复旦国际问题研究系列工作论文 fudan iis working …...1...
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复旦国际问题研究系列工作论文 Fudan IIS Working Paper Series
原创性·高质量·影响力 Originality. Quality. Impact
2016年第 1 期(总第 7 期) 2016年 10月 20 日出版
www.iis.fudan.edu.cn Issue 7 – 20 October 2016
Africa in the Maritime Silk Road: Challenges and Prospects
非洲与“海上丝绸之路”:挑战与前景
简军波
复旦大学国际问题研究院
Jian Junbo
Institute of International Studies, Fudan University
Abstract: In this working paper, I argue that while One Belt and One Road (OBOR)
is not a global policy in which all countries would be included, Africa should have its
place in the OBOR, especially in the Maritime Silk Road. According to this,
theoretically, which countries of Africa and what roles they should play in OBOR is
open for discussion. Firstly, at least some are inevitably China’s partners in the
Maritime Silk Road initiative, considering the geographical importance of these
countries for connecting Europe and the Indian Ocean. Northern and Eastern African
countries are involved in the initiative as key connection points within a larger
logistical system. Secondly, they are also part of infrastructural construction projects
of OBOR. Thirdly, the rest of Africa except for Northern and Eastern African
Dr. Jian Junbo is Associate Professor at Institute of International Studies, Fudan University. He
can be reached at: [email protected].
Dr. Jian very appreciates the valuable advice from Professor ZHEN Yu at School of International
Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University.
【收稿日期】2016 年 10 月 10 日(Received on 10 October 2016);【修回日期】2016 年 10
月 15 日 (Revised on 15 October 2016)。
版权声明:复旦国际问题研究系列工作论文注重原创性,系首次公开发表。版权属于作者
本人和复旦大学国际问题研究院。如需援引和转载,需征得作者本人书面同意并注明出处。
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countries can engage in OBOR by playing an auxiliary function in the framework of
African integration. However, there are also challenges including regional terrorism,
organized piracy, geopolitical competition in these regions, political instability and
also a degree of distrust within civil society against the initiative. Hence, firstly
anti-terrorism and anti-piracy measures have become key tasks of China and its
African partners in OBOR. Secondly, a comprehensive approach to enhance economic
cooperation is needed, especially in transportation and other infrastructural
construction areas. Thirdly, people-to-people communication and exchanges should
be encouraged by both sides for reducing African suspicion of the OBOR; and
fourthly, sophisticated skills to compete and cooperate with related powers in this
region are necessary for Beijing.
Keywords: One Belt and One Road; Africa’s roles; challenges of OBOR; prospects of
OBOR
摘要:本研究报告认为,尽管“一带一路”倡议并非要把全球都包含进来,但非
洲不应缺席,尤其不能不在“海上丝绸之路”上占有一席之地。首先,考虑到非
洲作为欧洲和印度洋桥梁的重要地理位置,有一些非洲国家应不可避免地成为中
国的合作伙伴,至少北非和东非的一些国家将成为“一带一路”上庞大的物流体
系的组成部分;其次,非洲也是一带一路实施广泛的基础设施建设项目的一部分;
第三,除红海和地中海沿岸的北非和东非之外的其他非洲国家,可以经由非洲一
体化框架参与“一带一路”的项目建设。然而,“一带一路”倡议将非洲涵括进
来也存在诸多挑战,包括地区恐怖主义和有组织犯罪的蔓延、微妙的地缘政治竞
争、社会和政治不稳定、以及一定程度在非洲民间社会中日益增加的对华不信任。
对此,我国应加强与非洲在反恐和打击海盗领域的合作;其次,应加强在经济领
域,尤其是基建领域的合作;再次,应加强双边人文交流,减少非洲国家对“一
带一路”倡议的疑虑;最后,我国应提高与在非洲的其他大国相交往的能力和技
巧,并加强与大国间的合作。
关键词:“一带一路”;非洲的角色;“一带一路”的挑战;“一带一路”的前
景
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Ⅰ. Introduction
After Chinese President Xi Jinping announced two related ambitious initiatives -
the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road - in 2013,
whether Africa is included in the initiatives or not was soon hotly discussed. In March
2015, Chinese government issued an official paper - “Vision and Actions on Jointly
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, in which
Africa’s position in these two initiatives (abbreviated as One Belt and One Road or
OBOR), is still not clear. The paper states that “[the OBOR Initiative] aims to
promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent
seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and
Road…[they] run through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting the
vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European economic circle
at the other, and encompassing countries with huge potential for economic
development”. According to this sentence, the initiative concerns Africa. However, it
also states that “the Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China,
Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and
the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China
with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century Maritime
Silk Road is designed to go from China's coast to Europe through the South China Sea
and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China's coast through the South China
Sea to the South Pacific in the other”.①
Clearly, in these sentences, compared to other continents (Asia and Europe),
Africa is absent. So in terms of this official paper, positions of Africa in the OBOR
initiative are pretty confused. Generally, it lies along the Belt and Road in geography,
yet when considering specific projects, Africa-related ones are not found. Because of
this confusion, some Chinese scholars argue that Africa’s position should be clarified
①
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council
authorization on March 2015.
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in the OBOR. Professor Justin Yifu Lin, an Chinese Economist and pre-Vice President
of World Bank, had proposed in 2015 that Africa should be included in the OBOR,
through which Chinese labor-intensive industries could be shifted to Africa, and based
on this, more Sino-African cooperation on infrastructural construction would be
possible. He said “OBOR is mainly focusing on infrastructural construction and
mutual communication and interconnection, supplemented by industrial transfer; with
respect to China-African cooperation, it should mainly focus on industrial transfer,
supplemented by infrastructural construction and mutual communication and
interconnection”. ①
According to him, Africa can play a significant role in OBOR
initiative.
His view is shared by some other Chinese scholars, diplomats, and African
people as well. For example, the Chairman of Egyptian African Association hopes
Africa will join the OBOR.② Phumelele Gwala, Consul-General of the Republic of
South Africa in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special
Administrative Region, also anticipated that the OBOR and the African Agenda 2063
can synchronously develop, promoting closer China-Africa cooperation, especially in
the field of infrastructure and marine economy.③
Liu Guijin, the Chinese
former-Special Representative for African Affairs had even argued in the 4th
Forum
for Chinese and African Think Tanks in September 2015 that Africa had benefited
from the OBOR, although it was not included in this initiative.④
In terms of these statements, discussions and arguments, it can be seen that
Africa’s positions and roles in OBOR should be affirmed. However, some details
should be discussed: which African countries could be pivots, which joint projects
should be planned, and which roles Africa should play? In order to specify the status
of Africa in OBOR, this paper will mainly analyze two of the most important factors –
geography and the nature of OBOR. This analytical framework will lead us to draw a
①
Justin Yifu Lin, “OBOR Needs Adding Africa”, The Paper, January 18, 2015. ②
NPC and CPPCC: Africa Included In ‘The Belt and Road’ Is A Historical Initiative, Xinhua News, March 8, 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-03/07/c_128780662.htm ③
“Interview with the South African Consulate General in Hong Kong and Macao: Hope ‘The
Belt and Road extended to Africa’”, The Dagong Daily, May 6, 2016. ④
Liu Chang, Mozambique’s Love on Blue and White porcelain, China Trade News, June 2, 2016.
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clear picture of Africa’s roles, advantages and limitations in OBOR.
This paper argues that Africa can play a significant role in OBOR and it should
be included in this initiative. It will analyze the roles of Africa in China-proposed
OBOR in the first section, and then analyze the challenges of OBOR in Africa in the
second section, followed by the conclusion in the last section.
Ⅱ. Africa’s roles in China’s Silk Road Initiative
Before the OBOR initiative was issued, Africa was an economic partner of China.
In former-President Hu Jintao’s administration, the China-African Cooperation Forum
was advocated by the two sides and several sessions of it had been successfully held.
Thus the deepening of Sino-African relationship in Hu’s time to some extent set a
foundation for the cooperation of the two sides in the OBOR initiative. Even during
the rule of Hu’s predecessor, then-President Jiang Zemin, Africa became a hot
destination for Chinese companies’ investment, stimulated by the “go-global” policy.
Now Africa’s roles in OBOR initiative stem from OBOR’s dynamics and aims,
and are also based on Africa’s endowments, such as resources, geographic positions,
capabilities in international society, typical needs, etc.
According to Beijing, the OBOR’s dynamic that pushes Chinese leaders to
initiate this great project is partly to boost China’s and the world economy while “the
underlying impact of the international financial crisis keeps emerging; the world
economy is recovering slowly, and global development is uneven; the international
trade and investment landscape and rules for multilateral trade and investment are
undergoing major adjustments; and countries still face big challenges to their
development”.① Namely, this ambitious initiative is mainly aimed at resuming fast
economic development at national and international levels, by “promoting orderly and
free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep
①
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council
authorization on March 2015.
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integration of markets; encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve
economic policy coordination and carry out broader and more in-depth regional
cooperation of higher standards”,① and so on. Apart from this economic dynamic,
there are some other targets to push the OBOR: for example, the enhancement of
regional stability and peace, multi-level cooperation and the progress of human
civilization. In the Preface of the official paper on OBOR policy, the spirit of Silk
Road is summarized as “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual
learning and mutual benefit”.②
According to the policy paper, the OBOR is stimulated by recession in the global
economy, and aims to revitalize and develop China’s and other countries’ economies,
and enhance cooperation and coordination in other fields with other countries as to
keep a stable situation and mutual friendly relationship. As for Africa, it can play
some key roles in the OBOR if one theoretically considers the OBOR’s dynamics,
aims and envisaged projects. Africa is an inevitable part of the logistical network of
OBOR (for example, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Tunisia), since this network is the base of
both “Belt” and “Road”, if one considers the geographic context of Africa as a
connector between Asia and Europe or the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic.
Furthermore, Africa is an ideal ground for China’s enterprises to do business
regarding infrastructural construction and energy since on the one hand Africa is eager
for good roads, railways, dams and school buildings, and on the other hand, “facilities
connectivity is a priority area for implementing the Initiative” of OBOR. Additionally,
Africa can also play important role in cultural exchange (or people-to-people
communication) with China. People-to-people communication is also highlighted by
the OBOR policy paper, and Africa is not only a target of China’s soft power
transmission, but also a good partner for implementing its cultural diversity strategy,
namely, reviving national (regional) culture and reducing the global hegemony of
Western culture. Last but not least, China can more easily take international
responsibility if it invites Africa to join the OBOR, because it’s easier for China to
①
Ibid. ②
Ibid.
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provide some “public goods” (especially those endorsed by China-Africa Cooperation
Forum), such as infrastructural facilities and common security, in Africa than in other
regions, for example, Europe or in Central Asia.
Infrastructural construction and China’s industrial transfer
China has had experience with infrastructural construction in Africa since the
1970s. China helped build the TanZam Railway between Tanzania and Zambia
between October 1970 and June 1975, in which 50,000 Chinese engineers and
laborers participated. Nowadays, lots of contemporary Chinese investment and aid are
also flowing into the field of infrastructural construction in Africa. Examples of such
projects include the Light Railway in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, the Abuja-Kaduna
railway in Nigeria, the Lobito-Luau railway in Angola, and the Nairobi- Mombasa
railway in Kenya.①
Some airports across the continent (including airports in Angola,
Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Togo) are also
under construction by Chinese companies.
Apart from the transportation field, Chinese companies are also involved in the
African energy sector, for instance, construction of hydropower dams in Ethiopia and
Uganda, biogas development in Guinea, Sudan and Tunisia, and construction of solar
and wind power plants in Ethiopia, Morocco, and South Africa.
This indicates infrastructural construction has been significant part of
China-African economic cooperation, and more ambitious cooperation in this area is
envisaged by both sides. In January 2015, Beijing and the African Union signed a
memorandum on Pan-African transportation development. In this memorandum,
Beijing promises to help Africa build a pan-African transportation network (including
railways, highways, airports and other related construction) that will be finished
within 48 years.②
Apart from the great potential of cooperation on infrastructural construction,
Africa is also a partner of China in promoting China’s industrial upgrading. With the
①
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road Helps Development of Africa”, Xinhua News, February 13,
2015 ②
“OBOR Extended to Africa, China Will Help Africa’s ‘Century Grand Development’”, acceded
to http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20150128/13464906_0.shtml on January 28, 2015.
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increase of wages and raw materials prices in China, labor-intensive industries face
serious financial crisis and even risk of bankruptcy. Africa, as a land that’s full of low
cost labor and resources, it is an ideal target for those labor-intensive industries. If
African countries can well regulate Chinese companies, set up reasonable economic
development strategies, and further promote judicial systems, as China did in 1980s,
Africa would greatly benefit.
Africa as part of the trans-continental logistical network
Geographically, Africa is located between Europe and Asia in the “Maritime Silk
Road”. Based on this reality, Africa is an indispensable partner in the OBOR initiative.
Not only do goods need sending to Europe from China or to China from Europe via
North Africa, but also raw materials and manufacturing products can be delivered to
China, Africa or Europe more conveniently, once Africa is included in the
trans-continental logistical network of OBOR. Obviously, Africa can utilize
deep-water ports and harbors to connect itself to the trans-continental logistic network.
With the hinterland transportation network that is under construction, more cities and
towns in Africa will be connected more easily and faster with Europe and Asia. If the
logistic network is successfully finished, a grand network for trade, personal mobility
and cultural communication among Africa, Asia and Europe will be formed.
In reality, China’s companies are involved in deep-water port construction in
some coastal cities, including Bizerte of Tunisia, Dakar of Senegal, Dar es Salaam of
Tanzania, Djibouti city, Libreville of Gabon, Maputo of Mozambique, Tema of Ghana,
Kribi of Cameroon, and so on. These ports as the extension of the Maritime Silk Road
will be key sites in the transcontinental exchange of manufactured goods and
commodities between Asian and African economies, linked by Mediterranean Sea and
the Red Sea.① Meanwhile, more African countries are competing to become a part of
this grand network. For example, the Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe had said
“Togo intends to be the anchor point in West Africa for the New Silk Road
initiative,… [my country] possesses many advantages to serve as a gateway” for West
①
“African Countries Bid for ‘anchor points’ in China’s Billion-dollar Silk Road Plan: It Could
Set off ‘Mini Battles’”, M&G Africa, May 29 2016. http://mgafrica.com/
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Africa, including its geography.① Anyway, geographically, Africa is “becoming one
of the pillars of the Marine Silk Road project”.②
Cultural exchange
Both China and Africa are bound to encourage cultural diversity around the
world, since cultural diversity is “as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for
nature”,③
and meanwhile, the cultures of both China and Africa are seriously
impacted and challenged by Western cultural hegemony.
For China, its traditional culture has been badly diminished by some modern
radical anti-tradition movements, including the “Cultural Revolution” in the 1960s,
and been attacked by Western culture in the era of globalization. For African
countries, due to their long history of being colonized by colonial powers from the
15th
century to 1960s and being continuously linked with these former-suzerains in
many ways, Africa’s culture now is deeply influenced and marked by European
culture, and in globalized era, it’s also deeply influenced by American culture.
In this context, considering the significance of cultural diversity in the world and
the significance of national/local culture for the survival of nationalities, Africa should
be one significant partner of China to promote bilateral cultural dialogue and bilateral
cooperation for the renaissance of both cultures and civilizations under Western global
cultural hegemony. If cultural exchange and people-to-people exchange are
cooperation priorities in the OBOR, Africa - as a continent with rich local cultures,
varied religions, languages, and ethnicities, and also as a continent that has a strong
will to address African cultural renaissance - can be an appropriate partner of China to
address global cultural diversity through improving Chinese and African cultures’
consciousness and independence by cooperation and communication.
In addition to the countries colonized by Western countries, some African
countries, i.e. Ethiopia, have resisted colonial aggression and preserved their cultural
①
Ibid. ②
“China Eyes Africa for Its Maritime Silk Road”, African Cargo News, January 22, 2015. ③
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2 November 2001,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=2
01.html
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identity. These countries could be used as possible partners to advance cultural
diversity in collaboration with China.
Enhancement of China’s international responsibility
OBOR is not only an initiative for China, but also a trans-national great project
for global economic prosperity and societal stability. From this perspective, to make
the project successful is not only a Chinese objective, but also a common task of all
countries and regions along this Silk Road. In turn, the success of the OBOR would
indicate the undertaking of more international responsibility by China, which is a
natural spillover effect or essentially is an embedded task of the OBOR. After all, the
enhancement of China’s international responsibility is one touchstone of the success
of the OBOR. In light of this, China should cooperate with Africa when pushing this
great project abroad since the latter needs the help of external international actors,
including for providing it with public goods, making use of chances for economic
cooperation, joint anti-terrorism, infectious disease prevention, and so on.
That is to say, compared to other regions, such as South-east Asia, Latin America
or Europe, Africa is a continent that needs more external assistance for social stability
and economic development and fortunately China can provide them by a market
approach or by aid. Namely, in Africa, there’s more room for China to act as an
international power and accordingly, bear more international responsibility through
economic cooperation and financial assistance.
Ⅲ. Challenges that the Maritime Silk Road Initiative in Africa will
encounter
As the least developed continent in the world, Africa has suffered from ongoing
social and military conflict, terrorist attacks, corruption, immature judicial systems,
and so on, all of which are obstacles for China’s implementation of OBOR in Africa.
Li Wentao, Professor at China Institute of Modern International Relations, argued that
there are seven risks for China’s investment in Africa: civil war, regime change,
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economic nationalism, violent terrorism, external intervention, organized crime, and
operational risks.① Some other risks are also highlighted by Chinese scholars, for
example, the financial risks when considering African governments’ ability to repay
loans.② This paper considers several serious challenges in Africa as follows: political
and societal instability, increasing terrorism, increasing distrust in China’s
involvement and geopolitical competition in the continent.
Political and societal instability
After the end of the Cold War, due to the lift of the pressure of the bipolar system
and the popularization of democratization③
, conflicts have kept flaring up in the
continent. Civil wars, trans-border conflicts, political disturbances, violent terrorism
and organized crime have been undermining all engagement of foreign countries,
although in some countries, social and political stability has somehow been kept well,
like South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius. In this context, China’s engagement in
Africa has been encountering big challenges.
For example, China had deep involvement in Libya before the civil war broke
out. However, after civil war escalated in 2011, Beijing had to abandon almost all
business operations in this country, and hurried to evacuate its citizens to China. In
this evacuation, about 35 thousand Chinese citizens were returned from Libya by
Chinese civil flights, ships, and military aircraft. ④
Because no one looked after the
Chinese factory sites and facilities in Libya, many of them were seriously destroyed
and looted. A similar case for China was seen in Sudan. It shows that China doesn’t
have the skill and ability to protect its economic interests when civil wars are taking
place in African countries that Chinese companies are involved in, and in which the
①
“Necessary for China to Help Africa Realize Common Prosperity through ‘The Belt and Road’”,
The People website, December 14, 2015.
http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1214/c190970-27925890.html ②
“Foreign Media: Seizing New Opportunities, Africa Welcomes ‘The Belt and Road’”, Global Times, March 4, 2015. ③
In the wave of the latest democratization happened in 1990s, some African countries had
suffered from the construction of multi-party system, a precondition of democratic transition. Due
the deep tradition of tribalism, the multi-party system practically increased the political
competition and economic contraction among different tribes and ethnics, and caused some
serious social conflicts or even civil wars such as in Rwanda, etc. ④
Xu Yapin, “The Evacuation You Don’t Know”, Xinhua News, march 31, 2015.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-03/31/c_127636215.htm
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Chinese long-standing diplomatic principle of “non-interference” also matters in some
degree.
Apart from civil war, the severest conflict in Africa, China’s engagement is also
challenged by some other social and political issues. Because Beijing is used to
building relationships with ruling parties and top officials in African countries, and
don’t have rich experience of people-to-people communication with Africa, in some
special cases, China and Chinese enterprises invested in Africa easily become the
target of criticism from social groups and opposition parties in Africa in certain
periods, for example, during Presidential campaigns. In these cases, some opposition
parties and groups are not indeed intending to criticize Beijing, but instead to criticize
opponents’ policies. However, whatever the intention of the critics, negative effects on
China in Africa have been produced and troubles that China has to deal with seriously
have emerged.①
Additionally, for various and complex reasons, in recent years, more and more
Chinese citizens have been kidnapped in Africa, and some of them have even been
killed. For instance, in 2007, several Chinese workers were kidnapped by armed
gunmen in Nigeria and Ethiopia; in 2012, 29 Chinese workers serving in China
Hydropower Group were kidnapped by a rebel armed group in Sudan; ②
and in 2015,
several cases of the kidnapping of Chinese happened in South Africa, resulting in
much fear in Chinese residents in the country.③ It seems that cases of the kidnapping
of Chinese citizens are increasing in Africa, however, the reasons for these
kidnappings are varied. For the Nigeria kidnappers, the goal was ransoms; yet for
some other countries kidnappers, it was just to put pressure on the authorities in order
to get some political returns. Basically, Chinese citizens are not unique targets in these
kidnapping cases, but with the increasing number of Chinese people entering the
continent, more kidnapping cases involving Chinese perhaps will happen in the future.
①
Anthony Harff, “Is China the New Colonist in Africa?” Business Weekly, October 27, 2006. ②
Tang Xiaoyang, Sino-African Economic Diplomacy and Its Implications for Global Industrial Chain, World Knowledge Press (Beijing), 2014.
http://military.china.com/critical3/27/20151203/20869053_all.html ③
Song Fangcan, “4 Chinese Kidnapped in South Africa, 6 Cases Happened since the End of Last
Year”, China News Service, march 17, 2016.
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As one scholar commented, “the inner politics is very complicated in Africa, and each
country has its own problems. In short, the more engagement of China in this
continent, the more easily it can become a vector for projecting internal contradictions
in these countries”.①
Growing threat of terrorism
Terrorism is the cancer of global political stability and economic development.
Unfortunately, the power and influence of terrorism in Africa has increased in recent
years, although terrorism did not emerge only in the 21st century. Since the 1980s,
due to the long-term civil war in Somalia, the expansion of Muslim Brotherhood to
neighboring countries, and especially due to the growth of other Islamic
fundamentalist organizations in Africa since 1990s, an “Arc of terrorism” composed
of “Al-Shabab” of Somalia, “Boko Haram” in Nigeria, and "Islamic Maghreb Al
Qaeda" in Algeria, and so on, located in Western, Northern and Eastern Africa, has
been formed.② Up to now, these terrorist organizations have carried out many violent
attacks on common people, resulting in severe casualties, an atmosphere of panic and
social instability in Africa.
For example, in July 2010 in Uganda, Al-Shabab killed over 70 people who were
watching the football World Cup final; in September 2013, the same group bombed a
shopping mall in Nairobi of Kenya and at least 67 people in this attack were killed; in
April 2014, terrorists of Boko Haram attacked a school in northeastern Nigeria,
almost 300 school girls were kidnapped; and so on and so forth.
According to the Department of State of the US, in 2014 “in East Africa, the
Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabab remained the primary terrorist threat”. In
West Africa, conflict in Nigeria continued throughout the northeast, with Boko Haram
and related actors committing hundreds of attacks, resulting in over 5,000
casualties”.③ According to the African Union, at present at least 16 primary terrorist
①
Yang Ziyan, “Complex Ecology Behind the Kidnapping Cases in Africa”, People’s Daily,
February 4, 2012, p.6. ②
Wang Jin, “An Arc of Terrorism Is Forming in Africa”, China Website, September 26, 2013 ③
“Country Reports on Terrorism 2014: Africa Overview”, by Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S.
Department of State.
14
groups are active in Africa, including "Al-Shabab" in Somali, “Boko Haram” in
Nigeria, “Lord’s Resistance Army” in Uganda, " Islamic Maghreb Al Qaida" in
Algeria, and “Jihad in West Africa unification movement" in Mali. More seriously,
these terrorist groups are engaging in cross-border activities, and strengthening their
links between each other, forming a great threat to regional stability.①
Because terrorism is caused by trans-border terrorist groups, no individual
African country can deal with it effectively. Yet despite encountering this increasing
threat, Africa as a whole and international society don’t pay much attention to it, or at
least don’t do much to act against it. Clearly, the rise of terrorism in Africa is partly
caused by Western countries. Western policy “has contributed significantly to the
current problems, especially when one bears in mind that it was the NATO powers
which toppled the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi, the main bulwark
against al-Qaeda in Northern Africa. Libya, like Syria, saw the West line up on the
same side as al-Qaeda.”②
With the expansion of terrorist influence in Africa, if no efficient endeavor is
taken, the threat will spread into many countries in Africa, and the projects OBOR
supports will face big risks posed by these terrorist groups. With the quick penetration
of ISIS in Africa, the challenge that OBOR faces in Africa would be much bigger. Liu
Jieyi, the permanent representative of China to the United Nations, called on
international society to help Africa cope with the challenges caused by terrorism. He
highlighted that the United Nations should help African countries to improve their
counter-terrorism capabilities as a priority and to provide more real help for African
countries.③ This shows that Beijing is aware of the reality that Africa is suffering
from the rise of terrorism and worries about this tendency will undermine China’s
engagement in Africa.
Increasing distrust in China’s involvement
①
Ding Jianting, “Not Ignore the Threat of Terrorism in Africa”, Nanfang Daily, July 28, 2015. ②
Neil Clark, “Terrorism in Africa: A Bigger Threat than in Europe, But Much Less Coverage”,
Reuters/Afolabi Sotunde, January 15, 2015. ③
Ni Hongmei, “The Chinese Representative Called for Helping Africa Cope with the Challenges
by Terrorism”, Xinhua News, July 9, 2016.
15
Generally, Chinese are welcomed by Africa. Their friendship is not only rooted
in the cooperation by older generations in 1950s-1980s when the TanZam Railway
project was finished, symbolizing traditional China-Africa friendship, but also based
on contemporary economic cooperation which benefits both sides absolutely. Chris
Alden, a specialist on African studies, had argued that “From the promulgation of
Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy to the blossoming of Chinese-language studies in
Nigeria, the African continent is eagerly embracing Chinese capital, its diplomatic
entreaties and even cultural trappings at an unprecedented rate” .①
Nonetheless, with more Chinese entering into this continent, more friction
between the two sides at company and national levels is emerging and rising, which
has gradually resulted in some decline of China’s image for African people. For
example, in April 2005, a massive explosion happened in a Chambishi copper mine in
Zambia which was owned by China Nonferrous Metal Construction Co., Ltd. This
explosion destroyed the factory, and also resulted to the death of 46 African people,
but the cause of this accident is still unknown. Then in July 2006, due to wage
disputes, unrest happened at the same copper mine, with protesters opposing the
Chinese management. This unrest finally resulted in the deaths of 6 workers.
Regardless of right or wrong, the two accidents had very negative impact on China’s
image in Zambia. To some extent, anti-Chinese sentiment spread in the country, and
the opposition party used this situation. In 2006 during the presidential campaign,
Michael Sata as opposition candidate criticized the wage that the Chinese investors
gave as too low, and said they ignored the safety of Zambian workers. In the
campaign period, he promised to reduce Chinese companies’ share and refuse more
investment from China.②
Anti-Chinese protests are also found in other countries. For example, in
December 2014, violent riots broke out in Madagascar. Workers at a Chinese-owned
sugar mill burned the factory and looted sugar stocks. The workers were demanding
①
Anita Spring and Yang Jiao, “China in Africa: African Views of Chinese Entrepreneurship”,
Proceedings of the 9th Annual Conference (Simon Sigué Ed., p.60). ②
“China Worrying Its Image in Africa”, Financial Times (in Chinese), October 29, 2006
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001007167?page=1
16
better pay and permanent contracts for some 1300 seasonal workers. The police
evacuated all Chinese nationals where the riots occurred to the capital, Antananarivo.①
There are varied factors that lead to anti-Chinese protests and sentiment in Africa.
The complaints of Africans toward Chinese include shoddy construction and projects
that bring little benefit to the local economy, non-transparency in development aid, or
so-called “neocolonialist” behaviors, bribes, unsafe working conditions and other
activities that undermine local morale, and so on.② Chinese officials admitted some
of these criticisms. Chinese ambassador to Tanzania said there are two common
problems among the Chinese people and companies in Africa - fierce infighting
resulting in vicious competition among Chinese companies, and failure to conform to
local laws, practices and customs.③
Another factor that has nothing to do with
Chinese image in Africa, is related to the democratic system in Africa. In democratic
African states like South Africa, Zambia, and Kenya, Chinese labor and capital often
encounter frustrated unemployed or underemployed masses with the lawful right to
protest, petition, and vote against “all things Chinese” that often compete with “all
things local”.④
Anyway, more deep engagement in Africa means the Chinese image will
encounter more challenges. Like other involved parties, China should develop
sophisticated skills to enhance its positive image and meanwhile, should adapt to the
reality that China’s image is complicated and diversified in Africa. As a power in
Africa, anti-Chinese sentiment is normal, which is just like anti-Indian sentiment that
①
Loro Horta, “Anti-China Sentiment in Africa: Why Are They Unwelcomed?” RSIS, March 10,
2015.
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co15049-anti-china-sentiment-in-africa-why-are-they-
unwelcomed/ ②
Lily Kuo, “China Is Putting $2 Billion into Fighting Its Neocolonialist Image in Africa”,
QUARTZ, May 20, 2014.
http://qz.com/745856/a-brand-new-stem-barbie-comes-with-an-educational-kit-that-teaches-girls-
engineering/ ③
Chankaiyee2, “Chinese People’s Bad Behavior Causes Poor Image in Africa, Negative
International Rating”, China Daily Mail, July 15, 2014.
https://chinadailymail.com/2014/07/15/chinese-peoples-bad-behaviour-causes-poor-image-in-afric
a-negative-international-rating/ ④
.Richard Aidoo, “Why Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Africa Is on the Rise? China’s Increasing
Presence across the African Continent Has Led to Social Conflict”, Six Tone, July 18, 2016.
http://www.sixthtone.com/news/why-anti-chinese-sentiment-africa-rise
17
is quite strong in East Africa and anti-French riots that often occur throughout
Francophone Africa.① However, in order to make OBOR be successful, China should
engage more deeply with African people to avoid mutual misunderstandings.
Geopolitical competition
At the end of the Cold War, major powers re-entered Africa because of its rich
energy resources and grand potential market. This made Africa become a center of
geo-political competition between the major powers. In the long run, the US and
Europe consider Africa as their backyard and have been attempting to dominate it and
revive the old colonial pattern of relationships, nevertheless, due to the different
model of engagement and aims of China, China’s emergence in Africa has fast
become a major challenge for America and Europe.
Two factors make China become the big challenger for the West. Firstly, China’s
economic engagement, especially the financial assistance for Africa, is without any
political condition. Chinese aid and investment is rendered with no political strings
attached and usually spent on infrastructure projects. For example, Sinopec, a Chinese
state oil company, acquired oil concessions in Angola and in return, it rebuilds the
country’s transport infrastructure, hospitals, and state buildings.②
Conversely, the
West always requires transparency, anti-corruption, environmental protection and
good governance that host countries in Africa should accept, although China’s
enterprises can also benefit from them. E.g., these countries now have an easy
alternative to getting FDI and aid from China, which indicates Western dominance is
challenged by China in Africa. Clearly, now China is bearing the blame and criticism
of the West.
Secondly, China’s success in national renaissance is attracting African leaders to
learn from China’s experience and wisdom, although China’s leaders argue that there
is no “China model” and each country should find its own development road. This
means the Western model is not a universal or unique model to reach successful state
①
Loro Horta, “Anti-China Sentiment in Africa: Why Are They Unwelcomed?” RSIS, No.049–10,
March 2015. ②
Salman Rafi Sheikh, “China’s Geo-Political Penetration in Africa”, New Eastern Outlook, September 25, 2013.
18
development, and China is another development reference for Africa. The challenges
China poses will cause Western countries’ rhetorical criticism and practical resistance.
Meanwhile, China also faces competition from other emerging states in Africa,
including India which has been increasingly promoting its close relationship with
Africa in recent years - the India-Africa Summit first held in 2008 is the symbol of
India’s deep engagement in Africa. Namely, because of competition among powers
economically, in security and strategically, the operation of China’s projects in Africa
will not be as smooth as imagined. The challenge not only results from African
domestic and internal problems, but also from potential questioning, intervention and
resistance of powers outside of Africa, directly and indirectly.
Ⅳ. Conclusion
When pushing the OBOR in Africa, stubborn and obsolete approaches should be
replaced by some flexible and skillful ones. Firstly, Beijing should insist on
“development peace” in lieu of “democratic peace”. For Africa, development is much
more important than anything else, and it’s proven that many social conflicts are
rooted in underdevelopment. Based on this, economic development is the core task of
OBOR projects in Africa. Secondly, Beijing should insist on “dialogue of civilizations”
with African countries, in lieu of “clash of civilizations”. Dialogues cannot escalate
the distinction of different civilizations, but can reduce the risk of confrontation,
which is one base of harmonization between China and Africa. Thirdly, Beijing
should insist on win-win in any projects. Although now Chinese companies’ behavior
can be explained by capitalism, China’s government has to guide its companies to
abide by local laws and benefit local people. Economic cooperation is to promote
prosperity of both sides, not only that of the Chinese side. Fourthly, Beijing should
insist on grassroots exchanges, not simply contact with top officials and ruling parties
of African countries. Through globalization, civil society is growing stronger, and
bottom-up communication with African people is now of as much importance as the
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top-down approach. Only based on reasonable strategy and appropriate approaches to
engagement in Africa can Beijing’s OBOR in Africa can be welcomed by Africans
and then be successful.
审校:郑宇(ZHENG Yu) 编辑:祁怀高(QI Huaigao)
出品方:复旦大学国际问题研究院 出版日期:2016年 10月 20日
编辑部电话:(86 21)5566 4941 电子邮箱: [email protected]
通讯地址:上海市邯郸路 220号复旦大学国际问题研究院 200433