ions in Afr ica’s h is tory against the propert ied explo i ters at home and abroad.

Typefaces used

Univers: Light/ Light Oblique/ Roman/ Light Condensed Oblique/ Light Ultra Condensed/ Condensed/ Condensed Oblique/ Bold Condensed/ Bold Condensed Oblique. Rockwell: Regular/ Italic/ Bold/ Bold Italic. Letter Gothic Standard: Medium/ Bold.

The editor’s commentaries in the main body of text are in green univers 57 condensed typeface as used in this sentence.

AN INTRODUCTION TO HUNGER

THE BURKINABE REVOLUTION

BURKINABE ECONOMY IN RECOVERY

THE WAR TACTIC

CONQUERABLE

KNOW THY ENEMY FIRST

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AN INTRODUCTION TO HUNGER

Promoting self-reliance &

empowerment

Food aid?

Flawed market system

Concentration of power and wealth

Hunger in the US

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1

WORLD HUNGER AS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

THE CAUSE OF HUNGER

THE CAUSE OF POVERTY

PREVENTIVE SOLUTIONS

KNOW THYThe earth’s productive capacities are more than sufficient to provide adequate nutrition for every person, so it cannot be argued that malnutrition is somehow necessary and inevitable.

KNOW THYSahel savanna in SW Burkina

Faso, near Gbomblora on the

road from Gaoua to Batié:

Gbomblora is a department

or commune of Poni Province

in southern Burkina Faso.

Malnutrition is surely one of the most curable

of diseases. The earth’s productive capacities

are more than sufficient to provide adequate

nutrition for every person, so it cannot be

argued that malnutrition is somehow necessary

and inevitable. Since malnutrition generally means

the suffering of unnecessary and avoidable injury

or death, it can be viewed as resulting from a

form of violence. The violence of hunger is slow

and indirect, in contrast to the sort of direct

violence suffered during revolutions and inter-

national wars. It is due not so much to specific

actions of individual persons as to the social

structure in which individuals are embedded.

Tord Hoivik explains the concept of structural

violence in these terms (see figure 1): The defi-

nition of structural violence is based on the

gap between actual and potential conditions. . .

We take violence to mean the loss of life from

external and avoidable causes. Direct violence

has the form of acts directed against specific

individuals. . . . In structural violence, the

loss of life is caused by social conditions. . .

. We can recognize structural violence only at

the collective level, when we observe survival

rates that are too low relative to the resources

available. The cause of structural violence lies

in the social structure itself. When a society’s

means of survival, from clear water to qualified

medical assistance, are concentrated among the

upper classes, the majority of the population

has life expectancies lower than necessary.

In Johan Galtung’s conception of structural

violence, the basic idea is that there is such a

concept as “premature death.” This we know, because

we know that with some changes in social structure,

in general and health structure in particular,

life expectancy can be improved considerably. More

particularly, it may be possible to give to the

whole population the life expectancy of the class

enjoying appropriate health standards, that is, the

“upper classes.” The laevel enjoyed by them would

be an indicator of the potential possibility to

“stay alive” in that society; for all but the upper

classes that would be above the actual possibility

to stay alive. The difference when avoidable, is

structural violence. Premature deaths are attribut-

able not only to malnutrition but also to a host of

other factors including, particularly, sanitation

and health care services. However, it seems reason-

able to estimate that malnutrition accounts for

at least half of all structural violence. This is

especially apparent when we consider that sound nu-

trition can greatly increase an individual’s toler-

ance for poor sanitation or health care conditions.

WORLD HUNGER AS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

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Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘World Hunger as Structural Violence,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007)

We can recognize structural violence only at the collective level, when we observe survival rates that are too low relative to the resources available. The cause of structural violence lies in the social structure itself.

TORD HOIVIK’S CONCEPT OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCEfigure 1

Structural violences such as premature death. Premature death is attributed to Malnutrition, sanitation, healthcare services.

ACTUAL CONDITION:

more than sufficient resources to provide adequate nutrition for every person.

POTENTIAL CONDITION: FLAWED SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Source: compiled by the editor.

8,611,428

DEATHS PER YEAR

During the most deadly of wars,

World War II, overall casualty rate was 8,611,428 deaths per year.

20,000,000

These numbers show very

clearly that historically

hunger has been far more

devastating than warfare.

There is no escaping the

conclusion that hunger

around the world constitutes

a slow and silent holocaust.

Malnutritioncauses an estimated 10 to 20 million deaths each year.

DEATHS PER YEARDEATHS PER YEAR

THE CAUSE OF HUNGER

Ever since Malthus, poverty and malnutrition have

been “explained” with vague references to overpopu-

lation. In The Good Earth, Pearl Buck showed how

the highly populated China of the 1920s suffered

through extraordinary famine. With an even larger

population now, however, modern China knows very

little malnutrition. If the difficulty is not the

absolute size of the populations of nations, is

the issue really population density? On the whole,

Latin America is rather sparsely populated, but

still it knows extreme and extensive malnutrition.

Is the issue population growth rates? Many contem-

porary analysts are greatly concerned with popula-

tion growth rates and what their consequences will

be in the next few decades, but these rates hardly

account for the extensive malnutrition that is suf-

fered now. In every region except Africa, overall

food production has been increasing at a faster

rate than population growth. People are producers

as well as consumers. It cannot be assumed that

Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834)

Malthus was an English scholar, influential in political economy and demography. He thought that the dangers of population growth would preclude endless progress towards a Utopian society: “The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.”

there is a fixed amount of food and that with more

people there necessarily must be less for each per-

son. When there is another mouth to feed there is

also another pair of hands to produce. The crucial

question of whether consumption outruns production

depends on many factors that go beyond simple body

counts. If population really is such an impor-

tant factor in explaining hunger and malnutrition,

someone ought to say just how it is important. In

saying that population growth is not the primary

cause of hunger I do not mean to suggest that popu-

lation growth is not a problem. Perhaps the best

understanding is that presented by William Murdoch:

“Rapid population growth and inadequate food sup-

ply have a common origin and a joint explanation,”

or in other words, “rapid population growth does

not cause the food problem—they share common

causes.” These common causes are poverty and

inequality (see figure 2).

Population growth

Population growth

CONVENTIONAL VIEW

BETTER VIEW

Poverty

Poverty

Hunger

Hunger

PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF POPULATION GROWTHfigure 2

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“ “

The sources of hunger seem to be well known. By

most accounts the major factors behind food short-

ages are overpopulation, rising affluence, igno-

rance, weather disturbances, arid the shortage of

resources such as land, water, energy, and fertil-

izer. These conventional explanations are often

accepted rather thoughtlessly. How well do these

factors explain hunger in the United States? The

problem in this country is certainly not one

of having too large a population (demand) in

relation to the total amount of land or water

or energy resources (supply). The nation devotes

an enormous amount of money to schooling, so it

would be hard to see how education could be a major

factor. Although not the highest in the world, the

agricultural productivity of the United States,

measured on a per acre basis, is quite good. These

explanations offered to account for hunger else-

where just don’t work for the United States.

The problem in the United States may not be as

serious as it is elsewhere, but it is important

when we face the challenge of explaining hunger.

The problem clearly is not one of total

quantities but one of distribution. Why does this

maldistribution exist? Why is it that with more

than adequate per capita food supplies there is

still extensive malnutrition in the United States?

Hunger in the US

Rapid population growth does not cause the food problem— they share common causes.

These common causes are poverty and inequality.

Surely, the major cause of hunger and malnutrition

everywhere is poverty—it is the primary cause, but

obviously not the only cause. There are varieties

of middle- and upper-class malnutrition, as shown

by common obesity, heart disease, and other ail-

ments, but really widespread malnutrition—chronic

under nutrition—generally comes from not having

enough money to obtain adequate-food; If you have

money you eat well, no matter how fast the popula-

tion around you is growing and no matter how short

the supplies of energy or land or fertilizer. Money

is a good defense even against natural calamities.

Famine in the African Sahel is sometimes explained

by reference to local drought, but if the American

Midwest suffered through comparable weather dis-

turbances, American consumers would suffer no more

than minor inconvenience. If there is a shortage in

U.S. grain supplies, the most serious effects are

likely to be felt in the Soviet Union or in Asia,

not in the United States itself. It is the rules

of the marketplace that decide who gets what to

eat. In our Basic economics courses that seemed

a rather sound system, but there it was implic-

itly assumed that everyone had about the same

amount of money, and that the main differences

among us were differences in tastes. The fact

is that we have enormously, different capacities

to bid for goods in the market place.

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Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Cause of Hunger,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007).

There is widespread agreement that hunger is caused

primarily by poverty; unfortunately, however, most

accounts leave it at that.. We really should not

leave the question, satisfied with that explana-

tion. We should go on and try to account for pov-

erty itself. Large or rapidly growing populations

do not adequately explain the incidence of poverty

any more than they explain the incidence of hunger.

Some observers, recognizing that the problem in the

United States is not one of insufficient resources,

point to the unscrupulous activities of individuals

in government or industry, or to bungling, lazi-

ness, and ignorance either among bureaucrats or

among the victims of hunger. While the charges may

be true, hunger in America does not need scoundrels

or incompetents to explain it. Just like the vague

references to ecological limits, those charges do

not provide an adequate explanation. I agree with

Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, authors

of Food First, who argue that hunger and poverty

are primarily due to the concentration of control

over resources in just a few hands. But why does

this concentration of control exist and persist? In

my judgment, it is the ordinary, normal work-

ing of the prevailing market system that leads

THE CAUSE OF POVERTY

to poverty, and thus to widespread malnutrition

and hunger. It is obvious that the market system

prevents people from getting adequate food if they

are poor. It is not so obvious that the market also

helps to make them and keep them poor. The differ-

ences in our wealth levels are not accidental,

nor are they given by nature. They are certainly

not due simply to differences in our intelli-

gence or in our motivation to work. Many among

those who work the hardest are paid the least.

In her text on Nutrition and the World Food Crisis,

Mary Caliendo says that “faulty marketing systems

are prevalent in many developing nations. Systems

for marketing and the institutions, infrastruc-

tures, and modes of operation are often ineffi-

cient.” This may sound similar to what I am saying,

but it is really very different. Caliendo’s view is

that a defective market system can lead to poverty

and malnutrition. In contrast, I am saying that the

ordinary, normally operating market system leads to

poverty and malnutrition. Caliendo says that “many

parts of the social body suffer when the marketing

system breaks down,” but I say that the social body

suffers when the marketing system operates as it is

supposed to operate.

In the economist’s theoretical free market based

on pure competition, prices are determined by

costs—that is, by the amounts of capital and labor

expended in production. In the real world, however,

prices are determined by the “reciprocal demands of

the exchanging parties.” In other words, it is the

parties’ relative bargaining powers that deter-

mine the terms of exchange. The poor have little

bargaining power. By “market system” or “market

economy” I mean any social system in which economic

outcomes are determined primarily by freely nego-

tiated transactions between independent parties,

uncoerced by government or other regulations. In

a pure or totally free market of the sort that

Flawed market systemeconomists theorize about, prices are deter-

mined entirely by supply-demand relationships,

but these prices can be understood as resulting

from a sort of implicit negotiation process. The

major point of unreality in the idealized free

market is the assumption that all buyers and

sellers are of equal bargaining power. Even if

it were possible to start a market economy with

parties of equal bargaining power, it would not

stay that way. The account is somehow overlooked

by many economists, but the way in which the market

system concentrates power in the hands of some and

impoverishes others is very simple. The elementary

transaction of the market system is the bargain,

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The market system explains the existence of poverty, and it explains the endless re-creation of poverty.

By circular causation with cumulative effects, a country superior in productivity and income will tend to become more superior, while a country on an inferior level will tend to be held down at that level or even to deteriorate further— as long as matters are left to the free unfolding of market forces.

the negotiated exchange. One’s bargaining strength

depends on the quality of one’s alternatives. Some

people (or companies, or countries) are stronger

than others.’ They have better options. Those who

have greater bargaining strength tend to gain more

out of each transaction than those who have lesser

bargaining strength. Thus, over repeated transac-

tions, stronger parties will systematically enlarge

their advantages over weaker parties. Bargainers

do not move to an equilibrium at which the benefits

are equally distributed, but instead move apart,

with the gap between them steadily widening.

Asymmetrical exchange feeds on itself, making

the situation more and more asymmetrical.

By circular causation with cumulative

effects, a country superior in productivity

and income will tend to become more superior,

while a country on an inferior level will

tend to be held down at that level or even

to deteriorate further—as long as matters are

left to the free unfolding of market forces.

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THE FREE MARKET ALLO

LDREN.feed their “the losers can

Many products imported to serve as pet food in

rich countries could have been used for direct

human consumption in poor countries.We know

this food is in very great demand by the fact that

much of the pet food sold in the United States

is actually eaten by people who cannot afford

any better. An educated guess has it that one-third

of the pet food purchased in slums is eaten by

humans, and “pet foods constitute a significant

part of the diet of at least 225,000 American

households, affecting some 1 million persons.”

BETTER THAN

“WS the big winners to

PETSfeed their

CHI

THE FREE MARKET ALLO

Concentration of power and wealthconcentration . . . “ and that “only the biggest

firms can proliferate new products and monopolize

supermarket space.” But we should continue to ask

why? Big firms have a great deal of power, but why

did they get big in the first place? Large corpora-

tions are partly a cause in the system, but they

can also be seen as effects. In my view, the steady

concentration of power in a few large corporations

is a natural and predictable effect of the working

of the economic system. The source of the problems

does not lie in the corporations themselves but

in the underlying economic system that creates and

recreates them (see figure 3). Carol Foreman, shortly

before becoming assistant secretary in the U.S.

Department of Agriculture, said that the problem

“is increased economic concentration in those seg-

ments of the food industry that sell to or buy from

farms . . . “ and suggested that “the solution is

to restore true free enterprise to the food indus-

try.” Free enterprise can be highly productive and

can yield a fair distribution of benefits—so long

as there are many small producers working primarily

for themselves. The difficulty is that such a free

enterprise system will not remain free. Foreman,

with others, fails to see that the market system

itself produces the concentration she wants

abolished. Such systems are not stable; over

time they would not tend toward equity for all

at some middling level.

Many observers attribute high food prices and hun-

ger and malnutrition to the concentrated power and

activities of the giant food conglomerates and mul-

tinational corporations such as Unilever, General

Foods, Ralston Purina, and H. J. Heinz. I think

they are right. But suppose we go further and ask

how these conglomerates came to be formed. Again,

no conspiracies, no white-collar crimes are needed

to explain it. The tendency toward concentration

of power is a natural consequence of the normal

working of the market system. The FAO also has

said there is a need to press to root causes: The

causes of inadequate nutrition are many and closely

interrelated, including ecological, sanitary and

cultural constraints, but the principal cause is

poverty. This, in turn, results from socio-economic

development patterns which in most of the poorer

countries have been characterized by a high degree

of concentration of power, wealth and incomes in

the hands of relatively small elites of national or

foreign individuals or groups.

Where did that concentration come from? In

many poor countries inequality has its roots

in their colonial history. However, if the source

were those historical events alone, their

effects could be expected to diminish over time.

It is quite obvious that the effects of histori-

cal colonialism are being sustained and even

amplified through an ongoing social structure,

a neocolonialism. The core of that structure

is the market relationship.

A flier on the U.S. food industry from Lappe and

Collins’ Institute for Food and Development Policy

(IFDP) poses the question, “Why growing concentra-

tion?” It answers that “advertising contributes to

How do we solve the poverty issue,thus hunger?

Instead, it is inherent in the structure and

dynamics of the market system that it produces

concentrations of power at one end and impover-

ishment at the other, squeezing out the middle.

That squeeze leaves many people hungry.

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Concentration of power & wealthMarket system

Colonial history

Over populationWealth

Ignorance

Inadequate resources

Corruption

Greed

Poverty Hunger

LARGE CIRCLES: major casual factors leading to hunger.

SMALLER CIRCLES: causes judged to be relatively minor.

MAJOR & MINOR CAUSE OF HUNGER figure 3

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Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Cause of Poverty,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007).

How do we solve the poverty issue,

PREVENTIVE SOLUTIONS Promoting self-reliance & empowerment

Extension programs designed to help farm-

ers figure out their own answers to their own

problems generally are much more empowering

than programs designed simply to deliver fixed

answers worked out in some remote laboratory.

Direct feeding programs carried on over an ex-

tended period of time are likely to be weakening

to the recipients, destroying their incentive to

provide for themselves.

True preventive solutions to the problem: a. Strategies of increasing self- reliance are strategies of disengagement. b. Strategies of empowerment are designed to enhance the capacities of the weak to deal with the strong so that, over time, the distinction fades away and they instead deal with each other on an equitable basis.

During the Burkina Faso revolution (1983-1987), Thomas Sankara successfully employed a combination of the first and the second strategies to overcome the poverty and hunger in his nation. More on this in the following chapter.

to the purported beneficiaries. Which of these

labels applies depends not only on the general type

of program but also on the concrete contextual

circumstances under which it is carried out.

In short-term emergency situations, however, direct

feeding programs ‘can be strengthening in that they

can help people to “get back on their feet” so that

they can resume providing for themselves. Food aid,

whether in domestic welfare programs or interna-

tional assistance programs, typically is symptom-

atic, curative relief.

Are curative nutrition intervention programs

appropriate under oppressive social condi-

tions? To put the dilemma starkly, if a man is

lying under a crushing weight, do you administer

balms to soothe him and thus make life under that

weight more tolerable? Under what conditions is it

appropriate to help people adapt to systems that

themselves should be substantially changed? Escape

from the dilemma may come from asking in what ways

is it right to make the intolerable more tolerable?

In my view, the answer lies in learning to make the

distinction between interventions that strengthen

and interventions that weaken. Any remedial program

that increases dependence on a bad system should

not be sustained. Programs should be devised that

move away from, rather than reinforce, that system.

To revert to the highway analogy, the solution to

highway congestion is not more highways, but rather

other more congenial alternatives such as bicycle

paths. The solution to the hunger problem does

If one accepts the central argument of this study—

that the major cause of poverty and hunger is the

normal working of the market system, both within

and among nations—then remedies would require

either replacement of the market system with some

other system (such as a planned economy) or adapta-

tion of the market system (with interventions such

as welfare programs). The core of the analysis of-

fered here is not simply that the market system is

flawed but, more precisely, that poverty and hunger

result from unequal power relationships that are an

inherent part of that system.

Strategies of increasing self-reliance are strate-

gies of disengagement a. With increasing self-reli-

ance those who do not like prevailing rules of the

game—set up by others to serve the interest of oth-

ers—opt out and set up their own alternative rules.

Strategies of empowerment are designed to enhance

the capacities of the weak to deal with the strong

so that, over time, the distinction fades away and

they instead deal with each other on an equitable

basis. b. These two strategies are closely intercon-

nected because, as argued earlier, the major de-

terminant of one’s bargaining power is how well off

one would be in the absence of agreement with the

other party. The better off one would be if there

were no agreement, the more demanding one can be in

negotiating the terms of any proposed agreement.

Thus increasing one’s self-reliance can be seen not

simply as an end in itself but as a means of em-

powerment, allowing one to face others with greater

bargaining strength.

All nutrition interventions, as all development

programs are either strengthening or weakening

Thus it follows that true preventive solutions to

the problem require altering power relation-

ships through either disengagement of the weak

from the strong or enhancement of the power of

the weak relative to the strong—or through some

combination of the two.

17

not lie in promoting growth and trade that are

the essence of the market system, but rather it

lies in alternatives to the market system. The

problem of hunger will not be solved by increasing

dependency on market mechanisms but by finding ways

to enhance the power of those who are chronically

undernourished.

Developed countries regularly promote the idea

of a world of interdependence. We are led to

understand interdependence as meaning cooperation—

healthy interactions in trade and other sectors

that work to the benefit of all involved parties.

But interdependence can also mean dominance.

While those at the top of the world like to

think of interdependence as essentially

symmetrical, reflecting horizontal connections,

many others see it as vertical, with

themselves at the bottom. Many fear that

strengthening interdependence means

strengthening the grip of the rich on the poor.

In a situation of asymmetrical interdependence—

that is, dominance—the interacting parties

are very unequal, so that interaction

between them can lead to the more powerful

party’s benefiting substantially more than

the weaker party. The result is exploitation,

not cooperation.

When one finds oneself on the wrong end of a

structure of dominance, one remedy is to detach

from it. More specifically, if it is primarily

the market system that creates and recreates pov-

erty, the poor would be well advised to disconnect

from that system as much as possible. Increasing

independence can be achieved by increasing self-

reliance, and thus reducing one’s vulnerability

to exploitation by others. However, it should be

understood that the goal of self-reliance is not

autarky, isolated self-sufficiency. After self-

reliance is achieved, interaction with others

should be resumed. But then, since the individual

or nation would not depend on those interactions,

it would not have to accept whatever terms were

offered. Increasing self-reliance increases

one’s capacity to say no. That is, in the

exchange relationship, one’s bargaining power

depends on the quality of one’s alternatives.

If you depend totally on the local market for your

food supplies, you must accept the prices presented

to you. However, if you can provide for yourself

in other ways, you can press for better terms in

the market. Even if you do not actually use those

alternatives, the fact that they are available in

the background increases your bargaining power.

The achievement of increasing (not necessarily

total) self-reliance is not the end in itself, but

only a stage in the transition to the achievement

of healthy, equitable, cooperative relationships.

A high level of self-reliance is essential if in-

teractions are to be symmetrical rather than of the

dominant submissive kind that leads to exploita-

tion. We should not arrest development at the stage

of isolated self-sufficiency because we need one

another, materially and psychologically. We become

less than human if we do not interact. Nations,

too, need to exchange resources and services, and

they are mutually enriched through interaction. We

need one another, but on the basis of equality and

mutual respect, and not on the basis of subservi-

ence of one to the other.

As argued earlier, one of the major sources

of inequities is the phenomenon of displaced

decision-making. People suffer because they bear

the consequences of decisions made by others in

the service of others’ interests. The problems

that arise out of the disjunction between produc-

ers’ interests and consumers’ interests vanishes

when the producer and the consumer are the same.

This is the essential political rationale for

For decades, many African nations have been the weaker side of the asymmetrical interdependence– in servitude to European countries’ colonial subjection.

Refer to author’s note on page 50.

Thus the increasing capacity for self-reliance

improves the quality of your relationships in

the marketplace.

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Food aid typically is not based on any sort of

systematic analysis of the sources of malnutrition.

It does not address the causes. Food aid can be

ineffective or, worse, it can be counter-productive

through its diminishing local incentives to

produce food.

There is another more serious sense in which

food aid can be counterproductive. If the presently

prevailing social system is judged to be

fundamentally unjust, and if food aid and other

ameliorative programs are what permit the system

to continue, then in the long term those

ameliorative programs block needed changes. Band-

Aids can get in the way of radical surgery.

Indeed, ameliorative measures may be undertaken

Promoting self-reliance & empowermentfor precisely that purpose. Large-scale programs

such as the development of high yielding

varieties (HYV) of grains may be undertaken for

similar reasons. The “Green Revolution,” according

to Susan George, was, in fact, an alternative

to agrarian reform, which implies redistribution

of power; it was a means of increasing food

production without upsetting entrenched interests.”

It may be that food aid and welfare programs

are kept just at that minimum level required

to give people a continuing stake in the system

and make them resist temptations to take more

radical measures. In making them more tolerable,

cures may tend to perpetuate problems.

subsistence food production. Increasing self-

reliance in food means increasing emphasis

on local production for local consumption.

This approach may be applied at the regional

level (for example, Southeast Asia) or the

national, state, county, village, family,

or individual levels. In general, the

shorter the exchange loops, the less likely

that there will be extreme concentrations

either of wealth or of poverty.

Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘Preventive Solutions,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007).

Changes & progresses made

22

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BURKINA FASO

THE BURKINABE REVOLUTION

THE COLONIAL ERA

1983-1987

1898-1960

THE BURKINABE REVOLUTION2

TACTICTHE WAR “ “

-Thomas Sankara, the leader of the revolution7

I bring you fraternal greetings from a country whose seven million children, women, and men refuse to die of ignorance, hunger, and thirst any longer.

Thomas Sankara, the leader of the Burkinabe revolution

TACTICTHE WAR

Peaks of Fabedougou, a village

in the Bérégadougou Department of

Comoé Province in south-western

Burkina Faso.

Source: Burkinabé government inforoute communale.

Burkina Faso – also known by its short-form name

Burkina – is a landlocked country in west Africa.

Burkina Faso is divided into thirteen regions (see

figure 4), forty-five provinces, and 301 departments.

The country’s capital is Ouagadougou in Centre

region. Its size is 274,200 square kilometers

(105,900 sq mi) with an estimated population of

more than 15,757,000. Formerly called the Repub-

lic of Upper Volta, it was renamed on 4 August

1984, by President Thomas Sankara, to mean “the

land of upright people” in Mòoré and Dioula, the

major native languages of the country. The inhab-

itants of Burkina Faso are known as Burkinabè.

Burkina Faso has a primarily tropical climate with

two very distinct seasons. In the rainy season, the

country receives between 600 and 900 millimeters

(23.6 and 35.4 in) of rainfall; in the dry season,

the harmattan – a hot dry wind from the Sahara –

blows. Three climatic zones can be defined: the

Sahel, the Sudan-Sahel, and the Sudan-Guinea. The

Sahel in the north typically receives less than 600

millimeters (23.6 in) of rainfall per year and has

high temperatures, 5–47 degrees Celsius (41–116.6

°F). Water shortages are often a problem, espe-

cially in the north of the country.

Burkina Faso was populated between 14,000 and 5000

BC by hunter-gatherers in the country’s northwest-

ern region. Farm settlements appeared between 3600

and 2600 BC. What is now central Burkina Faso was

principally composed of Mossi kingdoms. After a de-

cade of intense rivalry and competition between the

British and the French, waged through treaty-making

expeditions under military or civilian explorers,

the Mossi kingdom of Ouagadougou was defeated by

French colonial forces and became a French protec-

torate in 1896. The eastern region and the western

region, where a standoff against the forces of the

powerful ruler Samori Ture complicated the situ-

ation, came under French occupation in 1897. By

1898, the majority of the territory corresponding

to Burkina Faso today was nominally conquered. The

French and British convention of 14 June 1898 ended

the scramble between the two colonial powers and

drew the borders between the countries’ colonies.

BURKINA FASO

23

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Waterfalls at Karfiguela,

a village in the Banfora

Department of Comoé Province

in south-western Burkina Faso.

Lake Dourtenga, in Dourtenga,

departement of Dourtenga,

province of Koulpélogo. 1999

1 0Boucle du Mouhoun

9Hauts-Bassins

8Cascades

7Sud-Ouest

6Centre-Ouest 5

Centre-Sud

4Centre-Est

1 3Est

1 2Sahel

1 1Nord

3Centre-Nord

2Plateau-Central

1Centre

Primary school

in Dourtenga. 2008

Typical street scene in

Quagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Source: United Nations square-by GNU

licence by Helge Fahrnberger

1

4

THIRTEEN REGIONS OF BURKINA FASOfigure 4

25

In the village of Dourtenga,

departement of Dourtenga,

province of Koulpélogo.

February 2004

An aerial view of Ouagadougou

A village pump in BF,08 the

ree nursery is situated next

to the water pump in the

village to make watering.

Balga of Est. February 2010

4

1

13

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On the French side, a war of conquest against lo-

cal communities and political powers continued for

about five years. In 1904, the largely pacified

territories of the Volta basin were integrated

into the Upper Senegal and Niger colony of French

West Africa as part of the reorganization of the

French West African colonial empire. Between 1915

and 1916, the districts in the western part of

what is now Burkina Faso and the bordering eastern

fringe of Mali became the stage of one of the most

important armed oppositions to colonial government,

known as the Volta-Bani War. The French government

finally suppressed the movement. French Upper Volta

was established on 1 March 1919. This move was a

result of French fears of the recurrence of armed

uprising along with economic considerations, and to

bolster its administration, the colonial government

separated the present territory of Burkina Faso

from Upper Senegal and Niger. The new colony was

named Haute Volta. The colony was later dismantled

on 5 September 1932, being split up between the

Côte d’Ivoire, French Sudan and Niger. The decision

to split the colony was reversed during the intense

anti-colonial agitation that followed the end of

World War II. On 4 September 1947, the colony was

revived as a part of the French Union, with its

Market in Banfora, the capital

of the Comoe province. 2006 8

27

Central Market in Bobo-

Dioulasso, the second largest

city after Oagadougou. 2006

9

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previous boundaries. In 1955, under impact of co-

lonial revolution happening around the world, rep-

resentatives from 29 countries of Africa and Asia

held conference in Bandung, Indonesia. A revision

in the organization of French Overseas Territories

began with the passage of the Basic Law (Loi Cadre)

of 23 July 1956. This act was followed by reorgani-

zational measures approved by the French parliament

early in 1957 to ensure a large degree of self-

government for individual territories. Upper Volta

became an autonomous republic in the French com-

munity on 11 December 1958. Full independence from

France was received in 1960.

After gaining independence in 1960, the country

underwent many governmental changes until arriving

at its current form, a semi-presidential repub-

lic. In 1961, it joined nonaligned movement. The

purpose of the organization as stated in the speech

given by Fidel Castro during the Havana Declaration

of 1979 is to ensure “the national independence,

sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of

non-aligned countries” in their “struggle against

imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism,

and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation,

domination, interference or hegemony as well as

against great power and bloc politics.” In 1983,

in the midst of political turmoils, Thomas Sankara

led a popular uprising in Burkina Faso, then

Upper Volta, which initiated one of the most

profound revolutions in Afria’s history against

the propertied exploiters at home and abroad.

The revolution lasted for four years and ended in

1987 when Blaise Compaoré betrayed his long-time

friend and ally Thomas Sankara seized power in a

coup d’état with French help. Compaoré has been

the president since, reelected for three times.

Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘Burkina Faso,’ are adapted from “Burkina Faso.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation.

AINof local assetsand in terms of

DRTAXATION &EXPLOITATION

MIGRATION.The French tax burden destroyed the

foundations of the economic system in which

it operated while simultaneously providing

the colonial administration with the means to

establish a new economy.

The French improved transport and communication

infrastructures and introduced cotton around

1900. But with the introduction of cotton came

the disruption of traditional cultures,

compounding drought and in turn causing famines

and epidemics in 1908 and 1914.

acted as a

COLONIAL ECONOMIC POLICY

both in terms of

AINDR

THE COLONIAL ERA

FRO

M 1898–1960

Because of its limited natural resources and

harsh climate, Upper Volta was relegated to the

back burner of French colonial economic devel-

opment. Until about World War I, the French

were merely a drain on the local economy. Wary

of the potential budgetary consequences of

its colonial advances, France had passed a

law in 1900 requiring that colonial govern-

ments be supported by the colonized. For

local administrators, this meant taxing the

indigenous. Taxation was carried to such an ex-

treme in Burkina that it turned into a system-

atic expropriation of the assets of Africans.

Taxes were first collected in seeds, livestock,

and cowries and later in French francs. Louis

Tauxier reviews the consequences of this level

of taxation: “The Mossi were compelled to re-

sort to trade in order to obtain the French

money they did not have.... To meet this dif-

ficult situation the Mossi now organize small

caravans in the villages, and send the young

men . . . to sell cattle, sheep, goats, asses,

horses, and bolts of cotton. They bring back

with them either French money or kola nuts.”

For lack of administrative resources and income

data, the French resorted to a head tax, ir-

respective of wealth and income, and to an

ad valorem tax on trading caravans that passed

through the colony.

With the creation of the colony of Upper Volta,

Governor Hessling undertook several economic

development projects. Construction boomed in

Ouagadougou to support the new administration:

Roads, government buildings, schools, a hospi-

tal, and a football stadium were built in the

new capital. The commercial production of cot-

ton was also encouraged. But, the exploitation

of Voltaic labor continued, forcing “thousands

of Mossi and other Voltaics [to flee] Ouagadou-

gou and the labor recruiters in the countryside

and [migrate] to the Gold Coast” during the

Hessling years. Increases in taxation contin-

ued as well. The culture of rubber, unsuccess-

ful earlier in the century, was resumed in the

late 1920s, and ground nuts were introduced. In

1930, however, the worldwide recession reached

Upper Volta, and prices for its commodities

collapsed. A drought compounded the crisis in

1931. Deprived of many of their assets and

weakened by emigration, Voltaics fared poorly

in the slump that eventually turned into a full

fledged famine. The administration took stock

of the economic failure of Upper Volta and the

heavy emigration—which betrayed its comparative

labor advantage—and partitioned the colony.

The partition of Upper Volta marked a return to

exploitation at the expense of development. The

main economic reason behind the partition was

the French attempt to redirect the migration

of workers away from the Gold Coast and toward

its own colonies. Cote d’lvoire benefited from

Voltaic labor in agriculture (mostly in cof-

fee and cocoa plantations and in the timber

industry) and for its infrastructure projects

(the port of Abidjan, the railway to Bobo-Dio-

ulasso). Sudan put Voltaics to work on agricul-

ture projects around the Niger River and on the

railway between Bamako and Dakar. Although most

of these projects had used Voltaic labor before

1933, the colony’s partition increased the flow

By forcing people to sell their assets, the French tax burden destroyed the foundations of the economic system in which it operated while simultaneously providing the colonial administration with the means to establish a new economy. The French improved transport and communication infrastructures and introduced cotton around 1900. But with the introduction of cotton came the disruption of traditional cultures, compounding drought and in turn causing famines and epidemics in 1908 and 1914. The French did little to help the Voltaics.

31

of workers and facilitated their administra-

tion by the French. Meanwhile, Upper Volta’s

development remained neglected and hampered by

the depletion of its labor force. In the period

that followed World War II and the re-creation

of Upper Volta, the French renewed their ear-

lier emphasis on general infrastructure and

agricultural development. By 1954 the railroad

from Abidjan reached Ouagadougou. Emigration

continued, however, as employment prospects in

Cote d’lvoire and Ghana still exceeded those

in Upper Volta. Agricultural credit was made

…the exploitation of Voltaic labor continued, forcing “thousands of Mossi and other Vol-taics [to flee] Ouagadougou and the labor recruiters in the countryside and [migrate] to the Gold Coast” during the Hessling years. Increases in taxation continued as well. The culture of rubber, unsuccessful earlier in the century, was resumed in the late 1920s, and groundnuts were introduced. In 1930, howev-er, the worldwide recession reached Upper Volta, and prices for its commodities col-lapsed. A drought compounded the crisis in

1931. Deprived of many of their assets and

weakened by emigration, Voltaics fared

poorly in the slump that eventually turned

into a full-fledged famine.

available, and irrigation works were begun

(including the first studies for the future

Sourou Valley scheme), but cash-crop production

remained at low levels, with annual sales of no

more than 4,000 tons of cotton seed. Livestock

production, in contrast, increased substantial-

ly, making Upper Volta the first West African

producer of meat. The 1950s witnessed the be-

ginning of the industrial exploitation of Pou-

ra’s gold and the setting up of the Service des

Mines. The first studies for the exploitation

of Tambao’s manganese were also undertaken.

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Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Colonial Era,’ are adapted from Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa, (Colorado: Westview, 1996).

THE BURKINABE REVOLUTION

F ROM 19 83 -19 87

The leader of the revolution, Thomas Sankara, was

born in December 1949 in Yako in the center of the

country. When Sankara was getting his training in

Madagascar as a soldier, tens of thousands of work-

ers and students organized mass demonstrations and

strikes in 1972 that toppled the government. The

scope and character of the popular mobilization had

a deep impact on him. It was also in Madagascar

that Sankara first became acquainted with Marxism,

through study groups and discussions with students

from France who had been part of the May 1968 pre-

revolutionary upsurge there. During a subsequent

stay in France in the late 1970s, taking training

as a paratrooper, Sankara scoured bookstores for

revolutionary literature, studying, among other

things, works by communist leaders Karl Marx and

V.I. Lenin. A lieutenant in Upper Volta’s army,

Sankara came to prominence as a military leader

during a border conflict with Mali in December

1974 and January 1975, a war he later denounced as

“useless and unjust.” Over the next several years,

Jailed briefly in 1982 after resigning a government

post to protest the regime’s repressive policies,

Sankara was appointed prime minister in January

1983 in the wake of a coup that made Jean-Baptiste

Ouedraogo the president of the country. Sankara

used that platform to urge the people of Upper

Volta and elsewhere in Africa to advance their

interests against the propertied exploiters at

home and abroad. This uncompromising course led to

growing conflict with proimperialist forces in the

government. In May Ouedraogo had Sankara and some

of his supporters arrested. But, in face of street

protests by thousands, Ouedraogo transferred San-

kara from prison to house arrest. In the following

months, social tensions deepened across the

country, heading toward a political showdown.

On August 4, 1983, some 250 soldiers led by Captain

Blaise Compaore marched from an insurgent military

base in Po to the capital of Ouagadougou. The

regime of Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo was overthrown

in a popular uprising. Sankara became president

of the new National Council of the Revolution.

Over the next four years the popular revolutionary

government under Sankara’s leadership organized

the peasants, workers, and young people to carry

out deep-going economic and social measures that

curtailed the rights and prerogatives of the

region’s landed aristocracy and wealthy merchants.

They joined with working people the world over to

oppose imperialist domination. Mass organizations

of peasants, craftsmen, workers, youth, women,

and elders were initiated.

Thomas Sankara linked up with other junior

officers and soldiers dissatisfied with the

oppressive conditions in Upper Volta perpetu-

ated by the imperialist rulers in Paris and else-

where, with the support of landlords, business-

men, tribal chieftans, and politicians at home.

33

“ The democratic and popular revolution needs a convinced people, NOT a conquered people, not a people simply enduring their fate.

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Rally on Orodara

during revolution.

“

Thomas Sankara

“ A NEW PEASANT– serious, aware of his responsibilities,

turning to the future by arming himself with new technology.

Changes & progresses made

Upper volta, 1979. A peasant

cultivates milet using back-

breaking short-handled hoe.

200 volunteers build irrigation

dam near Puahigouya, September

1984, with women carrying stones

over half a mile to men working

at site. Between 1983 and 1987,

32 dams were built, compared to

20 in previous 23 years.

The revolution gives birth to

Tomato harvest, Sourou valley, 1986.

As a result of the creation of a dam

and irrigation system, people were

mobilized in this northern valley to

channel the river.

With broad popular support, the government

abolished tribute payments and compulsory

labor services to village chiefs.

It nationalized the land to guarantee rural

toilers—some 90 percent of the population—access

to the fruits of their labors as productive farmers.

The government launched tree-planting and

irrigation projects to increase productivity

and stop the advance of the desert in the Sahel

region in the north of the country.

The prices peasants received from the government

for basic food crops were increased.

1 .

2 .

3 .

4 .

3

3

“

Thomas Sankara

35BURKINA FASO AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION

POPULATION 7,964,705 (1985) 90% in rural areas

NONAGRICULTURAL WORKERS

40,000 government 20,000 industrial handicrafts & manufacturing 10,000 construction

SURFACE AREA 105,869 sq. mi./ 274,200 sq. km

CAPITAL Ouagadougou

AVERAGE YEARLY INCOME US$150 (1981)

CURRENCY CFA franc During 1983-1987, this fluctuated between 300 and 500 to the US dollar

NATIONAL BUDGET 58 billion CFA francs (1985)

MAIN PRODUCTION & EXPORT GOODS

Cotton, hides and skins, live stocks, shea nut products, gold

ETHNIC GROUPS Over 60, among them: Mossi Peul Gourmantche Curunsi Bissa Samo Lobi Senufo Marka Bobo

53.0% 7.8% 7.0% 6.0% 3.0% 2.0% 2.5% 2.2% 1.7% 1.6%

53.0% 8.8% 6.6%

LANGUAGES SPOKEN Official language: French

Over 60 spoken, among them: Moore Diula Fulfulde

ILLITERACY 92% 98% in rural areas

HEALTH Life expectancy 43.8 years (1980)

Maternal mortality rate 601 per 100,000 live births (1985)

Doctors Nurses Midwives Assistant midwives

1 for every 37,494 (1988) 1 for every 12,366 (1988) 1 for every 28,397 (1988) 1 for every 31,267 (1988)

Infant mortality rate 208 per 1,000 live births (1981)

Refer to number 5 on the next page to see the improvement of the situation during the revolution.

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figure 5

4

“

Led by Sankara, the Burkinabe Revolution charted

a course of internationalist solidarity with

those fighting oppression and exploitation in

Africa and worldwide.

Sankara championed the fight of the people of

Western Sahara against the occupation of their

country by Morocco and helped lead a successful

fight to admit the Saharawi representatives to

the Organization of African Unity.

He actively organized support, in Africa and

beyond, for the struggle against the apartheid

regime in South Africa and for the Palestinians’

fight to reestablish their homeland.

Sankara campaigned for cancellation of the onerous

debt imposed on semicolonial countries by

imperialist governments and banks.

He spoke in New York City’s Harlem to demonstrate

support for African-Americans’ fight against

racist oppression and for other struggles by

working people in the United States.

It organized massive immunization campaigns,

and made basic health care services available

to millions. By 1985 infant mortality had

fallen from 208 for every 1,000 live births at

the beginning of the decade to 145, and the

accelerated spread of parasite-induced river

blindness had been curbed.

In a country where illiteracy was 92 percent—and

even higher in the countryside—literacy campaigns

in its indigenous languages were initiated.

Steps were taken to combat the age-old subjuga-

tion of women, who were encouraged to organize

to fight for their emancipation.

The government funded public works to build roads,

schools, and housing.

Trusting in the justice of the working class

and peasantry, it set up popular revolutionary

courts to try former leaders and high officials

accused of corruption.

Safe drinking water, three meals a day, a clinic, a school, and a simple plow. These are still elements of an ideal in life that millions of Burkinabe have not yet achieved.

Ceremony on August 4,

1986, in Bobo-Dioulasso,

Houet province, celebrating

third anniversary of

revolution. Banner says,

“Vaccinated children,”

part of the revolution’s

primary health campaigns.

5 .

6 .

7 .

5

8 .

9 .

1 0 .

a .

b .

c .

d .

“

Thomas Sankara

37

4

4

Construction of housing

complex, Ouagadougou, 1987.

A literacy class in Kamboincé,

March 1986. To combat 92 percent

illiteracy rate, the revolution

initiated campaign to teach

reading and writing in main

languages spoken in country.

Revolutionary government

launched “Battle for the Rail-

road” in early 1985, aiming

to link Ougadougou with north.

Here, volunteer government

employees lay track, March 1985.

6

8

8

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““

In August 1987, speaking in Burkina Faso on the an-

niversary of the revolutionary uprising four years

earlier, Sankara emphasized that, “The democratic

and popular revolution needs a convinced people,

not a conquered people—a convinced people, not

a submissive people passively enduring their

fate.” Growing numbers of workers, peasants, and

youth issuing from the ranks of such a people were

becoming involved in social and political life in

Burkina Faso, setting an example that was already

reverberating throughout Central West Africa—far

beyond the borders of that landlocked country.

On October 15, 1987, Capt. Blaise Compaore led a

military coup serving the interests of those—

at home and abroad—whose property and class

domination were threatened by this deep-going

revolutionary mobilization. Sankara and twelve

of his aides and bodyguards were assassinated

and the revolutionary government destroyed.

Thomas Sankara has himself become a symbol

for millions of workers, peasants, and youth

throughout Africa especially, who recognize in

the Burkinabe Revolution—and in its continuing

political heritage—a source of political ideas

and inspiration for the battles for genuine

liberation on the continent.

We have built schools, clinics, roads, dams, enlarged our fields, done reforestation, and provided housing. Each Burkinabe feels

that wielding power is now his business.

Meeting of a Committee for

Defense of the Revolution

in Ouagadougou neighborhood,

August 1985. The CDRs aimed

to mobilize workers, farmers,

and youth to work together

to build a new society.

Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Burkinabe Revolution,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007).

Thomas Sankara

Economic growth amid poverty

Food Crops

Evolving Patterns of Livestock Production

A Small Country with Large Ambitions

42

42

48

42

46

50

THE ONGOING BATTLE FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY

UNDERSTANDING BURKINA’S PERFORMANCE

BUKINABE ECONOMY IN RECOVERY3

ER-CONQUDespite its poverty and limited size, Burkina’s economy is somewhat better balanced and has been growing on average faster than that of many of its wealthier neighbors. In the 1980s alone Burkina’s real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average of 4.2 percent a year.

ER-ABLEChildren of Dourtenga,

a village of Dourtenga, province

of Koulpélogo. February 2004

CONQU

THE ONGOING BATTLE FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY

IND

EPEND

ENCE–

POST REVO

LUTIO

N

Since independence, and despite the progressive

diversification of its output, Burkina has in fact

remained an agricultural economy, providing a

livelihood for the majority of the population but

also constraining the country’s development within

the erratic limits of land and weather. Indeed, the

performance of the agricultural sector had been

mostly disappointing until the mid 1980s. It began

the 1960s with low productivity, little integration

with other sectors, and few modern inputs. Most of

the cultivable land was fallow or uncultivated, and

the system functioned in near autarky, with on farm

consumption the rule and farmers purchasing few ag-

ricultural products. Although production grew over

time, its average annual increase of 2.2 percent

from 1965 to 1986 remained below population growth.

The situation changed in the 1980s. According to

the World Bank, the agricultural sector grew by

4.3 per their importance has been growing. Live-

stock, used primarily for exports and as a store

of wealth, consists of nearly 3 million cattle,

9.5 million sheep and goats, and more than 22

million poultry.

Burkina’s main food crops are rain-fed millet

and sorghum, whose short cycles and resistance to

drought are well adapted to the region’s brief and

erratic rainy seasons. These two cereals are used

in the preparation of to—a puree that, accompanied

by vegetable sauce and occasional meat or fish,

is the basis of most meals—and dob, the tradi-

tional sorghum beer. Output of millet and sorghum

has grown steadily since before independence,

despite competition for land from cash crops,

which has restricted the area given over to

millet and sorghum and shortened the length of

fallow, especially in the Mossi plateau. Produc-

tion averaged 560,000 tons in 1948-1957, 800,000

tons in 1961-1964, and 1 million tons in 1977-1981.

From 1981 to 1991 the average annual output was

Food crops

With a per capita gross national product (GNP)

between $200 and $300, Burkina is among the poorest

countries on earth. It is also a small economy in

absolute size, its GNP less than half of 1 per-

cent of that of the United States in 1992. Relying

mostly on the production of cereals for local con-

sumption and exports of gold and cotton, it has few

other resources than its work force, employed at

about 90 percent in an agricultural sector highly

dependent on erratic rainfalls. Yet despite its

poverty and limited size, Burkina’s economy is

somewhat better balanced and has been growing on

average faster than that of many of its wealth-

ier neighbors. In the 1980s alone Burkina’s real

gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an aver-

age of 4.2 percent a year. Minus a 2.6 percent

annual population growth rate, Burkina actu-

ally recorded annual per capita growth of 1.6

percent, a remarkable performance not only for

West Africa but by overall sub-Saharan African

standards. Although these statistics hide a bumpy

business cycle with dramatic year-to-year fluctua-

tions, data from the early 1990s suggest a continu-

ation and possible improvement of this performance.

1.418 million tons, with a substantial upward trend

from 1985 onward (see figure 6). The steady upward

trend in output continued in the early 1990s to

reach more than 2 million tons. Recent productiv-

ity increases are in marked contrast to the first

two decades of independence, when productivity

was estimated to have improved by only 25 percent

overall.

The production of rice has not experienced the

same record of growth. Average annual production

amounted to 17,000 tons in 1948-1957 and 33,000

tons both in 1961-1964 and 1977-1981. From 1960 to

1980 the yield per hectare increased by only about

15 percent. Furthermore, unlike millet and sorghum,

rice stagnated in the 1980s, with an average pro-

duction slightly below 33,000 tons for the period

Economic growth amid poverty

43

BU

RKINA

BE ECO

NO

MY IN

RECOVERY

1981-1991, forcing Burkina to remain an importer

of Asian rice. Output growth seemed, however,

to have resumed at the end of the decade:

The average production for 1988-1991 amounted

to 43,500 tons.

Maize is grown primarily by households on land that

surrounds their compounds and is usually consid-

ered an adjuvant cereal. Its production, too, has

grown steadily since the early 1980s, climbing

from 98,000 tons in 1980 to 296,000 tons in 1991.

Yams, sweet potatoes, cassava, and other fruits and

vegetables are usually grown on small individual

plots, and production estimates are unreliable and

hard to come by.

Despite the progress and modernization of the last

decade, Burkina’s cereal sector remains inward-

looking, subsistence-based, and technologically

backward. Only a small fraction of output is

marketed, and there is little exchange with other

sectors of the economy, both in terms of output

sales and input purchases. There even seems to be

little exchange within villages, for most compounds

consume what they themselves have produced. lac-

queline Sherman showed that in the Mossi region of

Manga, “a relatively market-oriented area, fami-

lies sell an average of only about 11 percent of

the sorghum, millet and rice they grow [and] buy

grain equivalent to about 6 percent of what they

produce.” In addition, technological development,

which has affected the cash-crop sector, has by-

passed most cereal farmers who still use the daba,

the traditional hoe, as their only tool. This lack

of market integration and technological progress

increases the vulnerability of cereal farmers,

who end up excessively dependent on their own

local conditions and crops.

The overall climatic deterioration from inde-

pendence to the mid-1980s no doubt accounted

in part for the relatively poor performance of

agriculture over the same period. A study by the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-

ment (OECD) reckons that a national rainfall index

equal to 111 on average between 1960 and 1965 had

plunged to 91 between 1975 and 1980, and a World

Bank index of per capita food production fell from

100 in 1965-1967 to 84 in 1975, dragging the daily

caloric intake per head down to 93 percent of need

at the end of the 1970s. The situation stabilized

and actually improved following the 1983-1984

drought. Given available data, I estimate that the

rainfall index averaged 93 between 1980 and 1989,

and the World Bank contends that the food pro-

duction index improved by 20 percent since 1980.

This comes as no surprise in view of recent output

figures. Total cereal production reached 2 million

tons for the first time in 1988, more than twice

its 1980 volume. In the 1991-1992 campaign

a record harvest of 2.2 million tons was reached,

and in 1993-1994 a new peak was again achieved

at 2.5 million tons.

Nevertheless, in good as in bad years, the

overall food production picture hides

substantial regional differences. The regions

of Yatenga, Ouagadougou, and the north are

usually in deficit, while the west and southwest

experience frequent surpluses, and the east

and southeast hover around self-sufficiency.

Unfortunately, poor infrastructure often

prevents the redistribution of excess output;

as a result, the government has to resort

to food aid and food imports.

Food aid, most of it in the form of cereals,

increased from around 28,000 tons per year (2.5

percent of domestic production) in the mid-1970s

to 73,000 tons a year (4.6 percent of domestic

production) in the mid-1980s before contracting

to 44,000 tons (2 percent of domestic production)

in the early 1990s. The high level of aid of the

mid-1980s, in the wake of the drought of 1983-1984,

illustrates how food inflows tend to continue even

during surplus years, as donor reaction typically

lags behind the actual drought situation. Food

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imports follow the same pattern: They increased

by 37 percent, from CFAFr 32,051 in 1984 to CFAFr

43,921 in 1985, although the latter year witnessed

a good harvest. Food aid is either freely

distributed (with the potentially perverse

consequence of depressing the local market

prices and acting as a disincentive for farmers)

or sold at subsidized or full-market prices.

Faced with uncertain weather and crops,

Burkina’s farmers have developed strategies

of income diversification and risk prevention.

Thomas Reardon, Peter Matlon, and Christopher

Delgado have shown how rural people generate

“purchasing power in non-cropping occupations,”

later using that revenue to purchase food,

especially during the season immediately

preceding harvest, when shortages are most severe.

Reardon and his colleagues found the following

distribution of sources of income for Sahelian and

Sudanian households, respectively: agriculture 23

percent and 56 percent; livestock 22 percent and

6.3 percent; local nonfarming income (crafts,

services such as dob brewing, and commerce) 25

percent and 14 percent; non local, nonfarm income

(including temporary migrants’ remittances) 22.6

percent and 16.8 percent; transfers from abroad 7.8

percent and 7.6 percent (of which 4.2 percent and

0.1 percent in food aid and 1.9 percent and 6.8

percent in remittances from permanent migrants).

In other words, there is more than farming and

herding to Burkina’s farmers and herders.

Faced with uncertain weather and crops,

Burkina’s farmers have developed strategies of income diversification and risk prevention.

45CEREAL OUTPUT & COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION OF MAIN CASH CROPS

FOOD CROPS (THOUSANDS OF TONS)

GDP % GROWTH (CALENDAR YEAR)

figure 6

500

0

0

1,000

Millet & Sorghum

Maize

Rice (paddy)

1,500

2,000

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

15.7

9.8

-2.1-1.2

2.2

4.4

1.7 1.2

6.1

-0.4

1.3

4.8

RevolutionBefore revolution Post revolution

1,025

1,2621,188

1,0941,130

1,580

1,875

1,632

2,092

1,939

1,774

2,216

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Evolving Patterns of Livestock ProductionNext to cotton, livestock is the second most

important agropastoral commodity. It was once

Burkina’s major export but currently comes in third

place behind cotton and gold. Yet exports of live

animals still account for between 4 percent and

10 percent of all export revenue. In addition,

hides and skins contribute about 5 percent a year

to total exports. The dwindling importance of

livestock as an export has resulted from several

factors, including the surge in cotton and gold

output, the effects of drought on animal survival

rates (it takes two years to replenish a herd after

a drought), and the progressive sedentarization and

transformation of the formerly nomadic Peul herders

who traditionally managed livestock production.

Recessions in the regional markets (such as Cote

d’lvoire and Ghana, where virtually all livestock

is exported on hoof) and competition from Latin

American (mainly Argentinian) meat and subsidized

European meat have also hurt Burkina’s livestock

industry.

Apart from being an export commodity, livestock

also serves as a form of saving and investment,

as it grows and reproduces, weather permitting.

It is rarely eaten but rather sold in poor years

in order to purchase cereal. The traditional ar-

rangement for cattle herding has been for sedentary

farmers such as the Mossi, Bissa, and Gurmanche to

entrust their cattle to the seminomadic Peul herd-

ers. In exchange, all the milk produced by the cows

becomes the property of the Peuls, who also receive

small annual gifts and cash payments when they han-

dle the sale of an animal. The advantages to both

the Mossi and the Peuls are numerous. For both,

there are the benefits of specialization (the Peuls

are experienced herders and the Mossi able agricul-

turalists whose labor force is better used farm-

ing). Contracting-out herding also allows the Mossi

to keep the number of cattle they own secret “from

both neighbors and government tax collectors.”

Finally, the Mossi usually arrange for the herds to

be pastured in their fields after the harvest, ob-

taining thereby natural fertilizer. For the Peuls,

the first advantage is ownership of the milk, which

they use as a source of food and as a source of

income (Peul women sell milk and milk products such

as yogurt on local markets). By paying the Peuls

in milk, the Mossi are guaranteed against misuse of

their cattle; the care of the livestock becomes as

important for the herders as it is for the own-

ers. The addition of the cattle from the Mossi to

the Peul herds induces decreasing marginal costs

and thus represents little extra effort. The Peul

also benefit from the annual gifts (mostly food and

clothing), and the cash payments compensate for the

additional work of selling a Mossi’s cow.

Observers of Burkina’s rural life, however, have

noticed that this pattern of herding has been

changing since the 1970s. Today the Mossi are

more likely to let their own children herd their

cattle or to entrust it to other Mossi farmers who

have larger herds and more experience. The Mossi

selection of their own family members and people

from the same ethnic group suggests that the Mossi

have felt the need for additional monitoring. This

evolving pattern coincides with an increased

distrust between Mossi and Peuls. Mossi now

complain about “the destruction of crops by cattle

who accidentally enter into fields or gardens.”

Although it is legally the responsibility of the

herder to pay for the damage, “in fact, owners of

cattle involved are expected to, and do make sig-

nificant contributions to such settlements.” This

was not a problem until population pressure on

the Mossi plateau reduced the area available

for grazing and transhumance and increasingly

sedentarized the Peuls, making the traditional

herding contract less attractive for the Mossi.

If the Peuls are going to remain around the village

all year, the Mossi may as well have their chil-

dren take care of the cattle. Since the children

share the family’s interest in keeping the crops

47

safe, they are likelier to supervise the animals

more carefully, limiting crop destruction. Another

reason the practice of Peul herding has changed may

be related to the increase in droughts since the

early 1970s and the resulting need for the Peuls

to maintained a very moderate level of foreign

debts, their burden on the economy remaining

quite bearable. Its average debt per capita in

the 1980s amounted to $72 as against $403 for the

rest of UMOA countries and $240 for Africa in gen-

eral (see Table 4.4). Its total external debt had

reached $956 million or 35 percent of GNP in 1991,

whereas many African countries have a level of

indebtedness well over 100 percent of GNP.

On average, in the second half of the 1980s debt

servicing amounted to 8.5 percent of exports of

goods and services, representing thus a limited

toll on export revenue. One reason Burkina has

managed to keep a low level of indebtedness is

that it has avoided white elephant development

projects—those heavy in capital requirements and

poor in economic returns. Another reason is that

its low-income status has allowed it to benefit

from a high level of grants and very concession-

al loans in its development aid. In the 1980s

grants made up an average of 77 percent of total

disbursed gross official development assistance.

The main bilateral donors and creditors are

France (with an average annual disbursement of

$55.7 million), Germany ($27.8 million), the United

States ($26 million), the Netherlands ($24.1

million), and Italy ($14.1 million). Most disburse-

ments from multilateral agencies come from the

World Bank ($18.6 million), the European Community

($16.9 million), and the United Nations Development

Program (UNDP) ($10.6 million).

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Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Ongoing Battle for Self-sufficiency,’ are adapted from Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa, (Colorado: Westview, 1996).

UNDERSTANDING BURKINA’S PERFORMANCE

In view of the economic burden in Burkina’s colo-

nial past, its apparent cultural bias against sav-

ings, accumulation, division of labor, and techno-

logical innovation, its poor climate, few natural

resources, and landlocked situation, it seems a bit

of a miracle after all that its economy has been

performing relatively well—and certainly better and

more consistently than those of similar countries.

It is the paradox of growth amid poverty.

Some explanations for this are to be found in

institutional constraints, which have prevented

successive governments from going astray with their

fiscal and monetary policies. Burkina’s participa-

tion in the UMOA, the Franc Zone branch for West

Africa, has imposed a fiscal and monetary disci-

pline that has benefited the country’s public fi-

nances. Yet this variable cannot by itself account

for Burkina’s record, as other UMOA countries,

especially Senegal and Cote d’lvoire, have experi-

enced dramatic economic imbalances.

Another possible factor lies in Burkina’s very

poverty. With few resources, there have been fewer

opportunities for mistakes and indebtedness. Cote

d’lvoire had a more promising future than Burkina

in the 1960s and 1970s because it had greater natu-

ral resources. In the 1990s, however, the “Ivorian

miracle” has turned sour amid commodity price col-

lapse and foreign debt. In Burkina the impact of

the fall in the price of cotton in the 1980s was

only as bad as the importance of cotton revenue—

quite weak in comparison to cocoa and coffee in

Cote d’lvoire.

Third, just as culture augured ill for the develop-

ment potential of the peoples of Burkina, culture—

albeit another dimension of it—may hold part of

the answer of the paradox of growth amid pover-

ty. There is no quantitative or systematic data to

support this claim, but anecdotal evidence—starting

with the colonial labor policy—abounds in favor of

national attributes of hard work, probity,

and managerial competence.

These qualities of order and discipline are cer-

tainly exceptional assets . . . Burkina has managed

to avoid most of the major investment and manage-

ment errors which in many African countries have

led to large-scale disasters. Yet the problem with

using cultural explanations for economic perfor-

mance is accounting for the origins of the cultural

features in question.

The Burkinabe capacity for hard work may have its

origins in the harshness of their environment,

where subsistence and survival can never be taken

for granted. A possible explanation for its mana-

gerial competence could be found in the Mossi’s

experience with statehood and public account-

ability, which is a trademark of good gover-

nance. The checks and balances of the Mossi system

In its 1989 economic memorandum on

Burkina, the World Bank was atypically

generous with praise: Wherever they may

come from, foreign missions visiting

Burkina invariably report being favorably

impressed by the quality of public sector

management, the competence of the offi-

cials in charge, the reliability of accounting

documents, the regularity with which such

documents are produced and, consequently,

the speed with which an update of the current

situation can be obtained. Other character-

istics of Burkina are its sense of realism,

its determination to avoid prolonged budget

deficits, and the government’s capacity to

respond rapidly and decisively to threats

of financial slippage....

49

together with the practice of large-scale public

administration over several centuries may have laid

the groundwork for today’s relatively efficient

and responsive public service and government. In a

shorter-run perspective, the personal austerity

and ethics of Presidents Lamizana and Sankara

have set powerful examples.

In addition, whether “democratic” or dictatorial,

Burkina’s regimes have always entertained a measure

of popular participation that has increased public

accountability. Before committing to the struc-

tural adjustment program with the World Bank, for

example, the government brought together some 2,000

delegates from political parties, trade unions,

and other social and professional groups (includ-

ing agricultural producers and traditional group-

ings, such as churches and ethnic authorities)

in May 1990 to answer the question, “Does Burkina

need a structural adjustment program?” Delegates

voted in favor of a program that would not reduce

the overall wage bill, and the conference gave the

government a mandate to continue negotiations with

the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) “while preserving the major gains of the

people.” Negotiations led to the signature in March

1991 of a structural adjustment facility (SAF)

with the IMF for an amount of $31 million to be

disbursed in three installments, conditional upon

program implementation, and in June it embarked

on a World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment

program worth $80 million. The SAF’s targets were

a GDP rate of growth of 4 percent, an inflation

of no more than 4 percent, the elimination of all

fiscal arrears, and a reduction in the current ac-

count deficit. The World Bank program concentrated

on public resource management and private-sector

incentives. Although the growth and inflation tar-

gets of the SAF were met, the government did not

successfully address the issue of fiscal arrears,

and the IMF did not disburse more than the first

tranche of its SAF. On 1 April 1993, however, it

approved a $67 million enhanced structural adjust-

ment facility (ESAF) for 1993-1995 to replace the

SAF on more generous terms.

In view of Burkina’s performance, the question can

be raised whether Burkina’s economy actually was

in need of such structural adjustment. After all,

Burkina’s past record was in line with the IMF

growth and inflation targets and the program rep-

resents a major increase in indebtedness. Indeed,

total gross foreign aid disbursements jumped from

$354 million in 1990 to $447 million in 1991 and

$462 million in 1992. Although grants increased

in a similar proportion to total disbursements

(maintaining a grant-to-total-disbursement ratio

of 75 percent for the 1990-1992 period), the abso-

lute value of loans rose quite significantly. Thus

overall indebtedness increased as a result of the

adoption of the structural adjustment program. In

fact, the decision to accept a program arose from

pressure from three directions. First, the World

Bank and the IMF themselves put considerable pres-

sure on most African governments to embark on these

flagship programs, and Burkina was no exception.

Indeed, the authors of the 1989 economic memoran-

dum, initiated by the bank, make no secret that it

was written from the perspective of leading toward

adjustment lending. Second, the Compaore govern-

ment’s more liberal fiscal policies had triggered

the problems of arrears accumulation. Finally,

under the Sankara government the country had been

relatively starved of foreign capital inflows, and

there was a domestic demand for money. It is not

necessarily an unreasonable contention that Burkina

could have got rid of its arrears and reduced its

fiscal and foreign imbalances without resorting to

the mixed blessings of adjustment lending. But that

is the topic of another book.

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A Small Country with Large AmbitionsThe boldness and radicalism of Thomas Sankara’s

foreign policy contributed much to putting his

country on the map in the early 1980s. From a dull

and marginal nation at the periphery of the world,

Burkina became the new child prodigy of anti-

imperialism, Third World pride, and development.

For the first time, it broke out of the francophone

circle as Sankara traveled the world and caught the

attention of the media. Before he died, Sankara was

nearing the international status of Ghana’s Kwame

Nkrumah, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, and Congo’s

Patrice Lumumba. His most important speeches had

been translated into English and published in the

United States.

Although his domestic policies contributed to the

world’s renewed interest in Burkina, it was most

of all his self-confident and provocative atti-

tude in foreign affairs that drew attention. Yet

upon closer scrutiny, it appears that CNR foreign

policy changed quite dramatically around the end of

1985, moving away from bold statements of indepen-

dence and velleities to export the revolution and

toward more pragmatic positions of cordial rela-

tions with Western donors and regional conservative

powers. This shift in foreign policy paralleled

an alteration of the domestic dimensions of the

revolution, characterized by Sankara’s attempt to

open up his increasingly isolated regime. Sankara

on the World Scene only hours after his seizure

of power, Sankara proceeded to revolutionize his

country’s foreign relations. His first step was to

accuse France of having sponsored both the CSP-2

regime and his imprisonment at the hands of his

army nemesis Some’ Yorian on 17 May 1983. President

As cited on page 17: Increasing independence can be achieved by increasing self-reliance, and thus reducing one’s vulnerability to exploitation by others. However, it should be understood that the goal of self-reliance is not autarky, isolated self-sufficiency. After self-reliance is achieved, interaction with others should be resumed.

Ouedraogo’s dismissal of Prime Minister Sankara

and his arrest on 17 May had indeed coincided with

the visit to Ouagadougou of President Mitter-

rand’s adviser for African affairs, Guy Penne, who

departed the next day. Supporters of the CNR have

ever since alleged that Penne came to encourage and

supervise this forcible political transition. The

CNR also frequently singled out the United States

for its “imperialism,” its support of Israel, and

its failure to sanction South Africa for its system

of apartheid. Because it, too, considered itself a

liberation movement, the CNR strongly identified

with the PLO, leading to Burkina’s concern with the

Middle East crisis.

To spread his message, Sankara took to every

available international platform, not least the

General Assembly of the United Nations, where his

speech of October 1984 garnered him many Third

World supporters. Although Sankara’s rhetoric

made him popular among some, it alienated those

he blasted. Official Development Assistance (ODA)

from France fell from $43.5 million in 1983 to

$26.8 million in 1985 and bounced back only when

the CNR became tamer and more cooperative in 1986

and 1987. The United States also grew weary of

Burkina’s rhetoric and its somewhat provocative

displays of friendship with Cuba and Libya.

Unfortunately for Burkina, the countries whose

policies it endorsed (such as Libya, North Korea,

Albania, and Yugoslavia) compensated little

for the drop in assistance from Western donors.

Libya, most notably, repeatedly failed to deliver

on its promises of financial assistance.

Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘Understanding Burkina’s Performance,’ are adapted from Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa, (Colorado: Westview, 1996).

“ For the popular masses,

INDEPENDENCE was

A V ICTORY over foreignoppression and exploitation.

“

Thomas Sankara

As we studied the successfu l groundwork of Burk ina Faso coping wi th the nat ional level of hunger and poverty, we shal l a lso not lose hope for the wor ld as i t s tands against wor ld hunger. Chi ldren of the next generat ion are wai t ing for us to take act ion. F i rs t s tep is to be at tent ive to the current s i tuat ion. Educate yoursel f and the ones around you. Then, spread the good news that

hunger is vincible for the people who ceaselessly fight against it.

Primary sources

Prairie, Michel, ed. Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987. Second ed. New York: Pathfinder, 2007.

Kent, George. The Political Economy of Hunger: The Silent Holocaust. New York: Praeger, 1984.

Englebert, Pierre. Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Nations of Modern World: Africa.

Photo sources

Thomas Sankara. Bwak. “Thomas Sankara – the Leader Who Became a President and Remained a Leader.” Web. 15 Apr. 2012. p.20 <http://www.clubafrica.info/?p=30>

Drought. S, Mohd. “Drought Facts.” www.giglig.com. 9 May 2011. Web. 15 Apr. 2012. p. 31 <http://www.giglig.com/environment/drought-facts>

Various photos. “Burkina Faso.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation. Web. 15 Apr. 2012. p. 3, 22-27, 41 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina_Faso>

designed & edited by Soo Kim 2012

Copyright © All pieces reproduced in this issue are under prior copyright by the creators or by contractual arrangements with their clients.

Manufactured in the United States of America/ printed in the Communication Design studio of Samfox School of Design & Visual Arts at Washington University in St. Louis.

Every reasonable attempt has been made to identify owners of copyright. Direct all inquiries regarding the content of this book to: soogleit@gmail.com

Special thanks to George Kent, the author of The Political Economy of Hunger, one of the primary sources for this book, and also to Jean Ziegler, the author of La faim dans le monde expliquée à mon fils (world hunger explained to my son) for inspiring me to put this book together.

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T H E S U C C E S S F U L S T O RY O F B U R K I N A FA S O , a country that has been act ive ly f ight ing against and s lowly overcoming hunger and poverty s ince the Burk inabe revolut ion (1983-1987 ) , one of the most profound revolut ions in Afr ica’s h is tory against the propert ied explo i ters at home and abroad.