emmanuel mbata 2013

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TITLE

THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL AUTHORITY IN MANAGING

ASSET INTEGRITY

By

EMMANUEL MBATA

B.Tech. Physics/Electronics Technology

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the

award of Master of Science in Safety and Reliability Engineering at the

University of Aberdeen

September, 2013


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i

DECLARATION

I EMMANUEL MBATA declare that the presented and submitted work is my original

work and has not been submitted for any other degree award to any University.


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ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am most grateful to my supervisor Dr H. Tan for his kind words of encouragement,

constructive feedbacks and support throughout this research. Most especially I want to

thank you for your patience and understanding.

My sincere appreciation to OPITO for the great opportunity granted me through the

Piper Alpha Memorial Scholarship. My profound gratitude goes to Bruce Lawson for

taking out time from your busy work schedule to guide me through this project work.

I want to say a big thank you to Les Linklater (Team leader Step Change in Safety),

Emily Taylor and Dr Gillian Simpson for your support and all the help rendered. I am

sorry for all the inconveniences caused. The Asset Integrity Steering Group of Step

Change in Safety for helping me ensure that the questionnaires where answered. I

would also like to use this opportunity to thank Bob Taylor and Valerie Wilson for their

valuable contribution to this work.

To my Parents Mr & Mrs Robert Mbata, you are the best, thank you for going the extra

mile to ensure that I do my Master’s degree.

To my family, friends and loved ones, thank you so much for your help, understandingand encouragement through it all.

Most especially, I am grateful to God.


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ABSTRACT

The offshore oil and gas industry on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) is a dynamic

and mature production area with an ageing infrastructure. Past and more recent

accidents have alerted the oil and gas industry of the need to manage their assets and

control the risks associated with production operations from design to abandonment.

Asset integrity is the fitness of an asset to be operated as intended in an effective and

efficient way with an acceptable risk of failure, and asset integrity management ensures

that the people, systems, processes and resources that deliver integrity are available,

functional and reliable over the whole life cycle of the asset.

Essential for the integrity of an asset are the safety critical elements. These are

components, systems (including computer programs) whose purpose is to control,

prevent or mitigate major accident hazards, and whose failure can lead to or contribute

substantially to a major accident.

Ensuring the functionality, availability, survivability and reliability of the safety critical

elements as offshore asset continually age is essential for an effective asset integrity

management. This responsibility lies with the Technical Authorities who acts as

backstop against continuous use of degraded safety critical elements.

The main objective of this research is to understand the current implementations of the

Technical Authority’s role within operating companies in the UKCS via a questionnaire

and the definition of key roles going forward.

The findings of the research highlighted the strengthening of the Technical Authority’s

role within operating companies and provide an insight into their functions, roles and

how they manage the integrity of assets.

The key roles identified in this research to be performed by Technical Authority’s going

forward includes definition of performance standards for safety critical elements,

ensuring the safety critical elements meets the defined performance standards, manage

maintenance deferral of safety critical elements, review deviations from the defined

performance standard, involve in accident/incident investigations and carry out reviews

and audit activities as required. This will ensure the continuous fitness for purpose of

the safety critical elements.


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TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................ i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................................... ii

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. iii

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. vii

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... viii

1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Background ................................................................................................................ 1

1.2 Aims and Objectives .................................................................................................. 2

2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 3

2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 3

2.2 ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT (AIM) ....................................................... 3

2.3 Asset Life Cycle ........................................................................................................ 4

2.3.1 Plan/Design Phase ............................................................................................... 5

2.3.2 Construction Phase .............................................................................................. 6

2.3.3 Commissioning Phase ......................................................................................... 6

2.3.4 Operations Phase ................................................................................................. 6

2.3.5

Decommissioning Phase ...................................................................................... 7

2.4 Asset Integrity Elements ............................................................................................ 7

2.4.1 Mechanical Integrity ............................................................................................ 8

2.4.2 Operational Integrity............................................................................................ 8

2.4.3 Personnel Integrity ............................................................................................... 8

2.5 Description of the Elements and the Intended Purposes ........................................... 9

2.5.1 Management of Change ....................................................................................... 9

2.5.2 Assessment and Continuous Improvements ...................................................... 10

2.5.3 Ownership and Accountability .......................................................................... 10

2.5.4 Asset register ..................................................................................................... 11

2.5.5 Risk Management and Hazard Evaluation ........................................................ 11

2.5.6 Protective Systems ............................................................................................. 11

2.5.7 Facilities Design and Construction .................................................................... 12

2.5.8 Operation and Maintenance ............................................................................... 12

2.5.9 Incident/Accident Investigation and Prevention ............................................... 13

2.5.10 Leadership ......................................................................................................... 13


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2.5.11 Competency/Skills Assurance ........................................................................... 13

2.5.12 Emergency Management ................................................................................... 14

2.6 Risk based approach ................................................................................................ 15

2.6.1 Risk Base Inspection (RBI) ............................................................................... 15

2.6.2 Reliability Based Maintenance (RBM) ............................................................. 15

2.7 Safety Critical Element (SCE), Major Accident Hazard (MAH), Risk Based

Inspections (RBI) and Performance Standard (PS) ............................................................. 16

2.7.1 Safety Critical Element (SCE) ........................................................................... 16

2.7.2 Risk Based Inspections (RBI) ........................................................................... 19

2.7.2.1 RBI Process ................................................................................................ 20

2.7.2.2 Risk Assessment Process ........................................................................... 20

2.7.2.3 Hazard Identification .................................................................................. 21

2.7.2.4 Frequency Assessment ............................................................................... 21

2.7.2.5 Consequence Assessment ........................................................................... 21

2.7.2.6 Risk Evaluation .......................................................................................... 21

2.7.2.7 Action Forward .......................................................................................... 25

2.8 Major Accident Hazards (MAH) ............................................................................. 25

2.9 Performance Standard (PS) ..................................................................................... 26

2.9.1 Integrity Assurance ............................................................................................ 27

2.9.2 Verification ........................................................................................................ 27

2.10 RBI, MAH, SCE and PS Loop ................................................................................ 28

3 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 30

3.1 Population and Sampling ......................................................................................... 31

3.2 Data Collection Method .......................................................................................... 31

3.2.1 Pilot Interview ................................................................................................... 31

3.2.2 Questionnaire ..................................................................................................... 31

3.2.3 Unstructured Interview ...................................................................................... 32

3.3 Data Analysis Method ............................................................................................. 32

3.4 Research Ethics and Limitations ............................................................................. 33

3.4.1 Research Ethics.................................................................................................. 33

3.4.2 Limitations ......................................................................................................... 33

4 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ........................................................................ 35

4.1 The Questionnaire.................................................................................................... 35

4.1.1 The Organisations .............................................................................................. 36


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4.1.2 TA Standard/Framework ................................................................................... 37

4.1.2.1 TA Disciplines............................................................................................ 39

4.1.3 TA Role Definition and Organisational Approach ............................................ 42

4.1.3.1 Review and Audit ....................................................................................... 44

4.1.3.2 Risk Assessments ....................................................................................... 45

4.1.3.3 Defines Regional Technical Standard ........................................................ 45

4.1.3.4 Endorse waiver to Technical Standard ....................................................... 45

4.1.3.5 Interpretation of Good Engineering Practice ............................................. 45

4.1.3.6 Endorse Deviation from PS ........................................................................ 46

4.1.3.7 Strategic Maintenance ................................................................................ 46

4.1.3.8 Approves Key Engineering Drawing ......................................................... 46

4.1.3.9 Ensure Conformity with Legislation and Standard .................................... 46

4.1.3.10 Guidance, Mentoring and Training ............................................................ 47

4.1.3.11 Investigations and Root Cause Analysis .................................................... 47

4.1.3.12 Review Suitability of SCE ......................................................................... 47

4.1.3.13 Defines PS .................................................................................................. 47

4.1.3.14 Maintenance Deferral of SCE .................................................................... 48

4.1.3.15 Review Changes and Modification ............................................................ 48

4.1.3.16 Independent View on Safety and Operational Risk ................................... 48

5 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 50

6 RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 51

APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................... 59


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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 2.1: IMPORTANT CONCEPT OF I NTEGRITY MANAGEMENT .............................................. 4

FIGURE 2.2: ASSET LIFE CYCLE .................................................................................................. 5

FIGURE 2.3: R ELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASSET INTEGRITY ELEMENTS .......................................... 7

FIGURE 2.4: COMPETENCY VERIFICATION SCHEME ................................................................. 14

FIGURE 2.5: SCE GROUPS AND BOWTIE DIAGRAM ................................................................... 18

FIGURE 2.6: MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE R ISK EVALUATION PROCESS .................................... 22

FIGURE 2.7: TYPICAL 4X4 R ISK MATRIXES .............................................................................. 23

FIGURE 2.8: R ISK R ATINGS ....................................................................................................... 24

FIGURE 2.9: RBI, MAH, SCE AND PS LOOP ............................................................................ 28

FIGURE 3.1: OVERVIEW OF PROCESS ........................................................................................ 30

FIGURE 4.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFSHORE PLATFORM ACROSS R ESPONDENT ..... 36

FIGURE 4.2: FLOW DIAGRAM FOR TA REPORTING STRUCTURE INTO SENIOR

MANAGEMENT .................................................................................................................. 37

FIGURE 4.3: THE BASIS FOR WHICH TA'S ARE SELECTED......................................................... 38

FIGURE 4.4: TA SELECTION BASIS % IN AGREEMENT .............................................................. 38

FIGURE 4.5: TA DISCIPLINE WITHIN DUTY HOLDERS IN THE UKCS ........................................ 39

FIGURE 4.6: TA DISCIPLINE % OF R ESPONDENT IN AGREEMENT .............................................. 40FIGURE 4.7: TA R OLES/R ESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................................... 43

FIGURE 4.8: TA R OLES/R ESPONSIBILITIES % OF R ESPONDENTS IN AGREEMENT ...................... 44

FIGURE 4.9: PS DEVELOPMENT FLOW DIAGRAM ....................................................................... 47

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 2.1: DEFINITIONS OF LIKELIHOOD FOR TYPICAL 4X4 R ISK MATRIX ............................. 24

TABLE 2.2: DEFINITIONS OF CONSEQUENCE FOR TYPICAL 4X4 R ISK MATRIX…... .................. 25

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

BP British Petroleum

UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf

HSE Health and Safety Executive

OSD Offshore Division

KP3 Key Programme 3

NUI Normally Unattended Installations

FP Floating Production

FPSO Floating Production Storage Offloading

MAH Major Accident Hazards

TA Technical Authority

SMS Safety Management System

LTI Lost Time Injury

HAZOP Hazard and Operability

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment

FMECA Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Assessments

HIPPS High Integrity Pressure Protection System

MOC Management of ChangeESD Emergency Shutdown

PSV Pressure Safety Valve

PSD Pressure Safety Device

RAM Reliability, Availability and Maintainability

RBI Risk Based Inspections

RBM Risk Based Maintenance

UK United Kingdom

AISG Asset Integrity Steering Group

SIS Safety Instrumented System

PA Public Address

GA General Alarm

BS British Standard

PS Performance Standard

ISO International Standard Organisation

OPEX Operational Expenditure


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ICP Independent Competent Person

EPC Engineering Procurement and Construction

P&ID Piping and Instrumentations Diagram

MMS Maintenance Management Systems


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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Long dismissed by many as a potential source of oil or gas, the North Sea has, over the

last four decades, become the centre of one of the world most productive and dynamic

energy industries. Gas was first found in commercial quantity in the Groningen area of

The Netherlands in 1959. This was followed by the first British discovery of gas in the

West Sole field, off the coast of East Anglia, by the British Petroleum (BP) jack-up

drilling rig Sea Gem, late in 1965 [1].

The offshore oil and gas industry on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) ofthe North Sea is now a matured industry with about 107 oil platform and 181 gas

platforms and many subsea installations. It operates in an increasingly more challenging

business environment due to rising energy demands, declining oil and gas production

rates and ageing infrastructures. It is a known fact today that more than 50% of the

offshore oil and gas production facilities has exceeded their design life and this

proportion is steadily increasing with time.

About a decade ago, in response to the deteriorating nature of assets especially the

Safety Critical Elements (SCE), the UK Health Safety Executives (HSE) Offshore

Division (OSD) responded with the Key Programme 3 (KP3) which was directed more

widely on asset integrity, and schedule to run between 2004 and 2007 [2].

The KP3 inspections were done by OSD’s specialist and inspection management team

in about a 100 offshore installations representing about 40% of the total infrastructures

in the UKCS. These included all types of offshore installations Fixed, Manned and

Normally Unattended Installations (NUI), Floating Production (FP), Floating

Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessels and Mobile drilling rigs [2].

The main focus of the KP3 was on the maintenance management of SCEs i.e. the

management systems and processes which should ensure the reliability and availability

of the SCEs. The SCEs are essential for the integrity of any installation, these are the

parts of an installation or component (e.g. hardware, software, procedure etc.) which are

designed to prevent, control or mitigate Major Accident Hazards (MAH) and the failure

of which could cause or contribute substantially to a major accident [2].


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In November 2007 a report was published by HSE detailing the findings of the KP3.

One of the main finding was that “…Technical Authorities (TAs) roles needs be

strengthened in many companies…” [2].

Although referred to frequently in HSE documents, and adopted widely in operating

companies within UKCS after the KP3, the role of the TA is not universally defined or

implemented.

This thesis will seek to assess and documents the implementation of TAs in duty holder

organisations via an industrial questionnaire, to understand the role TA plays in

managing asset integrity.

1.2 Aims and Objectives

As the currently operating oil and gas installations in UKCS are ageing, it is very

important to ensure that they are still capable of performing their intended functions in

the safest possible manner to avoid any harm to personnel or the environment. It is

therefore important that the role of the TA be universally defined and implemented

because it acts as a backstop against degraded SCEs and safety related equipment and

structures.

My main aim in this work is to understand the current implementation of the TA ’s role

with operating companies and definition of the key roles to be delivered by TA going

forward.

In an attempt to fully achieve the aim of this work, the objectives would be as follows;

To review various asset integrity management techniques

To understand the current implementation of the TA’s role within operating

companies in the UKCS

To draw conclusions and make recommendations based on my findings


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2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter seek to review different techniques employed in Asset Integrity

Management.

2.1 Introduction

Safe and reliable production is the cornerstone to efficient and profitable oil and gas

production operations. As majority of the offshore oil and gas installations in the UK

sector of the North Sea are operating beyond their design life, management and

prevention of unwanted incident especially those involving hydrocarbons, is essential to

achieving this desired safety and reliability. This sort of events can lead to multiple

fatalities with respect to people, contamination of the environment, economic loss andreputational damage for example, the Texas City refinery disaster in 2005 and The Gulf

of Mexico Oil Spill in 2010 [3].

The effective Asset Integrity Management (AIM) is critical to the control of MAH,

preventing major accidents, improve availability, business and operational efficiency

and increase reliability in oil and gas production operations. To achieve this, it is

necessary that an aware workforce deploy quality practices to sound facilities [4].

2.2 ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT (AIM)

Management of asset integrity in modern oil and gas industry is a complex and a cross-

functional activity made up of many components covering many disciplines, and it is a

birth to death journey for an asset.

The UK HSE defined Asset Integrity as “the ability of an asset to perform its required

function effectively and efficiently whilst protecting health, safety and the environment

and AIM as the means of ensuring that the people, systems, processes and resources that

deliver integrity are in place, in use and will perform when required over the whole

lifecycle of the asset” [2].

According to Sutton [5], AIM should be a core element in companies' total management

systems, strategies and activities. It seeks to ensure that all equipment, piping,

instrumentation, electrical systems, and other physical items in a unit are designed,

constructed, operated, inspected, and maintained to the appropriate standards. AIM is


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built on the philosophy that prevention of major accident is reliant on the following

principles that;

The Plant or equipment are designed and continually assessed to ensure it is

fitness for purpose (i.e. Mechanical integrity).

The Process (including programme and procedures) are in place, in use, up to

date and adhere to (i.e. Operational integrity).

The People are trained and competent with regards to their safety critical duties

(i.e. Personnel integrity).

Figure 2.1: Important Concept of Integrity Management [6]

For an effective integrity management of an asset, the people, plant and process needs to

remain fit for purpose over the life cycle of the asset.

2.3 Asset Life Cycle

The life cycle of an asset simply means the different phases/stages an asset goes through

before it is no longer fit for service. Over the life of an asset, the design intentions or

operational conditions may change. These changes can introduce risk or impose added


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burden on the assets both in terms of operating practices as well as the asset reliability

and integrity [7].

To ensure the life cycle integrity of the asset is managed and maintain, it is required that

such changes are recognised and appropriate steps taking to mitigate the effect. This is

dependent on good leadership, senior management commitment, effective maintenance

and risk management conducted by a competent workforce for each phase of the asset

life [8].

The main phases of an asset life are summarized in the figure 2.2;

Each of these phases has an impact on the integrity of the asset and is of itself a

significant event with the potential to change the risk profile of the asset [9].

These phases are discussed below;

2.3.1 Plan/Design Phase

The plan/design phase is crucial and the most important phase of any asset. Integrity in

design yields high reliability, availability, reduces downtime and cost of maintenance

[10]. Dreher et al [11] explain that, the most effective manner in which to reduce the

overall risk exposure for an asset is to reduce the risk during the planning and design

phases. Implementing the inherently safe design concept will minimise the hazards to

personnel during their operating phase and subsequent decommissioning.

A variety of studies may be undertaken during this phase to identify risk in order to take

appropriate step to mitigate the risk. These studies consider risk in a variety of areas,

including project, safety, and operational risk.

Asset Life

Cycle

Plan

Design

ConstructionCommissioning

Operations

Decommissioning

Figure 2.2: Asset Life Cycle


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These steps include, but not limited to the following;

Project risk assessment

Safety risk assessment e.g. Hazard Identification (HAZID), Hazard Analysis

(HAZAN), Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Quantified Risk

Assessments (QRA) etc.

Operational risk assessments e.g. Failure Mode Effect (and Criticality) Analysis

(FMEA/FMECA), Reliability and Availability Studies.

2.3.2 Construction Phase

In this phase of an asset, a variety of risks can also be introduced. These ranges from

occupational health and safety risks associated with injuries to major financial risks that

may have the potential to change the objectives of the project. In addition to managing

the lower level risks, it is essential to identify and address risks that have the potential to

seriously impact the viability of the project [11]. According to Butler [9], the cause of

the risk during the construction phase could be as a result of panic driven last minute

changes, or the root of the problem coming from the engineering design. Steps should

be taking during this stage to ensure that assets are constructed according to the design

specifications.

2.3.3 Commissioning Phase

De wardt et al [12] defines commissioning as “the process by which a plant, facility,

equipment (which is installed, or is complete, or near completion) is tested to verify if

its functions according to its design objectives or specifications”. During this phase of

an asset life cycle, reviews are essential to ensure that the equipment and system has

been manufactured (according to design specifications), connected and installed in a

safe and reliable way. Integrity testing of mechanical equipment, Loop testing of control

and Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), etc. should be conducted to ensure that the

installed design of the facility meets the specified performance parameter [13].

2.3.4 Operations Phase

When a plant has been commissioned and is in operations, the design and construction

safety has to be maintained by structural inspection and maintenance regime [11].

Particular emphasis should be placed on control of changes to the facilities for example,

changes in reservoir chemistry, or production parameters. Plant change control is

essential to ensure that any modifications are considered at the correct technical level to


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ensure that all potential risks are evaluated, if necessary by repeating the whole design

control measures as in the earlier phases.

2.3.5 Decommissioning Phase

Applying appropriate risk management during planning and design phases of an asset

will anticipate potential problems and take them into consideration in the initial design

of the facility. This can in the long run eliminate or reduce the issues associated with the

decommissioning of the facility at the end of their useful life [11].

2.4 Asset Integrity Elements

The asset integrity major elements are;

Mechanical Integrity

Operational Integrity

Personnel Integrity

[14]

The figure above shows the relation between asset integrity and its major elements, as

well as the interrelation between the elements. The way each of the elements performs

has effect on the others. The range for mechanical integrity is defined by the operations

and both of these elements depend on the personnel involved in dealing with them. This

enforces the requirement of personnel integrity to define asset integrity

Figure 2.3: Relationship between Asset integrity Elements

Mechanical

Integrity

Asset

Integrity

Operationalintegrity

PersonnelIntegrity


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comprehensively. Mechanical integrity is an important contributor to asset integrity, it

ensures that equipment are designed, constructed, installed and maintained to minimise

risk. The other two elements also have a potential influence on the integrity of an asset

[14].

These elements are discussed below;

2.4.1 Mechanical Integrity

Mechanical integrity is the ability of the asset to withstand the design load (i.e. design

pressure/stress, design temperature, etc.). It is primarily concerned with the structural

integrity, pressure containment and leak tightness, and focuses on pressurized

equipment, piping systems and major structure [15].

According to Smallwood [16], to achieve optimum mechanical integrity for process

fixed equipment, the following tasks must be used as applicable:

Effective management of plant’s operation, engineering and maintenance to

achieve mechanical integrity

Design mechanical integrity into a process plant during the design stage

Know and understand equipment's type/condition e.g. degradation or failure

mechanism

Operate equipment within acceptable operating envelope

Use secondary containment or other methods to diminish the effects of loss of

containment.

2.4.2 Operational Integrity

Operational integrity is the ability of the asset to perform its required functions

effectively and safely. It is primarily concerns with the reliability of SCE such as

Emergency Shutdown systems (ESD), critical process control systems, and hazard

mitigation system (e.g. Fire/gas detection system, High Integrity Pressure Protection

System (HIPPS), Safety valves etc.) [6]. Operational Integrity is about making sure the

operating basis are in place, understood, supported and adhere to.

2.4.3 Personnel Integrity

Personnel integrity is the ability of the asset personnel to operate the asset safely and

effectively. It is primarily concerned with human factors issues such as operators


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training, competency management systems, reporting systems, anomaly management,

etc. [17].

The AIM program is intended to be applicable at all stages/phases of an asset life from

design and construction to operation and decommissioning. It is a cradle-to-grave

program that covers the full life cycle of an operational facility and is based on a

continuous process of identification of potential hazards associated with such facility

and the risk management and mitigation programs developed to control the hazard [18].

For a facility to perform its required function effectively and efficiently whilst

protecting health, safety and the environment, the Mechanical, Operational and

Personnel Integrity should be maintained throughout the life cycle of the operational

facility.

Listed below are the selected AIM elements to ensure that the Mechanical, Operational

and Personnel Integrity are maintained over the life cycle of the asset [7].

Management of Change (MOC)

Assessment and Continuous Improvements.

Ownership and Accountability

Asset register

Risk Management and Hazard Evaluations

Protective System

Facility Design and Construction

Operations and Maintenance

Incidence Investigation and Preventions

Emergency Management

Competence/Skills Assurance

Leadership

2.5 Description of the Elements and the Intended Purposes

2.5.1 Management of Change

In AIM and major accident prevention, Management of Change (MOC) is one of the

most important elements which are employed throughout the life cycle of the asset. It is

simply about understanding changes and trying to control them.


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One of the major threats to MOC is that a change might not be recognised in the first

place, and this can be followed by the failure to identify the impacts of the change and

implement appropriate actions that allow transition to the change [19].

This is evident from a number of globally reported major incidents, where it was

revealed that failure to manage change was the root cause or a significant contributor.

For example,

Failure to manage temporary change led to the loss of containment, explosion,

fire and fatalities at the Nypro plant at flixborough in 1974 [20].

In most cases, MOC is applied well to permanent visible physical changes to an asset.

However, temporary or insidious changes are sometimes overlooked or not noticed. In

addition, issues such as operations outside of acceptable operating envelops, chemical

addition modifications, change in physical properties etc. are often missed. According

to Ciaraldi [6], understanding what constitute a change and how different types of

change are governed is important for an asset operator to establish an effective MOC

process. To further improve the effectiveness of MOC, an audit procedure which feeds

back into process modifications and clarifications should be employed [6].

2.5.2

Assessment and Continuous Improvements

Another important element in AIM is the assessment or evaluation of the changing

condition of an asset and the continuous assurance and verification of its integrity. This

can be achieved if performance measures are in place to monitor progress and determine

if effective systems and procedures are in place [7].

The preservation of safety critical function of SCE to achieve the required level of asset

integrity is achieved by a programme of planned inspection, testing and maintenance

activities. This is supported by timely/focussed repairs, replacements and restoration of

asset condition so that the asset remains fit for its operational purposes. Without this,

asset will deteriorate, leading to degradation of performance, ageing and unreliability of

its SCE.

2.5.3 Ownership and Accountability

If the accountability is not defined, the ownership of any task or initiatives is diluted

and progress will not be recorded. As such, for any integrity management plan orinitiative to succeed, the responsibility for identifying the loop holes in the integrity of


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the asset, the necessary actions required to close these identified gaps, monitoring of

progress made in the corrective actions and maintaining of the desired level of

performance must be defined [7].

2.5.4

Asset register

Palmer [21] explained that, data availability, accuracy and continued update are

necessary for the implementation of AIM initiatives and measure of progress towards

meeting the preset objectives.

Without integrity management data, it will be difficult for asset management to monitor

or to assert with any level of confidence that the plant or asset is in a safe condition or to

complete meaningful predictive work that will ensure the long term reliability of the

facilities. All supporting inspection, testing, investigative findings, modifications and

maintenance database should be aligned with the asset register. Therefore, periodic

reviews are required to ensure the asset register and supporting databases are maintained

and always up to date [22].

2.5.5 Risk Management and Hazard Evaluation

The core of AIM is risk and hazards evaluation. These involves the process of planning,

identifying, estimating, evaluating, selecting and implementing actions to prevent,

minimize, control or eliminate harm to personnel, environment and assets [23].

This emphasizes the need for continuous process that establishes and progressively

updates the understanding of the hazards and their management through the life cycle of

each asset.

The hazard analysis should produce a hazard register and SCE list (for prevention,

control and mitigation of the hazards) that includes the level of criticality based on the

likelihood and consequences of their failure in service [7].

2.5.6 Protective Systems

This are safety critical systems which contribute to preventing, detecting, controlling or

mitigate a major accident and ensuring the survival of people and protection of assets.

To ensure AIM, these systems should always be reliable, available and operational and

their operational functions continually verified to ensure they meet the performance

criteria. These systems include,


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ESD

Pressure Safety Valves (PSV)

Gas detectors and fire alarms

HIPPS Process Safety Devices (PSD) etc.

2.5.7 Facilities Design and Construction

This means ensuring integrity of the assets during design in order to operate within

acceptable safety margins and to ensure optimized economy throughout operational life.

This is achieved by adopting inherent safe design, developing a safe layout integrating

ergonomics (human factor) requirements right from design stage, selection of an

appropriate material for sustained operations and carrying out Reliability, Availability

and Maintainability (RAM) studies [10].

Laskar [15] explained that, the mechanical integrity of the asset is assured by

construction and fabrication to a suitable design using appropriate materials, good

workmanship and quality assurance in accordance with;

Recognised codes and standards

Good industry practises

Regulatory requirements

2.5.8 Operation and Maintenance

This element addresses the need to operate assets within the safe operating envelope and

define the limits beyond which system integrity may be jeopardized. Mechanical

integrity can be maintained by adhering to operating procedures and processes [7].

Asset integrity can be maintained when assets are;

Operated within the original design parameters or through parameters defined

through a MOC process that evolves as the facility moves through different

phases of its life cycle.

Inspected, maintained and repaired to a condition which is consistent with the

original design or fitness for service criteria.


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competency is not about training, intelligence or education level, but it is about the

specific skills required to properly do a particular job and the individual’s level of

expertise.

Managing people’s competence is a critical part of managing overall safety and integrity

of an asset. Wherever people interface with complex work systems, skilled knowledge

and skilled performance are vital to operational integrity [29].

A proper competency assurance program defines the skills required for each job and the

minimum level of competency necessary to carry out the job. Additionally, there must

be a means in place to continually assess the individual skills of a worker so that

deficiencies may be identified and corrected with targeted training and testing [30]. See

figure 2.4

Figure 2.4: Competency Verification Scheme [6]

2.5.12 Emergency Management

Tveiten et al [27] defines emergency management “as the total activities (both

administrative routines and informal processes) conducted in a more or less coordinated

way to control emergencies before, during and after an event. This includes analysis,

planning, training, handling, learning, anticipation and monitoring”.

This is the last line of defence in an AIM plan, the ability to reduce the effect or

mitigate the consequences of an accident. It is essential that assets are reliable and


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available and can respond quickly to mitigate the effect of an undesired event by having

robust emergency management plan. In addition to having the plans in place, they

should be regularly reviewed to be able to adapt to changes in the identified hazards, be

fully understood by all those likely to be impacted and regularly exercised and tested

through drills [28].

2.6 Risk based approach

Risk based approach provides a detailed evaluation of failure modes and the assessment

of their corresponding likelihood and consequences if the failure eventually occurs.

Leading and lagging indicators are then developed to monitor the performance of the

asset to prevent potential incidents [31]. Two types of risk based approach are discussed

below.

2.6.1 Risk Base Inspection (RBI)

Risk Based Inspection (RBI) methodologies are becoming standard industrial practice

for the management and planning of in-service inspection activities. According to

Horrocks et al [32], these methodologies seek to define and manage the risk associated

with individual equipment, such that items that constitute the highest risk receive the

greatest attention from a planned inspection program.

RBI provides detailed evaluations of the mode of failure, the barriers to prevent, control

or mitigate these failures, and results in an inspection programme to effectively identify

potential failure before they occur at reduced cost [33]. RBI is discussed later in details.

2.6.2 Reliability Based Maintenance (RBM)

The oil and gas process plants and facilities require essential targeted continuous

maintenance to ensure high levels of reliability and safety. A Risk Based Maintenance

(RBM) strategy is a useful tool to plan and design a cost effective maintenance schedule

[34]. The unexpected failures, the down time associated with such failures, the loss of

production and, the higher maintenance costs are major problems in any process plant.

RBM approach helps in designing an alternative strategy to minimize the risk resulting

from breakdowns or failures [35].

The RBM methodology is comprised of four modules;

Identification of the scope of maintenance Risk assessment


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Risk evaluation

Maintenance planning.

Krishnasamy et al [36] explained that, using this methodology, one is able to estimate

risk caused by the unexpected failure as a function of its probability and consequence.

Critical equipment can be identified based on the level of risk and a pre-selected

acceptable level of risk. Maintenance of equipment is prioritized based on the risk,

which helps in reducing the overall risk of an asset.

2.7 Safety Critical Element (SCE), Major Accident Hazard (MAH), Risk Based

Inspections (RBI) and Performance Standard (PS)

2.7.1

Safety Critical Element (SCE)

SCEs as defined earlier are those systems and components (including computer

programmes, hardware, procedures etc.) designed for the purpose of preventing,

controlling or to mitigate major accident hazards (MAHs) and the failure of which could

cause or contribute substantially to a major accident. These include SIS, structures, fire

and gas detection, and ESD, blow down, temporary refuge etc. According to HSE [2],

the term “contribute substantially to a major accident” is intended to include within the

category of SCE those parts whose failure would not directly initiate a major accident but would make a significant contribution to the chain of events which would result in a

major accident.

As assets age, it is very important to ensure that the SCEs are still capable of performing

their intended functions efficiently and effectively whilst protecting health, safety and

the environment.

Marty et al [37] explained that in AIM, duty holders must ensure that the SCE lifecycle

management should involve identification of the MAH, selection of the SCEs by

identifying structures and plant which can cause, contribute to, prevent or mitigate a

major accident event and develop Performance Standards (PS) for the identified SCEs.

This management plan should involve alignment of planned targeted maintenance,

inspection and testing etc. required to ensure the SCE meet it’s required PS.

Unnikrishnan [38] added that managing deviations or changes and impacts on MOC is

also a critical part of the lifecycle management of SCEs. The continual monitoring of

the status of the hardware barriers and performance assurance task (using a feedback


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loop) enable management and operators to analyse the ongoing conformance of the

SCEs with their PS. This provides opportunity for improvement and possibilities for

further risk reduction.

A comprehensive risk assessment is the best practice approach for the identification of

the SCE and the eventual definition of the required PS. This involves the detailed

identification of all hazards associated with different phases of the asset life [39]. This is

achieved by performing a number of HAZID exercises and representing the information

from the HAZID workshops using Bowtie diagram. Bowties are graphical

representations providing information related to hazard with threats which could release

the hazard’s potentials on the left hand side of the graph and the consequences on the

right hand side [40].

On each threat branch of the bowtie, there are shown barriers which are control

measures provided to prevent the threat from arising. Similarly, on each consequence

branch, there are mitigation barriers and recovery control measures which are

considered to provide risk reduction from the consequences [41].

The Figure 2.5 shows the barriers (SCE) on both sides of the top event (Hazard)


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Figure 2.5: SCE groups and Bowtie diagram [40]

The Swiss cheese model at the top of the bowtie diagram in figure 2.5 shows the

realisation of the hazardous event if all control safety barriers fails and the escalation of

the consequences if all mitigating safety barriers fails

For an effective life cycle management of SCE, the following point should be noted

[41];

The PS for the SCE should be defined based on the MAH (more on PS in the

next sub-heading).

The PS which describes the equipment operating parameters at which the safety

system fulfils its safety functions, should be defined for the SCE based on

recognised industry standards e.g. The British Standard (BS), International

Standard Organisation (ISO) etc.

To ensure the continuous integrity of the asset, it is important that correct

maintenance verification and test frequency is assigned to each SCE.


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SCE’s should be graded based on the risks associated, this assists in prioritizing

maintenance. It is important also to monitor the maintenance of non SCE’s

because their failure can increase the workload of the SCE eventually resulting

in major accident.

The reliability and availability target for the SCE should be specified. The best

approach to achieve this is to use the risk based approach by performing Safety

Integrity Level (SIL) calculations.

In order to avoid ambiguity, the PS should have a clear pass/fail criterion. This

would assist the verification operator to document the results clearly which

could be used for further analysis of the performance of the SCE.

2.7.2

Risk Based Inspections (RBI)

The scope of an inspection and frequencies has traditionally been time based and driven

by statutory regulation or insurance requirements and industry practices. Major

shutdowns were planned to take place at particular fixed intervals, and it was normal

practise to open, clean and inspect all equipment irrespective of its condition or

necessity. The inspections when completed were often unfocused and indiscriminate,

resulting in large amounts of data which are in most cases irrelevant. These practices,

although inflexible, have to an extent, provided adequate safety and reliability. They just have not been cost effective or efficient [42].

The Risk Based Inspection (RBI) approach is an effective inspection planning tool

supporting the engineers in their quest to focus the inspection and maintenance efforts

into the high risk operating assets, while assigning an appropriate effort to the lower risk

equipment. The end deliverable of RBI is a comprehensive inspection plan developed

through a risk management process that aims at ensuring the integrity of an asset in the

most cost effective manner [43].

RBI is an integrated methodology that factors risk into inspection and maintenance

decision making. It is a systematic and structured approach for developing inspection

plans using risk management techniques that identify the probability/likelihood of

failure and the consequences of such failure from the human, environmental, assets and

reputational viewpoints [44].

Overall, since a relatively large percentage of risk is associated with a small percentage

of equipment, the RBI methods improve the management of risk through closely


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focussing on the critical areas of the asset, and reducing efforts on the non-critical areas

i.e. inspection effort is proportional to the criticality of the operating asset [45].

The RBI methodology provides a logical, documented and repeatable system for

making informed decisions on inspection frequencies, details of inspection, inspection

scope etc.

2.7.2.1 RBI Process

According to Peterson et al [42] The RBI process consists of;

Carrying out a Risk assessment on the asset

Using the results of the assessment to determine the inspection frequencies and

scopes.

Before performing a criticality risk assessment, three basic questions should be asked,

this are;

What can go wrong or what are the potential failures?

What are the probabilities or likelihood of the failure events occurring?

What are the possible consequences of these failures?

2.7.2.2 Risk Assessment Process

Risk assessments are fundamental tools in the safety community. They help make and

implement decisions regarding safety, which in effect prevent accidents, improve safety

performance, and reduce Operational Expenditure OPEX by systematically identifying

and evaluating hazards concerning the design and potential failures [46].

To conduct a risk assessment, the following process has been developed;

Identify the hazards

Frequency assessment Consequence assessment

Risk evaluation

Action forward


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2.7.2.3 Hazard Identification

The first and most important step in any risk management program is to identify any

possible hazards associated with your activities. Unless hazards are identified,

consequence and likelihood reduction cannot be implemented.

Hazards identification is the act of recognising the failure conditions or threats, which

could lead to undesirable events.

The main item to determine the hazards is the amount of information which is known

about the equipment or conversely the identification of where there is a lack of

information. Even when information appears to be known, the risk based approach

requires the quality and accuracy of the information be tested and validated. Risk

increases when there is a lack of, or uncertainty in the information required to assess the

equipment integrity [42].

Information about the asset can be gathered from the design specifications, fabrication

records, operational experience, maintenance records, inspection records, the knowledge

of material degradation methods and the rates at which material degradation will, or has

occurred.

2.7.2.4

Frequency Assessment

This is the likelihood of the undesired event occurring and the rate at which these

specified events would be expected to occur in a specified period of time.

2.7.2.5 Consequence Assessment

This can involve the use of analytical models to predict the effects of different scenarios

or consequence of a failure event. Information exists describing the effects of hazardous

materials on humans, fire and blast effects on buildings and structures, dispersion and

environmental effects, etc.

2.7.2.6 isk Evaluation

Risk evaluation is used to determine the significance of a risk to the organization and

whether each specific risk should be accepted. The value indicating a risk and its

associated implications are arguably subjective but are nonetheless important for

assessing the risk status [47].


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For a given risk event (e.g. accidental hydrocarbon release), each of the release criteria

is evaluated based on the likelihood and consequence. Likelihood is the probability of

occurrence and Consequence is the severity of impact. In quantitative risk assessment,

the risk is the product of the numerical consequence and the probability of occurrence

[48]. (See figure 2.6).

According to Clare et al [48], Consequence and likelihood can each be assessed using

various methods of varying complexity, ranging from qualitative to quantitative.

Figure 2.6: Major Component of the Risk Evaluation Process [48]


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The simplest form of reporting risk is by simply grading the possible consequences and

likelihood of the failure events as high, medium or low. The preferred approach is to use

a Risk matrix to assign risk.

An example of a typical Risk Matrix is shown in Figure 2.7 below.

Each asset will fall within a cell in the matrix corresponding to the likelihood and

consequences of failure.

Risk = Likelihood×Consequences

C o n s e q u e n c e

V e r y s e r i o u s

4

8 12 16

S e r i o u s

3 6 9 12

M a r g i n a l

2 4 6 8

M i n o r

1 2 3 4

Low

(A)

Medium

(B)

High

(C)

Very High

(D)

Likelihood

Figure 2.7: Typical 4x4 Risk Matrixes


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Unacceptable Urgent Attention

Undesirable Action

Acceptable Monitor

Desirable No action

Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show sample definitions for Likelihood and Consequence for

4X4 Risk Matrix

Table 2.1: Definitions of Likelihood for Typical 4X4 Risk Matrix

Likelihood Ranking Likelihood Category Definitions

A Low Not likely

B Medium May occur

C High Probable Occurrence

D Very high Occurred/Occurring

Figure 2.8: Risk Ratings


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Table 2.2: Definitions of Consequence for Typical 4X4 Risk Matrix [42]

Consequence Ranking Consequence Category Impact

1 Minor First aid, little/no response,

minor equipment cost

2 Marginal Medical aid, limited

response, equipment

repairs, minor losses.

3 Serious Serious injury(s), major

response, major downtime,

expenses.

4 Very serious Fatality(s), long term

environmental, permanent

shutdown

2.7.2.7 Action Forward

The underlying implicit assumption is that in a competent organisation, findings from

the RBI will be followed by proper actions that will actually reduce equipment risk and

ensures the integrity of the asset [42]. The action plan may include one or a combination

of the following activities [42];

Follow up inspection

Asset monitoring

Asset replacement

Operational procedure changes

Use of upgraded materials

Instrumentation upgrade

2.8 Major Accident Hazards (MAH)

Major Accident can be thought of as an occurrence such as major emissions, spill, fire

or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of operations and

can lead to multiple fatalities or serious danger to the environment. MAH are hazard

that has the potential of resulting to a major accident e.g. hydrocarbon releases [49].

Craddock [50] explains that, major accident occurs because of failure to identify or

recognise MAH and take adequate steps to manage the associated risks. Major accidents


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are low frequency very high consequence events requiring careful management. This

needs to be supported by a safety culture that has all levels of an asset organisation

engaged in the common goal of major accident prevention. This starts with committed

leadership. Leadership that is complacent about low frequency high consequence events

will be leading an organisation that is closer to triggering a major incident than a

leadership that is mindful about such events.

It is important to recognise that for this class of failures, the primary risk control

measures are built into the system at the planning selection, design, construction, and

installation phases (i.e. ensuring the integrity of the asset in all phases). Major incidents

are not driven by operational considerations i.e. they do not necessarily require

operational failures to be realise, and may occur even if a system is operated within its

design envelop [51].

2.9 Performance Standard (PS)

PS are statements which can be expressed in quantitative or qualitative terms, of the

performance required of a system, item or equipment, person or procedure, and which is

used as the basis of managing the hazard e.g. planning, measuring, control or audit

through the life cycle of the asset (SCE). Or, they are documents describing the criteria

for the assessment of the asset (SCE) for compliance with minimum requirement to

asset operations and characterizing its performance criteria [41, 40].

Marty et al [37] explains that, The PS standard defines the following criteria for each of

the SCE;

Functionality of the SCE i.e. response time of the SCE

Availability of the SCE i.e. the handiness of the SCE

Reliability i.e. the ability of the system to perform its required functions when

it’s needed.

Survivability i.e. the ability of the element to deliver its function if exposed to an

undesired event e.g. fire, blast, vibrations, etc.

Interdependency i.e. other systems necessary for the function of the SCE to

perform adequately e.g. emergency power supply for SIS [37].


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2.9.1 Integrity Assurance

These are assurance activities performed to confirm that the asset meets the required PS

during design and throughout the operational lifetime of the asset. At the design stage,

such assurance is undertaken through the use of appropriate design codes and standards,

best practise, risk based approach, design review etc. by suitable qualified, experience

and competent persons [37]. Assurance activities during operational stage include

inspection, test and maintenance.

The activities mentioned above are required in other to enable;

2.9.2 Verification

Verification tasks are carried out in order to verify that the previously defined PS for the

SCE is achieved. According to Dhar [41], this is system of independent and competent

scrutiny of the suitability of SCE throughout its life cycle. The process of identifying

SCEs, producing PS and performing Assurance is monitored and verified by an

Independent Competent Person (ICP). Verification is a sampling process and includes

document review, checks using calculation, physical examination, testing or witnessing

of tests, audit, and confirmation of records during the operational life of the asset.


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2.10 RBI, MAH, SCE and PS Loop

The flow chart above shows the relationship between RBI, MAH, SCE and PS. For an

effective AIM, a RBI is carried out on the asset in other to identify MAH associated

with the asset. Then the SCE are grouped into barriers for preventing, controlling or

mitigating the consequences from a major accident. The PS is specified for all the

identified SCE first to ensure the suitability of the SCE in the design and construction

Figure 2.9: RBI, MAH, SCE and PS Loop

An Asset

Major Accident

Hazard (MAH)

Safety Critical

Element (SCE) toPrevent Major

Accident

Major accident

Occurs

Safety Critical Element

(SCE) to mitigate the effect

of Major Accident

Definitions of Performance

Standards (PS) for the SCE

Risk based inspection (RBI) to

classify MAH


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phase and secondly the performance criteria that ensures the on-going suitability of the

SCE in the operational phase. The defined PS detail the goal of the SCE, functionality,

suitability, availability, reliability and interdependency and also the acceptance pass/fail

criterion for which the performance of the SCE will be measured and recorded.


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3 METHODOLOGY

This chapter includes a review of the research method and design appropriateness, a

discussion of the population and sample, methods used in the collection of data, theapproach used in the analysis of collated data, ethical consideration and limitations.

This research was carried out in three main parts. The first was aimed at identifying key

background issues/studies relating to AIM. The second concentrated on the collation

and assimilation of available data. Specifically, it examined information relating to the

KP3 reports, review and studies on integrity management together with the data from

the questionnaire and notes made from the unstructured interviews with some TAs and

asset integrity managers. The final phase involved the analysis of all of the available

data, draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the findings.

An overview of the process is shown below with colour codes representing the different

parts.

TASK 1

Literature Review

TASK 2

Pilot interview/Brainstorming

Section with AISG

TASK 4

Sort Data from Duty-

Holders/Unstructured

TASK 3

Source for Information from

Duty-Holders via

TASK 5

Analysis and Discussions

TASK 6

Conclusions &

Figure 3.1: Overview of Process


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3.1 Population and Sampling

The main focus of this research was on the UK oil and gas industry. This involves duty-

holders operating in the UKCS of the North Sea. A form of sampling was introduced.

As explained by Silvermann [52], the purpose of this sampling was to study a

representative subsection of a precisely defined population in order to make inferences

about the whole population. Within the duty holders, the participant includes Asset

Integrity managers and TAs.

The above participants were chosen because of their relevance and experience to answer

the research question. It was necessary to employ this form of sampling techniques

because of the time and resources available to the research.

3.2

Data Collection Method

3.2.1 Pilot Interview

A pilot interview was done prior to administering of the questionnaire to inform me on

the approach to take in the design of the questionnaire. As described by Punch [53] it is

a small-scale trial before the main investigation with the intention of assessing the

adequacy of the research design and of the instruments to be used for data collection.

The pilot interview studies was crucial to this research which was primarily based on

questionnaire to gather data, since there will not be an interviewer present to clear up

any confusion when the participant are trying to answer the questions.

3.2.2 Questionnaire

This phase of data collection involves generating of questions to design the

questionnaire based on the findings from the pilot interview, brainstorming section done

with the Asset Integrity Steering Group (AISG) of Step Change in Safety and findings

from the literature review. The designed questionnaire was forwarded via an e-mail to

the participating companies. This method of distribution was preferred because it was

easier to reach a larger population.

Though questionnaire was seen as the best method of gathering data for this research

considering the time available, it is not without its own pros and cons. The pros include,

it was cheap particularly for group administered, it is far quicker to conduct, absence of

interviewers effect, and at the convenient for respondent.


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Nevertheless, the cons also include, the response rate was low, the fear of given some

confidential documents out and there were no one present to help the respondents if

they are having difficulty answering questions. In other to mitigate some of the cons, a

good covering letter explaining the reasons for the research, why it is important and

why the recipient has been selected and a guarantee of confidentiality was attached to

the questionnaire (see Appendix A). Furthermore, a simple questionnaire with clear

instructions and an attractive layout was designed.

The questionnaire contains 22 questions in total including open and close -ended

questions. It is assumed that the likelihood of response to this format considering their

busy schedule is more compared to using all open-ended questions. In addition, the

weakness associated with either form of question is the strength of the other.

The administration of the questionnaire to the target participants and the persistent

contact of the respondent to ensure quick response to the questionnaire were made

possible through the AISG of Step Change in Safety.

3.2.3 Unstructured Interview

These involved informal interviews and discussions conducted to explore or get a wider

understanding on the topic being researched. There was no predetermined list of

questions to work through in this situation, just knowledge of the aspect I want to

explore. As mentioned earlier, the interview was purely informal. The interviewee is

given the opportunity to talk freely about events, behaviour and beliefs in relation to the

topic area [54].

I was able to have three different unstructured interviews, two of which were from TA

working in the UK and the third was with TA in the United State of America. The

information obtained from this interviews where used to explore and explain themes

that have emerged from the use of the questionnaire.

3.3 Data Analysis Method

Various methods of data collection produce different types of data that requires different

handling strategies. The main method of data collection for this research was the use of

the questionnaire and an unstructured interview to explore on findings.


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First step involves reproducing the collated data so that they provide a fair summary of

what has been studied and so that they can be analysed readily to answer the

researcher’s questions.

The questionnaire as stated earlier, contains both closed and open-ended question, the

first step was to code this data, i.e. transforming the data from the questionnaire into a

form in which we can analyse efficiently. For the unstructured interviews, the analysis

of the data was a bit challenging since there was no interview agenda. This was finally

overcome by constantly visiting the note made from the discussions and ideas that form

in my head. This process continued until I felt fairly confident that I had identified the

set of variables that I needed and could measure, and had also identified some of the

main categories of each variable. The data extracted was also coded. The themes arising

from the coded data will be linked to the research objective in analysis providing a

framework with which findings will be reported and discussed.

The data was analysed using EXCEL, a personal computer based analysis software.

This was chosen because it is particularly useful in basic statistical analysis.

3.4 Research Ethics and Limitations

3.4.1

Research Ethics

During the period of this research, careful steps were taken to ensure that the way the

research was design is both methodologically sound and morally defensible to all those

who are involved. A confidentiality agreement was signed with the participant and also

a cover letter detailing what the research is about, the aims and objective of the research

and statements on the use of the data assuring confidentiality and anonymity of the

respondents (see Appendix A).

3.4.2 Limitations

The major limitation of this work is the poor access to primary data and time. Due to the

busy schedules of the target respondent, it was difficult to get them to respond to the

questionnaire. Likewise, it was impossible getting approval for interview with

representatives from the respondents, HSE, asset integrity managers and TAs as

proposed to clarify some of my findings. This limited the number of data and the

amount of respondent. To help overcome this limitation, a meeting with the members of


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the AISG was organised to brainstorm on the available data and make relevant

contributions.


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4 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In 2009, following the findings from KP3 as regards the declining nature of the

influence of the TAs; the OSD of HSE conducted a review of the industry’s progress.

The review concluded that there have been real changes to, and strengthening of, the TA

functions in a number of companies which are showing tangible benefits. The challenge

remaining for the industry according to OSD is to ensure that the enhancements to the

TAs’ role and resources are replicated uniformly and consistently across the industry

[56].

Based on the findings of the OSD of HSE, a questionnaire was developed to understand

the current implementation of the role of TAs across duty holders in the UKCS. This

chapter contain the data presentation, analysis and discussion of the findings.

4.1 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire is structured into 3 sections;

The organisation: To understand the organisational structure

TA Standard/Framework: To understand the TA’s discipline and the basis

within which TA’s are selected

The role definition and organisation approach: To understand the

implementation of the TAs within the organisation

This section details the findings from the questionnaire after coding of the data into the

different sections. (See Appendix B)

A total of 7 duty-holders responded to the questionnaire, with a combined total of 44

operating platforms within the UKCS. The platform includes FP, FPSO, Manned and

NUI platforms. The respondents are involved in explorations and productions,

consultancy, Engineering Procurement and Construction, project management. To

ensure anonymity, the respondent are hereafter referred to as Company A, B, C, D, E, F

and G. The pie chart below shows the percentage distribution of the offshore platforms

across the respondents.


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The flow chart below summarises the responses.

Figure 4.2: Flow Diagram for TA reporting Structure into Senior Management

The flow diagram shown in figure 4.2 above summarises the organisational structure

within which the TAs seat in, and how they report into the senior management within

the respondent organisation. The responses show a strengthening of the TAs within the

organisational structure of the respondent.

4.1.2 TA Standard/Framework

The TA in a company as mentioned by HSE act as a backstop against continuing

operations with degraded SCE, their function is to provide expertise and judgement on

key operational engineering issues [2]. This is an important strategic role particularly in

decision making relating to the continuing operations with degraded SCE, equipment

integrity and MAH management. To get a clear understanding about TAs and the

required qualification for this strategic role, the duty holders were asked to state the

basis upon which they select their TA’s.


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The stacked bar chart below (figure 4.3) summarises the responses from the respondents

with the colour code matching each respondent, and the bar chart in figure 4.4 showing

the percentage of respondent in agreement.

Figure 4.3: The Basis for Which TA's are Selected

Figure 4.4: TA Selection Basis % in Agreement

From the bar chart above in figure 4.4, it can be inferred that the TAs are recognised

engineers in their various discipline appointed by the organisation within a specific

technical discipline to provide independent technical advice.


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4.1.2.1 TA Disciplines

The duty holders where ask to list the TA’s discipline within their organisation. This

question was asked to have an understanding on the critical discipline occupy by TAs

across the industry. The stacked bar chart below (figure 4.5) summarises the responses

from all respondent and the bar chart in figure 4.6 shows the percentage of respondent

in agreement.

Figure 4.5: TA Discipline within Duty Holders in the UKCS


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Figure 4.6: TA Discipline % of Respondent in Agreement


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As stated earlier, the duty holders are involved in various operational activities within

UKCS; this explains the weak percentage of agreement notice in most of the TA’s

discipline. Different organisations select their TA’s discipline based on their specific

MAH operational activities or the relevance of the discipline to the organisation.

Nevertheless, there were some TA’s disciplines that had strong agreement across all

respondents, disciplines such as the mechanical/pressure vessels TA, structural TA,

electrical, instrumentation and control TA, process/technical safety TA, materials and

corrosion TA. These are disciplines with high potential of resulting in major accident if

not properly managed and they are susceptible to degradation as asset age. An

explanation of the TA’s discipline is given below;

The Mechanical/Pressure vessel TA: This TA is accountable as the company’s

authority for providing technical expertise to other departments on piping,

valves and vessel engineering issues with special emphasis on pressure

containment and vibration issues. It is a known fact that the effective pressure

containment of vessels and pipe work is essential to minimising the risk of

hydrocarbon releases. Maintaining the mechanical integrity of a vessel is a

significant factor in ensuring contained fluids is not accidentally released.

Structural TA: According to the HSE, TA act as a backstop against degraded

SCE, safety related equipment’s and structures. In other to prevent MAH, the

structural TA should have a good understanding of the behaviour of the

structure, and the degradation and failure mechanisms of critical structural

elements. This is necessary to prevent structural failures leading to hydrocarbon

releases or other catastrophic consequences which can lead to multiple fatalities

[2]. Structural integrity management is the principal barrier to safeguard assets

and those working offshore from MAH. The integrity of this offshore structures

depend on the structural TA getting it right at the design and construction stage,

and keeping it right over the life cycle of the structure.

Electrical, Instr

emmanuel mbata 2013

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