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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 163705 July 30, 2007

NOMER OCAMPO, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

On 22 May 1996, petitioner Nomer Ocampo, Elmer Miranda, andDanilo Cruz were charged with the crime of robbery with physicalinjuries. The Information reads:

That on or about the 14th day of November 1995, at around 8:15oclock in the evening, in Barangay San Nicolas I, Municipality ofMagalang, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,conspiring and confederating together and mutually

helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlafeloniously, with intent of gain and by means of intimidation grab one Rommel Q. Misayah by the neck with a bladed weapon attack the latter, inflicting physical injuries which required and did requireattendance, and on the occasion thereof, accused in fof their intent to gain did then and there willfully, unlafeloniously take, steal and carry away with them the fowit:

a) One (1) Icom radio . . . P4,500.00

b) Two (2) T-shirts . . . 350.00

c) A pair of maong pants . . . 345.00

d) A clutch bag . . . 150.00

e) Cash . . . 29,000.00

with a total value of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE FORTY FIVE (P34,345.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,to and owned by the said Rommel Q. Misayah, to the daprejudice of the owner, in the afore-said [sic] amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1


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Records show that there was an Amended Information2 dated 17July 1996 changing the crime charged to Robbery with Violenceand Intimidation against all of the accusedOcampo, Cruz andMiranda. Arraignment ensued on 19 July 19963 where all of theaccused pleaded not guilty. Accused Cruz jumped bail during thependency of the trial and was tried in absentia.4

The prosecution presented and offered the testimony of RommelQ. Misayah and several documentary evidence.

Misayah testified that on 14 November 1995, at around 8:10 p.m.,he was walking along San Nicolas Street on his way home whenthree male individuals approached him.5 As the place wassufficiently lighted by a nearby post, he was able to identify thetrio as accused Cruz, Ocampo and Miranda. When the threeaccused were already near him, Cruz grabbed Misayahs neck and

choked him while Miranda held his shoulder and got his shoulderbag.6 Ocampo meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife,warning him not to fight back. Sensing that he would be harmedanyway, Misayah fought back by pushing the hands of theaccused and trying to parry their blows. He and Cruz then fell onthe ground with Cruz on top of him. When the handle of hisshoulder bag snapped, all of the accused ran away with theshoulder bag.7

By reason of the incident, Misayah sustained wounds in his handscaused by the bladed weapon held by Ocampo when he

attempted to evade Ocampos blows.8 The shoulder from Misayah contained the items enumerated in the aInformation.

At the nearby Municipal Hall, Misayah reported the Police Officers de Leon, Mon Mendoza, and CatalinMisayah was brought to Balitucan Emergency Hotreatment and thereafter proceeded to the precinct. Afinvestigation, he then executed a statement beforCatalino Mutuc and SPO4 de Leon.10

In their defense, accused Ocampo, Miranda, and anotheOliver Santos, gave their version of what happened that

Miranda testified that he was with Ocampo in the afternNovember 1995 to accompany the latter to borrow a wh

from a certain Lut Ocampo.11 Miranda and Ocampo plauntil 6:00 in the evening at Lut Ocampos place while him to arrive. As they were leaving that place, they Instead of proceeding home, Ocampo invited Miranda at an establishment identified as "Irmas" and Cruz wwith them. That was already about 7:30 in the eveningtheir way to

Irmas, Cruz and Misayah "bumped each other analtercation."12 Then Miranda informed his companionwould go ahead. Miranda was about one yard away from


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Misayah when he saw Cruz strangle Misayah. Claiming that he didnot want to get into trouble, he did not pacify Cruz and Misayah.He hurriedly left and proceeded to Sally Felicianos house andstayed there until 11:00 in the evening. As he was in a hurry toleave the incident where the altercation happened, he did notnotice what happened to Ocampo.13

Ocampo, on his behalf, testified that he knew Misayah who has adrug store in Magalang, Pampanga. At about 8:00 p.m. of 14November 1995, he was walking with Miranda and Cruz on theirway to Vannies Restaurant when Cruz crossed the street andapproached Misayah.14 Ocampo and Miranda continued walkingwhen Ocampo saw Cruz choke Misayah and then have anexchange of fist blows. Ocampo and Miranda did not assist Cruz asit was only a brief fist fight. Ocampo saw Cruz run away while heand Miranda were left behind. Ocampo and Miranda saw Misayah

run towards the Municipal Hall and the two proceeded to theirrespective homes.15

Defense witness Oliver Santos who knew the three accusedtestified that on the evening of 14 November 1995, he was at

Vannies videoke having a drinking spree with his friends. At 9:00p.m., he asked leave from his friends to go ahead. While waitingfor a motorcycle ride outside of Vannies videoke, he saw Cruz andMisayah, whom he knew as the owner of a drug store, acting as ifthey were strangling each other. The fight took about a minute.He did not bother to do anything because he was afraid and also

because fighting was a common incident in that area.was somewhat inebriated when he witnessed the incidhad consumed one (1) pitcher of draft beer. Howeverecognized the faces of Misayah and Cruz. On that ocalso saw Ocampo and Miranda walking towards proper.17

All three accused were convicted by the trial court in a dated 31 May 2000, which held:

WHEREFORE, finding the three (3) accused, Danilo CrOcampo and Elmer Miranda @ Mitoy guilty beyond rdoubt of the crime of Robbery with Physical Injuries depenalized under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Cthe presence of an aggravating circumstance of conspare hereby sentenced to suffer each an imprisonm

indeterminate penalty of from [sic] eight (8) years to t(21) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the coRommel Q. Misayah the amount of P34,345.00 without imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.

Ocampo and Miranda appealed their conviction to thAppeals. However, in its decision19 dated 10 February


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Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial courtsdecision, stating thus:

As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence againstpersons is penalized under par. 5, Article 294 of the Revised PenalCode by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.

Considering the attendant aggravating circumstance of abuse ofsuperior strength (not conspiracy as ruled by the trial court),which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the penaltyshould be imposed in its maximum period, which is prision mayormedium or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of theimposable penalty shall be the penalty next lower in degree whichis arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium, in anyof its periods, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)years and two (2) months. Thus, appellants should have been

meted the indeterminate penalty of from [sic] 4 years and twomonths of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years ofprision mayor medium, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are herebysentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from [sic] four(4) years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum toeight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs againstappellants,

SO ORDERED.20

Miranda did not challenge the affirmance of his convictCourt of Appeals. On the other hand, Ocampo filed a Reconsideration21 which was denied through a Resolu20 May 2004.22 Ocampo alone then filed the present P

Review on Certiorari.23

Ocampo argues that the appellate court erred in ficriminally liable because: (i) Misayahs testimuncorroborated; (ii) it was unbelievable that Misayah walk on a slightly lighted street when he is carrying a coamount of cash and other items; (iii) there was no clthat the prosecution presented any of the police offapprehended and investigated petitioner; (iv) the cougive credence to the testimony of Santos simply becau

tipsy; (v) although Misayah claimed that he had been gthe neck, his medical certificate does not show any injneck or on the arm to confirm if he was indeed held bon that part of his body; (vi) the examining doctopresented to confirm the authenticity of the issuecertificate and to be cross-examined thereon; and (viiunlikely that Misayahs shoulder bag could accommoditems he claimed to have been contained thereinpetitioner reiterates that the prosecution failed to proveguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for which charged.


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Before proceeding to the merits of this case, certain observationsfrom the trial and appellate courts decisions have to be clarified.

The initial information filed by the prosecution in this casedesignated the offense charged as Robbery with Physical

Injuries.24 This was later amended to Robbery with Violence andIntimidation.25 Yet, the trial courts decision convicted theaccused of Robbery with Physical Injuries under Article 294 (5) ofthe Revised Penal Code. The appellate court, on the other hand,affirmed the conviction under Article 294 (5) but classified thecrime as robbery with violence against persons.

The variance in the assigned nomenclatures may give rise to thefalse impression that robbery with physical injuries under Article294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code is distinct from robbery with

intimidation as well as robbery with violence against persons. Thetitle or heading of Article 294 reads "Robbery with violence againstor intimidation of persons." Said heading is clearly the generalnomenclature given to all five (5) types of robbery enumerated

thereunder.26 Paragraphs 2 to 5 cover robbery with physicalinjuries.27 Paragraph 5, in particular, defines what is known assimple robbery. Simple robbery involves only slight or less seriousphysical injuries.28 For conviction under this paragraph, the injuryinflicted should not fall within the categories provided for inparagraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294. Thus, over and above the

dichotomy of the terms employed, it is certain and beyothat the three accused were tried for the crime under A(5) of the Revised Penal Code.

Now, to the merits.

The core of Ocampos arguments in this instant petition findings of the appellate court do not conform to the evrecord. It should be emphasized that factual matters raised in a petition for review on certiorari before the CoCourt is limited to reviewing only questions of law.29 Thof fact of the trial court are binding upon this Court wheby the Court of Appeals.30 Exceptions to this rule arefindings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to thand conclusions of the trial court, or are not supportevidence on record.31 Absent any ground to apply the

to this instant case, there is no reason, therefore, to dfindings of the lower courts.

Petitioner claims it was erroneous for the appellate cocredence to Misayahs uncorroborated evidence becauto establish where his money and other valuables camehis injuries did not conform to the nature of the attackhim as well.

Based on the records, we cannot see how and why theraised by petitioner can cast doubt on the credibi


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testimony of Misayah. As Misayah owns a drug store, it is notunlikely that Misayah would have P29,000.00 cash in hispossession as he returned home from a days work. With respectto the injuries suffered by Misayah, he stated in his crossexamination that he tried to parry the blows made by all theaccused by the use of his hands.32 Thus, it is believable that his

hands would bear the brunt of the blows. Further, Miranda himselfadmitted during his direct examination that he "personally saw"Cruz strangle Misayah.33

Moreover, we give weight to the trial courts observation thatMisayah testified "in a straightforward manner" and positivelyidentified not only Cruz as the one who choked him but also theother

two (2) accused.34 The testimony of a sole witness, though

uncorroborated, is sufficient for conviction if it is free from anysign of impropriety or falsehood.35 The testimony of a loneeyewitness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, issufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimonybears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been deliveredspontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner.36Indeed, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient and needsno corroboration, save only in offenses where the law expresslyprescribes a minimum number of witnesses.37

On the lower courts disregard of defense witnestestimony, we have consistently held that where the crwitnesses is an issue, the appellate court will generally the findings of the trial court unless some facts and circmay have been overlooked that may otherwise affect ththe

case.38 The Court accords deference to the trial courton a witnesss credibility, or lack thereof, because of itadvantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of twhile testifying.39 Given that the observation of the with respect to Santos is supported by evidence, thground to discredit the trial and appellate courts asseSantoss testimony.

Petitioner likewise alleges that Misayahs testimony was

inconsistencies such as his allegation that he imexecuted an affidavit after the incident when in fact hwas dated 20 November 1995 or six days after theHowever, it is not beyond reason if a victim like Misaimmediately report the incident but subsequently makstatement days after the incident especially when thedid Misayah, suffered injuries requiring medical Moreover, the RTC records also show that Misayah eseparate sworn statement before SPO1


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Mutuc, investigator of Magalang Police Station, on 16 November199540 and the prosecution submitted another affidavit byMisayah taken before SPO2 Rivera41 in its formal offer ofevidence. It is not unlikely, therefore, that several affidavits werein fact executed by Misayah in the days immediately following theincident.

Even as petitioner challenges the evidence of the prosecution, hedownplays the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnessesfor the defense. Said inconsistencies, particularly on the witnessesaccounts of what proceeded after the incident, are material andhave rendered their testimonies implausible. It is hard to believethat there was a mere lapse of memory of either Miranda orOcampo on whether they were indeed left behind together orwhether one of them fled and the other was left behind evenbefore the departure of Cruz.42 Certainly, one cannot fail to

observe or at least recall later who was with whom considering thegravity of the incident and the fact that only three of them weretogether that evening.

More fundamentally, the defenses version of the incident iscontrary to human experience and behavior. As correctly pointedout by the trial court:

It is incredible that accused Nomer Ocampo and Elmer Mirand[a]have not done anything when their companion Danilo Cruz was in

a fight with complainant. The least they could do was totwo protagonists yet, they did not do this and

they proceeded to go to their respective way home ashas happened. If indeed the incident happened so fasthe accused Danilo Cruz and complainant Romme

separated immediately after that "sudden stranglingother" [sic], the least that Ocampo and Miranda could dto wait and ask Cruz what happened. Yet, again, they this. x x x x43

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, succommon experience and observation of mankind can probable under the circumstances.44 And, the best tcredibility of a testimony is its compatibility wit

knowledge, observation and common experience oWhatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incrlies outside of judicial cognizance.46

On the conspiracy aspect, it is worthy of note that whileof Appeals in the body of its decision sustained the exconspiracy as held by the lower court47 yet in the pparagraph of the decision as well as in the dispositive ruled out the presence of conspiracy. Thus:


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As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence againstpersons is penalized under par. 5, Article 294 of the Revised PenalCode by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.Considering the attendant aggravating circumstance of abuse ofsuperior strength (not conspiracy as ruled by the trial court),48which is not offset by any mitigating

circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximumperiod, which is prision mayor medium or from eight (8) years andone (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the IndeterminateSentence Law, the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be thepenalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor maximum toprision correctional medium, in any of its periods, or from four (4)months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.Thus, appellant should have been meted the indeterminatepenalty of from 4 years and two months of prision correccional, as

minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor medium, asmaximum.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are herebysentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from four (4)years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum to eight(8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.49

It is a well-settled rule that the dispositive portion of thprevails over the opinion, the former being the final othe opinion is an informal expression of the views of thus forming no part of the judgment.50 Following thiappellate court thus found the presence of abuse ostrength as an aggravating circumstance but not conspir

The appellate court is correct in ruling out conspexistence of conspiracy cannot be presumed. The elconspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable Conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convthe commission of the offense itself.52 Conspiracy extwo or more persons come to an agreement conccommission of a felony and decide to commit it.53 inferred from the conduct of the accused before, duringthe commission of the crime. All taken together, how

evidence therefor must be reasonably strong enough community of criminal design.54

In the case at bar, there is no convincing evidence thataccused had resolved to rob Misayah prior to the actuaWhat is evident is that the robbery that transpired wasthe moment decision among the three accused. For onand Ocampo were consistent in their statement that thetheir way to have a drink at the common time of the incanother, they saw Misayah by chance. Still for another,no evidence that all of the accused knew beforehand th


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would be passing by the street where the robbery occurred thatfateful evening. Neither was it shown that the street was part ofMisayahs regular route on his way home.

According to Misayah in his testimony, Cruz grabbed his neck andchoked him while Miranda held his shoulder.1avvphi1 Ocampo

meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife and warning him notto fight back. While the evidence did not prove the existence ofconspiracy, it indelibly established that the accused tookadvantage of their superior strength.55

Article 294, paragraph (5) of the Revised Penal Code fixes thepenalty for simple robbery at prision correccional in its maximumperiod to prision mayor in its medium period, the range of which isfrom four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10)years.56 Considering the aggravating circumstance of abuse of

superior strength, the penalty should be imposed in its maximumperiod while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty nextlower in degree, which is arresto mayor maximum to prisioncorreccional medium in any of its periods, the range of which isfour (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)months.57

We note that the appellate courts decision did not order theaccused to indemnify Misayah the amount of P34,345.00. Therecords do not show that this amount had already been paid

pursuant to the Decision of the trial court dated 31 MThus, we modify the appellate courts decision in this res

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 10 February 2004 of thAppeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of four (4) year

(2) months of prision correccional as minimum to eightof prision mayor as maximum. Petitioner Ocampo toghis other co-accused Miranda and Cruz are ordered toRommel Q. Misayah the amount of P34,345.00 without imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs against petitio

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 138470 April 1, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.

ARTEMIO GARCIA y CRUZ, JR. and REGALADO BERNABaccused.


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REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision1 dated March 10, 1999 of theRegional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal

Case No. 830-M-98, finding Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. andRegalado Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of Carnapping with Homicide and sentencing them to sufferthe penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On June 3, 1998, Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe werecharged with the crime of Carnapping with Homicide as defined inRepublic Act No. 6539. The Information against them reads:

That on or about the 21st day of December, 1996, in the

municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, conspiring, confederating together and helping with eachother, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfullyand feloniously and by means of violence and intimidation, forciblytake from the driver Wilfredo Elis a brand new Toyota TamarawFX with Plate No. UJL-761 owned by Fernando Ignacio;

That during the commission of the offense, or by reason thereof,the said accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring,confederating and helping each other, did then and there, with

intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacand stab Wilfredo Elis in different parts of his body causwounds which directly resulted in his death.

Contrary to law.2

Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded "not guilty" tocharged. Thereafter, the case was tried on the merits.

It appears from the record that on December 17, 199Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulaapproached by Garcia and Bernabe because they borrow his brand new Mitsubishi L300 van for their tBicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the van was una

Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who

purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX for P475Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two ddaily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe and Garcia, on the orented the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day incluP500.00 drivers fee. They agreed to pay the rental fee return from Bicol.4

In the early morning of December 18, 1996, Cortez andWilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacios Tamaraw FX at his reMeycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same back tBulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left f


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Four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortezbegan to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from FerdinandIgnacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao,Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis wife, Nancy, approached Cortez andasked where her husband was.6

In the afternoon of December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurgaof the Moncada, Tarlac Police notified the Chief of Police that twosuspicious looking persons were seen selling a vehicle in Anao,Tarlac at the grossly inadequate price of P50,000.00. The Chief ofPolice immediately formed a team,7 but when they reached Anao,Tarlac, they found out that the two accused had already left forNampicuan, Nueva Ecija. The team thereafter coordinated withthe Nueva Ecija Police. The two accused were seen in front of astore in Brgy. Pangayan, Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. When they

failed to produce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX,they were brought to the Moncada Police Station forinvestigation.8

Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that theyattempted to sell the Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio.In the early morning of December 24, 1996, a joint team of policeofficers composed of members of the Moncada and Marilao Police,together with the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan,were accompanied by Cortez to Moncada, Tarlac, where the latterpositively identified Ignacios Tamaraw FX.

Cortez went to visit Garcia and Bernabe in detenadmitted to him that they stabbed Elis and dumped himhighway near the "sabana" in San Rafael, Bulacan. Ththat they were compelled to eliminate Elis when he refutheir plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. Garcia brought the

together with Cortez and the Barangay Captain, to SBulacan where he pointed to the place where they However, the police were unable to find Elis body. Afteto Moncada, Cortez immediately inspected the intervehicle and found bloodstains on the side and back of tseat. He also found several personal items belonging toas his clothes and drivers license,9 as well as Garcias contained bonnets, tear gas, the warranty card anregistration papers.10

On December 29, 1996, the Moncada police received inthat a male cadaver was found in San Rafael, Bulacan, sin mud ten meters away from where they searched ecadaver was identified as that of Wilfredo Elis byNancy.11

Dr. Benito Caballero, Municipal Health Officer and MeOfficer of the province of Bulacan, who performed thfound four stab wounds in the posterior, one stab wolateral and one on the left side of the thorax. He opinewounds which penetrated the abdomen and lungs were


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In their defense, Garcia and Bernabe alleged that they agreed torent the subject vehicle for a period of five days from December18, 1996; that Garcia and Elis had a fight because the latterallegedly did not want to go with them to Nueva Ecija; that Elis,while driving the Tamaraw FX, bumped a passenger jeepney along

Baliuag Highway; that they left Elis along the Baliuag Highway at3:30 a.m. so he can inform Cortez that they were already inBulacan and were en route to Nueva Ecija to have the dentedportion of the vehicle fixed.13

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositiveportion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, this Court finds and soholds that the prosecution has been able to establish the

accuseds criminal culpability. In view thereof, Artemio Garcia yCruz, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe are hereby found GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime ofCarnapping with Homicide in violation of Republic Act No. 6539 asamended by Republic Act No. 7659. Accordingly, absent anycircumstances that will aggravate the commission thereof, both ofthem are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of ReclusionPerpetua. Further, both accused are hereby ordered jointly andseverally to indemnify the heirs of Wilfredo Elis, the sum ofP50,000.00; to pay them the amount of P100,000.00 for moral

damages; P15,290.00 for actual/ compensatory damP250,000.00 for loss of earnings.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.14

Both accused appealed from the decision of the trial March 31, 2000, accused Garcia filed an Urgent Withdraw Appeal,15 which was granted in a ResolutSeptember 27, 2000.

Appellant Bernabe raises the following assignment of err

I

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ELEMENTS OF CARNAPPING AS DEFINED IN REPU6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT) AS AMENDED ARE PREDULY PROVEN.

II

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDIACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE WAS PART OF ANCONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CARNAPPING.


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III

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTINGACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGEDADMISSION OF THE CRIME TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.

Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventingand Penalizing Carnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking,with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to anotherwithout the latters consent, or by means of violence against orintimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."16 Morespecifically, the elements of the crime are as follows:

1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;

3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offenderhimself;

4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; orthat the taking was committed by means of violence against orintimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.17

A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all theelements of carnapping were proved in this case.

Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the the owner, or by means of violence against or intimpersons, or by using force upon things; it is deemedfrom the moment the offender gains possession of the tif he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.18

In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the natuappellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was initiaNevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for thof taking the vehicle radically transformed the characpossession into an unlawful one. Cortez categorically sduring his first visit to the Moncada Police Station whereand his co-accused were detained, the two separately ahim that they killed the deceased when the latter refutheir plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having band voluntarily given to Cortez, a private individual, is

against the appellant.19 Thus, the duration of the leaTamaraw FX, whether for an indefinite period as contendefense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by the prosecutibearing on the culpability of the appellant. It does nwhether the unlawful taking occurred within the perlease. What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant aaccused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point on crime and the nature thereof is to be determined. To reiprosecution was able to establish that appellant anaccused stabbed the victim to death because he refusthem in their plan to appropriate the vehicle. This un


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satisfied the element of unlawful taking through violence,rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.

Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed byappellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceasedwas the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is

that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidationor violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divestedof the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simplyrequired is that the property taken does not belong to theoffender. Actual possession of the property by the persondispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento ofpersonal property from another against the latter's will throughviolence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of aproperty belonging to another is imputable to the offender. 20

Furthermore, at the time of their apprehension, appellant Bernabeand Garcia were unable to give a plausible explanation why theystill had the Tamaraw FX in their possession. Appellant Bernabeclaims that he and his co-accused went to Nampicuan, Nueva Ecijato have the dent on the vehicle repaired. Garcia, on the otherhand, testified that there was no such damage. A person inpossession of a stolen article is presumed guilty of having illegallyand unlawfully taken the same unless he can satisfactorily explainhis possession of the thing.21

Appellant contends that he did not conspire with his co-commit the crime of carnapping.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons comagreement concerning the commission of a felony andcommit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evi

may be inferred from the conduct of the accused befoand after the commission of the crime,22 which are indi

joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of senIn conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracywhen one concurs with the criminal design of another,by the performance of an overt act leading to committed. It may be deduced from the mode and which the offense was perpetrated.24

In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proved that GBernabe, through Joselito Cortez, hired the brand neTamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio for their trthat at 8:00 a.m. of December 18, 1996, they left foboard the Tamaraw FX driven by Elis; that on DecemberSPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of Moncada, Tarlac reported tof Police that two suspiciously looking persons, who turbe Garcia and Bernabe were offering to sell a brand nTamaraw FX for a mere P50,000.00 in Anao, Tarlac; antwo were finally apprehended with the subject Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija by elements of the Tarlac aEcija Police.


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While there may be no direct evidence of the commission of thecrime, the foregoing constitute circumstantial evidence sufficientto warrant Garcias and Bernabes conviction. The followingrequisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction weremet, to wit: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts

from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) thecombination of all the circumstances is such as to produce aconviction beyond reasonable doubt.25 The circumstances indeedform an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonableconclusion that Bernabe and Garcia were the perpetrators of thecrime. It has been held that facts and circumstances consistentwith guilt and inconsistent with innocence constitute evidencewhich, in weight and probative force, may surpass even directevidence in its effect upon the court.26

The records show that Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez andIgnacio that they were responsible for taking the vehicle andkilling the victim, Elis. On December 24, 1996, Cortez went to theMoncada Municipal Jail and talked to them while they weredetained. Both admitted to him that they forcibly took the saidvehicle from Elis, stabbed him and thereafter dumped him at SanRafael, Bulacan.27 Subsequently, on December 26, 1996, Cortezand Ignacio went to Moncada and confronted the two in theircells. Garcia admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they stole thevehicle because they were in dire need of money, while Bernabekept quiet.28

Appellant Bernabe maintains that the trial court erred inin evidence his admission to Cortez and Ignacio on ththat (a) he did not make such admission; (b) the admisby Garcia should not prejudice him; and (c) assumingsuch admission, it should be excluded for having been m

duress and intimidation.29

In People v. Andan,30 it was held that the coprocedures on custodial investigation do not apspontaneous statement, not elicited through questionauthorities, but given in an ordinary manner wherebyorally admitted having committed the crime. What the Cbars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminatingconfessions. The rights under Article III, Section Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightecoercion by the state as would lead the accusedsomething false, and not to prevent him from fvoluntarily telling the truth. Hence, appellants voluntaryto Cortez that he and his co-accused conspired in deceased when the latter opposed their plan to sell theadmissible as evidence against him.

Anent Garcias extrajudicial confession implicating appecommission of the offense, it appears that the lattoppose or affirm Garcias statement. Neither did heattempt to refute the same insofar as his participat


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commission of the crime was concerned. As correctly observed bythe Office of the Solicitor General, "he cannot invoke his silenceduring this crucial moment as his right. He ought to speak andfailing to do so, his silence weighs heavily on him. Thus, it was notaccused-appellants Garcias admission that prejudiced accused-appellant Bernabe, but his own silence when it was such as

naturally to call for action or comment if not true."31

Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court provides that an act ordeclaration made in the presence and within the hearing orobservation of a party who does or says nothing when the act ordeclaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if nottrue, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may begiven in evidence against him.

We likewise find no merit in the allegation that duress wasemployed on appellant. Suffice it to state that such bare allegationof force and duress is not enough to prove that he was indeedtortured to admit complicity in the offense charged.

The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of RA 6539,as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, to wit:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.- Any person who is found guiltyof carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act,shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punishedby imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight

months and not more than seventeen years and fouwhen the carnapping is committed without violence or inof persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment fthan seventeen years and four months and not more years, when the carnapping is committed by means oagainst or intimidation of any person, or force upon t

the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be impothe owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motorkilled or raped in the course of the commission of the cor on the occasion thereof.32 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty operpetua on appellant Bernabe and his co-accused, Garc

The award by the trial court of P50,000.00 in favor of tthe victim should be affirmed. When death occurs as a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such aindemnity for the death, without need of any evidence damages.33 This is in addition to the actual daP15,290.50 which was duly substantiated by prohowever, reduce the award of moral damages to P50,line with current jurisprudence.35

Lastly, we find the court a quos award of P250,000.00 earning capacity to be without basis. Nancy testifiehusband Wilfredo was earning P600.00 a day prior to hihowever, she failed to produce evidence to substantiate


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As held in the case of People v. Panabang,37 a self-servingstatement is not enough; the indemnification for loss of earningcapacity must be duly proven.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 10, 1999, of the RegionalTrial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, finding appellant

Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe guilty of Carnapping with Homicide,sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, andordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, the sumsof P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,290.00 as actualdamages, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, WilfredoElis, moral damages in the reduced amount of P50,000.00. Theaward of P250,000.00 for loss of earnings is DELETED for lack offactual basis.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SO ORDERED.


SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 125059 March 17, 2000

FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHrespondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court odated February 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 159affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of QuBranch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-25910 to 1petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.the Bouncing Checks Law.

The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as

On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed toinstallment, from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a unit in the latter's project at Bacoor, Cavite.

Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as requirto FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.


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After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regardingdefects in the unit and incomplete features of the townhouseproject. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served onFRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he was suspendinghis installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the

project plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing andLand Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip and 12 out of 14 unitbuyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint wasdismissed as to the defects, but FRC was ordered by the HLURB tofinish all incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycipappealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects.

Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present forencashment Sycip's postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent"stop payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued topresent the other postdated checks to the bank as the due datefell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoidpaying bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" orderon the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioner'schecking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdatedchecks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for violations ofB.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.

On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filedwith the RTC of Quezon City six Informations docketed as Criminal

Cases No. Q-91-25910 to Q-91-25915, charging petviolation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Ca91-25910 reads:

That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in QuPhilippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfeloniously make, draw and issue in favor of FranCorporation a check 813514 drawn against Citibanestablished domestic banking institution in the aP9,304.00 Philippine Currency dated/postdated Octobein payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the timthat she/he did not have any funds in the drawee bank opayment of such check; that upon presentation of saidsaid bank for payment, the same was dishonored for tthat the drawer thereof, accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jhave any funds therein, and despite notice of dishonoaccused failed and refused and still fails and refuseredeem or make good said check, to the damage and pthe said Francel Realty Corporation in the amount aforeand in such other amount as may be awarded provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1


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Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informationssimilarly worded as in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910, except forthe dates, and check numbers2 were consolidated and jointlytried.

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of the

charges. Trial then proceeded.

The prosecution's case, as summarized by the trial court andadopted by the appellate court, is as follows:

The prosecution evidence established that on or about August 24,1989, at the office of the private complainant Francel RealtyCorporation (a private domestic corporation engaged in the realestate business) at 822 Quezon Avenue, QC, accused FranciscoSycip, Jr. drew, issued, and delivered to private complainantFrancel Realty Corporation (FRC hereinafter) six checks (among anumber of other checks), each for P9,304.00 and drawn pay tothe order of FRC and against Francisco's account no. 845515 withCitibank, to wit: Check No. 813514 dated October 30, 1990 (Exh.C), Check No. 813515 dated November 30, 1990 (Exh. D), CheckNo. 813518 dated February 28, 1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516dated December 30, 1990 (Exh. F), Check No. 813517 datedJanuary 30, 1991 (Exh. G) and Check No. 813519 dated March 30,1991 (Exh. H), as and in partial payment of the unpaid balance ofthe purchase price of the house and lot subject of the writtencontract executed and entered into by and between FRC as seller

and Francisco as buyer on said date of August 24, 198also Exh. 1). The total stipulated purchase price for the lot was P451,700.00, of which Francisco paid FRC in tP135,000.00 as down payment, with Francisco agrcommitting himself to pay the balance of P316,000.00 imonthly installments of P9,304.00 (which sum alread

interest on successive monthly balance) effective Sept1989 and on the 30th day of each month thereaftestipulated purchase price is paid in full. The said sichecks, Exhs. C thru H, as earlier indicated were drawand delivered by Francisco in favor of FRC as and payment of the said 48 equal monthly installments usaid contract (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). Sometime in Septemthe Building Official's certificate of occupancy for thouse a residential townhouse was issued (ExFrancisco took possession and started in the use and occthe subject house and lot.1wphi1.nt

When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were prethe Citibank for payment on their respective due dates, all returned to FRC dishonored and unpaid for the reasoclosed as indicated in the drawee bank's stamped notatiface and back of each check; in fact, as indicatcorresponding record of Francisco's account no. 81Citibank, said account already had a zero balance aSeptember 14, 1990 (Exh. 1-5). Notwithstanding theFRC, first thru its executive vice president and projec


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and thereafter thru its counsel, had notified Francisco, orally andin writing, of the checks' dishonor and demanded from him thepayment of the amount thereof, still Francisco did not pay ormake good any of the checks (Exhs. I thru K). . .3

The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial court

and adopted by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after takingpossession and starting in the use and occupancy of the subjecttownhouse unit, Francisco became aware of its variousconstruction defects; that he called the attention of FRC, thru itsproject manager, requesting that appropriate measures beforthwith instituted, but despite his several requests, FRC did notacknowledge, much less attend to them; that Francisco thusmailed to FRC a verified letter dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sumgiving notice that effective June 1990, he will cease and desist"from paying my monthly amortization of NINE THOUSAND THREEHUNDRED FOUR (P9,304.00) PESOS towards the settlement of myobligation concerning my purchase of Unit No. 14 of FRCTownhomes referred to above, unless and until your Officesatisfactorily complete(s) the construction, renovation and/orrepair of my townhouses (sic) unit referred to above" and thatshould FRC "persist in ignoring my aforesaid requests, I shall, afterfive (5) days from your receipt of this Verified Notice, forthwithpetition the [HLURB] for Declaratory Relief and Consignation togrant me provisional relief from my obligation to pay my monthly

amortization to your good Office and allow me to deamortizations with [HLURB] pending your completioTownhomes Unit in question"; that Francisco thru couFRC, its president, and its counsel notices/letters in seffect that Francisco and all other complainants in thecase against FRC shall cease and desist from paying the

amortizations unless and until FRC satisfactorily comconstruction of their units in accordance with the specifications thereof as approved by the [HLURBwarranted by the FRC in their contracts and that the dthe subject checks was a natural consequence of such sof payments, and also advising FRC not to encash or other postdated checks issued by Francisco and complainants and still in FRC's possession (Exhs. 3 thFrancisco and the other complainants filed the [HLagainst FRC and later on a decision was handed down tthe same is pending appeal with the Board (Exhs. 6, 7,17, also Exh. 8); that as of the time of presentation of tchecks for payment by the drawee bank, Francisco haP150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11Francisco closed his account no. 845515 with Citibank cowith the bank's customer service officer's advice to cloaccount instead of making a stop-payment order for emore than 30 post-dated checks still in FRC's possesstime, so as to avoid the P600.00-penalty imposed by thevery check subject of a stop-payment order.4


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On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty ofviolating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 in each of the six cases,disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910, Q-91-25911, Q-91-25912, Q-91-25913, Q-91-25914 and Q-91-25915,

the Court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty beyondreasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced in and for each caseto suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days and pay the costs.Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the offended party,Francel Realty Corporation, as and for actual damages, the totalsum of fifty-five thousand eight hundred twenty four pesos(P55,824.00) with interest thereon at the legal rate from date ofcommencement of these actions, that is, November 8, 1991, untilfull payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 15993. But onFebruary 29, 1996, the appellate court ruled:

On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so holdthat appellant has no basis to rely on the provision of PD 957 to

justify the non-payment of his obligation, the closure of his

checking account and the notices sent by him complainant that he will stop paying his monthly amortiz

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on Marchbut it was denied per Resolution dated April 22, 1996.

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following aof errors:

I

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECTHE LOWER COURT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-ADID NOT HAVE ANY JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE TO OTHERWISE PREVENT THE PAYMENT OF THE SUBJECBY THE DRAWEE BANK.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AAPPELLANT MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS COMPLAIN AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOWUNIT AND THE TOWNHOUSE PROJECT.

III


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THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OFTHE LOWER COURT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOTHAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS WITH THE DRAWEE BANK TO COVERTHE SUBJECT CHECKS UPON PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENTTHEREOF.

IV

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OFTHE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND

AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.7

The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court ofAppeals erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for violationof the Bouncing Checks Law.

Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it affirmed hisconviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, considering that he hadcause to stop payment of the checks issued to respondent.Petitioner insists that under P.D. No. 957, the buyer of atownhouse unit has the right to suspend his amortizationpayments, should the subdivision or condominium developer fail todevelop or complete the project in accordance with duly-approvedplans and specifications. Given the findings of the HLURB thatcertain aspects of private complainant's townhouse project wereincomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right to suspendpayments should not render him liable under B.P. Blg. 22.

The Solicitor General argues that since what petitcharged with were violations of B.P. Blg. 22, the icircumstances surrounding the issuance of a worthlessimmaterial.8 The gravamen of the offense charged is thof making and issuing a worthless check or one that is d

upon its presentment for payment. Mere issuing of a bamalum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfview, P.D. No. 957 does not provide petitioner a sufficieagainst the charges against him.

Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P.an offense is committed when the following elements ar

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check taccount or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer ttime of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or cthe drawee bank for the payment of such check in fupresentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drafor insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the sahad not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered thstop payment. 10


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In this case, we find that although the first element of the offenseexists, the other elements have not been established beyondreasonable doubt.

To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the partof the issuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not

have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof uponits presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantumthat the second element prima facie exists when the first and thirdelements of the offense are present. 11 But such evidence may berebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a

judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. 12 As pointedout by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency ofpetitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of hischecks for insufficiency of funds." 13 But such presumption cannothold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find thatthe other party has presented evidence to contradict saidpresumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove everyelement of the offense charged, and not merely rely on arebuttable presumption.

Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks.Postdating simply means that on the date indicated on its face,the check would be properly funded, not that the checks shouldbe deemed as issued only then. 14 The checks in this case wereissued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time said

checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover thpresented for encashment. 15 On the contrary, there isby petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checP150,000,00 cash or credit with Citibank.

As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of Account No. 845515 with Citibank was not for insuffunds. It was made upon the advice of the drawee banpayment of hefty bank charges each time petitioner issupayment" order to prevent encashment of postdatedprivate respondent's possession. 16 Said evidence contprima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiencyBut it establishes petitioner's state of mind at the time swere issued on August 24, 1989. Petitioner definiteknowledge that his funds or credit would be insufficientchecks would be presented for encashment. He couldforeseen that he would be advised by his own bank in tto close his account to avoid paying the hefty banks chcame with each "stop payment" order issued to preverespondent from encashing the 30 or so checks in its pWhat the prosecution has established is the closure of checking account. But this does not suffice to prove telement of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which explicit"evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds" by the athe time the check or checks are presented for encashm


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To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as theprosecution did in this case, would be to misconstrue the import ofrequirements for conviction under the law. It must be stressedthat every element of the offense must be proved beyondreasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutesare strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the

accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable actmust come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute.While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of thebanking system, 18 it is difficult to see how conviction of theaccused in this case will protect the sanctity of the financialsystem. Moreover, protection must also be afforded the interest oftownhouse buyers under P.D. No. 957. 19 A statute must beconstrued in relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimateends and purposes intended by the legislature. 20 Courts will notstrictly follow the letter of one statute when it leads away from thetrue intent of legislature and when ends are inconsistent with the

general purpose of the act. 21 More so, when it will mean thecontravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to bereconciled and given due effect.

Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D.957 to suspend payments until such time as the owner ordeveloper had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. 22 Thisexercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments, is toour mind, a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P.Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged with.

Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete featuconstruction of petitioner's and other units of thcondominium bought on installment from FRC, we are othat petitioner had a valid cause to order his banpayment. To say the least, the third element of "su

dishonor of the check. . . without valid cause" appearsestablished by the prosecution. As already stated, the ptried to establish the crime on a prima facie presumptBlg. 22. Here that presumption is unavailing, in the prevalid cause to stop payment, thereby negating the thiof the crime.

Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Chare not subject to the Revised Penal Code, but thsupplementary to such a law. 23 We find nothing in tB.P. Blg. 22, which would prevent the Revised Penal C

supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5) 24 of the RevCode, petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer underof P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges against

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges aunder Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evprove the offenses charged beyond reasonable dpronouncement as to costs.


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SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 149858 September 5, 2007

FRANCISCO M. BAX, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ILYON INDUSTRIALCORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Challenged in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are theDecision2 of the Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2000 andits Resolution dated September 5, 2001 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23356affirming in toto the Decision dated December 14, 1998 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Pasig City declaring

petitioner guilty of nine (9) counts of violations of Batas Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing C

On August 16, 1994, Francisco M. Bax, petitioner, wawith violations of B.P. 22 (10 counts) before the MetropCourt (MeTC), Branch 71, Pasig City,3 docketed as Crim

Nos. 14354 to 14363.The Information in Criminal Case No. 14354 reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 1994 in the MunPasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdictHonorable Court, the above-named accused, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw anIlyon Industrial Corporation to apply on account or forcheck described below:

Check No.:

:

AGRO94438

Drawn against

:


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United Coconut Planters Bank

In the amount

:

P47,250.00Dated/Postdated

:

March 13, 1994

Payable to

:

Ilyon Industrial Corp. rep. by Benedict Tan

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did nothave sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for thepayment in full of the face amount of such check upon itspresentment, which check could have been dishonored forinsufficiency of funds had not the accused, without any validreason, ordered the bank to "Stop Payment", and despite receiptof notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee

the face amount of the said check or made arrangemepayment thereof within five (5) banking days afternotice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Except as to the numbers and dates of the other niissued by petitioner, and the reason for their dishonagainst insufficient funds), the Informations in Criminal 14355-14363 and the above Information are similarly wo

The facts are:

Sometime in October 1993, petitioner, for and in Vachman Industries, Inc. (VACHMAN), purchased 80 mof chemical compounds, known as caustic soda flakes, Industrial Corporation (ILYON), respondent.

On December 6, 1993, ILYON delivered 27 metric tonssoda flakes to petitioner. Again in January 1994, ILYONanother 27 metric tons of caustic soda flakes to petpayment therefor, petitioner issued ten (10) checks amP464,750.00 in favor of ILYON.

Upon presentment of the checks to the United CoconuBank for payment, they were dishonored for being drawinsufficient funds. Despite ILYONs demand, petitione


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make good the bounced checks for the reason that he has beenencountering financial problems. As a result, ILYON caused thefiling of ten (10) Informations against petitioner.

After hearing or on March 27, 1998, the MeTC rendered a Decisionfinding petitioner guilty as charged, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court herebyrenders judgment finding the accused, Francisco Bax, "GUILTY" ofthe crime of Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, (10) counts,and accordingly sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6)months in each case and to pay the offended party the sum ofP464,750.00, the amount of all the ten (10) checks and to pay thecost.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, presided by JudgePablito Rojas, rendered a Joint Decision dated December 14, 1998affirming with modification the MeTC Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court aquo is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) accused is ACQUITTED in Criminal case No. 14354;

(b) the sentence imposed on accused in Criminal Case Nto 14363 of six (6) months imprisonment for each increased to ONE (1) YEAR in each case; and

(c) the total amount of indemnity to be paid by the accucomplainant-corporation is PHP 417,500.00.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal,4 the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR Nrendered its Decision on December 19, 2000 affirming RTC Decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsiderawas denied by the appellate court in a ResolutSeptember 5, 2001.

Hence the instant petition.

The basic issue is whether the prosecution was able toguilt of petitioner by evidence beyond reasonable doubt

The Solicitor General contends that the Court of Appeerr in affirming the RTC Joint Decision sustaining that ofbecause all the elements of violation of B.P. 22 are presecase. Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that sinnot receive a written notice of dishonor, not all the ethe offense have been established by the p

Accordingly, he should be acquitted.


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We agree with petitioner.

It is settled that factual findings of the trial court are accordedgreat weight, even finality on appeal, except when it has failed toappreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into

account, would materially affect the result of the case. Thisexception is present here.5

Section 1 of B.P. 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person whomakes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or forvalue, knowing at the time of issue that he does not havesufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the paymentof such check in full upon its presentment, which check issubsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of

funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the samereason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered thebank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of notless than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fineof not less than but not more than double the amount of thecheck which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousandpesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of thecourt.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person wsufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank whenor draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficiento maintain a credit to cover the full amount of thpresented within a period of ninety (90) days fromappearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonor

drawee bank.Where the check is drawn by a corporation, companythe person or persons who actually signed the check insuch drawer shall be liable under this Act.

Thus, the prosecution must prove the following essentiaof the offense:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check toaccount or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that aof issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with tbank for the payment of such check in full upon its preand

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the draweinsufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the samhad not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered thstop payment.6


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We find that the prosecution failed to prove the second element.

To hold petitioner liable for violation of B.P. 22, it is not enoughthat the issued check was subsequently dishonored forinsufficiency of funds. It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt

that he knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the checkwas issued.7 Hence, the law provides that he must be notified ofthe dishonor, thus:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. Themaking, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which isrefused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in orcredit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) daysfrom the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence ofknowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit, unless suchmaker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,

or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of suchcheck within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that suchcheck has not been paid by the drawee.8

While it is true that ILYON, through its president, Benedict Tan,asked petitioner to pay the dishonored checks, however, such kindof notice is not the one required by B.P. 22.

Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that theaccused issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must

also establish that the accused was actually notified thatwas dishonored, and that he or she failed, within fivdays from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of theamount due thereon or to make arrangement for its

Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a pfor violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper

In Domagsang v. Court of Appeals,10 we held that thedishonor of a check to the maker must be in writing. Anotice to the drawer or maker of the dishonor of his chenough, thus:

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not statnotice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction,with Section 3 of the law. i.e., "that where there are nofunds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shbe explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusa

oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insuconviction under the law. The Court is convinced thaspirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would requact to be punished thereunder not only that the accusecheck that is dishonored, but that likewise the acactually been notified in writing of the fact of dishconsistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construagainst the State and liberally in favor of the accused. supplied)


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Since petitioner did not receive a written notice of dishonor of thechecks, obviously, there is no way of determining when the 5-dayperiod prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. 22 would start and end.Thus, the prima facie evidence of petitioners knowledge of theinsufficiency of funds or credit at the time he issued the checks didnot arise.11

We thus find that the prosecution failed to prove by evidencebeyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty of violations ofB.P. 22.

However, petitioner should pay the face value of the nine (9)dishonored checks plus legal interest. It is well settled that thecivil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where such acquittal isbased on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since onlypreponderance of evidence is required in civil cases.12

We however modify the award of petitioners civil liability to ILYONfrom P417,500.00 to P425,250.00. In Criminal Case No. 14354,petitioner was acquitted by the RTC since the reason for thedishonor was his "stop payment order" to the drawee bank toenable VACHMAN to reconcile its accounts with ILYON. Hence,only the face value of the remaining nine (9) checks should beincluded in the computation of petitioners civil liability. Each checkhas a face value of P47,250.00 which, if we multiply by nine,yields P425,250.00.

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of the Court oPetitioner Francisco M. Bax is acquitted in Criminal C14355 to 14363 for violations of B.P. 22 for failuprosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doordered, however, to pay the offended party, ILYONvalue of the nine (9) checks in the total amount of P4

with 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Infuntil fully paid.


EN BANC

G.R. No. 171449 October 23, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.JOSE D. LARA @ JOSE KALBO, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CH.C. No. 01140 which affirmed with modification the D


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the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 128,finding accused-appellant guilty of Robbery with Homicide,Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Robbery.

On 31 January 1997, appellant Jose D. Lara, a.k.a. Joe Kalbo, wascharged with Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Illegal Possession

of Firearm and Robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708, respectively, before the RTC of Antipolo,Rizal, under the following Informations:

CRIM. CASE NO. 97-13706

That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in theMunicipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and withinthe jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accusedwith intent of gain and by means of violence, force andintimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

take, steal and carry away from Chito B. Arizala and divest him ofa NORINCO 12 Gauge Shotgun with Serial No. 9600942, while thelatter was in the performance of his duties as a Security Guard ofTaurus Security Agency and Allied Services, without the consent ofsaid Chito Arizala nor of the owner of the shotgun, Napoleon Y.

Arnaiz, operator of said security agency, to the damage of thelatter in the amount of P11,900.00 representing the value of thesaid shotgun, and by reason or on the occasion of the saidrobbery, and in pursuit of his evil intent and to defend possessionof the stolen shotgun, said accused with intent to kill, and with

treachery and evident premeditation, did then and theunlawfully and feloniously shot said Chito B. Arizala infleupon the latter mortal injuries thereby causing his instadeath.3


That on or about the 27th day of January 1997 in the Mof Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and w

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namewith intent to possess firearms with ammunition, anauthority or license to possess said firearms, nor permthem outside his residence, did then and there willfully, and feloniously have in his custody, control and possessof still unknown make and caliber and a NORINCO shotgun with Serial No. 9600947 and having said fireapossession, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

use the same in killing Chito B. Arizala.4


That on or about the 27th day of January 1997 in the Mof Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and w

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedwith intent of gain and by means of force, viointimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and rob and divest Chito Arizala of and take away from him


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latter was in the performance of his duties as a Security Guard ofTaurus Security Agency and Allied Services, a NORINCO 12 GaugeShotgun with Serial Number 9600947 with live ammunition valuedat P11,900.00 and owned by Napoleon Y. Arnaiz without the saidsecurity guards or the owners consent, to the latters damage inthe aforementioned amount.5

Upon motion by the Public Prosecutor, Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13707 and 97-13708 cases, which were raffled to Branch 74, wereordered consolidated with Criminal Case No. 97-13706 beforeBranch 71 of the same court.6 On 16 April 1999, the cases weretransferred to Branch 73, the latter being the branch designatedto try heinous crimes.7

When arraigned on 3 June 1999, appellant, with the assistance ofcounsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.8 On27 July 1999, upon agreement by the parties, the pre-trial of the

cases was terminated. Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.9

The Peoples evidence are as follows:

The deceased victim, Chito B. Arizala, was a security guard of theTaurus Security Agency and Allied Services designated as officer-in-charge of the security detachment, assigned to guard thepremises of the Sanchez Estate at Manalite II, Brgy. Sta. Cruz,

Antipolo City, then a municipality of Rizal. Among the security

guards under him was Nonilio Marfil, Jr. (TSN, Oct. 198).

Benjamin Alio, friend of the victim, testified that at arp.m. of January 27, 1997, he met the victim Chito Arizlatters place of work, Sanchez Estate, Manalite II, Brgy.

Antipolo City to collect his P150.00 debt (TSN, Jan. 16,4-5). After Alio was paid and when he was about to leaman (appellant) arrived and had an argument wregarding the entry of construction materials being brothe squatters to the Sanchez Estate which Arizala oppoibid., pp. 6, 15-16). Without any warning, appellan

Arizala (TSN, Id., p. 8). When Arizala fell to the gshotgun slid from his shoulder and likewise fell dowground. Appellant then immediately grabbed and cshotgun (TSN, Id., pp. 8, 16-17). Thus, Alio shoutetakbo na!" Arizala ran towards the direction of the secur

barracks, while Alio proceeded to the direction of hiKamandag, Mayamot, Antipolo City. Appellant could nshotgun since there was a number of people in the diwhich Arizala and Alio ran. The following day, AliMasbate to buy fish. On February 13, 1997, when Alio home, he learned that Arizala had been killed (TSN, IWhen asked to identify appellant in court, Alino sappellant was not in the court room. He, thus, identifiedthrough the latters picture (TSN, Id., pp. 12-14).


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Nonilio Marfil testified that on January 27, 1997, he was employedas a security guard by Napoleon Arnaizs Taurus Security Agencyand was assigned to guard the construction materials at SanchezEstate, Upper Manalite II, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, alongwith other guards whom he identified as Yap, Velasco, Garcia,

Abellar, and the victim Chito Arizala (TSN, Oct. 19, 1999, p. 8).

Around 6:15 p.m. of said date, while Marfil was waiting for hisreliever at their barracks, Arizala arrived and asked for Marfilsshotgun because the one assigned to him was grabbed and takenaway by appellant (TSN, Ibid., p. 9). Since the victim was both hissuperior and Officer-in-Charge, Marfil obliged (TSN, Id., p. 10).

Arizala then instructed him and the other security guards to followhim. Thereafter, Arizala went ahead carrying Marfils serviceshotgun.

When Arizala reached the corner, Marfil, who was following him,

suddenly heard a gunshot and saw Arizala slowly falling to theground. Then, he heard two or more shots and saw Arizala fallsupine on the ground. When he was about to approach Arizala toget the shotgun and to help the latter, he heard another shot. So,he moved back for about ten (10) meters. Immediately thereafter,he saw appellant emerge from behind a concrete wall and takethe shotgun that was lying on top of the chest of the fallen victim(TSN, Id., pp. 12-13). Fearing that he would be shot next, Marfilran back to their barracks and asked his fellow security guards to

look after Arizalas body. After which, he proceeded to ththe victims family to inform them of the incident (TSN, I

When Marfil, with Arizalas wife, went back to the crime people were already milling around the area and, therpolice arrived. Pictures of the victim and the crime sctaken (Exhibits "I" to "L") and an investigation was (TSN, Id., pp. 14-15). Marfil positively identified appellaas the subject pictures taken from the crime scene.

Roque D. Ogrimen, testified that around 6:20 p.m. of Ja1997, he was inside his house located at Upper ManalitSta. Cruz, Antipolo City. However, when he heard gunshots, he went out to investigate. He saw his watercausing its contents to leak through the three holewindow pane was broken. Ogrimen likewise saw appelldistance of about twenty-five (25) meters and witnesse

latter did to Arizala, because his view was unblocked 29, 1999, p. 21) and the crime scene was well lighted (Tpp. 21-22). When he first saw Arizala, the latter was alrsupine on the ground. Then Ogrimen saw appellant,holding a handgun. Appellant approached Arizala, handgun, took the shotgun that was then lying on top obody, cocked said shotgun, then stepped backwards,two (2) shots at the fallen Arizala (TSN, Id., pp. 7-8, firing the two (2) shots, appellant walked away, h


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shotgun he took from and used to shoot Arizala (TSN, Id., pp. 9,27-28).

Thereafter, Ogrimen went to the police station to report theincident. Thus, SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote responded to Ogrimenscall and supervised the picture-taking of the crime scene. Ogrimenidentified the photographs of the drum riddled with holes and hisbroken glass window (Exhibits "A" and "B"). SPO1 Anclote wasalso shown in the photographs recovering bullets from the drum.

Ogrimen explained that there is no mention of appellant shootingthe victim with a shotgun in his Affidavit dated January 27, 1997(Exhibit "I"), because this contains only his answers to thequestions of the investigating officer at the time he executed thesubject affidavit (TSN, July 29, 1999, p. 15).

Salvador Tejada, an employee of Taurus Security Agency and

Allied Services, testified that victim Chito Arizala and Nonilio Marfil,Jr. were, on January 27, 1997, their employees as security guards.

At the time of the incident, Arizala was the Officer-in-Charge ofthe Sanchez Realty Estate located at Manalite II, Sta. Cruz,

Antipolo City, where Marfil was also assigned. As such, Arizala andMarfil were issued service firearms pursuant to Mission Order Nos.96080012 and 96080013, both dated August 12, 1996,respectively (Exhibits "C" and "D"; TSN, July 29, 1999, p. 46). Thetwo (2) firearms issued were with Serial No. 9600942 (to Arizala[TSN, Ibid., 49]) and No. 9600947 (to Marfil [TSN, Ibid., p. 46]),

both with 5 ammunition (Exhibits "E" and "F"), and bothP11,900.00 each (Exhibits "C" and "H" [TSN, Ibid., p. 50

The subject firearms were both Norinco Caliber Shotguncovered by temporary license issued on August 15, September 6, 1996, respectively, that remained valid anuntil the issuance of the regular computerized licenseFirearm License Nos. RL-M76C1610878 and RL-M76C1

April 28, 1997 (TSN, Jan. 25, 2000, pp. 7-8).

The fact of the loss of the two subject firearms was repaccordingly, the Firearms and Explosives Division hadthem lost per Official Receipt 1726642 dated Septembecovering the payment of an administrative fine.

SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote conducted the on-the-spot investhe shooting of Arizala on January 27, 1997 at Upper M

Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City.

From the crime scene, he was able to recover two (2)spent shotgun shells and three (3) bullets (TSN, Nov. for which he requested the "PCCL and Ballistic Comballistic examinations (TSN, Ibid., p. 6). He personallythe request letter to the Criminal Investigation DivisioKamuning, Quezon City (TSN, Nov. 14, 2000, p. 8; Exidentified the spent shells he turned over to the sthrough the initial "A" that he wrote thereon.


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SPO1 Anclote supervised the pictures taken at the scene of thecrime (TSN, Nov. 14, 2000, pp. 15-17; Exhibits "D", "I", "K", "L").When he arrived at the crime scene, the victim was already lyingdead on the ground (TSN, Nov. 14, 2000, p. 21).

P/Sr. Insp. Abraham Pelotin, Firearms Examiner of the PNP CrimeLaboratory, Northern Field Office, testified that between February3 and 19, 1997, he conducted a ballistic examination on somecartridges of a 12-gauge shotgun and three deformedbullets/pellets which were involved in the shooting of Arizala. Heconducted a test firing and compared the specimen, subjectingthem to physical and microscopic examination. Histesting/examination was made upon the request by the CriminalInvestigation Office (Exhibit "N"; TSN, Nov. 17, 1999, pp. 4-6, 11-12).

P/Sr. Insp. Pelotin identified his Report FAIB-009097 (Exhibit "M")and declared that the pellet he examined measured 3.3millimeters, which, based on the size and weight, appears to havecome only from a 12-gauge shotgun. Pelotin admitted thatalthough the pellet may be similar to that of a 9-gauge shotgun,however he clarified that no striation on any two bullets are alike(TSN, Ibid., pp. 6-12).

SPO2 Wilfred Tagola of the Firearm and Explosives Division, CampCrame, Quezon City, testified on the authenticity of the

Certification dated October 18, 1999 duly issued by(Exhibit "D") showing that two (2) Norinco Shotguns,with Serial Number 9600942 and Serial Number 96009time of Arizalas shooting on January 27, 1997, were duand registered in the Firearms and Explosives DivisCrame, Quezon City to Taurus Security and Allied(Exhibits "O" and "R") (TSN, March 28, 2000, pp. 6-7).

SPO2 Tagola likewise testified on the authenticitCertification dated June 1, 2000, stating that appellant Lara of Upper Manalite II, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo Cilicensed/registered firearm holder of any kind or calib"W").

Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., a medico-legal officer, testifieconducted an autopsy on the body of the victim. His fthe victim sustained "gunshot wounds as well as shotgu

was contained in his Medico-Legal Report No. 97-177 (EHe likewise illustrated in two anatomical sketches thsustained by the victim (Exhibits "T" and "U"; TSN, 2000, pp. 7-8). After his autopsy of the victim, heCertificate of Post Mortem Exmaination (Exhibit "V").

Dr. Arizala found gunshot wound No. 1, which measuresfatal, because the bullet entered the victims brain cavihis forehead (TSN, March 29, 2000, p. 11). Barely


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gunshot wound No. 1, is gunshot wound No. 2, a gunshot grazmawound measuring 1.5 cm. (TSN, Ibid., p. 9).

Shotgun wound No. 1, with entrance wound measuring 3.5 x 2.5cm. is likewise fatal as it was inflicted at the deceaseds abdominalarea, injuring his intestine, spine and colon and with seven (7) exitwounds at the back of the victims body where two (2) metallicfragments were recovered (TSN, Id., pp. 10-12).

The wounds sustained by the victim were caused by a handgunand a shotgun (TSN, Id., pp. 17-24-25). From the tattooing seenon the victims body, Dr. Arizala concluded that the muzzle of theshotgun was probably a yard away from the victim when it wasfired (TSN, Id., pp. 14-15, 25). It is possible that the assailant wasstanding while the victim was lying down, when shotgun woundNo. 1 was inflicted (TSN, Id., p. 15). It is likewise possible thatwhen shotgun wound No. 2, was inflicted, the assailant fired at his

level while the victim was standing (TSN, id., p. 16). Shotgunwound No. 2, with entrance wound measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cm. (TSN,Id., p. 10) and with exit wounds at the back left side of the victim(TSN, p. 13), was also fatal since this was inflicted at the part ofthe body where vital organs are located (TSN, Id., p. 14).

Maria Arizala, wife of the victim, testified that they have a ten-yearold child and her husband was earning P4,500.00 a month for hiswork as a security guard (Exhibit "L").

Delia Arizala-Par, sister of victim, testified that she shoufuneral expenses of her brother and presented varioureceipts relative thereto (Exhibits "AA" to "GG") amounsum of P170,805.25. She also presented the victcertificate Exhibit "II").10

While the prosecution was in the process of adducing itsappellant escaped from detention.11 After the prosecuits case, the lower court granted the prosecutions declare appellant to have waived his right to present evto consider him a fugitive from justice.12

In a Decision dated 3 March 2003,13 the trial coappellant guilty of the charges, the dispositive portionreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE LARA

is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in CriNos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708. Said accusedsentenced to suffer the following penalties:

For Criminal Case No. 97-13706

- Death



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- Prision Mayor minimum period pursuant to the provision of P.D.1866 as amended by RA 8292 plus a fine of P30,000.


- imprisonment for 4 years 2 months of Prision Correccional asminimum to 10 years of Prision Mayor as maximum.

Further, the accused is hereby order (sic) to pay to the heirs ofChito Arizala P170,805.25 as actual damages, P200,000 as moraldamages, P50,000 as death indemnity, P648,000 for the victimsloss of earning capacity and P100,000 as exemplary damages. Andto indemnify Taurus Securit

crim. case. title x.doc

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