8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 1/33
1
Tolerance of Corruption or Ideological Blindness?*
Carlos Pereira, Professor, Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)
Lucia S. G. Barros, Ph.D. Candidate, Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)
Very Preliminary Draft Please do not quote or cite without authorization!!!
Abstract
It is quite puzzling that corruption persists in democratic countries given that voters have the
electoral chance to choose honest politicians for political positions and punish those ones that
misbehave. The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to investigate the impact of type of
misconduct and ideological matching on voters’ perception of corruption; and (2) whether the
perception of corruption influences voters’ choice. After critically dialoguing the relevant
literature, our investigation is carried out through an experimental approach conducted by
Facebook users. Our preliminary results indicate that when voters and the candidate share
ideological preferences, they are less likely to consider the candidate’s misbehavior as corrupt
than when they have different ideological preferences. It also indicates that ideology, both in
economic and in social dimensions, not only affects voters’ perception of corruption but also
it affects voters’ choice, regardless of the type of corruption (nepotism versus money).
*
Very first draft prepared to be presented at the Conference on Accountability and Public Goods Provision that
will take place at Brown University, Providence, on December 5-6, 2014.
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 2/33
2
Introduction
Corruption is a recurrent topic in the literature (Ewoh, Matei, and Matei, 2013), as it is
a pervasive phenomenon, costing to our society about $2.6 trillion dollars, what represents 5
per cent of global GDP (Graycar and Sidebottom, 2012). Even though democracy is
sometimes negatively related to corruption (Tiwari, 2012), this relation is not clear, with
findings pointing that corruption and democracy are not related (Lambsdorff, 2006; Treisman,
2007) or even positively correlated (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008).
It should be surprising, however, that corruption persists in democratic countries,
where voters would have the chance to choose honest people for political positions. Pereira
and Melo (2016) argue that even though voters hold politicians accountable for corruption,
they do not do so to the point of preventing misbehavior, especially when politicians are able
to reward voters with public goods in exchange for political support. Their findings suggest
that public spending moderates the negative impact of corruption on the probability of
reelection, and this occurs even when voters are informed about a mayor’s involvement in
corruption. In particular, they claim that while corruption decreases the probability of
incumbent re-election, the negative effect of corruption diminishes as public expenditure
rises. In a similar direction, Manzetti and Wilson (2007) claim that, especially in poorer
countries, corrupt incumbents obtain votes by delivering basic goods and patronage jobs.
They suggest that voters are mobilized by particularistic benefits and investigate the extent to
which political support varies conditional on government effectiveness, suggesting that those
who perceive high levels of corruption are significantly less likely to sanction the government
in countries where government effectiveness is low, than in countries where government
effectiveness is high. Golden (2009) also claims that even informed voters may vote for
allegedly corrupt incumbents if they expect to receive material benefits that other parties or
candidates cannot guarantee.
Alternatively, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) tests the implicit trade off in rouba
mas faz (steals, but get things done) argument in the Brazilian case. They explicitly presented
their hypothesis as alternatives: the informed rouba mas faz trade-off versus an information
constraint hypothesis that voters, once exposed to information about politicians’ past
behavior, will punish corrupt incumbents. The authors report that respondents strongly reject
the rouba mas faz trade-off, supporting the alternative “informational” hypothesis. The
authors utilize a nationwide survey experiment in Brazil, in which respondents were randomlyexposed to vignettes containing information about the politicians’ involvement (or lack
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 3/33
3
thereof) in corruption and party affiliation while being asked about the likelihood of support
by a hypothetical voter. Surprisingly, the authors report that respondents rejected the rouba
mas faz trade-off, displaying greater sensitivity to information on political misconduct.
The literature has also suggested other reasons why people would choose to vote for a
dishonest person. One widespread line of inquiry focuses on informational failures to explain
the seeming paradox of corrupt yet popular politicians. Voters, the argument goes, value
rectitude in office. When they acquire information about corruption they will sanction
wrongdoing (Ferraz and Finan 2008, Alesina and Tabellini 2006; Klasnja 2011). Uninformed
voters may reward corrupt incumbents primarily because of their inability to distinguish clean
politicians from dirty ones. This is exacerbated in contexts plagued by high corruption, where
mutual accusations and scandals are common. It follows that support for corrupt politicians is,
by and large, attributable to the existence of information asymmetries, as the inability of
voters to observe a politician’s true type generates moral hazards. By increasing the level of
information available to voters, corrupt incumbents are more likely to be sanctioned for
deviant or dishonest behavior. The information hypothesis suggests that voters’ support to
corrupt politicians takes place when they lack information about candidates’ involvement in
corruption upon which they then could act in the voting booth (Winters and Shapiro, 2013).
The authors found that this phenomenon happens in Brazil, where people voted for corrupt
politicians, even expressing a strong preference for punishing them. Thus, judicial
investigations by themselves do not necessarily lead to electoral punishment, unless such
episodes are widely reported by the media (Chang, Golden and Hill 2010; Ferraz and Finan
2008).
The alternative explanation to the “informational” argument for the phenomenon of
corrupt behavior being tolerated by the society is the “trading” or “trade off hypothesis,”
which suggests that corruption is one facet of a multidimensional voting space (Persson and
Tabellini, 2003; Rundquist, Strom and Peters 1977).
Our argument is that voting for a clean contestant proves costly if the contestant holds
preferences that deviate from the voter’s ideal point—be these ideological, religious or
kinship related. In the context of small towns, for instance, where voters are split into
ideologically defined constituencies, support for corrupt incumbents is driven by the
knowledge that a rival’s preferences lay far from the voter’s ideal point. In such cases, voters
prefer a “dirty” candidate who shares their ideological preferences or enjoys the family
support to a clean contestant from a different ideological camp or family background.Myerson (1993), for instance, explained that parties or candidates are different in honesty and
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 4/33
4
ideology. When there are candidates available for all ideological positions - what happens for
proportional representation and multimember districts – there is less room for dishonest
candidates, since voters have more options. However, in single-member districts, where only
one candidate can win the election, voters may tolerate a dishonest candidate if he or she is
ideologically preferred. That is, citizens weight corruption charges along with ideological
considerations (Golden 2009).
In line with this argument, Chang and Kerr (2007) distinguish between perceptions of
and tolerance for corruption, suggesting that voters who belong to the patronage network of
the incumbent are more tolerant of corruption and perceive corruption at a higher level
compared to patronage outsiders. The same finding applies to partisanship and ethnic
affiliation.
Considering that ideology may predict voting for a corrupt candidate, it is not clear
what psychological processes are behind this choice. On one hand, standard economic model
of rational behavior explains that a person consciously acts in a dishonest manner when the
benefits are higher than its costs (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). If the voting behavior
follows the same pattern, one should choose a corrupt candidate when the benefits of electing
him or her are higher than the costs of his or her corruption.
On the other hand, a psychological perspective introduces the idea that cheating may
hurt one’s self-concept of being honest (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, 2008). Thus, even though
there are situations in which the benefits of cheating may compensate its costs, one may
decide not to cheat to avoid the guilt of being dishonest. According to the authors, an
alternative is to behave dishonestly enough to profit but honestly enough to delude themselves
of their own integrity.
Considering this perspective, it is possible that some kinds of corruption may be seen
as ‘not that serious’, which allows voters to see corrupt candidates as honest. Mazar, and
Ariely (2006) supports this view, introducing the idea of self-deception, whereby individuals
reframe an act to themselves in a way that makes the act not be perceived as dishonest. A
variable that is particularly sensitive to reframing is the individual’s motivation to reappraise
the context, which may be higher or lower depending on extent to which the misconduct
threatens the self.
Because people tend to reappraise dishonest information more often when the person
who commits it is oneself instead of others (Chimonas, Brennan and Rothman, 2007), and
ideology is part of one’s identity (Iborra, 2005; Teles, 2008; Pimentel, 2008), it is possible
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 5/33
5
that voters reappraise more corruption information when the candidate shares their own
ideological positions.
So, the purpose of this paper is: (1) to investigate the extent to which different
dimensions of ideological preferences (economic and social) match on voters’ perception of
corruption; and (2) whether ideological preferences and the perception of corruption
influences voting choice. This investigation was carried out through an experimental
approach. After discussing our theoretical approach and hypothesis, we present the results,
discussion, limitations and suggestions for future investigations.
Theory and Hypothesis
Corruption and Ideology
When facing the dilemma of choosing a candidate, voters are concerned about the
policies that will be implemented, which involve trade-offs such as more or less government
spending (Ansolabehere, 2006). Because each voter has spatial preferences over the issue, he
or she chooses the candidate closest to an ideal policy, which means that vote follows a
certain ideology.
The term ideology was originally coined by De Tracy (1817) to connote a science of
ideas and it still can be understood as someone’s value or belief system which is accepted as
fact or truth (Singleton and Honeycutt, 2012). There are some systems that have been
identified by the literature, such as liberal, conservative, socialist, feminist, fascist, or other
(Festenstein and Kenny, 2005).
People may identify themselves through one of these ideological traditions, which, in
turn, will influence choice in an election. Literature suggests that ideological self-
identification is one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of politicians’ evaluation
and choice in a number of countries, such as the United States (Mann, 1980; Conover and
Feldman, 1981; Scotto, Stephenson, and Kornberg, 2004; Jost, 2006; Devine, 2012) and in
Brazil (Singer, 1998; Carreirão, 2002).
One common simplification of the concept of ideology is as a position on a liberal-
conservative continuum (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993, Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and
Russell, 1998), where voters positions themselves according to their attitudes toward the size
and role of government (Devine, 2012) or toward the willingness to change the status quo
(Conover and Feldman, 1981). In two-candidate elections, they vote for the candidate whoseideology is closest to their own (Berry et al. 1998).
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 6/33
6
Singer (1998) explains that even when people are not aware about the meaning of
ideological positions (e.g. the differences between left and right orientation), an intuitive
knowledge and feeling about the preferences of a candidate is sufficient for allowing them to
vote coherently with their own ideas. Conover and Feldman (1981) explain that ideological
identifications have largely symbolic meanings.
However, what would happen when the ideologically preferred candidate is corrupt? It
is known that people generally prefer to vote for an honest candidate (Myerson, 1993, Person
and Tabellini, 2004, Winters, and Shapiro, 2010, de Figueiredo, Hidalgo, and Kashara, 2011),
thus, this situation creates a problem for the voter, who has to choose between honesty and
ideology.
This situation happens in particular when there are only two options for the voter,
what happens when there are only two established parties, what is the case of the North
American electoral system (Myerson, 1993), or when there are only two competing
candidates, which is the case, for instance, of a runoff presidential election in Brazil
(Albuquerque, 1992).
Addressing this puzzle, we argue that voters might tolerate a dishonest candidate if he
or she is ideologically preferred, because switching to an honest candidate risks giving the
victory to a candidate of the opposite ideology. This idea is in accordance with Rundquist,
Strom and Peters (1977), Myerson (1993), and Golden (2009), who discuss the possibilities
that voters might support a corrupt politician in case he mirrors their ideological preferences.
Because ideology is a multi-dimensional concept, voters can access candidates’ values
and behaviors in terms of some policy dimensions, such as economic, foreign, and social
policies (Devine, 2012). Thus, if voters have to choose between a corrupt candidate and a
candidate of the opposite ideology, their dilemma may be different when the corrupt
candidate is similar to their own ideology in all dimensions, or in just in one of them.
In order to simplify ideology’s assessment in this paper, we measured it in two
dimensions: economic and social. Its measurement is better explained at the method section.
This assessment is consistent with a number of scholars, who explain that a position on a left-
right continuum remains the most meaningful indicator of ideological positioning in
contemporary democracies (Badescu and Sum 2005, Power and Zucco, 2009, Zucco, 2009,
Zucco and Lauderdale, 2011).
Bringing these two dimensions to our context, we suggest that voters are more willing
to tolerate a dishonest candidate when he or she is ideologically preferred in both economic
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 7/33
7
and social dimensions than when he or she is ideologically preferred in only one of these
dimensions. In other words, we hypothesize:
H1: Voters are more likely to choose a corrupt candidate when they share the same
ideology:
H1a: when voters and the candidate share the same ideology in the economic
dimension, voters are more likely to choose the corrupt candidate than when
they mismatch.
H1b: when voters and the candidate share the same ideology in the social
dimension, voters are more likely to choose the corrupt candidate than when
they mismatch.
H1c: when voters and the candidate share the same ideology in both
dimensions, voters are more likely to choose the corrupt candidate than when
they match in only one dimension.
If these hypotheses hold true, the next step is to investigate why these effects happen.
We propose two explanations: First, people may consciously choose the corrupt candidate
because they believe that it is better to tolerate a corrupt politician than to tolerate a person
whose ideology is contrary to their own. Second, people may ideologically identify
themselves with the corrupt candidate in such a way that they may not see the candidate’s
corruption as something very wrong.
According to the standard economic model of rational behavior, one would act in a
dishonest manner when the benefits are higher than its costs, which is a cognitive process
(Allingham, and Sandmo, 1972; Becker and Stigler, 1974). Considering this trade-off, in an
election context, it is possible that voters consciously tolerate corrupt candidates when their
benefits are believed to compensate their costs.
This cognitive trade-off has been found in studies in which a not “totally honest”, but
efficient person is preferred if compared to an honest, but “not that efficient” person
(Figueiredo, 2004, Almeida, 2006, 2007). There is even a literature suggesting that there are
circumstances in which corruption is not that harmful, but instead, it has some social,
economic and institutional roles in transition societies (Sousa, 2008). For this reason, we
propose that:
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 8/33
8
H2a: Voters are more likely to perceive that a corrupt candidate who shares the same
ideology is corrupt, but ideological matching makes the cost-benefit tradeoff of voting in a
corrupt candidate is worthwhile.
Literature suggests that people tend to reappraise dishonest information more often
when the person who commits it is oneself instead of others (Chimonas, Brennan and
Rothman, 2007). For instance, physicians reported that receiving gifts from the
pharmaceutical industry is generally wrong, but when they faced this situation themselves,
their evaluation changed, especially when they remembered how much sacrifice they made
during medical training (Sah and Loewenstein, 2010).
Because ideology is part of one’s identity (Iborra, 2005; Teles, 2008; Pimentel, 2008),
it is possible that ideology will contribute to corruption’s reappraisal. For instance, Van
Kenhove, Vermeir and Verniers (2001), explains that an extreme-left view that considers that
the rich are responsible for social inequality makes people reappraise theft in terms that it
becomes not considered to be a crime if the theft is from the rich. Therefore, thinking about
an electoral context, we suggest that voters reappraise more corruption information when the
candidate shares their own ideological positions. For this reason, we propose that:
H2b: When voters and the corrupt candidate’s ideology match, voters are less likely to
perceive him or her to be corrupt.
Corruption’s Reappraisal
Evidence from psychology suggests that people have internal reward mechanisms that
exert influence on individuals’ decisions (Mazar and Ariely, 2006). When the temptation for
dishonesty arises, people’s moral standards are also taken into account (Mazar et al., 2008).
The authors explain that even if misbehaving seems to be worthwhile, the fact that this
behavior is perceived as being wrong seems to be sufficient to prevent one from doing so.
Taking this fact into account, when developing a general model of dishonest behavior,
Mazar and Ariely (2006) proposed that the decision for dishonesty includes both internal
psychological reward mechanisms for honesty and dishonesty. Mazar et al. (2008) explained
that people often feel the conflict between benefiting from doing something wrong and acting
according to their belief of being honest. As a result, they tend to cheat, but ‘just a little’.
In other words, the authors explain that people tend to commit small dishonest acts,which allow them to have some benefit, but do not affect an honest self-image. In fact, under
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 9/33
9
some circumstances, the perceived “wrongness” of a dishonest behavior influences one’s
decision to commit it has already been found in the literature (Newman, 1979, Erffmeyer,
1984, Goldstone and Chin, 1993).
For example, Farrignton and Kidd (1977) found that more people claimed to own a
coin, which did not belong to them, when its value was low compared to high. Gino and
Pierce (2010) found that people tend to discount the wrongness of crossing ethical boundaries
to hurt or help others when the action restores equity; Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2005) also
found that students cheated only 20 percent of the possible average magnitude, even when
they had no chance to be caught.
Considering these ideas, it is possible that our evaluation of other people’s acts, such
as politicians’, might follow the same pattern. Even though it has not been explained by
literature yet, it seems reasonable that doing something ‘just a little’ wrong may sound
acceptable because it would not hurt honesty, but if wrongness becomes larger than this
‘little’, it may be perceived as too much and the politician would turn to be considered
corrupt.
In the political context, the literature provides evidence of the relativism of what is
considered corruption and what is not (Schwenke, 2000, Le Billon, 2003), as ethical norms
are ubiquitous (Resnik, 2011). Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public office
for private gain (Le Billon, 2003) and it is not clear what actions are considered a ‘misuse’.
This idea suggests that there are modes of corruption that are considered ‘more wrong’ than
others.
Johnston (1986) explains that the kinds of behaviors that will be socially defined as
corrupt may vary as a function of social attachments and customs, such as kinship, political
culture and popular attachment to government (or lack of it). It may also vary as a function of
attributes of the political process, such as its speed, patterns of access and exclusion; and
economic characteristics, such as relative size of the public sector.
Therefore, it is possible that the same behavior will be considered corruption for a
group of people and not for others. For example, Filgueiras (2009) found that people who
understand public interest as everybody’s responsibility perceive that an act committed by
anyone, which affects the government, is corruption. On the contrary, people who understand
public interest as a government’s responsibility perceive that an act is corruption only when a
politician or a public bureaucrat commits it.
Mazar et al. (2008) explained that the fact that something is wrong seems to besufficient to prevent one from doing so, because people want to have an honest self-image.
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 10/33
10
Going back to an election context, imagine that a person has to make a choice between a
corrupt and an honest candidate. Even if the corrupt candidate seems to be a better choice
(e.g. more experienced), the fact that he is perceived as corrupt (e.g. what he or she did is
perceived to be ‘very wrong’) should be sufficient to prevent this person from voting for this
candidate.
This idea would rule out the hypothesis that the choice for a corrupt candidate is based
on a cognitive cost-benefit analysis (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). In other words, the
choice for a corrupt candidate would not depend on a perception that he or she is in fact
corrupt but voting for him or her is worthwhile, but on a perception that what the candidate
did is not ‘wrong enough’.
This idea would also rule out the information hypothesis that voters’ support to corrupt
politicians happens when they lack information about candidates’ involvement in corruption
(Winters, and Shapiro, 2010). Instead of not having enough information, we propose that
voters’ support to corrupt politicians happens when the available information does not make
the candidate seems to be ‘corrupt enough’.
In other words, ideology may create a state of blindness, in which voters see the
candidate’s misconduct as not ‘wrong enough’. If corruption is not ‘very wrong’, voters may
believe that it is not a problem for them to vote for this candidate. Thus, we propose that:
H3: The way corruption is perceived (how wrong it is) affects choice.
Political Context
It is important to discuss the political and electoral context in which the experiment
was applied. The survey was posted on the Facebook platform between the first round and the
runoff presidential election in Brazil; precisely, two weeks prior the runoff election, which
took place on October 26 2014. This political environment became an excellent opportunity to
test the impact of voters’ ideological attachment on their tolerance to corruption.
Despite the high number of presidential candidates running for the presidency and the
great degree of uncertainty concerning who would be able to win the electoral contest, the
extremely competitive first round of the electoral race in 2014 consolidated as winners the
two main political and opposing ideological blocks that have polarized Brazil since 1994. On
the one hand, the Workers’ Party (PT), having President Dilma Rousseff running forreelection, and on the other hand, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) with his
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 11/33
11
candidate and former governor of the state of Minas Gerais, Aécio Neves. As none of the
candidates obtained the simple majority in the first round, the two first runners had to dispute
a runoff election three weeks later.
During the electoral process, a major corruption scandal was disclosure in the largest
state-oil company, Petrobras, in kickbacks financed by cash creamed from inflated contracts.
The scale of the wrongdoing could dwarf the other major scandal of recent years, known as
Mensalão – monthly bribes to legislators - and further undermine not only the reputation of
the a company that has long been seen as a national treasure, but also the political reputation
of the incumbent president running for reelection. Petrobras is seen as so important that both
the lower house and the Senate have launched inquiry committees to investigate the scandal.
The country spited in two opposite sides. On the one hand, PT’s supporters alleged
that corruption has been a pathology attributable to the Brazilian political system as a whole
and not necessarily would involve or be restricted to PT administrations. It was also argued
that during the former Cardoso’s administration and in states governed by the opposition,
many corruption scandals have also emerged, raising thus doubts about who would be in fact
corrupt or not. Although President Rousseff was chairperson of Petrobras’ board from 2003 to
2010, she has denied any knowledge of graft.
On the other hand, the opposition has blamed the Rousseff’s government to be
responsible for the largest corruption scandal ever in the Brazilian history, and their political
and economic consequences remain unpredictable. The opposition has also accused that PT
and coalition allies from blocking further investigation by the committees in Congress.
Although by very close electoral margin, President Rousseff has managed to be reelected.
Despite the hypothetical scenario of the experiment, the voting choice situation in
which voters had to access information about corruption and their ideological preferences
were present during the two weeks in which they answered the survey experiment.
Method
To test all hypotheses, we ran a web-based survey experiment. We used a 2 (mode of
corruption: money vs. nepotism) X 2 (economic ideology: matching vs. mismatching) X 2
(behavior ideology: matching vs. mismatching) between subjects design. We used two modes
of corruption to check if our results hold for both of them.
Our sample comprises 1.045 Brazilian subjects who were randomly assigned to one ofthe experimental conditions. We recruited these participants by placing an advertisement on
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 12/33
12
Facebook platform. This recruitment method is effective because it allows greater
demographic diversity and representativeness than student samples (Samuels & Zucco, 2012).
Interested participants answered an online survey. The procedure was the following: when
people agreed to participate, they received instructions asking them to imagine a second term
presidential election in which they would have to choose between two opposing candidates to
vote.
The participants (1) read the profile of both candidates; (2) made the decision in which
candidate they would vote for; (3) answered a questionnaire measuring their own ideology;
(4) read the manipulation; (5) made a second decision in whom to vote for; (6) answered a
questionnaire measuring the type of processing (whether the corrupt candidate was seen as a
cost-benefit choice – he steals, but he gets things done – or if he was seen as not corrupt); and
(6) answered some socio-economic questions.
The first option was the Candidate A, who had large political experience. He had been
a municipal mayor twice, and a former state-governor, and he had 70% of citizen’s approval,
and was considered very efficient by the population. The second option was the Candidate B,
who lacks administrative experience. He had been a municipal mayor just once, and he had
30% of citizen’s approval only. When he was a mayor, he did very little to improve people’s
quality of life. In this campaign, his platform focused on honesty in politics and public
service. After reading these political profiles, subjects chose for whom they would vote.
The questionnaire measuring type of ideology of the respondents contained the
indicators displayed on Figure 1. This measure is an adaptation of the scale used by the Pew
Research Institute. The Brazilian Institute Datafolha also used similar scale. We chose this
scale because it captures both dimensions of ideology (economic and social) and it has been
used in a Brazilian representative sample, which eventually allow us to compare our findings
with the Brazilian population.
As said before, the survey used two dimension of ideology, measured in terms of the
role of the government in the economy, and in social values related to religion, gay marriage
and legalization of marijuana. These dimensions were validated by exploratory and
confirmatory factorial analysis. All the indicators had two opposite sentences and subjects
should agree with one of them or say they do not know.
Based on the traditional left-right ideological continuum, we called economic-
conservative the voters leaning toward state intervention in the economy and economic-
liberals voters supporting competition and less regulation. Concerning social values, we
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 13/33
13
considered as social-liberals voters in favor of civil liberties such as gay marriage and social-
conservatives those voters supporting restrictions on individual behavior like the use of drugs.
[Figure 1 about here]
The manipulations came next. Subjects read a vignette showing again the profile of
both candidates and saying that they found more information about Candidate A. In the
money condition, Candidate A was accused of causing a BR$ 4 million loss in public
accounts for stealing money (vs. appointing a relative to a public position). In the economic
liberal condition, Candidate A was in favor of privatizations and less intervention on economy
(vs. creation of state-owned companies and more intervention/regulation on economy), and in
the social liberal condition, he was in favor (or against) legalizing the consumption of
marijuana and of homosexual marriage.
Based on their score differences, subjects were classified into matching or
mismatching (whether his or her ideological view matches or not with Candidate A’s that was
displayed to him or her) for both economic and social views. After that, subjects answered to
a questionnaire measuring type of processing, which contained the indicators displayed on
Figure 2. Because corruption can be chosen either due to a cognitive tradeoff (Figueiredo,
2004, Almeida, 2006, 2007) or to the perception that it was not ‘wrong enough’ (Mazar et al.
2008), this scale contains two dimensions, which was confirmed by exploratory and
confirmatory factorial analysis. Subjects rated the statements using a Likert-rating, ranging
from 1 (‘I totally disagree’) to 5 (‘I totally agree’).
[Figure 2 about here]
Results
The characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 1. As expected, there are no
significant differences across conditions, which indicates that subjects were randomly
assigned to the conditions and therefore our results are not driven by any demographic
characteristics.
[Table 1 about here]
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 14/33
14
First, we checked if the voting choice depended on type of corruption. We did not find
any difference between the types of corruption on voting choice (! 2 (2) = 3.13; p = .21). Table
2 shows the results divided by type of corruption. Given that we did not find differences in
our replicates with regard to the type of corruption on voting choice, we decided to analyze
these two groups together.
[Table 2 about here]
Then, we examined the extent to which voting choice depends on ideological
preferences. As we can see in Tables 3 and 4, there exist significant differences between
subjects in which ideology matched compared to when they did not match, both in economic
(! 2 (2) = 40.43; p < .001) and social (! 2 (2) = 48.47; p < .001) ideological dimensions. In other
words, when voters and the candidate shared the same ideological preferences, voters are
more inclined to vote for the corrupt candidate than when they have distinct ideological
preferences.
[Tables 3 and 4 about here]
The next step was to investigate if there is any difference among all possible
combinations of matching and mismatching in both economic and social dimensions of
ideology. Table 5 shows that when both ideological dimensions matches, Candidate A
receives a higher proportion of votes compared with the situation in which only the economic
dimension matched (! 2 (2) = 37.37; p < .001) as well as when only social dimension of
ideology matched (! 2 (2) = 31.38; p < .001). Consistently, when both ideological dimensions
mismatched, Candidate A received a lower proportion of the votes compared when only
economic matched (! 2 (2) = 10.18; p < .01), and when only behavior matched (! 2 (2) = 12.15;
p < .01). However, there was no statistically significant difference when only economic
ideology matched and when only social ideology matched (! 2 (2) =.16; p = .92). This result
confirms thus our hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c.
[Table 5 about here]
After that, we explored if any specific ideology drove this effect. Table 6 shows howsubjects in our sample made their voting choices based in each combination of our ideological
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 15/33
15
dimensions for each of the four conditions of matching and mismatching. We categorized
subject’s ideology into conservative and liberal. As mentioned earlier, for economic ideology,
conservative voters are in favor of a higher degree of interventionism, while liberals favor
economic competition and less regulation. For social ideology, liberals are in favor of gay
marriage and liberalization of drugs, while conservative voters believe in god as reference of
values.
[Table 6 about here]
Given that only 5.2% of our sample presented conservative social ideology, the
number of subjects was too small to split into eight conditions. However, among the subjects
that had liberal social ideology, we found some interesting differences.
Among economic conservatives, when both ideological dimensions matched,
Candidate A received a higher proportion of the votes compared when only social dimension
of ideology matched (! 2 (2) = 20.41; p < .001), and when only economic dimension of
ideology matched (! 2 (2) = 17.43; p < .001). However, when both ideological dimensions
mismatched, Candidate A did not receive a significant lower proportion of the votes
compared when only economic matched (! 2 (2) =.94; p = .624), and when only social matched
(! 2 (2) = 3.41; p = .18). Moreover, we did not find a significant difference when only
economic matched and when only social matched (! 2 (2) = 4.44; p < .108). It means that for
this group, the corrupt candidate should mirror their both ideological dimensions to get their
votes.
Among economic liberals, when both ideological dimensions matched, Candidate A
surprisingly received a lower proportion of the votes compared to when only economic
dimension matched (! 2 (2) = 41.42; p < .001), but, as we expected, much higher than when
only social dimension matched (! 2 (2) = 19.12; p < .001). When both ideological dimensions
mismatched, Candidate A received a marginal higher proportion of the votes compared with
when only economic dimension matched (! 2 (2) = 5.66; p = .059), and but much lower than
when only social dimension matched (! 2 (2) = 15.35; p < .001). It means that for economic
liberals, economy is more important than social issues to drive their vote decision. Another
indication that confirmed that there is a significant difference between when only economic
matched and when only social matched (! 2 (2) = 24.08; p < .001).
Psychological Mechanisms
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 16/33
16
The next step is to investigate the psychological mechanisms behind these voting
choices. Do people consciously evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoff of choosing a corrupt
candidate? Or do they unconsciously reappraise the corrupt behavior and consider it as “not
corrupt”? To investigate it, we run two factorial ANOVAs, first, where cost-benefit
evaluation serves as the dependent variable and then, where reappraisal serves as the
dependent variable. Our independent variables are economic and social matching or
mismatching, and subjects’ social and economic ideological dimensions.
For the cost-benefit tradeoff as the dependent variable, when the economic ideology of
the respondent matches with the candidate’s ideology, corruption is easier to be accepted as a
cost-benefit trade-off (Mmat = 2.14 vs. Mmis = 1.85; F = 7.89; p < .01). No other independent
variable predicts significant differences on cost-benefit tradeoff. Therefore, we find partial
support for H2a, because corruption is only accepted as worthwhile for the economic
dimension of ideology.
For reappraisal as our dependent variable, we find a direct effect of respondent’s social
ideology on reappraisal, so that when people have conservative social ideology, they
reappraise more than when they have liberal social ideology (Mcon = 2.01 vs. Mlib = 1.65; F =
5.28; p < .05). Because most of our sample has liberal social ideology, this finding may not
explain voting choice in this experiment.
More interestingly, however, is when both economic and social ideology matches.
Voters reappraise corruption information significantly more often (F = 5.97; p < .05) than
when only economic or social ideologies matches. It means that when the candidate shares the
same economic and social ideologies as the respondents, they think the candidate is less
corrupt, supporting H2b Figure 3 shows the different means and illustrates this finding.
[Figure 3 about here]
Moreover, we found a significant four-way interaction of economic matching, social
matching, economic ideology, and social ideology on reappraisal (F = 7.61; p < .01). Figure 4
shows the different means and illustrates this finding. For social liberals, we found that the
effect when the candidate shared the same economic and social ideologies as the respondent,
he or she thinks the candidate is less corrupt, is stronger for economic conservatives than for
economic liberals.
[Figure 4 about here]
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 17/33
17
Finally, we ran a logistic regression of the modes of processing (reappraisal and cost-
benefit tradeoff) and their interaction on choice (transformed into a dummy variable, where 1
equals voting for Candidate A, and 0, otherwise). Reappraisal, cost-benefit tradeoff, and their
interaction were significant predictors of choice (" = .994, SE = .212, p < .001; " = 1.629, SE
= .162, p < .001; " = -.370, SE = .075, p < .001, respectively).
It means that Candidate A was more likely to be voted when the voter saw him as less
corrupt, and when the candidate’s behavior is seen to be wrong, but worthwhile. When high
levels of both processes happened at the same time, their effects are reduced, but still
significant. We found support for H3, since the level of corruption’s reappraisal predicts
choice. However, the conscious cost-benefit tradeoff is also important to explain choice. It
means that the answer for voting for a corrupt candidate can be both tolerance of corruption
and ideological blindness.
Discussion
Even though, in democratic countries, voters have the electoral chance to choose
honest candidates for political positions and punish those ones that misbehave, there are
sometimes conditions for them not to do so. By using an experimental approach, we show that
ideology is one of these reasons. Specifically, our experimental analysis demonstrates that
voters are more likely to choose a dishonest candidate when they share the same ideology,
even acknowledging that this candidate may be corrupt. We additionally show that this effect
is even stronger when both economic and social ideological dimensions match.
We go a step further and investigate the psychological mechanisms behind this effect.
Interestingly, when people read information that an ideologically preferred candidate is
corrupt, they are more likely to reappraise it than when the candidate has the opposed
ideology. In other words, ideological matching facilitates the belief that the candidate’s
misconduct is not that wrong.
In addition, our findings suggest that both tolerance of corruption and ideological
blindness influence voting choice, in such a way that when an ideologically preferred
candidate is corrupt, voters see their corruption as mild, but even when they acknowledge that
the corruption exists, choosing the corrupt candidate is still worthwhile.
Even though our findings contribute to our understanding of why people choosecorrupt candidates, they meet some limitations. For instance, in the experimental procedure,
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 18/33
18
people first had to choose one candidate and, afterwards, fill in the type of processing form.
This may have made respondents rationalize their choice, what may have affected their
answers. Other experimental designs may replicate this study using a different order.
Another limitation is that the manipulation said that the candidate was suspected from
being corrupt, but there was no evidence to prove it. If he or she was already condemned, the
answers’ pattern may have been different. This modification in the experimental design can
also be tried in future research.
Finally, future research can investigate whether voters can differently reappraise other
modes of corruption. For example, if instead of nepotism, the non-monetary type of
corruption were patronage or public contracts, would the reappraisal process be different?
This kind of investigation could shed light on what kinds of behaviors are considered to be
corruption by the Brazilian (or other nationalities) voters.
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 19/33
19
References
Albuquerque, J. A. (1992). Identidade, oposição e pragmatismo: uma teoria política do voto.
Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política, (26), 53-79.
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis.
Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323–38.
Almeida, A. C. (2006). Por Que Lula? Rio de Janeiro: Record.
Almeida, A. C. (2007). A Cabeça do Brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: Record.
Ansolabehere, S. (2006). Voters, Candidates, and Parties. In: R. E. Goodin (Eds.). The Oxford
Handbooks of Political Science (pp. 29-49). New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
Asquer, R. (2012) “Why do Citizens of Democracies Tolerate Corruption? Preliminary
Evidence from the World Value Survey” (Unpublished manuscript).Becker, G. S., & Stigler, G. J. (1974). Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of
enforces. Journal of Legal Studies, 3, 1.
Badescu, G., & Sum, P. E. (2005, April). The Importance of Left-Right Orientations in the
New Democracies. International Conference on Elections and Democratic
Governance, Taipei, 10–11.
Berry, W. D., Ringquist, E. J., Fording, R. C., & Russell, L. Measuring Citizen and
Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93. American Journal of Political
Science, 42(1), 327-348.
Borba, J. (2005). Cultura política, ideologia e comportamento eleitoral: alguns apontamentos
teóricos sobre o caso brasileiro. Opinião Pública, 11(1), 147-168.
Borges, A. (2010). Burocracia, Política de Patronagem e Gasto Educacional nos Estados
Brasileiros: O Caso da Secretaria de Educação do Estado da Bahia. Estudos de
Sociologia, 15(29).
Carreirão, Y. S. (2000). A decisão do voto nas eleições presidenciais no Brasil (1989 a 1998):
a importância do voto por avaliação de desempenho. Doctoral Dissertation, USP, São
Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil.
Carreirão, Y. S. (2002). Identificação ideológica e voto para presidente. Opinião Pública, 1,
54-79.
Chabal P, Daloz, J. P. (1999). Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. James Currey:
Oxford.
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 20/33
20
Chandra, K. (2003). Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India.
UC Los Angeles: Department of Sociology, UCLA. Retrieved from:
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0vb620b2
Chimonas, S., Brennan, T. A., & Rothman, D. J. (2007). Physicians and drug representatives:
exploring the dynamics of the relationship. Journal of general internal medicine,
22(2), 184-190.
Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. (1981). The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-
Identifications. American Journal of Political Science, 25(4), 617-645.
De Tracy, A. D. (1817). A Treatise on Political Economy. Georgetown: Joseph Milligan.
Devine, C. J. (2012). Social Issues, Authoritarianism, and Ideological Conceptualization:
How Policy Dimensions and Psychological Factors Influence Ideological Labeling.
Political Psychology, 33(4), 531-552.
Erikson, R. S., Wright Jr., G. C., & McIver, J. (1993). Statehouse Democracy. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Erffmeyer, E. S. (1984). Rule-violation behavior on the golf course. Perceptual & Motor
Skills, 59, 591-596.
Ewoh, A. I. E. Matei, A. & Matei, L. (2013). Corruption, public integrity, and globalization in
South-Eastern European states. A comparative analysis. Theoretical and Applied
Economics, 1(578), 7-34.
Farrington, D. P., & Kidd, R. F. (1977). Is financial dishonesty a rational decision? British
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 16, 139–146.
Filgueiras, F. (2009). A tolerância à corrupção no Brasil: uma antinomia entre normas morais
e prática social. Opinião Pública, 15(2), 386-421.
Festenstein, M., & Kenny, M. (2005). Political Ideologies: a Reader and Guide. Oxford:
Oxford UP.
Figueiredo, M. (2004). Convite ao ‘Rouba, mas faz,’ Insight Inteligência, 24-7.
Figueiredo, M. F. de, Hidalgo, F. D., & Kasahara, Y. (2011). When do voters punish corrupt
politicians? Experimental evidence from Brazil. Unpublished Manuscript, University
of California Berkeley.
Fjeldstad, O. H., Kolstad, I., & Lange, S. (2003). Autonomy, incentives and patronage. A
study of corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda revenue authorities. Michelsen
Institute.
Gino, F., & Pierce, L. (2010). Lying to Level the Playing Field: Why People May DishonestlyHelp or Hurt Others to Create Equity. Journal of Business Ethics, 95: 89–103.
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 21/33
21
Golden, M. (2009) “The Electoral Underpinnings of Corruption in Rich and Poor Democratic
Polities” (Unpublished manuscript)
Goldstone, R. L., & Chin, C. (1993). Dishonesty in Self-Report of Copies Made: Moral
Relativity and the Copy Machine. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 14(1), 19–32.
Graycar, A., & Sidebottom, A. (2012). Corruption and control: a corruption reduction
approach. Journal of Financial Crime, 19(4), 384-399.
Green, E. (2010). Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda. Studies In
Comparative International Development , 45(1), 83-103.
Hsee, C. K., Yu, F., Zang, J., & Zhang, Y. (2003). Medium Maximization. Journal of
Consumer Research, 30(1), 1-14.
Iborra, A. (2005). Beyond Identity and Ideology: Processes of Transcendence Associated with
the Experience of Conversion. Culture & Psychology, 11(1), 89-100.
Johnston, M. (1986). The political consequences of corruption: a reassessment. Comparative
Politics, 18(4), 459–477.
Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. American Psychologist , 61, 651–670.
Keefer, P., & Vlaicu, R. (2008). Credibility, Clientelism and Democracy. Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, 24(2), 1-36.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (1996). Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross Country Tests Using
Alternative Institutional Measures. Economics and Politics, 7, 207-27.
Le Billon, P. (2003). Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed
Conflicts. Journal of International Development , 15, 413–426.
Mann, T. (1980). Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections. Washington,
DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Mazar, N., Amir, O. & Ariely, D. (2008). The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of
Self-Concept Maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 155, 633–644.
Mazar, N. & Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications,
Working paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, No. 06-3,
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55638
Melo, M., Pereira, C. & Figueiredo, C. (2009). Political and Institutional Checks on
Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions. Comparative
Political Studies, 42(9): 1217-1244.
Myerson, R. (1993). Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: a
game theoretic analysis. Games and Economic Behavior , 5, 118–32.
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 22/33
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 23/33
23
Singer, A. (1998). Identificação ideológica e voto no Brasil: o caso das eleições presidenciais
de 1989 e 1994. Doctoral Dissertation, FFLCH/USP, São Paulo, SP, Brazil.
Singleton, S. V., & Honeycutt, A. (2012). Utilizing Political Ideologies to Market a Political
Candidate. Journal Of Business & Economics Research, 10(1), 19-23.
Smith, G. (2001). The 2001 general election: Factors influencing the brand image of political
parties and their leaders. Journal of Marketing Management , 17(9-10), 989-1006.
Snyder Jr., J. M., & Ting, M. M. (2002). An informational rationale for political parties.
American Journal of Political Science, 90-110.
Sousa, L. (2008). As agências anticorrupção como peças centrais de um sistema de
integridade. Revista da CGU , 4(1), 20-45.
Stimson, J. A., MacKuen, M. B., & Erikson, R. S. (1995). Dynamic representation. American
Political Science Review, 89, 543–565.
Teles, C. D. P. (2009). Linguagem Escolar e a Construção da Identidade e Consciência Racial
da Criança Negra na Educação Infantil. Anagrama: Revista Científica Interdisciplinar
da Graduação, 1(4).
Tiwari, A. K. (2012). Corruption, democracy and bureaucracy. Theoretical and Applied
Economics, 9(574), 17-28.
Treisman, D. (1998). The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study, University of
California, Los Angeles, April, available at
http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980019.pdf .
Van Kenhove, P., Vermeir, I., & Verniers, S. (2001). An empirical investigation of the
relationships between ethical beliefs, ethical ideology, political preference and need
for closure. Journal of Business Ethics, 32(4), 347-361.
Winters, Matthew S. and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro. 2013. “Lacking Information or Condoning
Corruption? When do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians.” Journal of Comparative
Politics 45(4): 418-436.
Zucco C., Jr., (2009). Ideology or What? Legislative Behavior in Multiparty Presidential
Settings. The Journal of Politics, 71(3), 1076–1092.
Zucco, C., Jr, & Lauderdale, B. E. (2011). Distinguishing between influences on Brazilian
legislative behavior. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 36(3), 363-396.
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 24/33
24
Figure 1: Indicators of the Economic and Social Ideology Scale
Role of the government in the economy – Cronbach alpha = .6
Econ1 Income should be distributed in an equal way.Income differences serve as an incentive to
individual effort.
Econ2
Competition is good because it stimulates
people to work hard and develop new ideas.
Competition is bad because it brings up the worst
part of people.
Econ3
Government regulation of business is
necessary to protect the public interest.
Government regulation of business usually does
more harm than good.
Econ4
It is better to pay more taxes and have
education and health free of charge.
It is better to pay fewer taxes and hire private
education and health.
Social values – Cronbach alpha = .6
Social1
It is necessary to believe in God in order to be
moral and have good values.
It is not necessary to believe in God in order to be
moral and have good values.
Social2
Drug use should not be forbidden, because it
is the user who suffers the consequences.
Drug use should be forbidden, because all society
suffers its consequences.
Social3 Homosexuality should be accepted by society. Homosexuality should be discouraged by society.
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 25/33
25
Figure 2: Indicators of the Type of Processing Scale
Cost-Benefit 1 It is worthwhile voting for Candidate A, even though he is corrupt.
Cost-Benefit 2 The constituents’ benefits generated by Candidate A made his misbehavior worthwhile.
Cost-Benefit 3 I am aware that Candidate A is corrupt. But at least he gets things done.
Cronbach's Alpha = .8
Reappraisal 1
Candidate A was not corrupt. He just relied on a necessary political mechanism in order
to get things done.
Reappraisal 2 There was no dishonest behavior of Candidate A. He did what everybody does.
Reappraisal 3
Considering the political context and national conditions, Candidate A’s behavior is
appropriate.
Cronbach's Alpha = .8
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 26/33
26
Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics
Condition
Manipulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Total
Economy -Liberal
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social -
LiberalYes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Corruption -
Money No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 131 127 132 121 127 120 142 145 1.045
First Choice -
Candidate A90,8% 94,5% 93,2% 87,6% 91,3% 89,2% 91,5% 91,0% 91,2%
Ideology -
Economic
Score
1,86 1,88 1,94 1,90 2,01 1,88 1,82 1,92 1,90
Ideology -
Social Score1,50 1,49 1,52 1,52 1,54 1,58 1,47 1,54 1,52
Gender - Male 62,0% 55,2% 64,9% 65,5% 57,9% 61,0% 50,0% 65,3% 60,2%
Mean Age 32,9 31,4 30,1 31,9 32,2 31,1 30,3 29,9 31,2
Marital Status
- Single54,3% 68,8% 67,9% 59,7% 61,1% 65,3% 63,6% 62,5% 62,9%
Education -
Bachelor
degree
16,3% 19,2% 18,3% 15,1% 23,8% 20,3% 22,1% 22,2% 19,8%
State - São
Paulo41,1% 44,0% 35,9% 45,8% 42,1% 49,2% 40,7% 47,6% 43,2%
Monthly
income - above
US$2.800
48,8% 50,0% 51,2% 55,0% 41,7% 48,7% 54,4% 50,0% 50,0%
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 27/33
27
Table 2: Cross tabulation - New Choice vs. Type of Corruption
New Choice
Candidate A Candidate B Not Vote
% Nepotism 33,3% 35,1% 31,6%
% Money 38,3% 31,2% 30,5%
% Total 35,9% 33,1% 31,0%
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 28/33
28
Table 3: Cross tabulation - New Choice vs. Economic Matching
New Choice
Candidate A Candidate B Not Vote
% Within
Mismatching
26,7% 39,2% 34,1%
% Within
Matching
45,3% 26,8% 27,8%
% Total 35,9% 33,1% 31,0%
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 29/33
29
Table 4: Cross tabulation - New Choice vs. Social Matching
New Choice
Candidate A Candidate B Not Vote
% Within
Mismatching
26,2% 39,3% 34,5%
% Within
Matching
46,7% 26,3% 27,1%
% Total 35,9% 33,1% 31,0%
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 30/33
30
Table 5: Cross tabulation – New Choice vs. Economic Matching vs. Social Matching
Candidate A Candidate B Not Vote N
Both matched 58,8% 20,2% 21,0% 257
Economic matched / social mismatched 31,9% 33,5% 34,6% 257
Economic mismatched / social matched 33,6% 32,8% 33,6% 238
Both mismatched 21,2% 44,4% 34,5% 293
Total 35,9% 33,1% 31,0% 1045
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 31/33
31
Table 6: Cross tabulation - New Choice vs. All Ideological Conditions
Subjects’ Ideology
New Choice N
Candidate A Candidate B Not Vote
Social -
Conservative
Economic -
Conservative
BothMismatched
12,5% 62,5% 25,0% 8
Social
Matched33,3% 44,4% 22,2% 9
EconomyMatched
20,0% 60,0% 20,0% 20
BothMatched
30,0% 20,0% 50,0% 10
Total 23,4% 48,9% 27,7% 47
Social -Conservative
Economic -Liberal
BothMismatched
0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 1
SocialMatched 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 1
EconomyMatched
33,3% 66,7% 0,0% 3
BothMatched
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2
Total 42,9% 28,6% 28,6% 7
Social - LiberalEconomic -
Conservative
Both
Mismatched20,6% 44,4% 35,1% 248
SocialMatched
36,6% 31,7% 31,7% 202
EconomyMatched
27,3% 34,0% 38,8% 209
BothMatched
58,0% 22,2% 19,8% 212
Total 35,0% 33,5% 31,5% 871
Social - LiberalEconomic -
Liberal
BothMismatched
27,8% 41,7% 30,6% 36
Social
Matched11,5% 38,5% 50,0% 26
EconomyMatched
80,0% 4,0% 16,0% 25
BothMatched
69,7% 9,1% 21,2% 33
Total 46,7% 24,2% 29,2% 120
Total N 1045
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 32/33
32
Figure 3: Effect of Economic and Social Matching on Reappraisal
8/18/2019 Tolerancia Com a Corrupção Ou Cegueira Politica
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/tolerancia-com-a-corrupcao-ou-cegueira-politica 33/33
Figure 4: Four-way Interaction of Economic Matching, Social Matching, Economic
Ideology, and Social Ideology on Reappraisal
2.27
1.78
2.25
1.38
1.84
1.66 1.651.53
2.50
1.00
1.33
4.00
1.73
1.35
1.76
1.51
!"#$#%&" (
)*+",-.
!"#$#%&" (
)&/%*+",-.
!"#$#%&" (
)*+",-.
!"#$#%&" (
)&/%*+",-.
!"#$#%&" (
)*+",-.
!"#$#%&" (
)&/%*+",-.
!"#$#%&" (
)*+",-.
!"#$#%&" (
)&/%*+",-.
0#"&*1 ( )*+",-. 0#"&*1 ( )&/%*+",-. 0#"&*1 ( )*+",-. 0#"&*1 ( )&/%*+",-.
0#"&*1 ( 2#$/-34*54- 0#"&*1 ( 6&7-3*1
!"#$#%&" ( 2#$/-34*54-
!"#$#%&" ( 6&7-3*1