copyright trolls, an empirical study prof. matthew sag loyola university chicago school of law

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Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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Page 1: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study

Prof. Matthew SagLoyola University Chicago

School of Law

Page 2: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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What is a troll?

NPE’ish definitions Troll = the business of litigation is its business Troll = “systematic legal enforcement of copyrights in

which it has acquired a limited ownership interest.” Shyamkrishna Balganesh• asymmetric stakes

‘this suit is BS’ definitions Troll = ‘bottom feeder’, in effect nuisance value

settlements of ‘dubious’ claims• Lack technical merit, • Lack constitutional merit

Page 3: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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A troll is a systematic opportunist, manifestations of opportunism are varied.

Opportunistic litigation strategy• Weak claims

– asserts rights it does not have, – poorly substantiated claims of infringement,– disproportionate remedies.

• Not bound by conventions of tolerated use – Patent: because NPE – Copyright not interested in the conventional market place (courthouse

value> marketplace value, limited assignments)

Motive for rights acquisition is opportunistic • Paper patents (courthouse value> marketplace value) • Partial assignments, • Looking for infringed works whose courthouse value>

marketplace value. Exploits sunk costs and unavoidable infringement

Page 4: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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How are copyright trolls different to patent trolls?

The opportunism of copyright trolls is primarily directed towards statutory damages. courthouse value> marketplace value Makes weak cases stronger Makes otherwise individually inconsequential

infringements profitable

Status-based definitions clearly not helpful

Page 5: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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How do Multi-Defendant John Doe suits work?

“Copyright Owner v. John Does 1 – N” Alleging illegal file sharing using BitTorrent Defendants identified by IP address

– Joinder?, personal jurisdiction?

Early discovery from ISPs Negotiate settlements

– Threat of statutory damages, exposure, – Response to ‘it wasn’t me defenses’

Page 6: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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Are Lawsuits against BitTorrent users trolling?

Partly a question of motive, partly of tactics RIAA

• is not copyright troll. End-user litigation aimed at sending a message not creating an independent revenue stream

Voltage (e.g. The Hurt Locker)• Could be seen as a troll because independent

revenue stream Prenda Law (mostly porn)

• independent revenue stream + “extortion tactics”

Page 7: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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How significant are MDJD suits?

Database = all copyright cases filed in U.S. federal district courts between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2013.

– Data from PACER– Was just 2d, 7th and 9th, but now all.

Identifying “John Doe” lawsuits• “John Doe” and “Doe”

Identifying pornography• Tedious plaintiff by plaintiff review. • Assumes that one porn case is enough.

Page 8: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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SOME IMPRESSIVE DATA

Page 9: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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42%

of copyright filings were multi-defendant John Doe suits in the U.S. in 2013

Page 10: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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U.S. Federal districts where mdjd > all other copyright in 2013

Alabama (SD)ColoradoDelawareDistrict Of ColumbiaFlorida (MD)Georgia (ND)Georgia (SD)Illinois (CD)Illinois (ND)Indiana (ND)MarylandMichigan (ED)Ohio (SD)Pennsylvania (ED)Tennessee (ED)Tennessee (WD)Washington (WD)Wisconsin (ED)Wisconsin (WD)

Page 11: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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Page 12: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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Percentage of John Doe Law Suits by State, 2001-03, 2004-06, 2007-09, 2010-12, 2013

Page 13: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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Percentage of John Doe Law Suits by Circuit, 2001-03, 2004-06, 2007-09, 2010-12, 2013

Page 14: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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Districts where MDJD-Porn> all other copyright in 2013

Alabama (SD) Colorado District Of Columbia Illinois (CD)Illinois (ND) Indiana (ND) Maryland Michigan (ED)Pennsylvania (ED) Tennessee (ED) Tennessee (WD) Wisconsin (ED)

Wisconsin (WD)

Page 15: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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What (if anything) Should be Done?

What is driving this litigation? (pervasive infringement) Statutory damages Permissive joinder & Early discovery Porn “extortion”

– Districts where MDJD-Porn>MDJD-Other in 2013– Alabama (SD), California (SD) Colorado, District Of Columbia

Florida (MD) Florida (SD), Illinois (CD) Illinois (ND) Indiana (ND) Indiana (SD), Iowa (SD) Louisiana (ED), Maryland Michigan (ED), Michigan (WD), Minnesota, New Jersey, New York (ED), Ohio (SD), Pennsylvania (ED) Tennessee (ED) Tennessee (WD) Texas (ND) Texas (SD), Wisconsin (ED) Wisconsin (WD)

Page 16: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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Count of John Doe Copyright Lawsuits 2000–2013, by District

Page 17: Copyright Trolls, An Empirical Study Prof. Matthew Sag Loyola University Chicago School of Law

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What (if anything) Should be Done?

File-sharing is wrong, but … Fairness to defendants

• Statutory damages make a 5% case a winning case Abuse of the judicial process (esp. threats)

Proposals Reasonable Statutory damages Conditional joinder/discovery

• Safeguards, agreement to reasonable statutory damages

Sever & Consolidate