constitutionalism in a post-colonialism state: socio ... · authoritarian government supported by a...

RevistadeEstudosConstitucionais,HermenêuticaeTeoriadoDireito(RECHTD)11(1):23-43,janeiro-abril2019Unisinos-doi::10.4013/rechtd.2019.111.02

Esteéumartigodeacessoaberto,licenciadoporCreativeCommonsAtribuição4.0Internacional(CCBY4.0),sendopermitidasreprodução,adaptaçãoedistribuiçãodesdequeoautoreafonteoriginaissejamcreditados.

ConstitutionalisminaPost-ColonialismState:Socio-CulturalandHistoricalPerspectiveofIndonesianConstitutionIdentity

MuhammadFauzan1UniversitasJenderalSoedirman,Indonesia

[email protected]

TediSudrajat2UniversitasJenderalSoedirman,Indonesia

[email protected]

SriWahyuHandayani3UniversitasJenderalSoedirman,Indonesia

[email protected]

Abstract

SincetheestablishmentofIndonesianState,theideaofconstitutionalismhasincreasinglyexistedanddemandedachangevaluesasamovetowardsgoodstateadministration.However,buildingatraditionofconstitutionalismasasustainableeffortcannotbeexecutedsimplybyrelyingonthetext/editorialof a constitution alone. In other words, the success of developing aconstitutionalism culture within government administration is alsosignificantly determinedby thewillingness of every element of the societyand the state organizers in the effort to understand the contentwritten inthetextofaconstitution.Theefforttounderstandthecontextuallyofideasin the constitution is to seek an identity underlying the creation of aconstitution.ThisisclearlycorrelatedwithIndonesianhistoricalaspectasacolonizedcountry.Historically,thesubstanceofcolonialstateadministrationsystemwouldaffecttheidentityofIndonesianconstitutionasapost-colonialstate,which then createdan identityof Indonesian constitutionalongwiththelegalimplicationsthataccompaniedit.

Keywords: constitution, constitutionalism, constitution identity, colonialstate,post-colonialism,Indonesiancharacteristics.

1Jl.Prof.Dr.H.R.Boenjamin708.Purwokerto.CentralJava.53122.Indonesia.2Jl.Prof.Dr.H.R.Boenjamin708.Purwokerto.CentralJava.53122.Indonesia.3Jl.Prof.Dr.H.R.Boenjamin708.Purwokerto.CentralJava.53122.Indonesia.

Fauzan,Sudrajat,HandayaniIConstitutionalisminaPost-ColonialismState

RevistadeEstudosConstitucionais,HermenêuticaeTeoriadoDireito(RECHTD),11(1):23-43

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Resumo

DesdeoestabelecimentodoEstadoindonésio,aideiadeconstitucionalismotemaumentadocadavezmaiseexigidoumamudançadevalorescomoummovimentorumoàboaadministraçãodoEstado.Noentanto,construirumatradição de constitucionalismo como um esforço sustentável não pode serfeito simplesmente baseando-se no texto de uma constituição. Em outraspalavras, o sucesso de desenvolver uma cultura de constitucionalismodentro da administração do governo também é significativamentedeterminado pela disposição de todos os elementos da sociedade e dosorganizadoresdoEstadonoesforçodeentenderoconteúdoescritonotextode uma constituição. O esforço para entender o contexto das ideias naconstituição é buscar uma identidade subjacente à criação de umaconstituição. Isto está claramente correlacionado com o aspecto históricoindonésiocomoumpaíscolonizado.Historicamente,asubstânciadosistemade administração do Estado colonial afetaria a identidade da constituiçãoindonésiacomoumEstadopós-colonial,queentãocriouumaidentidadedeconstituiçãoindonésiajuntocomasimplicaçõeslegaisqueaacompanharam.

Palavras-chave:constituição,constitucionalismo,identidadeconstitucional,Estadocolonial,pós-colonialismo,característicasindonésias.

Introduction

ThereformorderhasbeengoingoninIndonesiaformorethanadecade,anorder/erafoughtby thepeoplewho initiallypresented adepictionof improvementoptimismover allthe order of national and state life. As an order/era of total correction over the practice ofgovernance, the new order under President Soeharto 1967-1998 was perceived as anauthoritariangovernmentsupportedbyacorruptcultureinalllinesofstatepower,notonlyinthedimensionofexecutivepower,butalso"penetrating"intothejudicialpower,includingthelegislativepower.

As generally known, the demand for reformwhich culminated in the declaration ofPresident Soeharto's resignation on Thursday,May 21, 1998 has brought a great theme ofchange which includes upholding the rule of law, eradicating corruption, collusion andnepotism (KKN), prosecuting Soeharto and his cronies, amending the 1945 Constitution(hereinafter, UUD´45), repealing dual function of Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), andgrantingregionalautonomytoagreatestextent.

The implication of such series of constitutional changes in Indonesia was theamendmentofUUD’45for4(four)timesin1999-2002accompaniedbyseveralfundamentalagreements,which include: First, Not Changing the Preamble of UUD’45 of the State of theRepublic of Indonesia; Second, Maintaining the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia;Third,Reinforcingthepresidentialgovernmentsystem;Fourth,theElucidationofUUD’45ofthe State of the Republic of Indonesia which includes that normative matters shall beincorporatedintothearticles(thebody)and;Fifth,Creatingchangeswithaddendum.

Historically, the creation of Amendment UUD’45 is a manifestation of Political andConstitutionalReformwhich tookplacedemocratically.TheReformErawasmarkedwithareformationinPoliticsandConstitutionalinthecourseofrefiningthesubstanceaccordingtotheneedsandconditionsunderlyingthereform.Inthisregard,theconstitutionalreformwas



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carried out due to several weak aspects within UUD’45 which implies undemocraticgovernance in Indonesia. The said weaknesses were, First, the UUD’45 built on a heavyexecutivepolitical systembyprovidingagreatportionofpower to thePresidentwithoutapropercheckandbalancemechanism;Second,UUD’45providedanexcessiveattributionanddelegation of authority to the President to regulate substantial issues using Law orGovernment Regulations; Third, UUD’45 includes several ambiguous articles or multipleinterpretations that may be interpreted with various interpretations, however,interpretationsthatshouldbeacceptedwereonlyinterpretationmadebythePresident;andFourth,UUD’45preferredthespiritoforganizingthestateratherthanthesystem.

The various issues related to the undemocratic governance of Indonesia under theNewOrdererahavecreatedaconditionthatrequiredchangeswithintheconstitutionalorderbasedonconstitutionalism.The fundamentalof constitutionalism isageneralagreementorconsensus amongmajorityof thepeople regarding an idealizedbuildingwith regard to thestate. Pattern of such relationships is required by the political community so its commoninterests canbeprotected or promoted through a formation and the use ofmechanism so-called‘thestate’.(JimlyAsshiddiqie,2014)

Inprincipal,aconsensusisdirectedtoensuretheestablishmentofconstitutionalismunderstoodbasedonelementofagreementonacommongoalorideal,agreementontheruleof lawas thebasisofgovernmentorstateadministration,andanagreementonthe formofstateinstitutionsandprocedures.Bywayofimplementation,constitutionalismregulatestwointerrelatedrelationships, i.e. therelationshipbetweenthegovernmentand itscitizens,andbetween one governmental institution to another. Based on the above explanation,constitutionmayserveasadeterminantandlimiterofstateorganpower,relationregulatorsbetweenstateorgans,relationregulatorsofstateorgansandcitizens,thesourceoflegitimacyof state power, diversion of authority, unifier, reference of identity and grandeur ofnationality,centerofceremony,meansofcommunitycontrol,andasthemeansofengineeringandsocietyrenewal.

Wiliam. G. Andrews (1968) said that in the context of governance, consensus orgeneralagreementisintendedtoensureanestablishmentofmodernconstitutionalismwhichisunderstoodtorelyon3(three)elementsofagreement,namely:

a. A state, or any system of government, should be founded upon law, while the people

exercisedwithinthestateshouldconformtodefinitelegalruleandprocedures(theideaofconstitutionorfundamentallaw).

b. The institutional structure of government should ensure that power reside with, or isdivided among, different branches which mutually control their exercise of power andwhich are obliged to co-operate (the ideas ofmixed government, separation of powers,checksandbalances).Thestructureofgovernmentinstitutionalshallensurethatpowerisin the hands, or divided amongst the different branches that mutually control theexecutionoftheirpowerandwhoareobligedtocooperate(theideaofmixedgovernment,separationofpower,checkandbalancesystem)mutuallycheckandbalance.

c. Therelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandthe individualmembersofsocietyshouldbe regulated in such manner that it leaves the letter’s basic rights and freedomsunimpaired. The relationship between the government and the individual members ofsociety should be regulated in such manner that it leaves the letter’s basic rights andfreedomsunimpaired.



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By looking at the three basic elements of constitutionalism, in the context ofIndonesianess,constitutionalismcancreateastateidentitythroughthemeansofconstitutionin the form of: First, a public authority can only be legitimated based on constitutionalprovisions;Second,theexecutionofpopularsovereignty(throughrepresentation)shouldbeimplementedbyapplyingtheprincipleofuniversalandequalsuffrage,andtheappointmentoftheexecutivethroughademocraticelection;Third,theseparationorsharingofpower,andlimitationofauthority;Fourth,theexistenceofanindependentjudicialpowerableupholdthelawandjustice,bothtothepeopleandauthorities;Fifth,theexistenceofacontrolsystemonmilitaryandpoliceinordertoenforcethelawandrespecttherightsofthepeople;andSixth,protectionguaranteeofhumanrights.(MahfudMD,2003)

TheProblem

Accordingtoconstitutionalism,thestudyonIndonesianidentity-formingelementsin

UUD’45 is as a form of understanding concerning the ideals of a state and the law to beinscribedbythefoundingstate.ThestudyonIndonesianidentity-formingelementsinUUD’45ofRepublicofIndonesiaiscriticaltobeexaminedinorderforustounderstandhowpoliticaland legal dynamics occurred during the establishment of the state constitution and thecreation of UUD’45. UUD’45 of the Republic of Indonesia is generally acknowledged as amanifestationofdemocratizationtoachieveaconstitutionaldemocracy.Basedontheabovebackground, this article discusses: First, theMeaning of Constitutionalism in Indonesia andthe historical relationship in the aspect of constitutionalism in Indonesia; Second, thedevelopment of post-colonialism within Indonesian Constitution and; Third, theestablishmentofDemocraticStateofLawwithinIndonesianConstitutionanditsimplicationsinstateadministrationstructureinIndonesia.Basedontheabovepoints,wewillunderstandthe foundations of Indonesian constitutional identity formation as a post-colonial state andthelegalimplicationstowardsfuturedevelopmentofIndonesianStateadministrationsystem.By using the above mentioned criteria and essence of constitutionalism, this short articlediscusses the identityof Indonesianconstitutionwithin theperspectiveofconstitutionalisminpost-colonialstate.DiscussionDefiningConstitutionalisminIndonesia

TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmericasignedby39delegatesonSeptember17,1787inPhiladelphia,Pennsylvania,wheretheConstitutionalConventionwasestablished,encouraging the birth of constitutional states in several regions of the world, including inmonarchies known as: constitutional monarch. In its development, several constitutionalstatesrecognizedthattheconstitutionoftheconcernedstatesdidnotincluderegulationsonlimitationoftheauthorityandrecognitionofcivilrightsofthepeople.Thereafter,Itcametheidea that the constitution shall regulate some kind of constitutional government, which inprinciple embodied matters on limiting the government aimed to keep the government inorder. The above notion was designed to initiate the adoption of constitutionalism inconstitutionalchange.(LaicaMarzuki,2010)

With regards to terminology of constitutionalism, its meaning differs from themeaning in constitution terminology. Simply put, one can argue that constitutionalism is aphilosophy,whileconstitutionisa"tool"usedtorealizethatideology.Theabovenotionoccurs



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duetothemeaningofanindepthconstitutionin"constitutionalism”.Inconnectionwiththeterm ‘constitution’,BrianThomson(1997)stated that “...aconstitution isadocumentwhichcontents the rule for the operation of an organization. Constitution has a broaderunderstanding than the Constitution as inUndang-UndangDasar (UUD), in that. Thewholewritten and unwritten rules governing in binding regarding the way a government isorganizedinasociety.(DahlanThaib,2001).

Carl J.Frederich (1968)stated that constitutionalism ...”Asetofactivitiesorganizedand operated on behalf of the people but subject to a series of restraintswhich attempt toensurethatthepowerwhichisneededforsuchgovernanceisnotabusedbythosewhoarecalledupon todobygoverning”.Restriction isappliedbydividingpower, constitutionalismestablishesaneffectivesystemofrestrictionsongovernmentmeasures.Theserestrictionsarereflected in Undang-Undang Dasar (UUD) or Constitution. Thus, in this assumption,constitutionhasaspecial functionand is theembodimentormanifestationof supremacyoflawwhichshouldbeobeyed,notonlybythepeoplebutalsobythegovernmentandeventheauthorities.(MiriamBudiardjo,1989)

Takingintoconsiderationsomeoftheaboveunderstandings,theideasandconceptofconstitutionalism are the ideas that put forward a paradigm that power in the life of stateadministration requires a restriction set forth in the form of laws or rules that carry thehighest position of UUD or constitution. In other words, it can be argued thatconstitutionalism is essentially a notion that recognizes the necessity of a constitution forgoverningastate.

Within the context of Indonesians’, Indonesian constitutionalism is constrainedby aconstitution both of codified constitution or non-codified constitution (unwritten rule). FortheIndonesiannation,thestaterulesofmodernsystemcannotbeseparatedfromthehistoryof formation of laws which was the first thing performed after the proclamation ofindependence.TheuseofUUD’45 (1945-1949),UUD’49 (1949-1950),UUD’50 (1950-1959),and UUD’45 (1959-present), all constitute a written rules/laws which are based onconstitutional democracy derived from Indonesian customs from the very first form ofculture. It is inevitable that during 1945-1950, the Dutch kept intervening the Indonesianstatesystem.AlthoughthecontentofConstitutionhaschangedandamended for four timesduring 1999-2002, the spirit and enthusiast of the constitution is greatly influenced by theconstitutional system established by the colonists. This means that the content in theconstitutionhadbeeninspiredbyacolonialsystem,andthereforeIndonesiabecameapost-colonialstate.TheHistoricalRelationAspectofConstitutionalisminIndonesia

From the time the proclamation of independencewas declared onAugust 17, 1945,

the journey of constitutional life of the Republic of Indonesia as a sovereign state isconsideredrelatively"young"i.e.,71years,comparedto240yearsofthatoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,whoseindependencewasdeclaredonJuly4,1776.Nevertheless,admittedlytheidea and or concept of constitutional implementation has always accompanied the stateadministration,regardless implementationempirical levelof this ideaoftenexperiencedtheups and downs, it is therefore interesting to analyze the notion, as the turn of the era in anation'shistoryhasoftenencompassedacompletelydifferentcharacteristic.

Awarenessofthestate’sconstitutionalismfoundershasgrownanddevelopedinlinewiththefounderofnation’sactivitiestofightandpreparefortheindependenceofIndonesia.



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This isdocumented in theseriesofhistoryof formationanddiscussionofUUDas stated inmeetingminutesofBPUPKIandPPKIwhichmaythenberatifiedonAugust18,1945bythePreparationCommitteeforIndonesianIndependence(PPKI).

Oneevidentofthestruggletopresenttheideaofconstitutionalismcanbeseenfromthe speech of Mohammad Yamin during BPUPKI meeting session, in which Yamin clearlystated, among others, that the need for protection of citizen freedom should be perfectlyguaranteedandthedivisionofpeople'spoweroverthesixpowerbodies(read=MPR,HouseofRepresentative,PresidentandVicePresident,AdvisoryCouncil,MinistriesandtheSupremeCourt)shallbeappliedinjustanddisregardabsolutismandoligarchy.(M.Yamin,1998)

TheestablishmentofUUD’45(beforetheamendment)isaconcreteawarenessoftheneedtolimitthepowerinadministrationofgovernanceinanindependentIndonesianstateandguaranteeofhumanrightsprotectionasanessentialelementofconstitutionalism,evenas itwasrealizedby the formingelements that theUUDadoptedonAugust18,1945wasatemporerUUD,andbecauseitwasatemporerUUD,therewereseveraldefiniteimperfections.

Several events in the first decade after the independence which showed paradoxesrelated to implementationof constitutionalismwas the issuanceofGovernmentDeclarationon November 14, 1945 in which the said declaration resulted in the change of previouslypresidential government system into a parliamentary government system,whereas, as it isknownthatbasedonUUD’45,Indonesiaadoptedapresidentialgovernmentsystem.

ThechangeofgovernmentalsystembasedontheaboveGovernmentDeclarationonacertain level is considered to have created a poor legal culture, as it is considered to havedisregardedtheconstitution,i.e.UUD’45,1(one)yearaftertheratificationbythePPKI,orinotherwords, suchdeclaration offered a reflection of aweak culture of respect towards theconstitution. At the time, however, the public generally regarded that the turn of thepresidential government system into parliamentary government system was anunconstitutionalact,whileothersarguedthatitwasnotanimplementationofalegalculturethatdidnotrespectandappreciateUUD’45ortheconstitution.

Achangeofthesaidsystemwasregardedasthebirthofconstitutionalconvention,i.e.a non-legal and extra-legal constitutional precedent, when in fact, it should be understoodthat the constitutional convention was not essentially matters that demeaned theconstitutionalprovisions.(MargaritoKamis,2014)Inpracticeofothercountry,aconventionshould always remain a reflection of respect towards the existence of constitution andimplementationofanconstitutionalismidea,asisthecaseofUSpresidentialelectionduringPresident George Washington era; the lack of clarity in their constitution concerning USpresidentialtermofofficewasrespondedverywellbyGeorgeWashingtonbywayofrejectingtobere-electedforthethirdtermandabrilliantconsideration,anditwastheembodimentofaconstitutionalismidea,asoverlongpowerwillregenerateafeudalsystem.

However,itshouldalsobenoted,thatintheearlyperiodofindependence,therewasaneventcategorizedasareflectionof implementationofconstitutionalism idea in thestateadministration,namely: the issuanceofVicePresident'sDeclarationNo.XonNovember16,1945. This is due to the said Vice President's Declaration, first, the regulation become themeans for democratic values to grow and expand within the governance by giving anopportunity for the birth of political parties as a forum to channel people's aspirations.Second, functional and positional transformation of the Central Indonesian NationalCommittee (KNIP) is a legislative body prior to the establishment of People's ConsultativeAssembly (MPR).The above changewithin theperspectiveof constitutionalismhas given a"role" sufficiently to prevent an unlimited power to the President. The issuance of VicePresidentdeclarationdidnotnecessarilyeliminatethepowerofthePresidentastheheadof



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government, but it only changed thepositionofKNIP fromassistance to thePresident to alegislative body that was equal to the position of the President and together with thePresidenthadthepowertocreatelaws.

Inthesubsequentdevelopment,theenactmentperiodofthe1950to1959ProvisionalConstitution (UUD) is considered as a period of constitutionalism culture fragility,characterizedbytheoverturningcabineteventsthatweretoooftenbasedonargumentsthatwerenotextremelyurgent, evenat a certain level, the reason for the cabinet change in thesystem parliamentary government was often towards like and dislike matters. The aboveeventsserveasavalidevidenceofthedepletionofconstitutionalismcultureamongthestateadministrators.

The practice of state management became ineffective, let alone consolidating thegrowthofthebasicideaofconstitutionalism,whereasinthisphase,thereweresomeamazingphenomenaaswell,namely:theindiscriminatelegalactionoftheAttorneyGeneralSupraptoas guardian of the law, who brought aminister to justice. Likewise, he summoned severalgenerals examinedby theAGO.Whenhewas replaced, he refused to go to thepresidentialpalaceduetohisfirmbelief.

Thedynamicsideaofconstitutionalismenteredaperiodofadeclineintheoldorderandtheneworder,i.e.the1960-1998period.Underthisperiod,UUD’45receivedlegitimacyaftertheissuanceofPresidentialDecreeonJuly5,1959.Tracedbacktothedecreeissuance,the purpose was to overcome the various constitutional issues occurred in the period ofUUDS’50(ProvisionalConstitution),thefailureofConstituentAssemblytocarryoutitsdutytocreateanUUDmarkedastartingpointfortheabandonmentofconstitutionalismideasinthepracticeofadministeringstatepower.

Immediately after the decree, with a great confident in the state of emergency, therevolution received a strategic spot. For and on behalf of the revolutionwhich has alwaysbeen considered unfinished, the law of revolution was enforced. Yet, surely it was theconstitutional law conceptualized as a revolution rule of law, and received the support ofseveralhighly ideological lawexperts, loyal totheBossofRevolution, the ideaofrevolutionlawtookarealform,anddetermineditspreysandimmediatelypreyedonthem.TheHouseofRepresentatives elected in 1955 was dissolved and replaced by Gotong Royong House ofRepresentatives(DPR-GR)whosemembershipwasappointedbythePresidentandfar fromdemocratic values, whereas, as most law and political experts believed, the House ofRepresentativesofthe1955electionwasrecognizedasthefirstandmostdemocraticelectioninthehistoryofelectionuntilrecently,wasdissolvedbytheFatherofRevolutionbecauseitrejectedtheDraftofStateBudget.

Severallegalproductsissuedatthetimedidnotequallyreflectthelegalproductladenwith the idea of constitutionalism, for example, a product issued by the MPRS as a stateinstitution whose membership was appointed by the President, and this was far from theessenceofconstitutionalismidea,atthetimealsoresultedintheformof,amongothers,MPRSDecreeNo. II/MPRS/1960PresidentSoekarnowasappointedas theMandateofProvisionalPeople'sConsultativeAssemblywithfullpower.

ThepowerofrevolutionarylawhadalsogiventhePresidentagreatclearanceandthisresultedinthePresident'sauthoritybeingunlimitednotonlywithinexecutiveterritory,butitcouldalsoextendtootherareasofauthority.TheabovepowerwasstatedinArticle19ofLawNo.19of1964regardingBasicProvisionsofJudicialPowerwhichstatedthat:Forthesakeofthe revolution, the honor of our State and Nation, or the urgency of public interest, thePresidentmayparticipateorinterfereincourtmatters.



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In addition to the above, the said period also includes a big event that offers anevidenceofdepletionorotherwisesaidasthelossofimplementationoftheconstitutionalismidea, among others, by the appointment of the Great Leader of Indonesian Revolution Ir.Soekarno to became the President of the Republic of Indonesia for life by the ProvisionalPeople'sConsultativeAssembly (MPRS)during theGeneral SessionofMPRS inBandungonMay15,1963asstipulatedinMPRSDecreeNo.III/MPRS/1963.

TheappointmentofIr.SoekarnoasalifetimepresidenthasobviouslyabandonedtheideaofconstitutionalisminUUD’45(beforeamendment),asitisexplicitlystipulatedinArticle7 that: The President and Vice President hold an office for a period of five years andthereaftermaybere-elected.Eventhoughitwasnotexplainedhowmanytimesapresidentcanbe re-elected,Article 7 ofUUD’45has by somedegrees given a very clear signal that apresidency should be carried out periodically, meaning that the UUD does not provide anopportunitytobeelectedasalifetimepresident.

The turningpointof theconstitutional lawdisorderunder theoldorderendedwiththe birth of an era popularly known as the new order under Suharto's leadership. The oldorderisaperiodconsideredoratleastpresentedasaperiodthatwas‘faraway”leavingtheUUD’45. The above assessment is justifiable as it was normatively seen by the issuance ofMPRSDecreeNo.5of1966thatrequestedPresidentSoekarnotocompletehisaccountabilityspeech. Although President Soekarno fulfilledMPRS request in his letter dated January 10,1967 called "Complementary of Nawaksara", however, it apparently did not meetexpectations of the people. After discussing the said President's letter, Chairman of MPRSconcluded that President Soekarno had been negligent in fulfilling his Constitutionalobligations.

The succession of national leadership in 1967 fromPresident Ir. Soekarno toMajorGeneral Soeharto, on March 12, 1967 took place during MPRS Session which appointedSoehartotobecomethePresidentofIndonesia,itwasunderstoodasthebeginningofaneraorordercalledtheNewOrder,anerawhichstoodascorrectionof thepreviousera.AnerawasbornwithacommitmenttoimplementUUD’45unitedlyandconsequently.

Inthecourseof itsactionsandpolicies implementedbytheNewOrdergovernment,the New Order originally regarded as an order that would amend the old order, wasconsideredinmanywaysharmingtheideaofconstitutionalism,evenwhencloselyobserved,in almost every policy, it stated the legal basis and there were few policies that were notreinforcedinlegalform;andwhenweanalyze/reviewthem,therearealotoflegalproductsthatwereinconsistentwiththespiritofconstitutionalismideaasmentionedearlier.

Thereweremanypoliciespackedaslegalproducts,butmaterialofthelegalproductswasessentiallycontrarytotheideaofconstitutionalism,suchasthelegalproductsinpoliticalfield, e.g. Law on Structure and Composition ofMPR/DPR/DPRD under theNewOrder erawhich clearly gavepower to thePresident to appointmembersof the legislature throughamechanism of appointment, as shown in Law No. 16 of 1969 regarding the Structure andCompositionofPeople'sConsultativeAssembly,People'sLegislativeAssemblyandRegionalPeople'sLegislativeAssemblyasamendedbyLawNo.5of1975.

The above legal products have resulted in the President "incarnated" as anunparalleled force, the MPR, which was normatively the highest institution and based onArticle6Paragraph(2)ofUUD’45(beforetheamendment)hadtheauthoritytoappointanddismiss the President as the Mandate, had been made ‘submissive’ in the presence of thePresident who was in fact appointed and dismissed by MPR. MPR merely acted as aninstitution that "sanctified" or more explicitly acted as a "stamp institution", complied to



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whateverthePresidentwished.TheaboveconditionwassimilartootherinstitutionssuchastheHouseofRepresentatives(DPR)andtheSupremeCourt(MA).

MPRasthesupremebodyofthestatehasinfactalsocommittedthesame"mistake"asMPRSdidintheoldorderwhichexplicitlyappointedBungKarnoasalifetimepresident,thedifferencewasthat thepolicyofelectingandappointingSuhartoasa ‘lifetime’presidentbyMPR of the New Order was coveredwith a rigid interpretation of Article 7 UUD’45whichstatesthat:ThePresidentandVicePresidentshallholdanofficeforaperiodoffiveyearsandthereaftermaybere-elected.Thesentence"...shallholdanofficeforaperiodoffiveyearsandthereaftermaybe re-elected..."was in fact interpreted indefinitely,whichmeans thatwhilethe presiding president was to be re-nominated for the next period, it was interpreted asconflictingtoUUD’45.

Thegovernment(read=authority)becametheonly interpreterthatwasconsideredas the most correct authority in interpreting UUD, different interpretations of articles inUUD’45 with interpretation set by the authority was considered as an act of treason andunconstitutional, as observed from interpretation on the article by Drs. Soerjadi, formerChairmanofIndonesiandemocraticparty(PDI),thatthefollowingsentencestatesas‘...maybere-elected’, means that it is only for 1 (one) period, so a president shall only serve for 2periodsor10(ten)years.TheconsequenceofhisinterpretationresultedinthedeathofDrs.Soerjadi’spoliticalcareer.

InterpretationofArticle7UUD’45bythegovernmenthasmadeSuhartosuccessfulinbecomingthepresidentfor32(thirtytwo)yearswithenormouspower,ifcomparedtoBungKarno's presidential power, the person that should be called as the lifetime president isSuharto,becauseBungKarnoonlyservedaspresidentfor21(twentyone)years.Inspiteoftheabove,itcanbeconcludedthatthetwonationalleadersandmembersoftheMPRSorMPRthat have enabled them to serve as the presidents for a long time, in asmuch as they areunfaithful to the choiceofbasic ideaof the state republic, asmandated inArticle1UUD’45which specifies that: The State of Indonesia is a unitary State of theRepublic. As a state ofrepublic, the term of public office will always recognize a time period, indeed article 7recognizesthetermforthepresidentandvice-president,i.e.5(five)years,butifthesentence"andthereaftermaybere-elected"withnorestriction,thenthereisnothedifferencebetweentheformofrepublicandmonarchyorkingdom.

Inshort,theperiodof1960-1998isadestructionperiodofconstitutionalismculture.Manipulationoverthespirit,normandruleoftheconstitutionwentonverypublicly.TheOldOrderandtheNewOrdersharethesamemeans.However,theyhavedifferentreasons.Bothof these orders are precisely categorized as the non-constitutional Government orauthoritarianGovernmentwithBungKarnoandPakHartoasthesourcesofallsourcesandnottheconstitution.

The strength of power of these two national figures was actually also caused byUUD’45 before the amendment, the constitution did normatively give and put the twopresidents at the topof thepyramidof power, even thoughArticle 1 paragraph2 specifiesthat: Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is fully implemented by the People'sConsultativeAssembly.As statedabove, suchprovisiondoesnotnecessarilymean theMPRbecomes the dominant in the administration of sovereignty in its implementation, becauseother provisions inUUD’45 before the amendment also stipulate that: The President is thestate highest governing body under the People's Consultative Assembly. In governing theState, the concentrationof power and responsibility liesupon thePresident. EvenArticle5paragraph(1)statesthat:ThePresidentholdsthepowertocreatelawswiththeapprovalof



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theHouseofRepresentatives.ThustheeigenaaroverthepowertocreatelawactuallyliesnotontheHouseofRepresentativesbutonthePresident.

UUD’45beforetheamendmentdidnotprovideaclearregulationconcerningmattersrelating to the reflection of the idea of constitutionalism such as openness, responsible oraccountablegovernment,exceptformattersrelatedtolimitationoftermofoffice(article7),judicialauthority,membershipofMPR/DPR,buttheyareinexplicitlyregulatedbecausethosemattersarefurtherregulatedinthelaws.

ThefallofSoehartoafterhestatedhisresignationonMay21,1998wasgreetedwithgreat excitement bymost people, people’s resentment towards theneworder and Suharto,and his cronies has "forced" MPR of the 1999 election to carry out a total revolution ofadministration of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, the notion was marked with theamendmentofUUD’45for4(four)times,whereasintheeraofNewOrder,theUUD’45waspositionedandsacred,soasthereshallbenoamendment.ThejargontoimplementUUD’45purely and consequently thatwas initially echoed in every heartbeat and every step of thegovernance, echoed by the new order regime, thereafter seemed disappeared. Entering theseconddecadeofpost-reformation,theeagernesstoamendUUD’45forthefifthtimehasbeenclearly sounded, both among the political elites and academicians, because they perceivedthattherearestillseveral imperfectionsontheamendmentsofUUD’45.Therehavebeenatleastfouramendmentprocesseswhichweremeanttoanswerthevariousproblemsfacingthenation.

The amendment of UUD’45 post reformation marked the re-enactment ofimplementation idea of constitutionalism, as evident from the paradigm that was"introduced" by the new constitution (UUD) of amendment, namely the accommodation ofcheck and balances mechanism in the implementation of state power. This changes theparadigm that heavy executive and implementationof sovereignty should only be executedaccording to the Constitution (UUD). Guarantee of human right is increasingly gainingreinforcement,aswellasregulationregardingthestatus,dutiesandauthorityofmajorstateinstitutionswhichshowareflectionofastrengtheningideaofconstitutionalism.Likewise,theintroduction of new state institutions in Chapter IX which regulates the judicial power,namely the presence of Constitutional Courtwhich is given the authority, among others, toconductajudicialreviewoflawsagainsttheConstitution(UUD),andtheJudicialCommissionwhich is given the authority to propose the appointment of Supreme Court and otherauthoritiesinordertomaintainandupholdthehonor,dignity,andbehaviorofthejudges.

Post-ColonialisminIndonesianConstitution

Post-Colonialism is generally known as an idea that emerged after the colonialperiod. As with other academic terms that often use post terminology such as post-modernism or post-structuralism, post-colonialism also means "after" colonialism. Post-colonial is to show to theWest (as the colonist) a non-Western state resistance as formercolony. If it is postulated that one of themajor aspirations of postcolonial theory is to re-establishabalance intherelationshipbetweenthe(former)colonizerandthecolonized,onthe otherhand to illuminatehowpower relations of thepresent are embedded inhistory.(AnaTomicicandFilomenaBerardi,2017)

Indonesiacannotbeseparatedfromcolonization.ThehistorystatesthatIndonesiawas colonized nearly 350 years and it has only been independent for several decades. Thecolonizationbycolonialgovernmentdidnotonlyaffecttheeconomic,commercial,andsocial



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aspects, but also the vital aspects of judicature. Daniel S. Lev states that new states owe agreat deal to colonial precedent. The above notion offered a suggestion that decolonizedcountries owed their colonial states because they have provided the way, guidance, ortraditiondirectlyorindirectly.ThelegalsysteminIndonesiaisconsideredasanexpansionoftheDutchcolonialgovernment.(DanielSLev,1985).ForLev,thelawalsobecameacolonialconfiguration which later adopted as the fundamental view of national structuredeterminationaswellassocial,politicalandeconomicdistribution inan independentstate.However, the law seems technically develop as a justification of hegemony between thecolonialgovernmentastherulerandtheindependentstatethatusedtobetheobjectoftheircolonies. The above notion is reinforced in four explanatory arguments which includepluralitylawandjudicialorganizationswithinacolonialsystem,commonlawpolicy,theroleof private law, and the transmission of colonial traditions to an independent state. Morespecifically,AidulFitriciadaAzhari states that theStateof Indonesia isanation-statewhichwasformedduetoaprocessofdecolonizationaftertheSecondWorldWar.Thecharacterofsuchdecolonizationwillcertainlygreatlyinfluencetheformationofideologyandconstitutionof Indonesianstateofasan ideologyandpost-colonialconstitution.(AidulFitriciadaAzhari,2013). Aidul Fitriciada Azhari added that Proclamation text is a clear statement regardingdecolonizationof Indonesia fromDutchcolonial state, andanational identityof Indonesiannation.(RMA.B.Kusuma,2004)TheproclamationtextofIndonesianindependencecarriesajuridicalmeaningtodecolonizationprocessofIndonesianstateandwasthefirstlegalproductthatmarkedtheestablishmentofIndonesianstateaswellasendedcolonialisminIndonesia.(AidulFitriciadaAzhari,2011)

The spirit of proclamation full of decolonization processwas then carried on in thepreambleofUUD’45(UUD).ThehistoricalpurposeofthenoblespiritandidealsofIndonesiannationtobefreefromcolonialismisfurtherembodiedinthepreambleofUUD’45whichisasoneunitywith thebodyofUUD’45.Thismeans that the identityof Indonesian constitutionformed from the post-colonial nation state is the identity of post-colonial constitution asstatedinUUD’45.

Normatively, Indonesian constitutional identity is incarnated in a consensus thatmaintains the upholding of Indonesian constitutionalism into the five basic principles ofPancasilaservedasanideological-philosophicalfoundationinachievingandrealizingthefourgoalsofthestate.Thefivefundamentalprinciplesare:

(1) BeliefintheOneandOnlyGod;(2) Ajustandcivilizedhumanity;(3) AunifiedIndonesia;(4) Democracy,ledbythewisdomoftherepresentativesofthePeople;and(5) SocialjusticeforallIndonesians.

Thefourgoalsofthestatetobeachievedinclude:(1)toprotecttheentirenationand

Indonesianhomeland;(2)toimprovethepublicwelfare;(3)toeducatethelifeofthenation;and(4) toparticipate in the implementationofworldorderbasedon independence, lastingpeace, and social dignity. Departing from the consensus that serves as the foundation ofideological philosophy, subsequently the Indonesian constitution was created, and itssubstanceservedasareflectionofconstitutionalismunderstandingadoptedbyIndonesia.

ItisevidentthatthemodernconstitutionhasinfluencedthesubstanceofIndonesianconstitution.(AlbertH.Y.Chen,2010)Inspiteoftheabove,Indonesiannationalsoprovidesitsownspecificidentityinthesaidsubstanceofconstitution,intheformof:



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1. AnIdeaofNationality

AnideaofnationalitywasoriginallyaproductofEuropeanhistory,createdafterthe

Westphalia treatyonOctober24,1648,whichended the30-yearwar inEurope.Under theabove agreement, the Dutch gained its independence from the Spain. Based on thisbackground,theDutchisalsoacountrycreatedbasedontheideaofnationalismaswiththestate of Indonesia. However, contrary to the idea of the expansive Dutch nationalism, theDutchcreatedthecolonialism.Ontheotherhand,Indonesiannationalismrejectscolonialisminallitsforms.

2. AnIdeaofPopularSovereignty

Initially, sovereignty of the people as written in Article 1 paragraph (2) UUD’45,

statedthat,"SovereigntyshallbeinthehandsofthepeopleandshallbeexercisedinfullbyPeople's Consultative Assembly" (referred to as Majelis Permusywaratan Rakyat (MPR)).Based on the above Article, the state of Indonesia is based on people sovereigntywhich isinstitutionallycarriedoutbytheMPR.Structurally,thismeansthattherewasMPRsupremacyas executer of people sovereignty. This idea emerged as a form of rejection against theautocraticpracticeundertakenbytheDutchEastIndiescolonialgovernment.TheDutchEastIndiescolonialgovernmentacquiredpowerfromtheDutchEmpire, therefore, itwasnotanembodiment of people sovereignty in the Dutch Indies.(Aidul Fitriciada Azhari, 2005) Thiscondition underlines a notion that the idea of people sovereignty as stated in UUD’45insomuchpurelyastheelementformingtheidentityofpost-colonialIndonesianconstitution.However, in line with democratization and dynamics of UUD’45, the third amendment ofUUD’45,whichreinforcestheessenceofsovereignty,becomessovereigntyinthehandsofthepeopleandimplementedaccordingtoConstitution(UUD)".

3. AnideaofastructureofIndonesianstategovernment

The founders of Indonesian state basically adopted the structure of Dutch Indies

governmentintheIndischeStaatregeling1925.TheymodifiedthesixstateinstitutionsintheIndische Staatregeling 1925. Details of the above are as follows: Kroon was changed intoPeople's Consultative Assembly; Fouverneurs-generaal into President; Volksradd into theHouse of Representatives; HogeRaad into the Supreme Court; Raad van Indie into theSupremeAdvisoryCouncil;andAlgemeneRekenkamerintotheAuditBoardoftheRepublicofIndonesia.

TheconversionofKroonintoMPRshowedafundamentalchangeintheprincipleofpopularsovereignty.Accordingly,theformofstateofIndonesiawasnotamonarchyaswithDutchEast Indies, but aRepublic. ThePresident as the head of Indonesian statewas not arepresentativeoftheKing/QueenasintheDutchEastIndies,becausetheHeadofIndonesianstatewasaccountabletoIndonesianPeoplerepresentedintheMPR.Therefore,thestructureofgovernmentinUUD’45hasanauthenticpost-colonialconstitutionalidentity.

There was a hierarchy of the state institutions within the government structurebasedonUUD’45,i.e.thehigheststateinstitutionandstatehighinstitutions.Thehigheststateinstitution isMPR. Those state high institutions are namely President, DPR,MA, DPA, andBPK. The shift of paradigm from constitution-identity forming elements of post-colonialUUD’45intoapost-authoritarianconstitutionalidentity,especiallyintheconstitution-identity



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forming element which was the idea of Indonesian government structure, has created anextensive legal implication. The said implications existed in consolidation and relationshipbetweenthestate institutions.Thecurrentrealitydemonstratesthat it is impossible for thebranchesofpower(executive, legislativeand judiciary)notto interconnectwitheachother,evenstandasequals,andcontroleachother inaccordancewiththeprincipleofchecksandbalances.(AidulFitriciadaAzhari,2005)

4. Theideaofequalrightsbeforethelawandgovernmentandreligiousfreedom

The idea of religious freedom stated by Soekarno, the most influential nationalist

leader (and Indonesia’sfirstpresident), proposeda compromise in June1945, according towhichthecountry’sideologicalfoundationwouldbethe“FivePrinciples”(Pancasila).(HannaLerner,2013).WhateventuallybecamethefirstoftheseprinciplesaffirmedthatthebasisoftheIndonesianstatewas“BeliefintheOnenessofGod”.(RobertW.Hefner,2013)

The identity of post-colonial relating with the equal rights before the law andgovernmentandreligious freedom isalsoreflected inArticles27and29.Thesearticlesarealso referred to as part of "essentials of UUD’45", - plus Article 33 - so they may not bechanged. Article 27 states the principle of non-discrimination in contrast with colonialregulations that embraced a racial division between the Indies population consisting ofEuropean,ForeignEasternandIndigenousgroupsinmattersrelatingtolawandgovernment.Article29includesaprovisionthatexplicitlyrejectsasecularsystemthatseparatesreligiousandstateaffairs.TheDutchcolonialgovernmenthasconsciouslycreatedapolicythatcurbedand limited the freedom of religion among theMuslims in Indonesia, even though the soletendency to provide support for Christianity was very strong. The constitution-identityforming elements of post-colonial UUD’45 as stated in articles 27 and 29 had legalimplications,thatthestatestrengthenedtheguaranteeofeveryone’spositionbeforethelawandgovernment.ThestatealsoguaranteedtherighttofreedomofreligionwhilepromotingreligiouslifeandisofficiallyactivelyinvolvedinmaintainingreligiouslifeinIndonesia.

5. AnideaofNationalEconomicSystem

TheprincipleofkinshipisstatedinArticle33Paragraph(1)UUD’45asfollows:“The

economy is structuredas a joint effortbasedon the familialprinciple".Basedon theaboveprovision, the principle of kinship is related to national economic system. During thediscussionatBPUPK,thisarticlewasdescribedbrieflybySukarnoas"collectivity".Thenextparagraphstates:“Sectorsofproductionwhichareimportanttothestateandaffectthelifeofthe people shall be under the authority of the State”, described briefly as "socialism". Thecollectivist-socialisteconomyofUUD’45isclearlyanantithesistotheliberalsystemofDutchIndiescolonialisteconomy.FoundersofthestateclearlyrejectedtheliberalsystemofDutchEast Indiescolonialismthat ledtotheresourceexploitationof Indonesiannation.AccordingtocreatorsofUUD’45,theprincipleofkinshipisnotsolelyinregardstoeconomiclife,butitisthefoundationthatunderpinsIndonesianstateadministrationsystemasawhole.

ThefiveideasledtheIndonesiannationtohaveaconstitutionalidentitythatbreathedon Pancasila. Historically, the ideawas evident both during themovement and at the timewhenUUD’45wasdraftedastheconstitutionofIndonesiannation,toincludeunderstandingsof religious teachings, customs and combined themwith the rule of law. Such visions anddissentdidnotdiminishtheirequalityofopinionregardingseveralprincipalmatters,i.e.:



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First, to designate the concept of people sovereignty as one of the link of an independentIndonesia;Second, thedemocracyusedasoneof the links isnotonly interpretedasapoliticalsystem,butalsoasaneconomicsystem.Democracyalso includespoliticaldemocracyandeconomicdemocracy;Third,inpoliticalunderstanding,thedemocracytobecarriedoutisnotacopyofdemocracyintheWesternorEasterncountries;Fourth, institutionally,variousmodesofmodernconstitutionsuchasrepresentativesystemareadopted.(IGdePantjaAstawa,1999)

Basedontheabovestatements,therewerehighexpectationsforDemocraticPancasila

whichwassupposed toactas the "middlepath,"neither liberalnorsocialist, that chartedanewcourseforphilosophyandpolitics.(PranotoIskandar ,2016)ItcanalsobearguedthatPancasila is a unifyingmeans for the heterogeneity of Indonesian nationwhich consists ofvariousethnicgroups,religions,culturesandlanguages.Pancasilaisalsoessentiallyaformofawareness of all elements of the nation, regardless to the differences and barriers amongdifferencestounitewithintheUnitaryStateoftheRepublicofIndonesia.

These differences are in fact considered as a national treasure that can foster acommonbelief to achieve the noble goals and ideals,whichwas long fought by Indonesianpredecessors, namely the creation of a just and prosperous society, which, according toterminologybyPresidentSoeharto:”...thecreationofajustsocietyinprosperity,andprosperinjustice.”Fromthelegalperspective(juridic),theexistenceofPancasilabecomesalegalidea(rechtside)whichalwaysservesasafundamentalformationandthepurposeofeveryexistinglegislation,therefore,thelaworregulationcreatedshouldessentiallybefurtherreflectionsofthevaluesstatedinPancasila.Pancasilashouldalwaysserveastheguidanceanddirectionofeverynormcreation.

PancasilaisnotnecessarilyformulatedinonearticleofUUD’45,butitwaswrittenastheclosingoftheopening.TheexpressivestatementsmentionedinthepreambleserveastheembodimentoftheprinciplesinPancasila,whichbecometheidealsoftheStateofIndonesia.Moreover,ifwefurtherexaminethebodyofUUD’45beforeitisamended,therewasnotermof ‘Pancasila’, which is different from UUD’45 after the amendment, in which Article 36Astates that the term Pancasila converted into a unified entity in the sentence "GarudaPancasila"inwhichArticle36Astatesthat:TheStateSymbolisGarudaPancasilaandtheStateMotto isBhinekaTunggal Ika (Unity inDiversity), however, the termPancasila has alreadyexistedwhenthefoundingfatherswereinvolvedinthedraftingofConstitution(UUD).

This is evident from the statementof Ir. SoekarnowhostudiedPancasilaandstatedthat: “... it is proven that Pancasila that I examine and dedicate to Indonesian people, isgenuinely a dynamic foundation, a foundation that can truly muster the entire energy ofIndonesian people, a foundation that can truly unite Indonesian people" . Thus, it can beargued that Pancasila is the embodiment of the values that grow and develop in the life ofIndonesiannationstretchingfromSabangtoMeraukeandexistedsincetheancienttime.

Notingtheforegoing,anylawscreatedintheformoflegislationoranyotherformsinIndonesiawhicharepartsofthedevelopmentofnational law,shouldbebasedonPancasilaby accommodating the text consistency, from the highest to the lowest hierarchy. In otherwords, Pancasila should be continuously pursued to be the guidance to implementation ofnationalandstategovernance,includingpreparationofnationallegaldevelopmentpolicy.

The law and regulation in Indonesia should also be directed to achieve the state'sgoalsasstatedinPreambleofUUD’45i.e.tobuildthewholenationandhomeland,toenrich



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andeducate the lifeof thenation, toadvance thecommonprosperity, toparticipate towardthe establishment of a world order. The above goals should be promoted as politicalorientationofdevelopmentandlaw,totheextentthatthelegalpoliticsshouldberegardedasthe endeavor to make the law as the means to achieve state goals from time to time, inaccordancewiththestagesofsocietydevelopment.ThusPancasila,whichis intendedastheprincipletoachievethegoalofthestate,createssomelegalguidingprinciples,namely:First,thelawscreatedinIndonesiashallaimtobuildandensureintegrationofIndonesianstateandnation, both territorially and ideologically. The laws in Indonesia shall not contain anysubstances thathave thepotentials to cause regional and ideologicaldisintegration, as theyarecontrarytothegoalofprotectingthewholenationandhomelandboundinunity;second,thelawscreatedinIndonesiashouldbebasedondemocracyandnomocracyatthesametime.Democracywhichservesasthebasisofpolitics(populist)requiresthecreationoflawbasedon popular agreement or its legally elected representatives, either through acclamationagreements or amajority vote when a consensus cannot be achieved; whereas nomocracywhichservesastheprincipleofstatelaw,requiresthelawsinIndonesiabecreatedbasedonlegalsubstance,whichphilosophically,inaccordancewithPancasilarechtsideaswellaswiththecorrectprocedure.ThusthelawinIndonesiacannotbecreatedonthebasisofmerelytowinthenumberofsupporters,butitshouldalsocomefromthephilosophyofPancasilaandacorrectprocedure.

Third, the laws created in Indonesia shall be directed to build social justice for allIndonesians.Basedontheforegoing,thereisnojustificationforlawsthatencourageorallowsocio-economic gap due to exploitation by the strong against the weak without protectionfromthestate. Indonesianlawshouldbeabletoprotecttheweakfrombeingconfrontedbythe strong that will certainly always be won by the strong. Consequently, Indonesian lawshouldbeabletoprovideaspecialprotectionfortheweak,inordertonarrowsocio-economicgapthatmayariseduetoexploitationbythestrongontheweak.Thelawsofsocialjusticearethereforeintendedtonarrowthegapbetweenthestrongandtheweak,andbetweentherichand the poor; Fourth, the laws created in Indonesia should be based on religious tolerancewhichiscivilized,i.e.thelawsthatdonotgiveprivilegenordiscriminatecertaingroupsbasedon thenumberof thebelievers. Indonesia is neither a religious state (i.e. not basedononeparticularreligion)norasecularstate(i.e.indifferenttoorwithoutreligiouszeal).Indonesiaas Pancasila State is a religious nation state, a religious nationhood that provides a strongprotectiontoeverycitizentoembraceandpracticehisorherownreligiousbelieveswithoutinterferingeachother,oreven leading todisintegration.Withinsuchconception, the lawofthestatecannotobligethepracticeofreligiouslaw,however,thestateshallfacilitate,protect,andensuretheirsecuritywhenitscitizenspracticetheirreligiousbelievebasedontheirownbeliefsandconscience.Accordingly,thestatedoesnotimposetheenactmentofreligiouslawsintoexclusiveformallaw,butrathertofacilitate,protect,andensurethesecurityofthosewhowishtoworshipwithtolerance.Theenforcementofsuchguidanceiscrucialconsideringtheissuesofreligionisthemostfundamentalissues,thusnooneisallowedtoforceorbeforcedto embrace or not to embrace a particular religion. Implementation of religious teachings,therefore,shouldbecarriedoutwithfulltoleranceandcivility.

Basedon theabovedescription, thespiritandsoulofevery law/norm/legislation inIndonesiashouldthereforebeanimplementationofthespiritandsoulofPancasila,hencethestateorganizersat the central and regional levelswith theauthority to formand formulatelawsofgovernmentregulation,presidentialregulationto localregulation, includingthoseofthegovernors/regents/mayors,shouldbeabletopresenta"figure"of lawwiththespiritofPancasila,orinotherwords,Pancasilaasthelegalidealshouldbeimplementedandrealized



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intheformoflawwithPancasila,signifyingthatanylawsandregulationscannotbeinconflictwith the principles of Pancasila. Based on the above reasons, the state of law withinIndonesianversionofconstitution iscalled the legalstateofPancasila. (JanpatarSimamora,2014)TheCreationofDemocraticStateofLawwithinIndonesianConstitution

Based on the identity of constitutional text formation, there are some changes andstrengthening in the state administration structure within the development ofconstitutionalisminIndonesiathat juxtaposetheconceptofnomocracyanddemocracy.Theconceptof'nomocracy'derivesfromthewords'nomos'and'cratos'.Theterm‘nomocracy’iscomparable to ‘demos’ and ‘cratos’ in ‘democratic’.‘Nomos'means the norm,while 'cratos'meansthepower,thedeterminingfactorintheexerciseofpoweristhenormorthelaw.Thusthetermnomocracyiscloselyrelatedtotheideaofruleoflawortheprincipleoflawasthesupremepower.

Democracycannotbediscussedseparatelyorwithoutrelatingittotheconceptofstateoflaw,becausethestateoflawisoneofdemocraticstate,anddemocraticstateisoneofthesafestwaystomaintaincontroloverthestateoflaw(ademocraticstateoflaw).Theideaofastateof lawisthatstateof lawshouldbewellexecuted, inthesensethatit is inaccordancewithwhat is expectedby the society from the lawand just (the fundamental goal of law isjustice).

Substantially,therearetwosignificancesofdemocracyfromtheperspectiveoflawthatisrelatedto thenorms, i.e. thewaytogainpowerandtoexercisepower. (Zulfirman,2006)Sovereigntyof thepeople(democracy)asdefined inArticle1Paragraph(2)andtheruleoflaw (nomocracy) regulated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) UUD’45 are the two things thatcorrelateandcannotbeseparatedinademocraticstatethatupholdsthelawandjusticelikeIndonesia.

After the change of democratic system as stated in Article 1 Paragraph (2) UUD’45,characterizedbyadirectdemocracyby thepeople, from thepeopleand for thepeople, theheadofstatewhichbeforetheAmendmentwaselectedbytheMPRRI,hasbeenchangedintoelecteddirectlybythepeoplethroughpresidentialandvicepresidentialelectionandlikewisewithregionalheadelection(pemilukada).Democratizationaims tocreate justice inpolitics.Additionally, democracy can create social justice for all Indonesian people in politics,economyandotherfields.Democracyineconomyiscalledeconomicdemocracy.DemocraticpoliticsanddemocraticeconomyofBungKarnoiscalledSocio-Democracy.(Djauhari,2006)

Withthedevelopmentofmodernstateoflawcharacterizedbytheruleoflaw(ROL)andthe development of law affecting Indonesia, not only derived from rechtsstaat but also theruleof law, the frameworkofsubstantive justice is thus taken fromthevaluesofsocietybythejudges/jurist,sothestateoflawwritteninArticle1Paragraph(3)AmendmenttoUUD’45combinestherechtsstaatandtheruleoflaw.

Constitution (UUD) as a common ground of nation and state finally created UUD’45.(Fatkhurohman,2009)UUD’45became the sourceof legal order.This signifies thatboth inthemakingandenactmentofanylegislation,thereshouldnotbeanyconflictswithUUD’45,letaloneusedasasourceorlegalbasisofaregulatoryproduct.

Indonesiaalreadyhasthecharacteristicsofalegalstate,i.e.First,Supremacyofthelawregulated inArticle1paragraph(3)UUD’45;Second,equalitybefore the law isregulated in



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Article27paragraph(1)UUD’45,andlawenforcementwithdueprocessoflaw,isregulatedinArticle24UUD’45.

TheprincipleofalegalstateadoptedbytheUnitaryStateoftheRepublicofIndonesia(NKRI)isaprismaticandintegrative"StateofPancasila",i.e.theprincipleofalegalstatethatintegratesorunifiesthegoodelementsofseveraldifferentconcepts(rechtsstaat,theruleoflaw,theconceptof formalandmaterial legalstate),andprovidedthevaluesofIndonesians’(e.g. parenting, paternity, harmony, balance anddeliberation are at the roots of Indonesianlegalculture)sotheybecometheprinciplesof"PancasilaStateofLaw".

The consequence of being a state of law, by way of mutatis mutandis raises theobligationforthestatetoimplementtheprincipleofjustice.Theprincipleofjusticeinalegalstate are seeking to gainamidpointbetween two interests, providingopportunities for thestatetorunthegovernmentwithitspower,butalsoontheotherhand,thepeopleshouldbeprotectedfortheirrightsthroughtheprincipleoflegaljustice.

As Indonesia becomes a constitutional state in UUD’45, it strengthens the position ofUUD’45asa stateconstitutionwhichshouldbemaintainedandenforced.Theabovenotionprovidestheroleforjudicialinstitutionsi.e.ConstitutionalCourtinupholdingUUD’45.

Article1paragraph(2)UUD’45affirmsthatdemocracywhichservesasamanifestationof people sovereignty by leaving it to the people to make political decisions within stateadministration. Meanwhile, paragraph (3) states the concept of nomocracy in the form ofsubmission to the law to solve various issues against democracy and people's rights.Withreference to the above provision, it is a necessity to build and enforce the law based on abalanced democracy and nomocracy. Indeed, democracy and nomocracy may describedifferent aspectsbut thatdoesnotmean that it cannotbebalanced.Democracywill alwaysdiscussthepoliticalaspectsonhowtoupholdpeoplesovereignty,whilenomocracydiscussesthe legal perspective. Therefore, without legal guardianship, people sovereignty willinevitablyleadtounbalancedcondition.

Democracy should be built within the limits of nomocracy, for democracy cannot berealized without the rule of law.Democracy requires clear rules of conduct and strictlyadherestothemtogether.Withoutrules,democracywillneverachieveitssubstantialgoals.Inimplementingtheprinciplesofnomocracy,theconceptofdemocraticstateoflawisapplied;democracy is regulated and limited by the rule of law, while the law itself is determinedthrough democratic means based on the constitution. Thus, the basic rules of stateadministration,withallitslegalpolitics,shouldbeconsistentlyrelegatedtotheconstitution.Withoutexception,allrulesoflawcreatedthroughamechanismofdemocracyshouldnotbeinconflictwiththeconstitution.Inotherwords,thestateofIndonesiaisastateoflawsoanypolitical activities e.g. direct democracy in General Election (Pemilu) or the process oflawmakinganditsimplementation,shallnotbeinconflictwiththeConstitutionorUUD’45.Ifinfact,alawisinconflictwiththeconstitution,thelawshallthenundergoajudicialreviewbythe Constitutional Court. This is to ensure that the constitution is upheld so ConstitutionalCourtisconstitutedasaconstitutionguardianorenforcementbody.

TheAmendmentofUUD’45 seeks to empower thepeople reconstructed fromvariousaspects,namelyFirst,theaspectofstrengtheningtherepresentativeinstitutions;Second,theexecutive aspect (direct presidential election); Third, the judicial aspect (the emergence ofConstitutional Court); and Fourth, aspects related to human rights.( Septi Nur Wijayanti,2009)

Within constitutional structure, there is a new institution called Constitutional Court.The institutionpresentstoequalizetheprinciplesofdemocracyandnomocracy,referredtoas theguardian institutionofdemocracyandconstitutionalenforcement.Thereare4(four)



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important changeswithin the judicial power or judicial authority, namely: First, before theamendment of UUD’45, the guarantee of judicial authority was only existed within theexplanation, after the amendment, such guaranteewas explicitlymentioned in the body ofUUD’45; Secondly, the Supreme Court and others were no longer the sole judicial powerbecausethereisalsoConstitutionalCourtwhichalsoservesasajudicialauthority;Third,theexistenceofnew institutions, independent in the judicialauthority structure i.e. the JudicialCommission authorized to nominate the appointment of Supreme Court Justice and otherauthorities, istomaintainandupholdthehonor,dignityandbehaviorofthe judges;Fourth,theauthorityandpowerofjudiciary,whichinthiscaseisexecutedbyConstitutionalCourttoexaminethelawagainsttheconstitution,istodecideanydisputesregardingauthorityofstateinstitutionswhoseauthoritiesaregrantedbytheconstitution, todecideupondissolutionofpoliticalparties,anddisputesconcerningelectionresults.(MuhammadFauzan,2008).

Basedontheabovematters,theamendmentofUUD’45(1999-2002)broughtinanewspiritwithinIndonesianstateadministrationsystem,bothinLegislativePowerasthepowerof lawmakers, executive power as the power of law enforcement, aswell as judicial power(which defends and enforces the law).Within the judicial power system, in addition to theSupremeCourtandthecourtsundertheSupremeCourtwithinthegeneralcourt,thereligiouscourt, military court and state administrative court, there have emerged new stateinstitutions, namely Constitutional Court and Judicial Commission as implications of theamendmentUUD’45.

There are 4 (four) points underlying the establishment of Constitutional Court; First,Understanding of Constitutionalism, is a belief that there is a limitation of power. Thisunderstanding has two important points, i.e. the concept of a legal state, that the lawovercomes state power, the lawwill exercise control over politics, and the concept of civilrightsofthestatecitizensstates,thatthefreedomofcitizensandstatepowerislimitedbytheconstitution; Secondly, check and balance mechanism, a good governance system ischaracterized,amongothers,byamechanismofchecksandbalanceintheauthorityofstateadministration.Checkandbalanceallowsamutualcontrolamongbranchesofexistingpowerandavoidsanytyrannicalmeasuresandpowerdecentralizationtopreventoverlapbetweenexistingauthorities.Byrelyingtotheprincipleofstateoflaw,therelevantcontrolsystemisajudicialcontrolsystem;Third,implementationofacleanstate,wheneveragoodgovernancesystem requires a clean state to be administered; Fourth, the protection of human rightsasserting thatuncontrolledpoweroftencommitsarbitraryactions in itsconductandnot toexercisethehumanrights.

SeveralconsiderationsontheestablishmentofConstitutionalCourtasstipulatedinLawNo. 24 of 2003 regarding Constitutional Court, that the unitary state of the Republic ofIndonesiaisastateoflawbasedonPancasilaandUUD’45whichaimstocreatethelifeorderofanationandastatethatisorderly,clean,prosperousandjust;thattheConstitutionalCourtasoneoftheexecutorofjudicialauthoritycarriesacriticalroleintheendeavortoupholdtheconstitution and the principle of legal state in accordancewith its duties and authority, asstipulatedinUUD’45;thatpursuanttotheprovisionsofArticle24CParagraph(6)ofUUD’45needstoregulatetheappointmentanddismissalofconstitutionaljudges,procedurallaw,andother provisions concerning Constitutional Court; that pursuant to considerations asmentioned in letters a, b and c and to implement the provisions of Article III of theTransitionalRulesofUUD’45,itisnecessarytocreateaLawonConstitutionalCourt.

The Constitutional Court is regulated in Article 24 of Amendment UUD’45 andsubsequently regulated in Law No. 24 of 2003 regarding Constitutional Court. The



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Constitutional Court is the embodiment of a just democracy in upholding the constitution.(PanMuhammadFaiz,2016)Conclusion

The course dynamics of constitutionalism idea in the history of the Republic of

Indonesiaconstitutionhasexperiencedupsanddownsinlinewiththeexistinglegalpoliticalregime. Building a tradition of constitutionalism as a sustainable effort cannot simply beexecuted by relying on the text/editorial of the constitution. The success to develop aconstitutionalismcultureingoverningadministrationisalsosignificantlydeterminedbythewillingnessofeveryelementofthesocietyandthestateorganizersintheefforttounderstandthecontentstatedinthetextoftheconstitution.

The idea of constitutionalism would simply be a meaningless idea if there is nosystematic effort from all elements of the people to jointly manifest, not only normativelywritten in "gold ink" stated in hundreds or even thousands of white papers scattered invariousformsoflegislation,butthereshouldbeasupportanddeterminationtomanifestalloftheminimplementingthenationalandstatelife.

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