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Japan BMD

Japan BMD..................................................................................................................................................................................................1Plan Text......................................................................................................................................................................................................41AC Inherency.............................................................................................................................................................................................51AC Normalization......................................................................................................................................................................................6

1AC Normalization......................................................................................................................................................................................71AC Normalization......................................................................................................................................................................................91AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................111AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................121AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................131AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................141AC China ASAT......................................................................................................................................................................................151AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................161AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................171AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................181AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................191AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................201AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................21

1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................221AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................231AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................241AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................251AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................261AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................271AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................281AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................301AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................311AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................321AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................341AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................351AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................371AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................391AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................401AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................411AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................431AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................451AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................471AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................481AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................491AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................501AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................511AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................531AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................541AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................561AC Weapons Exports...............................................................................................................................................................................58

1AC Weapons Exports...............................................................................................................................................................................591AC Weapons Exports...............................................................................................................................................................................611AC Weapons Exports...............................................................................................................................................................................63Article 9 Ext Internal Link......................................................................................................................................................................65Article 9 Ext Internal Link......................................................................................................................................................................66Article 9 Impacts.....................................................................................................................................................................................67Article 9 Good Human Rights................................................................................................................................................................68Article 9 Good East Asia........................................................................................................................................................................69Article 9 Good Global Modelling...........................................................................................................................................................70

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Article 9 AT: Disads...............................................................................................................................................................................71Nuclearization Ext Internal Link............................................................................................................................................................72Regional Security Impact Ext East Asia..............................................................................................................................................73Regional Security Impact Ext East Asia..............................................................................................................................................75Regional Security Impact China .........................................................................................................................................................76Regional Security Impact China .........................................................................................................................................................78Regional Security Impact China .........................................................................................................................................................79Regional Security Impact China/India/Spacemil.................................................................................................................................80Regional Security AT: South Korea Alt Cause......................................................................................................................................81Regional Security Irrationality................................................................................................................................................................82Regional Security China Modernization Internal Link...........................................................................................................................83Regional Security China Miscalc Frame................................................................................................................................................85Regional Security AT: BMD Deters Japan.............................................................................................................................................86China ASAT Impact Miscalc...............................................................................................................................................................87China ASAT Impact Arms Race..........................................................................................................................................................89China ASAT Impact Russia War.........................................................................................................................................................90China ASAT Impact Russia War.........................................................................................................................................................92China ASAT Ext Internal Link...............................................................................................................................................................93China ASAT Ext Internal Link...............................................................................................................................................................94China ASAT AT: Modernization Now...................................................................................................................................................95

China NFU Ext Internal Link.................................................................................................................................................................97China NFU Ext Internal Link.................................................................................................................................................................99China NFU Impact Laundry List.......................................................................................................................................................100JET On the Brink..................................................................................................................................................................................102JET Impact Ext Soft Power................................................................................................................................................................103JET Impact Japan/China Relations ...................................................................................................................................................104Japan Science On the Brink..................................................................................................................................................................106Japan Science iPS Bank Key................................................................................................................................................................107Japan Science AT: Stem Cells Bad.......................................................................................................................................................108Europe BMD Ext Internal Link............................................................................................................................................................109Europe BMD Ext Internal Link............................................................................................................................................................110Europe BMD Ext Russia Relations.......................................................................................................................................................112Europe BMD Ext Russian Relations Iran..........................................................................................................................................113

Europe BMD Impact Accidental Launch..........................................................................................................................................114Europe BMD Impact INF Withdrawal..............................................................................................................................................116Europe BMD Impact Ext. INF...........................................................................................................................................................117INF Good China Deterrence.................................................................................................................................................................118INF Good Iskander...............................................................................................................................................................................119INF Good Terror...................................................................................................................................................................................120INF Good Ext NPT...............................................................................................................................................................................121NPT Good - General................................................................................................................................................................................122NPT Good - General................................................................................................................................................................................123NPT Good AT: Impact Turns..................................................................................................................................................................124INF Good AT: Withdraw Now.............................................................................................................................................................125Europe BMD Russian Econ Scenario...................................................................................................................................................126Weapons Exports Ext Internal Link......................................................................................................................................................128

Weapons Exports Ext Kills US Defense...............................................................................................................................................129T...............................................................................................................................................................................................................130T...............................................................................................................................................................................................................131AT: Relations disad..................................................................................................................................................................................132AT: Relations Disad.................................................................................................................................................................................133AT: Relations Disad.................................................................................................................................................................................135AT: North Korea Disad............................................................................................................................................................................137AT: Japan BMD Good General............................................................................................................................................................138AT: Japan BMD Good China...............................................................................................................................................................139US support key/Japan key........................................................................................................................................................................140

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US support key/Japan key........................................................................................................................................................................1422AC North Korea Addon.........................................................................................................................................................................143Ext North Korea Addon...........................................................................................................................................................................1452AC Relations Addon..............................................................................................................................................................................1462AC Russia China Addon........................................................................................................................................................................147Ev Comparison Dates Matter................................................................................................................................................................149Naval Overstretch Addon........................................................................................................................................................................150Relations Disad........................................................................................................................................................................................151AT: China Adv.........................................................................................................................................................................................152Six Party Talks Disad...............................................................................................................................................................................153AT: Russia...............................................................................................................................................................................................154General Defense/little O..........................................................................................................................................................................155Security Guarantee...................................................................................................................................................................................156JET stupid................................................................................................................................................................................................157AT: Japan Soft Power..............................................................................................................................................................................158Article 9 Revision Inev and Good...........................................................................................................................................................159Europe BMD Good Russia/Iran............................................................................................................................................................160Europe BMD Good Iran/North Korea/Modelling.................................................................................................................................161Prolif No Japan Modeling.....................................................................................................................................................................162Japan Rearm Disad..................................................................................................................................................................................163

T...............................................................................................................................................................................................................164Article 9 Revision key to Japanese DIB..................................................................................................................................................165AT: Science Spending..............................................................................................................................................................................168

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Plan Text

Plan: The United States federal government should end its joint missile defense development and

deployment programs with Japan.

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1AC InherencyJapan is the key US partner on BMD soon Block IIA missiles will be able to intercept ICBMs

Ko Young Dae, contributor to Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea, 5/9/10, U.S. Military Strategy on the Korean Peninsula and MissileDefense in Northeast Asia, http://www.spark946.org/bugsboard/index.php | Suo

The United States regards Japan as its most significant international BMD partner. Japans MD system is part of the US

MD system. Japans MD system is being constructed through technical and operative cooperation with the United States.Japan has deployed the US FBX(Forward-based X band) Radar, and has interfaced its 28 ground radar networks with U.S.spy satellites. The principal weapons systems of Japans MD are the Aegis BMD system and the PAC-3 system. In January2008, Japan operationally deployed SM-3 block IA, capable of intercepting long-range missiles. Currently Japan isdeveloping SM-3 block IIA, capable of intercepting ICBMs, and scheduled to debut in 2015. Reversing its previous policyof non-deployment of THAAD, Japan intends to introduce THAAD as a higher tier defense system than a PAC-3. Japanhas also deployed its self-developed FPS-XX (L Band) Radar. The FPS-XX Radar is known to have succeeded in detectingand tracking Russian long-range missiles launched from the Sea of Okhotsk.

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1AC NormalizationWell isolate two scenarios

First, BMD cooperation will cause an Article 9 revision to remove the collective self-defense ban

Masako Toki and Sarah Diehl, Fellows at the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July Aug 7, Japan Takes Steps to Integratewith U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I17/I17_EA3_JapanTakesSteps.htm | Suo

The move toward deployment of a BMD and greater cooperation and integration with the U.S. heighten the need to answerthe question of whether Japans Constitution can be interpreted to allow collective self-defense. Article 9 of JapansConstitutionprovides the basis for the countrys exclusively defensive posture, and, as currently interpreted, bars collectiveself-defense. According to the 2006 annual Japanese defense White Paper: the exclusive defense oriented policy meansthat defensive force may not be employed unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country inwhich case, it must be limited to the minimum level necessary to defend itself, and furthermore that the extent of thedefense forces retained and the use of these forces should be kept to the minimum level necessary for self-defense. Thisexclusively defense oriented policy thus refers to a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of theConstitution. [17] Adopted in 1981, in a statement by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to the Japanese House ofRepresentatives (the lower house of the Japanese parliament, or Diet) and supported unanimously by successive Cabinets,this policy allows Japan to exercise only the right of individual self-defense. [18] The ruling was applied specifically to barthe use of ballistic missile defenses to protect a third country in a statement of Japans Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yasuo

Fukuda, in 2003, at the time the Japanese government first decided to deploy a BMD system. [19] Since taking office inSeptember 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has worked to revise the interpretation of Article 9 to facilitate closerintegration of the U.S. and Japanese BMD systems; eventually he is expected to amend the article. Some security analystsin Japan suspect that Abes eagerness to review the interpretation of collective self-defense was triggered by his firmdecision to enhance U.S.-Japan security cooperation through closer integration of the Japanese and U.S. missile defensesystems. [20]

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1AC NormalizationArticle 9 is the linchpin of world peace any attempt at revision, specifically of the collective self-defense

clause, directly causes global war

The Global Article 9 Campaign, project of the United Nations Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Japan-based internationalNGO Peace Boat, Japan Lawyers' International Solidarity Association and others, Copyright 2008, Article 9 as a Mechanism of Peace,

http://www.article-9.org/en/what/details2.html | Suo

Following the end of the war, Japan acquired its Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Article 9 does not allow the maintenance ofany war potential, and thus prohibits Japan to have any military forces. However, the SDF continue to expand, and Japansmilitary expenditure is now one of the highest in the world. Some criticize that the principle of Article 9 is, in effect, notkept. Yet on the other hand, it is also true that Article 9 has acted as a restraint on the further militarization of Japan. Article9 has also not allowed the SDF waging war outside of Japan. Even during the War in Iraq, despite its dispatch of its SDF toIraq under US demands, Japan was unable to exercise any military force. Furthermore, many of Japans policies andpacifist principles are based on Article 9. The Three Principles on Arms Export, for example, generally prohibiting theexport of arms and weapons, is a progressive principle that does not see any other precedent in the world. The principle ofExclusively Defensive Defense and the interpretation not allowing Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense havealso been maintained. Japan, with its experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has also the Non-Nuclear Three Principles,which prohibits the possession, production and introduction into its territory of nuclear weapons. These various principleshave played an important role in the establishment of trust relationships between Japan and the people of Asia and thePacific, and the international society. In other words, Japans Article 9 is not simply a provision of the Japanese law, but isacting as an international peace mechanism by restraining war and an arms race. As its principle, the UN Charter calls for apeaceful resolution to conflicts; and Article 26 stipulates the minimization of the worlds resources to be used for militarypurposes. Japans Article 9 further strengthens this principle of the UN. Any revision or abandonment of Article 9 isconnected to the loss of the above principles, and along with raising serious concerns for the security of the Asia Pacificregion, and especially Northeast Asia, entails a grave impact on peace and security of the world. "Article 9 of the JapaneseConstitution has been the foundation for collective security for the entire Asia Pacific region." (From the Global ActionAgenda for the Global Partnership on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), submitted to the UN Secretary-Generalin July 2005) US intentions, policies, and strategies lie behind the current movement towards the revision of Article 9within Japan. The United States, parallel to continuing its war on terror, is implementing its global reorganization andreallocation of its military bases. Since the late 1990s, the responsibility of the US military forces in Japan has expanded tothe whole of Asia Pacific, and post 9.11, has brought the Middle East into range. Despite Article 9, Japans SDF providedsupport for the US military in its operations against Afghanistan in 2001. In 2003, the SDF were deployed to Iraq.

Cooperation in the development of weapons, such as the missile defense system, has also been underway between theUnited States and Japan. In this context, the Unites States has been pressuring Japan for a more complete militarycooperation and partnership. Japan is in a military alliance with the United States, but as a country with a provisionrenouncing war and the maintenance or use of military force, has maintained a principle prohibiting the exercising of itsright to collective self-defense. For those interested in furthering the military collaboration between the US and Japan, theywould like to see this principle gone. As a matter of fact, most of the revisionists of Article 9 argue for the elimination ofSection 2 of Article 9, and enabling Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense. The corporate sector, with itsinterest in pursuing joint developments with and weapons export to the United States, also supports the revision of Article9. Voices Supporting the Amendment of Article 9 in Japan and the United States Japans restrictions on its right tocollective self-defense are a constraint on its alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and moreefficient security cooperation. October 2000, Institute for National Strategic Studies report The US and Japan: AdvancingToward a Mature Partnership (Armitage Report) The inability to exercise our right to collective self-defense translatesinto denying supportive activity to our allies, and is acting as a hindrance. January 2005, Japan Federation of Economic

Organizations (Keidanren) For Japan to change Article 9 is equivalent to making a country which can wage war alongsidethe United States. With such developments, how will Japans neighboring countries react? It is not difficult to expect arevamping of their military, as Japan may be seen as a threat. If an arms race should be accelerated in East Asia, it wouldelicit a security dilemma, and in effect threatening the security of all countries in the region, including Japans own.Maintaining Article 9 and working towards demilitarization through building trust in the whole of the Asia Pacific region isthe most realistic and reliable step in ensuring peace and security. Looking Towards Peace Without Dependence on ForceThe circle of war and violence is an epidemic in todays world. This is precisely why Article 9 has an increasing value tothe world. There are continued efforts throughout the world to build peace without the exertion of force. The abolition ofnuclear weapons, the abolition of landmines, regulations on arms trade, the establishment of an International Criminal

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Court, peaceful means to conflict resolution and prevention, post-conflict peacebuilding; are only examples where citizensand NGOs are actively continuing their efforts. The United Nations has also been calling on decreasing militaryexpenditure, and reallocating limited resources to solving poverty, epidemics, disasters, and to protecting humans from warand violence. The Japanese Constitution also serves as a foundation for human security over national security, with itspreamble recognizes that all people in the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and war. Japans Article 9is a symbol for a peace without the exertion of force, a sustainable society, the realization of the UN MillenniumDevelopment Goals, and a support for efforts by peace aspiring citizens and NGOs of the world. Let us strive to realize aworld, a just and fair world without war or poverty, where all countries have a constitution renouncing war. If Japan shouldrenounce Article 9, the world will only take a step back in realizing this vision.

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1AC NormalizationNow is the key time Block IIA capabilities will spur revision soon

Masako Toki, project manager in the Nonproliferation Education Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 16 January2009, Missile defense in Japan, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-japan | Suo

The Japanese Constitution. Under the current Japanese government's interpretation of Article 9 of its Constitution, Japan'sparticipation in collective self-defense is prohibited, as is using missile defense capabilities to defend a third country--evenan ally such as the United States. Therefore, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a strong advocate of changing Article 9,formed the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security in April 2007 to provide recommendations on the rightof collective self-defense. "Whether it is appropriate for Japan to use its missile defense to intercept ballistic missilestargeting the United States" was one of four scenarios he tasked the council to answer. The council was supposed to submitrecommendations to the Cabinet by September 2007, but after the devastating defeat of Abe's ruling party in the upperhouse election in July 2007 and his abrupt resignation two months later, the council's members delayed making theirrecommendations. Abe's successor, Yasuo Fukuda, wasn't as enthusiastic about changing the constitutional interpretation.So even though the council submitted its recommendations stating that Japan should have the right to exercise collectiveself-defense last June, nothing has changed. Taro Aso, the country's third prime minister in two years, is more supportive ofthe right to collective self-defense, which might revitalize debate over the issue. Technologically, Japan currently doesn'thave the capability to shoot down a missile heading toward the United States even if it legally could. But the two countriesare currently developing SM-3 Block II A missiles that could potentially intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. (See

"Japan Test Fires Its First Raytheon-Built Standard Missile-3.") As technological capabilities improve to intercept long-range ballistic missiles, the argument that Japan isn't allowed by its constitutional interpretation to shoot down a missileheading toward the United States might be perceived as unacceptable.

Second, missile defense cooperation legitimates Japanese militarization

Daniel Twining, the Fulbright/Oxford scholar at Oxford University and a transatlantic fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States,Summer 2007, Americas Grand Design in Asia, http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02445.pdf | Suo

Washington legitimizes new Japanese military roles abroad by helping to make Japan a mutual stakeholder in and enforcerof the global balance in a time of rising new challenges. After strong U.S. lobbying, Japan became a founding member ofthe Proliferation Security Initiative, a global initiative with global reach, and hosted armed interdiction exercises withnavies from three continents. 8 Successive U.S. administrations have also successfully lobbied Japan to jointly develop a

theater missile defense (TMD) system with the United States. This cooperation has put political and technological pressureson Japan to abandon old norms of military restraint, as TMD development requires Japan to plan for a range of regional andinternational contingencies unrelated to the defense of Japanese territory. To meet its TMD and ever-expanding securityresponsibilities within the alliance, Japan possesses, is producing, or is acquiring from the United States weapons systemsthat give it significant offensive power-projection capabilities, undercutting its postwar pledge never to become a militarygreat power. Tokyo also may have to abandon the principle of limiting defense spending to 1 percent of its gross domesticproduct. 9 Japan has called its regional security role within the U.S.-Japanese alliance a public good for all the countriesof Asia. 10 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called strengthening public support for Japans responsibility to maintainstability and security across Asia the unfinished business of my generation.11 Within the context of Japanese domesticpolitics, Japans expanded regional, global, and theater defense missions legitimize the expansion of Japans militarycapabilities and responsibilities in ways that reduce the political costs of future militarization. 12

Specifically, armament will take the form of nuclearization

Jonathan Monten is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, and Mark Provost is a graduate ofthe Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and is a consultant with Booz, Allen, Hamilton. September 2005,Theater Missile Defense and Japanese Nuclear Weapons, Asian Security, Volume 1, Issue 3, pages 285 303 | Suo

The development of a joint US-Japan theater missile defense system could have significant ramifications beyond thedefense of Japan and of American forces in the region. A growing debate within Japan on its international security position,the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and questions about the role of the United States in the region conspire to createconditions for significant changes in Japan's conception of its security status and its long-term political-militarycalculations. By upgrading Japan's strategic responsibilities, theater missile defense could inadvertently induce a

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reassessment of many of its national security policies, perhaps even the decision to forego nuclear weapons.

That leads to nuclear war

Interfax, 06, Nuclear Japan Would Trigger Terrible Arms Race in Asia, http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/a-list/2006-November/063410.html |Suo

The emergence of nuclear weapons in Japan would trigger an arms race in Asia and neighboring regions , PolitikaFoundation President Vyacheslav Nikonov said. "The situation would take a very dangerous turn should Japan take thispath: the nonproliferation regime would be undermined and a terrible arms race would begin in Asia," Nikonov toldInterfax on Tuesday. Nikonov made these remarks while commenting on the Japanese government's statement that Japancould legally possess nuclear weapons "however minimal the arsenal might be." "If this happens, South Korea could claimnuclear status and China would no longer put up with the small nuclear arsenal it has. The chain reaction would thenentangle India, Pakistan and Iran," the Russian expert said. "This race could ultimately result in the use of such weapons,"he said.

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1AC Regional SecurityUS-Japan cooperation on missile defense triggers an East Asian arms race ICBM interception

capability is flashpoint

Christopher W. Hughes, Principal Research Fellow & Acting Co-Director at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at theUniversity of Warwick, December 2006, Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared, http://www.garnet-

eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/1106.pdf | Suo

Instead, the principal security dilemma that BMD is likely to exacerbate for Japan is that vis--vis China. Chinese policy-makers are concerned that Japans development of a BMD system developed in conjunction with the US could lead to thenegation of its nuclear deterrent by providing Japan with both a spear and shield. The spear of the US extended nucleardeterrent would be complemented by a BMD shield, allowing Japan deterrence by both punishment and denial vis--visChina. Chinese fears might in part be justified as the Aegis BMD system may have some residual or break out capabilitiesto defend against its inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), and certainly the US regards the Aegis/SMD componentof its missile defence as part of a defensive shield against ICBMs.25 China in all likelihood though could overcome thenegation of its strategic nuclear arsenal through the employment of countermeasures and development of multipleindependently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) to overwhelm any BMD system. Chinas concerns extend also to theJapans possible countering of its tactical ballistic missiles and involvement in the Taiwan issue. Chinas worst casescenario would be Japans deployment either individually or in conjunction with the US of its sea-mobile NTWD system todefend Taiwan in a future crisis situation. In particular, China would fear the formation of a quasi-alliance amongst the US,Japan and Taiwan. For if the US were to sell AWS and BMD technology to Taiwan, this could result in all three powersbeing equipped with fully interoperable equipment, so smoothing the way for three-way military cooperation. Japansreluctance to become embroiled directly in a Taiwan Straits crisis makes this an unlikely scenario except in circumstancesof a full scale conflict. Far more likely is that Japan would utilise its BMD system to defend US forces operating in aTaiwan Straits crisis from bases in Japan; an action that would complicate any attempts by China to intimidate US forces inthe region short of initiating a war also against Japan. China can ultimately overcome any BMD system through increasingproduction of its missiles; a process that is relatively cheap and likely to saturate and overcome any defence. Therefore,Japans interest in BMD, although not initiating the process, carries the risk of accelerating Chinas upgrading of its nuclearand conventional ballistic missile capabilities and generating further momentum for a regional arms race.

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1AC Regional SecurityMaterial effects are irrelevant BMD creates the perception a broader shift in US-Japan security policy

toward a more hostile stance

Jing-dong Yuan, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 2006, BEIJING CLOSELY WATCHING RECENT U.S.-JAPANMISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENTS, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I9/I9_EA3_PRCJapan.htm | Suo

For the time being, Beijing is less concerned with the effectiveness ofthese emerging missile defense capabilities than with whatthese developments indicate about the future direction of Japans security policy and U.S. strategic intentions. ChinesePeoples Liberation Army analysts, for example, are taking pains to underscore the advantage, or edge, that offensiveballistic missiles meaning Chinese missiles will hold over missile defenses, even as they seek to gauge the long-termimplications of U.S.-Japan missile defense programs and recent deployments. [8] At the same time, Beijing is following thediscussion, however speculative,by certain individuals in the Japanese political elite that Japan should consider acquiring anindependent nuclear deterrent as a complement to its growing sophistication in the realm of missile defense. Indeed, Chineseanalysts point out that Japan has the necessary nuclear technologies, large quantities of plutonium potentially usable in nuclearweapons, and computer simulation techniques to design such weapons, which together would allow Japan to manufacturethem at short notice. For many Chinese observers, this is only a matter of time. Recent comments by former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro

Nakasone that Japan needs to consider the nuclear option further reinforce Chinese beliefs. [9]Chinese analysts point out Japan has undergonemajor changes in its attitude toward missile defense, from a hesitant and lukewarm initial reception of the concept, to activeparticipation and enthusiastic support. [10] They suggest that Japans failure to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security

Council in 2005 reinforced both the need for continued support from the United States and Tokyos view that missiledefense is a valuable means of reinforcing alliance cohesion. At the same time, Chinese analysts argue, Japan appreciatesthat missile defenses can protect it not only from North Korean missiles, but also Russian and Chinese systems. [11] Indeed,Chinese analysts argue that Japans core interest in speeding up missile defense deployment is directed toward China,despite Japans claims that its objective is to defend itself against North Korea. Chinese commentators argue that Japan plans to deploydefenses on Okinawa, noting that this would make them particularly useful in protecting Japanese Self-Defense Forces in their operations in the East

China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island area, with China obviously in mind. [12] (In fact, the defensive systems will bedeployed by the United States on U.S. bases on Okinawa, rather than by Japan, although they still could be employed toprotect Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the theaters noted by the Chinese commentators.) Japans interest in accelerated missiledefense deployments, its growing integration into related U.S. military operations, and its active participation with theUnited States in joint research and development activities raise serious questions, Chinese analysts say, about Tokyos intentions.They see these actions as reinforcing Japanese reconsideration ofthe long-standing restrictive interpretation ofArticle 9 of the JapaneseConstitution, which limits its right to collective self-defense, and as leading Tokyo to reexamine its ban on arms transfers to states that

could become involved in regional conflicts, in particular missile-defense related technology transfers to the United States (which could potentiallybecome involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait). Most troubling for Chinese analysts, it appears, is the possibility that Tokyosmissile defense activities could set the stage for Japanese involvement in a future conflict over Taiwan, with Japans sea-based missile defense systems deployed to support Taiwans defenses, as a counter to Chinese short-range missiles. [13]

Asia destabilization causes nuclear annihilation

Toshimura Ogura, Economics Professor at Toyama University, MONTHLY REVIEW, April 1997,http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m..._19693242/pg_8

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce orpossess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armamentcreates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in thisregion and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a globalconflagration.

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1AC Regional SecurityAnd, Asia is the most likely scenario for nuclear war stepped up US presence is needed

Jonathan Landay, Knight-Ridder National Security and Intelligence senior correspondent, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, 2k, "Topadministration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts," Lexis

The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South Korea and ends on the glacier where

Indian and Pakistani troops skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious title of most dangerous part of the world.Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. Buteven a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war.India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds oforganizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold WarEurope. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeastAsian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interestoverlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements forpotential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen andNational Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes couldhardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and theUnited States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea.While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global

taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition,globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to theU.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion lastyear, according to the Commerce Department.

Japan sea-based BMD is uniquely destabilizing US ground NMD cant defend Taiwan

Brad Roberts, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses with expertise on the proliferation and control of weapons ofmass destruction. Adjunct professor at George Washington University Member of DoDs Threat Reduction Advisory Committee and chairs itspanel on implementation of the National Strategy to Combat WMD Advisor to the STRATCOM Senior Advisory Group Member of the board of

directors of the United States Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, September 2003, China and Ballistic MissileDefense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf | Suo

There is another possibility for Chinas arms control strategy: that it will become directly concerned with establishing redlines in the U.S. BMD deployment strategies. Chinese experts and policymakers have sometimes suggested that if BMD isinevitable, then the United States should go about it in a way that minimizes its destabilizing implications. For example, thedeployment by Japan of sea-based systems is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-basedsystems, as this suggests the possibility that those systems would be deployed to protect Taiwan in time of crisis or war. Asanother example, the deployment by the United States of space-based boost-phase interceptors is seen in China as moredestabilizing than the deployment of ground-based interceptors in the continental United States, as the latter can moreeasily be overwhelmed by Chinese responses. More generally, Chinese experts are keenly aware of the assurances providedMoscow on the limited nature of the defenses that the U.S. will seek to deploy over the period of the Treaty of Moscow(i.e., to 2012) and wonder what assurances Washington is prepared to offer Beijing on a similar score.

And, Taiwan defense is the crucial concern for China

Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense of the US Head of the DOD, 2009, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military Power of the Peoples

Republic of China 2009 Office, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf | Suo

Despite a reduction in tensions following the March 2008 election and May 2008 inauguration of Taiwan President MaYing-jeou, a potential military confrontation with Taiwan and the prospect of U.S. military intervention remain the PLAsmost immediate military concerns. Chinas current strategy toward Taiwan appears to be one of preventing any moves byTaipei toward de jure independence, rather than seeking near-term resolution. A perceived shift in military capabilities orpolitical will on either side, or a change in the internal political landscape on Mainland China or Taiwan, could causeBeijing to calculate its interests, and its preferred course of action differently.

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1AC Regional SecurityBMD cooperation with other East Asian countries is irrelevant, only Japan has the will and capability to

integrate with the larger US NMD system

Wendell Minnick, staff writer for Defense News, 17 November 2008, China Adopts Russian Anti-BMD Rhetoric,http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3823111 | Suo

At a regular press conference the following day, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang said China "alwaysbelieves that setting up a global missile defense system, including deploying such a system in some regions of the world orconducting cooperation in this field, is detrimental to global strategic balance and stability, undermines mutual trust amongcountries and affects regional stability." "The recent development of the situation makes it evident that relevant countriesshould take other countries' concerns seriously," Qin said. The statement suggests China means to "drive a wedge" betweenthe United States and its Asian allies, said Yoichiro Sato of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu. ButSato noted that compared with Russia, China's opposition to regional missile defense has been moderate. "Even there,China refrains from using an overt threat," he said. "Thus, China's broader diplomatic course of maintaining the currentlyfavorable relationship with the United States is toning down its criticism of missile defense." The same day that Lavrovspoke in Tokyo, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced plans to deploy short-range Iskander missiles in the Balticexclave of Kaliningrad near Poland in response to U.S. efforts to expand ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems inEurope. Said Lavrov, "A number of countries of the [Asian-Pacific] region view these plans as nothing but a threat to theirnational security, let alone global strategic stability being jeopardized - for it is an open secret that the anti-missile system in

the APR [Asia Pacific Region] is a part of the global missile defenses being set up by our American colleagues." Lavrovdid not single out China as a country that shared its view. "China often enough these days supports Russian criticism ofU.S. policy," said Peter Woolley, author of "Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox." "It saves the leadership the onus ofpointing directly at U.S. support for Taiwan or calling attention to its own insouciance over North Korea," he said. "But aregional [anti-missile] system including Japan and Korea is hard to envision given recurring, agitated differences of opinionbetween the two." Woolley said recent Chinese complaints about regional BMD upgrades remind him of the Cold War."Some things change so slowly or not at all. Hearing the arguments about ballistic missile defense and new deployments ofballistic missiles is time travel back to the '70s and '80s. Realpolitik was in. And deterrence theory was an academicallyrespectable field," he said. "The recent Chinese statement that missile defense is potentially destabilizing and may simplyprovoke arms deployments are a point of view that goes back to the Nixon-Kissinger White House years," Woolley said."Of course, Nixon and Kissinger came to that conclusion based on the assumption that leadership of the Soviet Union wasstable and rational." Japan and Taiwan have been moving quickly to expand BMD capabilities, while South Korea has beenslower to react. In response to North Korean efforts to develop more ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, Japan and the

United States have fielded new Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense systems, Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missile defense systems on ships, and new early warning radar systems in and around Japan. "Japan and its ally see anopponent, in North Korea that is potentially either unstable or irrational or both," Woolley said. "Consequently, missiledefense has strong support in Japan." The U.S. Missile Defense Agency will conduct a missile interception exercise withthe Japanese Navy off Hawaii later this month or in early December. A Kongo-class destroyer, the DDG-176 Chokai, willintercept one missile fired from the Pacific Range Missile Facility, Kauai. Combined Japan-U.S. BMD tests have raiseddebates in Japan over the concept of "collective defense," where Japan and U.S. military forces create an overall BMD thatprotects both forces. However, the concept faces Japanese constitutional restrictions. "Related legal questions about'collective defense,' especially on the use of SM-3 and data exchanges, were considered by the [former Prime MinisterShinzo] Abe Cabinet, but later shelved by the [Yasuo] Fukuda Cabinet," Sato said. "The answers to the 'collective defense'questions will have implications on the scope of integration between the Japanese assets and U.S. missile defense system."South Korea It appears unlikely that South Korea would participate in a regional missile defense system, Sato said."Korea's participation beyond ground deployment of PAC-3s for its own defense will likely face two main obstacles: cost

and politics," he said. "The Korean Navy lacks platforms to install SM-3s, and building such a Navy would be a majorundertaking and possibly complicate the regional power balance by alerting Japan. "Domestically, Korea's preference to bea 'balancer' in Northeast Asia and a degree of anti-Americanism would keep Korea from getting deeply involved in missiledefense." Taiwan But if South Korea's participation looks unlikely, it seems impossible for Taiwan. Though Washingtonsupports Taipei with arms and training, neither it nor Tokyo nor Seoul recognize Taiwan as a nation-state. U.S. officialsrecently announced a Taiwanese purchase of PAC-3 missile defense systems and upgrades for the self-governing island'sPAC-2 Plus systems. The United States also is helping Taiwan build a phased array radar system for early warning. Chinahas about 1,300 Dong Feng 11/15 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. Taiwan has no ballistic missiles aimed atChina, but is preparing to produce the 600-kilometer Hsiung Feng 2E cruise missile.

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1AC China ASATChina perceives BMD cooperation as attempted space domination theyll respond by modernizing their

space weapons arsenal.

Eric Hagt, director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response," 2007, in China Security, Winterpp. 31-51 | VP

Chinas testing of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon on Jan. 11, 2007, was an unambiguous challenge not to U.S. power in space but toits dominance in space. With little explanation emanating from officialdom in China, their principal motivation has not been made clear. A number ofalternative intentions have also been offered up, for example, it was a clumsy maneuver to force the United States to the negotiating table for aspace arms control treaty. Or, with a turbulent year expected in the run up to Taiwan elections, it was a grave reminder of Beijings resolve todefend the nations sovereignty at all cost. Or, that it was a raw show of force, a flexing of its growing military muscle. It is possible that all thesemotivations played a part in Chinas decision to test an ASAT. But behind the test was a simpler message and arguably one more benign tointernational space security than this spectacular test and the orbital debris cloud it created would suggest. In fact, the test is consistent with bothChinas notion of active defense and its deterrence doctrine, and should not have been a surprise in light of the growing threats that Chinaperceives in space.While the fundamental aim of the test may have been relatively straightforward the process and conflict within Chinas political and military systemassociated with deciding to conduct the test are far less clear. That process has been marked by 1) diverging domestic influence over Chinas spaceprogram and its direction and 2) the differing responses by constituencies within China to the nations perceived security threats in space.Understanding the domestic actors and their objectives does not alter the danger this test poses to the security of space. It can, however, illuminate

the critical defects in the present strategic architecture in space and may point a way forward to avoid an arms race in space.ASAT Test as a ResponseIn the past decade, China has derived a number of key conclusions from its observations of U.S. military activities in space that havefundamentally shaped Chinas own strategic posture. The first is the profound implications of space for information and high-tech wars. Chinawitnessed with awe and alarm the power of the U.S. military using satellite communication, reconnaissance, geo-positioning andintegration capabilities for an impressive show of force beginning first with the Gulf war in 1991 to the recent campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq.1The U.S. militarys almost complete dependence on space assets has also not escaped the close examination of Chinese analysts.2Coupled with a number of key U.S. policy and military documents that call for control in space and the development of space weapons as well as theU.S. refusal to enter into any restrictive space arms control treaty, China has concluded that America is determined to dominate and controlspace.3 This perceived U.S. intent leads Beijing to assume the inevitable weaponization of space.4 Even more worrisome for China is thedirect impact of these developments on Chinas core national interests.The accelerated development of the U.S. ballistic missilesystem, especially as it is being developed in close cooperation with Japan, has been cited as threatening Chinas homeland and nucleardeterrent.5 The Shriever space war games conducted by the U.S. Air Force in 2001, 2003 and 20056 strongly reinforced the conclusion that U.S.

space control sets China as a target.7 Most central to Chinas concerns, however, is the direct affect U.S. space dominance will have onChinas ability to prevail in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits.8As U.S. military space developments have evolved, Chinas observations and subsequent conclusions have engendered a fundamentalresponse: we cannot accept this state of affairs. For reasons of defense of national sovereignty as well as Chinas broader interests in space civilian, commercial and military Americas pursuit of space control and dominance and its pursuit to develop ASATs and space weapons pose anintolerable risk to Chinas national security.9 Chinas own ASAT test embodied this message. Attempting to redress what China perceives as acritically imbalanced strategic environment that increasingly endangers its interests, China demonstrated a deterrent to defend against that threat. Itswillingness to risk international opprobrium through such a test conveys Chinas grim resolve to send that message.

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1AC Regional SecurityBlock IIA capabilities allow increased potential anti-satellite functionality even if we dont use it, China

will be forced to respond.

Brian Weeden, technical advisor for the Secure World Foundation, former US Air Force officer with a background in space surveillance and ICBMoperations, "The space security implications of missile defense," September 28, 2009, the Space Review,

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1474/1 | VP

The same dual-use argument can be made for several technologies being used for BMD. The same kinetic-kill interceptors that can destroy amissile in-flight could also be capable of destroying a satellite in low Earth orbit (and in doing so, effectively become anti-satelliteweapons, or ASATs). This was unequivocally demonstrated by the previously mentioned Operation Burnt Frost, which only requiredminor modifications, reportedly just software, to an existing Aegis SM-3 interceptor to destroy a satellite (USA-193), albeit one that was inthe initial stages of atmospheric re-entry.There are limits on the utility of BMD systems as ASATs: the maximum speed of the interceptor limits the maximum altitude at which it can attacksatellites. In the case of the SM-3 Block 1A, its maximum velocity is reportedly around 3 km/s. This gives it a maximum ballistic flight range of about1000 kilometers and a maximum theoretical ASAT altitude of about 500 kilometers, about twice the altitude of 240 kilometers at which it destroyedUSA-193.However, the newer Block 1B and 2A of the SM-3 will have a much greater burnout velocity and thus increased ASAT engagement altitude,reportedly around 4.5 km/s for Block 2A. This would allow it to reach satellites throughout low Earth orbit , up to a theoretical altitude ofaround 2000 kilometers. From this it is clear that as BMD interceptors increase their maximum velocity to be able to intercept ICBMs,they also increase in potential ASAT capability.Capability-based analysisThe core of the space security concerns with regard to BMD, and in particular Aegis, is summed up in this question posed to General JamesCartwright during the pre-mission press brief for Operation Burnt Frost:

QUESTION: General, if this shot is successful, would it be fair for the international community to regard the standard missile now as an anti-satellite-capable weapon? And have you dealt with that issue in the international community already?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: A fair question and a good question. One, this is a modification to the SM-3. In other words, this modification can'tcoexist with the current configuration. So it's a one-time deal. Does it have the kinetic capability? That's why we picked it. But you'd have to go inand do modifications to ships, to missiles, to sensors and they would be significant. This is an extreme measure for this problem. It would not betransferable to a fleet configuration, so to speak.As an ex-military officer who worked under General Cartwright (admittedly, several levels below) I believe he is sincere in his beliefthat this was a one-time deal. However, if I was another sovereign state and potential adversary of the United States, I do not think Iwould have that same luxury.

Many military planners would argue that the appropriate way to establish threats is to base it off what potential adversaries are capableof doing, and not on what they are likely to do. And in this case, I think it is logical to argue that potential US adversaries with spacecapabilities, such as Russia and China, would have to assume that the US could reconstitute the sea-based ASAT capability should itwant to.More critically, there is no way for any outside entity to independently verify that the US has or has not modified any of theoperational SM-3 interceptors for ASAT capability, since there are no external tell-tales or inspections. Lacking such verification, itwould be imprudent for these potential adversaries to assume such capability does not exist, and therefore it is logical that they woulddevelop measures to counter such a capability.Interestingly, this same argument could be applied to Chinas SC-19 ballistic missile. Based on a modified version of the CSS-5 MRBM, the SC-19

was used as the booster for the anti-satellite kill vehicle that destroyed a Chinese weather satellite in 2007. Some reports (which have not been fullysubstantiated) have claimed that the SC-19 is actually part of a Chinese ABM system. Even if untrue, it is clear that the Chinese direct-ascentASAT program and the US ground- and sea-based missile defense programs are two halves of the same capability, separated only byperspective and policy.

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1AC Regional SecuritySpecifically, theyll begin asymmetric weapons buildup, including their own anti-satellite weapons.American Academy of Arts and Sciences, independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex andemerging problems, Chinas Nuclear Arms Posture Examined in New Book from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, May 16, 2007,http://www.amacad.org/news/nuclear_china.aspx

Yet United States military policy to develop and deploy space-based missile defense systems threatens Chinas confidence in its abilityto deter a nuclear attack, argues arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis in a new book from the AmericanAcademy of Arts and Sciences. The Minimum Means of Reprisal: Chinas Search for Security in the Nuclear Age documents the history,development and principles behind Chinas nuclear policy, and discusses Chinas concerns about U.S. defense policy. Although internal factorscontinue to drive Chinas decisions about its nuclear forces, Lewis suggests that the United States is passing up an opportunity toreassure Chinese leaders in favor of preparations for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons that Chinese leaders will find increasinglydifficult to ignore.Lewis reasons that while a major buildup of strategic forces in China is possible, China is more likely to acquire asymmetric means ofhampering U.S. preemptive capabilities. These means may include countermeasures to defeat U.S. missile defenses, such as anti-satellite weapons, which China successfully tested earlier this year. Lewis argues that Chinas longstanding policy of maintaining the minimumnuclear force necessary to deter attack is fundamentally in the interest of the United States, and that U.S. policymakers should, among othermeasures, commit to a bilateral no-first-use pledge rather than to space-based weapons and defense systems that undermine Chinas security.

Chinese ASAT use eviscerates satellites key to the global economy.Ian Easton, research affiliate at the Project 2049 Institute, MA in China Studies at National Chengchi U in Taipei, BA Int'l Studies at U of IllinoisUrbana-Champaign, former translator for the Foundation on Asia Pacific Peace Studies, The Great Game in Space," June 24, 2009, Project 2049Institute, Scribd

Many specialists also argue that aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space, the U.S. economy, and in turn, much of theworld economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a space faringnation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium.War games conducted as part of U.S. national security protocols, such as the Army-After-Next, Navy Global and Air Force GlobalEngagement series, Space Game 2 and Schriever 1 & 2, as well as the privately conducted DEADSATS war games, conducted from the late1990s and the early 2000s, confirm this view. According to some space experts who were intimately involved with the war games, theexercises exposed a critical national Achilles heel that politicians, economists and corporate CEOs have largely ignoredlosses in

space can quickly affect the economic, social, and national security fabric not only of the United States, but of the entire world. Theseexperts further speculate that large military powers, such as the United States, could be held hostage by the unknowns inherent in anew kind of war.36 These concerns are directly linked with Chinas ASAT weapons and their potential applicability in any futureU.S.-Sino conflict. A more recent war game, Pacific Vision, conducted by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) underscored the vulnerability of theunprotected commercial communication satellite channels on which the Air Force relies, as well as its cyber and radar vulnerabilities to Chineseattack.37

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1AC Regional SecurityASAT testing alone puts crucial satellites at risk collisions create destructive debris fields.

Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, formerly worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, MA - School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins U, Prof. Politics

at U of Virginia, and Sam Black, Research Assoc. with Stimson Center's Space Security and South Asia programs, formerly worked as aResearch Assistant at the Center for Defense Information, where he focused on Space Security and Missile Defense issues, BA Gov't and MA Public

Policy at U of Maryland, "Space Security or Anti-satellite Weapons?" May, 2009, Space Security Project - Stimson,http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/Stimson_Space_Booklet_2009.pdf | VP

Crude ASAT weapons are far less expensive to build than sophisticated and vulnerable satellites that usually travel in predictablepaths and that are hard to hide. Consequently, major space-faring nations that rely on satellites also have the means to target them. Improved armor can help protect US troops operating in harms way, but heavily-armored satellites are impractical, and armor still cannot protectagainst high-speed collisions in space.Space Debris KillsSpace debris is deadly. Space debris travels at ten times the speed of a rifle bullet in low earth orbit, where a piece of debris the size ofa marble could strike a satellite with approximately the same energy as a one-ton safe dropped from a five-story building. The worstdebris fields in space can be caused by ASAT tests that pulverize satellites. The Reagan administration carried out a destructive ASAT test in1985 that generated 300 pieces of trackable debris, one of which came within one mile of the newly launched International Space Station 14years later. It took 19 years for the debris from the 1985 ASAT test to burn out of the earths atmosphere.China created the worst-ever man-made debris field in space by testing an ASAT in 2007. This test generated approximately 40,000pieces of lethal debris, and an estimated two million debris fragments overall. Because the Chinese ASAT test was conducted at sucha high altitude, its lethal, mutating debris field is likely to remain in low earth orbit for over a century. Even small pieces of debris can be

worrisome because they cant be tracked but can still penetrate the thin outer skin that protects satellites. The windows on the US Space Shuttlehave needed to be changed more than 70 times because of tiny debris hits. The United States now tracks more than 18,000 pieces of spacedebris.Debris MitigationSpace debris doesnt recognize US preeminence in space. Because the United States carries out the most space flights and operates asmany satellites as the rest of the world combined, it is most likely to be victimized by space debris . Major space-faring nations havebelatedly recognized that debris threatens this global commons. A consortium of space-faring nations began discussing voluntary guidelines fordebris mitigation in 1992. Voluntary guidelines for debris mitigation were finally endorsed by the United Nations in December 2007.Additional ASAT tests that create debris fields would make a mockery of these guidelines.

That disrupts global financial markets and investment.


at U of Virginia, and Sam Black, Research Assoc. with Stimson Center's Space Security and South Asia programs, formerly worked as aResearch Assistant at the Center for Defense Information, where he focused on Space Security and Missile Defense issues, BA Gov't and MA Public

Policy at U of Maryland, "Space Security or Anti-satellite Weapons?" May, 2009, Space Security Project - Stimson,http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/Stimson_Space_Booklet_2009.pdf | VP

The US economy and international commerce rely on satellites that enable financial markets and investors to make transactionsquickly and securely. Credit card users at gas pumps sometimes use satellites. War in space could disrupt financial markets and createhavoc in stock exchanges. Businesses such as delivery services that use satellite communication and tracking devices could be badlydisrupted. The use of weapons in space could place these and other services, the revenues they generate, stock markets, and thousands of

jobs at risk. Investments in Space From 1959 to 2007, US taxpayers invested over one and a half trillion dollars in space. These sunk costscould be nullified if the use of weapons in space trashes the orbits used by essential satellites .

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1AC Regional SecurityAnd, it ends global commerce and trade transactions.


at U of Virginia, "Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option," November, 2004, Arms Control Today,http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon

Space warfare would have far-reaching adverse effects for global commerce, especially commercial transactions andtelecommunication services that use satellites. Worldwide space industry revenues now total almost $110 billion a year, $40 billion of

which go to U.S. companies.[4] These numbers do not begin to illuminate how much disruption would occur in the event of spacewarfare. For a glimpse of what could transpire, the failure of a Galaxy IV satellite in May 1998 is instructive. Eighty-nine percent of all U.S.pagers used by 45 million customers became inoperative, and direct broadcast transmissions, financial transactions, and gas stationpumps were also affected.[5]

Protectionism's resurging globally new barriers to trade threaten reversal of economic recovery.

Greg Lindsay, exectuive director of the Centre for Independent Studies, and Roger Bate, Legatum Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,"Protect us from protectionism: keep the doors open," November 8, 2009, National Times, http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/protect-us-from-protectionism-keep-the-doors-open-20091107-i2ui.html

The economy could easily move backwards, though, thanks to the global resurgence of protectionist trade policies. As world leadersdeal with the recession, many have been tempted to erect trade barriers in misguided attempts to save domestic jobs.In September, for example, US President Barack Obama imposed a 35 per cent tariff on car tyres imported from China. A month later,China responded with a tariffof up to 36 per cent on some imported nylon products. And China's Commerce Ministry recently predictedthat major economies would ''introduce various trade restrictions and protectionist measures'' in 2010.Meanwhile, the European Commission is considering a proposal to extend the tariff on shoes from China and Vietnam.

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1AC Regional SecurityRenewed protectionism and economic nationalism triggers global economic collapse and increased great

power tensions.

Stewart Patrick, senior fellow and director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations,"Protecting Free Trade," March 13, 2009 National Interest online, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21084

President Obama and his foreign counterparts should reflect on the lessons of the 1930sand the insights of Cordell Hull. The longest-servingsecretary of state in American history (19331944), Hull helped guide the United States through the Depression and World War II. He alsounderstood a fundamental truth: When goods move, soldiers dont.In the 1930s, global recession had catastrophic political consequencesin partbecause policymakers took exactly the wrong approach.Starting with Americas own Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930, the worlds major trading nations tried to insulate themselves by adopting inwardlooking protectionist and discriminatory policies. The result was a vicious, self-defeating cycle of tit-for-tat retaliation. As states tookrefuge in prohibitive tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies and competitive devaluations, international commerce devolved into adesperate competition for dwindling markets. Between 1929 and 1933, the value of world trade plummeted from $50 billion to $15billion. Global economic activity went into a death spiral, exacerbating the depth and length of the Great Depression.The economic consequences of protectionism were bad enough. The political consequences were worse. As Hull recognized, global economicfragmentation lowered standards of living, drove unemployment higher and increased povertyaccentuating social upheaval and leaving destitutepopulations easy prey to dictators and desperadoes. The rise of Nazism in Germany, fascism in Italy and militarism in Japan isimpossible to divorce from the economic turmoil, which allowed demagogic leaders to mobilize support among alienated massesnursing nationalist grievances.Open economic warfare poisoned the diplomatic climate and exacerbated great power rivalries, raising, in Hulls view, constanttemptation to use force, or threat of force, to obtain what could have been got through normal processes of trade. Assistant SecretaryWilliam Clayton agreed: Nations which act as en

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