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Virtue

Vice

Moral

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oral

Ethical

Unethica

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rmissi

ble

Impermissible

Dr. Clea F. Rees

Cyflwyno Athroniaeth Foesol

Introducing Moral Philosophy

Yr Hydref/Autumn 2014

Canolfan Addysg Gydol Oes Centre for Lifelong LearningPrifysgol Caerdydd Cardiff University

Compilation, supplementary material and main cover imagesCopyright ©2014 Clea F. Rees.

Cover images created in METAPOST and TikZ.Typeset using pdfLATEX, BibLATEX and Biber in Latin Modern and URW ChanceryL.

All course materials can be producedin alternative formats. Please let meknow your requirements.

Contents

Syllabus 7

Resources 19Writing with Philosophical Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Philosophical Target Practise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Rule One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Paper Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Guidelines for Paper Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Glossary of General Philosophical Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

§1 The Philosopher’s Toolbox 31Validity Workshop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

§2 Morality, Society & Survival 37Morality, Society & Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Selections from Leviathan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Prifysgol Caerdydd/Cardiff University

PHI14A3250A/CE3250

Cyflwyno Athroniaeth Foesol

Introducing Moral Philosophy

Dr. Clea F. Rees

John Percival 1.39

029 2087 0000

[email protected]://cfrees.wordpress.com/

Yr Hydref/Autumn 2014

Ll/M 14:00–16:00

John Percival 0.01

https://learningcentral.cf.ac.uk/

Course Description:

What makes an action right? How should one live? What kind of person should one be? How areindividual morality and social justice connected?

Ethical theory can inform our understanding of moral issues and relationships. This course introducesstudents to a variety of topics in both theoretical and applied ethics, focusing primarily on ideasfrom the western analytic tradition. No previous knowledge of philosophy is assumed.

Topics may include:

• ethical relativism

• moral character and right action

• major ethical theories:

◦ consequentialism/utilitarianism

◦ deontological/Kantian ethics

◦ virtue ethics

• social justice

• resistance and respect

• moral psychology

• feminist ethics

• particular social or political issues

The course draws on examples from fiction and non-fiction to illustrate the theoretical positionsdiscussed and students are encouraged to draw further examples from their own experience.

Goals:

By the end of this course, you should

understand a selection of views regarding:• what individual morality requires;• what social justice requires;

• what moral obligations, if any, individuals have to pursue social justice;• how an individual’s morality and behaviour affect social institutions and community beliefs;• how social institutions and community beliefs affect an individual’s morality;• to what extent, if any, social institutions should be designed to support and encourage individual

morality;be able to:

• critically read and analyse a philosophical text;• reconstruct an argument;• critically evaluate an argument;• give reasons both for and against an argument;• formulate and defend a philosophical thesis;• constructively discuss philosophical ideas with others.

Library and Computer Accounts:

You will be provided with details of your computer account during the first class provided that youregistered in advance and do not already have one. Students taking the module on a free-standingbasis should use their regular university account. Your computer account will enable you to submitwork for feedback and assessment, to make use of institutional subscriptions to electronic resourcesand to use the university’s computing facilities.

All students are entitled to use the university libraries. Lifelong Learning students can obtain a cardfrom the library in the Centre for Lifelong Learning on Senghennydd Road.

As the course proceeds, we will draw on a number of resources, including the paper and electronicresources available through the university, publicly accessible internet sources and photocopies.

Accreditation and Funding:

This is an accredited course. The guidelines anticipate that students will study for 80–100 hours fora 10 credit module such as this one, including class contact time and activities outside the classroom.

Students taking the course as a free-standing module should ensure that I am aware of this andthat I have your full details as you are not included on the pre-printed register and the paperworknecessary for reporting assessment will not be automatically generated. Please also ensure that youprovide me with your home school, your university email address, a current telephone number andpreferred postal address so that you can be contacted if necessary. I do not have these and theCentre may not have them if your home school registered you directly.

I strongly encourage all students to attempt one of the assessment options. Even if you are notpersonally concerned with gaining the credits available, there are at least two reasons to participate.The first and most important reason is that assessment is designed as an integral part of the courseand will form the basis for class discussion and collaboration. Participation should enhance yourunderstanding of the reading and enable you to get the most out of the class. I hope that completingthe assignments will prove an enjoyable and stimulating part of the course.

Unfortunately, the second reason is less pedagogically inspiring. The viability of the Centre in general,and the humanities programme in particular, depends on students attempting assessment. This is aconsequence of national educational funding policy. The Centre relies on two primary sources of

8 Cyflwyno Athroniaeth Foesol — Introducing Moral Philosophy

income to fund choices: student fees and hefcw funding. We receive no hefcw funds for studentswho do not attempt assessment.

Course Requirements:

All work should include appropriate references, be double-spaced in a reasonable fontand submitted electronically through Learning Central, which includes plagiarism de-tection. Do not include your name on your work itself. Use your student identificationnumber instead. This enables me to grade ‘blind’ (or at least attempt to).

either• 5 weekly responses (300–400 words each)

◦ This course pack includes eight weekly prompts. These ask you to write a brief responsewhich will be used as a resource in the course of discussion. All students are welcome tosubmit these for comment.

◦ Provided responses are submitted before the relevant class discussion, students who wishto do so may revise them in the light of my comments and class discussion and resubmitthem later in the course but this is not a requirement.

◦ Responses are welcome at any time before the final deadline but may not be revised andresubmitted if the class has already discussed the topic.

◦ If more than 5 responses are submitted, the best 5 will be considered for assessmentpurposes.

◦ A copy of the response should be printed for use during class discussion. Please bring thiscopy to class.

or• Final paper (1,500–2,000 words)

◦ A list of topics is included in this course pack.

◦ Students who are considering writing a paper are strongly encouraged to complete asmany weekly responses as possible.

◦ A draft should be submitted in advance and will be returned with comments to help youprepare the final version. Deadlines are marked on the included provisional class schedule.

Please keep copies of all work submitted.

Help with Referencing:

The Centre’s Student Handbook (available from Reception) explains the basics of formatting citationsand references and includes a pointer to the university’s guides at http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/insrv/educationandtraining/guides/citingreferences/index.html.

The handbook also explains what plagiarism is and strategies for avoiding it. You should readthis if you are in any doubt whatsoever about these matters. I will be happy to answerany further questions you may have.

Yr Hydref/Autumn 2014 9

Environment:

If something occurs which you feel negatively affected your ability to learn, please do not hesitateto discuss the matter with me. If you have any disability which may affect your ability to succeedin the class, please discuss the matter with me as soon as possible. I will be happy to discuss anyaccommodations you may require.

Provisional Class Schedule

This schedule is tentative and will almost certainly require modification depending on the paceat which we cover the material. I would also like to adapt the topics and readings in the light ofstudents’ interests. If you would like to see a particular topic included, please let me know.

Note that the schedule includes a reading week. There will be no class during this week.

Many of the readings are included in Pojman (2004) so a copy of this anthology may be convenient1.In some cases, the anthology contains an excerpt. If so, reading this extract is sufficient if cited asan option in the schedule. Because the text is rather expensive and because the library is unlikely toprovide copies for everybody, I try to provide alternative sources for readings. Where alternativesources are given for a reading, you need only obtain one of the alternates listed. Thealternatives are obviously somewhat less convenient than the anthologised versions since they arenot all in one place and they are not typically excerpts so that they are sometimes slightly longer.

Whether you have a copy of the anthology or not, you will need your library/computeraccount in order to access certain readings. Occasionally, I will circulate copies of readingswhich are not otherwise readily available.

All readings are designated with one of the following symbols:

Ñ key: These are the most important. Generally, you will find it difficult to follow the class ifyou have not read the key readings for that week.

H useful: These generally support or extend the key readings, and some may be required tocomplete weekly responses. You will generally get more out of the course if you are able toread some of these as well.

I additional: These are extras. They will enhance your understanding or provide further examplesillustrating the theories we are discussing.

• optional: These are mostly short, and potentially helpful, topic introductions in Pojman (2004).If you have the anthology, you may like to read these before tackling the other readings. Theyare, however, very far from being essential and I will assume that you have not read them.The course packet includes standalone introductions to many of the topics. These have beendesigned specifically to meet the needs of students taking this module and reading these shouldmore than compensate for any lack of Pojman’s introductions.

I would be happy to provide additional reading suggestions upon request.

1Note, however, that the edition cited here is not the one currently available. Page numbers and contents maydiffer somewhat if you have a different edition. If you have a choice, buy the second edition which is cited here. Thisshould also be much cheaper than the current one.


§1 The Philosopher’s Toolbox

Week 1: 29 Sept What is ethics?Philosophical Boot CampValidity Workshop

§2 Morality, Society & Survival

Week 2: 6 Oct Psychological Egoism & the Social Contract• Pojman, introduction (2004, 1–7)

Ñ Hobbes, ‘On the State of Nature’ 2 (Pojman 2004, 41–52)or Leviathan: Part I: Man3,4 (Hobbes 2010/2015, ch. 13; ch. 14

pars. 1–13, 18–20; ch. 15 pars. 1–3)H Golding, ‘Lord of the Flies: A Moral Allegory’ (Pojman 2004, 8–31)

or Lord of the Flies5 (Golding 1954, ch. 4 p. 59; pp. 67–72; ch. 5 p. 85,p. 88; ch. 11 pp. 162–173; ch. 12 pp. 173–175 pp. 187–192)

I Colson, ‘The Volunteer at Auschwitz: Altruism’ (Pojman 2004, 550–556)or Being the Body (Colson and Vaughn 2004, 348–357)

I Hallie, ‘From Cruelty to Goodness’ (Pojman 2004, 92–107)or ‘From Cruelty to Goodness’ (Hallie 1981)

I Carroll, ‘A Haven from Hitler’ (2006)

§3 Consequentialism

Week 3: 13 Oct Classical Hedonism• Pojman, introduction (Pojman 2004, 227–228)

Ñ ‘Seaman Holmes and the Longboat of the William Brown, Reported byJohn William Wallace’ (Pojman 2004, 229–230)

or United States vs. Holmes, Reported by John William Wallace(Wallace 1842)Utilitarianism

Ñ Mill6, ‘What Utilitarianism Is’ (2004, ch. 2)—, ‘Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility’ (2004, ch. 3)

H Huxley, ‘The Utilitarian Social Engineer and the Savage’ (Pojman2004, 272–293)

or Brave New World (Huxley 1960, chs. 15–17)

2Excerpts from the original 1651 text.3References are by chapter and paragraph number which should enable you to find the relevant passages in any

version of the text although you may need to count the paragraphs in older editions.4An updated version of the text. Details of modifications at http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/f_how.html.5Note that although the chapter numbers should be correct, page numbering will depend on the particular edition.

The excerpts in Pojman (2004) are connected by brief explanations and summaries. If you do not have access tothese and are unfamiliar with the novel, a plot summary such as the one at http://www.sparknotes.com/lit/flies/summary.html may be helpful.

6References to Mill’s works are by chapter which should enable you to find the relevant passages in any version ofthe text. Open access electronic versions are cited here but paper editions are (at least) equally good.


Week 4: 20 Oct Utilitarianism Cont.Ñ Mill, ‘What Utilitarianism Is’ (2004, ch. 2)

—, ‘Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility’ (2004, ch. 3)Should You Walk Away?

Ñ Le Guin, ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’ (Pojman2004, 265–271)

or ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’ (Le Guin 1975)H Robert Nozick, ‘The Experience Machine’ (Pojman 2004, 644–647)

or ‘The Experience Machine’ (Nozick 1974, 42–45)H Bernard Williams, ‘Against Utilitarianism’ (Pojman 2004, 252–264)

or ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’ (Williams 1973, § 3 pp. 95–96;97–100; § 4 pp. 100–104; §5 pp. 108–109; 112–118)

§4 Deontological Theories

Week 5: 27 Oct The Value of a Good WillÑ Kant, ‘The Moral Law’ (Pojman 2004, 297–306)

or Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals7 (Kant 1999, AK 4:389,4:393–401)

or Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals8 (Kant 2008, 3,8–17)The Formula of Universal Law (FUL)

Ñ Kant, ‘The Moral Law’ (Pojman 2004, 306–313)or Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1999, AK

4:402–403, 4:408–409, 4:411–412, 4:419–424)or Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (Kant

2008, 18–20, 25–26, 29–30, 38–44)

— Reading week —

7The abbreviation AK refers to the Berlin Academy Edition of Kant’s complete works. Better quality translationsinclude these references in the margins. If you have such a translation, you can use these references to locate therelevant passages even if the translation or pagination differs from the particular one cited here.

8Either the translation or the transcription contains a glaring error in the first sentence of the first passage assignedhere. The first sentence should read:

As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question suggested to this: Whether itis not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everythingwhich is only empirical, and which belongs to anthropology?


Week 6: 10 Nov The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself (FHEI)Ñ Kant, ‘The Moral Law’ (Pojman 2004, 314–315)

or Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1999, 4:428–429,4:432–433)

or Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (Kant2008, 48–50, 54)

H Maya Angelou, ‘Graduation’ (Pojman 2004, 653–665)or ‘Graduation’ (Angelou 1969)

What About Hedgehogs?H Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers (Pojman 2004, 356–370)

or ‘Trifles’ (Glaspell 2004)H Kant, ‘We Have Only Indirect Duties to Animals’ (Pojman 2004, 859–861)

or ‘Duties to Animals and Spirits’ (Kant 1977, 239–41)

§5 Virtue Ethics

Week 7: 17 Nov Living Well• Pojman, introduction (2004, 388–389)

Ñ Foot, ‘Virtues and Vices’ (2002)or ‘Virtues and Vices’ (2003)

H Aristotle, ‘Virtue Ethics’ (Pojman 2004, 407–423)or Nicomachean Ethics9 (Aristotle 2002, I. 1–2 (1094a1–1094b12); I. 4

(1095a14–1095a30); I. 5 (1095b15–1096a10); I. 7 (1097a15–1098a21); I. 13(1102a5–1102a7, 1102a14–1102a18); II. 1–3 (1103a15–1104b13); II. 4–6(1105a17–1107a27); II. 8–9 (1108b11–1109b27))

or Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle 1934b, references as above)Virtues & Vices

H Hugo, ‘The Bishop and the Candlesticks’ (Pojman 2004, 390–407)or ‘Fantine’ (Hugo 2008, book 2 chs. 3–5, 10–12)

H Tolstoy, ‘How Much Land Does a Man Need?’ (Pojman 2004, 464–478)or ‘How Much Land Does a Man Need?’ (Tolstoy 2004)

21 Nov Paper draft due by noon.

9Citations refer to book, chapter and standard ‘bekker’ page/line numbering of the original Greek. These bekkerreferences are approximate due to differences between Greek and English syntax. Better quality translations includethese references in the margins. If you have such a translation, you can use them to locate the relevant passages evenif the translation or pagination differs from the particular one cited here.


§6 Reality, Resistance & Respect

Week 8: 24 Nov Stoicism & SufferingÑ Epictetus et. al., ‘The Stoic Catechism’ (Pojman 2004, 500–512)

or Aurelius, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius10 (2001, II. 5)and Seneca, ‘Epistle 70: On the Proper Time to Slip the Cable’

(1917/1925, 57–59)and Epictetus, ‘Enchiridion’ (1934a, chs. 1–3; 5–6; 8–13; 15–17; 19–24;

26–30; 33–35; 37–38; 41–44; 48; 50–52)or ‘Enchiridion’ (Epictetus 1934b, references as above)

H Stockdale, ‘The World of Epictetus: Courage and Endurance’ (Pojman2004, 521–535)

or The World of Epictetus (Stockdale 2006, 7–21)I Russell, ‘Reflections on Suffering’ (Pojman 2004, 547–549)

or ‘Principia Mathematica’ (Russell 1967b, 220–221)and ‘What I Have Lived For’ (Russell 1967a)

Week 9: 1 Dec Autonomy & RespectÑ Hill, ‘Servility and Self-Respect’ (Pojman 2004, 691–702)

or ‘Servility and Self-Respect’ (Hill 1973)H A Class Divided (Peters 1985, online documentary)I King, I Have a Dream (Pojman 2004, 649–653)

or I Have a Dream (King 1963)

§7 Situation, Attribution & Character

Week 10: 8 Dec Situationism & Individual MoralityÑ Milgram, ‘An Experiment in Autonomy’ (Pojman 2004, 666–679)

or ‘The Perils of Obedience’ (Milgram 1973)H Zimbardo, The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of the

Psychology of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University (1999–2005,online slide-show and more)

I Gansberg, ‘Moral Cowardice’ (Pojman 2004, 486–489)or ‘38 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call Police’ (Gansberg 1964)

15 Dec Paper and/or prompt responses due by noon.

10Citations refer to book and paragraph number. Theoretically, this should allow you to find the correct passage inany translation and edition. However, translations do not always seem to agree. For example, Project Gutenberg’sedition does not agree with the Harvard Classics edition cited here.


References

Angelou, Maya (1969). I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings. Random House/Ballantine.Aristotle (1934a). Aristotle in 23 Volumes. Trans. by H. Rackham. Vol. 19. Cambridge, Massachusetts

and London: Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd.— (1934b). Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. by Gregory R. Crane. Trans. by H. Rackham. Perseus Digital

Library Project. Tufts University. urn:cts: greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.perseus-eng1:1094a. FromAristotle (1934a). Includes bekker numbering.

— (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. Trans., with a historical introd., by Christopher Rowe. Philosophicalintrod. and comment. by Sarah Broadie. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Aurelius, Marcus (2001). The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Ed. by Charles William Eliot. Trans.by George Long. Vol. 2.3. 51 vols. The Harvard Classics. New York: Bartleby.com, 6th Mar. 2001.url: http://www.bartleby.com/2/3/.

Carroll, Tim (2006). ‘A Haven from Hitler’. The Sunday Times Magazine (4th June 2006). url:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article726900.ece.

Colson, Charles and Ellen Vaughn (2004). Being the Body. Thomas Nelson Inc. Google Books:Q3Gjuw-tGUoC.

Epictetus (1934a). ‘Enchiridion’. In The Works of Epictetus: His Discourses, in Four Books, theEnchiridion, and Fragments. Ed. by Gregory R. Crane. Trans. by Thomas Wentworth Higginson.Perseus Digital Library Project. Tufts University. urn:cts: greekLit:tlg0557.tlg002.perseus-eng2:1.

— (1934b). ‘Enchiridion’. In The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheridion and Fragments. Ed.by Gregory R. Crane. Trans. by George Long. Perseus Digital Library Project. Tufts University.urn:cts: greekLit:tlg0557.tlg002.perseus-eng1:1.

Foot, Philippa (2002). ‘Virtues and Vices’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy.Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon, 1–18.

— (2003). ‘Virtues and Vices’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford:Oxford University Press/Oxford Scholarship Online, Nov. 2003. doi: 10.1093/0199252866.003.0001.

Gansberg, Martin (1964). ‘38 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call Police’. The New York Times (27th Mar.1964). url: http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/scraig/gansberg.html.

Glaspell, Susan Keating (2004). ‘Trifles’. In Plays. Fairbanks, Arkansas and Salt Lake City, Utah:Project Gutenberg, 1st Jan. 2004. Project Gutenberg ebook: 10623.

Golding, William (1954). Lord of the Flies. Penguin Modern Classics. Harmondsworth: Penguin inassociation with Faber & Faber.

Hallie, Philip (1981). ‘From Cruelty to Goodness’. Hastings Center Report 11.3 (June 1981), 23–8.JSTOR: 3561320.

Hill Jr., Thomas E. (1973). ‘Servility and Self-Respect’. The Monist, 87–104.Hobbes, Thomas (2010/2015). ‘Man’. In Leviathan. Ed. by Jonathan Bennett. Early Modern Texts, 1–

76. url: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/hobbes1651part1.pdf.Hugo, Victor (2008). ‘Fantine’. In Les Misérables: Complete in Five Volumes. Trans. by Isabel F.

Hapgood. Vol. 1. Fairbanks, Arkansas and Salt Lake City, Utah: Project Gutenberg, 22nd June2008. Project Gutenberg ebook: 135.

Huxley, Aldous (1960). Brave New World. url: http://www.huxley.net/bnw/. Repr.Kant, Immanuel (1977). Lectures on Ethics. Trans. from the German by Louis Infield. Indianapolis/

Cambridge: Hackett.— (1999). Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. Ed. and trans. from

the German by Mary J. Gregor. With an intro. by Allen W. Wood. The Cambridge Edition ofthe Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 37–108.


Kant, Immanuel (2008). Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. Trans. from theGerman by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. Easy Reading. Forgotten Books. url: http://www.forgottenbooks.org/info/9781605069845. One disadvantage of this version is that it doesnot have marginal references to the Berlin Academy Edition (AK) which are generally usedto reference Kant’s works and make it easy to specify passages independent of any particulartranslation. In addition, the free version is of very poor quality. Google Books has a much clearerversion which allows full preview but probably not printing. The Project Gutenberg copy is alsonicer but, crucially, lacks page numbers of any kind. Alternatively, get any translation from thelibrary which does include references to the Berlin Academy Edition and use those to find therelevant passages.

King Jr., Martin Luther (1963). I Have a Dream. This speech was delivered at the March onWashington for Jobs and Freedom. Washington, D. C., 28th Aug. 1963. url: http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/kingweb/publications/speeches/address_at_march_on_washington.pdf.

Le Guin, Ursula K. (1975). ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas (Variations on a theme byWilliam James)’. In The Wind’s Twelve Quarters. New York, Evanston, Illinois, San Franciscoand London: Harper & Row, 275–284. Also at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/dunnweb/rprnts.omelas.pdf. Repr. of ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas (Variations on a theme byWilliam James)’. New Dimensions 3.

Milgram, Stanley (1973). ‘The Perils of Obedience’. Harper’s Magazine (Dec. 1973), 62–77. Abridgedand adapted from Milgram (2009).

— (2009). Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. With an intro. by Philip G. Zimbardo.New York: HarperCollins/Harper Perennial Modern Thought. Repr.

Mill, John Stuart (2004). Utilitarianism. Fairbanks, Arkansas and Salt Lake City, Utah: ProjectGutenberg, 22nd Feb. 2004. Project Gutenberg ebook: 11224. Repr. of Utilitarianism. 7th ed.London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1879. Repr.

Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. No address provided. Perseus Books/Basic Books.Peters, William, dir. and prod. (1985). A Class Divided. Frontline producer/director Janet McFadden.

Frontline anchor Judy Woodruff. CD. Boston. url: http ://www.pbs .org/wgbh/pages/frontline / shows/divided/. Yale University Films. Produced by W.G.B.H. Boston for theDocumentary Consortium.

Pojman, Louis P., ed. (2004). The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature.2nd ed. New York and London: Oxford University Press.

Russell, Bertrand (1967a). ‘Prologue: What I Have Lived For’. In The Autobiography of BertrandRussell 1872–1914. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company/Atlantic Monthly Press, 3–4.url: http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/br-prolog.html.

— (1967b). The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 1872–1914. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brownand Company/Atlantic Monthly Press.

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus (1917/1925). Moral Epistles. Trans. by Richard M. Gummere. Vol. 2.3 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. url: http://www.stoics.com/seneca_epistles_book_2.html.

Stockdale, Vice Admiral James (2006). The World of Epictetus. With a forew. by Os Guinness. TheTrinity Forum Readings. MacLean, Paul D.: The Trinity Forum. url: http://www.ttf.org/pdf/TFR_05_Stockdale.pdf. Repr. of ‘The World of Epictetus’. Atlantic Monthly (Apr. 1978).

Tolstoy, Leo Nicolayevich (2004). ‘How Much Land Does a Man Need?’ In What Men Live By andOther Tales. Trans. by Aylmer Maude and Louise Shanks Maude. Fairbanks, Arkansas and SaltLake City, Utah: Project Gutenberg, 1st July 2004. Project Gutenberg ebook: 6157.

Wallace, John William (1842). United States vs. Holmes. Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. 26F.Cas. 360. Case no. 15,383. 22nd Apr. 1842. url: http://www.law.stetson.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6927.


Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen (1973). ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’. In Utilitarianism: For andAgainst. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77–150.

Zimbardo, Philip G. (1999–2005). The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of thePsychology of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University. url: http://www.prisonexp.org/.


Thompson, The Bookshelf

Resources

Compilation and supplementary material copyright ©2014 Clea F. Rees.Cover image: Colin Thompson. The Bookshelf. As noted, ‘Rule One’ is from Jay Rosenberg’s ThePractice of Philosophy (Prentice Hall, 1996). ‘Writing with Philosophical Attitude’ is a modifiedversion of a handout developed by William G. Lycan. The structured paper schema is based on asystem developed by John Roberts and other graduate students at University of North Carolina,

Chapel Hill.Typeset using pdfLATEX, BibLATEX and Biber in Latin Modern and URW ChanceryL.

Writing with Philosophical Attitude

First things first: You need, first of all, to make sure you understand the assignment. One thingyou will need to decide is whether the assignment requires you to give your own view or simplyto present some view which you may or may not share.

The pondering stage: Once you understand the assignment, you will need to think the issuesthrough carefully. Mull them over, discuss them with each other or with me. Even after this, youmay not be sure what you think — that’s wise, as the issues are tricky. If you need to presentyour own view, you may feel stuck. Simply pick the side you are inclined most towards and thendefend it to the death. This is useful for developing your budding philosophical wings, even ifyou’re not sure you’ve picked the correct side!

A word about scholarship1: When you are presenting or using the ideas of another, you mustdo so fairly and accurately. You must, of course, acknowledge the source of the idea, giving acitation and full reference. Except in a very few cases, quotations are unacceptable but, of course,if you do use the words of somebody else, you must use quotation marks and give a page referenceas part of your citation.You are not encouraged to do extra reading to complete assignments. They are not, or not mainly,research papers. I want to see you working out your own thoughts, as clearly and as rigorouslyas you can. If you do use a source from outside class, be sure to credit the author, giving a fullcitation in a footnote, including page references.Failure to give full citations, acknowledge the source of others’ ideas or to use quotation markswhen using the words of another counts as plagiarism, a particularly awful violation of academicintegrity. You must acknowledge the source of ideas and words you use whatever the source —e.g. book, web site, journal, relative, friend, classmate etc. etc.

Philosophy is hard: If you don’t find it hard, then either you were born with philosophy in yourvery bone marrow or you do not understand the assignment. Although the degree of difficulty ishigh, my expectations are modest. I expect only that you say something reasonable — not thatyou discover a 422 step deductively valid argument from indisputable premises! (Though thatwould be great, should you stumble across one!)

Writing style: A simple, clear and concise style is recommended. Oratory and rhetorical flourisheswill not particularly help, nor will bare assertion in any style; it is the content of your argumentsand the substantive force of your reasoning that I will be assessing. Imagine your audience as abright 14 year-old, who is intelligent but has no special philosophical knowledge. She needs to beable to understand your paper. Note that it is fine to use ‘I’ in philosophy papers.

Is there a right answer? When you are asked for your own opinion, there is no preferred answer.You make take any position, provided you can give reasons for it. Remember: any claim isadmissible in philosophy, provided one can give reasons for it. I don’t care what position you endup taking, but only how clearly and cogently you defend it.

1Further discussion can be found in the Centre’s Student Handbook, available from Reception or at http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/learn/student_information/index.php.

2I hope that everyone fully understands the great significance of this figure for the universe.


Relevance: Be sure that your paper answers the question. If you are asked to defend a particularview, that’s what your paper should do. If you are asked to write about a particular topic, thatis the topic you need to write about. You will lose credit for including irrelevant material.

Language: Clarity and conciseness are very important. It should be crystal clear to your readerexactly what you are saying and what your reasons are for saying it. Philosophy requiresvery precise use of language, because many of the issues involve somewhat subtle distinctions.Remember, I will evaluate the written work you hand in and not the thoughts you had whilewriting. So, you need to say what you mean and mean what you say, as precisely as possible.You may remember Lewis Carroll on this topic3:

‘Come, we shall have some fun now!’ thought Alice. ‘I’m glad they’ve begun asking riddles —I believe I can guess that,’ she added aloud.

‘Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer to it?’ said the March Hare.‘Exactly so,’ said Alice.‘Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on.‘I do,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least — at least I mean what I say — that’s the same thing,

you know.’‘Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter. ‘Why, you might just as well say that “I see

what I eat” is the same thing as “I eat what I see”!’‘You might just as well say,’ added the March Hare, ‘that “I like what I get” is the same

thing as “I get what I like”!’‘You might just as well say,’ added the Dormouse, which seemed to be talking in its sleep,

‘that “I breathe when I sleep” is the same thing as “I sleep when I breathe”!’

Structure: If you are asked to use a particular structure, be sure to follow it exactly.

Editing: It is usually best to write quite a lot and then later pare down your draft, eliminatingredundancies, repetition and irrelevancies. You can then organise the remainder as systematicallyas possible. Be sure to proofread and edit, edit, edit! Here are some suggestions which you mayfind useful:

• When you’ve written your first draft, put it aside for a time. Then look at it again. Imagineyou are your own worst enemy and have been paid by the CIA to humiliate and destroy thepaper. Write down the criticisms and objections which occur to you.

• Now, stop imagining you’re somebody else and try to answer the criticisms. Some of thisadversarial thought process might go into your paper; philosophers often try to anticipateobjections.

• Get a friend or classmate to read your (new) draft. Read it aloud to yourself.• Make sure you have answered the question / done the assignment and not something else.• If the assignment has several parts, make sure you have done all of them.• Remember that spell-checkers are fallible. In particular, be careful that you have the correct

word spelt correctly and not merely a correctly spelt word. Triple-check authors’ names!• If the assignment allows you to turn in a draft for feedback, make full use of the opportunity

by turning in a draft which is as complete and as good as you can possibly make it.• Keep repeating the process until you feel your paper is as good as possible.

Good Luck. I’m looking forward to seeing what you have to say.3Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland in The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll, The Modern Library:

Random House. Pp. 75–76. (Note: no copyright year is included as none is given.)

Philosophical Target Practise

This handout is designed to offer some guidance on developing effective objections. The mostimportant point is covered by ‘Rule One’ (included in ‘Resources’ in part 1 of the course packet).Recall Rosenberg’s ‘Rule One’:

Any opinion for which one can give reasons is admissible in philosophy, but once a claim has beensupported by an argument, subsequent criticism must then engage the argument. (Original emphasis.Rosenberg 1996, 19)

Indeed, Rosenberg continues:

In fact, the point is so important that there is no Rule Two. (Original emphasis. Rosenberg 1996, 19)

What does it mean to say that ‘subsequent criticism must. . . engage the argument’? It meansthat an objection should not typically consist of an independent argument for a thesis contrary tothe thesis defended in the original argument. That is, to object in philosophy is not typically togive reasons against a particular thesis or conclusion. Rather, it is to explain why the particularreasons given in the original argument fail to establish that thesis. Crucially, this isentirely consistent with the truth of the thesis. Of course, objections will often cast doubt on theoriginal thesis but this should be a side-effect rather than the focus of the objection.

Of course, there are exceptions to this. Occasionally, you might have excellent reasons for thinkinga thesis false even though you cannot pinpoint exactly where an argument for that thesis goes wrong.However, this move should be the option of last resort since it leaves your reader in something of aquandary.

To see this, suppose that on Monday you read a really convincing argument for Socrates’ claimthat ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. The author of the argument has provided what seemsto be a series of valid inferences from premises to conclusion. The terms of the argument are clearlyexplained and you have a strong grasp of what it means to live an ‘(un)examined life’ and of what itmeans for a life to be ‘(not) worth living’. Moreover, the argument provides compelling reasons tothink the premises are true. That is, you have good reason to think that the argument is sound andthe conclusion true. On Tuesday, therefore, you set about leading a more examined life.

But there’s a problem. On Wednesday, you try to persuade a classmate of the thesis by explainingthe argument. Your classmate agrees that the argument appears to be sound but insists that itcannot be so because there are good reasons to think the thesis is, in fact, false. In support of this,the classmate produces an argument for the claim that ‘the unexamined life is the only one worthliving’. This argument also appears to be valid, explains its terms clearly, and includes compellingreasons to think its premises are true. Moreover, it is clear that both arguments are using theirterms in the same ways. So the inconsistency cannot be explained away by arguing that the twotheses are using ‘(un)examined’ or ‘(not) worth living’ in different senses.

Now you (and your classmate) are stuck. You have two apparently sound arguments forincompatible conclusions. At least one of them is unsound but you’ve no idea which.

Now suppose that rather than producing an argument for an incompatible claim, your classmatehad pointed out a subtle flaw in the original argument. Perhaps the classmate has specialist expertisewhich casts doubt on one of the premises. Or perhaps the appearance of validity is merely that —an appearance — and your classmate points out an invalid inference. Since this objection pointsout the specific mistake in the reasoning, you now know the original argument is unsound and this


casts doubt on the thesis. This does not show the thesis is false, of course. However, it does tell yousomething important about the issues involved. It puts you in a good position to decide whether tosuspend judgement concerning the truth of the thesis, to attempt to develop a new argument forthat thesis, or to try to repair the existing argument for that thesis.

So an objection which points out the mistake in a particular argument for a thesis is a muchmore constructive and helpful contribution to debate than one which merely provides an independentargument for an incompatible thesis.

What does this mean? It means that the conclusion of part 2 should not typically bethat the paper’s thesis is false. Part 2 should typically develop an objection to the particularargument given for that thesis in part 1. The same considerations apply to part 3. Part 3 shouldtypically respond to the specific objection developed in part 2. It should not simply reiterate theargument of part 1 or provide a different argument for the paper’s thesis. It should instead explainwhy the criticism of the original argument is mistaken or how that argument can be defended againstthat criticism.

Consider the following (daft) example:

Part 1:

1. All apples are red.2. All post boxes are bright yellow.3. Red and bright yellow are not the same colour.

4. No apple is the same colour as any post box. (1–3)

Part 2:

1. Post boxes in the UK are red.2. Red and bright yellow are not the same colour.

3. Some post boxes are not bright yellow. (1–2)

Credit: OpenClip, Darts (2013)Source: http://pixabay.com/

This does not commit the objector to the falsity of (4) because the objection is not a defence ofthe claim that some apple is the same colour as some post box. Instead, the objection points out aspecific mistake in the particular argument advanced in part 1 for the paper’s thesis.

Rule One

This is how Jay F. Rosenberg explains the point:

Any opinion for which one can give reasons is admissiblein philosophy, but once a claim has been supported by anargument, subsequent criticism must then engage the

argument.

Rule One

In fact, the point is so important that there is no Rule Two. (Originalemphasis. Rosenberg 1996, 19)

Paper Schema

The structure of your paper should follow this schema. Throughout your paper, you must useyour own words. This is emphasised, especially, for part 1, where it is easiest to forget the importanceof using your own language. It applies, however, to all parts of the paper.

Except in a very few, unusual cases, quotations are not acceptable and you should not use them.

Part 0: Introduction Thesis = main conclusion. 1 sentence.2–3 supplementary sentences.

Transitional sentencePart 1: Initial argument Present and explain the argument fully, fairly and accurately in

your own words.Transitional sentence

Part 2: Objection An argument (1 reason) that raises an objection to the argumentin part 1.** Remember ‘Rule 1’

Transitional sentencePart 3: Response An argument (1 reason) that attacks the argument in part 2.

** Remember ‘Rule 1’

Optional:Transitional sentence

Part 4: Objection An argument (1 reason) that raises an objection to either theargument in part 1 or the argument in part 3.** Remember ‘Rule 1’

Transitional sentencePart 5: Response An argument (1 reason) that attacks the argument in part 4.

** Remember ‘Rule 1’No conclusion

Guidelines for Paper Schema

Throughout your paper: use your own words; follow the advice in “Writing with PhilosophicalAttitude” and any mechanics guidelines; and edit! Proofread! Edit!

Part 0: Introduction [3–4 sentences total]Write this part ** last **.Include a 1 sentence thesis statement. Make it as clear and concise as possible.Note: your thesis is the same as the conclusion of your argument. In some papers, your thesis

may be stated for you — in this case, use the exact wording given in the assignment.Write 1 other sentence to introduce the thesis.Write 1 or 2 other sentences explaining what you will do in your paper.Avoid “yawners” i.e. unnecessary sentences which immediately bore. Examples include “Religious

belief is a very controversial topic”, “Since the dawn of time. . . ”, “Collins English Dictionary saysthat. . . ” etc.

This part of your paper is of least importance.

Part 1: Argument to be defended [1 paragraph]Present and explain the argument fully, fairly and accurately.

• in some papers, you will need to reconstruct the author’s argument. In this case, you aresimply explaining her argument — whether you agree or not is irrelevant.

• in others, you may be presenting an argument of your own.

Be sure to focus on one specific argument. You are to present only one of the manyarguments the author gave in her paper. If you are presenting your own argument, you may haveseveral, present only one — the strongest one.

It’s a good idea to work out the conclusion and then work backwards to get the premises.Remember to use your own words — especially if you are reconstructing the argument of somebody

else.Your premises should be basic. They shouldn’t obviously beg a central question.Every time you write down a premise, ask ‘why?’ This will help push you back to the most basic

claims the argument rests on. (Obviously, at some point, you’ll have to stop! But only stop whenyou have to.)

Sometimes, an author does not state all the claims she relies on explicitly. Rather, some of thepremises may be implicit. If you are reconstructing an argument, you need to make all such implicitpremises explicit — that is, you need to state them, explaining that the author doesn’t state themexplicitly but that her argument relies on them. You need to explain how the argument relies onthem, too.

If it’s your argument, all your premises should be explicit!The argument should be valid.


Part 2: Objection [1 paragraph]Present one single objection to the argument in part 1 — i.e. one reason to reject it.Pick the strongest objection.You need to offer an argument challenging the truth of one of the premises in part 1.Do not be tempted to weaken this section in order to write a super-duper part 3!

Part 3: Response [1 paragraph]Present one single response — i.e. one reason to reject the argument in part 2.Pick the strongest response.If you find this part hard, you may be on the right track — you probably did a good job in part

2; if you find this part easy, you are almost certainly on the wrong track — you probably did a poorjob in part 2.

You are defending the argument in part 1 and your thesis by doing this. Make sure that you donot say things inconsistent with what you said in parts 0 and 1!

Optional Parts

• If you have enough to say in parts 1–3, you do not need to include parts 4 and 5.

• Only include parts 4 and 5 if the arguments you develop in parts 1–3 do not require the fulllength of the paper.

• State the arguments in parts 1–3 as concisely as possible but do not omit points in order toinclude parts 4 and 5.

• Depth is more important than breadth.

Part 4: Objection [1 paragraph]Present one single objection to the argument in parts 1 and 3 — i.e. one reason to

reject it.Pick the strongest objection.You need to offer an argument challenging the argument presented in parts 1 and 3.Do not be tempted to weaken this section in order to write a super-duper part 5!

Part 5: Response [1 paragraph]Present one single response — i.e. one reason to reject the argument in part 4.Pick the strongest response.Again, this part should be hard if you did a good job in part 3.You are defending the argument presented in parts 1 and 3 and your thesis by doing this. Make

sure that you do not say things inconsistent with what you said in parts 0, 1 and 3!

Glossary of General Philosophical Terms

argumentA set (or group) of sentences. One of the sentences is the conclusion* of the argument andthe other sentences are premises*. The premises are supposed to support the conclusion.

conclusionThe claim which an argument* is trying to convince you of.

invalidAn argument is deductively invalid iff it is not deductively valid. See valid*.

premiseAny sentence in an argument* which is not its conclusion*.

soundAn argument is deductively sound iff it is deductively valid and all its premises are true. Seevalid*.

unsoundAn argument is unsound iff it’s not sound: either it is deductively invalid or one (or more) ofthe premises is false. See sound*.

validAn argument* is deductively valid iff if the premises* are all true, then the conclusion*must be true as well — i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises; it is not possible for thepremises to all be true and the conclusion false.

§1 The Philosopher’s ToolboxPhilosophical Boot Camp

Compilation and supplementary material copyright ©2014 Clea F. Rees.The validity workshop is a modified version of one developed by Louise Antony.

Typeset using pdfLATEX, BibLATEX and Biber in Latin Modern and URW ChanceryL.

Validity Workshop

‘Deductively valid’ and ‘deductively invalid’ are technical philosophical terms and it is importantthat you come to understand them. They are used to describe arguments, so first we need an answerto the question, ‘What is an argument?’.

An argument is a set (or group) of sentences. One of the sentences is the conclusion ofthe argument and the other sentences are premises. The premises are supposed to support theconclusion. The conclusion is the claim the argument is trying to convince you of.

An argument is deductively valid if, and only if, if the premises are all true then theconclusion must be true as well. In other words, an argument is deductively valid if, and onlyif, the conclusion follows from the premises and it is not possible for the premises to all be true andthe conclusion false. An argument is deductively invalid if, and only if, it is not deductively valid.

Two methods for showing an argument is deductively invalid:

1. Describe a possible situation in which the premises of the argument are true, butthe conclusion is false. If you can do this, the argument is deductively invalid.

2. Find another argument with the same form where the premises are true, in theactual world, and the conclusion is false, in the actual world. If you can do this, theargument is deductively invalid.

Although this worksheet is about deductive validity, it helps to introduce a contrasting term.An argument is deductively sound if, and only if, it is deductively valid and all itspremises are true. A deductively valid argument, as we’ll see, can still be rubbish. This is becauseit may start from false, even ridiculous assumptions. To be good a (deductive) argument must bedeductively sound.

It follows that there are two ways in which an argument can be deductively unsound (ie bad).That is, deductive argument can go wrong in two different ways and it’s important, when you raisean objection to an argument, to be clear which kind of problem you are raising. Here are the twoways:

1. The argument is deductively unsound because it is deductively invalid. That is,there’s something wrong with the logic — the conclusion doesn’t ‘follow’.

2. The argument is deductively unsound because one (or more) of the premises isfalse.

If you can show either that a (deductive) argument is deductively invalid or that one of itspremises are false, you’ve shown it’s bad — you’ve shown this argument gives you no reason, byitself, to accept its conclusion.


Exercise 1

Decide whether each of the following arguments is deductively valid or deductively invalid:

(1) 1. Some Republicans are conservative.2. Some conservatives dislike Bill Clinton.

3. Some Republicans dislike Bill Clinton.

(Be careful. Don’t conclude that the argument is deductively valid just because the premises and theconclusion all happen to be true in the actual world. Use the definition and procedures above.)

(2) 1. Some dogs are animals.2. Some animals have hooves.

3. Some dogs have hooves.

(Note that this argument has the same form as (1). What does this mean?)

(3) 1. If you’re in Chapel Hill, then you’re in North Carolina.2. You’re in Chapel Hill.

3. You’re in North Carolina.

(For the purposes of these exercises, assume that ‘Chapel Hill’ refers to exactly one place and thatthat place is in North Carolina.)

(4) 1. If you’re in Chapel Hill, then you’re in North Carolina.2. You’re in North Carolina.

3. You’re in Chapel Hill.

(Question: what is the difference in structure between (3) and (4). Why does it matter?)

(5) 1. Pornography causes sexual violence.2. This material caused sexual violence.

3. This material is pornography.

(6) 1. Gunshots to the brain cause death.2. This event caused death.

3. This event was a gunshot to the brain.

Validity Workshop 35

Exercise 2

Go back and, for each argument considered in the previous exercise, decide whether it is deductivelysound or deductively unsound.

Exercise 3

Supply a premise or premises to make the following arguments deductively valid. Don’t worry aboutwhether the premises you add are true, or even plausible. Just make each argument deductivelyvalid.

(1) 1. Abortion is the killing of a human being.2. ????

3. Abortion is murder.

(2) 1. A woman has a right to control her own body.2. ????

3. A woman has the right to an abortion.

(3) 1. Abortion is immoral.2. ????

3. Abortion should be illegal.

(4) 1. People have a right to disagree about the morality of abortion.2. ????

3. There should be no laws prohibiting abortion.

Exercise 4

Go back and, for each argument completed in the previous exercise, decide whether it is deductivelysound or deductively unsound.


Exercise 5

Give an example of an argument of each of the following types:

(1) Deductively invalid, all true premises, true conclusion.

1.

(2) Deductively invalid, one or more false premises, true conclusion.

1.

(3) Deductively valid, all false premises, false conclusion.

1.

Exercise 6

Go back and, for each argument constructed in the previous exercise, decide whether it is deductivelysound or deductively unsound.

§2 Morality, Society & SurvivalPsychological Egoism & the Social Contract

Compilation and supplementary material copyright ©2014 Clea F. Rees.Selections from Hobbes typeset in Venturis ADF by Hirwen Harendal.

Typeset using pdfLATEX, BibLATEX and Biber in Latin Modern and URW ChanceryL.

Morality, Society & Survival

Psychological Egoism & the Social Contract

Psychological egoism is the view that all human beings act so as to further whatthey perceive as their own, individual best interests, insofar as they are able to

do so. This thesis is one of the premises* of Thomas Hobbes’s argument in Leviathan4. Someof our experiences and some literature may illustrate this idea. For example, descriptions of Naziconcentration camps or William Golding’s Lord of the Flies. Other experiences and literature maysuggest that psychological egoism is false.

Altruism involves acting for the sake of something other than one’s own, individual best interests.If at least some people are capable of acting altruistically at least some of the time, then Hobbes’spremise is wrong. Any of the additional readings (from Hallie, Carroll or Colson) may offer food forthought but you can probably think of plenty of examples of your own.

In order to defend his theory, then, Hobbes needs to explain how examples of apparent altruismare consistent with psychological egoism. To do this, he needs to explain how cases of apparentaltruism could fail to be cases of genuine altruism. That is, he needs to explain how self-interestcould motivate people to perform apparently altruistic acts.

Briefly describe one example of (apparent) altruism and suggest one way in which Hobbes mightexplain it consistently with psychological egoism.

You may be tempted to pick an ‘easy’ case which is relatively straightforward for Hobbes toexplain. It is better, however, to pick the strongest possible candidate — that is, the best example ofpossible altruism you can think of — even though this will make the second part of the assignmentharder. This is because you are trying to help Hobbes here and Hobbes needs to defend his theoryagainst the strongest possible objections. To put this another way: if you’ve got a good potentialexample of altruism, it should be relatively difficult to explain it consistently with Hobbes’s view. Soif it seems too easy, you may need to rethink your example.

When responding to weekly prompts, you do not need to include an introduction or conclusion.You do not have enough words for that!

Draft due: by noon on Monday, 6 October, 2014Revised due: by noon on Monday, 15 December, 2014Length: 300–400 wordsSubmission: via Learning Central (which includes plagiarism detection)

Please bring a printed copy to classReferencing: in-text citations; bibliographyNOT needed: introduction; conclusionLayout: double-space; reasonable font; page numbers; word countAnonymous: do NOT include your name in your uploaded document

do include your student ID number on every page

4According to the standard reading. We will not be concerned with alternative interpretations of Hobbes’s view.


Before beginning work, you MUST read the sections of the Centre’s Student Handbook dealingwith plagiarism and how to avoid it. Copies of the handbook are available from Reception andonline at http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/learn/student_information/index.php. I would be happy toanswer any further questions you might have.

The Handbook also explains the basics of formatting citations and references and includesa pointer to the university’s guides at http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/insrv/educationandtraining/guides/citingreferences/index.html.

You do not need to seek outside sources when completing this assignment and I recommendnot doing so unless you wish to draw on them for an original example. Any sources you do useshould be properly cited. Whether you use additional sources or not, your list of referencesshould include full references for all sources, including assigned materials distributed inclass. The introductory section of the course packet includes bibliographical details for all readings.Citations in the text should include specific page numbers where appropriate.

Condition of human beings in the State of Nature

1. A human being will always do what she thinks is best for herself. [Psychological egoism]

2. In the State of Nature, a human being who cannot obtain what she thinks is good for herotherwise, will think it best for her to fight for it if she can.

3. Human beings are all strong and smart enough to fight each other. [Equality]

4. In the State of Nature, a human being who cannot obtain what she thinks is good for herotherwise, will fight others for it. (From 1, 2, 3.)

5. Human beings think satisfying their desires for food, shelter, water etc. is good for them.

6. There is not enough food, shelter, water etc. to satisfy the desires of all human beings. [Scarcity]

7. A human being will either have less food, shelter, water etc. than she desires or she will haveenough but there will be others who do not. (From 6.)

8. In the State of Nature, if she has less, then she will fight others. (From 4, 5.)

9. In the State of Nature, if she has enough, then others will attack (fight) her. (From 4, 5, 7.)

10. In the State of Nature, human beings think it is best for them to fight back when attackedand/or to fight others who may otherwise attack them.

11. In the State of Nature, if she has enough, then she will fight others. (From 9, 10.)

12. In the State of Nature, human beings will fight each other. [War of all against all] (From 7, 8,11.)

This covers two of the three motives Hobbes refers to as resulting in a state of continual war in theState of Nature (Hobbes 2005, part 1 ch. 13 par. 6):

Morality, Society & Survival 41

1. ‘competition’: people will fight over the scarce resources available in the world to meet theirneeds and satisfy their desires;

2. ‘diffidence’: people will fight each other because they cannot trust others not to attack them inorder to get any stuff they hold and/or to make use of them;

Both motives arise from human beings’ pursuit of their own best interests together with someplausible assumptions about the kinds of things people will believe to be in their best interests:enough food and water; shelter from the cold, rain or sun; etc. Hobbes’s commitment to psychologicalegoism means that all human beings will share these motives. The third motive Hobbes cites is alittle different because it seems to be making an additional psychological claim:

3. ‘glory’: people will fight those who do not show them sufficient respect both to exact revengefor perceived slights and to teach others by making an example of the offenders.

Hobbes concludes that the State of Nature will involve a continual war of every person against everyother person. Nobody will be secure because nobody will be able to trust others not to attack her.Nobody will spend time building things or gaining knowledge because the fruits of her labours wouldbe taken from her by others keen to reap the benefits without having put in the work. ‘Worst of all,’there will be ‘continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,brutish, and short.’ (Hobbes 2005, part 1 ch. 13 par. 9)

The Social Contract, commonwealth and LeviathanBecause things are bad for everybody in the State of Nature, everybody has a reason to agree

to a Social Contract provided that others do likewise. Remember that everyone is a psychologicalegoist on Hobbes’s view. They will act in their own best interests. They are also rational and aretherefore capable of understanding, making and keeping agreements with each other. The SocialContract involves each person agreeing to give up some of her freedom provided that others do thesame. The idea is that having secure rights to some things is better than having insecure rights toeverything. Consider food. In the State of Nature, you have a right to all the food in the world.However, everybody else has the same right so you must fight to acquire or keep food for yourself.If you spend hours gathering food and storing it for the winter, you are a fool because others willsimply come and take the food you’ve put by. It would be better, then, to give up the right to allthe food in the world if by doing so you could secure your right to some food — the food you’vegrown, harvested or stored yourself, say. Others are in the same position. So everybody agrees tokeep to rules which ensure everybody some rights. So long as everybody obeys the rules, peoplewon’t have to fight for the rights the rules give them. You won’t have to defend your harvest or sitawake all night guarding your grain store.

Unfortunately, there’s a catch. Why should people keep the rules when they don’t want to? If Ithink your grain looks good and I get together with some other people who think the same, what isto stop us from overpowering or killing you and enjoying the fruits of your labour? Hobbes says that‘nothing is more easily broken than a man’s word’ (Hobbes 2005, part 1 ch. 14 par. 7). The only wayto stop psychological egoists from breaking the rules is to make sure it is not in their interests to doso. This means that the Social Contract will only work if there is somebody to enforce a systemof punishments sufficiently harsh to deter people from breaking the rules. People therefore agreeto obey a sovereign — the Leviathan — who will rule the commonwealth and guarantee the SocialContract.

With the Leviathan comes civil society, law and justice. In the State of Nature, there is no suchthing as justice or injustice, right or wrong. There is no property. Everybody is entitled to everything,

even to the bodies and lives of other people. People have no reason to keep their agreements orpromises. Indeed, agreements and promises are not valid in the State of Nature. Once the Leviathanis in place to guarantee that those who break the law will be punished, justice and injustice, rightand wrong begin. Justice consists in obeying the law and keeping valid agreements. Injustice consistsin disobeying the law and breaking valid contracts.

ReferencesCarroll, Tim (2006). ‘A Haven from Hitler’. The Sunday Times Magazine (4th June 2006).Colson, Charles and Ellen Vaughn (2004). Being the Body. Thomas Nelson Inc. Google Books:

Q3Gjuw-tGUoC.Golding, William (1954). Lord of the Flies. Penguin Modern Classics. Harmondsworth: Penguin in

association with Faber & Faber.Hallie, Philip (1981). ‘From Cruelty to Goodness’. Hastings Center Report 11.3 (June 1981), 23–8.

JSTOR: 3561320.Hobbes, Thomas (2005). Leviathan. Parts I and II. Ed. by Aloysius P. Martinich. Peterborough,

Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press. Repr.— (2010/2015). Leviathan. Ed. by Jonathan Bennett. Early Modern Texts.

Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes

Edition Notes

Hobbes’s Leviathan consists of four parts, of which excerpts from the first are reproduced here. Theseexcerpts are from Jonathan Bennett’s digitised and edited version of Hobbes’s text1.

— Clea F. Rees

Chapter 13

The natural condition of mankind as concerning their happiness and misery

Nature has made men so equal in their physical and mental capacities that, although sometimes we 1may find one man who is obviously stronger in body or quicker of mind than another, yet taking all in allthe di�erence between one and another is not so great that one man can claim to have any advantage ·ofstrength or skill or the like· that can’t just as well be claimed by some others. As for •strength of body: theweakest man is strong enough to kill the strongest, either by a secret plot or by an alliance with otherswho are in the same danger that he is in.

As for •the faculties of the mind: I find that men are even more equal in these than they are in 2bodily strength. (In this discussion I set aside skills based on words, and especially the skill—known as‘science’—of being guided by general and infallible rules. Very few people have this, and even they don’thave it with respect to many things. I am setting it aside because it isn’t a natural faculty that we areborn with, nor is it something that we acquire—as we acquire prudence—while looking for somethingelse.) Prudence is simply experience; and men will get an equal amount of that in an equal period of timespent on things that they equally apply themselves to. What may make such equality incredible is reallyjust one’s vain sense of one’s own wisdom, which •most men think they have more of than the commonherd—that is, more than anyone else except for a few others whom they value because of their fame orbecause their agreement with •them. It’s just a fact about human nature that however much a man may

1Thomas Hobbes. ‘Man’. In Leviathan. Ed. by Jonathan Bennett. Early Modern Texts, 2010/2015, 1–76. url: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/hobbes1651part1.pdf.

— 1 —

2 Thomas Hobbes

acknowledge many others to be more •witty, or more •eloquent, or more •learned than he is, he won’teasily believe that many men are as •wise as he is; for he sees his own wisdom close up, and other men’sat a distance. This, however, shows the equality of men rather than their inequality. For ordinarily there isno greater sign that something is equally distributed than that every man is contented with his share!

·Competition·: This equality of ability produces equality of hope for the attaining of our goals. So if any3two men want a single thing which they can’t both enjoy, they become enemies; and each of them on theway to his goal (which is principally his own survival, though sometimes merely his delight) tries to destroyor subdue the other. And so it comes about that when someone has through farming and building cometo possess a pleasant estate, if an invader would have nothing to fear but that one man’s individual power,there will probably be an invader—someone who comes with united forces to deprive him not only of thefruit of his labour but also of his life or liberty. And the ·successful· invader will then be in similar dangerfrom someone else.

·Distrust ·: Because of this distrust amongst men, the most reasonable way for any man to make himself4safe is to strike first, that is, by force or cunning subdue other men—as many of them as he can, untilhe sees no other power great enough to endanger him. This is no more than what he needs for his ownsurvival, and is generally allowed. ·And it goes further than you might think·. Some people take pleasurein contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, pursuing them further than their securityrequires, ·and this increases the security needs of others·. People who would otherwise be glad to be atease within modest bounds have to increase their power by further invasions, because without that, in apurely defensive posture, they wouldn’t be able to survive for long. This increase in a man’s power overothers ought to be allowed to him, as it is necessary to his survival.

·Glory·: Every man wants his associates to value him as highly as he values himself; and any sign that5he is disregarded or undervalued naturally leads a man to try, as far as he dares, to raise his value in theeyes of others. For those who have disregarded him, he does this by violence; for others, by example. I say‘as far as he dares’; but when there is no common power to keep them at peace, ‘as far as he dares’ is farenough to make them destroy each other. That is why men don’t get pleasure (and indeed do get muchgrief) from being in the company of other men without there being a power that can over-awe them all.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of discord. First •competition, secondly6•distrust, thirdly •glory.

The first makes men invade for •gain; the second for •safety; and the third for •reputation. The first7use violence to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the seconduse it to defend them·selves and their families and property·; the third use it for trifles—a word, a smile, adi�erent opinion, and any other sign of a low regard for them personally, if not directly then obliquelythrough a disrespectful attitude to their family, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

This makes it obvious that for as long as men live without a common power to keep them all in awe,8they are in the condition known as ‘war’; and it is a war of every man against every man. For WAR doesn’tconsist just in •battle or the act of fighting, but in •a period of time during which it is well enough knownthat people are willing to join in battle. So the temporal element in the notion of ‘when there is war’ is likethe temporal element in ‘when there is bad weather’. What constitutes bad weather is not a rain-shower ortwo but an inclination to rain through many days together; similarly, what constitutes war is not actualfighting but a known disposition to fight during a time when there is no assurance to the contrary. Allother time is PEACE.

Therefore, whatever results from •a time of war, when every man is enemy to every man, also results9from •a time when men live with no other security but what their own strength and ingenuity providesthem with. In such conditions there is

no place for hard work, because there is no assurance that it will yield results; and consequently no cultivationof the earth, no navigation or use of materials that can be imported by sea, no construction of large buildings,no machines for moving things that require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of

Leviathan 3

time, no practical skills, no literature or scholarship, no society; and—worst of all—continual fear and dangerof violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to you, if you haven’t thought hard about these things, that nature should thus separatemen from one another and make them apt to invade and destroy one another. So perhaps you won’t trustmy derivation of this account from the nature of the passions, and will want to have the account confirmedby experience. Well, then, think about how you behave: when going on a journey, you arm yourself, andtry not to go alone; when going to sleep, you lock your doors; even inside your own house you lock yourchests; and you do all this when you know that there are laws, and armed public o�cers of the law, torevenge any harms that are done to you. Ask yourself: what opinion do you have of your fellow subjectswhen you ride armed? Of your fellow citizens when you lock your doors? Of your children and servantswhen you lock your chests? In all this, don’t you accuse mankind as much by your actions as I do by mywords? Actually, neither of us is criticising man’s nature. The desires and other passions of men aren’tsinful in themselves. Nor are actions that come from those passions, until those who act know a law thatforbids them; they can’t know this until laws are made; and they can’t be made until men agree on theperson who is to make them. But why try to demonstrate to learned men something that is known even todogs who bark at visitors—sometimes indeed only at strangers but in the night at everyone?

It may be thought that there has never been such a time, such a condition of war as this; and I believe 10it was never generally like this all over the world. Still, there are many places where people live like thateven now. For the savage people in many parts of America have no government at all except for thegovernment of small families, whose harmony depends on natural lust. Those savages live right now in thebrutish manner I have described. Anyway, we can see what way of life there would be if there were nocommon power to fear, from the degenerate way of life into which civil war has led men who had formerlylived under a peaceful government.

Even if there had never been any time at which •individual men were in a state of war one against 11another, this is how •kings, and persons of sovereign authority relate to one another at all times. Becauseof their independence from one another, they are in continual mutual jealousies. Like gladiators, with their•weapons pointing and their •eyes fixed on one another, sovereigns have •forts, garrisons, and guns on thefrontiers of their kingdoms, and permanent •spies on their neighbours—this is a posture of war, as muchas the gladiators’ is. But because in this the sovereigns uphold the economy of their nations, their stateof war doesn’t lead to the sort of misery that occurs when individual men are at liberty ·from laws andgovernment·.

In this war of every man against every man nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, 12justice and injustice have no place there. Where there is no common power, there is no law; and wherethere is no law, there is no injustice. In war the two chief virtues are force and fraud. Justice and injusticeare not among the faculties [here = ‘natural capacities’] of the body or of the mind. If they were, they could bein a man who was alone in the world, as his senses and passions can. They are qualities that relate to menin society, not in solitude. A further fact about the state of war of every man against every man: in it thereis no such thing as ownership, no legal control, no distinction between mine and thine. Rather, anythingthat a man can get is his for as long as he can keep it.

So much for the poor condition that man is actually placed in by mere •nature; but ·as I now go on to 13explain·, he can extricate himself from it, partly through his •passions, partly through his •reason.

The passions that incline men to peace are •fear of death, •desire for things that are necessary for 14comfortable living, and a •hope to obtain these by hard work. And reason suggests convenient items in apeace treaty that men may be got to agree on. These items are the ones that in other contexts are called

4 Thomas Hobbes

the Laws of Nature. I shall have more to say about them in the two following chapters.

Chapter 14

The first and second natural laws, and contracts

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty that each man has to1make his own decisions about how to use his own power for the preservation of his own nature—i.e. hisown life—and consequently ·the liberty· of doing anything that he thinks is the aptest means to that end.[The Latin phrase jus naturale standardly meant ‘natural law’; but jus could mean ‘right’, and Hobbes is clearly taking the phrase

to mean ‘natural right’.]

The proper meaning of LIBER TY is the absence of external obstacles. Such obstacles can often take2away part of a man’s power to do what he wants, but they can’t get in the way of his using his remainingpower in obedience to his judgment and reason.

A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis) is a command or general rule, discovered by reason, which forbids3a man to •do anything that is destructive of his life or takes away his means for preserving his life, andforbids him to •omit anything by which he thinks his life can best be preserved. For although those whospeak of this subject commonly run together right and law (jus and lex), they ought to be distinguished.RIGHT consists in the liberty to do or not do ·as one chooses·, whereas LAW picks on one of them—eitherdoing or not doing—and commands it. So law di�ers from right as much as obligation di�ers fromliberty—which ·are so di�erent that· it would be inconsistent to suppose that a person had both libertyand an obligation in respect of the same action.

As I said in chapter 13, the condition of man is a condition of war of everyone against everyone, so4that everyone is governed by his own reason and can make use of anything he likes that might help him topreserve his life against his enemies. From this it follows that in such a condition every man has a right toeverything—even to someone else’s body. As long as this continues, therefore—that is, as long as everyman continues to have this natural right to everything—no man, however strong or clever he may be, canbe sure of living out the time that nature ordinarily allows men to live. And consequently it is a commandor general rule of reason that •every man ought to seek peace, as far as he has any hope of obtaining it;and that •when he can’t obtain it he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. •The first branchof this rule contains the first law of nature—the fundamental one—which is this:

First law of nature: Seek peace and follow it.

The second branch contains in summary form the right of nature, which is the right to defend ourselves byany means we can.

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to seek peace, is derived this5second law:

Second law of nature: When a man thinks that peace and self-defence require it, he should bewilling (when others are too) to lay down his right to everything, and should be contented with as muchliberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.

For as long as every man maintains his right to do anything he likes, all men are in the condition of war.But if other men won’t also lay down their right, there is no reason for him to divest himself of his; for ·ifhe alone gave up his rights· that would be to expose himself to predators (which no man is obliged to do)rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is the law of the Gospel:

Leviathan 5

Whatever you require others to do to you, do it to them.

And this law of all men:

Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris—·Don’t do to others what you don’t want done to you·.

[In the interests of clarity, the next paragraph is written in terms of ‘I’ and ‘you’, replacing Hobbes’s ‘a man’ and ‘another’.] 6For me to lay down my right to something is for me to deprive myself of the liberty of blocking you (forinstance) from getting the benefit of your right to the same thing. In renouncing or giving up my right Idon’t give anyone else a right that he didn’t previously have, because every man has a right by nature toeverything. All I do ·in renouncing my own right· is to stand out of your way, so that you can enjoy yourown original right without interference from me; but you may still be impeded by some third person. Thus,the e�ect on you of my lacking a certain right is just a lessening of hindrances to your exercise of youroriginal right.

A man can lay aside a right either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to someone else. He 7RENOUNCES it when he doesn’t care who gets the benefit. He TRANSFERS it when he intends the benefitto go to some particular person or persons. And when a man has deprived himself of a right in either ofthose ways—abandoning it or giving it away—he is said to be OBLIGED or BOUND not to hinder those towhom such right is given or abandoned from having the benefit of it; and ·it is said· that he ought, andthat it is his DUTY, not to deprive that voluntary act of his of its e�ectiveness; and ·if he does so·, thathindrance is ·what we call· INJUSTICE and INJURY. [The word ‘injury’ comes from ‘in-’ as a negater and jure which

is Latin for ‘right’. Hobbes gives this explanation in compact form.] So that •injury or injustice in the controversiesof the world is a little like •absurdity in the disputations of scholars. For as scholars call it ‘absurdity’ tocontradict what one maintained at the outset, so in the world it is called ‘injustice’ and ‘injury’ voluntarilyto undo something that one had voluntarily done at the outset. How a man either renounces or transfers aright is by a declaration or indication—using some voluntary and su�cient sign or signs—that he does ordid renounce or transfer the right to the person who accepts it. And these signs are either words only,or actions only, or (as most often happens) both words and actions. Those ·words and/or actions· are theBONDS by which men are bound and obliged: bonds whose strength comes not from their own nature (fornothing is more easily broken than a man’s word) but from fear of some bad consequence of their beingbroken.

Whenever a man transfers or renounces a right, he does so either in consideration of some right 8reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopes to get from what he is doing. For itis a voluntary act, and the goal of the voluntary acts of every man is some good to himself. It followsthat there are some rights that no man can be taken to have abandoned or transferred, no matter whatwords or other signs he uses . First and foremost: a man cannot lay down the right of resisting those whobring force against him to take away his life, because he couldn’t be understood to be doing that with theaim of getting some good for himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment;both because •there is no benefit to be got from putting up with such things, as there is ·or may be· tobe got from allowing someone else to be wounded or imprisoned; and also because •when a man seesothers coming against him by violence, he can’t tell whether they intend his death or not. ·There is also athird reason·. Lastly, the point of the procedure of renouncing and transferring rights—the motive andpurpose for which it exists—is simply to preserve a man’s security in his person, in his life, and in hismeans for preserving his life in a manner that won’t make him weary of it. So •if a man by words or othersigns seems to deprive himself of the very thing for which those signs were intended, he should not beunderstood to have meant it; rather, we should take it that he was ignorant of how such words and actionsought to be interpreted.

The mutual transferring of a right is what men call a CONTRACT. 9Transferring a right to a thing is di�erent from transferring or delivering the thing itself. ·The two can 10

happen together·. For a thing may be delivered along with the transfer of the right to it, as in buying

6 Thomas Hobbes

and selling with cash, or exchanging goods or lands. ·But they can be separated·, and the thing may bedelivered some time after ·the right to it has been transferred·.

·Something else that can happen is this·. One of the contractors [= ‘parties to the contract’] may do his part11by delivering the thing contracted, leaving it to the other ·contractor· to do his part at some specified latertime, trusting him in the meantime. In such a case, the contract on the latter person’s side is called a PACTor COVENANT. Or it can happen that both parties contract now to do something later. In such a case,when someone who has been trusted to perform at a later time does perform, this is called ‘keeping apromise’ or ‘keeping faith’; and if he fails to perform, and his failure is voluntary, it is called ‘violation offaith’.

When the transferring of a right is not two-sided, but one of the parties transfers a right in the hope12that this will •bring him friendship or service from someone else, or will •get him a reputation for charityor magnanimity, or will •bring him a reward in heaven, or when he does it so as free his mind from thepain of compassion (·e.g. giving money to a beggar so as to relieve one’s oppressive feeling of pity for him·),this is not a contract but a GIFT, FREE - GIFT, GRACE—all of which mean the same thing.

Contracts are expressed either •explicitly or •by inference. •Explicitly when words are spoken with13understanding of what they mean, and they speak of either the present or the past (‘I give’, ‘I grant’, ‘Ihave given’, ‘I have granted’, ‘I will that this be yours’) or the future (‘I will give’, ‘I will grant’)—the wordsconcerning the future are called PROMISE.

. . .What if a covenant is made in which the parties do not perform now, but trust one another ·to perform18

at an appropriate time in the future·? •If this happens in the condition of mere nature (which is war ofevery man against every man), the contract is void if one of the parties has a reasonable suspicion ·thatthe other is not going to perform·. For the one who performs first has no assurance that the other willperform later, because the bonds of words are too weak to rein in men’s ambition, greed, anger, and otherpassions—unless there is something to be feared from some coercive power; and in the condition of merenature, where all men are equal and are judges of the reasonableness of their own fears, there can’t possiblybe such a power. So he who performs first merely betrays himself to his enemy, which is contrary to hisright (which he can never abandon) to defend his life and his means of living.

On the other hand, •if there is a common power set over both parties to the contract, with right19and force su�cient to compel performance, the contract is not made void ·by the suspicions of eitherparty to it·. When there is a power set up to constrain those who would otherwise violate their faith, thatfear—·namely, the suspicion that the other party will not perform·—is no longer reasonable; so he who hascovenanted to perform first is obliged to do so.

For someone’s fear ·or suspicion· to make such a covenant invalid, it must arise from something that20happened after the covenant was made—perhaps some new act or other sign of the other party’s planningnot to perform. Otherwise it can’t make the covenant void; for something that didn’t hinder a man frompromising oughtn’t to count as a hindrance to his performing.

Chapter 15

Other laws of nature

From the ·second· law of nature, which obliges us to transfer to someone else any rights of ours the1retention of which would hinder the peace of mankind, there follows a third:

Leviathan 7

Third law of nature: Men should perform the covenants they make.

Without this, covenants are useless, are mere empty words, and all men retain the right to all things sothat we are still in the condition of war.

This ·third· law of nature is the source of JUSTICE. When no covenant has been made, no right has 2been transferred, so every man has a right to everything, so no action can be unjust. But when a covenantis made, to break it is unjust; and the definition of INJUSTICE is simply the non-performance of a covenant.And whatever is not unjust is just.

As I said in chapter 14, covenants of mutual trust are invalid when one part fears that the other party 3will not perform. Although the origin of justice is the making of covenants, there can’t be any actualinjustice until the reason for such fear be taken away, which can’t be done while men are in the naturalcondition of war. So the labels ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ can have application only when

there is some coercive power to •compel all men equally to perform their covenants, through the terror ofsome punishment greater than the benefit they expect from breaking their covenant, and ·thereby· to •ensurethat men get the benefits they contract for, this being their compensation for giving up some of their rights.

There is no such power before the commonwealth is created.

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