emu i srbija

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EVROPSKAMONETARNA

UNIJA ISRBIJA

Rezime

U radu se analizira nastanak i razvoj EMUi uslovi, propisani Ugovorom o funkcionisanjuEU, za lanstvo u EMU - kriterijumi zaekonomsku i pravnu konvergenciju. Navodese referentne vrednosti kriterijuma zaekonomsku konvergenciju iz najnovijegIzvetaja o konvergenciji ECB iz 2010. godine,

a koje je operacionalizovao jo EMI 1995.godine. U Radu se akcenat stavlja na pravnukonvergenciju i navode odredbe Zakona oNBS kojima se ostvaruje pravna konvergencijaSrbije za lanstvo u EMU. Autor konstatuje da

je za Srbiju, u ovoj fazi pristupanja evropskomintegracionom procesu, transponovanjeodredbi Ugovora o EU u Zakon o NBSpreuranjeno i nepotrebno i da bi moglo bititetno. Takoe, autor istie znaaj prethodnog

dostizanja odrivog nivoa kriterijumaekonomske konvergencije pre zakonodavnogpreuzimanja odredbi Ugovora o EU. Zakonomo NBS eksplicitno je zabranjeno nansiranjekratkoronih budetskih neravnoteasredstvima monetarne vlasti Srbije, mada efektiovakvog zaduivanja ne mogu da se izjednaesa efektima koje moe da proizvede dugorono

decitarno nansiranje budeta. Srpski budetupuen je na zaduivanje, i na kratak rok, po

trinim uslovima. U radu se navodi suprotanprimer vedske, koja za svaki sluaj, ni posle13 godina u statusu drave sa odstupanjem, nije

preuzela tako doslovno u svoje zakonodavstvozabranu monetarnog nansiranja budeta.

Kljune rei: EMU, Ugovor o funkcionisanjuEU, kriterijumi konvergencije, ekonomskakonvergencija, pravna konvergencija, Zakono NBS, nansiranje kratkoronih budetskih

neravnotea, decitarno nansiranje

JEL klasikacija: E58, F33

originalni nauni rad

UDK 339.923:061.1EU]:336.74(4-672EU: 497.11) ;339.972(497.11)

Prof. dr Ljiljana Lui

Fakultet za evropske pravno -politike studije Novi Sad

Univerziteta Singidunum iz [email protected]

Rad primljen: 01.06.2011.

Odobren za tampu: 11.10.2011.


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Summary

The paper analyzes the creation anddevelopment of the EMU, along with thepreconditions, prescribed by the Treaty on theFunctioning of the EU, for EMU membership- i.e. economic and legal convergence criteria.The paper also lists the reference values ofeconomic convergence criteria from the latest

ECB Convergence Report 2010, which wereoperationalized back in 1995 by the EMI. Thepaper focuses on legal convergence and statesthe provisions of the Law on NBS, whereby thelegal convergence of Serbia for membershipin the EMU has been achieved. The authorexpresses his opinion that for Serbia, at thisstage of joining the European integrationsprocess, the transposition of provisions fromthe Treaty on the EU into the Law on NBS might

be premature, unnecessary and potentiallydetrimental. Also, the author underlinesthe importance of reaching the sustainablelevel of economic convergence criteria beforetransposing the legislative provisions of theTreaty on the EU. The Law on NBS explicitlyforbids the nancing of short-term budgetaryimbalances by means of funds provided by themonetary authorities of Serbia, although theeects of such borrowing cannot be equal to the

eects caused by long-term decit nancing ofthe budget. The Serbian budget is directed toborrowing, short-term, at market conditions.The paper states an opposite example - that ofSweden - which, just in case, even after 13years of being a Member State with a derogation,

has not transposed the ban on monetary budget

nancing into its legislative system so literally.

Key words: EMU, Treaty on the Functioning

of the EU, convergence criteria, economicconvergence, legal convergence, Law on NBS,nancing of short-term budgetary imbalances,decits nancing

JEL classication: E58, F33

EUROPEANMONETARY

UNION ANDSERBIA

original scientifc paper

UDC 339.923:061.1EU]:336.74(4-672EU: 497.11) ;339.972(497.11)

Prof Ljiljana Lui PhD

Faculty of European Legal andPolitical Studies, Novi SadSingidunum University, [email protected]

Paper received: 01.06.2011

Approved for publishing: 11.10.2011


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Uvod

U ovom radu analizira se nastanak, razvoji legislativa Evropske monetarne unije (EMU),a u cilju sagledavanja da li je i koliko Srbija

pripremljena za prikljuivanje EMU sa aspektaispunjavanja predvienih uslova. Ova analizapodstaknuta je izmenama Zakona o NBS iz 2010.godine kojom je izvreno usklaivanje naegzakonodavstva sa Ugovorom o EU u pogleduekonomske i monetarne unije i Statutom ESCBi ECB. Rad pored Uvoda i Zakljuka sadri tripoglavlja sledeih naslova: 1. Nastanak i razvojEMU, 2. Odredbe Ugovora o EU od znaaja zasticanje prava drava lanica EU na uvoenje

evra i uee u Evrosistemu i 3. Evrosistem iSrbija.Cilj analize je da ukae na sloenost i duinu

procesa formiranja same Evropske monetarneunije i proceduru predvienu za pristupanjeovom nivou integrisanosti lanica EU. Takoe,cilj analize je i da ukae da je za Srbiju, u ovoj fazi

pristupanja evropskom integracionom procesu,doslovno prepisivanje i transponovanje svihodredbi iz Ugovora o funkcionisanju EU, kojima

je regulisana ekonomska i monetarna unija, uZakon o NBS, a pre ispunjavanja predvienihekonomskih kriterija za lanstvo, preuranjenoi nepotrebno i da bi moglo biti tetno.

U Zakonu o NBS izriito je zabranjenonansiranje Budeta Srbije sredstvimamonetarne vlasti Srbije i na kratak rok, zapotrebe nansiranja kratkoronih budetskihneravnotea, i na dugi rok, decitarno nansiranje

budeta. Iz tog razloga, Srpski budet upuen

je na zaduivanje, i na kratak rok, po trinimuslovima. Treba znati da efekti kratkoronogzaduivanja budeta kod sopstvene monetarnevlasti ne mogu da se izjednae sa efektima kojemoe da ima dugorono decitarno nansiranje.

U radu se navodi primer vedske, koja za svakisluaj, ni posle 13 godina u statusu dravesa odstupanjem (drave koja se priprema zalanstvo u EMU), nije preuzela tako doslovno usvoje zakonodavstvo ovu odredbu iz Osnivakog

ugovora. U radu se istie znaaj prethodnogdostizanja odrivog nivoa kriterija ekonomskekonvergencije pre zakonodavnog preuzimanjaodredbi Ugovora o EU iz monetarne oblasti iznaaj utvrivanja prioriteta i sinhronizacijeizmeu transponovanja prava EU iz monetarne

sfere i ostalih oblasti, a kako je i navedeno uProgramu stabilizacije i pridruivanja Srbije EU.

Nastanak i razvoj Evropskemonetarne unije

Evropska ekonomska zajednica (EEZ)formirana je u vreme kada je Meunarodnimonetarni standard u sistemu Meunarodnogmonetarnog fonda (MMF) garantovaostabilnost deviznih kurseva. To je bio razlogzato u osnivakim ugovorima nije bilapredviena precizna odredba o monetarnojsaradnji u EEZ. Osnivakim ugovorom bio jepredvien samo sluaj neravnotee u kojoj su,

ako bi ona postala ozbiljna, zemlje EEZ mogleda ostvare veu stabilnost deviznih kursevate bliu saradnju u monetarnoj i ekonomskimpolitikama. Prvi pokuaj formiranja Evropskemonetarne unije (EMU) uinjen je krajemezdesetih godina. Odluci SAD o ukidanjukonvertibilnosti dolara za zlato i ukidanjuksnih deviznih kurseva u sistemu MMF,prethodili su ekonomski i monetarni problemio kojima se u EEZ raspravljalo. Iz tog perioda

datira Odluka Saveta o koordinaciji tekuihekonomskih politika drava lanica, koja jedoneta na osnovu Memoranduma o koordinacijiekonomskih politika i monetarnoj saradnji uokviru Zajednice, koga je Komisija dostavilaSavetu 12. februara 1969. godine (Secretariat ofthe Commission, 1969). Predsednici drava ilivlada drava lanica saglasili su se o potrebipravljenja plana o stvaranju ekonomske imonetarne unije po fazama do kraja 1970.

godine. Na osnovu brojnih razliitih predloga oustanovljavanju ekonomske i monetarne unije,ekspertska grupa na elu sa Pjerom Vernerom(Pierre Werner) tadanjim premijerom iministrom nansija Luksemburga, sainila jeprvi zajedniki dogovoreni monetarni plankoji je izloen u Izvetaju o faznoj realizacijiekonomske i monetarne unije u Zajednici(Council-Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, 1970). Ocena ekspertske grupe

bila je da je u Zajednici napravljeno nekolikoznaajnih koraka u ekonomskoj integraciji,kompletirana carinska unija i denisanazajednika poljoprivredna politika, meutimda opta ekonomska neravnotea u dravamalanicama ima direktne i indirektne posledice na


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Introduction

This paper analyzes the creation,development and legislation of the EuropeanMonetary Union (EMU), in order to view

whether, and to which extent, is Serbiaready to join the EMU in terms of meetingthe prescribed preconditions. This analysiswas inspired by the amendments to the Lawon NBS from 2010, whereby our legislationhas been harmonized with the Treaty on theEU concerning the economic and monetaryunion, and with the ESCB and ECB Statutes. Inaddition to Introduction and Conclusion, thepaper contains three chapters titled: 1. Creation

and Development of the EMU, 2. Provisions ofthe Treaty on the EU relevant for the acquisition

of right to the introduction of the euro andparticipation in the Eurosystem by the EUmember states, and 3. Eurosystem and Serbia.

The objective of this analysis is to underlinethe complexity and length of the formationprocess of the European Monetary Union itself,

along with the procedure prescribed for joining

this level of EU member integration. Also, the

analysis aims to point out that for Serbia, atthis stage of joining the European integrationsprocess, literal copying and transposition of allprovisions from the Treaty on the Functioningof the EU, regulating the economic andmonetary union, into the Law on NBS, beforemeeting the prescribed economic membershipcriteria, might be premature, unnecessary andpotentially detrimental.

The Law on NBS explicitly forbids the

nancing of the Budget of Serbia by means offunds provided by the monetary authoritiesof Serbia, both short-term, for the purpose ofnancing short-term budgetary imbalances,and long-term, for the purpose of decitnancing of the budget. Therefore is the Serbian

budget directed to borrowing, short-term, atmarket conditions. One should be aware thatthe eects of short-term borrowing from onesown monetary authorities cannot be equal to

the eects caused by long-term decit nancingof the budget. The paper states the example ofSweden, which, just in case, even after 13 years

of being a Member State with a derogation (i.e.a country preparing to gain membership in theEMU), has not transposed this provision from

the Treaty Establishing the EEC so literally. The

paper underlines the importance of reachingthe sustainable level of economic convergencecriteria before transposing the provisions of the

Treaty on the EU in the monetary eld, along

with the importance of dening the prioritiesand synchronization between the transpositionof monetary provisions of the EU legislation and

EU legislation in other elds, as is stated in theEU Stabilization and Association Agreement forSerbia.

Creation and Development of theEuropean Monetary Union

The European Economic Community(EEC) was established at the time when theInternational Monetary Standard within thesystem of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

guaranteed the stability of foreign exchangerates. This is why the Treaty Establishing theEEC was not supposed to contain a preciselydened provision on monetary cooperationwithin the EEC. The Treaty Establishing theEEC covered only the case of an imbalance

during which, if it became serious, the EECcountries could achieve greater stability ofFX rates, and thus closer cooperation in theirmonetary and economic policies. The rstaempt to establish the European MonetaryUnion (EMU) took place in late 1960s. Thedecision of the US to suspend convertibilityof the dollar for gold and to suspend xedexchange rates in the IMF system, waspreceded by economic and monetary problems

discussed within the EEC. This period broughtabout the Council Decision on Coordinationof Current Economic Policies of the MemberStates, adopted based on the Memorandum onEconomic Policy Coordination and MonetaryCooperation within the Community, submied

by the Commission to the Council on February12th1969 (Secretariat of the Commission, 1969).Presidents and Prime Ministers of the MemberStates agreed on the necessity of designing a plan

for the creation of an economic and monetaryunion in stages by the end of 1970. Based onnumerous and diverse proposals concerning the

establishment of the economic and monetaryunion, an expert group led by Pierre Werner,the then Prime Minister and Minister of Finance


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globalni razvoj Zajednice i ometa liberalizacijukretanja roba, usluga i kapitala. Monetarnaunija podrazumevala bi totalnu i neopozivukonvertibilnost valuta, eliminisanje uktuacijai neopozivo ksiranje kurseva i kompletnu

liberalizaciju kretanja kapitala. Izloena jeideja o paralelnom sprovoenju monetarneintegracije i pribliavanju ekonomskih politika.

U planu za poveanje stepena monetarneintegrisanosti meu dravama, predlagalose postepeno smanjenje margina uktuacijadeviznih kurseva i harmonizacija razliitihinstrumenata monetarne politike, dok se zajaanje integrisanosti ekonomskih politikapredlagao ceo niz reformi sa ciljem postizanja

uniformnosti sa aspekta skalne politike, tritakapitala i nansiranja javnog duga, odnosnodecita nacionalnih budeta. Savet je prihvatioVernerov plan, ali on tada nije i praktinoprimenjen. Razlozi za to su bili veliki ekonomskii strukturni dispariteti izmeu drava lanica.Meutim, kada se razmatrao Plan koga jepredloio ak Delor 1988. godine, Vernerovplan bio je kamen temeljac za monetarnuintegraciju u EEZ.

Kada su Sjedinjene Amerike Drave 1971.godine suspendovale kovertibilnost svoje valuteza zlato, te je nakon toga ukinut Meunarodnimonetarni zlatno-dolarski standard i sistemksnih kurseva u sistemu MMF, te iste godine,drave lanice EEZ potpisale su Evropskisporazum o ogranienim uktuacijamadeviznih kurseva, poznat kao Evropskamonetarna zmija. Sporazum je stupio na snagu1972. godine i imao je za cilj da obezbedi najveu

moguu stabilnost za valute EEZ. Drave suprihvatile Sporazum o deviznim kursevimakoji je omoguavao odravanje meusobnihuktuacija deviznih kurseva u okvirimamargina od 2,25% u odnosu na indirektneparitete. Sporazum nije dao oekivane rezultate

zato to su se drave lanice EEZ podelile, pa su

neke sledile potpisani Sporazum a neke vodilepolitiku deviznog kursa mimo njega. Zbog togase od Zmije u tunelu prelo na Zmiju van

tunela. Drave su izmeu 1972. godine i 1979.godine esto poravnavale paritete, a Zmijaje 13. marta 1979. godine reapsorbovana uEvropski monetarni sistem (EMS).

Evropski savet usvojio je temelje Evropskogmonetarnog sistema (EMS) u 1978. godini u

Bremenu i naredne godine doneo potrebneodluke o ustanovljavanju zone monetarnestabilnosti u Evropi i implementaciju EMS(European Commission, Directorate-Generalfor Economic and Financial Aairs, 2005).

Odlueno je da se EMS razvija uz tri simultanesmernice: 1. preko unapreenja mehanizmadeviznih kurseva ERM, 2. osnivanjaEvropskog monetarnog fonda (EMF), tanijetransformacije Evropskog fonda za monetarnusaradnju (European Monetary Cooperation Fund- EMCF) koji je formiran 1973. godine u EMFi 3. odobravanja olakica manje razvijenimdravama. Evropski mehanizam deviznihkurseva (ERM) zasnivao se na novouvedenoj

evropskoj valutnoj jedinici (ECU). ECUje denisana prema strukturi evropskemere vrednosti koja je na bazi korpe valutakomponovana od valuta drava lanica EEZ i,u narednim godinama, menjala se po potrebi.ECU se koristio kao mera vrednosti i pokazateljodstupanja, dok su pariteti i poetne intervencije

determinisani na bilateralnoj bazi i intervencijena deviznim tritima postale su obavezne poistim principima kao i kod monetarne zmije

(uktuaciona margina zadrana je na nivouod 2,25% sa izuzetkom italijanske lire kojoj jedoputeno da na odreeno vreme uktuira uokviru irih granica od 6%).

Vrlo brzo nakon ustanovljavanja Evropskogmonetarnog fonda postalo je uoljivo da njegovo

funkcionisanje zavisi od radikalnijih reformiEMS, odnosno ECU. Na treu smernicu - podrka

manje prosperitetnim ekonomijama - gledalo sekao na sutinski vanu za uspeh Evropske zone

monetarne stabilnosti. Progresivna monetarnaintegracija pretpostavljala je stvaranje brojnihnadnacionalnih skalnih instrumenata kako bise kompenzovao delimian gubitak nansijskei monetarne autonomije i garantovaloravnoteno reenje za probleme platnih bilansa

drava lanica. Meutim, ovaj mehanizam seretko i delimino primenjivao i nije napravljenznaajni pomak u usvajanju mera za manjerazvijene zemlje.

Zadatak da predloi novi monetarni plan,odnosno plan za realizaciju ekonomske imonetarne unije (EMU) dobila je Komisijaguverenera centralnih banaka drava lanicaEEZ pod predsednitvom aka Delora (JacquesDelors), tada predsednika Evropske komisije.


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of Luxembourg, composed the rst commonmonetary plan, disclosed in the Interim Reportof the Werner Group on the Aainment byStages of Economic and Monetary Union within

the Community (Council - Commission of the

European Communities, 1970). The expertgroup assessed that several important steps had

been made within the Community in terms ofeconomic integration, the customs union hadbeen completed and common agriculturalpolicy dened, but that the general economicimbalance in the Member States had haddirect and indirect consequences for the globaldevelopment of the Community, standingin the way of liberalization of movements of

goods, services and capital. The MonetaryUnion would entail total and irrevocableconvertibility of currencies, elimination ofuctuations and irrevocable xing of exchangerates, along with the complete liberalizationof capital movements. The idea of parallelimplementation of monetary integrationand economic policy harmonization was putforward. The plan to increase the level ofmonetary integration among the countries

included the proposal to gradually reduce themargins of FX rates uctuations and harmonize

various monetary policy instruments. For thepurpose of strengthening the economic policyintegration, there was a whole range of reforms

proposed in order to achieve uniformity interms of scal policy, capital market and public

debt nancing, i.e. national budgets decits.The Council accepted the Werner Report, butit was not implemented in practice at the time.

The reasons behind this were large economicand structural disparities among the MemberStates. However, when the plan proposed byJacques Delors was being considered in 1988,the Werner Report was the corner stone formonetary integration within the EEC.

When the United Stated of Americasuspended convertibility of their currencyfor gold in 1971, after which the internationalmonetary gold-dollar standard was abolished,

along with the xed exchange rates systemin the IMF, the EEC Member States signedthe European Treaty on Limited ForeignExchange Rates Fluctuations, also known as the

European Monetary Snake. The Agreementcame into eect in 1972 and had the objective

of providing the greatest possible stability forthe EEC currencies. The countries accepted theAgreement on Foreign Exchange Rates whichenabled the bilateral FX rates uctuations tobe kept within 2.25% margins in relation to

indirect parities. The Agreement did not yieldthe expected results because the EEC MemberStates were divided, some of them followingthe signed Agreement, and some of themleading an exchange rate policy regardless ofits provisions. This is why the transition fromthe Snake in the Tunnel to the Snake outside

the Tunnel occurred. In the period between1972 and 1979 the states often readjusted theparities, and on March 13th1979 the Snake

was re-absorbed into the European MonetarySystem (EMS).The European Council adopted the

fundamentals of the European Monetary System

(EMS) in 1978 in Bremen, and the following year

adopted the necessary decisions concerning theestablishment of a monetary stability zone inEurope and the EMS implementation (European

Commission, Directorate-General for Economicand Financial Aairs, 2005). It was decided

for the EMS to develop in three simultaneousdirections: 1. through the advancement of theExchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 2. through the

establishment of the European Monetary Fund(EMF), or more precisely the transformationof the European Monetary Cooperation Fund- EMCF, formed in 1973 into the EMF, and 3.through the extension of facilities to the lessdeveloped countries. The European ExchangeRate Mechanism (ERM) was based on the newly-

introduced European Currency Unit (ECU). TheECU was dened according to the structure ofthe European measure of value, composed onthe basis of a basket of EEC member statescurrencies, and was modied as the need arosein the following years. The ECU was used as ameasure of value and an indicator of deviations,whereas parities and initial interventionswere determined bilaterally, and FX marketinterventions became obligatory according to the

same principles as in the case of the monetarysnake (uctuation margin was kept at the level

of 2.25% with the exception of Italian lyre which

was allowed to uctuate for some time withinthe wider spread of 6%).

Very soon after the establishment of the


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Delorov izvetaj o ekonomskoj i monetarnojuniji u Evropskoj zajednici predstavljen je uaprilu 1989. godine i sugerisao je da se EMUdostigne preko tri etape kroz koje bi evropskevalute prole put od

ujednaavanja i smanjivanjauktuacija deviznih kurseva

do uvoenja jedinstvenevalute. Mada je predstavljaostav Komisije, Delorov plannije bio jednoglasno usvojen.Velika Britanija je izraavala

npr. kontinuiranu sumnju uzamenu nacionalnih valutaza jedinstvenu evropsku

valutu i sama predloilaalternativni projekat. Plankoji je izradila Delorovakomisija preuzeo jeEvropski savet u junu1989. godine. Za realizaciju Delorovog planabilo je potrebno menjati Osnivaki ugovor,ugraditi neophodne odredbe za ekonomskui monetarnu uniju i princip supsidijarnosti:Sutinski element u denisanju odgovarajueg

balansa moi u okviru Zajednice bila biprivrenost principu supsidijarnosti, saglasnokome bi funkcije viih nivoa vlasti trebalo da su

limitirane to je vie mogue i da su pomoneonima na niim nivoima vlasti (Commieefor the study of economic and monetary union,

1989, str. 18). Delorov plan je predstavljaosutinski deo novog osnivakog ugovorakoji je trebalo da zameni sve prethodne, odRimskog ugovora do Jedinstvenog evropskog

akta. Pri tome, u Izvetaju Delorovog odboraposebno je napomenuto da okretanje deviznogkursa amerikog dolara verovatno neebiti eliminisano pa ni smanjeno stvaranjemjedinstvene evropske valute, zato to bitakvoj valuti u odsustvu mone politikeunije, nedostajao politiki i strategijski formatamerikog dolara.

U junu 1989. godine Evropski savet odluioje da Prva etapa (ECB, 2004, str. 101-103)

izgradnje EMU zapone 1. jula 1990. godine,dana kada e se izmeu drava lanica ukinutisve prepreke za slobodno kretanje kapitala.Tada je Komitet guvernera centralnih banakadrava lanica EEZ, koji je osnovan jo 1964.godine i tokom godina obavljao veoma znaajne

zadatke oko monetarne saradnje u EEZ,dobio novi zadatak: da odrava konsultacijei koordinira rad monetarnih politika dravalanica u cilju postizanja stabilnosti cena. Ovaj

Komitet takoe je trebalo

da inicira poetak narednihetapa EMU, a na osnovuprethodno denisanogradnog programa koga jetrebalo da saini do kraja1993. godine. Osnovnizadatak Komiteta u sutinibio je da identikuje uprvoj etapi sva pitanjaod znaaja za formiranje

EMU, formira podkomitetei radne grupe koje biProgram realizovale. Zarealizaciju druge i treeetape izgradnje EMU, bila

je potrebna institucionalna struktura koja senije mogla konstituisati bez promene Rimskogugovora - Ugovora o EEZ. Iz tog razloga, 1991.godine, istovremeno kada i Meuvladinakonferencija o politikoj uniji, bila je sazvana

Meuvladina konferencija o EMU. Rezultatpregovora bio je novi osnivaki ugovor - Ugovor

o EU. Ugovor o EU, dogovoren decembra 1991.godine, potpisan je u Mastrihtu 7. februara 1992.

godine, a stupio je na snagu tek 1. novembra1993. godine. Period ratikacije u dravamalanicama trajao je celu godinu. Treba imati uvidu da je Ugovor o EU izmenio Ugovor o EEZu Ugovor o EZ i ustanovio Protokol o Statutuevropskog sistema centralnih banaka (ESCB)

i Evropske centralne banke (ECB) i Protokolo Statutu Evropskog monetarnog instituta(EMI), kao institucije koja prethodi Evropskojcentralnoj banci. Za poetak naredne faze bilo

je potrebno saekati da novi Ugovor o EU stupina snagu.

Ustanovljavanjem EMI u januaru 1994.godine, zapoela je druga etapa EMU. Tada jeprestao sa radom Komitet guvernera centralnih

banaka drava lanica. EMI je formiran kao

privremena institucija, do formiranja ECB. EMInije bio odgovoran za upravljanje monetarnompolitikom u EU, zato to je ona i dalje bila unadlenosti nacionalnih vlasti, a nije imaonadlenosti ni da intervenie na deviznomtritu. EMI je imao dva zadatka: da ojaa

JacquesDelors


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European Monetary Fund, it became obviousthat its functioning depended on the moreradical reforms of the EMS, i.e. ECU. Thethird direction - support to less prosperouseconomies - was considered to be crucially

important for the success of the Europeanmonetary stability zone. Progressive monetaryintegration involved the creation of numeroussupra-national scal instruments in order tocompensate for the partial loss of nancialand monetary autonomy and to guarantee a

balanced solution to the problems concerningthe member states balances of payments.However, this mechanism was being only rarely

and partially implemented and no considerable

progress was made regarding the adoption ofmeasures for less developed countries.The task to propose the new monetary

plan, i.e. the plan for the realization of theEconomic and Monetary Union (EMU), wasentrusted to the Commiee of Governors ofthe EEC Member States Central Banks, chaired

by Jacques Delors, the then President of theEuropean Commission. The Delors Report onthe economic and monetary union within the

European Community was presented in April1989 and suggested the EMU to be reachedthrough three stages in which the Europeancurrencies would go from harmonizationand reduction of FX rates uctuations to theintroduction of a single currency. Although itrepresented the position of the Commission, the

Delors Report was not adopted unanimously.For instance, Great Britain voiced continuousdoubts about the replacement of national

currencies by a single European currency andproposed an alternative project on its own.The plan prepared by Delors Commieewas undertaken by the European Council inJune 1989. For the purpose of realization ofthe Delors Report, it was necessary to amendthe Treaty Establishing the EC, embed thenecessary provisions concerning the economicand monetary union, and the subsidiarityprinciple: An essential element in dening

the appropriate balance of power within theCommunity would be adherence to theprinciple

of subsidiarity, according to which the functionsof higher levels of government should be aslimited as possible and should be subsidiary tothose of lower levels. (Commiee for the study of

economic and monetary union, 1989, pp. 18). TheDelors Report represented the essential partof the new Treaty Establishing the EC, whichwas to replace all preceding ones, startingfrom the Treaty of Rome to the Uniform

European Act. In addition, the Delors Reportespecially underlined that the creation of asingle European currency probably would noteliminate or reduce the shifting of the FX rateof the US dollar, because such new currency,without a powerful political union to supportit, would lack a political and strategical formatthat the US dollar possesses.

In June 1989 the European Council decidedthat the First Stage (ECB, 2004, pp. 101-103) of

the EMU creation was to start on July 1st

1990,on which date all restrictions to free capitalmovements among the member states were to

be suspended. It was then that the Commiee of

Governors of the EEC Member States CentralBanks, established back in 1964 to conductrather serious tasks concerning the monetarycooperation within the EEC, was entrustedwith the new task: to perform consultationsand coordinate monetary policy activities of

member states in order to achieve stability ofprices. The same Commiee was also to initiate

the commencement of other stages of the EMUcreation, based on the previously denedwork schedule, which was supposed to becompleted by the end of 1993. The main taskof the Commiee was essentially to identify,in the rst stage, all issues relevant for thecreation of EMU, establish sub-commieesand work groups to implement the Program.

Implementation of the second and third stagesof the EMU creation required the internationalstructure that could not have been constitutedwithout an amendment to the Rome Treaty -Agreement on EEC. Therefore, in 1991, at thesame time as the Intergovernmental Conference

on Political Union, the IntergovernmentalConference on the EMU was convened.The result of the negotiations was the newestablishing contract - Treaty on the EU. The

Treaty on the EU, agreed upon in December1991, was signed in Maastricht on February 7th1992, but came into force only on December1st 1993. The ratication period in MemberStates lasted an entire year. One should bearin mind that the Treaty on EU modied the


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saradnju centralnih banaka i koordinacijumonetarnih politika i da izvri pripremeza ustanovljavanje ESCB za upravljanje

jedinstvenom valutom i za stvaranje jedinstvenevalute u treoj fazi. Do poetka tree faze, EMI

je bio mesto za konsultacije i razmenu miljenjai informacija o pitanjima politike i odreivanjuregulatornog, organizacionog i logistikogokvira potrebnog za izvravanje zadataka ESCBu treoj fazi.

U decembru 1995. godine Evropski savetdogovorio se da ime evropske jedinice, koja ese uvesti u treoj fazi, bude evro i da e treaetapa EMU zapoeti 1. januara 1999. godine.U decembru 1996. godine EMI je prezentovao

Evropskom savetu Izvetaj koji se odnosiona sprovoenje Rezolucije Evropskog savetao principima i fundamentalnim elementimanovog mehanizma deviznog kursa (ERM II)(European Council, 1997)i dizajn serije evra kojie biti puten u opticaj 1. januara 2002. godine.Radi operacionalizacije odredaba Ugovora o EUkoji se odnosio na EMU, Evropski savet usvojio

je u junu 1997. godine dva propisa koja su biladeo Pakta stabilnosti i rasta koji je imao zadatak

da osigura budetsku disciplinu drava lanicaEMU (limit za decit nacionalnih budeta uiznosu od 3% BDP). U maju 1998. godine Savet

je jednoglasno odluio koje su drave ispunilepotrebne uslove za usvajanje jedinstvenevalute i koje e moi od 1. januara 1999. godineda uestvuju u treoj etapi EMU. Odluka jedoneta na osnovu Izvetaja o konvergencijikoga je pripremio EMI (EMI, 1998). Nakonustanovljavanja ECB, Izvetaji o konvergenciji,

saglasno Ugovoru o EU, u nadlenosti su ECBi dostupni su na njenom sajtu. lanom 140Osnivakog ugovora ustanovljena je obavezaza ECB da najmanje jednom svake dve godineili na zahtev drave lanice EU izvetava onapretku drava lanica u ispunjavanju obaveza

i ostvarivanju ekonomske i monetarne unije.Trea etapa EMU zapoela je 1. januara 1999.

godine kada je 11 drava EU ksiralo deviznekurseve svojih nacionalni valuta i kada su

upravljanje nacionalnim monetarnim politikaprenele u nadlenost ECB. V. Britanija, Danska,

Grka i vedska do daljnjeg nisu bile ukljueneu III etapu EMU. Protokolima uz Ugovor oEU, za Veliku Britaniju i Dansku ustanovljen jespecijalni status, pravo da ne usvoje evro. Ovo

pravo nema ni jedna druga sadanja lanica EU,

ali ni bilo koja druga drava koja se pripremada to bude. U meuvremenu, Grka je, poredjo est lanica EU ukljuena u Evrosistem,a vedska i danas ima status drave sa

odstupanjem kao i sve ostale drave laniceEU koje ne ispunjavaju uslove za uvoenje evra.

Trea etapa EMU trajae dok sve dravelanice EU ne ispune uslove za pristupanje EMU.

Do tada treba razlikovati ESCB od Evrosistemai evro oblasti. Pravne osnove jedinstvenemonetarne politike ustanovljene su Ugovoromo EU, tanije Ugovorom o funkcionisanju EU iprotokolima uz Ugovor i Statutom ECB i ESCB.ECB je centralna banka svih drava lanica

EU, bez obzira da li su one usvojile ili nisuusvojile evro. Praktino Osnivaki ugovor nepretpostavlja situaciju u kojoj sve lanice EUnisu i lanice EMU. Meutim, kako sve dravelanice EU nisu i lanice EMU nego i dalje imaju

svoje nacionalne centralne banke i nacionalnevalute, od ESCB treba razlikovati Evrosistemkoji ukljuuje ECB i samo drave lanice EMU.Razlika izmeu ESCB i Evrosistema postojaesve dok se sve drave lanice EU ne ukljue u

EMU. Pored toga od ESCB i Evrosistema trebarazlikovati i pojam evro oblasti u formalnomi neformalnom smislu. U formalnom smislu,dananja evro oblast ukljuuje samo 17 dravalanica EU. Meutim, kao svoju valutu, evrosu prihvatile i neke drave koje nisu laniceEU (npr. Crna Gora). One pripadaju evrooblasti ali samo u neformalnom smislu. ECB nepodrava praksu uvoenja evra van propisaneprocedure.

Kada se razmilja koliko bi trokovi biliostati van a koliko biti u EMU, trebaimati u vidu da je izvesno da je uspenofunkcionisanje monetarne unije skuplje ako sumeu dravama vee razlike: 1. u visini inacije

i nezaposlenosti, 2. u institucijama trita rada,3. u pravnom sistemu, 4. u stopi rasta BDP,5. u skalnom sistemu (Hrauve, 2004). Iz tograzloga Osnivakim ugovorom predvieni suuslovi - kriteriji ekonomske konvergencije -

koje drave lanice EU moraju ispuniti da bimogle postati lanica EMU. Pored ekonomskihkriterija konvergencije, za lanstvo u EMU uslov

je da drave lanice EU ispune i predvienepravne kriterije konvergencije. Do ispunjenjauslova za EMU drave lanice EU imaju status


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Treaty Establishing the European EconomicCommunity (ECC) into the Treaty on European

Community (EC) and established the Protocolon the Statute of the European MonetaryInstitute (EMI), as an institution preceding the

European Central Bank. For the next stage tocommence, it was necessary to wait for the newTreaty on the EU to come into eect.

The establishment of EMI in January 1994marked the second stage of the EMU. TheCommiee of Governors of the EEC MemberStates Central Banks was dismantled. The EMI

was formed as a temporary institution, untilthe formation of the ECB. The EMI was not incharge of monetary policy in the EU, because

it was still under the jurisdiction of nationalauthorities, and it also had no authority tointervene at the FX market. EMI had two tasks: to

strengthen the cooperation of central banks and

coordinate monetary policies, and to conductpreparations for the establishment of the ESCBfor the purpose of creation and managementof the single currency in the third stage. Untilthe commencement of the third stage, the EMIwas the place for consultations and exchange

of opinions and information concerning theissues of policies and denition of regulatory,organizational and logistic framework required

for the performance of ESCB tasks in the thirdstage.

In December 1995, the European Councilagreed upon the name of the single Europeancurrency - to be introduced in the third stage -to be euro, and the commencement date forthe third stage of EMU creation to be January

1st

1999. In December 1996 the EMI presenteda Report to the European Council concerningthe implementation of the European CouncilResolution on Principles and FundamentalElements of the New Foreign ExchangeMechanism (ERM II) (European Council, 1997),

and the design of the rst issue of Euros to bereleased for circulation on January 1st 2002.Wishing to operationalize the provisions ofthe Treaty on the EU relating to the EMU, in

June 1997 the European Council adopted tworegulations which were part of the Growthand Stability Pact, and had the task of ensuringbudgetary discipline in the EMU MemberStates (limit on the national budget decitin the amount of 3% GDP). In May 1998 the

Council unanimously decided which countrieshad fullled the necessary preconditionsfor adopting the single currency and whichcountries would be allowed to take part inthe third stage of EMU creation starting from

January 1st

1999. The decision was based onthe Convergence Report prepared by the EMI(EMI, 1998). After the establishment of the ECB,

Convergence Reports, pursuant to the Treatyon the EU, are the responsibility of the ECBand are available at its website. Article 140 ofthe Treaty Establishing the EU obliged the ECBto report, at least once in every two years, orat the request of an EU member state, aboutthe progress of member states concerning the

fulllment of obligations and establishment ofeconomic and monetary union.The third stage of EMU creation commenced

on January 1st1999, when 11 EU states xedthe foreign exchange rates of their nationalcurrencies and placed the management overtheir national monetary policies under the ECB

jurisdiction. Great Britain, Denmark, Greece andSweden were excluded from the third stage ofEMU creation until further notice. According to

the Protocols from the Treaty on the EU, GreatBritain and Denmark were granted a specialstatus - the right not to adopt the euro. Thisright is not grantable to any other present EUmember state, or to any other country applying

for this status. In the meantime, Greece, alongwith six other EU member states, was integrated

into the Eurosystem, whereas Sweden till thepresent day bears the status of a country witha derogation, along with all other EU member

states that do not meet the preconditions tointroduce the euro.The third EMU stage will last until all EU

Member States meet the preconditions tojoin the EMU. Until then, one should make adistinction between the ESCB, on one hand,and Eurosystem and euro area, on the other.Legal basis for a single monetary policy wasestablished by means of the Treaty on the EU, or

more precisely, the Treaty on the Functioning of

the EU, the protocols accompanying the Treatyand the Statutes of ECB and ESCB. The ECBis the central bank of all EU Member States,regardless of whether they have adopted theeuro or not. Principally, the Treaty Establishing

the EU does not specify a situation in which


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drava lanica sa odstupanjem. Procena ECB jeda je za drave period od 10 godina optimalanod lanstva u EU do lanstva u EMU (tolikoje trebalo najrazvijenijm dravama lanicamaEU da pripreme svoje privrede za uvoenje

jedinstvene valute).Evropska monetarna unija je ostvarenjenajveeg mogueg stepena ekonomskeintegracije nezavisnih drava. Politikireimi sadanjih drava lanica EMU sastojese od centralizovane monetarne politike idecentralizovane, ali koordinirane ekonomskei budetske politike. Evro je dostignue puneintegracije na monetarnom planu. Kada segovori o politikoj integraciji politika unija

moe biti shvaena iroko. Ako se ona shvata usmislu tradicionalne drave, tada EMU jo uvek

nije Evropska federacija sa ustavom, poreskomvlau i jedinstvenom valutom.

Odredbe ugovora o EU od znaaja zasticanje prava drava lanica EU nauvoenje evra i uee u evrosistemu

Drave lanice EU imaju obavezu da

ispunjavaju obaveze iz Osnivakog ugovorakoje se tiu ostvarivanja ekonomskog imonetarnog jedinstva. Drave lanice EU kojenisu usvojile evro imaju tretman drava lanica

sa odstupanjem. Drave lanice sa odstupanjem,

da bi postale lanice EMU moraju prethodnoda postignu visok nivo odrive ekonomske ipravne konvergencije.

Kriteriji za ekonomsku konvergenciju

Kriteriji konvergencije i postupak analizedostignutog stepena konvergencije utvrenisu ul. 140 Ugovora o funkcionisanju EU nasledei nain:

1. Komisija i ECB e svake druge godine,ili pre toga na zahtev drave lanice saodstupanjem od referentnih vrednosti,izvestiti Savet o napretku drave laniceu ispunjavanju njenih obaveza u pogledudostignua ekonomske i monetarne unije. Ovi

izvetaji obuhvatie i analizu kompatibilnostinacionalnog zakonodavstva, ukljuujui statute

nacionalnih centralnih banaka, sa lanom 130 i131 Statuta ESCB i ECB. Takoe, u Izvetaju e

biti analizirano da li je drava lanica dostiglavisok stepen odrive konvergencije referentnih

vrednosti za sledee kriterije: visok stepen stabilnosti cena koji e se

ogledati u stopi inacije koja je blizu nivouinacije u tri drave lanice sa najstabilnijim

cenama,

odrivu poziciju budetskih nansija koja ese ogledati u dostizanju budetske pozicijebez prekomernog decita koji je utvren ul. 126 (6),

odravanje normalnih uktuacija deviznogkursa i najmanje dve godine bez devalvacijenacionalne valute u odnosu na evro,

postojanost dostignute konvergencijedrave lanice koja se reektuje u nivoimadugoronih kamatnih stopa.

etiri gore navedena kriterija i relevantniperiodi dalje se razrauju u Protokolu uaneksu Ugovora (Protokolu o kriterijumimakonvergencije). Komisija i ECB u svojimizvetajima ispituju postignute rezultate uintegraciji trita, stanje i kretanje tekuegrauna platnog bilansa, kretanja trokova radne

snage i ostalih indeksa cena.2. Nakon rasprave u Evropskom parlamentu

i Evropskom savetu, Savet na predlog Komisije,

a na osnovu kriterija iz take 1, donosi odlukukoja je drava, meu dravama lanicama saodstupanjem, ispunila potrebne uslove.

Ovim lanom utvrena je i procedura pokojoj drava lanica sa odstupanjem, za koju jeSavet doneo odluku, vri zamenu nacionalnevalute po ksnoj stopi za evro i uvodi evroumesto nacionalne valute.

U Protokolu br. 13 o kriterijumima

konvergencije, izmeu ostalog utvreno je da

su referentne vrednosti za kriterije iz l. 140sledee: stabilnost cena - najmanje jednu godinu

prosena stopa inacije ne moe bitipreko 1,5 procentnog poena via od nivoainacije koji je ostvaren u tri drave lanicesa najmanjom inacijom; inacija se meriindeksom potroakih cena,

kriterij uea u deviznom mehanizmuERM podrazumeva da je drava lanica

najmanje dve godine pre pravljenja Izvetajapotovala normalne uktuacije marginaovog mehanizma bez ozbiljnih tenzija;posebno da u istom periodu drava lanicanije devalvirala svoju valutu u odnosu naevro na sopstvenu inicijativu,


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not all EU member states are the membersof the EMU. However, since all EU memberstates are not the EMU members, but still havetheir own national central banks and nationalcurrencies, the ESCB should be distinguished

from the Eurosystem which includes theECB and only those states that are the EMUmembers. The dierence between the ESCB and

the Eurosystem will exist until all EU memberstates join the EMU. Moreover, the ESCB andEurosystem should also be distinguished fromthe notion of euro area, both in ocial andunocial terms Ocially, the present euro area

includes only 17 EU member states. However,the euro was also adopted as currency by some

non-EU countries (e.g. Montenegro). Theybelong to the euro area, but only unocially.The ECB does not approve of the practice ofthe euro introduction outside the prescribedprocedure.

When considering the costs of stayingoutside or being inside the EMU, oneshould bear in mind that the successfulfunctioning of a monetary union is sure to bemore expensive when member states dier

more prominently in the following areas: 1.ination and unemployment rate, 2. labourmarket institutions, 3. legal system, 4. GDPgrowth rate, 5. scal system (Hrauve, 2004).Therefore, the Establishing Treaty prescribescertain preconditions - economic convergencecriteria - that the EU member states have tofull in order to become an EMU member.In addition to economic convergence criteria,another precondition for gaining membership

in the EMU is for the EU member states to meetthe prescribed legal convergence criteria. Untilthey meet the preconditions for the EMU, theEU member states have the status of a memberstate with a derogation. The ECB estimates thata 10-year period is optimal for a country to gofrom EU membership to EMU membership(this is how much it took the most developedEU member states to prepare their economiesfor the introduction of a single currency).

European Monetary Union is theachievement of the highest possible level ofintegration of independent countries. Politicalregimes of the present EMU member statesinvolve a centralized monetary policy and adecentralized, but coordinated economic and

budgetary policy. The euro represents fullintegration at the monetary level. When it comes

to political integration, a political union may be

interpreted broadly. If it is understood in thesense of a traditional state, then the EMU is still

not a European federation with a constitution,scal authority and a single currency.

Provisions of the Treaty on the EUrelevant for the acquisition of rightto the introduction of the euro andparticipation in the Eurosystem bythe EU Member States

The EU Member States are bound to full

the obligations from the Treaty on the EUconcerning the achievement of economic andmonetary union. The EU Member States thathave not adopted the euro enjoy the treatmentof countries with a derogation. The countrieswith a derogation, in order to become the EMUmembers, previously have to achieve a high level

of sustainable economic and legal convergence.

Economic convergence criteria

Convergence criteria and the procedure ofanalyzing the achieved convergence level aredened in Article 140 of the Treaty on theFunctioning of the EUas follows:

1. At least once every two years, or at therequest of a Member State with a derogation,the Commission and the European CentralBank shall report to the Council on the progress

made by the Member States with a derogationin fullling their obligations regarding the

achievement of economic and monetary union.These reports shall include an examination of the

compatibility between the national legislationof each of these Member States, including thestatutes of its national central bank, and Articles130 and 131 and the Statute of the ESCB andof the ECB. The reports shall also examine theachievement of a high degree of sustainableconvergence by reference to the fulllment byeach Member State of the following criteria:

the achievement of a high degree of pricestability; this will be apparent from a rate ofination which is close to that of, at most,the three best performing Member States interms of price stability,

the sustainability of the government


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kriterij konvergencije kamatne stope odnosise na obavezu da u periodu preko jednegodine pre pravljenja Izvetaja za dravulanicu, prosena nominalna dugoronakamatna stopa nije bila vea od 2 procentna

poena od nivoa u tri drave lanice sanajveom stabilnou cena; kamatna stopamerie se na osnovu dugoronih dravnihobveznica ili uporedivih vrednosnih papirauzimajui u obzir razlike u nacionalnimdenicijama,

za budetske pozicije predviene lanom140, referentne vrednosti utvrene suProtokolom o proceduri prekomernogdecita, s tim da se u Protokolu o

kriterijumima konvergencije utvruje dase u vreme pravljenja Izvetaja za dravulanicu sa odstupanjem na nju ne primenjuje

predviena procedura Saveta za prekomerni

budetski decit; U Protokolu br. 12 oproceduri prekomernog decitautvreno

je da referentne vrednosti iznose: 3% BDP zaplanirani ili stvarni budetski decit i 60%BDP za javni dug.Ugovor ustanovljava jasnu hijerarhiju ciljeva

za Evrosistem i istie znaaj cenovne stabilnosti.Fokusirajui monetarnu politiku ECB na ovajprimaran cilj, u Ugovoru je sasvim jasnonapisano da je osiguranje cenovne stabilnostinajvaniji doprinos monetarne politikedostizanju poeljnog ekonomskog okruenja ivisokog nivoa zaposlenosti. Prema poslednjemIzvetaju o konvergenciji ECB, referentnavrednost za inaciju bila je 1% (ECB, 2010, str.9), a za dugorone kamatne stope 6% (ECB,

2010, str. 14). Od devet drava lanica EU zakoje ECB ima obavezu da sainjava Izvetajo konvergenciji, u sistemu ERM II uestvujusamo Estonija, Litvanija (od 2004. godine)i Letonija (od 2005. godine) (ECB, 2010, str.13). Za ove zemlje kretanje nacionalne valuteu odnosu na evro analizira se kao odstupanjeod odgovarajueg centralnog pariteta ERM II.Za ostalih est drava, u odsustvu centralnogpariteta ERM II, kao merilo, u cilju ilustracije, a

bez bilo kakvog prosuivanja o visini deviznogkursa, koriste se proseni devizni kurseviu odnosu na evro. Uee drave lanice usistemu ERM II predstavlja predvorje za ulazaku Evrosistem.

Kriteriji za pravnu konvergenciju

Pravna konvergencija drava lanicasa odstupanjem odnosi se na analizukompatibilnosti njihovog nacionalnogzakonodavstva i statuta njihovih centralnih

banaka sa lanom 130 i 131 Ugovora ofunkcionisanju EU.U lanu 130 utvreno je da u vrenju svoje

vlasti i izvravanju svojih zadataka i obavezanijedan lan organa ECB i Nacionalnih centralnih

banaka (NCB-e) nee traiti i nee uzimatiinstrukcije niti od institucija, organa, kancelarijaili agencija Unije niti od jedne vlade dravalanica ili bilo kog drugog organa. Institucije,organi, kancelarije ili agencije Unije i vlade

drava lanica potovae ovaj princip i neetraiti da utiu na izvravanje zadataka lanovaorgana ECB ili NCB-a koji donose odluke. Istesadrine je i lan 7 Protokola br. 4 uz Ugovor oEU koji se odnosi na Statut ESCB i ECB. Ovimodredbama regulisana je nezavisnost centralne

banke kao monetarne vlasti.U lanu 131utvreno je da e svaka drava

lanica osigurati kompatibilnost nacionalnogzakonodavstva ukljuujui statute nacionalnih

centralnih banaka sa Ugovorima (Ugovor o EUi Ugovor o funkcionisanju EU) i Statutom ESCBi ECB.

Na osnovu lana 131 Ugovora o EU u lanu

14 Statuta ESCB i ECButvreno je sledee:14.1. U skladu sa lanom 131 Ugovora

o funkcionisanju EU svaka drava lanicaosigurae kompatilnost njenog nacionalnogzakonodavstva, ukljuujui statute nacionalnih

centralnih banaka, sa Ugovorima i ovim

Statutom.14.2 U Statutima nacionalnih centralnihbanaka posebno e biti utvreno da mandatguvernera ne traje manje od 5 godina.

Guverner moe biti razreen samo ako dalje

ne ispunjava sve uslove potrebne za vrenjedunosti ili bude kriv za ozbiljan propust. Akose Odlukom o razreenju kre ovi Ugovori ilibilo koja odredba zakona koja se odnosi nanjihovu primenu, Guverner ili Savet guvernera

moe je uputiti Evropskom Sudu pravde. Takavpostupak bie pokrenut u roku od dva mesecaod objavljivanja odluke ili njenog upuivanjatuiocu, ili u odsustvu toga, to moe biti sluaj,

od dana kada je tuilac doao do saznanja oodluci.


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nancial position; this will be apparent from

having achieved a government budgetaryposition without a decit that is excessiveas determined in accordance with Article126(6),

the observance of the normal uctuationmargins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European MonetarySystem, for at least two years, withoutdevaluing against the euro,

the durability of convergence achieved bythe Member State with a derogation andof its participation in the exchange-ratemechanism being reected in the long-terminterest-rate levels.

The four criteria mentioned in this paragraphand the relevant periods over which they areto be respected are developed further in aProtocol annexed to the Treaties. The reportsof the Commission and the European CentralBank shall also take account of the results ofthe integration of markets, the situation anddevelopment of the balances of payments oncurrent account and an examination of thedevelopment of unit labour costs and other

price indices.2. After consulting the European Parliament

and after discussion in the European Council,the Council shall, on a proposal from theCommission, decide which Member States with

a derogation fulll the necessary conditions onthe basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 1,and abrogate the derogations of the MemberStates concerned.

This article also denes the procedure

according to which a country with a derogation,pursuant to the Councils decision, conducts the

substitution of its national currency for the euro

at a xed rate, and thus introduces the euroinstead of its national currency.

Protocol no. 13 on Convergence Criteria

denes benchmark values for the criteriareferred to in Article 140, as follows: The criterion on price stability - an average

rate of ination, observed over a period of

one year before the examination, cannotexceed by more than 1 percentage pointsthat of, at most, the three best performingMember States in terms of price stability;ination shall be measured by means of theconsumer price index;

The criterion on participation in theExchange Rate mechanism of the EuropeanMonetary System shall mean that a Member

State has respected the normal uctuationmargins provided for by the exchange-rate

mechanism on the European MonetarySystem without severe tensions for at leastthe last two years before the examination; in

particular, the Member State shall not havedevalued its currency's bilateral central rateagainst the euro on its own initiative for thesame period;

The criterion on the convergence of interestrates shall mean that, observed over aperiod of one year before the examination,

a Member State has had an average nominallong-term interest rate that does not exceed

by more than two percentage points that of,at most, the three best performing MemberStates in terms of price stability; interest rates

shall be measured on the basis of long-termgovernment bonds or comparable securities,taking into account dierences in nationaldenitions;

The criterion on the government budgetary

position shall mean that benchmark valuesare dened by the Protocol on the excessivedecit procedure, with the Protocol onconvergence criteria prescribing that at thetime of the examination the Member Stateis not the subject of the prescribed Councilprocedure for an excessive budgetary decit.

Protocol no. 12 on the excessive decit

procedure denes benchmark values as: 3%GDP for the planned or achieved budgetary

decit and 60% GDP for public debt.The Treaty establishes a clear hierarchyof objectives within the Eurosystem andunderlines the importance of price stability.Directing the ECB monetary policy towards this

primary objective, the Treaty unambiguouslystipulates that the insurance of price stabilityrepresents the most important contributionof monetary policy to the achievement of adesirable economic environment and a high

employment rate. According to the latest ECBConvergence Report, benchmark value forination amounted to 1% (ECB, 2010, pp.9),and for long-term interest rates 6% (ECB,2010, pp.14). Out of the nine EU memberstates for which the ECB is bound to prepare


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14.3. Nacionalne centralne banke integralnisu deo ESCB i delovae u skladu sa smernicama

i instrukcijama ECB. Savet guvernera preduzee

korake da osigura usaglaenost sa smernicama iinstrukcijama ECB i zahtevae da dobije svaku

potrebnu informaciju.14.4. Nacionalne centralne banke moguvriti i funkcije koje nisu utvrene ovimStatutom ukoliko, veinom od 2/3 glasova,Savet guvernera smatra da one nee ometaticiljeve i zadatke ESCB. Takve funkcije vrie sena odgovornost nacionalnih centralnih banakai nee se smatrati delom funkcija ESCB.

Za pisanje Izvetaja ECB o konvergencijiuvek se koristi isti okvir. ECB analizira

da li je postignut visok nivo odriveekonomske konvergencije, da li je nacionalnozakonodavstvo kompatibilno sa Ugovorom,i da li su ispunjeni zakonski uslovi kako biNCB-e mogle postati sastavni deo Evrosistema.Analiza pravne konvergencije obuhvataprilagoavanja nacionalnog zakonodavstva upogledu: nezavisnosti centralne banke (l. 130Ugovora), zabrane za monetarno nansiranje(l. 123 Ugovora) i integraciju NCB-a u

Evrosistem. U Ugovoru i Statutu ESCB IECB nije propisan nain na koji nacionalnozakonodavstvo treba da bude prilagoeno,tako da je pravnu konvergenciju mogueostvariti ili pozivanjem na Ugovor i Statut, iliinkorporisanjem u nacionalno zakonodavstvoistih odredbi i upuivanjem na njihovoporeklo ili brisanjem nekompatibilnosti ilikombinacijom ovih metoda. Prilikom procenepravne konvergencije, ECB nije ograniena

na izradu formalne procene, nego moe darazmotri i da li je primena relevantnih odredbiu skladu sa duhom Ugovora i Statuta.

1. Za sagledavanje kompatibilnosti upogledu nezavisnosti nacionalne centralnebanke, ECB analizira da li je zakonodavstvokompatibilno ne samo sa Ugovorom negoi sa sekundarnim zakonodavstvom Unijekoje ima primat u odnosu na nacionalnozakonodavstvo. Svaka nekompatibilnost mora

da se otkloni. to se tie nezavisnosti NCBkoncept nezavisnosti ustanovio je 1998. godineEMI u svom prvom Izvetaju o konvergenciji.Prema ovom konceptu, nezvisnost NCBukljuuje funkcionalnu, institucionalnu,personalnu i nansijsku nezavisnost.

Funkcionalna nezavisnost ukljuuje da je ciljNCB u potpunosti u skladu sa primarnim ciljemECB - stabilnosti cena. ECB je zauzela stav daova obaveza tee od datuma pristupanja EU.Princip institucionalne nezavisnosti izriito je

naglaen u l. 130 i ukljuuje zabranu treimlicima da daju instrukcije organima ECB, daodobravaju, suspenduju, ponitavaju ili odlau

odluku NCB, cenzuriu odluke koje se tiuizvravanja zadataka ESCB (osim nezavisnihsudova), uestvuju sa pravom glasa u donoenju

odluka NCB, vre ex antekonsultacije u vezisa odlukama NCB, razreavaju dunostilanove organa odluivanja NCB. Personalnanezavisnost tie se zatite guvernera od

proizvoljnog razreenja, u kom sluaju jepredvieno pravo na obraanje Sudu pravdeEU. Iz tog razloga u Statutu ESCB i ECB, kojenacionalno zakonodavstvo mora da preuzme,utvren je minimalan mandat od 5 godina,predvieni razlozi zbog kojih je guverneramogue smeniti i zatitne mere protiv sukobainteresa. Finansijska nezavisnost obavezujedrave lanice da svojim NCB omogue daimaju dovoljno nansijskih sredstava da izvre

zadatke koji su u vezi sa ESCB i Evrosistemom,ali i za vrenje svojih nacionalnih zadataka.Finansijska nezavisnost NCB obavezna je zatoto je Statutom ESCB i ECB predvieno da, usluaju gubitka nastalog u ECB koga ona nemoe pokriti iz svog fonda rezervi, ECB imapravo da donese odluku da se gubitak alocira naNCB-e. Pored toga ECB ima pravo i da pozoveNCB-e da doprinesu formiranju kapitala ECB ivre dalje transfere deviznih rezervi. Zbog ovih

razloga, nansijska nezavisnost podrazumevada NCB-e treba da se dovoljno kapitalizuju.Sa nansijskom nezavisnou nespojivo je datrea strana utie na budet NCB, odreujeraunovodstvena pravila, ograniava NCB dagradi sopstvene rezerve kapitala do nivoa koji jepotreban lanicama Evrosistema da ispunjavaju

svoje zadatke, utie na kadrovsku politiku ECB,

inerevenie ili daje uputstva u vezi sa imovinomkojom raspolae NCB.

2. Zakonodavstvo drava lanica mora dase uskladi s odredbama Ugovora i Statuta ozabrani monetarnog nansiranja (lan 123Ugovora) i privilegovanog pristupa (lan 124Ugovora).

U lanu 123 Ugovora propisano je sledee:


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convergence reports, only Estonia, Lithuania(since 2004) and Latvia (since 2005) take part inthe ERM II system (ECB, 2010, pp.13). For these

countries, the movements of national currencies

towards the euro are analyzed as a deviation

from the appropriate central ERM II parity.For the remaining six countries, in the absenceof central ERM II parity, the average FX ratesagainst the euro are used as a measure, for thesake of illustration, and without any judgement

of the FX rate level. Participation of a memberstate in the ERM II system is a sort of a doorway

to the Eurosystem.

Legal convergence criteria

Legal convergence of member states with aderogation concerns the analysis of compatibility

of their national legislation and their centralbanks statutes with Articles 130 and 131 of theTreaty on the Functioning of the EU.

Article 130stipulates that when exercisingthe powers and carrying out the tasks andduties conferred upon them by the Treatiesand the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB,neither the European Central Bank, nor a

national central bank, nor any member of theirdecision-making bodies shall seek or takeinstructions from Union institutions, bodies,oces or agencies, from any government ofa Member State or from any other body. TheUnion institutions, bodies, oces or agenciesand the governments of the Member Statesundertake to respect this principle and not toseek to inuence the members of the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or

of the national central banks in the performanceof their tasks. Similar in content is Article 7 ofthe Protocol no. 4 accompanying the Treaty onthe EU, related to the ESCB and ECB Statute.These provisions regulate the independence ofthe central bank as monetary authority.

Article 131 prescribes that Each MemberState shall ensure that its national legislationincluding the statutes of its national centralbank is compatible with the Treaties and the

Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB.Based on Article 131 of the Treaty on the

EU, Article 14 of the Statute of ESCB and ECBprescribes the following:

14.1. In accordance with Article 131 of theTreaty on the Functioning of the European

Union, each Member State shall ensure that itsnational legislation, including the statutes of its

national central bank, is compatible with theseTreaties and this Statute.

14.2. The statutes of the national central

banks shall, in particular, provide that the termof oce of a Governor of a national central bank

shall be no less than ve years.A Governor may be relieved from oce only

if he no longer fulls the conditions required for

the performance of his duties or if he has beenguilty of serious misconduct. A decision to thiseect may be referred to the Court of Justiceby the Governor concerned or the GoverningCouncil on grounds of infringement of these

Treaties or of any rule of law relating to theirapplication. Such proceedings shall be instituted

within two months of the publication of thedecision or of its notication to the plainti or,in the absence thereof, of the day on which itcame to the knowledge of the laer, as the casemay be.

14.3. The national central banks are anintegral part of the ESCB and shall act inaccordance with the guidelines and instructions

of the ECB. The Governing Council shall takethe necessary steps to ensure compliance withthe guidelines and instructions of the ECB, andshall require that any necessary information begiven to it.

14.4. National central banks may performfunctions other than those specied in thisStatute unless the Governing Council nds, bya majority of two thirds of the votes cast, thatthese interfere with the objectives and tasks of

the ESCB. Such functions shall be performedon the responsibility and liability of nationalcentral banks and shall not be regarded as being

part of the functions of the ESCB.To write a Convergence Report, the ECB

always uses a framework, analyzing whetherthe high level of sustainable economicconvergence has been achieved, whether thenational legislative is compatible with theTreaty and whether the legal preconditions

have been met for the national central banksto become an integral part of the Eurosystem.Legal convergence analysis includes theharmonization of the national legislation interms of: central bank independence (Article130 of the Treaty), monetary nance prohibition


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Kreditiranje ili bilo koja vrsta kreditneolakice kod ECB ili kod NCB-a zabranjena jeza institucije, organe i kancelarije EU, kao i zavlade na dravnom, regionalnom i lokalnomnivou kao i za ostale organe javne vlasti, a za

ECB ili nacionalne centralne banke zabranjenoda od njih direktno kupuju dunike hartije odvrednosti.

Stav 1 ne primenjuje se na kreditneinstitucije u dravnom vlasnitvu koje e, ukontekstu ponude rezerve centralnih banaka,imati za NCB-e i ECB, isti tretman kao i privatnekreditne institucije.

U lanu 124 Ugovora o funkcionisanju EUzabranjena je svaka mera kojom se ustanovljava

privilegovan pristup nansijskim institucijamaza institucije, organe, kancelarije ili agencije EU,dravne, regionalne i lokalne ili druge javnevlasti, organe na koje se primanjuje javno pravoili javna preduzea drava lanica.

Zabrana monetarnog nansiranja od znaaja

je da se obezbedi ostvarivanje primarnogcilja stabilnosti cena i moe da podlee samonavedenom izuzetku iz lana 2 i iz posebneUredbe (Regulation EC No 3603/93), koja

omoguava da NCB moe izmeu ostalogda nansira obaveze prema MMF i odobravakredite javnom sektoru sa rokom vraanja od24 asa - v. none kredite.

3. Kompatibilnost u pogledu pravne integracijeNCB u Evrosistem odnosi se na usaglaenostodredbi nacionalnog zakonodavstva, ali i drugih

propisa sa Ugovorom o funkcionisanju EU iStatutom ESCB i ECB kojima treba da se omogui

Evrosistemu da vri svoje zadatke, kada drave

lanice usvoje evro. Odredbe zakonskih propisaiz ove oblasti treba da stupe na snagu na dankada drave lanice sa odstupanjem usvoje evro.

Na osnovu najnovijeg Izvetaja ECB okonvergenciji iz 2010. godine moe se zakljuiti

da je osim kod Estonije u ostalim dravamalanicama sa odstupanjem zabeleeno znaajno

odstupanje od referentnih vrednosti za kriterije

ekonomske konvergencije i nekompatibilnostnacionalnog zakonodavstva sa Ugovorom o

funkcionisanju EU i Statutom ESCB i ECB.

Nivoi integracije u svetu i EMU

Evropska unija je oblik regionalneekonomske asocijacije. Izraz regionalna

ekonomska asocijacija (REA) zajedniki jenaziv za razliite oblike ekonomske integracijeizmeu nezavisnih drava. Prema rastuemstepenu integrisanosti relevantna literaturapravi razliku izmeu sledea etiri oblika REA:

slobodna trgovinska oblast (STO) =slobodnatrgovina izmeu lanica; carinska unija (CU) = STO + zajednike spoljne

carine (ZSC) u trgovini sa nelanicama; zajedniko trite (ZT) = CU + slobodna

mobilnost faktora proizvodnje; ekonomska unija (EU) = ZT + zajednika

ekonomska politika; monetarna unija (EMU) = EU + jedinstvena

valuta.

Osnovna razlika izmeu lanstva u EU ilanstva u EMU je to drave lanice EU imajusopstveni monetarni suverenitet i pravo davode nacionalnu monetarnu politiku, a dravelanice EMU ili Evrosistema odriu se tog prava

u korist ECB. Monetarni suverenitet postaoje deo dravnog politikog suvereniteta sauvoenjem papirne novanice kao denitivnog

sredstva plaanja. Monetarni suverenitetoznaava vrhovnu pravnu vlast drave da

na svojoj teritoriji regulie odnose vezane zanovac. Ova denicija monetarnog suverenitetaposledica je injenice postojanja drava,koje de facto i de iureimaju monopol pravnogregulisanja i u monetarnoj sferi. Meutim,monetarni suverenitet moe biti shvaen netoire, odnosno kao ovlaenje suverene vlasti, pa

i drave da regulie monetarnu materiju, dakleod bilo koje suverene vlasti pa i drave, ali neiskljuivo drave. Ovo stoga, to se novac javio

mnogo ranije od nastanka drave, i to je bioizdavan od strane neke suverene vlasti (uri,

1992, str. 14).Motiv Evropske unije da formira EMU

proizaao je iz injenice da zajednika valutaima znaajne ekonomske prednosti: prvo, da bi

zajednika valuta u Evropi smanjila transakcione

trokove, to bi imalo ne samo direktne koristi(trokovi su procenjeni na 0,5% BDP EU) ve iindirektne koristi jer bi stimulisala ekonomsku

integraciju; drugo, da se sa prestankom rizikauktuacija deviznih kurseva stvara cenovna imonetarna stabilnost koja poboljava alokativnuekasnost cenovnog mehanizma; tree, da vea

transparentnost cena obezbeena upotrebomzajednike valute poveava konkurentnost,


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(Article 123 of the Treaty) and integration ofthe national central bank into the Eurosystem.The Treaty and the ESCB and ECB Statute donot prescribe the manner in which the nationallegislation is to be harmonized, so that legal

convergence may be achieved by referring tothe Treaty and Statute, or by incorporating thesame provisions into the national legislationand referring to their origin, or by deletingthe incompatibilities or by combining allthese methods. When assessing the legalconvergence, the ECB is not limited to thepreparation of a formal assessment, but mayalso consider whether the implementation ofrelevant provisions is in line with the spirit of

the Treaty and the Statute.1. In order to asses the compatibility interms of independence of a national central

bank, the ECB analyzes whether the legislationis compatible not only with the Treaty, but alsowith the secondary legislation of the Union,which bears precedence over the nationallegislation. Every single incompatibility hasto be removed. As for the independence ofa national central bank (NCB), this concept

was established back in 1998 by the EMI in itsrst Convergence Report. According to thisconcept, independence of an NCB includesfunctional, institutional, personal and nancialindependence. Functional independenceimplies that the NCB goal is fully in line withthe primary goal of the ECB - i.e. price stability.The ECB took a stance that this obligationbecomes eective on the date of accession tothe EU. Principle of institutional independence

is particularly dened in Article 130 and impliesa ban for third parties to issue instructions tothe ECB bodies, to approve, suspend, annulor postpone an NCB decision, censor thedecisions relating to the execution of tasks bythe ESCB (except in case of independent courts),

participate with a right of vote in decision-making of an NCB, conduct ex anteconsultationsregarding the NCB decisions, dismiss members

of the NCB decision-making bodies. Personal

independence refers to the protection of agovernor from voluntary dismissal, in whichcase he has the right to appeal to the EU Courtof Justice. Therefore, the Statute of the ESCBand ECB, which the national legislation hasto comply with, denes the minimal 5-year

mandate, the possible reasons for dismissinga governor and protective measures againstconicts of interest. Financial independenceobliges the member states to enable theirNCBs to have sucient funds to perform the

tasks concerning the ESCB and Eurosystem, butalso to conduct their national tasks. Financialindependence is obligatory because the Statuteof the ESCB and ECB prescribes that, in case ofa loss occurring within the ECB that cannot becovered from its own reserves fund, the ECBhas the right to decide to allocate this loss tothe NCBs. Moreover, the ECB has the right toinvite NCBs to contribute to the formation ofECB capital and conduct further transfers of

foreign exchange reserves. For these reasons,nancial independence implies that NCBsneed to be suciently capitalized. Financialindependence excludes the possibility ofa third party inuencing the NCB budget,dening the accounting rules, limiting NCB inbuilding its own capital reserves to the levelneeded to the Eurosystem members to fulltheir tasks, impacting the ECB personnel policy,

intervening or issuing instructions concerning

the assets owned by NCBs.2. Legislation of member states has tobe harmonized with the provisions of theTreaty and the Statute, when it comes to theprohibition of monetary nancing (Article 123of the Treaty) and the privileged access (Article

124 of the Treaty).Article 123 of the Treaty prescribes the

following:Overdraft facilities or any other type of

credit facility with the European Central Bankor with the central banks of the Member States(hereinafter referred to as national central

banks) in favour of Union institutions, bodies,oces or agencies, central governments,regional, local or other public authorities,other bodies governed by public law, orpublic undertakings of Member States shall beprohibited, as shall the purchase directly fromthem by the European Central Bank or national

central banks of debt instruments.Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publiclyowned credit institutions which, in the contextof the supply of reserves by central banks, shall

be given the same treatment by national central

banks and the European Central Bank as private


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to donosi korist potroaima; etvrto, dabi evro kao globalna valuta donosila koristiza dravne prihode i uticala na ekspanzijunansijske industrije (Hrauve, 2004). Meutim,

treba imati u vidu da monetarna unija sama po

sebi ne stimulie dugoroni ekonomski rast ida se koristi od monetarne unije ne nalaze utoj sferi, mada je prilikom njenog formiranjai to isticano kao oekivani dobitak za dravelanice. Takoe ne treba smetnuti sa umada osim dobitaka, monetarna integracijapodrazumeva i odreene trokove. Da bi seovi trokovi ublaili, dravama lanicamaEU na raspolaganju su sredstva Budeta EU.Trokovi monetarne unije proizilaze iz injenice

da drava ulaskom u monetarnu uniju naputanacionalnu valutu i gubi monetarni suverenitet,odnosno mogunost da upravlja nacionalnommonetarnom politikom. Konkretno dravagubi mo da utie na promenu cene valute,da utvruje koliinu novca u opticaju ilimenja kratkorone kamatne stope. U mnogimsluajevima nezavisna monetarna politika

moe da bude od velike koristi za nacionalnudravu.

Evrosistem i Srbija - zakonodavniokviri

Srbija je drava sa statusom potencijalnogkandidata za lanstvo u EU. Oekuje se da dokraja 2011. godine stekne status kandidataza lanstvo u EU. Prema lanu 18 Sporazumao stabilizaciji i pridruivanju izmeu Evropskih

zajednica i njihovih drava lanica, sa jedne strane, i

Republike Srbije, sa druge strane: Zajednica i Srbijae u periodu od najvie est godina, poevi odstupanja na snagu ovog Sporazuma, postepeno

uspostaviti bilateralnu zonu slobodne trgovineu skladu sa odredbama ovog Sporazuma iodredbama GATT 1994 i Svetske trgovinskeorganizacije. Kako je Sporazumom o stabilizacijii pridruivanju predvieno da svaka dravakandidat za lanstvo u EU izradi Nacionalniprogram za usvajanje prava EU, Vlada Srbije jesainila, za vreme dok Sporazum ne stupi na

snagu Nacionalni program integracije Srbije uEU. On je instrument koji treba da omogui

ekasno planiranje, koordinaciju i praenjesprovoenja svih Vladinih aktivnosti uprocesu pristupanja EU.

Usklaivanje Zakona o Narodnoj banci

Srbije (NBS) sa Ugovorom o funkcionisanjuEU i Statutom ESCB i ECB izvrenoje poslednjim izmenama i dopunamaZakona iz 2010. godine. Usklaivanje nijeizvreno jedino u pogledu integracije NBSu Evrosistem. Odredbe Zakona o NBS u

potpunosti su kompatibilne sa zahtevimao cilju NBS (stabilnost cena), nezavisnosti(funkcionalnoj, institucionalnoj,personalnoj i nansijskoj) NBS, zabranimonetarnog nansiranja i privilegovanogpristupa. Usklaivanje sa Ugovoromi Statutom ESCB I ECB je do te meretemeljno i nedvosmisleno da je u lanu 62Zakona o NBS direktno preuzeta odredbalana 123 Ugovora o funkcionisanju EU.

lanom 62 Zakona o NBS utvrenoje da: NBS ne moe odobravati kredite,pozajmice, prekoraenja po raunu ilidruge vidove kreditnih olakica Republici

Srbiji, autonomnoj pokrajini ili jedinicilokalne samouprave, javnim preduzeima


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credit institutions.Article 124 of the Treatyon the Functioning

of the EU prescribes: Any measure, not basedon prudential considerations, establishingprivileged access by Union institutions, bodies,

oces or agencies, central governments,regional, local or other public authorities,other bodies governed by public law, or publicundertakings of Member States to nancialinstitutions, shall be prohibited.

Prohibition of monetary nancing isimportant for the achievement of the primarygoal, i.e. the stability of prices, and may haveonly the exception referred to in Paragraph 2above and in a special Decree (Regulation EC,

No. 3603/93), which enables the NBCs, amongother things, to nance its obligations towardsthe IMF and extend 24-hour maturity loans, the

so-called overnight loans, to the public sector.3. Compatibility in terms of legal integration

of an NCB into the Eurosystem refers tothe harmonization of national legislationprovisions, along with other regulations, withthe Treaty on the Functioning of the EU andthe Statute of the ESCB and ECB, whereby

the Eurosystem is to be enabled to conduct itstasks, once the member states adopt the euro.Provisions of laws and regulations in this eldare to come into eect on the date the memberstates with a derogation adopt the euro.

Based on the latest ECB Convergence Report

for 2010, it may be concluded that, except inEstonia, all other member states record aconsiderable deviation from benchmark values

for economic convergence criteria, and an

incompatibility of their national legislation withthe Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the

Statute of the ESCB and ECB.

Levels of integration in the worldand in the EMU

European Union is a form of regionaleconomic association. The term regionaleconomic association (REA) is an umbrella

term for various forms of economic integrationamong independent countries. According to the

increasing level of integration, relevant authors

dierentiate among the following four types ofREAs: Free Trade Area (FTA) = free trade among

members; Customs Union (CU) = FTA + common

external customs (CEC) in trading with non-

members; Common Market (CM)= CU + free mobility of

production factors; Economic Union (EU) = CM + common

economic policy; Monetary Union (MU) = EU + single currency.

The main dierence between the membership

in the EU and membership in the EMU lies in the

fact that the EU member states have their ownmonetary sovereignty and right to lead theirnational monetary policy, whereas the EMU orEurosystem member states renounce that right

and transfer it to the ECB. Monetary sovereigntybecame a part of a states political sovereigntyafter the introduction of paper banknotes as the

denitive legal tender. Monetary sovereigntyimplies the ultimate legal authority of a state toregulate money-related issues at its territory.This denition of monetary sovereignty comesas a result of the existence of states, which defacto and de iure have monopoly over legalregulations in the monetary sphere. However,

monetary sovereignty may be understood in asomewhat broader sense, as an authorizationfor a sovereign authority, and a state, toregulate monetary issues, meaning any form ofsovereign authority, including a state, but notnecessarily a state. This is due to the fact thatmoney appeared long before the establishmentof the rst state, when it was issued by otherforms of sovereign authorities. (Djuric, 1992,pp. 14).

The motivation of the European Union toform the EMU rose from the fact that commoncurrency entails considerable economicadvantages: rst, a single currency in Europewould reduce transaction costs, which wouldhave not only direct benets (the costs wereestimated at 0.5% GDP of the EU), but alsoindirect benets, since this would stimulateeconomic integration; secondly, the elimination

of FX rate volatility risk would generate price

and monetary stability which improves theallocation eciency of the price mechanism;thirdly, higher transparency of prices ensuredby the usage of common currency increasescompetitiveness, which is benecial forconsumers; fourthly, the euro as a global


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i drugim pravnim licima iji je osniva Republika

Srbija, autonomna pokrajina ili jedinica lokalnesamouprave, odnosno u kojima RepublikaSrbija, autonomna pokrajina ili jedinicalokalne samouprave imaju kontrolno uee.

NBS ne moe neposredno kupovati hartije odvrednosti koje izdaju subjekti iz stava 1 ovoglana. Zabrana iz ovog lana ne odnosi se nadnevne kredite ije rokove dospea nije mogue

produavati, kao ni na kredite, pozajmice,prekoraenja po raunu ili druge vidovekreditnih olakica koji se odobravaju RepubliciSrbiji za izmirivanje njenih obaveza po osnovulanstva u Meunarodnom monetarnom fondu.

Ne dovodei u pitanje potrebu usklaivanja

Zakona o NBS sa Ugovorom o EU i StatutomESCB, treba imati u vidu da je stav ECB daje za prelazak sa lanstva iz EU u Evrosistempotrebno deset godina i da je u lanu 72Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruivanju izmeu

Evropskih zajednica i njihovih drava lanica, sa

jedne strane, i Republike Srbije, sa druge strane,

izmeu ostalog, utvreno sledee: Stranepriznaju vanost usklaivanja vaeeg srpskogzakonodavstva sa zakonodavstvom Zajednice

i njegove delotvorne primene. Srbija enastojati da obezbedi postepeno usklaivanjepostojeih zakona i budueg zakonodavstva sapravim tekovinama Zajednice. Usklaivanjee zapoeti na dan potpisivanja Sporazumai postepeno e se proirivati na sve elementepravnih tekovina Zajednice na koje upuujeovaj Sporazum do kraja prelaznog periodautvrenog lanom 8 ovog Sporazuma (6 godina

prim. aut.). Usklaivanje e naroito u ranoj fazi

biti usredsreeno na osnovne elemente pravnihtekovina o unutranjem tritu, pravosue,slobodu i bezbednost, kao i na druga podrujavezana za trgovinu. U kasnijoj fazi Srbija ese usredsrediti na preostale delove pravnihtekovina Zajednice.

Zakljuak

Usklaivanje Zakona o NBS pre nekih

drugih oblasti zakonodavstva Srbije, aposebno pre dostizanja odrivog nivoakriterija ekonomske konvergencije moe bitisamo tetno po interese Srbije. Zbog izriite

zakonske zabrane nansiranja dravnogbudeta, privremene budetske neravnoteemoraju se nansirati, sasvim nepotrebno potrinim uslovima, i iz dravnog budeta potom osnovu, izdvajati sredstva za plaanje

kamata. Decitarno nansiranje budeta netreba poistoveivati sa pozajmicama budetusa rokom vraanja do 1 godine ili kupovinomkratkoronih dravnih hartija od vrednosti sarokom dospea do 1 godine. Priroda i efektinansiranja budetskog decita sredstvimaprimarne emisije sasvim su razliiti od prirodei efekata nansiranja nedostajuih budetskihsredstava za nansiranje javnih potrebausled neusklaenosti izmeu priliva i odliva

budetskih sredstava tokom budetske godine.Sa koliko panje i opreza drave lanice EUpristupaju pravnoj konvergenciji govori primervedske koju ECB od 1998. godine bezuspenoupozorava u svakom Izvetaju o konvergenciji,pa i u ovom poslednjem da: vedski zakon nijeu skladu sa zahtevima za nezavisnost centralne

banke, zabranu monetarnog nansiranja ipravnu integraciju u Evrosistem. vedskaje drava lanica sa odstupanjem i stoga se

mora uskladiti sa svim zahtevima iz lana 131Ugovora. Pored toga, ECB napominje da jevedska, saglasno Ugovoru, bila u obavezi dausvoji nacionalno zakonodavstvo u pogleduintegracije u Evrosistem 1. juna 1988. godine.(ECB, 2010, str. 53)

Pristupanje EU i EMU je proces. Ne dovodei

u pitanje potrebu usklaivanja zakonodavstvaSrbije sa pravom EU, treba pri tome sleditiredosled koji namee razvojni proces integracije

od STO do EMU. Izmeu ostalog i to je jedanod razloga zato drave sa razliitim statusomu odnosu na EU imaju razliit pristupsredstvima Budeta EU, odnosno fondovimaUnije. Pored toga, uvek treba imati u vidu dase proces prikljuivanja evropskoj asocijacijii EMU zasniva pre svega na odrivomdostizanju kriterija ekonomske konvergencije.Za procenu u kojoj meri su pokazatelji Srbije

blizu referentnih vrednosti kriterija ekonomske

konvergencije nije potrebna analiza, dovoljno jeporeenje navedenih referentnih vrednosti zaanalizu drava sa odstupanjem iz poslednjegIzvetaja ECB sa naim aktulenim podacima.


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currency would bring benets to state revenues

and inuence the expansion of the nancialindustry (Hrauve, 2004). However, one should

bear in mind that the monetary union in itselfdoes not stimulate long-term economic growth

and that the monetary union benets are notto be found in this sphere, although this usedto be underlined as one of the expected gainsfor member states on the occasion of monetaryunion formation. Also, one should not forgetthat, in addition to gains, monetary integrationalso implies certain costs. In order to mitigatethese costs, the EU member states may resort to

the EU Budget Funds. The costs of a monetaryunion arise from the fact that by entering a

monetary union, a state abandons its nationalcurrency and loses its monetary sovereignty, i.e.

the possibility to govern its national monetarypolicy. In particular, the state loses its powerto inuence the changes in currency prices, todetermine the amount of money in circulation,or change short-term interest rates. In manycases, independent monetary policy may begreatly benecial for a national state.

Eurosystem and Serbia - Legalframeworks

Serbia has the status of a potential candidate

country for the EU membership. It is expectedto gain the status of a candidate country for theEU accession by the end of 2011. Accordingto Article 18 of the Stabilisation and Association

Agreement between the European Communities and

their Member States of the one part, and the Republic

of Serbia, of the other part: The Community andSerbia shall gradually establish a bilateral freetrade area over a period lasting a maximum ofsix years starting from the entry into force of this

Agreement in accordance with the provisionsof this Agreement and in conformity withthose of the GATT 1994 and the WTO. Sincethe Stabilisation and Association Agreementprescribes that each EU membership candidatecountry prepares a National Programme for the

Adoption of the Community Acquis, the SerbianGovernment has prepared the NationalProgramme of Integration of Serbia into the EU,until the Agreement comes into eect. ThisProgramme is an instrument that shouldenable ecient planning, coordination and

implementation monitoring of all activities ofthe Government in the process of EU accession.

Harmonization of the Law on the NationalBank of Serbia (NBS) with the Treaty on theFunctioning of the EU and the Statute of the

ESCB and ECB was conducted by means ofthe latest amendments to the 2010 Law. Theonly harmonization that was not conductedis the one concerning the integration of theNBS into the Eurosystem. The provisions ofthe Law on the NBS are fully compatible withthe requirements concerning the goal of theNBS (stability of prices), independence of theNBS (functional, institutional, personal andnancial), prohibition of monetary nancing

and privileged access. Harmonization with theTreaty and Statute of ESCB and ECB is thorough

and un

emu i srbija

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