Babst v. National Intelligence Board

G.R.No.L-6299228

September 1984

PONENTE: Plana, J.

PARTIES:

1. PETITIONERS: ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P. DOYO, JO ANN Q.

MAGLIPON, DOMINI TORREVILLAS SUAREZ, LORNA KALAW-TIROL, CIELO

BUENAVENTURA, SYLVIA MAYUGA, SHEILA S. CORONEL, ET AL.

2. RESPONDENTS: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, SPECIAL COMMITTEE NO. 2,

BRIG. GEN. WILFREDO ESTRADA (ret.), COL. RENATO ECARMA, NBI ASST. DIRECTOR

PONCIANO FERNANDO, COL. BALBINO DIEGO, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, COL.

EUSTAQUIO PERALTA, ET AL.

NATURE: Petition for Prohibition and Issuance of a Writ of Injunction

PROCEDURAL   BACKGROUND:

Supreme Court: Original Petition filed with the Supreme Court

FACTS:

Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications.

Since July 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who

have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,

sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. The invitations were contained

in letters sent by the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) and were of the following tenor:

Madam:

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before

this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer’s Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila

(sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being

looked into by this Committee.

Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your

part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA

Brig. General, AFP (Ret.)

Chairman

Petitioners argued that the respondents do not have the authority to conduct the proceeding

above-described which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on freedom of expression

since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.

Petitioners further claim that such proceedings are a punitive ordeal or subsequent

punishment for lawful publications and that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing

the “free flow of information and petition and opinion,” indispensable to the right of the

people to know matters of public concern guaranteed the Constitution. Finally they claim that

such coercive invitations constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty.

Respondents countered by claiming that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not

pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners. They claimed that what were sent to

petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which

were completely voluntary, without any compulsion employed on petitioners. The dialogues

themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange of ideas. Respondents

contended that the that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of

the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be

followed by petitioners. Finally, they argued that the petition filed is moot and academic

because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the

interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity

as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been

terminated.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the present petition has become moot and academic.

2. Whether or not the issuance of letters of invitations and the subsequent

interrogations that are conducted thereafter are valid under the Constitution.

ANSWERS:

1. Yes.

2. While the Court did not resolve such issue on its merits, it can be reasonably

inferred from the dictum of the Court that under the facts of this case, such

interrogations are unconstitutional.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1.    THE PETITION WAS MOOT AND ACADEMIC

Effect of the termination of the proceedings – Considering that the proceedings have been

terminated and the acts sought to be prohibited have been abated, the petition has become

moot and academic.

2.     A MERE INVITATION TO ATTEND A HEARING WHICH A PERSON MAY REFUSE IS NOT 

ILLEGAL,   HOWEVER,   AN   INVITATION   WHICH   HAS   AN   APPEARANCE   OF   COERCION   IS 

CONSTITUTIONALLY OBJECTIBLE

Invitation with coercion is constitutionally objectionable – Be that as it may, it is not idle to

note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the

person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally

objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a

different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed

predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged

from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has

not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can

easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an

authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the

instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that “failure to appear . . . shall be

considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance

with law.” Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating

the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

New York Times Co. v. SullivanNo. 39

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

376 U.S. 254

Argued January 6, 1964

Decided March 9, 1964

* Together with No. 40, Abernathy v. Sullivan, also on certiorari to the same court, argued January 7, 1964.

Syllabus

Respondent, an elected official in Montgomery, Alabama, brought suit in a state court alleging that he had been libeled by an advertisement in corporate petitioner's newspaper, the text of which appeared over the names of the four individual petitioners and many others. The advertisement included statements, some of which were false, about police action allegedly directed against students who participated in a civil rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil rights movement; respondent claimed the statements referred to him because his duties included supervision of the police department. The trial judge instructed the jury that such statements were "libelous per se," legal injury being implied without proof of actual damages, and that, for the purpose of compensatory damages, malice was presumed, so that such damages could be awarded against petitioners if the statements were found to have been published by them and to have related to respondent. As to punitive damages, the judge instructed that mere negligence was not evidence of actual malice, and would not justify an award of punitive damages; he refused to instruct that actual intent to harm or recklessness had to be found before punitive damages could be awarded, or that a verdict for respondent should differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages. The jury found for respondent, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.

Held: A State cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves "actual malice"--that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. Pp. 265-292.

(a) Application by state courts of a rule of law, whether statutory or not, to award a judgment in a civil action, is "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 265.

(b) Expression does not lose constitutional protection to which it would otherwise be entitled because it appears in the form of a paid advertisement. Pp. 265-266. [255]

(c) Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of damages for false statements unless "actual malice"--knowledge that statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth--is alleged and proved. Pp. 279-283.

(d) State court judgment entered upon a general verdict which does not differentiate between punitive damages, as to which, under state law, actual malice must be proved, and

general damages, as to which it is "presumed," precludes any determination as to the basis of the verdict, and requires reversal, where presumption of malice is inconsistent with federal constitutional requirements. P. 284.

(e) The evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for respondent, since it failed to support a finding that the statements were made with actual malice or that they related to respondent. Pp. 285-292.

273 Ala. 656, 144 So.2d 25, reversed and remanded. [256]

Adiong Vs Comelec

ADIONG v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 103956

March 31, 1992

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.

It is unlawful:…

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.

Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.