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No.ICC01/0501/08 1/30 20April2009
Original:English No.:ICC01/0501/08
Date:20April2009
PRETRIALCHAMBERII
Before: JudgeEkaterinaTrendafilova,PresidingJudge
JudgeHansPeterKaul
JudgeFumikoSaiga
SITUATIONINTHECENTRALAFRICANREPUBLIC
INTHECASEOF
THEPROSECUTOR
v.JEANPIERREBEMBAGOMBO
PublicDocument
AMICUSCURIAEOBSERVATIONSONSUPERIORRESPONSIBILITY
SUBMITTEDPURSUANTTORULE103OFTHERULESOFPROCEDUREAND
EVIDENCE
Source: AmnestyInternational
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Documenttobenotifiedinaccordancewithregulation31oftheRegulationsoftheCourtto:
TheOfficeoftheProsecutor
MsFatouBensouda,DeputyProsecutor
MsPetraKneuer,SeniorTrialLawyer
CounselfortheDefence
MrNkwebeLiriss
MrKarimA.A.Khan
MrAimKiloloMusamba
MrPierreLegros
LegalRepresentativesofVictims
MsMarieEdithDouzimaLawson
LegalRepresentativesofApplicants
UnrepresentedVictims UnrepresentedApplicantsfor
Participation/Reparation
TheOfficeofPublicCounselfor
Victims
Ms.PaolinaMassidda
TheOfficeofPublicCounselforthe
Defence
StatesRepresentatives
REGISTRY
AmicusCuriae
Registrar
MsSilvanaArbia
DefenceSupportSection
VictimsandWitnessesUnit DetentionSection
VictimsParticipationandReparations
Section
Other
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I. INTRODUCTION1. Theeffectiveexerciseofcommandisanessentialtoolinensuringthatcrimesunderinternationallawarepreventedand,iftheynonethelessoccur,arepunished:
Sincecommandersarethecriticalpathtoenabling[an]organizationtofight
collectivelytheylogicallymustbethecriticalpathtocontrollingandfocusingthe
violencewhichtheyaloneareresponsibleforreleasingontothebattlefield.1 The
applicationandinterpretationofthedoctrineofsuperiorresponsibilityisthusof
paramountimportancetomilitarycommandersandothersuperiors;2tothosewho
canbeaffectedbysuchsuperiorsexercise,orfailuretoexercise,theircommandor
authorityappropriately;andtotheinternationalcommunityasawhole.
2. ThiscasepresentstheInternationalCriminalCourt(theCourt)withitsfirstopportunitytoanalysethescopeandcontentofthedoctrineofsuperior
responsibilityunderArticle28oftheRomeStatute(theStatute). Itraisesspecific
questionsthatcouldhaveasignificanteffectonthemannerinwhichthedoctrineis
understoodandimplementedworldwide. Inlightoftheseconsiderations,on6April
2009,AmnestyInternationalsoughtleavefromthePreTrialChamber,underRule
103(1)oftheRulesofProcedureandEvidence,tosubmitobservationsasamicuscuriaeoncertainissuesrelatedtosuperiorresponsibility.3 Pursuanttothedecision
dated9April2009grantingthisapplication,4AmnestyInternationalherebysubmits
observationson:(i)thementalelementapplicabletomilitarycommandersabsent
actualknowledge;(ii)criminalresponsibilityforthefailuretosubmitamatterto
1 MichaelA.NewtonandCaseyKuhlman,WhyWarlordsEvadetheLawofCommandResponsibility:A
PleaforaMoreAppropriateConceptionofEffectiveControlat48(draftarticlependingpublication,onfile
withamicuscuriae).MichaelNewtonisProfessorofthePracticeofLawatVanderbiltUniversityLaw
School. Heisaretiredmilitaryattorney,andwasamemberoftheU.S.delegationthatnegotiatedtheElementsofCrimes,whichassisttheCourtintheinterpretationandapplicationofthecrimeswithin
itsjurisdiction.2 Unlessotherwisespecified,thetermssuperior(s)andsuperiorresponsibilityrefertoboth
militaryandciviliansuperiors,whilethetermcommander(s)refersonlytomilitarysuperiors.3 ApplicationForLeavetoSubmitAmicusCuriaeObservationsPursuanttoRule103oftheRulesof
ProcedureandEvidence,6April2009,ICC01/0501/08399.4 DecisiononApplicationforLeavetoSubmitAmicusCuriaeObservationsPursuanttoRule103of
theRulesofProcedureandEvidence,9April2009,ICC01/0501/08401.
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competentauthoritiesasappliedtononstateactors;and(iii)whethercausationisan
elementofsuperiorresponsibility.5
II. MENTALELEMENTAPPLICABLETOMILITARYCOMMANDERSABSENT
ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE
3. ThementalstatessufficienttogroundcriminalresponsibilityformilitarycommandersunderArticle28(a)(i)representanexpressandintendedpolicychoice
ofthedraftersoftheStatutetostrengthencommandersobligationsbeyondthose
undercustomaryinternationallaw. Asexplainedbelow,absentactualknowledge,6
customaryinternationallawimposescriminalresponsibilityonasuperioronlyifhe
orsheisonnoticeofsubordinatescrimes,whileArticle28(a)(i)extendscriminal
responsibilitytoamilitarycommanderwhoshouldhaveknownofsubordinates
crimes. Consequently,Article28(a)(i)replacesthepassivenoticestandardunder
customaryinternationallawwithamoreactivedutytotakestepsthatwillallow
commanderstoknowofcrimescommittedbytheirsubordinates.
A. CustomaryInternationalLawImposesCriminalResponsibilityIfaSuperiorisonNoticeofCrimes,ButDoes
NotImposeanActiveDutytoSeekInformation
4.
Internationallegal
instruments
codifying
the
doctrine
of
superior
responsibilityrecognisebothactualknowledgeandconstructiveknowledgeas
satisfyingthementalelementrequirementofthisformofresponsibilityand,forthe
latter,articulateanoticestandard. Article86(2)ofAdditionalProtocolItothe
GenevaConventionsof1949(AdditionalProtocolI)thefirstcomprehensive
codificationofthesuperiorresponsibilitydoctrineprovidesthatsuperiorsarenot
absolvedofresponsibilityiftheyknew,orhadinformationwhichshouldhave
5 AmnestyInternationalwishestothanktheinternationallawexpertswhoprovidedadviceduring
thedraftingofthisbrief,includingCharlesGarraway(inhispersonalcapacity),MichaelA.Newton
andPatriciaViseurSellers.6 BothArticle28andcustomaryinternationallawimposecriminalresponsibilityonsuperiorsfor
thecrimesoftheirsubordinateswherethesuperiorhadactualknowledgeofthecrime. SeeProsecutor
v.Delali,Muci,Deli,andLando,CaseNo.IT9621T,Judgment,16Nov.1998(elebiiTrial
Judgment),383;Prosecutorv.Muci,Deli,andLando,CaseNo.IT9621A,Judgment,20Feb.2001
(elebiiAppealJudgment),222,239; Prosecutorv.Sesay,Kallon,andGbao,CaseNo.SCSL0415
T,Judgment,2Mar.2009(RUFTrialJudgment),282,309.
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enabledthemtoconcludeinthecircumstancesatthetimethatasubordinatewas
committingorgoingtocommitabreachoftheGenevaConventionsorAdditional
ProtocolI.7 Similarly,draftArticle6oftheInternationalLawCommissions(ILC)
DraftCodeofCrimesagainstthePeaceandSecurityofMankindprovidesthat
superiorsarenotrelievedofresponsibilityiftheykneworhadreasontoknow,in
thecircumstancesatthetimethatasubordinatewascommittingorwasgoingto
commitacrime.8 ThestatutesoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformer
Yugoslavia(ICTY),theInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda(ICTR),and
theSpecialCourtforSierraLeone(SCSL)eachprovidethatasuperiorisnot
relievedofcriminalresponsibilityif[he]kneworhadreasontoknowofthe
subordinatescrimes.9 ThestudybytheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross
(ICRC)alsostatesthatasamatterofcustomaryinternationallaw,thementalelement
forsuperiorresponsibilityisknowledgeorreasontoknow.10
5. Despiteearliercaselawsuggestingapositiveobligationonmilitarycommanderstoobtaininformationirrespectiveofnotice,11contemporary
internationalcriminaltribunalshavelimitedconstructiveknowledgetoamore
7 ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andRelatingtotheProtection
ofVictimsofInternationalArmedConflicts,Art.86(2),1125U.N.T.S.3,enteredintoforce7Dec.1978(AdditionalProtocolI).8 DraftCodeofCrimesAgainstthePeaceandSecurityofMankind,Art.6,inReportofthe
InternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsFortyeighthSession,UNDoc.A/51/10(1996)(ILC
DraftCode). TheILCDraftCodeseekstocodifyinternationalcrimespursuanttoG.A.Res.174(II)
(21Nov.1947).9 StatuteoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsiblefor
SeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedintheTerritoryoftheformer
Yugoslaviasince1991,(1993)32ILM1159,asamendedbySecurityCouncilResolution1660of28Feb.
2006(ICTYStatute),Art.7(3);StatuteoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda,(1994)33
ILM1602,asamendedbySecurityCouncilResolution1534of26Mar.2004(ICTRStatute),Art.6(3);
StatuteoftheSpecialCourtforSierraLeone,2178UNTS138,U.N.Doc.S/2002/246,16Jan.2002,
AppendixII(SCSLStatute),Art.6(3). Theseprovisionshavebeenheldtoreflectcustomary
internationallaw. SeeelebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,241;Prosecutorv.Bagilishema,CaseNo.
ICTR951AT,7June2001(BagilishemaTrialJudgement),37.10 JeanMarieHenckaertsandLouiseDoswaldBeck,InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,
CustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw,Vol.I(Rules)558,r153(2005)(ICRCStudy).11 SeeTrialofWilhelmListandOthers(CaseNo.47),UnitedNationsWarCrimesCommission,Law
ReportsofTrialsofWarCriminals(1949),Vol.VIII,p.71(Ifhefailstorequireandobtaincomplete
information,thederelictionofdutyrestsuponhimandheisinnopositiontopleadhisown
derelictionasadefence.).
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restrictivenoticestandard. Intheelebiicase,theAppealsChamberoftheICTY
consideredthedutiesimposedonsuperiorsundercustomaryinternationallawinthe
courseofitsinterpretationandapplicationofArticle7(3).12 Itheldthatitwas
consistentwithcustomaryinternationallawforasuperiortobefoundcriminally
responsible,intheabsenceofactualknowledge,onlyifinformationwasavailableto
himwhichwouldhaveputhimonnoticeofoffencescommittedbysubordinates.13
Itreachedthisconclusionafterconsideringtheinstrumentscodifyingthedoctrineof
superiorresponsibilityreferredtoabove,aswellasthepostWorldWarII
jurisprudenceonsuperiorresponsibilityandtheFieldManualoftheUnitedStates
DepartmentoftheArmy.14 SubsequentjudgmentsattheICTY,theICTR,andthe
SCSLhaveconsistentlyadoptedandappliedtheelebiistandard.15
6. Theadhoctribunalshavefoundthat,undercustomaryinternationallaw,asuperiorhasnogeneraldutytoactivelyseekandobtaininformationabouthisorher
subordinatespossiblecriminalconduct.16 Thetribunalshavethusrefusedto
recognisesuperiorresponsibilitywhereasuperiorhasmerelybeennegligentin
failingtoacquireknowledgeofhisorhersubordinatescriminalconduct.17
12 elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,221,22839.13 Ibid,241.14 Ibid,22839.15 See,e.g.,Prosecutorv.Blaki,CaseNo.IT9514A,Judgment,29July2004(Blaki Appeal
Judgment),62;Prosecutorv.Strugar,CaseNo.IT0142A,Judgment,17July2008(StrugarAppeal
Judgment),29798;Prosecutorv.Bagilishema,CaseNo.ICTR951AA,Judgment,3July2002
(BagilishemaAppealJudgment),42;Prosecutorv.FofanaandKondewa,CaseNo.SCSL0414T,
Judgment,2Aug.2007(CDFTrialJudgment),233.16 Prosecutorv.Kordi and erkez,CaseNo.IT9514/2T,Judgment,26Feb.2001(Kordi and erkez
TrialJudgment),435(thereisnogeneraldutytoknowincustomaryinternationallawforeither
militaryorciviliansuperiors);RUFTrialJudgment,supranote6,312([A]superiorcannotbeheld
liableforhavingfailedinhisdutytoobtainsuchinformationinthefirstplace.).17 elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,226(findingnoliabilityundercustomaryinternational
lawforfailingtoacquireknowledgeaboutthecriminalactsofsubordinates);BagilishemaAppeal
Judgment,supranote15,3237(findingthatthetestforcriminalnegligenceasadvancedbythe
TrialChambercannotbethesameasthehadreasontoknowtestintermsofArticle6(3)ofthe
Statute);Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,6163(rejectingcriminalnegligencestandard);
Prosecutorv.Brima,Kamara,andKanu,CaseNo.SCSL0416T,Judgment,20June2007,796([S]olely
negligentignoranceisinsufficienttoattributeimputedknowledge.);CDFTrialJudgment,supra
note15,245(asuperiormaynotbeheldliableforfailingtoacquireinformationinthefirstplace).
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B. Article28DepartsfromCustomaryInternationalLawByIncorporatingaNegligenceStandardforMilitaryCommanders
7. Inpointedcontrasttocustomaryinternationallawasreflectedinthejurisprudenceoftheadhoctribunals,Article28(a)(i)imposescriminalresponsibility
onamilitarycommanderifheorsheshouldhaveknownthattheforceswere
committingorabouttocommitsuchcrimes. Article28(a)(i)mustbeinterpretedin
accordancewiththeordinarymeaningofitstermsincontextandinlightofthe
objectandpurposeoftheStatute.18 Theordinarymeaningofthephraseshould
haveknownisnotrestrictedtocircumstanceswhereacommanderisonnotice,
becauseitindicatesanunmetobligationtoobtaininformation.
8.
Furthermore,
an
explicit
object
of
the
Statute
is
to
contribute
to
the
preventionof[seriousinternational]crimes.19 Becauseoftheirpositionandpowers,
militarycommandersareuniquelyplacedtopreventcrimes. Ifcommandersare
subjecttoactiveobligationstoensuretheyremaininformedoftheconductoftheir
subordinates,thereisagreaterlikelihoodthattheywillpreventfuturecrimesor
repressthemmoreswiftly.20 Thenoticestandardassumeswithoutexpresslysaying
thatcommandandcontrolstructuresareinplacethatwillensureinformation
reachesthesuperiors. Incontrast,theshouldhaveknownstandardimpels
commanderstoensurethatsuchmechanismsareinfactinplaceandarefunctioning
correctly. Accordingly,itfurtherstheobjectandpurposeoftheStatutetointerpret
Article28(a)(i)asimposingmoreheighteneddutiesuponcommanderstokeep
18 ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,23May1969,enteredintoforce27Jan.1980,U.N.Doc.
A/Conf.39/27(1969),1155U.N.T.S.331(VCLT),Art.31;SituationintheDemocraticRepublicofthe
Congo,CaseNo.ICC01/04168,JudgmentontheProsecutorsApplicationforExtraordinaryReview
ofPreTrialChamberIs31March2006DecisionDenyingLeavetoAppeal,13July2006,33(The
interpretationoftreaties,andtheRomeStatuteisnoexception,isgovernedbytheViennaConvention
ontheLawofTreaties(23May1969),specificallytheprovisionsofarticles31and32.).19 RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,17July1998,enteredintoforce1July2002,U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.183/9,37ILM1002(1998),2187UNTS90(Statute),preamble.20 SeeNewtonandKuhlman,supranote1,at48([I]nternationallawentrustscommandersasthe
primaryenforcementmechanismforthelawsandcustomsofwar,soanycommanderinany
conflictunderanyformoforganizationwhofieldsafightingforceassumestheriskofcriminalityifhe
doesnotproperlyemplacemechanismstoensurecompliancewiththelawsandcustomsof
warfare.).
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informedoftheactivitiesoftheirsubordinates.
9. Forthesereasons,Article28(a)(i),properlyinterpreted,coverscircumstancesofnotice,butalsoextendssuperiorresponsibilitytoacategoryofcasesnot
criminalisedby
customary
international
law
where
acommanders
absence
of
knowledgeisduetohisorherfailingsinkeepinginformedoftheconductof
subordinates.21 Indeed,notlessthanayearaftertheadoptionoftheStatute,the
ICTRnotedtheimpositionbywayofArticle28ofamoreactivedutyuponthe
[military]superiortoinformhimselfoftheactivitiesofhissubordinates.22 Inshort,
Article28(a)(i)imposescriminalresponsibilityforaformofnegligence.
10. Thetravauxprparatoiresconfirmthisinterpretation.23 DespitetheuseofthehadreasontoknowstandardinthestatutesoftheICTYandICTR,earlydraftsof
theStatuteincorporatedashouldhaveknownstandardforallsuperiors.24 Asa
resultofconcernsoverapplyingtheshouldhaveknownstandardtocivilian
superiors,thedelegationoftheUnitedStatestotheRomeConferenceproposedan
amendmentprovidingfordifferentiatedmentalstandardsformilitaryandcivilian
superiors. Inintroducingitsproposal,therepresentativeoftheUnitedStatesstated
that
[a]n
important
feature
in
military
command
responsibility
and
one
that
was
uniqueinacriminalcontextwastheexistenceofnegligenceasacriterionofcriminal
responsibility.25 TheUnitedStatesrepresentativestatedthatthenegligence
standardwasnotappropriateinaciviliancontextandwasbasicallycontrarytothe
21 SeeKaiAmbos,SuperiorResponsibility,in1TheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:
ACommentary823,869(AntonioCasseseetal.eds.,2003)(concludingthatsuperiorsareresponsible
for...effectivereportingsystem[s]within[their]command);WilliamJ.Fenrick,Article28:
ResponsibilityofCommandersandOtherSuperiors,inCommentaryontheRomeStatuteofthe
InternationalCriminalCourt515,519(OttoTriffterered.,1999).22 Prosecutorv.KayishemaandRuzindana,CaseNo.ICTR951T,Judgment,21May1999,227.23 VCLT,supranote18,Art.32.24 See,e.g.,PreparatoryComm.ontheEstablishmentofanIntl.Crim.Ct.,WorkingGrouponGen.
PrinciplesofCrim.LawandPenalties,ChairmansText,ArticleC:CommandResponsibility,
A/AC.249/1997/WG.2/CRP.3(18Feb.1997).25 U.N.DiplomaticConferenceofPlenipotentiariesontheEstablishmentofanIntlCrim.Ct.,
SummaryRecordsofthe1stMeetingoftheCommitteeoftheWhole,U.N.Doc.A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1(20
Nov.1998)(RomeConferenceSummaryRecords),67.
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usualprinciplesofcriminallawresponsibility.26 However,thenegligencestandard
foramilitarycommanderappearedtobejustifiedbythefactthathewasincharge
ofaninherentlylethalforce.27 Therewaswidespreadsupportfortheproposal,and
nodelegationtookissuewiththeUnitedStatesscharacterisationoftheshouldhave
knownstandardasanegligencestandard.28 Thedraftersthereforedeliberately
departedfromthehadreasontoknowformulationofthestatutesoftheadhoc
tribunals,andintentionallyincorporatedanegligencestandardforthemental
elementofsuperiorresponsibilityformilitarycommanders.
11. Anegligencestandarddoesnotimposestrictliabilityoncommandersforthecrimesoftheirsubordinates. Acommanderthathastakensufficientstepsto
guaranteehisorherknowledgebut,notwithstandingthesesteps,didnotlearnof
crimes,shouldnotbeconvicted. Thesestepswouldincludeinstititutinganeffective
andefficientreportingsystemthatensuresinformationabouttheconductof
subordinatesisconveyedtothesuperiorpromptlyandaccurately. Ultimately,the
specificstepsthatareasonablecommandermusttakewillnecessarilydependonthe
circumstancesofacase. Therefore,AmnestyInternationaldoesnotattemptto
proposeinthisbriefthedetailedcriteriafordeterminingwhatlevelandformsof
negligencebyamilitarycommanderarecapturedbyArticle28(a)(i).However,the
organisationmayseekonanotheroccasiontoassisttheCourtindevelopingthe
specificdetailofthesemoreactivedutiesasitappliestheArticle28(a)(i)standard.
C. CircumstancesSatisfyingTheHadReasonToKnowStandard12. AlthoughcustomaryinternationallawimposesadifferentmentalelementstandardforsuperiorresponsibilitythanArticle28(a)(i),thejurisprudenceof
internationalcriminaltribunalsapplyingthatstandardisnonethelessinstructive. As
Article28(a)(i)extendstheobligationsimposeduponcommanders,thetypesof
circumstancesthatsatisfythecustomaryinternationallawstandardwillalsosatisfy
26 Ibid,68.27 Ibid,67.28 Ibid,6982.
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therequirementsofArticle28(a)(i).
13. Underthehadreasontoknowstandard,informationputtingasuperioronnoticeneednotbespecific.29 Inaddition,itneednotcompeltheconclusionofthe
commissionof
crimes.
30Itneed
only
be
sufficiently
alarming
to
justify
further
inquiry,31orsufficientlyalarmingtoputasuperioronnoticeoftheriskthat
crimesmightsubsequentlybecarriedoutbyhissubordinates.32 Inaddition,a
superiormaynotremainwillfullyblindtoinformationthatisavailabletohimor
her.33
14. Thejurisprudenceindicatesthatasuperiorsknowledgeofpastcrimescommittedbysubordinatesthathavegoneunpunishedmayputhimorheronnotice
oftheriskoffuturecrimes. TheICTYAppealsChamberhasmadethefollowing
statementinanumberofcases,whichhasbeenexplicitlyendorsedbytheSCSL:
[W]hileasuperiorsknowledgeofandfailuretopunishhis
subordinatespastoffencesisinsufficient,initself,toconcludethat
thesuperiorknewthatsimilarfutureoffenceswouldbecommitted
bythesamegroupofsubordinates,thismay,dependingonthe
circumstancesofthecase,neverthelessconstitutesufficiently
alarminginformationtojustifyfurtherinquiry....34
15. InStrugar,theICTYAppealsChamber,applyingthemorerestrictivecustomaryinternationallawstandard,rejectedtheProsecutionssubmissionthat
noticeofpriorcommissionofcrimesis,perse,noticeofanunacceptableriskof
29 elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,238;BagilishemaAppealJudgement,supranote15,42;
Prosecutorv.Milutinovi,CaseNo.IT0587T,Judgment,26Feb.2009,120.30 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,393;Prosecutorv.Strugar,CaseNo.IT0142T,Judgment,
31Jan.2005(StrugarTrialJudgment),369;Prosecutorv.Limajetal.,CaseNo.IT0366T,Judgment,
30Nov.2005(LimajTrialJudgment),525.31 Prosecutorv.Hadihasanovi andKubura,IT0147A,Judgment,22Apr.2008(Hadihasanovi andKuburaAppealJudgment),28;seealsoProsecutorv.Krnojelac,CaseNo.IT9725A,Judgment,17
Sept.2003(KrnojelacAppealJudgment),59.32 StrugarAppealJudgment,supranote15,304.33 Prosecutorv.Halilovi,CaseNo.IT0148T,Judgment,16Nov.2005(Halilovi TrialJudgment),
69(citingelebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,387).34 StrugarAppealJudgment,supranote15,301; Hadihasanovi andKuburaAppealJudgment,supra
note31,30;KrnojelacAppealJudgment,supranote31,169;RUFTrialJudgment,supranote6,
311.
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similarfuturecrimes.35Nonetheless,itstressedthatwhereasuperiorfailstopunish
crimesofwhichheorshehasactualknowledge,thisislikelytoincreasetheriskof
newcrimesbeingcommitted.36 Strugarsconvictionsaroseoutoftheshellingofthe
OldTownofDubrovnik. Onthespecificfactsofthecase,Strugarwasfoundtohave
orderedtheattackonSr (apositionaboveDubrovnik),andtohaveknownthat
(i)previousmilitaryactionintheareainvolvedunauthorizedshellingoftheOld
TownofDubrovnik,(ii)hissubordinateshadsubstantialartillerycapacity,
(iii)existingordersprohibitingtheshellingoftheOldTownhadnotproved
effective,and(iv)therehadbeennopunishmentofpreviousactsofshellingofthe
OldTown.37 Inlightofthesefacts,theAppealsChamberfoundthattheAccused
wasalertedoftheriskthatsimilaractsofunlawfulshelling[likethosethathad
occurredpreviously]oftheOldTownmightbecommittedbyhissubordinates.38
16. Indeterminingwhetherasuperiorhasreasontoknow,thejurisprudenceindicatesthattheinformationthesuperiorhasmustbeviewedasawhole. In
Krnojelac,theICTYAppealsChamberoverturnedtheTrialChambersfindingthat
therewasnotsufficientevidencethattheAccused(aprisonwarden)knew,orhad
reasontoknow,thatdetaineeswerebeingtortured.39 TheAppealsChamberfound
thattheevidence,takenasawhole,wassufficientlyalarmingtoputtheAccusedon
noticeoftheriskthattorturewas,orwouldbe,carriedout. Thisevidenceincluded
proofthatindividualsweredetainedbecauseoftheirethnicity;Krnojelacs
knowledgethatMuslimdetaineeswerebeingbeatenandmistreated,becauseitwas
apparentphysicallyandhehadpersonallywitnessedabeating;hiswitnessing
detaineesbeingtoldtheywouldbepunishedasaresultofanescape;andhis
supervisoryrole,
which
involved
going
to
the
prison
every
day
of
the
working
week.
Similarly,withrespecttomurdersthattookplaceattheprison,thefacts,takenasa
35 StrugarAppealJudgment,supranote15,286.36 Ibid,301.37 Ibid,305.38 Ibid,306.39 KrnojelacAppealJudgment,supranote31,169.
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wholewerefoundtoconstitutealarminginformationwhichshouldhaveprompted
theAccusedtoopenaninvestigation.40
17. ICTYjudgmentshavecitedwithapprovalthefactorsidentifiedintheICRCCommentary
to
Article
86(2)
of
Additional
Protocol
Ias
information
placing
a
superioronnotice.41 Thesefactorsincludereportsaddressedtothesuperior,the
tacticalsituation,theleveloftrainingandinstructionofsubordinateofficersand
theirtroops(includingoninternationalhumanitarianlaw),andtheircharacter
traits.42 ICTYChambershavealsocitedtheindiciaidentifiedbytheUnitedNations
CommissionofExpertsinitsFinalReport43onthearmedconflictinformer
Yugoslavia.44 Theseindiciaincludethenumber,type,andscopeoftheillegalacts45
andthetimeduringwhichtheyoccurred;46thenumberandtypeoftroopsinvolved;47
thelogisticsinvolved;thegeographicallocation48andthewidespreadoccurrenceof
theacts;thetacticaltempoofoperations;themodusoperandiofsimilarillegalacts;the
officersandstaffinvolved;49andthelocationofthecommanderatthetime.50 Reports
40 Ibid,166,167,169,170,175.41 Prosecutorv.Hadihasanovi andKubura,CaseNo.IT0147T,Judgment,15Mar.2006
(Hadihasanovi andKuburaTrialJudgment),99;Hadihasanovi andKuburaAppealJudgment,
supranote31,28n.75.42 CommentaryontheAdditionalProtocolsof8June1977totheGenevaConventionsof12August
1949,3545(YvesSandozetal.eds.,1987)(ICRCCommentaryontheAdditionalProtocols).43 FinalReportoftheCommissionofExpertsEstablishedPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution
780,58(1992),annexedtoU.N.Doc.S/1994/674(27May1994)(listingallrelevantindices).44 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,386;Prosecutorv.Gali,CaseNo.IT9829T,Judgmentand
Opinion,5Dec.2003(Gali TrialJudgment),174;Prosecutorv.Gali,CaseNo.IT9829A,
Judgment,30Nov.2006,183.45 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,770(findingthatcrimesweresofrequentandnotorious
thatthereisnowaythatMr.Muci[]couldnothaveknownorheardaboutthem.);RUFTrial
Judgment,supranote6,2148(commissionofcrimeofforcedmarriagewaswidespreadinthe
relevantdistrictandthroughoutthecountry;inthesecircumstances,commanderhadreasontoknow
ofthefighterswhocommittedthiscrimeintherelevantlocation).46 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,769(determiningthattheaccusedspolicyofabsenting
himselffromthecampwhiletheabuseswereoccurringimputedknowledgeofthecriminalactions
ofhissubordinates);seealsoBagilishemaAppealJudgment,supranote15,30.47 Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,618(imputingknowledgeofmistreatmentofdetainees
toanaccusedwhoseunitswereundermannedyettrenchescontinuedtobedug).48 SeeBagilishemaAppealJudgment,supranote15,30.49 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,770(criminaltendenciesofsubordinateknownto
superior).
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byinternationalorhumanrightsorganizations,orbythemedia,mayalsobeusedto
provethatasuperiorwasonnoticeofthecommissionofcrimes.51
III. DUTYTOSUBMITTHEMATTERTOCOMPETENTAUTHORITIESFORINVESTIGATION
AND
PROSECUTION
18. Undercustomaryinternationallaw,superiorshaveadutytoensurethatsubordinatesarepunishedfortheircrimes.52 Thisobligationappliestoallsuperiors
possessingtheabilitytoaffecttheconductofasubordinate,regardlessofmilitaryor
civilianstatus.53 Thespecificactionsrequiredofasuperiorinordertodischargethe
dutytopunishdependuponhisorherdejureordefactocapabilities54andmustbe
determinedonacasebycasebasis.55 Consequently,ifasuperiordoesnothavethe
legalauthoritytopunishasubordinateforthecrime,heorshemustsubmitthe
mattertoanauthoritycompetenttodoso.56
50 FinalReportoftheCommissionofExpertsEstablishedPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution
780,58(1992),annexedtoU.N.Doc.S/1994/674(27May1994)(listingallrelevantfactors).51 Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,618(includingasoneofsixfactorsestablishing
constructiveknowledgethat(v)thepracticewaswidelyknowntoandreportedbyinteraliathe
ICRC,theECMM,andUNPROFORrepresentatives; (citationsomitted));Gali TrialJudgment,supra
note44,704(findinginviewofthecircumstanceswhichprevailedduringtheconflict,thenotoriety
ofcertainoftheincidentsscheduledintheIndictmentandthesystematiccharacterofthesecriminalactswhichextendedoveraprolongedperiodoftime,inconjunctionwiththemediacoverageof
whichtheSRKCorpscommandwasaware,renderstheAccusedsprofessedignoranceuntenable.).52 SeeStrugarTrialJudgment,supranote30,357(Theprincipleofindividualcriminal
responsibilityofsuperiorsforfailuretopreventortopunishcrimescommittedbysubordinatesisan
establishedprincipleofinternationalcriminallaw....);accordLimajTrialJudgment,supranote30,
519.53 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,377.54 Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,417([TheAppealsChamber]generallyconcurswith
theelebiiTrialChamberwhichheld:[i]tmust,however,berecognisedthatinternationallawcannot
obligeasuperiortoperformtheimpossible.Hence,asuperiormayonlybeheldcriminally
responsibleforfailingtotakesuchmeasuresthatarewithinhispowers.(quotingelebiiTrial
Judgment,supranote6,395)).55 Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,72;seealsoHaliloviTrialJudgment,supranote33,74.56 See,e.g.,ICRCCommentaryontheAdditionalProtocols,supranote42,3562(observingthatthe
obligationsofasuperioratanylevelincludeproposingasanctiontoasuperiorwhohas
disciplinarypower,orinthecaseofsomeonewhoholdssuchpowerhimselfexercisingit,within
thelimitsofhiscompetence,andfinally,remittingthecasetothejudicialauthoritywherenecessary
withsuchfactualevidenceasitwaspossibletofind);LimajTrialJudgment,supranote30,529(The
obligationonthepartofthesuperioristotakeactivestepstoensurethattheperpetratorswillbe
punished.);Kordi and erkezTrialJudgment,supranote16,446(Thedutytopunishincludesat
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19. ThisunderstandingofthepracticalrequirementsofthedutytopunishisreflectedinArticle28oftheStatute. Inresponsetoconcernsexpressedduringthe
draftingprocessthatciviliansuperiors,inparticular,arenotalwaysthemselvesina
positiontoprosecute,57Article28doesnotexplicitlyrefertoanobligationto
punishsubordinates;instead,itinvokesthesuperiorsdutytosubmita
subordinatescrimestothecompetentauthoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution.
TheStatutethusrecognisesthat,evenifasuperiordoesnotpossesstheauthorityto
investigateandpunishcrimeswithintheCourtsjurisdiction,heorshemust
neverthelesstakeallnecessaryandreasonablemeasurestoensurethat
subordinateswhocommitsuchcrimesdonotescapepenalsanction.58
20. Inadditiontothisdutytosubmit,Article28alsoreflectsthesuperiorsindependentobligationsunderinternationallawtopreventandrepressthecriminal
conductofsubordinates. UndertheStatuteandcustomaryinternationallaw,the
dutiestoprevent,repress,andsubmitapplytosuperiorsaffiliatedwithstateand
nonstategroups.59 Asexplainedbelow,inapplyingArticle28tosuperiorsaffiliated
withnonstateactors,thefollowingprinciplesshouldbeobserved:(1)superiors
affiliatedwithnonstategroupshaveadutytosubmitmattersinvolving
internationalcrimescommittedbysubordinatestocompetentstateorinternational
authoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution,andmaynotdischargethisduty
leastanobligationtoinvestigatepossiblecrimes,toestablishthefacts,andifthesuperiorhasno
powertosanction,toreportthemtothecompetentauthorities.).57 RoyS.Lee,TheInternationalCriminalCourt:TheMakingoftheRomeStatute,Issues,Negotiations,
Results204(1999);seealsoAmbos,supranote21,at862(explainingthatthedutytosubmit
formulationfillsagapinthatitformulatesaspecificdutyforthosesuperiorswhohavethemselves
nodisciplinarypowerstorepressacrime.).58 Statute,Art.28(a)(ii),(b)(iii);seealsoRobertaArnoldandOttoTriffterer,Article28:Responsibility
ofCommandersandOtherSuperiors,inCommentaryontheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminal
Court795,838(OttoTriffterered.,2ded.2008)([W]heredisciplinarymeasuresappeartobe
insufficientlyseveretopunishthecrimethathasbeencommittedthisshallalwaysbethecasewith
regardtothecrimesoutlawedbytheICCStatute[thesuperior]shallsubmitthecasetothe
competentauthorities,whoshallthendelegatethecasetothemilitaryjustice.).59 SeeStatute,Art.28(a)(ii),(b)(iii);RUFTrialJudgment,supranote6,648&pp.67787(convicting
accusedSesayandKallononbasisofsuperiorresponsibilityforcrimescommittedbythe
RevolutionaryUnitedFront,describedasaguerrillaarmyandanirregularforce).
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throughinternaldisciplinarymeasuresorprosecutions;and(2)submissionofa
mattertothecompetentauthoritiesdoesnotabsolveasuperiorofresponsibilityfora
priorfailuretopreventorrepress.
A. SuperiorsAffiliatedWithNonStateGroupsMustSubmitReportsofInternationalCrimesCommittedbySubordinates
toCompetentStateorInternationalAuthorities
21. UnderArticle28,superiorsmaybeheldcriminallyresponsibleiftheyfailtosubmitreportsofsubordinatescrimestothecompetentauthoritiesforthepurposes
ofinvestigationandprosecution.60 ThecrimeswithintheCourtsjurisdictionare
themostseriouscrimesofconcerntotheinternationalcommunity.61Whilethe
obligationtorepresssuchcrimesmayincludetheapplicationofappropriate
disciplinaryorremedialmeasuresontheaccusedperpetrators,thosemeasures
cannotsatisfytheindependentobligationtoinitiateaninvestigativeand
prosecutorialprocessthatcanresultincriminalsanction.62
22. TheStatuterequirestheChambertointerpretandapplythelawinamannerconsistentwithinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights.63 Thus,ininterpreting
thetermcompetentauthorities,64theChambershouldhaveregardtointernational
60 Statute,Art.28(a)(ii),(b)(iii).61 Id.,preamble.62 See,e.g.,Hadihasanovi andKuburaTrialJudgment,supranote41,1777(concludingthata
disciplinarysanctionofaperiodofdetentionnotexceeding60daysforcrimesofmurderand
mistreatmentofprisonersofwarisnotsufficientpunishmentoftheperpetratorsofthosecrimes).
Cf. AmnestyInternational,InternationalLawCommission:TheObligationtoExtraditeorProsecute
(AutDedereAutJudicare),AIIndexNo.IOR40/001/2009(3Feb.2009)(discussingtheobligationof
statestoeitherprosecuteindividualsresponsiblefor,interalia,warcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,
orgenocide,orextraditethemtocompetentauthoritiesforprosecution).63 Statute,Art.21(3).64 Thedraftinghistorydoesnotaddressthemeaningofcompetentauthorities.RomeConference
SummaryRecords,supranote25,6783(discussingsuperiorresponsibility,butomittingtoaddress
themeaningofcompetentauthorities). NoneoftheleadingcommentariesontheRomeStatute
provideguidanceastothecorrectinterpretationofcompetentauthorities. See,e.g.,Lee,supra
note57,at202204;Ambos,supranote21,at862;M.CherifBassiouni,TheLegislativeHistoryofthe
InternationalCriminalCourt210214(2005).However,thistermechoestherequirementinArticle7(1)
oftheConventionagainstTorturetosubmitthecasetoitscompetentauthoritiesforthepurposeof
prosecution. ConventionagainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentor
Punishment,Art.7(1),G.A.Res.39/46,annex,39U.N.GAORSupp.No.51at197,U.N.Doc.A/39/51
(1984),1465U.N.T.S.85,enteredintoforce26June1987. ThetermsofArticle28makeitclearthatthe
authoritiesmustbeabletoinvestigateandprosecutethesubordinate.
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humanrightslaw,whichrequiresthatindividualssuspectedofacrimebegivena
fairandpublichearingbyacompetent,independentandimpartialtribunal
establishedbylaw.65 Thetermestablishedbylawisinterpretedstrictlytomean
onlybyaparliamentarystatuteorequivalentunwrittennormofcommonlaw.66
23. Superiorsofnonstategroupsmayfaceparticulardifficultiesinsubmittingmatterstothecompetentauthorities. Submissionbyasuperiorofamatterfor
eventualtrialbyajudicialbodyofhisorherownnonstategroupwouldnot
normallysatisfythedutytosubmittocompetentauthorities,assuchbodiesare
notestablishedbyparliamentarystatuteoranequivalentsourceoflaw,67andmay
failtocomplywithfairtrialprinciples.Infact,inthecontextofanarmedconflict,
trialsthatarenotconductedbyaregularlyconstitutedcourt,affordingallthe
judicialguaranteeswhicharerecognizedasindispensiblebycivilizedpeoples,are
consideredawarcrime.68
65 InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,Art.14(1),G.A.res.2200A(XXI),21U.N.
GAORSupp.(No.16)at52,U.N.Doc.A/6316(1966),999U.N.T.S.171,enteredintoforce23Mar.1976.
SeealsoAmericanConventiononHumanRights,Art.8,O.A.S.TreatySeriesNo.36,1144U.N.T.S.123,
enteredintoforce18July1978;AmericanDeclarationoftheRightsandDutiesofMan,Art.XXVI,O.A.S.
Res.XXX,adoptedbytheNinthInternationalConferenceofAmericanStates(1948),reprintedinBasic
DocumentsPertainingtoHumanRightsintheInterAmericanSystem,OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6rev.1
at17(1992);EuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,
Art.6(1),213U.N.T.S.222,enteredintoforce3Sept.1953,asamendedbyProtocolsNos.3,5,and8which
enteredintoforceon21September1970,20December1971and1January1990respectively. See
generallyAmnestyInternational,FairTrialsManual,AIIndexNo.:POL30/002/1998(Dec.1,1998).66 ManfredNowak,U.N.CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights:CCPRCommentary319(2005);seealso
Zandv.Austria,App.No.7360/76,15Eur.CommnH.R.Dec.&Rep.70,69(1979)(holdingthe
objectandpurposeoftheclauseinArt.6(1)[isthat]...thejudicialorganization...mustnotdepend
onthediscretionoftheExecutive,butthatitshouldberegulatedbylawemanatingfrom
Parliament.),accordComev.Belgium,App.Nos.32492/96etal.,Eur.Ct.H.R.Judgmentof22June
2000,98.67 SeeJonathanSomer,JungleJustice:PassingSentenceontheEqualityofBelligerentsinNonInternational
ArmedConflict,89IntlRev.oftheRedCross655,664665(2007)(Totheextentthattheregularly
constitutedrequirementofIHLincorporatestheestablishedbylawcriterionasunderstoodby
humanrightslaw,anarmedoppositiongroupmaybebarredfrompassingsentences.). Insomerare
cases,however,therebelgroupmaybeabletosatisfytheserequirements. Forexample,therebelshad
astateandlocalcourtsystemduringtheAmericanCivilWar. SeeCharlesE.George,TheSupreme
CourtoftheConfederateStatesofAmerica,6Virg.L.Reg.n.s.592,599(19201921).68 SeeStatute,Art.8(2)(c)(iv)(establishingjurisdictionoverseriousviolationsofCommonArticle3,
includingtheprohibitioninCommonArticle3(1)(d)of[t]hepassingofsentencesandthecarryingout
ofexecutionswithoutpreviousjudgmentpronouncedbyaregularlyconstitutedcourt,affordingall
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24. Thoughunabletorefersuchmattersforinternalprosecution,superiorsofnonstategroupsneverthelesshaveothermeansbywhichtheycanmeettheir
internationalobligations. Itmaybepossible,forexample,forsuperiorstosubmit
reportsofsubordinatescrimestothecompetentauthoritieswithinthestatewhere
thecrimeswerecommitted. Nonstategroupsoftenbutnotalwaysopposethe
authoritiesofthestatewithinwhichtheyoperate,sosubmissionofreportstothe
establishedgovernmentmayprovepoliticallyunfeasible,andtheriskthatcourts
wouldnotbeimpartialduringthearmedconflictmaydiscouragesuchsubmission.69
Insuchcases,superiorsmaydischargethedutybymakinggoodfaitheffortsto
submitreportsofcrimestotheauthoritiesofotherstatesandtoprosecutorsof
internationalcriminaltribunalswithjurisdictionrequestinginvestigationand
prosecution.
25. Referraltoforeignandinternationalauthoritiesprovidesaneffectivealternativemeansforsuperiorstoensureprosecutionoftheirsubordinates. An
overwhelmingmajorityofstatesareabletoexerciseuniversaljurisdictionover
conductconstitutingoneormorecrimeswithintheCourtsjurisdiction,70andan
increasingnumberofstatesarewillingandabletoinvestigateandprosecutealleged
offenders.71 Furthermore,prosecutorsofinternationaltribunalsincludingthis
thejudicialguaranteeswhicharerecognizedasindispensiblebycivilizedpeoples). Seealso
AdditionalProtocolI,supranote7,Art. 75(4)(thebodyadjudicatingcasesrelatedtothearmed
conflictmustbeanimpartialandregularlyconstitutedcourtrespectingthegenerallyrecognized
principlesofregularjudicialprocedure);ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12
August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNonInternationalArmedConflict,Art.6(2),
1125U.N.T.S.609,enteredintoforce7Dec.1978(AdditionalProtocolII)(Nosentenceshallbe
passedandnopenalty...executed...exceptpursuanttoaconvictionpronouncedbyacourtoffering
theessentialguaranteesofindependenceandimpartiality.).69 See,e.g.,Somer,supranote67,at655,685(recognisingthatarmedoppositiongroupsuperiorswill
mostlikelynotbewillingtodischargetheirdutybyengagingthegovernmentparty).70 SeegenerallyAmnestyInternational,UniversalJurisdiction:TheDutyofStatestoEnactand
ImplementLegislation,AIIndexNo.IOR53/002/200153/018/2001(Sep.1,2001)(discussingstate
practicein125states). Thisstudyisbeingupdatedin192comprehensivepapersoneachU.N.
memberstate.Eachofthesedocumentsisavailableontheorganizationswebsite
(http://www.amnesty.org/).71 SincetheSecondWorldWar,criminalinvestigationsorprosecutionsbasedonuniversal
jurisdictionhavebeenconductedbythecourtsofAustralia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,Denmark,
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Courthavediscretiontoinitiatepropriomotuinvestigationsandprosecutions
withintheirrespectivejurisdictions.72
26. Arequirementthatsuperiorsmakegoodfaitheffortstoreferreportedcrimesto
competent
authorities
for
investigation
and
prosecution
best
implements
the
principlesandpracticalgoalsofthesuperiorresponsibilitydoctrine:itholds
superiorstotherequirementthattheytakeallnecessaryandreasonablemeasures
torespondtocriminalconduct,whileretainingaflexibilitythatpermitsChambersto
determine,onacasebycasebasis,whetherthestepstakenbyanaccusedwere
sufficienttodischargetheduty. Inmakingthisdetermination,theChambershould
takeintoaccount,amongotherthings,(a)whetherthesuperiorhasprovidedall
informationinhisorherpossession;and(b)whetherheorshehascooperatedfully
intheinvestigation. Incasesofsubmissiontoforeignorinternationalauthorities,the
Chambershouldhaveregardtowhetherthesuperiorhasmadeallreasonableefforts
torequestinvestigationandprosecution,suchassubmittingthemattertostatesthat
areabletoexerciseuniversaljurisdictionandtointernationalcriminaltribunalswith
jurisdiction.
B. SubmissionofMattertoCompetentAuthoritiesDoesNotAbsolveSuperiorofResponsibilityforFailuretoPreventorRepress
27. Thejurisprudenceoftheadhocinternationalcriminaltribunalshasconsistentlyconfirmedthat,undercustomaryinternationallaw,thedutytoprevent
andthedutytopunisharenotalternatives:[T]heobligationtopreventorpunish
doesnotprovidetheaccusedwithtwoalternativeandequallysatisfyingoptions,73
Finland,France,Germany,Israel,Netherlands,Norway,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,theUnited
KingdomandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Moreover,statesarebeginningtomovetoashared
responsibilitymodelforinvestigationandprosecution,basedonuniversaljurisdictionofcrimes
underinternationallaw,astheyanswertheSecurityCouncilscallstoacceptcasestransferredfrom
theICTYandICTR,aswellaswithregardtoothercrimes,suchastheroutinetransferofpiracy
suspectscapturedonthehighseasbynavalforcestoKenyafortrial.72 See,e.g.,Statute,Art.15(1).73 Prosecutorv.Blaki,CaseNo.IT9514T,Judgment,3Mar.2000,336;accord,e.g.,Kordi and
erkezTrialJudgment,supranote16,444;BagilishemaTrialJudgment,supranote9,49;StrugarTrial
Judgment,supranote30,373;LimajTrialJudgment,supranote30,527. SeealsoWilliamA.Schabas,
TheUNInternationalCriminalTribunals:TheFormerYugoslavia,RwandaandSierraLeone322(2006).
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becausethedutytopreventcrimesandthedutytopunishtheperpetratorsare
distinctandseparateresponsibilitiesunderinternationallaw.74 Thus,asuperior
maynotescaperesponsibilityforanearlierfailuretopreventorhaltcriminal
conductbylaterpunishingorreferringthematter.
28. InlightofthedirectioninArticle21oftheStatutetoapplytherulesandprinciplesofinternationallaw,Article28shouldbeinterpretedinaccordancewith
customaryinternationallaw,sothatthedutiesreflectedinsubparagraphs(a)(ii)and
(b)(iii)areacknowledgedasseparateandindependentobligationsimposedon
superiors. Thatis,thetermorinthephrasefailedto...preventorrepresstheir
[thecrimes]commissionortosubmitthemattertothecompetentauthorities75does
notpresentasuperiorwithalistofoptions,butratherreflectsthefullrangeofhisor
herdutiesinrespectofsubordinatecriminalconduct.76
29. Asaresult,theChambershouldconcludethatiftheotherelementsofsuperiorresponsibilityaresatisfied,asuperiorssubmissionofsubordinatesalleged
crimestocompetentauthoritiesdoesnotabsolvehimorherofresponsibilityfora
failuretopreventorrepressthosecrimes.
IV. CAUSATIONISNOTANELEMENTOFSUPERIORRESPONSIBILITY30. Undercustomaryinternationallaw,superiorresponsibilityrequires:(i)asuperiorsubordinaterelationship;(ii)thesuperiorsknowledgeofthecrimes
committedbythesubordinate;and(iii)thesubsequentfailurebythesuperiortohalt,
preventorpunishthecrime.77 Absentfromthisthreeelementtestisany
requirementthatthesuperiorsfailuretoactdirectlycausedthesubordinates
74 Prosecutorv.Halilovi,CaseNo.IT0148PT,DecisiononProsecutorsMotionSeekingLeavetoAmendtheIndictment,17December2004(HaliloviDecisiononAmendmentofIndictment),31;
accord,e.g.,BagilishemaTrialJudgment,supranote9,49;StrugarTrialJudgment,supranote30,373.75 Statute,Article28(a)(ii),(b)(iii)(emphasisadded).76 SeeHaliloviDecisiononAmendmentofIndictment,supranote74,3132(observingthatthe
orisdisjunctiveandreflectsseparateduties);Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,7885;
AlexanderZaharandGranSluiter,InternationalCriminalLaw269(2008).77 See,e.g.,elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,346;AntonioCassese,InternationalCriminalLaw
24749(2008)(identifyingthecumulativeconditionsforsuperiorresponsibility).
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crime.78 Instead,thelinkbetweenthesuperiorsfailureandtheunderlyingcrimeis
capturedthroughtherequirementofeffectivecontrolthematerialabilityofthe
superiortoaffectthesubordinatesconductratherthanthroughaseparate
causationelement.79
31. Inspiteofthisestablisheddoctrine,Article28hasbeenunderstoodbysometoimposeanewcausationrequirement.80 Tothecontrary,anexaminationoftheterms
oftheArticleinlightoftheircontext,theStatutesobjectandpurpose,andthe
draftinghistory,demonstratesthattheprovisionwasnotintendedtodepartfrom
customaryinternationallawbyrequiring,asaseparateelement,proofthatthe
superiorsfailingscausedthesubordinatescrimes. Inthealternative,evenifArticle
28werereadasrequiringproofofcausation,thatcausationrequirementwouldbe
properlyinterpretedassatisfiedbyevidencethatthesuperiorsfailingsincreasedthe
riskthatsubordinateswouldcommitcrimes.
A. CausationIsNotRequiredUnderCustomaryInternationalLaw32. Noneoftheinternationallegalinstrumentsreflectingcustomaryinternationallawontheelementsofsuperiorresponsibilityincludesarequirementthatthe
superiorsomissioncausedtheunderlyingcrimesinquestion.
33. ThelanguageofArticle86(2)ofAdditionalProtocolIdoesnotrequireacausallinkbetweenthesuperiorsfailuretoactandthesubordinatescrimes:
Thefactthatabreach...wascommittedbyasubordinatedoesnot
absolvehissuperiorsfrompenalordisciplinaryresponsibility...if
78 See,e.g.,elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,398. Seealsoinfranote90andaccompanyingtext.79 Cassese,supranote77,at24142(2008)(asthedoctrinehasbeenrefinedbytheadhoc
jurisprudence,thecriminalliabilityofthesuperior[i]sincreasinglyseenasaconsequenceofhisown
culpability,notnecessarilylinkedbymeansofacausalnexustotheresponsibilityofthe
subordinates);seealsoGideonBoas,JamesL.Bischoff,andNatalieL.Reid,1InternationalCriminal
LawPractitionerLibrary:FormsofResponsibilityinInternationalCriminalLaw(2007)at178,232.80 See,e.g.,Ambos,supranote21,at860(statingthatArticle28impliesacausalrelationship
betweenthesuperiorsfailureandthesubordinatescommissionofcrimes);OttoTriffterer,
Causality,ASeparateElementoftheDoctrineofSuperiorResponsibilityasExpressedinArticle28
RomeStatute?,15LeidenJ.IntlL.179,197(2002)(describingcausationasaconstituentelementof
Article28);MarkOsiel,TheBanalityoftheGood:AligningIncentivesagainstMassAtrocity,
105Colum.L.Rev.1751,1779n.123(2005).
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theyknew,orhadinformationwhichshouldhaveenabledthemto
conclude...thathewascommittingorwasgoingtocommitsucha
breachandiftheydidnottakeallfeasiblemeasureswithintheir
powertopreventorrepressthebreach.81
34. Whileatleastonecommentatorhasclaimedthatthislanguagereflectsacausalconnectionbetweenthesuperiorsomissionandthesubordinatescrime,82
thereisnosupportforthatinterpretationinthetext. Indeed,asinternational
judgmentsinterpretingthisprovisionmakeclear,theissueisnotoneofcausation,
butratherofeffectiveauthorityandcontrol,socriminalresponsibilityisimposednot
onlyonthesuperiorwhocouldhavepreventedthecrime,butalsoonthesuperior
whofailedtostoporpunishit.83
35. TheprovisionsonsuperiorresponsibilityintheStatutesoftheadhocinternationalcriminaltribunalsreflectthecustomarythreeprongtest,84andlike
Article86(2),containnoseparatecausationrequirement.85 Similarly,theconstituting
documentsofboththeSCSLandtheExtraordinaryChambersintheCourtsof
Cambodiadonotidentifycausationasanelementofsuperiorresponsibility.86Nor
doesthemostrecentILCDraftCodeofCrimesAgainstthePeaceandSecurityof
81 AdditionalProtocolI,supranote7,Art.86(2). Seealso,e.g.,ICRCCommentaryontheAdditional
Protocols,supranote42,3543(citingonlytheelementsofthecustomarythreeprongtestandnot
includingcausation).82 SeeTriffterer,supranote80,at184(Article86(2)establishesacausalconnectionbetweenthe
omissionofthesuperiorandthecrimecommittedbyhisorhersubordinatebecauseitimpliesthat
ifasuperiorhadusedhispower,hewouldhaveoratleastcouldhavepreventedtheattemptedor
completecrime).83 See,e.g.,elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,340,378;elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,
25556.84 Seesupranote77.85 ICTYStatute,supranote9,Art.7(3);ICTRStatute,supranote9, Art.6(3). Insupportofthis
reading,see elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,398;butseeTriffterer,supranote80,at185(finding
nocausalconnectionwithrespecttotheobligationtopunish,butassertingthatonemustexistforthe
obligationtoprevent).86 SCSLStatute,supranote9,Art.6(3);LawontheEstablishmentoftheExtraordinaryChambersin
theCourtsofCambodiafortheProsecutionofCrimesCommittedDuringthePeriodofDemocratic
Kampuchea,asamendedon27Oct.2004,Doc.No.NS/RKM/1004/006,unofficialtranslationbythe
CouncilofJuristsandtheSecretariatoftheTaskForce,revisedon26August2007,Art.29.
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Mankind.87
36. Thejurisprudenceoftheadhocinternationalcriminaltribunalsconfirmsthatcustomaryinternationallawdoesnotrequireproofofcausationinordertoimpose
individualliability
on
asuperior.
The
Trial
Chamber
in
elebii
concluded
that
causationhasnottraditionallybeenpostulatedasaconditiosinequanonforthe
impositionofcriminalliabilityonsuperiors.88 ThatChamberobservedthatArt.7(3)
andcustomaryinternationallawbothprovideforliabilityforasuperiorsfailureto
punishapastcrimewhichcouldneverhavebeencausedbythelaterfailureto
punishandconcludedthatthisdemonstratestheabsenceofarequirementof
causalityasaseparateelementofthedoctrineofsuperiorresponsibility.89
Furthermore,theTrialChamberfoundnosupportfortheexistenceofa
requirementofproofofcausationasaseparateelementofsuperiorresponsibility,
eitherintheexistingbodyofcaselaw,theformulationoftheprincipleinexisting
treatylaw,or,withoneexception,intheabundantliteratureonthissubject.90It
refusedaccordinglytoconsidercausationasaseparateelementofthedoctrine.
37. TheICTYTrialandAppealsChambershaverepeatedlyfollowedelebiibyholding
that
the
prosecution
need
not
prove
that
the
superiors
omissions
caused
the
subordinatescommissionofthecrimes.91 Thesejudgments,alongwiththe
internationallegalinstrumentsalreadydiscussed,providecompellingevidencethat
87 ILCDraftCode,supranote8,Art.6.88 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,398.89 Ibid,400;seealsoBoas,Bischoff,andReid,supranote79,at261(Iftheeffectivecontroltest
meantthatasuperiorcouldonlybeheldliableforafailuretopunishcrimesthatoccurredbecauseof
apriorfailuretocontrolhisorhersubordinates,therangeofpunishableomissionscouldbe
dramaticallyconstrained,apossibilitythathasnotbeenborneoutbytheactualpracticeofthose
tribunals.).90 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,398. TheTrialChamberrejectedearliercontraryanalysis
byM.CherifBassiouni. Ibid,n.428. SeeM.CherifBassiouni,CrimesAgainstHumanityinInternational
CriminalLaw42223(2ded.1999)(assertingthat[t]heessentialelementincasesofcommand
responsibility,particularlywithrespecttothoseinthehigherechelonsinthechainofcommandis
thatofcausation,butcitingnoauthority).91 See,e.g.,Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,at77;Prosecutorv.Ori,CaseNo.IT0368,
Judgment,30June2006(Ori TrialJudgment),338;Prosecutorv.Ori,CaseNo.IT0368A,
Judgment,3July2008(OriAppealJudgment),PartiallyDissentingOpinionandDeclarationof
JudgeLiuDaqun,32;Hadihasanovi andKuburaAppealJudgment,supranote31,40.
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customaryinternationallawdoesnotrequirecausationtobeprovenasaseparate
elementofsuperiorresponsibility.
B. CausationIsNotRequiredUnderArticle2838. Asatreatyprovision,theinterpretationofArticle28isgovernedbyarticles31to33oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(VCLT).92 Inaddition,
Article21oftheStatutedirectsChamberstoapply,whereappropriate,othertreaties,
principlesandrulesofinternationallaw,andgeneralprinciplesoflawderivedfrom
nationallaws.93 InordertodeterminewhetherArticle28includesacausation
requirement,theChambershouldthusconsidertheplaintextincontextandinlight
ofthetreatysobjectandpurpose.94 Ifthetextisambiguous,theChambermaythen
considerthe
travaux
prparatoires
of
the
treaty,
95and
any
guidance
provided
by
conventionalorcustomaryinternationallaw,generalprinciplesoflaw,anda
comparisonofthesixauthenticlanguageversionsoftheStatute.96 Applicationof
theseinterpretativestepsconfirmsthatArticle28doesnotrequireproofthatthe
superiorsomissionscausedthesubordinatescommissionofthecrimes.
1. ViewedincontextandinlightoftheStatutesobjectandpurpose,theplaintextofArticle28doesnotrequirecausation.
39.Article
28
of
the
Statute
provides
in
its
relevant
parts
that
a
superior
shall
be
criminallyresponsibleforcrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourtcommittedby
subordinatesasaresultofhisorherfailuretoexercisecontrolproperlyoversuch
subordinates,wheretheknowledgerequirementissatisfiedandthesuperiorfailed
topreventorrepress[thecrimes]commissionortosubmitthemattertothe
92 Seesupranote18.93 Article21oftheStatuteliststhesourcesofinternationallawtowhichtheCourtmayrefer.While
aChambermustapplytheStatuteinthefirstplace,Art.21(1)(a),itmayalsohaveresortto
applicabletreatiesandtheprinciplesandrulesofinternationallaw,Art.21(1)(b),andtogeneralprinciplesoflawderivedfromnationallawsoflegalsystemsoftheworld,Art.21(1)(c);inall
cases,[t]heapplicationandinterpretationoflawpursuanttothisarticlemustbeconsistentwith
internationallyrecognizedhumanrights.Art.21(3).94 VCLT,supranote18,Art.31.95 Ifconfirmationisrequiredortheconclusionreachedbasedupontextualinterpretationis
ambiguousorabsurd,recoursemaybehadtosupplementaryaids,includingthepreparatorywork
ofthetreatyandthecircumstancesofitsconclusion. VCLT,supranote18,Art.32.96 VCLT,supranote18,Art.33.
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competentauthoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution. Theplainreadingofthis
provisionisthattheclauseasaresultofhisorherfailuretoexercisecontrol
properlyreferstothesuperiorscriminalresponsibility,whichisengagedbyhisor
herknowingornegligentomissions.
40. AnalternativeinterpretationofArticle28assertedbysomeisthattheclausebeginningasaresultofreferstothesubordinatescrimes,andthusrequiresa
causalnexusbetweenthesuperiorsomissionandthecrimes.97 Thisattemptto
introduceadistinctcausationrequirementmustberejectedasdiscordantinthe
contextoftheStatute. First,itwouldrenderobsoletethedistinctdutytosubmitfor
investigationandprosecution,becauseitwouldcreateanillogicalindeed,
impossibleburdenontheProsecutiontoprovethatasuperiorcausedthecrimeby
laterfailingtosubmitthatcrimeforinvestigationafteritwascommitted.98 Second,it
wouldignoretheStatutesrecognitionthatsuperiorresponsibilityisdifferentin
characterfromthemodesofliabilityprovidedforinArticle25,whichcaptureforms
ofparticipationinacrime. Superiorresponsibility,incontrast,ispremisedonthe
existenceofaparticularrelationshipwiththosewhoparticipatedinacrime,andis
onlyinvokedwhenalltheelementsofthecrimearesatisfiedbytheconductof
others.99 Requiringsatisfactionoftheadditionalelementofcausationwouldbe
tantamounttochang[ing]thebasisofcommandresponsibilityforfailuretoprevent
orpunishtotheextentthatitwouldpracticallyrequireinvolvementonthepartof
97 See,e.g.,Ambos,supranote21,at860(statingthatArticle28impliesacausalrelationship
betweenthesuperiorsfailureandthesubordinatescommissionofcrimes);Triffterer,supranote80,
at197(describingcausationasaconstituentelementofArticle28);Osiel,supranote80.98 AccordelebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,400(Theveryexistenceoftheprincipleofsuperior
responsibilityforfailuretopunish,therefore,recognisedunderArticle7(3)andcustomarylaw,
demonstratestheabsenceofarequirementofcausalityasaseparateelementofthedoctrineof
superiorresponsibility.).99 SeeBoas,Bischoff,andReid,supranote79,at330n.327([A]naccusedheldliableundersuperior
responsibilityneednothaveparticipatedinthecrimeinanyway,andmayhavehadnoconnectionto
thecriminalconductsavehisfailuretoprevent,intervenetostop,orpunishit.);GunalMettraux,
TheLawofCommandResponsibility(2009),at79([S]uperiorresponsibilitypresupposesthata
[completed]crimehasactuallybeencommittedbyasubordinate.).
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thecommanderinthecrimehissubordinatescommitted,100andsuperior
responsibilitywouldceasetohaveanypracticalreachbeyondArticle25smodesof
criminalliabilitypremiseduponparticipation.
41.Moreover,
the
plain
reading
cited
above
ismore
consistent
with
the
object
and
purposeoftheStatutethantheproposedalternativeinterpretation. Superior
responsibilityispremisedontherecognitionthatpersonsinpositionsofcommand
andauthorityarebestplacedtopreventorrepresscriminalconduct,andisthus
crucialtotherealisationoftheStatutesgoalsofanendtoimpunityandprevention
ofthemostseriousinternationalcrimes.101 Thispurposeisbestservedbyimposing
criminalresponsibilityonsuperiorswhofailintheirdutiestoreducetheincidenceor
riskofsuchcrimes,notonlythosewhosefailurecausedthecrimes.102
2. AllothermeansofinterpretationcompeltheconclusionthatArticle28doesnotrequirecausation.
42. ApplicationofthesubsidiarymeansofinterpretationandotherguidancesetforthinArticles32and33oftheVCLTandArticle21oftheStatuteconfirmsthat
Article28cannotbereadtorequirecausation. First,theplainreadingdiscussed
aboveplacesArticle28inaccordwithexistinginternationallawandgeneral
principlesoflawasreflectedinnationallegislationasofthedraftingoftheStatute.103
Asdiscussedabove,neithertreatiesnorcustomrequiresproofofcausationasa
separateelement,104andpriortotheStatute,themilitaryandciviliancriminallawsof
100 HaliloviTrialJudgment,supranote33,78(rejectinganycausallink).AccordOriTrial
Judgment,supranote91,338(Ifproofofcausationwererequired,theborderlinebetweenArticle
7(3)...andArticle7(1)oftheStatutewouldbetransgressedand,thus,superiorcriminal
responsibilitywouldbecomesuperfluous.).101 Statute,preamble.102 Theabsenceofacausationrequirementfullycomplieswiththeprincipleofguilt,becausea
convictioncannotbesecuredwithoutproofofthespecialrelationshipbetweenthosewhoparticipate
inthecrimeandthesuperiorchargedwithsupervisoryduties. Individualresponsibilityfora
superior,aswithotherformsofliability,istriggeredbyhisorherownconduct,andthelinkbetween
theindividualaccusedandthecrimeiscapturedbytherequirementofeffectiveauthorityandcontrol.
SeeNatalieL.Reid,BridgingtheConceptualChasm:SuperiorResponsibilityastheMissingLink
BetweenStateandIndividualResponsibilityunderInternationalLaw,18LeidenJ.IntlL.795,82224.
103 SeeStatute,Art.21.104 Seediscussion,supra,atsectionIV.A.
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overtwentynationssurveyedbytheICRC105didnotexpresslyrequirethatthe
superiorsfailuretoacthavecausedthesubordinatescrimesinorderfor
responsibilitytoarise.106
43.
Second,the
travauxprparatoires
of
the
Statute
support
the
absence
of
a
causationrequirementasthemostplausiblereading. Althoughthephraseasa
resultofhadbeenincludedintheproposedtextbeginningwithanearlydraft,107the
Statutesdraftinghistoryrevealsnoexpressintentiononthepartofthedraftersto
introduceanewrequirementofproofofcausationintothedoctrineofsuperior
responsibility.108 Ofthetwopossibleinterpretationsofthephrasediscussedabovein
paragraphs39to40,thefirstcomportswiththecontemporaryunderstandingof
superiorresponsibility,whilethesecondwouldmarkadramaticdeparturefrom
establisheddoctrine. Giventhelackofdeliberationonthecausationissue,109itis
doubtfulthatthisphrasingwasintendedbythedrafterstodivergesosharplyfrom
105 JeanMarieHenckaertsandLouiseDoswaldBeck,InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,
CustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw,Vol.II(Practice)37453751(2005)(providingexcerptsofthe
nationallegislationof24statesonsuperiorresponsibility,includingArgentina,France,Germany,
Rwanda,SpainandtheU.S.,withonlyoneCanadacontaininglanguagerequiringacausalnexus).106 ManyStatesPartiestotheRomeStatutehaveorareintheprocessofadoptinglegislation
incorporatingverbatimitsprovisions(includingArticle28)inordertofulfiltheircomplementarity
obligationsrecognizedinthePreambleandtodevelopalegalbasisforcooperationwiththeCourt.
See,e.g.,InternationalCriminalCourtAct2001,c.17, 65(1),(2)(U.K.);CrimesAgainstHumanity
andWarCrimesAct2000,c.21,5(Canada);InternationalCriminalCourt(Consequential
Amendments)Act2002268.115(Australia). Itremainstobeseenhownationalcourtsinterpret
Article28withrespecttocausation. ButseeVlkerstrafgesetzbuch[CodeofCrimesAgainst
InternationalLaw],26June2002,4(Germany)(notrequiringproofofcausationforimpositionof
criminalliabilitypursuanttodoctrineofcommandresponsibility).107 TheclausebeginningasaresultoforiginatedindraftArticleCofthe1996Preparatory
CommitteeandremainedunrevisedthroughouttheRomeStatutesevolution. SeeGeneralPrinciples
ofCriminalLaw,in2TheLegislativeHistoryoftheInternationalCriminalCourt182,21014(M.Cherif
Bassiounied.,2005).108 TheOfficialRecordsoftheRomeConferencerevealthatdelegatesdidnotdiscussthe
introductionofcausationasadistinctelementofthesuperiorresponsibilitydoctrine. Rome
ConferenceSummaryRecords,supranote25,6783(indiscussingtheU.S.proposal,thedelegates
focusedtheirdiscussionsontheextensionofthedoctrinetociviliansuperiorsanddidnotaddressthe
causationissue).109 Theleadingcommentaryonthenegotiationsdoesnotidentifycausationasanareaofcontention.
SeePerSarland,InternationalCriminalLawPrinciples,inTheInternationalCriminalCourt:The
MakingoftheRomeStatuteIssues,Negotiations,Results189,20204(RoyS.Lee,ed.,1999)(identifying
contentiousissuesrelatingtothedoctrineofsuperiorresponsibilitytobeitsapplicabilitytocivilian
superiors;anditsstatusasanadditionalformofliability).
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establishedcustomaryinternationallaw.
44. Finally,totheextentthattheChamberconsidersthatanambiguityremainsaftertheapplicationofArticles31and32oftheVCLTtotheinterpretationof
Article28
of
the
Statute,
itshould
adopt
the
reading
that
best
reconciles
the
different
versionsoftheArticleinitssixequallyauthentictexts.110WhiletheArabic,Russian,
andSpanishversionsofArticle28alluseaphraseequivalenttoasaresultofhisor
herfailuretoexercisecontrol,andarethusconsistentwiththeEnglishtext,neither
theFrenchnortheChineseversionscontainanylanguagethatcouldbereadto
suggestacausationrequirement. TheFrenchtextusesthephraselorsquilouelle
napasexerclecontrle,whichtranslatestowhenheorshedidnotexercise
control,111andtheChineseversionreferstotheimpositionofcriminalresponsibility
ifamilitarycommanderfailstoexercisepropercontrol.112 TheChambershould
thusadoptthereadingthatreconcilestheFrenchandChinesetextwiththeother
authoritativeversionsoftheArticlebyholdingthatcriminalresponsibilityunder
Article28isimposedonasuperiorasaresultofthefailuretoexercisecontrol,and
doesnotrequirethatthecrimesbecommittedasaresultofthatfailure.
C. IntheAlternative,Article28RequiresOnlyThattheSuperiorsFailuresIncreasedtheRiskoftheSubordinatesCrimes.
45. Inthealternative,iftheChamberweretointerpretArticle28asdepartingfrompreexistinginternationallawbyrequiringproofofcausation,thetextdoesnot
110 SeeStatuteArt.128;VCLT,supranote18,Art.33(4)([W]henacomparisonoftheauthentictexts
disclosesadifferenceofmeaningwhichtheapplicationofarticles31and32doesnotremove,the
meaningwhichbestreconcilesthetexts,havingregardtotheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty,shallbe
adopted.).111 TheFrenchtextprovides,inrelevantpart:Unchefmilitaireouunepersonnefaisant
effectivementfonctiondechefmilitaireestpnalementresponsabledescrimesrelevantdelacomptencede
laCourcommispardesforcesplacessoussoncommandementetsoncontrleeffectifs,ousoussonautoritetsoncontrleeffectifs,selonlecas,lorsquilouellenapasexerclecontrlequiconvenaitsurces
forces(emphasisadded).
112 (emphasisadded). TherelevantpartoftheChinese
versionofArticle28isbesttranslatedtoEnglishasfollows:Ifamilitarycommanderorperson
effectivelyactingasamilitarycommanderfailstoexercisepropercontrolovertheforcesunderhisor
hereffectivecommandandcontrol,oreffectiveauthorityandcontrolasthecasemaybe,underthe
followingcircumstances,suchcommanderorpersonshallbecriminallyresponsibleforthecrimes
committedbysuchforcesthatcomewithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt.
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provideanystandardbywhichtojudgetherequisiteproximitybetweenthe
superiorsomissionandthesubordinatescrime.113 Giventhislacuna,the
appropriatecausationstandardwouldhavetobedeterminedinlightoftheStatutes
contextandobjectandpurpose. Fortworeasons,thepropercausationrequirement
mustbelowerthanabutforstandard. First,butforcausationwouldrenderthe
superiornodifferentfromanordinaryperpetrator,becauseitwouldmakehisorher
omissionanintegralelementofthecrime.114 Second,asuperiorsindividualexercise,
orfailuretoexercise,effectivecontrolcanaffecttheriskofcrimesduringhostilities
farbeyondthescopeofthatindividualsdirectactions. Inordertoholdaccountable
thosepersonsinpositionsofauthoritywhoarebestplacedtopreventorrepress
crimes,thedoctrineshouldprovideliabilitywherethesuperiorsfailureshave
increasedtheriskforcrimeandthatriskwasrealised. Forthesereasons,ifthePre
TrialChamberweretoconcludethatArticle28includesacausationelement,it
shouldrequiretheprosecutiontoproveonlythatthesuperiorsfailureincrease[d]
theriskthatthesubordinatescommitcertaincrimes.115
46. Underthisincreasedriskstandard,thecausationrequirementwouldbesatisfiedbypresentingproofofeither(i)aspecific,isolatedomissionrelatedtothe
crimeinquestion;or(ii)ageneral,continuingseriesofomissionstoexercisecontrol
properly. Incontext,practicalconsiderationsruleoutahigherstandard.116 Asan
exampleofaspecificomission,asuperiormayfailtotakesomeactionthat
unquestionablywouldhavepreventedaparticularsubordinatescrimeofwhichhe
wasaware. Inthisinstance,thecausallinkisstrongestbetweentheomissionandthe
crime,asthesuperiorclearlyhadtheabilitytopreventcommissionandfailedtodo
113 Triffterer,supranote80,at196(Itdoesnotdefinehowtightorloosetheconnectionbetweenthefailureanditsresulthastobe.).114 Seesupra40(discussingtheStatutesrecognitionoftheuniquenatureofsuperiorresponsibility).115 Ambos,supranote21,at860. SeealsoVolkerNerlich,Symposium:SuperiorResponsibilityUnder
Article28ICCStatuteForWhatExactlyIstheSuperiorHeldResponsible?,5J.IntlCrim.Just.655,
673(2007)([I]tsufficesthatthesuperiorsfailuretoexercisecontrolproperlyincreasedtheriskthat
thebasecrimewascommitted.).116 Triffterer,supranote80,at197(2002)(thenexusisnotoneofstrictcausalityaccordingtothelaws
ofnaturalsciences).
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so. However,theincreasedriskstandardwouldalsobesatisfiedbyevidenceofa
generalomission. Asanexampleofageneralomission,asuperiormayroutinely
omittocontrolhissubordinatesproperly(by,forexample,turningablindeyeor
failingtoeducatethemininternationalhumanrightsorhumanitarianlaw). The
prosecutionmayallegethatthesuperiorsgeneralfailuretocontrolhissubordinates
createdanatmosphereofimpunity,increasingthelikelihoodofcommissionof
crimes. Althoughthecausalrelationshipappearsweaker,astheelebiiAppeals
Chamberacknowledged,ageneral,ongoingfailuretoexercisethedutiestoprevent
orpunish,maybeofsignificantlygreatergravitythanisolatedincidents,because
ofitsimpliciteffectofencouragingsubordinatestobelievethattheycancommit
furthercrimeswithimpunity.117
47. Ifproofofcausationisrequired,thentheStatutesobjectandpurposebestisaccomplishedbyrequiringtheprosecutiontoproveonlythesuperiorsgeneral
failuretoproperlycontrolhissubordinates. Becauseinternationallawcharges
superiorswithaffirmativedutiestoimpart,enforceandabidebyinternational
humanitarianlaw,holdingthemcriminallyresponsibleinconnectionwithcrimes
committedbytheirsubordinatesshouldnotbelimitedtothoseinstanceswherea
directcausallinkcanbeproven. Toeffectivelyimplementinternationallawand
curtailthecommissionofcrimes,theStatuteshouldbeinterpretedtorecognizethat
anatmosphereofimpunityandlawlessnesscreatedbyafailureofcommandisan
importantcausalfactorofcrimes. Inordertoholdresponsiblemilitaryorcivilian
superiorswhofailtoexercisetheirsupervisoryauthority,thedoctrineshouldnot
requiremoreproofofcausationthanthatthesuperiorsfailureshaveincreasedtherisk
thatcrimes
may
be
committed.
117 elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,739.
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V. CONCLUSION48. Forthesereasons,theChambershouldconcludethat(i)Article28incorporatesanegligencestandardformilitarycommanders;(ii)superiorsaffiliated
withnon
state
groups
have
aduty
to
submit
matters
involving
subordinates
crimes
tocompetentstateorinternationalauthoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution,but
suchsubmissiondoesnotabsolveasuperiorofresponsibilityforapriorfailureto
preventorrepress;and(iii)causationisnotanelementofsuperiorresponsibility.
Respectfullysubmitted,
MsWidneyBrown MrDonaldFrancisDonovan MrRoyS.Schndorf
MrChristopherKeithHall MsNatalieL.Reid CounselfortheApplicant
AmnestyInternational Debevoise&PlimptonLLP
CounselfortheApplicant
DatedthistwentiethdayofApril2009
AtLondon,UnitedKingdom,NewYork,USAandAseret,Israel
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