division b: the history of the jewish people / חטיבה ב: תולדות עם ישראל ||...

World Union of Jewish Studies / האיגוד העולמי למדעי היהדות

/ הצלה בימי השואה — אפשרויות ומכשולים RESCUE DURING THE HOLOCAUST — OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES Author(s): LENI YAHIL and לני יחילSource: Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies / דברי הקונגרס העולמי למדעיחטיבה ב: תולדות עם / DIVISION B: THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE ,היהדות, כרך חישראלpp. 161-166 תשמ"א / 1981Published by: World Union of Jewish Studies / האיגוד העולמי למדעי היהדותStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23528348 .

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RESCUE DURING THE HOLOCAUST — OPPORTUNITIES

AND OBSTACLES LENI YAHIL

The problem of rescue during the Holocaust has acquired the signifi cance of a shihboleth for the judgment of human behavior of Jews and non-Jews alike. Rescue, undertaken by the otherwise doomed Jews themselves or Initiated and assisted by others Inside the realm of the Nazis or outside, Is considered an act of resistance. As such it is evaluated as morally commendable while its absence

arouses moral indignation. Jewish resistance developed through several stages and had different features, yet it is very often

not easy to distinguish between resistance and rescue attempts

and survival as such. There can be no doubt that the preservation

of life was the foremost endeavor of all the Jews in the west as

in the east, in the south as in the north - wherever they became

the victims of Nazi rule or of the antisemitism of the Nazi satel lite countries. But for some notable exceptions the communal and

most of the individual struggles for life were eventually in vain. Here we have to ask ourselves several questions.

1. The Jewish people had known persecutions and destruction

through thousands of years during which it fought success

fully for survival - why was it this time at such a loss?

2. Very seldom in the course of this long history had 80

many Jews enjoyed so much freedom, been integrated to

such a degree into the life of the peoples in whose midst they dwelt, been granted 80 many equal rights -

why at the moment of deadly danger did they find them selves in want of the help they desperately needed?

3. Under what circumstances could rescue be attempted; what

conditions made it possible; who were the helpers and

what were their motives?

These are vast questions and the answers to them are too compli

cated to be exhausted in a short lecture - if at all. What I can

do here is only hint at some of the complex factors involved.

According to the dictionary definition,to RESCUE means to free

people from imminent danger of assault or death, or capture or from

any evil. This implies that deliverance is effected by prompt and

vigorous action or by force. By using this expression for the sav

ing of Jewish life during the Hitler period we tacitly project our

own knowledge of what happened during it and assume that there was

or should have been the possibility for prompt action. Our hind

sight tempts us to overlook historical facts and to disregard normal human attitudes.

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LENI YARIL

Most adult people relate to the present and to the future on the basis of past experience, and their Judgment largely depends on the maxims or axioms current in their society. The thinking of the leaders and of most people in the Western and democratic

hemisphere followed a course diametrically different from the

concepts by which Hitler and his henchmen directed their deeds. If this was true, for instance, for the obligation to honor official announcements, agreements, treaties, the killing of millions of people by gas in specially erected institutions was

utterly inconceivable.

This inability to comprehend - common to Jews and non-Jews -

was aggravated by the unfolding of the successive stages of the

persecution scheme, namely: Before the war from 1939 - 19^1» its culmination during the war against Russia with the imple mentation of the •final solution1. Moreover, the war was not

foreseen, nor after its outbreak was its course. Eventually it turned out that the only secure refuge Jews could find was over seas or in European countries that remained free and neutral. We still do not have a comprehensive survey of the wanderings of the Jews who emigrated or escaped from the German ruled or Ger man-satellite realm before and during the war. In particular it seems impossible to assess the number of those who tried to get away but could not make it or were recaptured. It became one of the major arguments in dealing with the Holocaust, that emigra tion was not organized on a wide scale as !1oag as the Germans themselves proclaimed it their solution* Thanks to an increas

ing number of studies conducted in European and overseas coun

tries, we have a fairly clear picture today of the political

interests, prejudices and bias provoked by open or concealed

antisemitism, and of the real and imagined economic difficulties which placed almost insurmountable obstacles before mass emi

gration and immigration. Moreover, conventional thinking, especially of the Jews themselves, claimed originally that it is

the Jews' duty to defend their rightful existence in Germany even 'ander Nazi reign.

We have, however, to deal with another principal approach which became one of the crucial and fafel problems regarding rescue

right up to the end of the war. Little as resulted from the nations' deliberations at Eviaiin 1938, it was then acknow ledged that emigration was a necessity. It soon became obvious that the Germans would not forfeit the pawn without gaining con siderable economic advantages from the transaction for which the Jews in and outside Germany would have to pay. In the govern ments involved and among the Jews the question arose whether one

should improve Germany's financial situation, especially in foreign currency, and the hesitancy to do so was one of the

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RESCUE DURING THE HOLOCAUST

reasons why the negotiations between Germany and the Inter governmental Committee were drawn oat until the outbreak of the war made them obsolete. Actually the inner-Jewish discussion for and against Haavara was afoot right from the beginning.

The situation repeated Itself again and again. Even under duress Jewish leaders tried to negotiate with the German ruler. They provided the Germans with money, work and goods for the war effort in order to gain a breathing space 80 that the community could go on with its struggle for survival. The question re mainedt To what extent was this justified and when did it be come disastrous collaboration? All the major efforts and schemes for rescue were also based on negotiations by which the Germans were granted or promised gains: the working group in Slovakia succeeded in halting deportations for two years by paying Wisll ceny $1+0,000; the Europa Plan by which Rabbi Weismandel hoped to rescue a million Jews would have provided the Germans with a dollar for every Jew freed; well known are the Germane? terms for

the abortive mission of Toel Brand. During the last months of the war, when Germany's defeat was in sight, Himmler became int erested in such negotiations. Now he weus no longer so eager to get money or goods but to establish contact with the Western Allies. Dedicated men like Kastner and Saly Meyer in Switzer

land, under the auspices of the Joint, Hillel Storch and Robert Masur in Sweden on behalf of the World Jewish Congress tried very hard in this turbulent last hour to save the rem nants of Jews din the still existing camps. Their efforts were

supported by the Scandinavians who tried to save their own

people by Bemadotte's Red Cross action and by others who wish ed at the last moment to go on record as having saved human

life.

On November 8, IWt the New York Times published a proclama

tion of Eisenhower'8 Headquarters from the previous day call

ing on the Germans not to obey orders to harm or persecute

people from concentration and forced labor camps •no matter

what their religion or nationality may be'. This formilation had been introduced by Eisenhower instead of

the one proposed by Pehle from the War Refugee Board which X*6cL(l 2

•without regard to their nationality or whether

they are Jewish or otherwise'.

Even then, the supreme commander wanted to avoid mentioning

the Jews and preferred to hide their identity behind their

religious affiliation, thus pretending that the Jewish plight was the same as that of other 'religions'. Here we are con

fronted with one of the basic differences in notion that

determined the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust:

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LENI YAHIL

For Hitler the Jews had a distinct identity as the evil element in mankind that has to be exterminated in order to procure the beneficial reign of the superior race. For him this was a poll tical issue. The nationality or citizenship of Jews was of

importance only insofar as the respective governments insisted on

safeguarding their subjects' rights. These claims were respected when it seemed necessary or advisable to do so for German

interests. The British and American citizenship of Jews - civi lians and prisoners of war - was honored not always but mostly;

The Danish government protected its Jews successfully as long as it managed to retain its power; the neutral states Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden and Switzerland were effective when

they showed keen interest in the well-being and liberation of their subjects. Their protective actions in Hungary saved the lives of tens of thousands of Jews in Budapest. Even the

government of Hungary, before occupation, protested the depor tation of its subjects from Paris. Jews who held certificates for Palestine could be freed by the

exchange-project, and many remained protected. But when the Latin American governments did not recognize the genuine and false passports of Jews, the Jews holding them were doomed.

In December 1942, the Allies admitted publicly that the Jews were being murdered en masse. Still, in spite of the outcry, protestations and petitions, not only of Jews, which followed, nothing in the way of rescue was undertaken except for the

smoke-screen of the Bermuda conference. What was the reason

for that? The Americans as well as the British adhered firmly to three principles! 1. The aim of the war is to free the world from the danger

of subjection to Nazi Germany. 2. This can be achieved only by Germany's unconditional

surrender; until then no negotiations of any sort will be conducted.

3• This war should by no means be regarded as a 'Jewish war•; only the victory on the battlefield that will free the world will also free the Jews.

German industrial plaits at Monowitz were bombed several times in August 1944» but in spite of repeated suggestions the nearby crematories at Auschwitz were not made a target.

The refusals to lend a hand to rescue Jews were based entirely on political and military arguments,but as opposed to Hitler the

rest of the world did not admit that the Jewish problem had to be understood in political terms. Jews were not considered an

Allied partner in the war. Their formal standing was described by an official of the British Foreign office in January 1943,

164



RESCUE DURING THE HOLOCAUST

«S followsI ,So long as Jews are the nationals of various States they oust

speak as nationals In those States so far as official action 18 concerned'. He even added •that they nay complain that they have at present no official representative body In the world'. Jews were the war's quasi-anonymous victims whose rescue was a humane

obligation second or third in magnitude to the political and mill

tary exigencies of the war. Only where and when the humanitarian motivation was congruent to those with pressing interests was rescue effective. Action in favor of the Jews in occupied or satellite countries was generally associated with an intensified anti-German disposition and increasing anti-German activity. That was true for Denmark as well as for the Balkan states, Italy, Belgium and even France. A decisive factor was the pro bability of the Allies' victory. According to this, help was denied or provided by the population, the underground or the local authorities. The Neutrals, the Red Cross and the Holy See behaved no differently. The humane impetus was also precondi

tioned by whether antisemitism or solidarity with the Jews was

prevailing.

These were the conditions under which Jews could try to ex

tract themselves from the •final solution• or free those con

fined in the huge Nazi prison from the outside. Much was needed

to survive. Every escape account tells a story of incredible

human endurence, of will, of the versatility needed to adapt to

the most dangerous situations. Physical strength, help by others

and very often sheer luck were indispensable. Solidarity between

people was a pre-condition for survival and as often proved to be

fatal. The immoral regime created insoluble moral conflicts as

far as survival and rescue were concerned.

In addition to all the adverse conditions very few among the Jews

inside and outside grasped the true meaning of the Nazis' inten

tions, until it was too late. Communities in which emancipation somehow impaired the sense of common danger, and brought about

individual identification with the authorities, were rather

easily deceived. On the other hand, experience in persecution and previous political thinking and action sparked Jewish under

ground organization. The core of it almost everywhere were

Zionist Youth organizations. However, the German schemes of de

ception were for the most part successful as long as there seemed

to be a chance for survival.

American Jewry and the Yishuv have been accused of disregard of

the information available to them and of inaction. The Joint did

much, legally and Illegally, to rescue Jews; the World Jewish

Congress was involved in many efforts. Ben Gurion put forward

the demand for the Jewish State, for which he tried to rally American Jewry. He asked the Mandatory Power to recognize the

165



LENI YAHIL

Yishuv as a partner In the war by the formation of the Brigade. He thus tried to remedy the political deficiency of the Jewish

people's standing - but a third of it could no longer join him in his endeavor. It is an open question if the rescue efforts undertaken by the Yishuv, including illegal Allya, were

necessarily Inadequate.

Selected Bibliography

Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust. Proceedings of the Second Yad Va.ah.em International Historical Conference, Y. Gutman E. Zuroff ed., Jerusalem, 1977.

S. Adler-Rudel, A Chronicle of Rescue Efforts, Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute XI, 1965, pp.213-2M H. Ami, Contemporary Spain and the Jewish People. Jerusalem, 1975 (Hebrew, English translation in preparation). Y. Bau er, The Holocaust in Historical Perspective. Seattle,1978. F.B.Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution. Pittsburg, 1972. H. Fein, Accounts for Genocide. National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust, New York-London,1979. H.L.Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, the Roosevelt Admlnis tration and the Holocaust 1938-1945, New Jersey, 1970. Ph. Friedman, Their Brothers' Keepers. Holocaust Library, New York, 1978. S. Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed. United States Policy toward Jewish Refugees 1938-1945, Detroit, 1973• W. Laqueur, The Terrible Secret, an Investigation into the

Suppression of Information about Hitler's Final Solution, London, 1980. H. Lindberg, Svenak Flygtingpolitik under Internationellt Tryck 1936-1941, Stockholm, 1973. K. Ludwig, Die Flttchtllngspolitlk der Schweiz seit 1933 bis zur Gegenwart. Bern, 1957. A.D. Morse, While Six Millions Died, a Chronicle of American Apathy, New York, 1967 - London, 1968. M. Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews. German-Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy, Oxford 1978. A.J. Sherman, Island Refuge. Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933-1939, London, 1973. A. Tartekover-K.R.Grossman, The Jewish Refugee. New York, 1944. B. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945. London, 1979.

** **"* "****"

M. Wischnitzer, To Dwell in Safety. Philadelphia, 1948. L. Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry. Test of a Democracy,

Philadelphia, 1969.

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