Brown v. Hammond, 810 F.Supp (E.D. Pa. 1993)

FACTS:

Cynthia Brown is a former employee of the Defendant and his law firm. She was employed by

Robert M. Hammond & Associates from November 4, 1990 to April 4, 1991. She was employed by the

Defendants as an at-will paralegal and secretary. The time Ms. Brown spent on client matters was billed

to the clients as “attorney time” without any kind of forewarning to the firm’s clients that the work was

being performed by someone who was not an attorney. Despite Ms. Brown’s protests that the practice

was improper, her supervisors still directed her to bill her time as “attorney time.” Therefore, Ms. Brown

then took it upon herself to inform various authorities and affected clients of the improper practice

while not laying claim to any responsibility for overseeing the firm’s billing practices. In doing so, the

Defendants responded by imposing new work rules with respect to hours of employment which only

applied to and discriminated against Ms. Brown, who was subsequently terminated for her actions.

ISSUES:

Whether Ms. Brown terminated in violation of public policy for reporting the improper actions

of the Defendants’, whether Ms. Brown was terminated in violation of public policy for protesting

against performing such improper actions, and whether the Defendants’ actions were calculated and

intentional enough to purposely cause Ms. Brown harm and result in a “prima facie tort.”

HOLDING:

The Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,

could very well provide the basis for a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

REASONING:

Under Pennsylvania law, either party may terminate an employment relationship for any or no

reason unless a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary exists. Pennsylvania law

(Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 1421 et seq.) protects Ms. Brown for reporting impropriety to

outside authorities. However, it does not allow her to directly voice the impropriety to the firm’s clients.

Therefore, termination for gratuitously alerting others about the Defendants' improper billing practice

does not violate the type of significant, clearly mandated public policy required to satisfy the very

narrow exception to Pennsylvania's rigid at-will employment doctrine. Furthermore, assuming that a

specific intent to harm exception even existed, such intent cannot be established by the harm normally

occasioned by the act of discharging an employee and such exception, if truly existed, would only exist

in cases of purely malevolent conduct. In other words, it would have to be a termination for which no

reason existed other than to cause "an atavistic desire to hurt another" (Id. at 57, 508 A.2d 1263).

Despite the fact Ms. Brown’s whistleblowing conduct was well motivated, the Defendants' reason for

discharging Ms. Brown was due to conduct of her own making and for conducts which threatened to

deprive the Defendants of clients and subject them to sanctions.

However, given no employee should be forced to choose between his or her livelihood and

engaging in fraud or other criminal conduct to the extent that Ms. Brown alleges, her action may

proceed.