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가격인상으로 인한 후생감소분 : (Overcharge) 물량감소로 인한 후생감소분 : (Volume Effect)

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ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Proving Antitrust Damages : Legal and

Economic Issues(2nd Ed), 2010

― , Providing Antitrust Damages ; Legal and Economic Issues,

American Bar Association, 2012

Alfter, M & Young, J, "Economic Analysis of Cartels - Theory and

Practice", E.C.L.R, Issue 10, 2005, p.546

- 118 -

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law in perspective : cases, concepts, and problems in competition

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― , "White Pater and Damages actions for breach of the EC

antitrust rules", 2008

,― "Best Practices for the Submission of Economic Evidence and

Data Collection in Cases concerning the Application of Articles 101

and 102 and in Merger Cases", 2010

― , "Draft Guidance Paper : Quantifying Harm in Actions for

Damages based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on

the Functioning of the European Union", 2011

― , IP/05/1634, Brussels, 20th December 2005, Competition : Commission

launches consultations on facilitation damages claims for breaches of EU

competition law

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Ed), Aspen Publishers, 2000

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Abstract

EU Guideline and Case Study on Quantifying Damages of anti-competitive practices

MOON, Jongsuk

Department of Economics

The Graduate School

Seoul National University

The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter,

"Fair Trade Act") amended in 2005, allowed the court to assess

damages in antitrust cases or the damage approval system. Fair

Transactions in Subcontracting Act (hereinafter, "Subcontract Act"),

amended in 2011, introduced treble damage action which imposes a

penalty amount of up to three times of the damages on those whose

illegal trading practices damaged others.

These made it possible that the party injured by an anti-competitive

behavior would get compensation by bringing a civil suit itself, while

in the past, enforcement of the Fair Trading Act and Subcontract Act

in Korea was focused mainly on giving administrative sanctions such

as desist orders and fines. Such a damage compensation scheme is

expected to show great deterrence against anti-competitive behavior.

Not only in the US where damage litigation activities are

vigorous, but also in the EU, damage suits have been encouraged for

its positive effect of preventing anti-competitive conducts. The Korean

government has introduced several measures to stimulate damage

lawsuits as well. However, despite these efforts, Korea still cannot be

viewed as a country with dynamic damage suits. My personal view

on the issue is that such sluggish movement in damage suits is

because of the difficulties in estimating a proper amount of damages.

That is, in the absence of any direct evidence on a specific amount

- 123 -

of damages caused by anti-competitive behaviors such as cartel, there

is no other way but to use assumptions about what has yet to happen

and rely on econometric analytical techniques to anticipate about a

simulated reality and guess damage amounts. This process inevitably

involves errors and complicated econometric analytical methods and

they require a considerable amount of knowledge on economics and

statistics. I gather these all undermine the efforts to stimulate damage

suits.

In this regard, it is significant to introduce 2011 EU guidelines

on the estimation of damages in anti-competitive practices and to

review and evaluate, based on the guidelines, 7 most typical examples

where econometric approaches were taken to address damage claims

against competition-restricting behaviors. Although it is the United

States that sees most active antitrust enforcement and damages

litigations along with many published theses and reports on damages

assessment, it was the EU Commission that first issued such

guidelines in the public sector. Recognizing this, we, in this thesis,

take a look at estimation methods by focusing on the EU guidelines.

This thesis starts by studying the EU guidelines in Chapter 2.

We looked at the background and processes of producing the

guidelines first then, followed the contents to examine the guidelines’

structure and detailed methodologies. As for general damage

assessment methodologies, quantifying harm caused by a rise in prices

or from exclusionary practices, we referred to the EU guidelines to

study further but also, in addition, we used papers listed in domestic

and foreign journals and some books issued in the US.

Chapter 3 examines 7 cases of damage suits against fair trade act

violation or other anti-competitive conducts where the court made its

final verdicts. Five of the 7 cases are violation of Article 19

‘prohibition on unfair common action' of the Fair Trading Act and

the other 2 are offenses of Article 23 ‘prohibition on unfair trading

practices’ of the Act. This thesis looked into those cases to see which

econometric analysis method was used based on the written rulings

- 124 -

and made some evaluation by referring to the EU guidelines. A major

case among them is military fuel bid rigging that has recently

received the Supreme Court’s final verdict. This chapter also discusses

about flour cartel, school uniform cartel, local phone-call cartel, Credit

Card Company and VAN cartel, online educational services and

hypermarket with unfair practice.

Lastly, Chapter 4 puts together the discussions above and explored

the availability and usefulness of the EU guideline. This chapter

contains suggestions, policy proposals and requirements to stimulate

damage claim system against competition-harming practices.

The points highlighted in this thesis are as follows:

First, damage estimation method largely depends on the court

of a lawsuit. As a result, damage assessment results vary hugely. This

indicates that the plaintiff may try to avoid filing a lawsuit because

such a huge gap reduces their expected benefits. To prevent this

problem, we can make it mandatory to refer the case to a damage

surveyor when the claimed damage amount or the number of

stakeholders exceeds a certain level.

Second, it is stipulated in the Civil Proceedings Act that the

court of a lawsuit, a commissioned judge and entrusted judge should

appoint damage surveyor. In consideration of the purpose of this Act,

court, plaintiff and defendant should respect the result of the

court-appointed surveyor while limiting personal estimation.

Third, in line with the purpose of legislating the "damage

approval system", the court should take impartial steps thoroughly

relying on rules and not necessarily be wavered by the amount

claimed by plaintiffs or evidence they presented.

Fourth, econometrics analysis by a surveyor should be

publicized after considering if its results are not inclined toward one

party and how useful it is in applying academic damage estimation

methods.

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Fifth, as shown in the amendment of GWB (Gesetzgegen Wett be

werbsbeschrankungen), we also need to build a legislative approach

about “passing on defence".

I hope the discussions presented in this dissertation will be

helpful to trigger more damage suits against anti-competitive

behaviors.

Keyword:　 anti-competitive behavior, unfair trading practices, compensation for damages, damage lawsuit, unfair common action, cartel, estimation of damage, Fair Trade Act, Monopoly Regulation Act, Subcontract Act, Military fuel bid rigging

Student ID: 2003-23251　

제 1 장 서 론제 1 절 연구 목적 및 의의제 2 절 선행 연구제 3 절 논문 구성 및 연구 방법론

제 2 장 EU 가이드라인 상의 손해배상액 산정방법제 1 절 가이드라인 작성 경과제 2 절 가이드라인의 구성제 3 절 손해배상액 산정의 일반적 방법론1. 비교분석 방법론(Comparator-Based Methods)가. 가상적 시나리오 설정법 나. 방법론의 실제 적용 : 경제변수를 추정하기 위한 기술적 방법들

2. 기타 방법론가. 시뮬레이션 분석나. 원가기준 분석

3. 방법의 선택

제 4 절 가격상승으로 인한 피해액 산정1. 반경쟁행위의 가격인상효과2. 가격인상분 산정가. 카르텔로 인한 가격인상분 산정나. 기타 반경쟁행위로 인한 가격인상분 산정

3. 물량효과분 산정

제 5 절 경쟁자 배제에 따른 손해액 산정 1. 반경쟁행위의 경쟁자 배제 효과 2. 경쟁자의 피해액 산정가. 시간의 흐름에 따른 경쟁자 배제행위의 영향나. 이익감소분 산정을 위한 일반적 접근법다. 기존의 경쟁자라. 신규진입 제한마. 미래의 이익(future loss)에 대한 보상

3. 소비자의 피해액 산정가. 손실분의 회수나. 반경쟁행위의 소비자이며 경쟁자인 경우

제 3 장 사 례　 분 석제 1 절 군납유류 입찰담합사건1. 사건 개요2. 손해액산정 경제분석가. 1심 법원 판결 나. 2심 법원 판결다. 대법원 판결

3. 평 가가. 경제분석에 대한 평가나. 법원판결에 대한 평가

제 2 절 밀가루 담합사건1. 사건 개요2. 손해액산정 경제분석가. 담합후 더미변수 설정나. 손해(비용)전가의 항변

3. 평 가

제 3 절 교복 담합사건1. 사건 개요 및 손해액산정2. 평 가

제 4 절 전화요금 담합사건1. 사건 개요2. 손해액산정 경제분석3. 평 가

제 5 절 신용카드 담합사건1. 사건 개요2. 손해액산정 경제분석3. 평 가

제 6 절 온라인 교육서비스 관련 거래상 지위남용사건1. 사건 개요2. 손해액산정 경제분석 3. 평 가

제 7 절 대형마트의 거래상 지위남용건1. 사건 개요2. 손해액산정 경제분석3. 평 가

제 4 장 결 론참고문헌Abstract