Download - Wikileaks Ankara
-
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
1/41
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkishp.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strongchallenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus,economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turnhe will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe isthe formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2)concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG supportfor his government. While the Turkish side sees the visit as mainly aboutdeveloping our broad common strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a publicoutcome he can characterize as concrete results. At the same time, althoughErdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political figure inTurkey, he and his party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise tothem, will affect his longevity in government, Turkey's democraticdevelopment, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.
2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommonluck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopesto demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.
3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S.interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2)to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperateunreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamistones (he rejects the term Islamic terrorism ); (4) to cooperate onIraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and (6) to reopen the EcumenicalPatriarchate's Halki seminary in a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.
4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to
a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomaticactions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks ofall political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation ofa de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USGactions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USGsupport for the GOT's new Cyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possiblesignal that the U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory
for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country,Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away fromthe radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par1 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
2/41
his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has alsoled him to avoid precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as thewearing of Islamist headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skillsand persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment tomaintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious supporters.
6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and anability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of thecommon citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready totake on corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. Asa result his AK Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002national elections. Owing to AK's image as the party of change at thenational level, good record in providing services at the municipal level,and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of thevote in March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project thatsuch a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara andperhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of the
other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to try todiminish him whether by blocking legislation or attacking his motives cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the
Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various lociof the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible politicalopponent or party.
7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit wellbeyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, iffully implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. Hisgovernment's inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AKsupporters land registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform,
Koran course reform has not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment'sopposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one can attributeTurkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in 30 years to luck, CentralBank skill, and global emerging market trends rather than to the AKgovernment's actions, Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.
8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU candidacythrough direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being fetedby EU leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EUCommission President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washingtontrip and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor
Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not the) mostimportant leaders of the Muslim world. Erdogan's view of relations with theu.s.
9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey'seconomy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks'sambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeledpro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 hehas taken several supportive steps, while being careful not to be tooclosely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for the Iraq war.Erdogan agreed to a ground line of communication for Coalition forces inIraq. He pushed through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support
of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlikairbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step inNov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par6 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
3/41
and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than anyprevious Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate'sHalki seminary.
10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what
most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de factoindependent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. actionagainst the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicionsamong the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul toldus recently on the margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closedmeetings FonMin Gul continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003turndown of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreignpolicy orientation as a counter to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless,Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S.support for his government as essential to his survival, and he wants asuccessful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen seriousdomestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin toput a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his andour ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously
vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreignaffairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt hisequilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming
from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, aclose confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzedthis trait in a draft book on Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranicallusion in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the pointabout his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streakwhich prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful advisors, a broadflow of fresh information to him, or development of effectivecommunications among the party headquarters, government, and parliamentarygroup. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, anoverweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image, rendershim fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for swiftand resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itselfnot only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness
to give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft
of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, withthe latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. ParliamentarySpeaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AKM.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial questions likepushing the right to wear headscarves at State functions. Although Arinchas kept a low profile for the past seven months, he remains a locus oftroublemaking, especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., trooprotation through Incirlik).
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par10 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
4/41
Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be
capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to bepursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing thebureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear constantanecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who havedeep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the right, that AK
appointees, at the national and provincial levels, are incompetent ornarrow-minded Islamists. AK officials from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across the country admit to us that the party'schoice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March localelections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of controversialor inept AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at thelocal and national level.
Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan
lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none ofhis advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military. Hisgovernment has failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to
prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms,or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment or trooprotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by theEstablishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda oris selling out the country, leading to Establishment (dis)informationcampaigns which cause the government to retreat.
Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion againstcorruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks asmayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now hear more and more frominsiders that close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk,Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influencepeddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited directly from the awardof the Tupras (state petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortiumincluding a Russian partner. Erdogan's direct acquisition of a significantinterest in a food distribution company has become a public controversy.
Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime
Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling intoquestion the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry UndersecretaryBirinci (who in the past called himself an ummetci , i.e., a followerof a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic), and head ofState-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who once paid homage toAfghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made the core of the StateEstablishment Armed Forces, Presidency, and Judiciary profoundly
uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn these positions, the question of thelevel of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including thefollowers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence ofTurkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in theSoutheast have also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassycontacts who themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes thepernicious effect of a closed brotherhood mentality (cemaatcilik) inpolitical affairs, as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium inIstanbul, but how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very openquestion.
Comment
-
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
5/41
12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and forwider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved powerand wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a differentelite. While his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this
time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S.vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe. Edelman
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029
TAGS: PRELPGOVPINSECONTU
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:
TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).
1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to
have a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that
there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs
heavily in politics. Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party
face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace
core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization,
and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with
core U.S. interests. End summary.
2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power
Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and
phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong
candidate for European leader of the year. A regional leader
to be reckoned with for a decade to come. The man who won
Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU.
Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on
Cyprus. Who drove major human rights reforms throughparliament and through constitutional amendments. Whose
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/ECON_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/ECON_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/ECON_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA348.html#par12 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
6/41
rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is
redolent with traditional and religious allusions that
resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous
exurban sprawls. Who remains the highly popular tribune of
the people, without a viable or discernible political
rival...outside his own ruling AKP.
3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable. But is he? And
is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership
and momentum they need from the Turkish side?
4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament. Main
opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch
of elitist ankle-biters. There is currently no serious,
broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's
rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social
questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in
Turkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the
stultifying effect of current party and election laws on
entry for younger, untainted political aspirants. AKP argues
that the economy, at least from the perspective of macroindicators and continued willingness of emerging-market
portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the
facts, appears to have stabilized. Moreover, the authority
of AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the
Turkish State's executive power at the provincial and
district level and with municipal functions to an extent not
seen since the days of the one-party state. These factors
seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.
5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful
challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus);
quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and
resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open,
prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place
of religion; identity and history; rule of law).
EU
--
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par3 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
7/41
6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a
negotiation date from the EU. He achieved that goal. The
Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have
opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process
leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus
on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the
question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.
7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on
the ground here is not so neat. With euphoria at getting a
date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival
and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become
substantially clearer. Nationalists on right and left have
resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national
interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions. Core institutions
of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have
once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed
insinuations into the press in parallel with the
nationalists' assertions. In the face of this Euro-aversion,
neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimalsteps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin
tackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious --
legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must
occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform. The
road ahead will surely be hard.
8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP
chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and
political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan.
But theirs is a routine whine. More significant for us is
that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence
at Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that
the EU will let Turkey in. And there is parallel widespread
skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in
ten years.
9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin
Gul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par6 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
8/41
bruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the
final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara
have given us the other side of the story). Gul was
noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the
lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit
negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor.
There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in
Brussels according to "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray
Basaran. She also noted to us that when negotiations seemed
to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone
calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk. Basaran
says that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do
so.
10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of
openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky,
muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have
encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing
membership...or at least the process. Some see the process
as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what
remains of the arid "secularism" of Kemalism. We have alsorun into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief
among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's
role is to spread Islam in Europe, "to take back Andalusia
and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683" as one
participant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put
it. This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of
FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime
Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the
Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for
one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU.
11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP
whinge that the EU is a Christian club. While some assert
that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of
Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of
civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others
express concern that harmonization and membership will water
down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey. Indeed, as
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par10 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
9/41
AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, "If the EU
says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while. Then
the real difficulties will start for AKP. If the EU says no,
it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long
run."
12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to
prepare for harmonization. In choosing a chief negotiator
Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he
taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh
the political challenge his choice will face since it will be
the Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU
position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet. It is because
the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU
demands and a prickly domestic environment that some
observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief
internal rival Gul.
13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire
a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU
languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacingwith the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization
starts. If the government continues to hire on the basis of
"one of us", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge
milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil
service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem. If the
government hires on the base of competence, its new hires
will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous
hires at all levels.
Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance
---------------------------------------------
14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's
and AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to
take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to
the U.S.
15. (C) First is Erdogan's character.
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par14http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par14http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par15http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par15http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par15http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par14http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par12 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
10/41
16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected
that Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material
benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots
popularity. Others disagree. Pollster and political analyst
Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us
late in Dec. that the erosion has started. We note that (1)
Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership
did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy
services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream
opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory
web site. So we treat his view cautiously. However, judging
by his references and past experience in the Turkish State,
he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State
apparatus and to have a network of observers and data
collectors in all 81 provinces.
17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals
itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of
others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife
Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trusthim." In surrounding himself with an iron ring of
sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated
himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially
explains his failure to understand the context -- or real
facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and
elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With
regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who
is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul
associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous."
Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen
Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de
cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of
touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to
MPs and party intellectuals.
18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks
vision. He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin
Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par16http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par16http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par17http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par17http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par18http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par18http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par18http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par17http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par16 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
11/41
depth. He relies on poor-quality intel and on media
disinformation. With the narrow world-view and wariness that
lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he
ducks his public relations responsibilities. He (and those
around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced
pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent
the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign
policies.
19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly
traveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past
two years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to
Russia, "Eurasia", the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, his
staff says 2005 is the "year of Africa", but they provide no
coherent reason why. This grueling cycle of travel has
exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep
his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and
government. He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary
group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs. Moreover, we
understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen
influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan keyfinancial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002
elections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability.
Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential
Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist
Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads
into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and
Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to
the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it
initially had toward Erdogan and AKP.
20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited
number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of
some -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek --
to undermine Erdogan. No one else in AKP comes close to
Erdogan in grassroots popularity. However, Gul's readiness
to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors
(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduce
Erdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S.
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par19http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par19http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par20http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par20http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par20http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par19 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
12/41
policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan
constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his
credentials by making statements inimical to good
U.S.-Turkish relations. We expect Erdogan to carry out a
partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be
unable to remove the influence of Gul.
21. (S) Third is corruption. AKP swept to power by promising
to root out corruption. However, in increasing numbers
AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party,
are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption
in the party at the national, provincial and local level and
among close family members of ministers. We have heard from
two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks;
his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding
presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman
is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan
children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame.
22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently
involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu,Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial
chairman Muezzinoglu. As we understand it from a contact in
the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a
continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket
and other activities has already produced evidence
incriminating Erdogan. In our contacts across Anatolia we
have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to
look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the
trend is a time bomb.
23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's
appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party
headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates. A broad range
of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul,
former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former
Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has
expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence,
prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer,
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par21http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par21http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par22http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par22http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par23http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par23http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par23http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par22http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par21 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
13/41
-
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
14/41
anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly
educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,
anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.
Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to
challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,
verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so
long been used to justify violence against "infidels".
26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of
politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized
Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in
Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,
defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and
unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society.
27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its
citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens'
individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,
and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and
practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind
one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chiefassembles his party cadres and, warning against various
ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain. It's
only that damned past that keeps changing."
28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,
including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free
and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the
concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will
it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate
policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are
joining what is still only a handful of others to take
tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.
However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of
education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,
and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between
citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi)
Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate
road."
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par26http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par26http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par27http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par27http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par28http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par28http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par28http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par27http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par26 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
15/41
29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015
TAGS: PRELPGOVPINSMARRTU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT
REF: A. ANKARA 1074
B. ANKARA 1231
C. ANKARA 1275
D. ANKARA 1511
E. ANKARA 1342
F. ANKARA 944
G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign policy driftstemming from leadership and structural problems in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy debate over Turkey's identity and AKP, including itshandling of relations with the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddleis leaving a vacuum that resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. Thisperiod of drift could be extended, making EU reforms and bilateralcooperation more difficult. The drift may well continue until the nextcrisis creates new political alternatives in a day of reckoning. End
Summary.
AKP Government Adrift
-----------------------
2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EUharmonization, it is manifestly adrift on domestic political and economicreform. Implementation of reform legislation passed in 2003-2004 isseriously deficient (refs A and B). The AKP government has a poor workingrelationship with the military, the Presidency and the largely-secular
state bureaucracy. It is failing to control corruption in the AK party. Ithas been slow to introduce the banking, tax administration and socialsecurity legislation required by the IMF as a pre-condition for a new
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par29http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par29http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/MARR_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/MARR_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parBhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parBhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parChttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parChttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parDhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parDhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parEhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parEhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parFhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parFhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parGhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parGhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parGhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parFhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parEhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parDhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parChttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#parBhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/MARR_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04ANKARA7211.html#par29 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
16/41
stand-by program. It is neglecting relations with the EU. Erdogan hasdelayed appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations; bothErdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have disturbed EU officialsand politicians. Erdogan has still not decided on a much-anticipatedcabinet reshuffle.
3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's obvious drift andwe see no sign it has yet begun to undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP'sability to get back on track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottomanreflexes and single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this governmentwill be able to refocus or move our bilateral relationship which remainsstrong in some areas back to a more strategic level.
4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his Cabinet andparliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers alike, xxxxx who is close toErdogan, complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel obligedto kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath. Business associations,
strong advocates of AKP economic policies, tell us they feel they have lostthe PM's ear. Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritualadvisors in the Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which he grew up,as we have heard directly from xxxxx.
5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan readsminimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press. According to others withbroad and deep contacts throughout the establishment, Erdogan refuses todraw on the analyses of the MFA, and the military and National IntelligenceOrganization have cut him off from their reports. He never had a realisticworld view, but one key touchstone is a fear of being outmaneuvered on theIslamist side by Hoca Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his
charisma, instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracytheories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies, e.g.,Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally Ahmet Davutoglu.
6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin Gul continuesbehind-the-scenes machinations, especially during Erdogan's foreignjunkets. Gul seems to be trying to undermine Erdogan and take on more partycontrol. He may hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forcedto cede to Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power. With hisrelatively good English, Gul works to project an image of being moderate,
or modern. In fact, Gul's peers say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than Erdogan. Gul, reflecting his pragmatic streak, has
made some constructive statements on bilateral relations and on Turkey'sIraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we understand that Gul anda group of like-minded MPs and journalists continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes as one way to get at Erdogan while also being moved byemotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal unease from thosewho support Erdogan, but also from some of the other tendencies forming AK.xxxxx that Erdogan does not know how to proceed, either on domestic policyor on rebuilding relations with the U.S. xxxxx, a bellwether of Islamistsentiment, has told two of our insider contacts that he is about to resignin disgust at the party's rampant corruption. xxxxx one of Erdogan's
closest business and brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, sayshe sees no future for this government and thinks it is time for a more
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par3 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
17/41
flexible and open leader. Leading member xxxxx has expressed to us theGulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it. Long Overdue Healthy Debate
-----------------------------
8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force some toquestion the real roots of inertia and stasis in a Turkey that needs to
accelerate its transition. We are encouraged by the determination of someto open a long-overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of Turkey'srelations with the U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6 visit and subsequentU.S. media coverage helped ignite the debate. Another catalyst was DeputyCHOD Basbug's January 26 press briefing, in which he coolly analyzedTurkish concerns about Iraq and repeatedly emphasized that one cannotreduce broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations to a single issue. Itwas not until late February, that Erdogan albeit without conviction inhis voice expressed anything similar to Basbug's assessment of theimportance of bilateral relations.
9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant criticism of
AKP's domestic and foreign policies from several insightful mainstreamcommentators. However, mainstream commentators are seen as too pro-American to be persuasive among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps moreimportant have been the decisions of some pro-AKP Islamist columnists towrite unusually blunt warnings that the AKP government must pull itselftogether or risk a fall. The Parliamentary opposition has continued itsanti-American 60's leftist rhetoric as it winds its merry way toirrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
----------------------
10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's weakness:resurgent nationalism. Two of the hottest selling books in Turkey areMetal Storm, a conspiracy novel that feeds the worst instincts of Turks
with its tale of a U.S. invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclearcounter-strike with the help of the Russians; and Mein Kampf (ref C).Under instructions from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, imams acrossTurkey delivered a March 11 sermon against Christian missionaries (ref D),claiming they aim to steal the beliefs of our young people and children.
We are receiving increased reports of anti-Christian activity in differentregions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank Governor told us thatnationalist/isolationist forces are behind the problems with the IMF (refF). An attempt to burn the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration inMersin has drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the spectrum,including a statement from the General Staff that the Turkish nation and
the Turkish armed forces are ready to sacrifice their blood to protecttheir country and their flag. The decision to memorialize, after a 47-yearhiatus, the killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers duringthe Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks the national mood.
11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to what appears tobe a growth in street crime and to a parallel refusal of the police, angryat limitations on their operational abilities under the new EU-inspiredcriminal code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, ErtugrulOzkok, managing editor of Turkey's leading newspaper Hurriyet and one of
the most authoritative press voices of the Establishment, noted that theTurkish public is deeply disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par8 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
18/41
law and order. Ozkok, in what would appear to be an overstatement, closedwith a warning to Erdogan that, when democratic forces cannot ensure safetyin the streets (sic), then the public and political space is left to otherforces. In a March 4 column, Umit Ozdag, now in the running forchairmanship of the right-wing nationalist MHP, cited increased crime asone reason for the current popularity of Mein Kampf.
12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played a role in thepress and government reactions to comments from EU Ambassador Kretschmerabout the government's loss of momentum and EU accession, to the EUTroika's worry about the police violence against a March 6 Istanbuldemonstration, and the press feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman'sinnocent remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals a date to begin EUaccession negotiations Erdogan's AKP government is out of ideas andenergy. For now, EU- and IMF-required reforms will face tougher oppositionfrom re-energized nationalists, the government will be tempted to delaydifficult decisions in any realm, and resistance to change will be thedefault mode. Bilateral cooperation will be more difficult, more vulnerableto characterization as unreasonable U.S. demands that infringe uponTurkish sovereignty.
14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's Parliamentary
majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G). Despite the unhappinessinside AKP, there is currently no political alternative and there are risksto anyone who actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a nuclear option
in hand early elections. The danger is that tough decisions and thesettling out of the political system will be put off until a real newcrisis emerges which will either energize the AKP or bring new politicalalternatives. Waiting bears a real cost, since Turkey needs to be morenimble in pursuing the political, economic, social and foreign policyagendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S., have been supporting, than thistype of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
2005-06-08 15:03
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003199
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2025
TAGS: PRELPGOVPINSPHUMTU
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par14http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par14http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2005-06_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2005-06_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PHUM_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PHUM_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PHUM_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINS_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2005-06_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par14http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1730.html#par12 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
19/41
SUBJECT: CABINET SHUFFLES AND THE LONG SQUEEZE: PM ERDOGAN
SETS HIS SIGHTS ON FONMIN GUL
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 12958 1.4(b,d).
1. (C) Summary: Long rumored to be considering a cabinet re-shuffle, PMErdogan has made his first move suddenly and in limited fashion. However,more ministers in a cabinet which is still dominated by people loyal toErdogan's chief internal rival FonMin Gul may be in Erdogan's sights as hetries slowly but surely to whittle down Gul's influence. End summary.
2. (C) In a trademark sudden move, PM Erdogan announced the replacement of
three ministers in a mini-Cabinet shuffle June 4. Cabinet changes have beenan intense subject of debate and waiting-for-Godot expectation in rulingAKP since Erdogan inherited the Cabinet from his internal arch-rivalAbdullah Gul, now FonMin, in March 2003. Yet despite the heavy Gulinfluence (until this shuffle Erdogan could depend on only four of 22ministers for internal political support) and despite his overridingpopular support, Erdogan long appeared intimidated from making any changes.When Minister of Culture and Tourism Erkan Mumcu resigned in Feb. 2005,Erdogan remained in thrall to Gul for the abortive choice of current StateMinister Besir Atalay and eventual choice of Atilla Koc to replace Mumcu.
3. (C) Now Erdogan appears to have overcome his indecision, spurred in
part by what Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler told a close contact of oursJune 6 is Erdogan's realization of how much damage to his policies Gul andhis circle are wreaking. Finally dismissed are three prominentincompetents: Minister of Agriculture Sami Guclu, a barrier to progress onissues of concern to the U.S. and a Gul ally; Minister of Public Works ZekiErgezen, infamous for his scornful remarks about infidels (gavurlar),
surrounded by rumors of corruption, unable to finish Erdogan's 15,000kilometer divided highway project on time, an ally of Minister of theInterior Abdulkadir Aksu, and reportedly close to Gul; and State Ministerfor Women's Affairs Guldal Aksit, daughter of Galip Demirel, a prominentfollower of controversial Islamist sage Fethullah Gulen and a closeassociate of Aksu.
4. (U) Erdogan appointed as Minister of Agriculture Mehmet Mehdi 1), aDiyarbakir MP from a prominent local family with high status in theNaksibendi brotherhood. Born in Bismil (Diyarbakir province) 1956; graduateof Ankara U. veterinary faculty, MA in agricultural economics from AberdeenU, PhD from Ankara U.'s health sciences institute. Veterinarian. Worked inupper-mid-level positions in the Agriculture Ministry and as director ofveterinary affairs in the Greater Istanbul Municipality when Erdogan wasmayor. Married, three children. Speaks English, but we haven't yet testedhis level.
5. (C) An AKP xxxxx and two other long-term Embassy contacts with deep
relations in AKP describe Eker as a decent but passive man, close toErdogan. These contacts and Minister of Energy have described in detail howEker was deeply involved in a plan to remove former Minister Guclu by
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par1 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
20/41
concealing from him a Russian government note threatening six months ago tosuspend imports of Turkish fruits and vegetables for phytosanitary reasons;the ban recently went into effect with Guclu looking ineffectual anduninformed. Embassy Ag Counselor's contacts note that Eker is unlikely tobe able to override the Ministry's entrenched, protectionist bureaucracy.
6. (U) The new Minister of Public Works is Trabzon MP Faruk Nafiz 2)(umlaut over the O). Born Trabzon 1946. Civil engineering degree fromKaradeniz technical University in Trabzon. Senior civil engineer. Formercaptain of premier league Trabzonspor football team. Chairman of the boardof YAPISUN construction company. Chairman of the board of Trabzonspor. Afounder of the Trabzon development Foundation. Married, two children.Reportedly speaks English.
7. (C) A fellow Trabzon contractor and Trabzonspor board member describesOzak as coming from the Sufi (mystical) line of the Milli Gorus Islamistmovement; he is a quiet, reserved, obedient Erdogan man. As part of
Erdogan's strategy to use sports to maintain AKP's grassroots support, andin the wake of AKP's defeat in the Trabzon mayoral race in March 2004, theIstanbul-Black Sea axis which forms Erdogan's Istanbul power basereportedly subsequently succeeded in having Ozak appointed Trabzonsporchairman of the board. At the same time Erdogan reportedly agreed totransfer several million dollars from one of the Prime Ministry's hiddenreserves to permit Trabzonspor under Ozak to purchase better players. Ourcontacts expect Ozak to be relatively more upright than Ergezen was (not ahigh bar).
8. (U) Istanbul Second District MP Nimet 3) is the new State Minister forWomen's Affairs. Born Ayranci (Ankara) 1965. Grew up in relatively well-to-
do circumstances with a family summer home on Heybeliada, one of thePrinces' Islands off Istanbul. Law degree from Istanbul U. law faculty.Worked as an independent attorney, most recently representing the Islamistbusinessmen's association MUSIAD. A founding member of AKP. Married, onechild.
9. (C) Cubukcu is focused, highly ambitious, and months ago made clear tous she sought the state minister position. She has ensured that she staysclose to Erdogan's wife Emine, which appears to have been a major factor inher selection, according to what party deputy chairman Saban Disli told usJune 7. Her businesslike approach and relative openness in private aboutproblems in AKP brought her to our attention early in AKP's tenure; she
participated in Embassy's NATO tour for MPs in Feb. 2004 and in the NDI-sponsored democracy commission trip to Washington in Spring 2005.Responding to the bitter complaints of many women from AKP's grassroots inthe northeast Black Sea region who have seen their husbands take Russianand other Black Sea-littoral women as second wives, Cubukcu vigorouslyargued for criminalization of adultery during a controversy over adulteryin autumn 2004. On the other hand, although she talks about her son, sherarely mentions her husband and there are persistent questions among someobservers of AKP about her attitude toward her own marriage.
10. (C) With the dismissal of Guclu and these appointments Erdogan hasshown more clearly that he intends to whittle down Gul's influence. By
dismissing Aksit and Ergezen and appointing Eker, whose family status inDiyarbakir makes him a powerful rival to Interior Minister Aksu, Erdoganhas also drawn the noose around Aksu. Aksu has most recently served
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par6 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
21/41
Erdogan's purposes by dismissing Hanefi Avci, an leading Gulenist who asNational Police (TNP) department head for organized crime was starting topush corruption investigations that were leading to the heart of AKP.However, Erdogan has long been troubled by Aksu, whom he suspects of beingready to bolt from AKP with a number of disgruntled MPs. Aksu's Kurdishfavoritism, reported ties to the heroin trade, well-known predilection for
teenage girls, and his son's open Mafia links make him a weak link in theCabinet, one Erdogan knows the core institutions of the Turkish State couldexploit at any time.
11. (C) Contacts such as Prime Ministry advisor xxxxx who has provided awealth of accurate insights into AKP, foresee a high possibility thatErdogan will continue to shuffle his cabinet in stages. In addition toAksu, those who appear to be most in his sights are Minister of Labor MuratBasesgioglu, a former ANAPer who has a poor record of responding to AKPMPs' queries and requests; Minister of Trade and Industry Ali Coskun, whoappears to be deeply implicated in a major corruption scandal at theTurkish Standards Institute (TSE) involving payoffs of $500 million for
certifications, according to the TSE director's statement in the June 7press; and State Minister for Foreign Trade Kursad Tuzmen, a former (ultra-nationalist) MHPer who was implicated in the Iraq oil for food payoffs andis described by multiple contacts as open to every type of kickback.
12. (C) Erdogan may also be aiming over time to remove Gul's closeassociate State Minister Atalay and Minister of Justice and governmentspokesman Cemil Cicek, who has not bothered to hide his prime ministerialand presidential ambitions and his disrespect for Erdogan. MOORE
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
05ANKARA7215 2005-12-08 15:03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text ofthe original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007215
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015
TAGS: ECONPGOVPINRTUPOLITICALPARTIES
SUBJECT: NO SPLITS IN TURKEY'S GOVERNING AKP PARLIAMENTARY
GROUP -- FOR NOW
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2005-12_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2005-12_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/classification/1_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/classification/1_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/origin/41_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/origin/41_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/ECON_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/ECON_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINR_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINR_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/POLITICAL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/POLITICAL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PARTIES_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PARTIES_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PARTIES_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/POLITICAL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/TU_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINR_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/ECON_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/origin/41_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/classification/1_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2005-12_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05ANKARA3199.html#par11 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
22/41
REF: A. ANKARA 6543
B. ANKARA 6251
C. ANKARA 6337
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Despite media reports and opposition rumors
of splits among PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's
(AKP) 357 parliamentarians, the group remains intact )- for
now. Among AKP MPs, there are distinctive pious, pragmatic
and nationalist currents, with crosscutting personal
loyalties. Recent events in Turkey's heavily-Kurdish
southeast have heightened tensions between AKP,s
Kurdish-origin MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group.
While AKP MPs, numbers may slowly erode over the next year
(ref A), a major split is unlikely as long as AKP -- and in
particular PM Erdogan -- retain power and popularity. End
Summary.
Despite Wishful Thinking, AKP Not Crumbling Yet
--------------------------------------------- --
2. (C) Over the past year, the Turkish press has repeatedly
predicted open splits in the 357-member AKP parliamentary
group. While AKP has ideological and personality-based fault
lines, there appears to be little chance of a major split
while AKP remains Turkey,s number one party and Erdogan the
country,s most popular politician. Even Ankara AKP MP
Ersonmez Yarbay, a maverick frequently openly critical of his
own party, downplayed to us the rumors of party splits,
saying they have been fueled by the opposition to force early
elections.
AKP,s Ideological Currents
--------------------------
3. (C) AKP,s parliamentary group is composed of politicians
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#parBhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#parBhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#parChttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#parChttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par3http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par2http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par1http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#parChttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#parB -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
23/41
with widely differing viewpoints. There are three main
ideological currents: pious, nationalist and pragmatic.
Most AKP MPs do not fall neatly into any one category, and
personal loyalties crosscut ideology, mostly among pious MPs.
Pious
-----
4. (C) Almost all AKP MPs are religiously observant to some
degree; for example, the vast majority fast during Ramadan.
However, there is a large and distinctively more pious group
of MPs, comprising former members of the banned Islamist
Virtue (Fazilet) Party, former members of the National View
Islamist youth group, and members of a wide range of
(officially banned) Muslim brotherhoods. Most of AKP,s top
leaders fall into this group: PM Erdogan, DPM/FM Abdullah
Gul, parliament Speaker Arinc, Vice Speaker Alptekin (former
PM and Islamic Saadet Party head Erbakan's right-hand man)
and all five of AKP,s parliamentary whips. Pious MPs
generally represent the central Anatolian heartland, speak no
English, and have traveled little.
5. (C) While most Turkish Islamists oppose the EU, AKP,s
Islamist MPs toe the AKP line and support it, albeit less
enthusiastically since October 3. Typical of Turkish
Islamists, they dislike Turkey,s military and have no ties
to it other than their required military service. Attitudes
about the U.S. vary widely, from friendly to suspicious, but
most favor better ties with the Muslim world. Although the
GOT, under Erdogan,s leadership, has taken a politically
courageous public stand favoring privatization and foreign
investment, many pious MPs oppose both.
6. (C) AKP,s pious MPs are widely rumored to be deeply
unhappy about PM Erdogan,s inability to ease restrictions on
the wearing of headscarves and on religious schools.
However, since AKP came to power in November 2002, no AKP MP
has resigned and gone over to the Happiness (Saadet) Party,
on AKP's Islamist flank.
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par4http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par6http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par5http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par4 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
24/41
Nationalists
------------
7. (C) It is hard to find a Turk who is not nationalistic.
Yet a significant number of AKP MPs (as many as 50, according
to one former MP), many of them former members of the
ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP) or center-right
True Path Party (DYP), are strong nationalists, even by
Turkish standards. This group includes Justice Minister and
party spokesman Cemil Cicek, Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener,
State Minister Kursad Tuzmen, and parliament Vice Speaker
Sadik Yakut.
8. (C) Among AKP MPs, nationalists take the hardest line
against &concessions8 to the EU and on Cyprus. MFA
officials have told us on several occasions that the GOT is
delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement extension protocol to
parliament for ratification out of concern for the reaction
of nationalist AKP MPs (ref B). Nationalist AKP MPs are
deeply suspicious about the motives of Turkey,s ethnic Kurdsand were vocal critics of PM Erdogan,s August declaration in
Diyarbakir that Turkey has a &Kurdish problem.8 Like their
pious colleagues, nationalists, attitudes about the U.S.
vary widely, from friendly to suspicious. However, even
pro-U.S. nationalists become extremely prickly at any
perceived U.S. slight to Turkish national honor.
Pragmatists
-----------
9. (C) AKP,s pragmatic MPs generally speak English, are
foreign-educated, and tend to be better-traveled than their
colleagues. They often come from large cosmopolitan areas,
particularly Ankara or Istanbul; some were previously members
of the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP). Three of AKP,s
five vice chairs, who frequently deal with foreigners, are
from the pragmatic wing: Bulent Gedikli, Reha Denemec and
Saban Disli. All are U.S-educated and represent either
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par7http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par9http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par8http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par7 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
25/41
Istanbul or Ankara. The same is true for pragmatic Erdogan
translator and foreign policy advisor Egemen Bagis, who
accompanies the PM on his trips to Europe and the U.S.
10. (C) Although the pragmatic MPs are often AKP,s most
visible face to foreigners, they have less influence inside
AKP than their pious and nationalist colleagues. In early
2005, there were signs of frustration among AKP,s moderates,
when a spate of AKP MP resignations went mostly to ANAP.
Culture Minister Mumcu, AKP,s highest-profile resignation
who went on become ANAP,s Chairman, said publicly he had
only felt like a &guest8 in AKP (ref C).
11. (C) Erdogan can ill afford to lose the pragmatists. In
addition to giving AKP a reasonable, big-tent image that
plays well in the U.S. and Europe, AKP,s pragmatists are
links to Istanbul and Ankara elites. These MPs are AKP,s
friendliest face toward the U.S. (Bagis heads parliament,s
Turkey/U.S Friendship Committee), and most receptive to
liberal political and open market economic reforms needed for
EU accession.
Crosscutting Personal Loyalties
-------------------------------
12. (C) AKP MPS are as divided by personality as by
politics, but personality-based fault lines crosscut
ideological ones. PM Erdogan is the glue that holds AKP
together; a chunk of AKP MPs were part of Erdogan,s team
when he was Istanbul mayor and have followed him onto the
national stage. They include Finance Minister Unakitan,
Transportation Minister Yildirim, State Minister Cubukcu, AKP
whip Irfan Gunduz, and Erdogan speechwriter Huseyin Besli.
All are personally pious or, in Cubukcu,s case, at least
have consistently supported positions of the party,s pious
wing. Cubukcu, a female, was one of the few MPs who publicly
supported Erdogan,s 2004 proposal to re-criminalize adultery.
13. (C) Erdogan has consistently protected all three
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par10http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par13http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par12http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par11http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par10 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
26/41
"Istanbul" Ministers despite repeated calls for their
resignation. Many other AKP MPs profess staunch loyalty to
&Tayyip Bey8 and seek to stay close to him. One contact
suggests that Erdogan's strategy is to keep subordinates
competing with each other for his attention so they are too
busy to be a threat to him.
14. (C) DPM/FM Gul remains Erdogan,s chief political rival
within AKP. Their differences are not ideological ) Gul and
Erdogan are both pious ) but spring from Gul,s ambitions
for greater power. Gul, who represents the parliamentary
faction of the banned Virtue Party, has a small, quiet
following among AK MPs that includes whip Salih Kapusuz (from
Gul,s home town of Kayseri), former AKP public relations
vice chair Murat Mercan (sacked for incompetence by Erdogan
earlier this year) and Taner Yildiz (also from Kayseri).
15. (C) Parliament Speaker Arinc is AKP,s third leading
personality and potential future rival to Erdogan. However,
Arinc is well behind Gul in influence and, according to our
contacts, currently without a significant group of MPloyalists.
AKP's Kurdish MPs
-----------------
16. (C) About 60 AKP MPs, mostly from Turkey,s southeast,
are of Kurdish origin; Political and Legal Affairs Vice Chair
Dengir Mir Firat is AKP's most visible Kurdish MP. The Kurds
who joined AKP and were elected to parliament tend to be
pious, stressing the common bonds among all Muslims over
Kurdish nationalism. (The strongest Kurdish nationalists ran
from the pro-Kurdish Democratic People,s Party (DEHAP) in
2002 elections and failed to enter parliament because DEHAP
did not cross the ten percent electoral threshold.) One
former Kurdish-origin MP, himself pious, has consistently
told us even he considers AKP,s Kurdish MPs extraordinarily
passive on Kurdish issues.
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par14http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par14http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par15http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par15http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par16http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par16http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par16http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par15http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par14 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
27/41
17. (C) Yet recent events in the southeast, including AKP
nationalists' reaction against PM Erdogan,s August &Kurdish
problem8 speech in Diyarbakir and alleged Jandarma
involvement in a November bombing in the southeastern town of
Semdinli, have created tension between AKP,s Kurdish-origin
MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group. An Ankara
provincial AKP official told us recently that tension with
AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs has infected AKP's pious wing,
weakening it relative to other AKP factions.
18. (C) Comment: AKP's parliamentary strength, so far,
springs from Erdogan's ability to keep such a diverse group
of MPs united, and the lack of any viable opposition. The
question is whether Erdogan can continue to keep the
parliamentary group together without turning AKP into an
internally-undemocratic, personality-based party in the
classic Turkish tradition. AKP,s opposition will eventually
come from inside AKP itself. However, for now, Erodgan
appears well in control and there is no viable political
alternative for dissatisfied AKP MPs. End Comment.
WILSON
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
06ANKARA4688 2006-08-11 14:02 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #4688/01 2231453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111453Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7906
INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 5386
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par17http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par17http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par18http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par18http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06ANKARA4688.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06ANKARA4688.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2006-08_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2006-08_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/classification/2_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/classification/2_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/origin/41_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/origin/41_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/origin/41_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/classification/2_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/date/2006-08_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06ANKARA4688.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par18http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7215.html#par17 -
7/31/2019 Wikileaks Ankara
28/41
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0316
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1549
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3053
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5290
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0075
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1083
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004688
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2021
TAGS: PGOVPINRPRELTU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO
THE FORE
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) The long-standing split between the professional MFA
diplomats and the tight circle of advisers around PM Erdogan
has widened noticeably in recent weeks. This gap has existed
under Erdogan,s Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government, largely because of the close links that both PM
Erdogan and FM Gul have with PM adviser Davutoglu, who has
been willing to undertake numerous initiatives. Until
recently, however, such strains have usually been more
effectively papered over. This internal debate now affects
every step the GOT takes on the international stage.
2.(C) The Turkish diplomatic corps is highly educated and
well attuned to what will sell in the U.S. or Europe; less so
on the domestic political front. PM Erdogan,s core of AKP
advisers, including Davutoglu and the AKP vice chairs,
understand what will play well with their constituencies.
Their sense of how policy will play outside of Ankara is
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PGOV_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINR_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PINR_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/PREL_0.htmlhttp://cablegate.wikileaks.