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www.wateralternatives.org Volume1|Issue1Molle,F.2008.Nirvanaconcepts,narrativesandpolicymodels:Insightfromthewatersector.WaterAlternatives1(1):131156
Nirvana Concepts, Narratives and Policy Models:
Insights from the Water Sector
Franois MolleInstitutdeRecherchepourleDveloppement(IRD),UR199,Montpellier,France;[email protected]
ABSTRACT: Analysis of water policy shows the importance of cognitive and ideological dimensions in theformulationofpolicydiscourses.Ideasareneverneutralandreflecttheparticularsocietalsettingsinwhichtheyemerge,theworldviewsandinterestsofthosewhohavethepowertosetthetermsofthedebate,tolegitimate
particularoptions
and
discard
others,
and
to
include
or
exclude
particular
social
groups.
This
article
focuses
on
threetypesofconceptualobjectswhichpermeatepolicydebates:nirvanaconcepts,whichunderpinoverarchingframeworksofanalysis,narratives i.e.causalandexplanatorybeliefsandmodelsofpoliciesordevelopmentinterventions. Itsuccessivelyreviewshowthesethreetypesofconceptspopulatethewatersector, investigateshowtheyspread,andthenexaminesthe implicationsofthisanalysisforappliedresearchonpolicymakingandpractice.
KEYWORDS:Watermanagement,waterpolicy,policymaking,IWRM,narratives
INTRODUCTION
Itis
atruism
that
human
mental
maps,
judgments
and
decisions
are
necessarily
structured,
or
at
least
influenced, by past experiences, formal training, worldviews and idiosyncrasies. Likewise, onesinclinationsandideologiesarerarelyindependentfromonesindividual interests.Theemergenceandthe social life of concepts are therefore tightly linked to the ideas and interests that permeate themilieu in which they evolve. The field of development sciences,just like other fields, is prone tosuccessive, sometimes cyclical,discoveriesof ideasand theories that informor inspirepractice foranumberofyears(CornwallandBrock,2005).Forsome,thesearemerefadsofthedayproppedupby"buzzwords";forothers,theyreflecttheevolutionandgradualrefiningofknowledgeandconcepts;andfor stillothers, they reflect thepowerandembody theworldviewof thosewhohave thepower todisseminatethem.
This paper proposes a tentative and preliminary reflection on how one particular sector of
development
the
development
and
management
of
water
resources
is
influenced
by
ideas
that
manifest themselves throughubiquitous andproliferating "success stories", "bestpractices", "brightspots",or"promisingtechnologies"readilypromotedasuniversalandtransferabletoothercontexts.Thepaperdistinguishesamongthreedifferenttypesofconceptsthatshapepolicyanddecisionmakinginthecontemporarywatersector:nirvanaconceptsunderpinoverarchingframeworksthatpromoteorstrengthen particular narratives or storylines i.e. simple, causal, and explanatory beliefs andlegitimize specific blueprints or models of both policies and development interventions. Nirvanaconcepts,narrativesandmodels/iconsareallideationalandideologicalobjectswhichemergeatsomepointintimetotypifyacertainview,approach,or"solution".Overtime,suchconceptualobjectstendtoacquirealifeoftheirown;theymaybereified,orreworkedandreappropriated.Thedisseminationand the eventual fate of these concepts depend on many factors, not least their usefulness for
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particularactorsandconstituencieswhomayreappropriate,repackageand integratethem intotheirdiscoursesandstrategies.
Influential concepts inpolicymakingarenotmerelyneutralor scientific; theydonotemergebychancebut,rather,aretheemanationofcomplexwebsof interests, ideologies,andpower.Inreturn,
theyalso
shape
the
ways
things
are
framed;
options
are
favoured,
disregarded
or
ignored;
and
particular social groups are empowered or sidelined (Shore andWright, 1997; Keeley and Scoones,1999).Thisarticledrawsontheliteratureonthecognitiveandideologicaldimensionsofpolicymaking(seeApthorpe,1986;Roe,1994;ShoreandWright,1997)andseesestablishingknowledgeasinherentlypartoftheconstitutionofpolicynetworksitself(Latour,1989).
Thepaperdoesnotdiscuss"howdoesanideastimecome"(Kingdon,2002),neitherdoesitaddresstheprocessofpolicymaking;itmerelylooksathowdiscursiveobjectsareusedtodesignpoliciesandsupportparticularagendas,as"devices thatcloakpolicieswith the symboland trappingsofpoliticallegitimacy" (Shore and Wright, 1997). It successively reviews how the three types of conceptsconsidered populate the water sector, investigates how they spread, and then examines theimplicationsofthisanalysisforappliedresearchonpolicymakingandpractice.
NIRVANACONCEPTS
Nirvana conceptsare concepts thatembodyan ideal imageofwhat theworld should tend to.Theyrepresentavisionofa 'horizon'that individualsandsocietiesshouldstrivetoreach.Although,justaswithnirvana,thelikelihoodthatwemayreachthemisadmittedlylow,themerepossibilityofachievingthem and the sense of 'progress' attached to any shift in their direction suffice to make them anattractiveandusefulfocalpoint.
Nirvanaconceptsusuallytaketheformofa'photonegative'oftherealworld.Forexample,asthesocialandenvironmentalcostsofconventionalindustrialdevelopmentbecameapparent,theconceptof sustainable developmentproposed a visionwhereby contradictionswouldbe dissolved,negativeimpacts internalized,andantagonismsreconciled.Likewise,theconceptofgoodgovernanceemergedasamodelinwhichinefficient,corrupt,biasedanddiscriminatorygovernmentswould"asaresultof"or"through"growingtransparencyandpowersharingbecomeaccountabletotheirpopulationsandactforthecommongood.Participationorempowerment,atsomelevelofgeneralization,alsoappearas desirable counterpoints to exploitation and disfranchisement. All these words are "warmlypersuasive" (Williams, 1976), nicesounding, sanitized, and endowed with "almost unimpeachablemoralauthority"(CornwallandBrock,2005),atleastinthespheresofdevelopmentprofessionals.
In the field of water, the main ubiquitous nirvana concept is Integrated Water ResourceManagement (IWRM). IWRMevolved from thecorrectperception thatwatermanagementhasbeenunintegrated, or fragmented: economic sectors and ministries have managed water independentlywhile interventions in, anddevelopmentof,water resources in upper catchments have taken placewithoutadequateconsiderationofimpactsondownstreamareas;waterqualityissueshavebeenofteneitherdisregardedordisconnected fromquantity issues;groundwaterhas frequentlybeenexploitedwithout concern for its hydrological linkages with surface water (and vice versa), and landwaterinteractionshavebeenoverlooked;and last,ecosystemshavebeen impairedand socialequityoftendisregarded.Theseandotherproblemsledtoasituationofperceivedcrisiswhere,inthewakeofthe1992 Dublin Conference and the endorsement of the economic dimension of water, IWRM wasconceptualizedastheoppositeofthisratherchaoticsituation,conveyingthevisionofaworldwherethemultiplicityofdesiredgoalswasreaffirmedandwhereimbalanceswereredressed.
According to its most frequently used definition, "IWRM is a process which promotes the coordinateddevelopmentandmanagementofwater, landandrelated resources, inordertomaximizethe resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising thesustainabilityofvitalecosystems"(GWP,2000).Animportantaspectofthedefinitionisitsemphasisonthe
process
dimension
of
IWRM.
This
rightly
suggests
that
IWRM
is
amoving
target
since
new
problems
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emerge and evolve over time,which requires considerable flexibility and regular attention to thesechanges; inadditionjustaswithnirvanatheobjectiveisalwaysjustbeyondreachandthecruxofthematteristokeepinchingtowardandgraduallyapproachingit.
However, IWRM faces twodifficulties inherent in thenirvanaconcept.By itsverynature, it isan
attractiveyet
woolly
consensual
concept
(nobody
is
against
nirvana).
Such
concepts
typically:
a)
obscure thepoliticalnatureofnatural resourcesmanagement; andb) are easilyhijackedby groupsseekingto legitimizetheirownagendas(WesterandWarner,2002).Theabovedefinitionemphasizesthethreedesired 'E'(Efficiency,EquityandEnvironmentalsustainability)but impliesthattheycanbeachieved concomitantly if as theword 'maximize' suggests problemsolving canbe informedbyneutral and rational approaches, good science 1 and expert knowledge, reflecting these threedimensionsratherthanbeinginformedbyoneofthemonly.Thisparticularviewpointisapparent,forexample,inthedefinitionthatUSAID(2007a)offersforIWRM:
Aparticipatoryplanningand implementation process,basedon sound science, thatbrings stakeholderstogether to determine how to meet societys longterm needs for water and coastal resources whilemaintaining essential ecological services and economic benefits. IWRM helps to protect the worlds
environment,foster
economic
growth
and
sustainable
agricultural
development,
promote
democratic
participationingovernance,andimprovehumanhealth.2
Little ifanything inthisdefinitionsuggeststhatthethreegoalsofIWRMarefrequently, ifnotalways,antagonistic(hencetheconflicts),thattradeoffsarenecessaryandhardtoachieveinsuchsituations.This means that all parties must relinquish something and that the outcome of painful politicalprocessesinwhichthedifferentpartiesrarelywieldequalamountsofpowerwillgenerallyfallshortofthe'optimal'.Patternsofparticipationtendtoreflectpowerasymmetriesratherthaneveningthemout.Inotherwords,thedefinitionofaccesstoscarceandcontestedresourcesisinherentlypolitical.
To be fair, participation features as a key component of 'IWRM in practice' but the approachneverthelessdrawsmoreonaconceptofinstrumentalrationalityinformedbygoodwillandgooddata(hence, thepivotal rolesof thestate inempoweringpeopleandofexperts inproviding information)than on the politics of resource management (Allan, 2003; Miller and Hirsch, 2003; Biswas, 2004;Merreyetal.,2007;Molleetal.,2007).Inthebackgroundproper"policiesandinstitutions"mustbeinplaceandthegovernmentsmustbeabletoexercise"theirresponsibilitiesofgoodwatergovernance",while"ensuringempowermentofthepoor".Supporttothepoliciesiscrucialand"consciousactionstobuildconsensus,alsoatthehighestpoliticallevelmustbebuiltintotheprocess;()awarenessraisingandmultistakeholder involvement iscriticaltothesuccess"(JonchClausen,2004;UNDESAandGWP,2006).
SouthAfrica(andZimbabwe)providegoodexamplesofhowIWRMwasenthusiasticallyadoptedbygovernmentsasacommongroundforblackandwhitewaterusers,offeringthepromisearticulatedintheSouthAfricandefinitionofIWRMtodeliver"equitableaccesstoandsustainableuseofwaterresourcesbyall stakeholdersat catchmentand regional levels,whilemaintaining the characteristicsand integrity of water resources within agreed limits" (Pollard, 2001). However, after ten years ofexperience,expectedbenefitshavenotmaterialized(Manzungu,2002;MerreyandvanKoppen,2007).Althoughexperiencevaries,andreasonsforunfulfilledpromisesarediverse,powerfuluserstendedto
1RiverBasinOrganizations(RBOs),forexample,viewedaspillarsoftheIWRMimperativetomanagewaterresourcesatthebasin level,are said tobe "increasinglypromotedasa scientific/rationalmeansofadministration forwater" (UNDESAandGWP,2006).2Seealso,amongotherexamples,thedefinitiongivenbyFIU(2007):"IWRMintegratespoliciesandmanagementactivitiestoensuresustainablesuppliesoffreshwaterfor1)themultiplesectorsofhumanuseanddevelopment(domestic,agricultural,industrial,etc),2)instreamneedsforecosystemprocessesandbiodiversityconservation,and3)theneedsofupstreamanddownstream human communities and ecosystems, including coastal zones".ADB (2006) states that "IWRM is focused on
deliveringatriple
bottom
line
of
abalance
of
economic,
social,
and
environmental
benefits
resulting
from
an
integrated
approachthatcarefullyconsiderseachtradeoff".
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forbottomupplanning(NGOForum,2005).Likewise,conservationistsorgreenNGOshaveusedIWRMto promote conservation of nature or environmentalism in general: the 'Ecosystem Approach'incorporatedintheConventiononBiologicalDiversity(CBD,2000),andpromotedbyseveralNGOsandinternationalorganisations(e.g.IUCN),isaperfectexampleofareading(andtranslation)ofIWRMthat
makesecosystem
preservation
both
the
starting
point
and
the
overarching
goal.
Figure1.IWRManditsthree'E'
Green economists
Market toolsfor environmentalregulation
Livelihood-
orientedNGOs
Genderand
Water Alliance
Conservationists,
green NGOs
"Ecosystem
approach"
Resource
economistsPrivatization
Efficiency
IWRM
EquityEnviron-
ment
More generally, consulting firms, bureaucracies and development banks adapt their discourses andrepackage their policies and approaches. Here IWRM is used to uphold and give legitimacy toconventional developmental approaches. The use of the IWRM rhetoric as a depoliticizing act isthereforeprofoundlypolitical in itself,as itdoesnotcriticallyquestionbut,rather,reinforcesthetraditionalrole,mandateandworldviewofthemainactorsinwaterresourcesmanagement,favouringthestatusquoandbusinessasusualstrategies.
Consultingfirms,forexample,haverecycledmanystructuralwaterresourcesdevelopmentprojectsaspartofnew'participatory'and'integrated'riverbasincomprehensiveplanswhich,despiteevidencetothecontrary,claimtodifferfromthemasterplansofearlieryears(Molle,2005).Developmentbanksorcooperationagencieshavealsoembarkedonruraldevelopmentprojectsshroudedinwatershedorriverbasinrhetoric(seeMolleandHoanh,2007,onVietnam)andhavepromotedpolicyreformswithstandard prescriptions allegedly sanctioned by IWRM (establishment of 'apex bodies', RBOs, waterrights,servicesproviders,costsharingagreements,etc.;see,forexample,ADB,2006).Justasalltheiractions "contribute to poverty alleviation", similarly, these recharacterized projects have regularlybeentoutedas IWRMachievements.5Statebureaucracieshavesuddenlyoften 'discovered'thattheyhadbeendoing IWRMallalongwithoutknowing itandhave later framed theiractionsaccordingly.6The tendency is for states touse IWRMas they commonlydowithotheroverriding concepts (food
5AsUSAID's (2007b)webpageon "IWRM success stories" reveals,any story, from villagersgainingaccess to freshwater inSudan,toupgradingan Iraqicanalsystem,toafishcompanytapping intoglobalmarkets inRomania,topurifyingwaterforHaitisfloodvictims,seemstoqualifyasan"IWRMachievement".6InEgypt'sIntegratedIrrigationImprovementandManagementProject(IIIMP),presentedasanIWRMundertaking(UNDESAandGWP,2006), "Watermanagement isbest improvedbyan integratedpackageof servicesand technicalassistance thatrespondstotheusersdemands[while]manykindsoftechnologyandexpertisewillbeusedtooptimizetheresultsof[theproject] activities". See, also, a document on Laos: "The immediate objective of the Water Sector is to foster and
institutionalizethe
IWRM
approach
in
the
mainstream
planning
process
of
the
Government
both
at
the
central
as
well
as
at
theprovinciallevel"(Anonymous,2004).
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security,national independence,selfsufficiency,povertyalleviation,etc)tomanipulateand foreclosedebateandimposepredeterminedagendas.
The influenceofIWRMonwatermanagementpractice isamatterofdebate.WhileJonchClausen(2004) posits that it has inspired reforms that aim atmore integratedmanagement, Biswas (2004)
believesone
can
successfully
argue
that
the
IWRM
label
has
not
"made
any
difference".
Monitoring
progress, evaluating change or singling out success stories becomes essential in the continuedpromotion of IWRM. Thailand, for example, is cited by the GWP as a good example of a countryimplementing IWRMbecause ithasestablished formalRBOs in its25 riverbasins,designeda"policywith full stakeholder participation",while a "frameworkwater law is under preparation through anopen and participatory process seeking the views of the stakeholders" (JonchClausen, 2004). Thissomewhatoverlyoptimisticviewemphasizestheformalexistenceof institutionsandtendstoequateparticipationwiththeconductofmeetingsorpublichearings.7
Despite all these misuses of the concept as a smoke screen to camouflage other agendas andobjectives, IWRMcanalsobeconceivedofasa 'boundaryobject' (Cashetal.,2002;Conca,2006):aconceptthatallpartieswillappropriateanduseandalsoremodelbytheirowndiscourseandpractice.
As
such,
it
can
be
seen
as
a
collective
construct
offering
a
common
ground
to
stakeholders
willing
to
engage other parties. Inclusion of environmental sustainability has, for example, enabled easierpropagationoftheconceptofenvironmentalflow(eflows),anapparentlytechnicalwordwhichallowsdiscussionofmoresensitiveallocationissues.Inthatsense,IWRMmayalsohaveallowed,ashavetheconceptsofgoodgovernanceandparticipation(seeMollinga,thisissue),reintroductionofpoliticsandacknowledgementof the relations of socialpower by the back door, even though these issueshadearlierbeenobfuscated.
NARRATIVESANDSTORYLINES
Anarrative isdefinedhereasastorythatgivesan interpretationofsomephysical/socialphenomena.Many people organize daily experiences and beliefs gathered from social interactions in logicalrelationships fromwhichtheyderiveopinionsonwhat isdesirableandwhat isnot.Narratives inthefieldofdevelopment firstestablishcausal relationshipsbetween twonegativeaspectsofaparticularproblem.Theserelationshipsoftendrawoncommonsenseandthusappearuncontroversial,obscuringboththecomplexityoftheprocessesatplayand,sometimes,theirideologicalunderpinnings:waste(orpollution)ofresourcesoccursbecauseinsufficientpricingfailstoreflectrealcosts(hencethenecessitytopricewater);flood (ordroughts)areduetodeforestation, itselfaresultofabusiveslashandburnpractices(conservationandafforestationwillcounterbalancethisstateofaffairs);poorperformanceofwaterusergroupsreflectslackofhumancapitalorobstructivebureaucracies(trainingisneeded);lackof private investment results from insecure tenure (definition of rights and titling is the solution);limited agricultural diversification follows from the inflexibility of irrigation networks (which needmodernization),etc.
The 'naturalness'ofnarratives,or storylines, seemingly anchored in common sense,makes themvery resilient (Roe, 1991). Their appeal flows from the legitimacy they can afford policies anddevelopmentprogramsbyhelping rationalize them in termsofboth their intended targets and themeanstobedeployedtoachievethosetargets.Bynature,theysimplifyandofferastablevisionandinterpretationofrealityandareabletorallydiversepeoplearoundparticularstorylines.ThecombinedactionsofthesepeopleinthepromotionofastorylinetendtocoalesceintoloosenetworksandwhatHajer (1995) defined as discourse coalitions: a set of storylines and the actorswho promote these
7Foranextremecaseofsimplificationofassessing"progresstowardIWRM",seeJPW(2006)whereparticipationisassessed
byyes/no
answers
to
two
questions:
1)
Do
you
have
alegal
framework
for
participation
of
stakeholders;
2)
Is
there
governmentspendingforparticipationofconcernedparties?
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storylinesandthepracticesthattheyhighlight.Whenasetofactorstriestoestablishhegemonyandtopreemptdebate,severalcoalitionsmayemerge,unitedbytheirrespectivestorylines.
Narratives,just likepolicies (Mosse,2004),areoftenselfvalidatingbecause theytend toproduceevidenceratherthantheotherwayaround.Iftheyareatfaultitisbecausetheprescriptionhasbeen
eitherinadequately
or
insufficiently
implemented.
Higher
water
prices,
more
trees,
or
more
training
wouldhavedonethejobbutunfortunatecircumstances limitedthefullrealizationofthe intendedorexpectedbenefits.8So,evennonrealizationvalidatestheinitialcausalpostulate(Rap,2006).
For the sakeof illustration Iwill considerhere the 'freewater' storyline (seemore inMolle andBerkoff,2007a).Thecausalmodelofthisnarrativeisbasedonthebanalandstraightforwardeverydayexperience that cheap or free goods and services tend to be wasted. If my son does not pay forelectricity(whichhedoesnt)hewillprobablynotbotherswitchingoffthelightortheheaterwhenheleaveshis room (as, indeed, is thecase). Ifmyneighbourdoesnotpayenough forwaterhewillbetemptedtowaterhisgardenthewholenightlong,orwastewaterwashinghiscar(whichhedoes).Insum,cheapgoodsbegetwaste.Thisobviousnesshasaffinitywiththe'lionsshare'narrative:agricultureis responsible for 70% of the world waterwithdrawals and often "gobbles" up to 90% or more in
developing
countries.
This
lions
share
is,
in
turn,
associated
with
the
common
wisdom
that
irrigation
is
awastefulprocess,epitomizedbytheubiquitousstatementthat itsefficiency is lowandthat60%ofwaterdeliveries fail to reach the fields (TheEconomist,2003).The conclusionnaturally follows thatraisingwaterpriceswillforcesquandererstosavewater,whichcanthenbemadeavailabletocitiesortorestoreecosystemhealth.9
Avastliteratureonthesubjectdevelopedduringthe1990sandearly2000s,10largelyfuelledbytheWorldBankandothermainstreaminstitutions.Books,conferences,andjournalarticlesreportedonthepotentialofpricingfordemandmanagementandconservation.Althoughtheroleofwatercharges inoperationandmaintenanceandasabasis for the financialandmanagerialautonomyofwateruserassociationswaswellrecognizedinthemid1980s,theemphasisoneconomicinstrumentswasgreatlyinflatedduringthisperiod.TheWorldBankStrategyof1993stipulatedthat"settingpricesattheright
level
is
not
enough;
prices
need
to
be
paid
if
they
are
to
enhance
the
efficient
allocation
of
resources"
(WorldBank,1993); for Johansson (2000) "The fundamental roleofprices is tohelpallocate scarceresourcesamongcompetingusesandusers.Onewaytoachieveanefficientallocationofwater istopriceitsconsumptioncorrectly".Withhigherpricesthatreflectopportunitycosts,thereasoninggoes,lowvalueactivitiesarephasedout,thusreleasingwaterforhighvalueusesandraisingsocialwelfare.Foranumberofreasons,thepolicybubbleformedduringthisperiodhasbeensubstantiallydeflatedinrecent years.Several key lessons about the "lifetimeof an idea" (Molle andBerkoff,2007b) canbeextractedfromthissetofevents.
First, this example provides a good illustration of how the epistemic community that graduallyformed around irrigation pricebased incentives largely extended from mainstream economicdepartmentsinuniversitiesandinternationalorganizationstoreachpolicymakersinallcountries,andeventuallypercolateddowntonationalwaterlaws.Thenarrativedevelopedbyconflatingevidenceonthe effectiveness of pricing policies in the domestic and industrial sectorwith those in agriculture,
8Thisisgermanetodebatesineconomicswhereneoliberalpoliciesassertedlyfailbecausederegulationhasnotbeencompleteandstateinterventionnotfullydispensedwith.9Thelinkbetweenwaterwastageandunderpricinghasbeenrepeatedlyshowcasedbyallwaterrelatedinstitutions,rangingfrom theWorldBank ("thebiggestproblemwithwater is thewasteofwater through lackof charging: "President JamesWolfensohn,2000), to theWorldWaterVision ("usersdonot valuewaterprovided freeor almost free and sowaste it":CosgroveandRijsberman,2000),andtoenvironmentalistswho favour"developingapricingsystemthatpreventsexcessiveuseofwater" (WWF,2002). For the EU (2000) "Efficientwaterpricingpolicieshave ademonstrable impacton thewaterdemandofdifferentuses.As a resultof changes inwaterdemand, efficientwaterpricing reduces thepressureonwaterresources.Thisisparticularlytruefortheagriculturalsector".Seealso:"Inefficientpricingandmanagementofirrigationwatersupplyleadstomassivewastage"(HansenandBhatia,2004).10
The
phrase
'water
pricing'
entered
as
aGoogle
search
yielded
19,500
hits
in
October
2003
compared
to
338,000
in
March
2007,a17foldincrease.
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without differentiating between sectors.Many studies referring to agricultural useswere based oneconometrics (where correlationandcausalityareoftenundistinguished)oronmodelling (basedonmere farm budgets, which in any case often showed that using prices to regulate use was noteconomicallyandpoliticallyfeasible).Unfortunately,nicheswheresuchincentivescanbeeffectiveare
rathernarrow,
because
of
several
constraints
specific
to
irrigation
(for
more
details
see
Bosworth
et
al.,
2002;CornishandPerry,2003;HellegersandPerry,2004;MolleandBerkoff,2007a).11
Despitelimitedevidenceofsuccess,theideaof'gettingthepricesright'flourishedandtheconcepttook on a hegemonic character at least in the development establishment. It became increasinglydifficulttoofferunorthodoxpointsofview.Forexample,areviewofexperience inoneregionoftheworldon theexistenceofa linkbetweenpricesandefficiency concluded "toa certainextent, yes",whileshowingatthesametimehowlittleimpacttherewasforanumberofreasons.Isnotthesubtle(andperhapsunconscious)semanticshift from"Toa largeextentthere isnoevidencethat"to"Tosomeextent,thereisevidencethat"whattrulyrevealsthehegemonicnatureofanarrative?
Theexampleofwaterpricingpoliciesalsoshowstheresilienceofnarratives.AsRoe(1991)observes,narratives tend toacquirea lifeof theirownandarenoteasilydebunkedbycontradictingempirical
evidence,
as
"they
continue
to
underwrite
and
stabilize
the
assumptions"
for
policy
making
"in
the
face
of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization". For example, although the narrow concept ofirrigation efficiency has been shown to be misleading as far as basin management is concerned,decisionmakerscontinuetojustifycostlycanalliningprogramsinorderto"avoidlosses"eveninclosedbasinswherenowater flowsout,with littleattention tohowwater is implicitly reallocated throughtheseinterventions.
Enduring narratives are perhaps most prominent in economics. Easterly (2001) has shown howvariousnarratives thatallunderpinnedthe logicofaidandexternalcapital investment indevelopingcountries have proven incredibly persistent and resilient, continuing to survive in the minds ofpractitioners long after they had been debunked or proven wrong by scientific work. All thesenarratives,again,areappealing,simple,anddrawoncommonsense.Theyareoftensoundinparticular
contexts
but
generalising
them
across
the
board
takes
them
into
uncharted
terrain
where
key
assumptionsandtheirprescriptionsnolongerhold.
ICONSANDMODELS
Athirdtypeofconceptualobjectisthatofmodels.Modelsarebasedonparticularinstancesofpolicyreformsordevelopmentinterventionswhichostensiblyembodyadimensionof'success'andqualifyas'success stories'. They are apparently sanctioned by experience, approved by experts and powerfulinstitutions, andusing them seeminglyminimizes risk.Althoughwe are chiefly concernedherewithwater policy,models and what Chambers (1997) has called the ModelT12 approach of coursepervade all strands of practice and all disciplines: in the field of hydraulics, for example, they willsupport either upstream or downstream regulation, simplified or elaborate designs, overshot orundershot gates. Agronomists routinely promote(d) zero tillagemodels, vetiver grass, or integratedpest management; sociologists, community forestry management or Community Organizers;extensionists,the"Training&Visit"approach,etc.Genericmodelsareoftensupportedbypetprojectsthatareroutinelyshowcasedtoofficialsandforeignvisitors(Chambers,2008).13
11Many factorsmake irrigationdiffer from thedomestic sector.Farmers are 'water takers'usingwhateverwater ismade
availabletothembyirrigationagenciesandnot(orrarely)customerswhocanaccesswateratwill;inaddition,incentivesforsavingwatercanonlybeeffectivewhenchargesarevolumetric,anexceptionratherthantherule.Eveninsuchcasespricesaregenerallytoo lowtoencourageuserstosavewaterandscarcity is invariablymanagedthroughquotas,withpricesonlyregulatingoveruseatthemargin.SeeMolleandBerkoff(2007a)formoredetails.12
AfterH.Ford'sremarkthatAmericanscouldhavetheirModelTautomobileanycolourtheylikedaslongasitwasblack.13
The
managed
visits
and
the
selected
and
selective
perceptions
of
rural
development
tourism
contribute
to
generating
and
sustaining myths and paradigms. Examples in the water sector have been Sukhomajri in Haryana and the Gram Gaurav
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In thewater sector, threewellknownmodelscan serveasexamples.The firstone is theChileanmodelofwatermarkets; thesecond is theMexicanmodelof IrrigationManagementTransfer (IMT);and the thirdone is theconceptof riverbasinorganizationwithseveral iconicexperiencesvying forpreeminence,includingtheAustralianMurrayDarlingBasinCommissionmodel,theFrenchAgencesde
lEau,and
the
US
Tennessee
Valley
Authority
(TVA).
TheChileanwatermarkets
In 1981 Chile enacted a Water Code that recognized private property rights in water and allowedtransactionsthroughafreemarket.14Thisreformwaspartof,and in linewith,thedeep influenceoftheChicagoBoys15intheshapingofChileseconomicpolicy.Theapplicationofthecodeandtheinitialexperiencewithwatermarketsweredocumented intheearly1990sbya fewpublicationsthatweresubsequentlytakenupbytheWorldBankwhich,togetherwiththeInterAmericanDevelopmentBank,IFPRI,anumberofAmericanuniversitiesandrelatedinstitutions,wasinstrumentalinspreadingitasasuccessstory(Gazmuri,1994;RosegrantandBinswanger,1994;RosegrantandGazmuri,1994;Hearne1995;Hearne and Easter, 1995,1997, 1998;Holden andThobani,1996).According toBauer (2004)
"Sincethe
early
1990s,
these
proponents
have
used
their
considerable
resources
and
influence
to
promote a simplified description of theChileanmodel,both elsewhere in LatinAmerica and in thewider internationalwaterpolicyarena".Countries likeMexico,BoliviaandArgentinawere influencedbythemodelanditstranspositiontoPeruhaslongbeenadvocated(Thobani,1995;Trawick,2003).16
Althoughproponentssometimesrecognizeflawsinthemodel,thegeneraltendencyistodownplaythe importanceof these flawsand toascribe them to thehaste togeteffectivemarketsestablished(RogersandHall,2002)and to stress, instead, thepurported 'adaptiveness'of the system.Problemsencounteredinclude"arangeofcriticalwatermanagementissues,suchassocialequity,environmentalprotection, river basin management, coordination of multiple water uses, and resolution of waterconflicts"(Bauer,2004).Anumberofstudieshavedocumentedthe limitations inherent inthemodel(for example: Bauer, 1997; Hendriks, 1998; Dourojeanni and Jouravlev, 1999; Hadjigeorgalis, 1999;
Budds,2002;
Zegarra,
2002;
Hadjigeorgalis
and
Lillywhite,
2004;
CEPAL,
2004;
Boelens
and
Zwarteveen,
2005).Yet, it is striking to see thepervasivenessof the success associatedwith this iconicmodel intodays literature: this observation isnot intended todismiss itsmeritsbut to stress how commonknowledge isneitherupdated,modifiednorqualified,at least inwiderinternationalcircleswherethemodelhas continued toplay its role in thepromotionof tradablewater rights. Likewise, the iconicSouthAfricanWaterLaw,withits'reserves'forthepoor,itsprovisionsforenvironmentalflows,anditsCatchmentManagementAgencieshasbeen(andstill is)highlypraisedandhasbecomeaworldwidemodel.Yet,andwithoutdownplaying thepositiveaspectsandthe inspirationalroleofthemodelforother countries, increasing evidence documenting that its achievements fall short of its promisesremainsconfinedtospecializedliterature(MerreyandvanKoppen,2007).
Pratistan inGujarat in the early1980s, theMohiniCooperative inGujarat (which generated and sustained amythof thewidespreadexistenceofwatercooperativesinGujaratinthe1970sand1980s),andtheMweaIrrigationSettlementinKenyafrom1960sthroughtothe1980s(Chambers,2008).14
IamdrawingheremainlyonBauer(2004).15
TheChicagoBoys(c.1970s)wereagroupofabout25youngChileaneconomistswhotrainedattheUniversityofChicagounderMiltonFriedmanandArnoldHarberger.TheylaterworkedinAugustoPinochet'sadministrationtocreateafreemarketeconomyanddecentralizecontroloftheeconomy(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_boys).16
Thepowerof theChileanmodel isalsowell illustrated inananecdote reportedbyanexpertwhohadworkedwith thegovernmentofanunnamedLatinAmericancountrytodraftanewwaterlaw.Aftermanyexpertreports,consultantvisits,etc.,thekeygovernmentministerthrewthewholepileofstudiesandrecommendationsoffhisdeskandsaid:"Thisisawasteof
time!What
Iwant
is
acopy
of
the
Chilean
Water
Code
with
the
word
"Chile"
deleted
and
[our
country's
name]
written
instead!"ChilehasreceivedcountlessdelegationsfromothercountriesandinspiredreformsinplaceslikeMorocco.
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TheMexicanIMT
ThegovernmentofMexicolauncheditsIMTprogrammein1992withtheaimofturningthe3.4millionhaofpublic irrigation schemesover to groupsof farmers (mdulos) tobeorganized at the levelofsecondarycanals.Theprogrammewaspartoftheprocessofstructuraladjustmentunderaneoliberal
modelof
economic
deregulation,
downsizing
of
the
public
sector,
reductions
in
public
expenditures,
and the reconfiguration of public administration responsibilities among the federal, state, andmunicipalgovernments(PrezPrado,2003;Rap,2004).Primarilydrivenbymeasuresoffiscalausterity,the programme was successful in transferring to users the costs of operation and maintenance ofinfrastructuresbelowthemaincanals.Lessthantenyears latertheprogrammewasconsideredtobecompleted.
TheMexicanmodelofIMTwasdrivenbyastronginternalpoliticalcommitmentofseniorMexicanengineersandofthegovernmentwhoseviewpointsandinterestsconvergedwiththoseofWorldBankanalysts.WaterengineerssawthereformasanopportunitytoregainanautonomythattheyhadlostwhentheMinistryofAgricultureabsorbedtheirrigationsector.Assuch,itbecameavehicletoadvancethe engineers "autonomy" agenda within a wider context of strategic political realignment and
economicrestructuring
(Rap,
2004;
Wester,
2008).
IMTwassupposedtodeliverothergains intermsof irrigationandeconomicefficiency(Cummingsand Nercessiantz, 1992). Although provisions for temporary trading of water were made suchexchangeshavebeenrare.Theyare limited tomduloswithinasingleschemeandrequire thepriorassentofthegovernment(Kloezen,1998).FurtherresearchfoundthattheimpactofIMTonirrigationefficiencyandproductivityhadbeenneutral(KloezenandGarcsRestrepo,1998;Kloezen,2002;Rap,2004).Despitelaterqualificationsandthediscoveryof"secondgenerationproblems"(Svendsenetal.,1997;Palacios,1999)andnotwithstandingthesuccessesachieved,theMexicanIMThasturnedintoaworldwidemodel.
Riverbasinorganizationmodels
TheUnited States: Although comprehensive river basinmanagement may have startedwith BritishendeavoursintheIndusandNileriverbasins,andalthoughearlyinstancesofriverbasinmanagementcanbefoundinSpainorGermany(Molle,2006),thebeginningof"unified"riverbasindevelopmentisbestassociatedwiththeTennesseeValleyAuthority.EstablishedbyF.D.RooseveltduringtheNewDeal,the TVAwas the first experiment in regional development to be based on full control of the riversystem through a network of multipurpose reservoirs. The TVA would not only attempt to "fully"control the river system by a series of dams, thus providing protection from floods and producinghydropower, but would also tackle poverty by an ambitious range of activities, including training,agriculturalextensionservices,soilconservation,afforestation,productionoffertilizers,stimulationoflocalenterprisesandwelfareorientedprogramsfocusingoneducation,healthandsanitation.
TVAsinitialideologicalunderpinningrestedontheengineeringethosthatscientificknowledgeandsystematicrationalplanningcouldradicallychangesociety iftheycouldemancipatethemselves fromvested interestsandpolitics. Itwasalso tingedwith thedemocratic rhetoricdistilledbyD.Lilienthal(1944),oneof the initialthreecochairmen,whostressedthedangerofcentralizedandtechnocraticauthoritarianism and the need for "grassroots democracy". Despite the gap between rhetoric andrealitiesontheground(TugwellandBanfield,1950),theTVAsdemocraticgloss,marketedinparticularbytheprophetictoneofLilienthals(1944)book"TVA:Democracyonthemarch",wastoproveamajorassetofUSoverseasdevelopmentanddiplomacy,and"anewexportcommodity" in theeraofColdWarpolitics(Ekbladh,2002).
Based on his belief that the TVA "demonstrated for all time the efficiency and the humanity ofcomprehensively planned, multipurpose river basin development", Truman (1949) declared in hispresidentialinauguraladdress:"Wemustembarkonaboldnewprogramformakingthebenefitsofourscientific
advances
and
industrial
progress
available
for
the
improvement
and
growth
of
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underdevelopedareas".TheideawaspickedupquiteenthusiasticallyinIndia(withtheestablishmentin1948oftheDamodarValleyCorporation:SahaandBarrow,1981),inMexico(BarkinandKing,1970),andmanyother countries, including Iran,Columbia,Brazil, Egypt,Mozambique, Salvador, Sri Lanka,Surinam, Tanzania and Turkey, where schemes were planned or implemented with mixed success
(Molle,2006).
Geopolitical
considerations
also
led
to
the
idea
being
floated
for
the
Danube,
the
Jordan
River,andthe"vastMekong[which]canprovidefoodandwaterandpoweronascaletodwarfevenourownTVA"(Johnson,1965).
Most thirdworldeliteswereall tooeager toacceptamodel thatpromised tospreadmodernismandprogress to theirnewly independentcountries,while strengthening their legitimacy through theprovisionof iconicandpolitically rewardingprojects.TheTVAmodelwellbefittedconventionalstatepaternalism andmassive state investment in river system infrastructure and technology: riverbasindevelopmentwouldgeneratesignificantamountsofhydroelectricitytopowerdevelopingeconomies,helpcontrolflooddamage,bringprosperitytoruralmasses,andthuscontributetomodernizationandstatebuilding.
France:Inthelate1960s,FranceestablishedAgencesFinanciresdeBassin(FinancialBasinAgencies)
in
each
of
the
six
main
river
basins,
as
part
of
the
1964
water
law.
The
agencies
were
a
response
to
criticalwaterqualityproblemsaswellasameanstoensurethelargeflowsneededtocoolthenewlybuilt nuclear plants (Nicolazo, 1997). The central feature of the agencies is the mix of economicincentivestousersandpolluterstoimprovetheirpracticescomplementedbyBasinCommitteeswhichfacilitates representation of the state, local government and users (Barraqu, 1999). In interveningyearstheyhavetakenovernewplanningresponsibilitiesandbeenrenamedAgencesde lEau(WaterAgencies)butwaterqualitycontrolremainsacentralgoal,especiallyaftertheEuropeanUnionissuedmorestringentenvironmentalstandardsin1992(Betlem,1998).
Becauseoftheirrelativesuccessinmobilizingfundsandredistributingthemassubsidiestovariouswatersanitationandwaterqualityenhancingprojects,theAgencesweresoonalsoturnedintoamodelwhichwasproposedthroughdifferentjointcooperativeprojectswithcountriessuchasIndonesia,and
later
Morocco,
Algeria,
Venezuela,
Mexico,
Turkey,
and
Brazil
(MMA,
2001).
The
model
was
promoted
by the Government of France which surfed the postRio IWRM wave and supported, in 1994, theestablishmentofthe InternationalNetworkofRiverBasinOrganizations (INBO),hostedby theOfficeInternationalde lEau (OiEAU),anorganizationmainly fundedby the Frenchwater industryand thegovernment(GovernmentofFrance,2007).
The strength of the French model is perhaps best illustrated by its decisive influence on theEuropean Water Framework Directive (WFD), which incorporated the principle of river basinmanagementand imposed itonallmembercountries.Another specific reason for thepowerof thismodel,however, lies in its incorporationof theeconomicallyorthodox 'userpays'and 'polluterpays'principles,especiallyafter theirendorsementby theenvironmentalmovementwhich saw themasapromiseofreduceduseandincreasedwaterflowsinEuropeanrivers.Australia: In Australia, the MurrayDarling Basin Initiative and its implementing body, the MDB
Commission,havebeenresponsibleintheirfirst22yearsofoperationforimplementingthepoliciesnegotiated by the Ministerial Council, which represents the federal government, the four stategovernmentsofQueensland,NewSouthWales,Victoria,andSouthAustralia,andtheAustralianCapitalTerritory.TheMDBinitiativeisconsideredtohavebeenveryinnovativeinexploringandimplementingprocessestoincreasetheefficiencyandsustainabilityofwateruse.Earlyeffortsincludedidentificationof systemwide salinizationproblemsandacomprehensivepackageofmeasures to tackle that issueincludingtradingbetweengovernmentsof 'saltcredits'.MDBCwasalsoakeyplayer inwatersharingagreements, the establishment of a water market, formal agreements to cap the level of waterabstractions in subbasins, and independent public audits of the performance of each subbasin inadheringtocapagreements(Haisman,2004).Despitetheseefforts,thebasinhealthandsustainabilityofproduction isstillseriouslythreatenedandtensionsbetweenthepartnerscontinue.Catalysedbyalonglastingseriousdrought,frustratedbytheunderstandablepartisanshipofindividualmembers,and
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concernedthattheexistinginstancesofcooperationdespitemanypositiveaspectsareinsufficient,in2007thefederalgovernmentlaunchedatakeoverbid.Aswaterhasassumedfargreatersignificanceon the national agenda, the federal government has 'purchased' new powers to exercise moreauthorityonwholeofbasin issuesconsideredcrucialtothesocialandeconomichealthofthenation
(Connell,2006).
This experience, with its successes and failures, is of course linked to particular physical andinstitutional settings. Yet, the Australian federal government widely promoted the MurrayDarlingmodel,especiallyinAsia,andhasbeeninfluentialinsupportingestablishmentofRBOsincountriessuchas China, Sri Lanka and Vietnam, and also the creation of transboundaryjurisdictions such as theMekongRiverBasin(Malanoetal.,1999;Birchetal.,1999;Pigram,2001;Molle,2005).
InterestinglytheconceptofRBOasnecessaryforwatermanagementisbeingpromoteddespitethehugevariation insuchorganizations:althoughtheycomeunderthesametermandtheyalldealwithriverbasins,thethreeRBOmodelsreviewedabovedifferwidely.TheTVAmodelrepresentedastageofstateledmassiveinfrastructuraldevelopment(which,significantly,wasneveragainreplicatedintheUS,notablybecauseofpowerconflictswithbothfederal andstatelevelagencies).TheFrenchmodelwas
designed
to
respond
to
water
quality
degradation
and
to
meet
Frances
need
for
more
nuclear
plants,
whilesimultaneously internalizingcosts.TheMurrayDarlingCommissionspecificallyaddressedwatersharingand,later,managementofenvironmentaldegradationandincreasingwaterscarcity.Althoughthey have distinct purposes these models sometimes find themselves in competition and are allpotentialsourcesof'lessonslearned'forvariedcontexts.
AWorldBankreportnotedthattheTVA"hasperhapsthebestnamerecognitioninthebusinessofriverbasinmanagement.ItisconsideredbymanyoutsidetheUnitedStatesasthemodelforriverbasindevelopmentandmanagement"(MillerandReidinger,1998)17and isstillpresentedbyUSAID(2007c)as an uncontroversial and resounding success, despite the serious reservations that even a limitedreviewofTVAliteraturewouldsubstantiate.TheMurrayRiverBasinCommissionhasbeenpromotedasacaseof"aworldsbestpracticemodelinbasinmanagement,particularlyacrossjurisdictionalborders"
(Linn
and
Bailey,
2002).
Yet
promoters
tend
to
gloss
over
the
respective
weaknesses
or
specific
limitationsofeachofthemodels.Forexample,continuedenvironmentaldegradation(MillerandHirsch,2003) or failure to curb abstraction (Connell, 2006) in theMurrayDarlingbasin, orheateddebatesaroundtheAgencesdelEau(Flory,2003),seldommakeheadlinesininternationalcircles.
Modelsprovetobequitemalleablewhenimplemented.Thisisshown,forexample,bythevariousincarnationsof theTVAmodelwhichhave little in commonwith their forbear. Likewise theTurkishmodelofIMTwasinspiredbytheMexicanmodelbutfellshortofestablishingautonomouswaterusergroups.This is littlewonderbecausemodelsarebynaturedecontextualizedand theirapplication inspecific settings can but lead to utter diversity; but this is also testimony of the preeminence ofpolitical and other motives in the adoption of a given model, especially when the context andmodalitiesofitsimplementationarequitedistinctfromthecircumstances inwhichtheoriginalmodelwas developed. In some cases, this can also signal the excessive zeal of development banks andcooperationagencies in replicatingmodels.18However selective,borrowing from theoriginal IMTorriverbasinmanagementmodelscanalso,morepositively,beconstruedasaninitialsteponacommontrajectory that gradually institutionalizes decentralization in resource management and
17AsnotedbyMillerandHirsch(2002),thispublicationfollowedaWorldBanksponsoredseminar"RiverBasinManagement:
TennesseeValleyAuthorityandtheMurrayDarlingBasin"onFebruary13,1997heldinWashington,DC,andwaswrittenwiththeaimofsummarising"thoseaspectsofTVAparticularlythoserelatedtowaterresourcesmanagementthatcouldserveas a useful reference to Bank staff and client countries in evaluating the various institutional arrangements, operatingprograms, technological bases, and other conditions conducive to comprehensive river basin development" (Miller andReidinger,1998).18
For
example,
the
experience
with
participatory
management
of
irrigation
in
the
Philippines
was
praised
as
amodel
and
replicatedinThailand,Indonesia,SriLanka,andNepal,whereitfailedaltogether.
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democratizationofdecisionmaking(MeublatandLourd,2001). InBrazilor inMexico(Wester,2008),reformshavecreatedpoliticalspaceforthecivilsociety,beyondwhatstateagencieshadanticipated.
Models fit easily into the 'practiceof development', viewed as theprovisionof adequateexpertknowledge, technologyand targeted infrastructure investments thatare traditionallyassociatedwith
theengineering
world
and
state
visions
of
social
engineering
(Long
and
van
der
Ploeg,
1989;
Scott,
1998;
Arceand Long,2000;MollingaandBolding,2004).Models canalsopropup the social legitimacyoftechnical expertise19 as well as of the state. They foster topdown bureaucratic approaches thatprecludesgenuineparticipationofstakeholders(MillerandHirsch,2003);andtheyallowreplicationofcapital intensiveprojectsthatmeetthe interestsofapowerfulcoalitionofconstructionfirms,banks,politiciansandbureaucrats(Ostrometal.,1993;MolleandRenwick,2005).Morefundamentallytheykeeppoliticsatbaybypromotingahistoricalrecipes.
THEEPIDEMIOLOGYOFPOLICYCONCEPTS
Graspingthedynamicinterplayofnirvanaconcepts,narrativesandmodelsisarealchallenge:thereare
validating
linkages
among
these
three
categories
of
concepts
and
self
reinforcing
implicit
causalities
between concepts within the same category. For example IWRM (a nirvana concept) providesjustification for riverbasinmanagement (whichwillbe linked toa specificRBOmodel) thatcalls fordemandmanagementandpricingpoliciesanchored in several storylines (realpricesbringefficiency,etc).Policies,technicalassistance(TA)grants,anddevelopmentprojectstranslatetheseconcepts intoconcreteactions.
An intriguing issue is the social andpolitical lifeof these concepts. Inotherwordshowdo theyemerge, spread, and influence policy, practice and intellectual production; how do they becomeresilient,sometimeshegemonic,adapt/mutateorjustvanish?Conceptsdonot,ofcourseemergefroma vacuum, and canonlybeunderstood as social andpolitical constructs shapedby the interplayofinstitutions,networks,interests,andvisionsofthefuture(Mosse,2004).Afewpreliminaryreflectionscanbedrawnfromtheexamplesgivenabove.Althoughthethreetypesofconceptsare influentialatdifferentlevels,weexaminehere1)howtheyarereproducedandspread,2)the incentivesforactorsinvolvedinthatprocess,and3)theprocessof'paradigmmaintenance'thatisactivatedwhentheyneedtoprotected.
Thesnowballingeffect
Snowballing is the process through which a concept is gradually adopted by a growing number ofdispersed actors, projected in professional events, circulated in academic literature, and graduallyestablished as a consensual and controlling idea. A concept may pursue its course by itself oncelauncheddownhillbutitdoesneedabiginitialpush.Ifthepushisnotsufficienttheconceptmightnotacquireenoughmomentumtoestablishitself.Ifitistoostrong,itmaywellarousestiffoppositionand
bediscredited.
Success
means
that
the
model,
or
the
concept,
is
self
sustaining
because
enough
people
havebeenconvincedandarereadytoutilizeitprofessionally,thusminimizingforallusersthepersonalriskofconfrontingcriticism,andinsomecasesmaximizingusersrewards(seebelow).
Such informalgroupsofactors that takeupand furtherpropagateaconceptcomeclose towhatHaas(1992)hastermedepistemiccommunities,20thatis,"anetworkofprofessionalswithrecognizedexpertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevantknowledge within that domain or issuearea". An epistemic community may consist of academics,decisionmakersandotherprofessionals fromdifferentdisciplineswho shareasetofnormativeandprincipledbeliefs,aswellascausalbeliefsandcauseandeffectunderstandings.Epistemiccommunities
19SeeforexampletheprestigeassociatedwiththeingenieroinLatinAmericaorthemouhandisintheArabworld.
20
Rap
(2006)
uses
the
concept
of
policy
network
to
designate
the
"network
of
active
supporters
enrolled
in
the
proliferation
of
apolicy".
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typicallyrespondtoademandforexpertopinioninthefaceofincreasinglycomplexsocietalproblems.Members do not need to meet frequently or in a formalmanner and are, rather, linked (typicallythroughacademicorprofessionalliterature)bytheirconsensualbeliefsandknowledgereferences,andbytheirsharedobjectiveofinfluencingpolicy.21
Epistemiccommunities
often
contribute
to
establishing
institutions
which
will
carry
the
message
forwardanddevelop it.ActorsaroundtheIMTparadigmandmodels,forexample,proposedcreatingthe INPIMnetwork (Rap,2006).Those involvedwithpromoting IWRMsupported thecreationoftheGlobalWaterPartnership,whilepromotersofriverbasinmanagementsupportedtheestablishmentofthe InternationalNetwork of BasinOrganizations (INBO); the GWP and INBO have also establishedregionalbranches.All these themes (IWRM,basinmanagement, IMT)havebeensupportedbymanydonors,andhavepaved theway for innumerableMScprogrammes,capacitybuildingactivities, fieldtrips,internationalconferences,WorldWaterForums,andpublications(Conca,2006).
DevelopmentagencieslikeSida,GTZ,USAID,AusAIDorDFID,andUNagencies,haveallcontributedto these dynamics but none of them comes close to the role and influence of the internationaldevelopmentbanks,principallytheWorldBank.TheBankhasalwaysmaintainedakeeninterestinthe
dissemination
of
ideas
and
has
even
recently
morphed
into
a
"knowledge
bank",
claiming
to
be
both
a
neutralgatekeeperandamajorproducerofknowledge (Mehta,2001).Between1997and2002,theBank spent US$283 million reorganizing itself in line with its intent of becoming a "knowledgeinstitution".Farmorewasspentonactualactivitiessuchastrainingandreports.TheBanksresearchiswidelydisseminatedandhighlyrespectedamongmany importantaudiences.22AstudycommissionedbytheSwedishgovernmentin2000concludedthat"theWorldBankcontinuestobedominantasthemainpurveyorofdevelopmentideas"(BrettonWoodsProject,2007).
Bankpublicationpowerisunparalleled:beyonditsownworkingpapers,reports,briefsandscientificjournal (e.g. theWorldBankObserver), it alsopublishesbooks, frequently in associationwithotherpublishers, and supports associatedjournals (e.g. World Development). Bank researchers and theirconsultantsproducednearly4,000papers,books,andreportsbetween1998and2005,orroughly500
documents
annually
(Banerjee
et
al.,
2006).
This
flood
of
literature
is
amplified
by
the
World
Banks
organizationof,orsupportto,manynationaland internationalevents.The literatureemanatingfromtheBank ishighlyselfreferentialand tendstoreproducetheconclusionsof (early)keypaperswhicharerepeatedlycited,disseminated,andthuspassedontooutsideacademiccircles.ArecentreviewofBankresearchduringthe19982005periodissued"criticismsofthewaythatthisresearchwasusedto proselytizeon behalf of Bank policy,oftenwithout taking a balanced view of the evidence, andwithoutexpressingappropriatescepticism.InternalresearchthatwasfavourabletoBankpositionswasgivengreatprominence,andunfavourableresearchignored"(Banerjeeetal.,2006).
As thesnowballgrows insize,dissent tends tobemechanicallysuppressed,1) through the sheerdisproportionbetweendiscourseand literaturepromoting,anddiscourseand literatureopposing,thestoryline; 2) because the risk of professional marginalization increases; and, 3) because key actorspositively internalized the concept and consider it as auniversal 'best practice'. It is then taken forgrantedandcanbecometrulyhegemonicifacceptedwithoutbeingquestionedevenbypeopleagainstwhom these ideas work (Gramsci, 1971). As a World Bank official replied, when asked why he
21According to Haas (1992): "The epistemic communities approach focuses on this process through which consensus is
reachedwithinagivendomainofexpertiseandthroughwhichtheconsensualknowledgeisdiffusedtoandcarriedforwardbyotheractors. Itsprimaryconcern isthepolitical influencethatanepistemiccommunitycanhaveoncollectivepolicymaking,ratherthanthecorrectnessoftheadvicegiven".22
According to the BrettonWoods Project (2007),700,000 users amonth access theBank'swebsite.A1999WorldBanksurveyof271highlevelpolicymakersin36developingandtransitioncountriesfoundthatof itsrespondents84%useBankproducedanalyticalreports;theBankwasratedthemostimportantinformationsourceofalistofdomesticandinternationalorganisations; the majority considered the Bank's work "technically sound, relevant and objective". According to aGovernmentofficialfromBrazilrespondingtoasurveyontheBank'sknowledgesharing"TheBankistheinstitutionwhichwe
addresswhen
we
need
some
kind
of
information
or
advice.
Dont
underestimate
this
fact.
If
you
really
need
an
expert
on
acertainissuerelatedtodevelopment,theWorldBankiswhereyougo[to]"(WorldBank,2003).
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considered theMexican case tobea success:"becausenobodydenies it isa success" (cited inRap,2006).
Somemodels,however, fadeaway rapidlybecause theyare lessconvincingorcredibleandwerenever supportedby a criticalmassofpublicationsor apolicynetwork strongenough to generate a
snowballeffect
(Latour,
1989).
Turkeys
IMT
was
directly
inspired
by
the
Mexican
model
(decision
makersmadeseveraltripstoMexico)andforashorttimeitwasbelievedthatitwouldbecomeanewshowcase;sowasAndhraPradeshwith its 'bigbangreform'(Mooij,2003;Nikku,2006).Otherstravelfarandwidebutatthecostofaselectivepresentationoftheexperience:theNIA(NationalIrrigationAdministration) reform in the Philippines, for example,waspraisedwith regard to transferof smallschemes while the much less successful experience in transferring largescale public schemes toirrigationassociationswasnevercriticallyexamined(Oorthuizen,2003;MollingaandBolding,2004).
Incentiveforinvolvedactors
Theconceptandadoptionofmodelsbringsseveralbenefits to theparties involved, includingpolicymakersandmanagersinrecipientcountries,expertsandacademics,aswellasdevelopmentbanks.This
isapparent,
for
example,
in
the
RBO
models:
beyond
the
genuine
belief
that
success
could
be
replicated
anddevelopmentfostered,TrumansbidtoexporttheTVAmodelwasalsopredicateduponthepowerofthedemocraticrhetoricembeddedinthemodelthatservedgeopoliticalinterestsinthefightagainstcommunism,23 and the interest of engineering and construction companies that couldbenefit fromimplementing hightech dams in countries which did not have the technical capacity to constructthem.24Similar interests inbothpromotingnational industrialandconsulting firms,andexpandingacountryspolitical/symbolic influence,arealsosalient in thesupportbyFranceandAustraliaof theirrespectivemodels.
Fornationalelites,modelsofferfirstofallapossible(atleastapartial)solutiontosignificantwatermanagement problems. Second, they offer a means to espouse the referential of bilateral andmultilateraldonorsandtoattract fundsfromcountrieseagertospread theirmodel,ordevelopment
bankseager
to
place
loans
successfully,
upon
which
technical
staff
members
year
end
bonuses
are
based(Chambers,1997).Third,becausemodelssupposedlybringlegitimacyandembodyapromiseofsuccess (Mollinga andBolding,2004), they areoftenmobilized inbureaucratic struggles inorder tojustify/impose,forexample,aparticularreconfigurationofthebureaucracyordecentralizationpolicies.InIndonesia,theFrenchmodelservedtojustifythelevyofapollutiontax;inBrazilthefederalNationalWaterandEnergyAgencypromotedtheFrenchmodelinanticipationofa'fiscaldrought'asameanstoensureaseparatebudget, independentof thestate (MeublatandLourd,2001).Although IWRMhasbeen largely hijacked by state bureaucracies the concept has also internally been appropriated indifferentways. InVietnamand inThailandthenewMinistriesofNaturalResourcesandEnvironmentsawtheintermediatescaleoftheriverbasinastheirlegitimatelevelofaction,butalsoasawindowofopportunity for obtaining some power and an expanded rolewithin the preexisting administrative
structuredominated
by
the
Ministry
of
Agriculture
and
Rural
Development
(in
Vietnam)
or
the
Royal
Irrigation Department (in Thailand). The concept of integrated river basin management and RBOintroduced, at the instigation of the ADB, as pillars of IWRM became sites and objects of internalstruggleinthecontextofwiderbureaucraticchange(MolleandHoanh,2007).
National policymakers also have significant incentives to rely on sanctioned concepts.Straightforward advantages include travel to international conferences,jointpublications, andotherfringebenefitsbutalso the increasedprofessional reputationandderivedcareerenhancements thatmayaccompanyinvolvementwithasuccessstoryoranirvanaconcept.ManynationalrepresentativesofGWPweregiventheopportunitytoacquireregionalorinternationalstatus.Rap(2006)showedthat
23"TheTVAwasaweaponwhich,ifproperlyemployed,mightoutbidallthesocialruthlessnessoftheCommunistsforthe
supportof
the
peoples
of
Asia"
(Schlesinger,
1949;
cited
in
Ekbladh,
2002).
24
SahaandBarrow(1981)refertothe"hugeprofitsmadebyoverseasconstructionandconsultancyfirms"inmostcases.
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severalMexicanwaterofficials associatedwith the IMT reformwere able to project themselves asinternationalconsultants,virtually'selling'themodel.TheMexicangovernmentbureaucracycontrolledthe releaseofpublic informationon theprogressand successof the transferandorchestratedmassmediacampaigns todrawsupport to the reformandsatisfydonors.Over time, the trajectoryof the
policymodel
mobilised
and
united
these
groups
into
an
epistemic
community
of
transnational
policy
makers. Their activitiesoverlapped,paths crossed, and interrelationsmultiplied throughmultilateralinstitutions, conferences, professional associations, and so forth. Through these influences theyincreasinglysharedanddisseminatedanumberofculturalandideologicalunderstandings,values,andpractices thatunderpin the successof thepolicymodel.This selfreinforcingcongruence shaped theproduction of the policymodel and its acceptance and fashionability amongpeer communities andpolicyelitesinrelevantpolitical,financial,andhydraulicinstitutionsaroundtheworld(Rap,2006).
Models also epitomize the rational and reductionist process of policy and planning, anchored inexpert knowledge and replicability of solutions. Therefore they offer attractive blueprints fordevelopmentbanksor agencieswhichneed to saveon administration and transaction costs and toavoidlengthy,costly,andaboveallconfusingindepthanalysesofeachspecificsituation.Asstressedby
Evans
(2004)
"the
intellectual
difficulties
of
translating
the
complexities
of
institutional
analysis
into
concretesuggestionsfordevelopmentpolicyandpracticearesufficientlydauntingtomakeretreattosimplermodelsaconstanttemptation".Fathomingthecomplexityofaparticulardevelopmentcontextwill,inall likelihood,surfaceconfusedandconflictingviews.Thisinstilsdoubt,hindersaction,anddelegitimizes the application of models that, on the contrary, are based on stable, simplified, anddepoliticizednarratives.Blueprintsandmodelsthusplaykeyroles inpreparingandsellingprojects, inpart because they represent 'certified' testimony that 'development can work'. This importance ofmodelsexplainswhy thebanksarealsokeen to intervenewhen financialorotherdifficulties, in thecourseoftime,threatentounderminetheirstatusasasuccessstory(asshownbythecaseofAndhraPradeshin2001:Mooij,2003).
Severalpowerful incentives targetingdevelopmentagencystaffalso leadto ideologicalorthodoxy
and
elicit
adherence
to
approved
narratives
and
models.
Using
interviews
with
several
World
Bank
staff
andpartners,Broad (2006) singledout severalmutuallyreinforcing structures, including "a seriesofincentives:increasinganindividualschancestobehired,toadvanceonescareer,tobepublished,tobepromotedbytheBanksexternalaffairsdepartment,and,ingeneral,tobeassessedpositively".Theassociationofheftysalaries,lucrativebonusesforsuccessfulloanplacement,postretirementschemesandcontractsthataretemporaryinnatureactsas'goldenhandcuffs'andtendstogenerateconformity,limiting"dissentbyincreasingthe'opportunitycosts'ofanydissidence"(Broad,2006)orevenbydirectcensorship.25 This particularly applies to national staff members employed by the Bank, who areunderstandablynot very keen tojeopardize their gains in social status and salary for the sakeof amundanedoctrinaldisagreement.26JustasoperationspeoplearerewardedforpreparingloansthattheBank approves (Meltzer, 2000; Easterly, 2001), Bank researchers are rewarded for bolstering theeconomicparadigmand ideologicalunderpinningsoftheBank.Suchresearcheffortsmaysometimesamountto"paradigmmaintenance".
25Senior Bank researcher David Ellerman complained of "bureaucratic conformity", with public relations staff acting as
"thoughtpolicetotheblacksheepintheorganizationwhoarenot'onmessage'"(BrettonWoodsProject,2007).26
Asastaffmemberatheadquartersrealisticallyadmitted,"IhavetwosonsstudyinginUSuniversitiesandthatcostsalot;Iamnotgoingtorocktheboat".ForamorestringentcritiqueseeGoldman(2005):"Aconsultantforthe[World]BankinAddismakes the equivalent of thirty timeswhat an equally qualified economistmakes. TheWorld Bank successfully cultivated
transnationalprofessional
class
actors
and
networks
that
not
only
meet
the
Banks
needs
but
have
their
own
interests
and
rolestoplay,suchasservingnationalpoliticalandcorporateagendas".
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Paradigmmaintenance
Justasintheformationofepistemiccommunities,thepromotionofnarrativesandmodelsisrarelytheresultofapurposefulstrategicorconspiracybut,rather,abyproductofthewebofinterestsdescribedabove. As social constructs, these concepts and models are rarely neutral and embody causal
assumptionsabout
how
societies
work
and
normative
beliefs
about
how
they
should
work,
as
well
as
conceptions about international relations, governance, or how to exercise power. Unsurprisingly,economicandpoliticalassumptionsaredeeplyideological,evenifthisisnotalwaysapparent.
Theframingconceptsofpoverty,economicgrowth,governance,andmarkets,whichunderpinthemodelsandbestpracticespromotedbytheBankinevitablyendupbeingbeliedbyparticulareventsorinstances.Insuchacasethenarrativemayrequireactiveprotectionsothatthesnowballdoesnotmelt.Broad (2006), for example, documented how the paradigm linking openness to foreign trade andinvestmentandfastergrowthhadtobeinternallyprotectedbydiscardingcontraryevidenceandevenmassaging executive summaries so that Bank ideological axiomatics (in that case, the WashingtonConsensus)would remainunsullied.More specifically, Easterly (2001)has vividlydescribedhow thenarrativeofthefinancinggap,thatfirstlinksgrowthtocapitalinvestmentandthenjustifiesforeignaid
bythe
lack
of
national
savings
for
achieving
necessary
investments
(hence
the
need
to
'fill
the
gap'),
has
survivedduring50years(andisstillactive),despiterenewedacademicrefutation.27Asimilarexampleof"theartofparadigmmaintenance"relatedtotheinterpretationoftheEastAsianeconomicmiraclehasbeenanalysedbyWade(1996).
Thepreeminenceof ideologicalbias sometimes leads tosituationswhereargumentsareatoddswith reality. One example is the insistence of international organizations on downsizing waterbureaucraciesandinternalizingcostsofactivitiessubsidizedbythestate,whicheventuallyunderminedstateaction(Chambers,1997).Othersincludethemythofefficiencylinkedtoprivatization(Letzaetal.2004), and the argument of the 'fiscal drain': establishing water charges, for example, is oftenpredicatedontheimpossibilityforthegovernmenttocontinueshoulderingsuchcosts,evenincontextswhere this argument is unwarranted.While Sur andUmaliDeininger (2003) stress that in 1997/98,
canalirrigation
subsidies
were
equivalent
to
2.6%
of
the
fiscal
deficit
in
Karnataka
and
7%
of
the
fiscal
deficitinAndhraPradesh,thisonlyamountsto0.1and0.3%ofrespectivestateexpenditures,aratherlimitedsubsidyifredistributiontofarmingpopulationsisconsideredastatepolicy.Likewise,inThailandHalcrow&PartnersandARCADIS/Euroconsult(2001)proposedirrigationcostsharingpoliciesbecauseofthe"hugedrainonthenationalbudget"occasionedbysubsidies,buttheseonlyrepresent0.27%ofThai government expenditures. In Jordan, the presentO&M subsidy to the Jordan ValleyAuthorityamountsto lessthan0.1%ofstateexpendituresestimatedatUS$3.7billion(VenotandMolle,2007).Thisdoesnotmeanthatcostrecoverymeasuresareunsoundbutitisstrikingtoseehowtheycanbefostered by an ideology of 'real costs' propelled by expertswho often come fromOECD countries,whereyearlyaggregatedsubsidiestoagricultureexceed300billiondollars(WorldBank,2008).
The link between poverty and water resource development is another example of a paradigm
infusedwith
ideology
and
interests
that
needs
regular
maintenance
because
of
its
major
importance
for
justifyingfurther investments.Onesubquestion isaboutthetypesof investmentsneededforAfricanagriculture, notably with regard to irrigation. The potential irrigation area established by a reportcommissionedbytheBritishCommissionforAfricawasjudgedtoolowbypoliticalandotherinterestsinwantofahighertarget(andwassubsequentlydoubled).AnotherstudyhasbeencommissionedbyseveralinternationalorganizationstodrawlessonsfromagriculturalwatermanagementinvestmentsinsubSaharan Africa. The drafting of the report was 'hijacked' by one of the partners with a strong
27Themodelisbasedonaworkwrittenin1946byDomar(andlaterrepudiatedbyitsowncreator)andwasgivensaliencein
Rostow'stheoryofeconomictakeoff.Whenthedogmawascriticizedinthe1980sitwasmodifiedsoastostatethat"althoughphysicalcapitalaccumulationmaybeconsideredanecessaryconditionofdevelopment, ithasnotprovedsufficient".This is
probablythe
clearest
example
of
how
afalse
narrative
debunked
by
economic
science
can
nevertheless
endure
over
half
acenturywhenitservespowerfulinterestsbyprovidingadhocjustifications.SeemoredetailsinEasterley(2001).
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interest inpromoting largewater investments. Itusedconsultantswhowrote the report inaway tosupport higher investments in conventional irrigation, and deliberately downplayed the potentialreturns from investing in microagricultural water management technology and upgrading rainfedagriculture, retaining thisbiaseven after a groupof seniorAfricanpeer reviewersexpressed strong
reservationsabout
it
(Merrey,
2007).
Inpracticethejustificationsgiventosupport theborrowingofamodel,thedesignofaparticularproject,ortheestablishmentofaparticularpolicy,oftenrevealshiftingcontradictionsandflawsthataretellingindicationsofideologicalbiasandotherconcealedmotivations.
IMPLICATIONSFORPOLICYMAKING
Regardlessofhowtheseglobalconceptsandiconsemergeandaredisseminated,theyhavebynatureanumber of consequences for development interventions and for policy formulation andimplementation.Not all these implications are negative. Sanctioned concepts andmodels outline arather stable and consensual common ground for water experts or officials worldwide to meet,
exchange,
discuss
and
learn
from
each
other
by
putting
their
own
particular
water
problems
into
perspective(Bauer,2004).ForvanderZaag(2005)IWRMconceptshave"inspiredanewgenerationofwatermanagers and researchers to think out of thebox and act creatively [and] broughtmutualrespect,understandingandcooperationamongwaterprofessionalsinSouthernAfrica".Beyondwaterprofessionals,IWRMasanirvanaconcepthasalsoallowedotherconstituencies,interestgroupsandNGOs tousetheconceptto frameanddisseminate theirownvisions.Sanctionedconceptsallowthediffusionofgeneralprinciplesand the identificationofcommonproblemsand solutionsatagenericlevel; theyoffer support/expertiseand fosternationalprocessesof reflectiononwaterpolicies; theysometimes encourage dialogues between segments of the administration or ministries that shareresponsibilitiesonwaterissuesbutfailtocoordinatetheiractions.
Thedownsideofthesepositiveaspectsistheconceptionofadequateknowledgeasa'bestpractice'that tends to become normative. Yet valueladen 'truths' are insensitive to context, and typicallyoverrideendogenoussolutions.Knowledgeisconceivedofasneutralinformationthatcanbeprovidedlikeanyothercommodityifitisproperlyorganized,archived,andtransmitted.Thereisastrongtensionbetween the World Banks messages that it wants to avoid blueprint approaches, and its manydocumentsandindicatorswhichclaimtomeasure28'therightpolicies'(BrettonWoodsProject,2007).Likewise,whileontheonehandtheADB formallyacknowledgesthat"there isnostandardapproachthat fitsalltheneeds" (Arrins,2004),on theother, itproposesaquiteunambiguousmodelof 'the'appropriate water regime, whereby "modern" water laws are enacted, the state is confined to aregulatory role which it then decentralizes to RBOs, while provision of irrigation and urban water"services" ishandledbyutilitiesorprivate sectorproviders thataredulypaidby their customers inordertoensurefullcostrecovery(Arrins,2004).Changesareevaluatedbasedontheformalexistenceofparticularadministrativedevicesor institutions,withoutexaminingtheircontentsandprocesses inanygreatdepth.29
28SalethandDinar(2000),forexample,reviewwaterreformprocessesin11countriesandextractforeachofthemwhatthey
consider as "best practices", or "healthy practices that can strengthen the institutional basis for betterwater allocation,financing,andmanagement";theseincludeIMT,theformationofRBOs,waterpermitregistry,marketbasedwaterallocation,privatization of urban water supply, water law, etc. These practices are presented as elements whose achievement is ameasureofsuccessandmodernism,butneithertheirrelevance(orlackthereof)toaparticularcontextnorhowtoassessthatrelevanceisdiscussed.29
A graphic example of this is provided by a "progress report" on water sector reforms in Asia (Mosley, 2004), whichestablishes a list of 41 "policy elements" and estimates to which degree different countries have achieved them. These
elementsinclude
"legislation
adopted",
"private
sector
investments",
"cost
recovery",
"river
basins/aquifer
organization",
"rightsandresponsibilitiesofstakeholders",etc.
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somemodelsornarratives fade awaybecause they fail toestablish themselves in competitionwithmore 'effective' concepts. Voluntary efforts to strengthen or keep afloat embattled doctrinairenarratives(withsomecasesofparadigmmaintenance)alsosuggestthattheyarenotimmunetocriticalanalysis and that practitioners and applied researchers can, with persistence either root out
inappropriateconcepts
or
incrementally
refine
and
improve
those
that
do
offer
real
value
to
acommunityofwaterusersandotheractors.
Ifmodels and nirvana conceptswork to mobilize their promoters and tend to reflect dominantinterestsandthedistributionofpowerinsociety,theyalsoservetomobilizeprotestsandtorallythosewho feel they stand to lose in the conceptual game. Instances of IMT introduced in Sri Lanka orparticipatory irrigationmanagement(PIM)inPakistan,attemptstoestablishirrigationwaterpricinginThailand, or privatization and tradablewater rights in Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru have allconfrontedstiffresistance.Sometimescounterhegemonicdiscoursesandconceptsmayalsoarise.
CONCLUSIONS
This
article
examined
some
of
the
cognitive
dimensions
of
policy
making
in
the
water
sector
by
focusing
onthreetypesofconceptualobjects.Nirvanaconcepts,suchasIWRM,are'photographicnegatives'ofprevailing chaotic situations and embodiments of a consensual reconciliation of antagonisticworldviewsand interests.As theybecomeglobalpoliticalcurrency,nirvanaconceptsare invested in,and reappropriated by, various constituencies as a means of forwarding their agendas or as asmokescreen forbusinessasusual strategies.Yet, theyalsoofferopportunities for contestation andmay serveasboundaryobjectsbyprovidingacommonground fornegotiation. IWRMhasserved todisseminatesociallyandenvironmentallysensitiveconceptsand,perhaps,inspiredanewgenerationofwaterprofessionals.
It has also provided an overarching framework under which various interlinked narratives andmodelshavebeenaccommodated.Narratives structure thinkinganddecisionsbyestablishingcausalbeliefs that are tightly connected with particular policy models. Nirvana concepts, narratives andmodels are disseminated and promoted by a number ofmechanisms inscribed in the professional,social and political sets of incentives faced bymany decisionmakers. They also tend to reflect theideologies and interests of powerful parties and include more active processes of snowballing andparadigm maintenance by which concepts may become hegemonic and fuel a normative andprescriptivepolicymaking.
Roe (1991)doubts thatnarrativesorblueprintswill everbedebunkedby contrary evidence andarguesthatfailednarrativesshouldbereplacedby'betternarratives'or'bettertruths'.Yet,narrativesandmodelsareliabletoinvestigation,canbeweakenedorinvalidatedbyempiricalevidenceandare,inotherwords,falsifiable.Evenifdebatesareneverfullyexhausted,theprincipleofconstantlyreopeningdebates, exposing shortcomings, discussing concepts, engaging opposed views, deconstructinggeneralisations,inotherwordstirelesslypromotingopenness,scrutiny,andaccountability,remainthecentralrecoursesavailabletoactorswhofindtheirinterestsundervaluedorignored,aswaterprojectsareconceptualizedand implemented.Thesearemeanstoforestalldebateclosure(orreopen 'settled'debates)andeffectivelychallengetheneutralizationorexclusionofparticularalternatives,viewpoints,orsocialgroups.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Theauthorwould liketo thankseveralcolleaguesand friends fortheir interest inthispaperand thevaluable comments theymadeonearlierdraftversions: JohnDore,MargreetZwarteveen,PhilippusWester,V.S.Saravanan,JamieThomson,RobertChambersandDougMerrey.SpecialthanksgotoPeterMollingaforfruitfuldiscussionontheconclusion.
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